country:algeria

  • Assassinat de deux scientifiques palestiniens en Algérie
    Dimanche, 22 Juillet 2018 - 20:56 - Nessma
    https://www.nessma.tv/fr/article/deux-scientifiques-palestiniens-tues-en-algerie-2183

    Des sources médiatiques algériennes ont confirmé l’assassinat d’un scientifique de la famille Al Farra et un médecin de la famille Al Banna, sachant que les deux étaient Palestiniens, de Khan Younès au sud de la bande de Gaza.

    L’ambassade palestinienne en Algérie a annoncé à la famille Al Farra à Khan Younès la mort de leur fils Suleiman Mohamed Al Farra (33 ans) et du docteur Mohamed Hameed Al Banna.

    Selon les conclusions préliminaires des autorités, ils sont morts soit par étouffement soit par électrocution.

    Le mystère entoure la mort des deux scientifiques.

    • Two Palestinian Scientists Found Dead in Algeria
      July 23, 2018 6:52 PM
      http://imemc.org/article/two-palestinian-scientists-found-dead-in-algeria

      Two Palestinian scientists were found dead in an Algerian apartment, reports in Gaza said, on Sunday.

      The two, identified as Suliman al-Farra, aged 34, and Mohammed Albana, a 35-year-old physician from Khan Younis, in the Gaza Strip.

      According to reports, they were found in al-Farra’s apartment, and the Palestinian embassy in Algeria told the family of one of the deceased that the two died of gas inhalation or due to a short circuit.

      Some Palestinian reports said that they were assassinated, but there was no confirmation from the authorities. Palestinian scientists and experts around the world have been killed, in recent years, in assassinations alleged to be carried out by Israel’s Mossad espionage agency.

      However, local sources in Gaza assure that the two died as a result of inhaling butane gas, used for cooking, and not as rumored on social networking sites.

    • Migranti:da inizio anno sbarcati 16.566,-79% rispetto a 2017

      Dall’inizio dell’anno ad oggi sono sbarcati in Italia 16.566 migranti, il 79,07% in meno rispetto allo stesso periodo dell’anno scorso, quando ne arrivarono 79.154. Dai dati del Viminale, aggiornati al 28 giugno, emerge dunque che per il dodicesimo mese consecutivo gli sbarchi nel nostro paese sono in calo: l’ultimo picco fu registrato proprio a giugno dell’anno scorso, quando sbarcarono 23.526 migranti (nel 2016 ne arrivarono 22.339 mentre quest’anno il numero è fermo a 3.136). Dal mese di luglio 2017, che ha coinciso con gli accordi siglati con la Libia dall’ex ministro dell’Interno Marco Minniti, si è sempre registrata una diminuzione. Dei 16.566 arrivati nei primi sei mesi del 2018 (la quasi totalità, 15.741, nei porti siciliani), 11.401 sono partiti dalla Libia: un calo nelle partenze dell’84,94% rispetto al 2017 e dell’83,18% rispetto al 2016. Quanto alle nazionalità di quelli che sono arrivati, la prima è la Tunisia, con 3.002 migranti, seguita da Eritrea (2.555), Sudan (1.488) e Nigeria (1.229).

      http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2018/06/30/migrantida-inizio-anno-sbarcati-16.566-79-rispetto-a-2017-_30327137-364e-44bf-8

    • En Méditerranée, les flux de migrants s’estompent et s’orientent vers l’ouest

      Pour la première fois depuis le début de la crise migratoire en 2014, l’Espagne est, avant l’Italie et la Grèce, le pays européen qui enregistre le plus d’arrivées de migrants par la mer et le plus de naufrages meurtriers au large de ses côtes.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/280618/en-mediterranee-les-flux-de-migrants-s-estompent-et-s-orientent-vers-l-oue
      #routes_migratoires

    • Migratory flows in April: Overall drop, but more detections in Greece and Spain

      Central Mediterranean
      The number of migrants arriving in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route in April fell to about 2 800, down 78% from April 2017. The total number of migrants detected on this route in the first four months of 2018 fell to roughly 9 400, down three-quarters from a year ago.
      So far this year, Tunisians and Eritreans were the two most represented nationalities on this route, together accounting for almost 40% of all the detected migrants.

