Person:Hazem - Seenthis

Tear gas fired as Egyptian Islamists (salafists) target security HQ in Cairo

2013-05-03T19:20:59Z

Tear gas fired as Egyptian Islamists (salafists) target security HQ in Cairo

http://us.mobile.reuters.com/article/article/idUSBRE94116G20130503

Salafist preacher Hazem Salah Abu-Ismail and Islamist leader Hossam Abu El-Bokhary to be investigated after calling for protest

http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/70597/Egypt/Politics-/Top-preacher-to-be-investigated-for-terrorising-Eg.aspx

#mob #salafists

Egypte : mandat d'amener contre 5 militants pro-démocratie opposés au président Morsi

2013-03-25T21:31:01Z

Egypte : mandat d'amener contre 5 militants pro-démocratie opposés au président Morsi
http://www.romandie.com/news/n/_Egypte_mandat_d_amener_contre_5_militants_pro_democratie_opposes_au_presi

Le parquet a émis un mandat d'amener contre cinq militants politiques, accusés d'avoir incité à la violence lors (des affrontements) qui ont eu lieu devant le bureau du Guide de la confrérie islamiste dans le quartier de Moqattam (au Caire) a indiqué la Mena.
Ils ont interdiction de quitter le pays et leur nom a été placé sur une liste de personnes interdites de voyage en raison des investigations, a précisé la Mena.
Les cinq militants —Alaa Abdel Fattah, Ahmed Douma, Karim el-Chaer, Hazem Abdel Azim et Ahmed Eid— font partie des jeunes militants pro-démocratie célèbres pour leur opposition au président Morsi et les Frères musulmans dont il est issu.
Le parquet a également convoqué la militante Nawara Negm pour l'interroger au sujet d'accusations concernant son éventuelle implication dans les affrontements de vendredi.
Ces affrontements entre des manifestants de l'opposition et des islamistes près du siège des Frères musulmans avaient fait plus de 160 blessés.
Si les enquêtes prouvent que certains hommes politiques sont impliqués, des mesures nécessaires seront prises contre eux, quel que soit leur niveau, avait affirmé M. Morsi, dans des déclarations diffusées dimanche sur son compte twitter ainsi que par la télévision d'Etat.
L'opposition et plusieurs journaux égyptiens ont vivement réagi lundi à ces propos.
On peut s'attendre au pire. Les menaces de Morsi signifient la mort de l'Etat de droit. Il démontre qu'il est le président des Frères musulmans seulement, a déclaré à l'AFP Khaled Daoud, porte-parole du Front du salut national (FSN), la principale coalition de l'opposition.

Hazem Kandil · Deadlock in Cairo · LRB 21 March 2013

2013-03-15T21:31:55Z

Hazem Kandil · Deadlock in Cairo · LRB 21 March 2013
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n06/hazem-kandil/deadlock-in-cairo

When you consider the central importance of the security services to the old regime, it is remarkable how well they have done so far. Not a single police officer has been charged with a single offence before or after the revolt. (...) Egypt's infamous State Security Investigations Service was simply renamed Egyptian Homeland Security without any change in its powers. Even though repression and torture continued, Morsi never missed an opportunity to praise the patriotism of the Interior Ministry, which he claims has already been reformed.
Part of the reason Egypt's security establishment has landed on its feet is that it has been careful to bide its time. It seems willing to refrain from full-blown ‘pacification' until the revolutionaries come to learn that the only alternative to police repression is chaos. It hasn't been entirely passive . It has stirred up and ambushed protesters at carefully selected times and places, engaging them in short, brutal battles and leaving dozens of bodies behind. After each incident, investigations have been carried out, unnamed ‘third parties' blamed and the matter shelved. One such episode occurred in February last year at Port Said Stadium. Determined to punish the football fans – the Ultras – for spearheading street battles against the police, the Interior Ministry bussed in thugs from the capital and, after blocking all the stadium's exits, unleashed them against the unsuspecting fans. In little more than an hour, 79 people were killed and at least a thousand injured. A court ruling was scheduled for 26 January this year, and a clear indictment of the security service plot was expected, especially after hints from the presidency that such a ruling might provide the legal basis for a purge and restructuring of the security apparatus. Instead, 21 civilians were sentenced to death and the police were exonerated.
Violence erupted around the country and the riot police didn't hold back, killing fifty demonstrators and injuring hundreds more. People were further enraged by a YouTube video showing a middle-aged demonstrator called Hamada Saber being stripped naked, trampled on by police in heavy boots and dragged along the tarmac. A few days later, a young activist called Mohamed al-Guindy was allegedly tortured to death in a police station. Morsi commended the Interior Ministry's effectiveness, and appeared on television waving his fist defiantly and threatening troublemakers with harsher measures.
For security officers, the message was clear: under the Brotherhood, they could carry on as usual. This was hardly surprising. An organisation obsessed with conspiracies cooked up by ‘enemies of Islam', and aspiring to spread piety throughout society, is bound to appreciate a formidable police force. The security services know, then, that they have a good friend in the Brotherhood. But they're also open to counter-offers from members of the old regime – better the devil they know, as the loyalists tell them. (...).
So while military officers have had to make tough choices, their counterparts in the security services have survived the revolution's first wave by alternating strategically between permissiveness and repression. In this way they have managed, on the one hand, to make plain to the military the drawbacks of giving in to the revolutionaries, while, on the other, proving to the highest political bidder that security men are still perfectly capable of committing any atrocities that might be demanded of them. And it is under the shadow of these two mighty institutions that the three contenders for political supremacy have jockeyed for power.

