An Indian Political Theorist on the Triumph of Narendra Modi’s Hindu Nationalism | The New Yorker
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Comprendre la situation en Inde devrait nous aider à penser la démocratie globale. Et ce n’est pas rose.
Hindu majoritarianism traditionally appealed more to higher-caste Hindus than to lower-caste Hindus and non-Hindus. And you are saying that this might be beginning to change?
Yes, that is significantly beginning to change. And I think the political evidence of this is that the B.S.P. [the Bahujan Samaj Party, the third-largest party, which represents lower castes and ethnic minorities] in Uttar Pradesh, which is headed by Mayawati—a very, very formidable leader—had one of its worst performances. It’s not clear she will turn out most of the Dalit [the lowest caste] vote in U.P., let alone transfer it to her allies. That is the most visible political manifestation. I think the attempt to create Dalit social movements, which would traditionally have opposed Hindutva, are at their weakest. Hindutva is no longer simply an upper-class or élite phenomenon. It is spreading across social groups, and the incentive to oppose it, even if you don’t want to actively participate, certainly seems to be declining.
Modi is often talked about as a populist. Is there more of a history of populism in post-independence India than people realize, or is his way of campaigning pretty sui generis?
I think there are elements of continuity and elements of change. The elements of continuity are that mobilizing elements of nationalism and Hindutva have a long history in Indian politics, and that has been an undercurrent since partition. I think where he represents a radical departure, and I think this is part of the appeal he projected, is that he has been able to basically say that India’s power structure was constituted by Anglicized élites, and that secularism has become a cultural symbol for a contempt of Hinduism rather than a constitutional philosophy of toleration. That there was an élite that was very comfortable, for the most part, with what Modi and the B.J.P. call dynastic politics. That [other parties] are largely family fiefdoms whose intellectual legitimacy was sustained by élite intellectual culture. That what politics should aim for is also a cultural regeneration of Hindutva and an open assertion of cultural majoritarianism. In that sense, it is of a piece with populists elsewhere who try to combine cultural majoritarianism with anti-élitism.
How is Modi distinct from other demagogic figures whom we see rising? He seems both more broadly popular and more ideological, no?
I think both of these things are true. He is a genuinely popular figure, and I think the level of popular identification that he has managed to produce is, in a sense, truly astounding. We can do a lot of sophisticated sociological analysis, but ultimately this election is about two words: Narendra Modi.
The way I think he quite differs from Trump is that he has access to an astonishing array of deeply entrenched civil-society organizations that have been doing the ideological groundwork for his victory for years and years. And what the base of that organization does is it gives him an army of foot soldiers whose target is long-term. These are people who have a very simplistic and clear-eyed goal, namely, the entrenchment of cultural majoritarianism in the Indian state. And I think the extent of the success of those organizations—that they have managed to transform what used to be the default common sense of public discourse, which was a certain kind of embarrassment about majoritarianism—has played a significant part in this victory. He is not just a political phenomenon; he is also a large social movement.
They lost in 2014, and, even five years later, even among those of us who were rooting for Congress to do much better in this election, it is very hard to point to anything as a sign that the things that made Congress weak are being transformed. Here is Modi running on a platform that says he is against old feudal India, which is a shorthand for dynastic politics. What does the Congress Party do? They win two state elections, and the first act of the two chief ministers is to give their sons [key positions], even though the sons have no visible track record of political achievement. And I think one of the most remarkable things about this election is how many of those dynasts have actually lost in some ways. Part of it was this desperation, was trying to get your friends to see the precipice they are walking on.
My position on Mr. Modi in 2014, which I still do maintain, was that one of the big mistakes that those of us who disagree with him made is to not recognize his political strengths. I got a lot of flak for saying he has deep democratic legitimacy. You cannot deny the fact he is an absolutely extraordinary politician, in terms of thinking about the aesthetics of politics, in terms of thinking about what communication means in politics, in terms of thinking about political organization. One of his remarkable gifts—and I will use the word remarkable—is that he actually takes politics seriously. Most other political parties were in thrall of a certain kind of sociological determinism that says, so long as I can keep this caste behind me or create some sort of [caste] alignment, I will be successful. What he does as a politician is to say, “You can create a new reality. You are not trapped by inherited categories of thinking.” His ability to think politically—and, through that thinking, make lots and lots of people feel democratically empowered—is quite astounding. It is precisely that ability that also poses a major danger.
If there were two dangers implicit in 2014 that have become explicit now, they are the dangers of concentration of power and the deification and personification of one leader. This has happened to an extraordinary degree.
What are your biggest fears about the next five years?
I think we have already seen evidence, particularly in the last year, that democracy requires some fragmentation of power. There has to be some credible opposition that can hold the government to account. And I think with the kind of mandate they have got—and potentially the B.J.P. can get an even bigger mandate in the upper house of parliament—means their ability to get through constitutional amendments and legislation is enhanced a great deal. Plus, they control most of India’s states now. So I think the absence of even a minimal opposition is certainly a worrying sign because there will be no one holding the government to account..
Secondly, I think what we have seen over the past year and a half is that a lot of India’s independent institutions—the Election Commission of India, even the Supreme Court of India, and, at the edges and margins, even the armed forces of India—are being accused of deep and significant political partisanship. If these institutions inch toward the government, or become more executive-minded than the executive, then I think the checks and balances of constitutional government will be significantly weakened.
And what do you think the next five years might mean for India’s Muslim minority?
On the specifics, it is hard to tell. I think what we can say, based on the track record of this government, is that certainly the attempt to culturally marginalize them will continue. Will there be a large-scale outbreak of violence? I hope not. I think the strategy in the previous government was to let small-scale incidents fester, specifically lynchings of people allegedly trading in cattle and beef. And those lynchings had the remarkable political effect that they could be ignored, because they were not, like, a large riot, like in 2002.
Yet they were always sending subtle signals to communities to stay in their place. I suspect some of that will continue. Whether that escalates into large-scale violence? I hope not. Given the mandate they have, there may not be a need to engage in that. But I think that subtle politics of signalling will continue. I think there will be regional variations. The state of West Bengal is the state I am most worried about, at this point. It has a long history of electoral violence. I think that the political context in West Bengal will mean a lot of violence. But I think the politics of saying to India’s minorities that you are irrelevant to India’s political and cultural life is likely to deepen.