      Eastern Mediterranean
      In April, the number of irregular migrants taking the Eastern Mediterranean route stood at some 6 700, two-thirds more than in the previous month. In the first four months of this year, more than 14 900 migrants entered the EU through the Eastern Mediterranean route, 92% more than in the same period of last year. The increase was mainly caused by the rise of irregular crossings on the land borders with Turkey. In April the number of migrants detected at the land borders on this route has exceeded the detections on the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.
      The largest number of migrants on this route in the first four months of the year were nationals of Syria and Iraq.

      Western Mediterranean
      Last month, the number of irregular migrants reaching Spain stood at nearly 1100, a quarter more than in April 2017. In the first four months of 2018, there were some 4600 irregular border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route, 95 more than a year ago.
      Nationals of Morocco accounted for the highest number of arrivals in Spain this year, followed by those from Guinea and Mali.

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/migratory-flows-in-april-overall-drop-but-more-detections-in-greece-a
      #2018 #Espagne #Grèce

    • EU’s Frontex warns of new migrant route to Spain

      Frontex chief Fabrice Leggeri has warned that Spain could see a significant increase in migrant arrivals. The news comes ahead of the European Commission’s new proposal to strengthen EU external borders with more guards.

      Frontex chief Fabrice Leggeri said Friday that some 6,000 migrants had entered the European Union in June by crossing into Spain from Morocco, the so-called western Mediterranean route.

      https://m.dw.com/en/eus-frontex-warns-of-new-migrant-route-to-spain/a-44563058?xtref=http%253A%252F%252Fm.facebook.com

    • L’Espagne devient la principale voie d’accès des migrants à l’Europe

      La Commission a annoncé trois millions d’euros d’aide d’urgence pour les garde-frontières espagnols, confrontés à un triplement des arrivées de migrants, suite au verrouillage de la route italienne.

      –-> v. ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/683358

      L’aide supplémentaire que l’exécutif a décidé d’allouer à l’Espagne après l’augmentation des arrivées sur les côtes provient du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure et a pour but de financer le déploiement de personnel supplémentaire le long des frontières méridionales espagnoles.

      Le mois dernier, la Commission a déjà attribué 24,8 millions d’euros au ministère de l’Emploi et de la Sécurité sociale et à la Croix-Rouge espagnole, afin de renforcer les capacités d’accueil, de prise en charge sanitaire, de nourriture et de logement des migrants arrivants par la route de l’ouest méditerranéen.

      Une enveloppe supplémentaire de 720 000 euros a été allouée à l’organisation des rapatriements et des transferts depuis l’enclave de Ceuta et Melilla.

      Cette aide financière s’ajoute aux 691,7 millions que reçoit Madrid dans le cadre du Fonds pour l’asile, l’immigration et l’intégration et du fonds pour la sécurité intérieure pour la période budgétaire 2014-2020.

      https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/avramopoulos-in-spain-to-announce-further-eu-support-to-tackle-migration

    • En #Méditerranée, les flux de migrants s’orientent vers l’ouest

      Entre janvier et juillet, 62 177 migrants ont rejoint l’Europe par la Méditerranée, selon les données de l’Agence des Nations unies pour les réfugiés. Un chiffre en baisse par rapport à 2017 (172 301 sur l’ensemble des douze mois) et sans commune mesure avec le « pic » de 2015, où 1 015 078 arrivées avaient été enregistrées.

      Les flux déclinent et se déplacent géographiquement : entre 2014 et 2017, près de 98 % des migrants étaient entrés via la Grèce et l’Italie, empruntant les voies dites « orientales » et « centrales » de la Méditerranée ; en 2018, c’est pour l’instant l’Espagne qui enregistre le plus d’arrivées (23 785), devant l’Italie (18 348), la Grèce (16 142) et, de manière anecdotique, Chypre (73).


      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/030818/en-mediterranee-les-flux-de-migrants-s-orientent-vers-l-ouest
      #statistiques #chiffres #Méditerranée_centrale #itinéraires_migratoires #parcours_migratoires #routes_migratoires #asile #migrations #réfugiés #2018 #Espagne #Italie #Grèce #2017 #2016 #2015 #2014 #arrivées

      Et des statistiques sur les #morts et #disparus :


      #mourir_en_mer #décès #naufrages

    • The most common Mediterranean migration paths into Europe have changed since 2009

      Until 2018, the Morocco-to-Spain route – also known as the western route – had been the least-traveled Mediterranean migration path, with a total of 89,000 migrants arriving along Spain’s coastline since 2009. But between January and August 2018, this route has seen over 28,000 arrivals, more than the central Africa-to-Italy central route (20,000 arrivals) and the Turkey-to-Greece eastern route (20,000 arrivals). One reason for this is that Spain recently allowed rescue ships carrying migrants to dock after other European Union countries had denied them entry.