الربيع والعجز المائي وسيناريوهات (مرعبة) : عطش صنعاء وإخفاق محتمل بالخليج وتوتر المالكي وعداء بين…

2013-02-18T11:33:10Z

الربيع والعجز المائي وسيناريوهات (مرعبة) : عطش صنعاء وإخفاق محتمل بالخليج وتوتر المالكي وعداء بين عرب إفريقيا
http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=latest/data/2013-02-17-05-17-49.htm

الربيع والعجز المائي وسيناريوهات (مرعبة): عطش صنعاء وإخفاق محتمل بالخليج وتوتر المالكي وعداء بين عرب إفريقيا

Compte-rendu vraiment intéressant d'une étude, écrite par Hazem Nasser, un ancien ministre jordanien de l'Agriculture et des ressources hydroliques. Il y met en relation les soulèvements dans le monde arabe et la question de la très mauvaise gestion des ressources hydrauliques, provoquant entre autres conséquences la hausse des coûts alimentaires... Beaucoup d'éléments intéressants et peu repris, par exemple que l'explosion de colère à Daraa, qui a donné lieu au basculement de l'opposition syrienne dans la confrontation armée, aurait pour origine un différend autour d'un puits illégal. La situation de l'eau est également très préoccupante à Sanaa au Yémen...

La citation qui tue (hélas, au sens propre du terme) : « Le monde arabe (ANMO) équivaut à 10 % de la superficie mondiale, on y trouve 1 % des ressources hydrauliques et 5 % de la population mondiale... »
مساحة منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا تمثل 10 بالمائة من مساحة الكرة الارضية ، الا انها تحتوي على أقل من 1 بالمئة من موارد المياه العذبة في العالم وفي المقابل يعيش على أراضيها 5 بالمائة من سكان العالم,

❝What is developing in Egypt is the ideological battle of the decade❞ ❝The Muslim Brotherhood and…

2012-12-19T08:37:10Z

http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/12/19/255900.html

What is developing in Egypt is the ideological battle of the decade

The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters within the Salafis want to turn Egypt into a place that is far closer to its ideas of what are right and wrong. There are spin-off groups within the Salafis, such as those led by Hazem Abou Ismael, who want even greater moves to the far conservative fringe. On the other sides are the intellectuals and he so-called “secular groups”, which are often populated by pious Muslims and Copts who are far from secular. However, the Salafis and some of the stricter members of the Muslim Brotherhood do not consider the Muslims who are part of these groups as even full Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis have their own tests and ideas of what is a true Muslims

Most Egyptians see themselves as pious Muslims, but are far from fanatical and extremist. They are serious in the following of the rules of Islam as they understand them. They resent anyone trying to impose their ideological approaches upon them.
The more liberal Egyptians, the more free-wheeling intellectuals and the internationalist Egyptians often resent such outside interference in their ideas more than the average Egyptians.
In many ways what we may be seeing in Egypt is a clash of interpretations of Islam, or even a clash of civilizations within Egypt. How this works itself out could affect similar debates and clashes in many places throughout the Muslim world.

#egypt #revolution