Tonygamalgabriel

▻http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/07/doctor_in_a_desperate_land

I really feel that I’ve been given everything in this life. I was born to this incredible family, very supportive. My parents have been married 50-some years and I’ve never heard them fight. I got the chance to attend great universities and medical school. I’ve had everything. I don’t think I’ve had any adversity. I mean, yeah, I studied hard in school but that’s not adversity. Everyone in the Nuba Mountains has faced incredible adversity, every single one of them. Just to finish primary school is an incredible challenge. What the heck?

You asked about God. I wonder why God gave me all this stuff and gave them the short end of the stick. I don’t understand it. I feel I have some obligation to even the score up a bit.

It usually happened only when it finally became clear to a White House that jealously guarded all foreign policymaking — and then relied heavily on the military and intelligence agencies to guide its decisions — that these agencies’ solutions were no substitute for the type of patient, credible diplomacy that garners the respect and support of allies. Time and again, when things seemed to be falling apart, the administration finally turned to Clinton because it knew she was the only person who could save the situation.

▻http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/the_inside_story_of_how_the_white_house_let_diplomacy_fail_in_afghani

▻http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/spring2013/maliki

Maliki’s experiences are especially relevant for today’s Middle East: in Egypt and Tunisia, where Islamist parties, long hidden in the shadows, similar to those that nourished the Dawa, are striving to shed authoritarian instincts and make the transition to mainstream democratic politics; in Libya, where regional militias, mindful of recent history, still do not trust one another enough to disarm; and in Syria, which is currently roiled by bloodshed among its warring ethnic and religious groups that rival the darkest moments in Iraq.

It is a mistake to see Maliki or Mohammed Morsi in Egypt or any of the ascendant new leaders in the Middle East as builders or wreckers of new democracies. Maliki was a defender of Iraq, the country’s Shiite population, and himself, the way his predecessors had been defenders of their own amendable ideologies. His experiences were what allowed him to rise in the turbulence of post-Saddam Iraq, but his decades of humiliation set him on the path of running a faltering autocratic state immersed in perpetual war.

In Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, it may prove tempting to color the country’s new leaders as democrats when they are not, or to accept their potentially dictatorial tendencies as the natural order. Maliki, the first elected Arab Islamist leader, shaped in the shadows, exemplifies all the challenges of the new breed. He is not bound to authoritarian rule, but his history leads him in that direction. Since taking office in 2006, amid dismal hopes, he has both disappointed and exceeded expectations. There is a fundamental tension among the new Islamists, whether from Maliki’s Dawa Party or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or their counterparts in Tunis—on how to create a society living in harmony with Islamic values. How much of this can be imposed, and how much should be a free choice made by the society, remains an open, but crucial, question. Iraq under Maliki has seen the slow creeping tide of religious values imposed with raids on alcohol shops and nightclubs. Sudden whispers that the government will shut down arts colleges and separate male and female students at university are swiftly dismissed—perhaps planted by the state to see how far it can go. Intimidation and pressure by the state has also been apparent in Egypt since its revolution, as Islamist lawyers bring lawsuits against artists they consider blasphemous. In Tunis, radical Salafis are given tacit freedom to physically attack bars, actors, and political opponents. It is still a riddle for the Arab world’s now ruling Islamists leaders—how to bring their societies into harmony with their religious values. But Maliki and his counterparts all have similar aspirations for their nations. They want to establish modern, vibrant states in accordance with Islam.

►http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/12/19/255900.html

What is developing in Egypt is the ideological battle of the decade

The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters within the Salafis want to turn Egypt into a place that is far closer to its ideas of what are right and wrong. There are spin-off groups within the Salafis, such as those led by Hazem Abou Ismael, who want even greater moves to the far conservative fringe. On the other sides are the intellectuals and he so-called “secular groups”, which are often populated by pious Muslims and Copts who are far from secular. However, the Salafis and some of the stricter members of the Muslim Brotherhood do not consider the Muslims who are part of these groups as even full Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis have their own tests and ideas of what is a true Muslims

Most Egyptians see themselves as pious Muslims, but are far from fanatical and extremist. They are serious in the following of the rules of Islam as they understand them. They resent anyone trying to impose their ideological approaches upon them.

The more liberal Egyptians, the more free-wheeling intellectuals and the internationalist Egyptians often resent such outside interference in their ideas more than the average Egyptians.

In many ways what we may be seeing in Egypt is a clash of interpretations of Islam, or even a clash of civilizations within Egypt. How this works itself out could affect similar debates and clashes in many places throughout the Muslim world.