      Toute la Méditerranée:

      #Méditerranée_occidentale:

      #Méditerranée_centrale:

      #Méditerranée_orientale:

      http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/18/the-most-common-mediterranean-migration-paths-into-europe-have-changed-

    • The “Shift” to the Western Mediterranean Migration Route: Myth or Reality?

      How Spain Became the Top Arrival Country of Irregular Migration to the EU

      This article looks at the increase in arrivals[1] of refugees and migrants in Spain, analysing the nationalities of those arriving to better understand whether there has been a shift from the Central Mediterranean migration route (Italy) towards the Western Mediterranean route (Spain). The article explores how the political dynamics between North African countries and the European Union (EU) have impacted the number of arrivals in Spain.

      The Western Mediterranean route has recently become the most active route of irregular migration to Europe. As of mid-August 2018, a total of 26,350 refugees and migrants arrived in Spain by sea, three times the number of arrivals in the first seven months of 2017. In July alone 8,800 refugees and migrants reached Spain, four times the number of arrivals in July of last year.

      But this migration trend did not begin this year. The number of refugees and migrants arriving by sea in Spain grew by 55 per cent between 2015 and 2016, and by 172 per cent between 2016 and 2017.

      At the same time, there has been a decrease in the number of refugees and migrants entering the EU via the Central Mediterranean route. Between January and July 2018, a total of 18,510 persons arrived in Italy by sea compared to 95,213 arrivals in the same period in 2017, an 81 per cent decrease.

      This decrease is a result of new measures to restrict irregular migration adopted by EU Member States, including increased cooperation with Libya, which has been the main embarkation country for the Central Mediterranean migration route. So far this year, the Libyan Coast Guards have intercepted 12,152 refugees and migrants who were on smuggling boats (more than double the total number of interceptions in 2017). In the last two weeks of July, 99.5 per cent of the refugees and migrants who departed on smuggling boats were caught and returned to Libya, according to a data analysis conducted at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). The number of people being detained by the Libyan Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM) has continued growing (from 5,000 to 9,300 between May and July 2018), with thousands more held in unofficial detention facilities.

      So, was there a shift from the Central to the Western Mediterranean Migration route? In other words, has the decline of arrivals in Italy led to the increase of arrivals in Spain?

      First of all, while this article only analyses the changes in the use of these two sea routes and among those trying to go to Europe, for most West Africans, the intended destination is actually North Africa, including Libya and Algeria, where they hope to find jobs. A minority intends to move onwards to Europe and this is confirmed by MMC’s 4Mi data referred to below.

      The answer to the question on whether or not there has been a shift between the two routes can be found in the analysis of the origin countries of the refugees and migrants that were most commonly using the Central Mediterranean route before it became increasingly difficult to reach Europe. Only if a decrease of the main nationalities using the Central Mediterranean Route corresponds to an increase of the same group along the Western Mediterranean route we can speak of “a shift”.

      The two nationalities who were – by far – the most common origin countries of refugees and migrants arriving in Italy in 2015 and in 2016 were Nigeria and Eritrea. The total number of Nigerians and Eritreans arriving in Italy in 2015 was 50,018 and slightly lower (47,096) in the following year. Then, between 2016 and last year, the total number of Nigerian and Eritrean arrivals in Italy decreased by 66 per cent. The decrease has been even more significant in 2018; in the first half of this year only 2,812 Nigerians and Eritreans arrived in Italy.

      However, there has not been an increase in Nigerians and Eritreans arriving in Spain. Looking at the data, it is clear that refugees and migrants originating in these two countries have not shifted from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route.

      The same is true for refugees and migrants from Bangladesh, Sudan and Somalia – who were also on the list of most common countries of origin amongst arrivals in Italy during 2015 and 2016. While the numbers of Bangladeshis, Sudanese and Somalis arriving in Italy have been declining since 2017, there has not been an increase in arrivals of these nationals in Spain. Amongst refugees and migrants from these three countries, as with Nigerians and Eritreans, there has clearly not been a shift to the Western route. In fact, data shows that zero refugees and migrants from Eritrea, Bangladesh and Somalia arrived in Spain by sea since 2013.

      However, the data tells a different story when it comes to West African refugees and migrants. Between 2015 and 2017, the West African countries of Guinea, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia and Senegal were also on the list of most common origin countries amongst arrivals in Italy. During those years, about 91 per cent of all arrivals in the EU from these five countries used the Central Mediterranean route to Italy, while 9 per cent used the Western Mediterranean route to Spain.

      But in 2018 the data flipped: only 23 per cent of EU arrivals from these five West African countries used the Central Mediterranean route, while 76 per cent entered used the Western route. It appears that as the Central Mediterranean route is being restricted, a growing number of refugees and migrants from these countries are trying to reach the EU on the Western Mediterranean route.

      These finding are reinforced by 3,224 interviews conducted in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso between July 2017 and June 2018 by the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative (4Mi), which found a rise in the share of West African refugees and migrants stating their final destination is Spain and a fall in the share of West African refugees and migrants who say they are heading to Italy.[2]

      A second group who according to the data shifted from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route are the Moroccans. Between 2015 and 2017, at least 4,000 Moroccans per year entered the EU on the Central Mediterranean route. Then, in the first half of this year, only 319 Moroccan refugees and migrants arrived by sea to Italy. Meanwhile, an opposite process has happened in Spain, where the number of Moroccans arriving by sea spiked, increasing by 346 per cent between 2016 and last year. This increase has continued in the first six months of this year, in which 2,600 Moroccans reached Spain through the Western Mediterranean route.

      On-going Political Bargaining

      The fact that so many Moroccans are amongst the arrivals in Spain could be an indication that Morocco, the embarkation country for the Western Mediterranean route, has perhaps been relaxing its control on migration outflows, as recently suggested by several media outlets. A Euronews article questioned whether the Moroccan government is allowing refugees and migrants to make the dangerous sea journey towards Spain as part of its negotiations with the EU on the size of the support it will receive. Der Spiegel reported that Morocco is “trying to extort concessions from the EU by placing Spain under pressure” of increased migration.

      The dynamic in which a neighbouring country uses the threat of increased migration as a political bargaining tool is one the EU is quite familiar with, following its 2016 deal with Turkey and 2017 deal with Libya. In both occasions, whilst on a different scale, the response of the EU has been fundamentally the same: to offer its southern neighbours support and financial incentives to control migration.

      The EU had a similar response this time. On August 3, the European Commission committed 55 million euro for Morocco and Tunisia to help them improve their border management. Ten days later, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights reported that Moroccan authorities started removing would-be migrants away from departure points to Europe.

      Aside from Morocco and Libya, there is another North African country whose policies may be contributing to the increase of arrivals in Spain. Algeria, which has been a destination country for many African migrants during the past decade (and still is according to 4Mi interviews), is in the midst of a nationwide campaign to detain and deport migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

      The Associated Press reported “Algeria’s mass expulsions have picked up since October 2017, as the European Union renewed pressure on North African countries to discourage migrants going north to Europe…” More than 28,000 Africans have been expelled since the campaign started in August of last year, according to News Deeply. While Algeria prides itself on not taking EU money – “We are handling the situation with our own means,” an Algerian interior ministry official told Reuters – its current crackdown appears to be yet another element of the EU’s wider approach to migration in the region.
      Bargaining Games

      This article has demonstrated that – contrary to popular reporting – there is no blanket shift from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western Mediterranean route. A detailed analysis on the nationalities of arrivals in Italy and Spain and changes over time, shows that only for certain nationalities from West Africa a shift may be happening, while for other nationalities there is no correlation between the decrease of arrivals in Italy and the increase of arrivals in Spain. The article has also shown that the recent policies implemented by North African governments – from Libya to Morocco to Algeria – can only be understood in the context of these countries’ dialogue with the EU on irregular migration.

      So, while the idea of a shift from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route up until now is more myth than reality, it is clear that the changes of activity levels on these migration routes are both rooted in the same source: the on-going political bargaining on migration between the EU and North African governments. And these bargaining games are likely to continue as the EU intensifies its efforts to prevent refugees and migrants from arriving at its shores.

      http://www.mixedmigration.org/articles/shift-to-the-western-mediterranean-migration-route
      #Méditerranée_centrale #Méditerranée_occidentale

    • IOM, the UN Migration Agency, reports that 80,602 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea in 2018 through 23 September, with 35,653 to Spain, the leading destination this year. In fact, with this week’s arrivals Spain in 2018 has now received via the Mediterranean more irregular migrants than it did throughout all the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 combined.

      The region’s total arrivals through the recent weekend compare with 133,465 arrivals across the region through the same period last year, and 302,175 at this point in 2016.