#egypt #revolution

►http://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/12/17/egyptian-women-and-morsy

Women are burying their children on almost a weekly basis now. In our poor country where women view their children as the single reason to wake up in the morning, this death aroma is bound to stir action.

And despite what these women offer the country, they have been marginalized in a sick joke of a Constituent Assembly and completely left out of an even sicker draft constitution. Young women are harassed by Niqabis on the street, as well as men, for being unveiled or not face-veiled. Pseudo-Sheikhs spout out their own twisted version of the role of women—mainly a sex minion and a reproduction vessel—on TV all the time.

#egypt #revolution #women #rights #morsi

►http://www.arte.tv/fr/tunisie-rien-n-a-change/7138312,CmC=7139176.html

Tunisie : "Rien n’a changé, selon la bloggeuse tunisienne Sarah Ben Hamadi

quand on fait le bilan de ces deux années, rien n’a vraiment changé, et les gens veulent des décisions et des actions concrètes et pas des promesses en l’air. Ils ont l’impression d’avoir été trahis ; la corruption est toujours présente, la justice transitionnelle n’a pas été activée, les nominations se font encore sur des considérations partisanes... Ben Ali est parti, mais le système Ben Ali est toujours là.

La situation du pays est certes difficile, mais l’incompétence du gouvernement y est aussi pour beaucoup. la méconnaissance des dossiers, parfois même l’arrogance. Le gouvernement ne cesse de se discréditer au fil des mois, refusant toute critique de l’opposition, renvoyant tout mouvement contestataire spontané du peuple à une manipulation « politique », s’engouffrant ainsi dans un déni de la réalité. En les voyant, je me dis qu’ils n’ont vraiment pas compris pourquoi Ben Ali est tombé."

#tunisie #printemps #arabe #revolution #ben #ali

►http://www.tariqramadan.com/spip.php?article12655&lang=fr

J’hallucine un peu. Rien n’est de la faut des Freres musulmans, tout est de la faute des salafistes, des laics, des etats unis et disrael.

Il est désormais évident que des forces tentent de déstabiliser l’avancée du pays vers la démocratie : on a vu le rôle joué par les salafis, avant puis après les élections, comme durant les débats sur la Constitution. On a pu identifier également des responsables de l’ancien régime, de même que l’armée et des laïcs qui, derrière la scène, attisaient les tensions, tentaient de fragiliser le nouveau gouvernement à la tête duquel se trouvait Mohammed Morsi, des Frères Musulmans, cherchant à le mettre en difficulté, voire en échec, à ce moment crucial de la transition politique. Ces pressions, jeux et manipulations politiques sont évidentes et le Président Morsi, en y faisant référence dans sa dernière adresse publique, parlait d’une réalité tangible dans l’espace politique égyptien

C’est armé de cette légitimité que le Président Morsi a voulu forcer la marche en avant vers la stabilité politique. Il savait les forces d’opposition particulièrement actives et le pouvoir judiciaire menaçait même, semble-t-il, de proposer de nouvelles élections présidentielles. L’octroi par décret de pouvoirs discrétionnaires temporaires au Président (décret qu’il a finalement accepté d’annuler le 9 décembre 2012) et l’élaboration définitive du texte de la Constitution soumis à référendum ont soulevé les opposants et les foules.

Fragilisés par leur accès au pouvoir et au gré d’une autorité objectivement restreinte, ils font face à des forces politiques (salafis ou laïques) et à des institutions (financières et/ou militaires) qui atrophient leur potentielle compétence à réformer les pays respectifs

►http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8819/the-muslim-brotherhoods-militias-in-action_a-first

Muslim Brotherhood supporters were attacking using rocks, shotguns, blanks, live ammunition, and teargas. Their push split the crowd into three main fronts, one on each side of three intersections, namely al-Khalifa al-Ma’moun Street, Mansheyet El Bakry Street and Roxy Square. Clashes continued in various places. I moved toward al-Khalifa Al-Ma’moun Street. The clashes continued on all fronts with Brotherhood supporters outnumbering protesters, showing signs of strong organization in their attacks, and possession of superior fire power. The Molotov cocktails prepared by anti-Morsi protesters to counter the weaponry used by Muslim Brotherhood supporters were highly ineffective.

Many protesters were injured with birdshot pellets. Human rights activists who had talked to doctors at Mansheyet El-Bakry hospital told me that two people had died by live bullets.