      Spain, with 44 per cent of all arrivals through the year, continues to receive seaborne migrants in September at a volume nearly twice that of Greece and more than six times that of Italy. Italy’s arrivals through late September are the lowest recorded at this point – the end of a normally busy summer sailing season – in almost five years. IOM Rome’s Flavio Di Giacomo on Monday reported that Italy’s 21,024 arrivals of irregular migrants by sea this year represent a decline of nearly 80 per cent from last year’s totals at this time. (see chart below).

      IOM’s Missing Migrants Project has documented the deaths of 1,730 people on the Mediterranean in 2018. Most recently, a woman drowned off the coast of Bodrum, Turkey on Sunday while attempting to reach Kos, Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean route. The Turkish Coast Guard reports that 16 migrants were rescued from this incident. On Saturday, a 5-year-old Syrian boy drowned off the coast of Lebanon’s Akkar province after a boat carrying 39 migrants to attempt to reach Cyprus capsized.

      IOM Spain’s Ana Dodevska reported Monday that total arrivals at sea in 2018 have reached 35,594 men, women and children who have been rescued in Western Mediterranean waters through 23 September (see chart below).

      IOM notes that over this year’s first five months, a total of 8,150 men, women and children were rescued in Spanish waters after leaving Africa – an average of 54 per day. In the 115 days since May 31, a total of 27,444 have arrived – or just under 240 migrants per day. The months of May-September this year have seen a total of 30,967 irregular migrants arriving by sea, the busiest four-month period for Spain since IOM began tallying arrival statistics, with just over one week left in September.

      With this week’s arrivals Spain in 2018 has now received via the Mediterranean more irregular migrants than it did throughout all the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 combined (see charts below).

      On Monday, IOM Athens’ Christine Nikolaidou reported that over four days (20-23 September) this week the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) units managed at least nine incidents requiring search and rescue operations off the islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Farmakonisi.

      The HCG rescued a total 312 migrants and transferred them to the respective islands. Additional arrivals of some 248 individuals to Kos and some of the aforementioned islands over these past four days brings to 22,821 the total number of arrivals by sea to Greece through 23 September (see chart below).

      Sea arrivals to Greece this year by irregular migrants appeared to have peaked in daily volume in April, when they averaged at around 100 per day. That volume dipped through the following three months then picked up again in August and again in September, already this year’s busiest month – 3,536 through 23 days, over 150 per day – with about a quarter of the month remaining. Land border crossing also surged in April (to nearly 4,000 arrivals) but have since fallen back, with fewer than 2,000 crossings in each of the past four months (see charts below).

      IOM’s Missing Migrants Project has recorded 2,735 deaths and disappearances during migration so far in 2018 (see chart below).

      In the Americas, several migrant deaths were recorded since last week’s update. In Mexico, a 30-year-old Salvadoran man was killed in a hit-and-run on a highway in Tapachula, Mexico on Friday. Another death on Mexico’s freight rail network (nicknamed “La Bestia”) was added after reports of an unidentified man found dead on tracks near San Francisco Ixhuatan on 15 September.

      In the United States, on 16 September, an unidentified person drowned in the All-American Canal east of Calexico, California – the 55th drowning recorded on the US-Mexico border this year. A few days later a car crash south of Florence, Arizona resulted in the deaths of eight people, including four Guatemalan migrants, on Wednesday. Two others killed included one of the vehicles’ driver and his partner, who authorities say had been involved with migrant smuggling in the past.

      https://reliefweb.int/report/spain/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-80602-2018-deaths-reach-1730

    • Analyse de Matteo Villa sur twitter :

      Irregular sea arrivals to Italy have not been this low since 2012. But how do the two “deterrence policies” (#Minniti's and #Salvini's) compare over time?


      Why start from July 15th each year? That’s when the drop in sea arrivals in 2017 kicked in, and this allows us to do away with the need to control for seasonality. Findings do not change much if we started on July 1st this year.
      Zooming in, in relative terms the drop in sea arrivals during Salvini’s term is almost as stark as last year’s drop.

      In the period 15 July - 8 October:

      Drop during #Salvini: -73%.
      Drop during #Minniti: -79%.

      But looking at actual numbers, the difference is clear. In less than 3 months’ time, the drop in #migrants and #refugees disembarking in #Italy under #Minniti had already reached 51,000. Under #Salvini in 2018, the further drop is less than 10,000.


      To put it another way: deterrence policies under #Salvini can at best aim for a drop of about 42,000 irregular arrivals in 12 months. Most likely, the drop will amount to about 30.000. Under #Minniti, sea arrivals the drop amounted to 150.000. Five times larger.

      BOTTOM LINE: the opportunity-cost of deterrence policies is shrinking fast. Meanwhile, the number of dead and missing along the Central Mediterranean route has not declined in tandem (in fact, in June-September it shot up). Is more deterrence worth it?

      https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1049978070734659584

      Le papier qui explique tout cela :
      Sea Arrivals to Italy : The Cost of Deterrence Policies


      https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/sea-arrivals-italy-cost-deterrence-policies-21367

    • Méditerranée : forte baisse des traversées en 2018 et l’#Espagne en tête des arrivées (HCR)

      Pas moins de 113.482 personnes ont traversé la #Méditerranée en 2018 pour rejoindre l’Europe, une baisse par rapport aux 172.301 qui sont arrivés en 2017, selon les derniers chiffres publiés par le Haut-Commissariat de l’ONU pour les réfugiés (HCR).
      L’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés rappelle d’ailleurs que le niveau des arrivées a également chuté par rapport au pic de 1,015 million enregistré en 2015 et à un moindre degré des 362.753 arrivées répertoriées en 2016.

      Toutefois pour l’année 2018, si l’on ajoute près de 7.000 migrants enregistrés dans les enclaves espagnoles de #Ceuta et #Melilla (arrivées par voie terrestre), on obtient un total de 120.205 arrivées en Europe.

      L’an dernier l’Espagne est redevenue la première porte d’entrée en Europe, avec 62.479 arrivées (dont 55.756 par la mer soit deux fois plus qu’en 2017, avec 22.103 arrivées).

      La péninsule ibérique est suivie par la #Grèce (32.497), l’Italie (23.371), #Malte (1.182) et #Chypre (676).

      https://news.un.org/fr/story/2019/01/1032962

  • It’s 34,361 and rising: how the List tallies Europe’s migrant bodycount.
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/the-list-europe-migrant-bodycount