According to the eyewitness, rumors were spreading among the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters that the church had sent in people to fight them.

The show of force, the disregard to opposition and the people, and the strong insistence on monopolizing power are strong indications that Muslim Brotherhood leaders do not intend to lend their ear to anyone but their own.

#egypt #brotherhood #revolution

►http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8870/al-masry-al-youm-goes-inside-the-brotherhoods-tort

Opposing protesters were brought to the chambers after being detained by Brotherhood members, who beat them and tore their clothes. The chambers were informal and it was unclear how many there were; when someone was detained, a chamber would be established anywhere near a building.

The kidnappers would take the detained person’s ID card, mobile phone and money before beginning “investigations,” which included intervals of beating to force the confession that he or she is a “thug.”

#egypt #revolution #brotherhood #tahrir #morsi

►http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/jewish-family-recounts-their-memory-egypt-and-life-israel

“We were not sent away or harassed because we were Jewish, but because we were foreigners. A big percentage of the Jews present in Egypt had a foreign nationality, and consequently, many of those who became refugees were Jews,” Cohen points out. “We had Egyptian nationality, but they took it away and forced us to leave. People called us ‘British Zionist Jews’ — it was a very hard time,” Cohen explains with a melancholic tone.

“We were given one week to leave the country. Egyptian police stayed outside our door and did not allow us to leave the house. They closed my father’s shop and put him in jail for two days,” he says.

Cohen explains how their Muslim neighbors went to the Mugamma, Cairo’s administrative hub in Tahrir Square, to try to prolong their stay.

“We stayed another two months in Cairo, then we left on a boat to England,” he says.

After disembarking in the Greek port of Piraeus, Israeli immigration officers were waiting for Jewish families.

“They asked us why we were going to London and proposed we go to Israel instead. They offered us a house and a new nationality. And we accepted,” Cohen recounts.

The arrival in Israel was shocking for the Cohen family. They all had to share one room, they had no running water or jobs, and they had left their belongings behind.

In Egypt they were rich and part of the high society of Cairo. In Israel, they were no one — just another refugee family.

#egypte #israel #Jews #nasser #revolution

►http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/stop-calling-us-copts

But rarely do you hear Egypt’s Christians referred to as “Egyptian,” whether by Christians themselves, their Muslim compatriots or the local media.

Instead, you almost always hear the word “Copt.”

On the other hand, the word Copts, or in Arabic, Aqbat, puts a thick and guttural line between Egypt’s Christians and the rest of the country’s citizens — it’s a word that sounds nothing like the Arabic word for Egyptian, Masry. Suddenly, we’re talking about “us” and “them,” about “the other” and all the rhetoric of a nation sewn of one fabric goes out the window.

#egypt #copte

►http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/stop-calling-us-copts

But rarely do you hear Egypt’s Christians referred to as “Egyptian,” whether by Christians themselves, their Muslim compatriots or the local media.

Instead, you almost always hear the word “Copt.”

On the other hand, the word Copts, or in Arabic, Aqbat, puts a thick and guttural line between Egypt’s Christians and the rest of the country’s citizens — it’s a word that sounds nothing like the Arabic word for Egyptian, Masry. Suddenly, we’re talking about “us” and “them,” about “the other” and all the rhetoric of a nation sewn of one fabric goes out the window.

#egypt #copte

►http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-faces-multiple-challenges-increasing-opposition

In the absence of Islamist groups, the size of opposition protests has been significant due to the presence of a new kind of protester — one vehemently against the threat of any limitations on personal freedoms. Among them are those staunchly opposed to the Brotherhood, but they are also accompanied by others who voted for Morsy or have so far supported the Brotherhood, until this recent juncture.

#egypt

►http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/blog-reporting-clashes-ranks-brothers

“We beat them hard,” said one of them, while another who had just arrived said, “We found alcohol and hashish with them.”

“They look strange,” said the first, pointing at the opponents. “Indeed they do,” said the other. “Beating them is the only way.”

#egypte #revolution #brotherhood #morsi

►http://www.merip.org/why-anti-mursi-protesters-are-right

From the day Mubarak was deposed, the Muslim Brothers have shown disdain for other opposition groups and little interest in building consensus on a road map for the political transition and the fundamentals of the new political order. Instead, they pushed for speedy elections, knowing they were poised to win a near majority, and emerged as an elected power broker rather than a partner in a democratic revolution.

the battle in Egypt is indeed one between a democracy that reflects the country’s political diversity and a remodeled authoritarianism, led by the Muslim Brothers and their allies, that seeks to circumscribe it.