    30/04/18 2 N.N. (2 men) unknown bodies recovered in Gasr Garabulli (aka Castelverde) (LY) IOM Libya
    30/04/18 1 N.N. (woman) unknown body recovered on Tajoura beach (LY) IOM Libya
    30/04/18 6 N.N. (1 baby; 5 men) unknown bodies recovered in Zuwara (LY) IOM Libya
    30/04/18 1 N.N. (man) Algeria drowned trying to swim across the Kolpa River on Croatian-Slovenian border; 7 intercepted by police IOM Slovenia/TotSloveniaNews
    29/04/18 19 N.N. (1 man) Africa 16 drowned in shipwreck off Cap Falcon, Oran (DZ) on way to Spain; 3 missing, 19 rescued ObsAlgerie/Caminando/EFE/Réf/QUOTI/IOM
    25/04/18 17 N.N. Sub-Saharan Africa 5 drowned afer boat sank between Morocco and Spain near Alboran Island; 12 missing, 17 rescued ElDiario/Caminando/SalvaM/EuroPress
    22/04/18 11 N.N. (1 boy; 10 men) unknown drowned when rubber dinghy overturned in the Mediterranean Sea near Sabratha (LY); 83 rescued MEE/Reu./IOM Libya/JapanTimes
    20/04/18 1 N.N. (boy, 6 months) Eritrea strangled by desperate mother who hanged herself afterwards in Eckolstädt asylum centre (DE) Berliner Ztg/FR-th/OTZ
    20/04/18 1 Snaid Tadese (woman, 19) Eritrea suicide, strangled her baby and hanged herself out of despair in Eckolstädt asylum centre (DE) Berliner Ztg/FR-th/OTZ
    20/04/18 1 N.N. (man, 30) unknown electrocuted when he climbed on roof of freight train in depot outside Thessaloniki (GR) AP/NYTimes/MailOnline
    19/04/18 2 N.N. unknown died in accident in Horasan (TR) when smuggler driving their truck saw control point and panicked HurriyetDN/PrensaLat
    14/04/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown died of cardiac arrest, body found near border fence in Anyera in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta (ES) FaroCeuta/APDHA/CeutaTV/IOM
    13/04/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown died of cardiac arrest, body found near border fence in Anyera in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta (ES) FaroCeuta/APDHA/IOM/CeutaTV
    10/04/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown drowned in the Kolpa River near Črnomelj (SI) on border with Croatia IOM Slovenia/AFP
    09/04/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown drowned in the Kolpa River near Črnomelj (SI) on border with Croatia DELO/IOM Slovenia
    09/04/18 36 N.N. unknown 6 presumed drowned off coast of Houara 20 km south of Tangiers (MA); 30 missing, 10 survived EFE/Caminando/El Diario/IOM
    06/04/18 1 Omar “Susi” (boy, 16) Maghreb deliberately crushed by truck near Port of Ceuta (ES) after driver chased after refugees El Faro de Ceuta/Ceuta Actualidad/IOM
    06/04/18 1 N.N. (woman) unknown drowned, found on Jabonera beach in Tarifa, Cádiz (ES) Diario de Cádiz/IOM/EPress/EFE
    02/04/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found 6 nautical miles northwest of Port of Bouzedjar in Ain Témouchent (DZ) Liberté/Ouest Tribune/IOM
    01/04/18 11 N.N. (1 man) unknown 4 drowned after boat capsized between Tangier (MA) and Tarifa (ES); 7 missing, 1 rescued Watch TheMed/IOM Spain/SalvaM/HinduTimes
    01/04/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found near Habibas Islands off coast of Ain Témouchent (DZ) Réf/DK/OuestT/IOM
    01/04/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found off coast of Al Hoceima (MA) EFE/IOM/YABI
    31/03/18 1 N.N. unknown presumed drowned, body found west of Sbiaat beach in Ain Témouchent (DZ) Réf/DK/OuestT/IOM
    30/03/18 17 N.N. unknown died in vehicle accident in province of Igdir province (TR) near border with Armenia; 33 survivors Reu./LV/IOM
    29/03/18 7 N.N. (7 men) unknown presumed drowned, unspecified location in the Strait of Gibraltar between Morocco and Spain Caminando/IOM
    28/03/18 1 N.N. (boy, 16) Eritrea died in hospital in Lille after jumping from truck on motorway near Port of Calais (FR) CMS/Parisien/VoixDuNord/IOM
    24/03/18 1 N.N. (woman) unknown died of lack of access to medicines in hospital in Turin (IT) after being turned away on Italian-French border CDS/FrSoir/IOM
    22/03/18 1 N.N. (man, 22) Algeria stowaway, got stuck between 2 vehicles at Zeebrugge port (BE) while trying to get to Great Britain CMS
    20/03/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found on shore of Tripoli (LY) IOM Libya
    18/03/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown drowned, body recovered on beach in Rota, Cádiz (ES) GuardiaCivil/EPress/IOM
    17/03/18 2 N.N. unknown died in vehicle acccident on highway near Xanthi (GR) near Bulgarian border; 7 survivors Reu./AP/IOM/ChNewsAsia
    17/03/18 19 N.N. (9 children) Afghanistan, Iraq 16 drowned after migrant boat capsized off coast of Agathonisi (GR); 3 missing, 3 rescued HellCoastG/IOM Greece/Reu./AP/ChNewsAsia
    16/03/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found on beach in Tinajo, Lanzarote, Canary Islands (ES) EFE/La Provincia/IOM/VozDeL
    15/03/18 1 Mame Mbaye Ndiaye (man, 35) Senegal died of heart attack after police chased street vendor through Madrid (ES) until he collapsed LocalES/AfricaNews/TeleSur