#egypte #brotherhood #muslim #revolution

►http://boutique.monde-diplomatique.fr/extrait-l-islam-la-republique-et-le-monde

Moi, qui étais de culture française, qui parlais bien mieux cette langue que l’arabe, je n’ai pas compris pourquoi des avions français nous bombardaient, j’ai pleuré en apprenant que Port-Saïd avait capitulé, je me suis réjoui à l’annonce de la défaite des envahisseurs.

Durant ces années au Caire, on se politisait jeune, malgré l’interdiction des partis et la chape pesante du nouveau régime nassérien. Nous vivions une époque formidable. L’Empire britannique se désagrégeait, la conférence de Bandoung (1955) annonçait le mouvement des non-alignés, la guerre de libération battait son plein en Algérie et, au Caire, nul ne doutait un instant ni de la justesse de cette cause ni de sa victoire

Je découvrais que même des penseurs de la gauche radicale peinaient à produire des analyses sans partir de la prétendue « supériorité » de l’Europe sur le monde « oriental ».

#egypte #nasser #colonialisme #orientalisme

►http://rivesudrivenord.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/11/04/de-lutilite-du-concept-dislamisme-modere

Les mouvements politiques dont est issue Ennahda en Tunisie ou encore les Frères musulmans en Egypte, ont misé par le passé et misent encore, alors qu’il sont désormais aux affaires, sur une ré-islamisation encore plus grande de la société et une tendance à l’ostentation de sa piété dans l’espace public comme marqueur identitaire puissant face au désarroi des populations devant le mal-vivre et la perte des repères générés par la mondialisation et l’irruption abrupte d’une économie de bazar déstructurante des modèles traditionnels.

Il ne leur restera, dès lors que le fait religieux devienne dominant, qu’à s’aligner sur cette demande « sociale » de « moralité » de l’espace public, avec en prime, la prétention de la couler dans le moule du discours sur la souveraineté populaire.

Hillary Clinton aurait, dans ses tournées récentes, clairement signifié aux décideurs issus des appareils militaro-sécuritaires et aux reliquats des anciens régimes au Caire comme à Tunis, que dorénavant les occidentaux entendaient miser sur cette nouvelle force politique, en espérant, mutatis mutandis une évolution politique de celle-ci sur le modèle turc, du moins à long terme.

La stabilité d’une région pourvoyeuse de tant de richesses énergétiques, mais aussi, productrice d’autant de radicalité politique semblant prioritaire sur tout le reste ; le marketing politique et médiatique se chargera de bien vendre cette option stratégique.

#ennahda #freres #musulmans #tunisie #egypte

►http://www.dw.de/syrian-opposition-driven-into-arms-of-islamists/a-16322351

Many forces are more secular in outlook. They have no great interest in religion. Even so, they have moved closer to the armed Islamic forces, as they receive support from foreign Islamic networks. This comes mainly from the Gulf region. It should be pointed out that these people are in a battle. They need weapons and ammunition. They receive the money for this from the Gulf states, especially through Islamist networks that are organized around the mosques. The money also comes from wealthy Syrian businessmen who live there. All of this shapes the identity of the armed opposition - and in a way that is sometimes highly opportunistic. Often the fighters are not very convinced of what they say in public. But in this way they are meeting their sponsors’ demands.

Overall, the development of the opposition was strongly influenced by the way the regime responded to the initial protests. This development gained a momentum of its own. But the more the opposition followed an Islamist course, the fewer people were willing to support it. However, we also observed an opposite development: In some places the Syrians faced such violent force from the regime that they supported anyone who fought against it.

The Syrians initially assumed that the international community would intervene at some point. They assumed that, in the end, it would not leave them to fend for themselves. In the event, too many signals came from the international community that encouraged armed opposition groups to escalate the situation. There were numerous indications of international support. But words were not followed by deeds

Russia, Iraq and Iran are pointing to the jihadist forces to justify their positions. Yet their positions go back to a time before these jihadists existed in Syria. But even in the West we tend to use these holy warriors to excuse our unwillingness to intervene. In this context, we then say Syria is a complicated case, the country lies in a highly unstable, sensitive region

Currently, mediation, dialogue and negotiation are impossible. The hatred is too great; too much blood has been shed

►http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8073/civil-society-in-revolt_from-the-arab-spring-to-oc

It has become commonplace to say that the Arab revolts and OWS have failed because they did not manage to transform political institutions. This is the wrong stick with which to measure their achievements. By occupying public squares, these protests have occupied the space of democracy and thus taught us that democracy does not begin with the ballot box, but rather with us.

#egypt #occupy #arab #tunisia

“it is not just about sexual harassment, it’s about women’s freedom. If women cannot walk safely on the streets, what about the right to work, to education, to make independent decisions, and all their other rights”
►http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/are-you-man-enough-men-both-sides-fight-against-harassment
#women #egypt

Qui est ami avec qui sur facebook ?
–mouvements migratoires et colonisation principaux facteur d’amitiés entre les pays sur facebook

►http://www.facebookstories.com/stories/1574/interactive-mapping-the-world-s-friendships#color=continent&story=1

La victoire ideologique de CharlieHebdo

►http://www.cqfd-journal.org/La-victoire-ideologique-de-Charlie

Charlie Hebdo a-t-il titré « Talmud Hebdo » et déversé seize pages d’« humour » sur les juifs quand l’extrême droite religieuse est entrée au gouvernement israélien ? C’était pourtant un « fait d’actualité étrangère » au moins aussi considérable que le résultat du scrutin tunisien.

#charliehebdo #mohamed #tunisie #israel

« L’Europe méprise la production intellectuelle venant du monde arabe »

►http://www.la-croix.com/Debats/Opinions/Debats/L-Europe-meprise-la-production-intellectuelle-venant-du-monde-arabe-_NP_-2

L’Europe méprise la production intellectuelle venant du monde arabe et de la Turquie. C’est l’une des autres grandes découvertes de cette étude. Nous restons prisonniers de nos cultures d’empire, de notre ethnocentrisme et de notre européocentrisme. L’orientalisme – cette construction par l’Occident de ce qu’est l’Orient, le monde arabe et au-delà – se poursuit et entretient cette simplification des imaginaires. L’Europe s’est construite dans une logique de centre à périphérie. Nous sommes au centre et ce que nous produisons est central, les autres sont aux marges et ce qu’ils produisent est marginal. Ce déficit de connaissances peut en partie expliquer que nous n’ayons pas vu venir les révolutions arabes et que nous restions démunis face à ces bouleversements : dans les six à dix-huit mois qui ont suivi ces révolutions, on a essentiellement publié des commentateurs français sur le monde arabe et non pas traduit des auteurs arabe.

#arabe #arab #egypt #tunisie #orientalisme #colonisation #culture #traduction

Cher Charb, je vous défends !

►http://nawaat.org/portail/2012/09/19/cher-charb-je-vous-defends

à cause de votre publication, il risque d’y avoir des morts et des émeutes dans des pays où les débats sur la question de la religion ont atteint un niveau de sensibilité extrême à la lisière de la guerre civile, niveau que vous ne pouvez pas imaginer, vous qui êtes dans la dérision et non pas dans la compréhension profonde des faits qui bouleversent actuellement les pays arabes tels que la Tunisie. Ces débats s’arrêtent et se transforment en inquisition fasciste contre les progressistes des ces pays, auxquels j’appartiens, qui se battent jour et nuit pour les valeurs que vous défendez, ces débats s’arrêtent à chaque fois qu’un gros pachyderme inculte, tel que Sam Bacille, décide d’exprimer son point de vue sur l’islam.

#Mahomet #Mohamed #Islam #Tunisie #carricatures #CharlieHebdo

A country of extremists
It is safe to say that Egypt is going through its own version of a culture war

►http://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/09/18/a-country-of-extremists

First of all, given that this is a Muslim country, one should call Egyptian “Islamists” on who they really are: a bunch of shrill, patriarchal, misogynistic, violent extremists who are using Islam as a cover for their behaviour. That in reality we don’t have “islamists” as much as people with unresolved sexual and personal issues that have found in certain Islamic schools an excuse to carry out their convoluted fantasies about sex, control and mental lock-down.

Secondly, one should establish that calling them up on it doesn’t make someone less of a muslim, but rather a defender of Islam from those who are actually tarnishing its image, for what they are doing is more damaging to Islam’s reputation than a thousand so called “Islam –attacking films”. And finally, that their aggressive drive to push their vision on the Egyptian population with its diverse Islamic beliefs and modes of behaviour will not only end up with creating an unbridgeable chasm in Egyptian society amongst its muslim population, but will lead many people who are perfectly good muslims to walk away from the religion and its practices all together.