    14/03/18 1 N.N. unknown went missing during rescue operation in the sea near Tangiers (MA); 9 rescued Watch TheMed
    13/03/18 1 Tesfalidet “Segen” Tesfon (man, 22) Eritrea died of tuberculosis and malnutrition after being rescued from boat; had been trapped in Libya for 18 months Proactiva/IOM/ANSA/Reu./LocalIT/HRW
    12/03/18 1 N.N. (man, ±30) unknown found dead in delta of the Evros River on Turkish-Greek border AP/MENAFN/IOM
    12/03/18 12 N.N. unknown found dead on sinking boat in the Alboran Sea between Morocco and Spain; 22 rescued Caminando Fronteras/IOM
    08/03/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown drowned, body recovered on beach in Rota, Cádiz, (ES) Guardia Civil/EPress/IOM
    06/03/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown drowned in the Evros River near Edirne (TR) near Greek border IOM Turkey/HurriyetDN
    03/03/18 23 N.N. (2 babies; 4 women; 17 men) Sub-Saharan Africa 2 found dead on boat, presumed drowned off coast of Libya; 21 missing, 30 survivors SOSMed/IOM/Reu.
    03/03/18 3 N.N. (2 women; 1 man) unknown drowned, bodies found off coast of Benzú in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta (ES); 2 survivors UNHCR/Caminando Fronteras/IOM/El Periódico
    01/03/18 1 Lamin (man, 20) Sierra Leone died due to lack of medical care in Passau (DE), had previously been deported to Italy despite severe illness Matteo
    28/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown found dead by coast guard near Bouzedjar beach in Ain Témouchent (DZ) RadioAlg/IOM
    27/02/18 6 N.N. (4 children; 1 woman; 1 man) unknown died of hypothermia near the Mergasur River (IQ) close to Turkish border; 4 survivors Kurdistan24/DailySabah/IOM/Rudaw
    26/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown died of cardiac arrest, body found in Tarifa, Cádiz (ES) EPress/IOM/JuntaAndalucía
    25/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found at Levante beach in Cádiz (ES) EPress/AndalucíaInfo/IOM/CostaCádiz
    21/02/18 2 N.N. (1 woman; 1 man) unknown presumed drowned, bodies found 25 nautical miles north of Béni-Saf in Ain Témouchent (DZ) SoirAlgerie/Algérie360/IOM/Réf
    18/02/18 2 N.N. unknown presumed drowned, bodies found 8 nautical miles north of Bouzedjar beach in Ain Témouchent DZ) Réflexion/IOM Algeria
    17/02/18 1 N.N. unknown drowned, body found 10 km off coast of Benabdelmalek Ramdane in Mostaganem (DZ) IOM Algeria/TheHuff
    16/02/18 1 N.N. unknown presumed drowned, body retrieved in Zawiyah (LY) IOM Libya
    16/02/18 1 N.N. unknown presumed drowned, body retrieved in Tripoli (LY) IOM Libya
    16/02/18 1 N.N. unknown presumed drowned, body found on Madagh beach, Aïn El Kerma, west of Oran (DZ) ElW/Réf/IOM
    15/02/18 11 N.N. unknown presumed drowned, bodies retrieved in Zuwara (LY) IOM Libya
    15/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found on Bouzedjar beach in Ain Témouchent (DZ) AlgériePresse/QUOTI/Réf/IOM
    15/02/18 2 N.N. (2 men) unknown presumed drowned, bodies found on Andalouses beach, Bousfer, west of Oran (DZ) ElW/Réf/IOM
    14/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found on Sbiaat beach in El Messaid, Ain Témouchent (DZ) RadioAlg/QUOTI/Réf/IOM
    14/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown presumed drowned, body found on Sassel beach near Ouled Boudjemaa, Ain Témouchent (DZ) RadioAlg/QUOTI/Réf/IOM
    14/02/18 19 N.N. (4 children; 1 woman; 14 men) Somalia, Eritrea died in vehicle accident 60 km southeast of Bani Walid (LY); 159 survivors DTM/NationalAE/Reu./MENAFN/IOM Libya
    13/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown drowned, body found at Sidi Mejdoub beach, west of Mostaganem (DZ) Alg24/IOM Algeria
    13/02/18 1 Ayse Abdulrezzak (woman, 37) Turkey drowned when boat sunk in the Evros River on Turkish-Greek border; teacher fleeing crackdown in Turkey Reu./TDEMD/IOMTurkey/TurkeyPurge/TRMinute
    13/02/18 1 Ibrahim Selim (boy, 3) Turkey missing after boat sunk in the Evros River on Turkish-Greek border; was fleeing post-coup crackdown in Turkey Reu./TDEMD/IOM Turkey/TurkeyPurge/TRMinute
    13/02/18 1 Aslı Doğan (woman, 27) Turkey missing after boat sunk in the Evros River on Turkish-Greek border; was fleeing post-coup crackdown in Turkey Reu./TDEMD/IOM Turkey/TurkeyPurge/TRMinute
    13/02/18 1 Fahrettin Dogan (man, 29) Turkey missing after boat sunk in the Evros River on Turkish-Greek border; was fleeing post-coup crackdown in Turkey Reu./TDEMD/IOM Turkey/TurkeyPurge/TRMinute
    13/02/18 1 Ugur Abdulrezzak (man, 39) Turkey missing after boat sunk in the Evros River on Turkish-Greek border; was fleeing post-coup crackdown in Turkey Reu./TDEMD/IOM Turkey/TurkeyPurge/TRMinute
    13/02/18 1 Halil Munir Abdulrezzak (boy, 3) Turkey drowned when boat sunk in the Evros River on Turkish-Greek border; son of teacher fleeing crackdown in Turkey Reu./TDEMD/IOM Turkey/TurkeyPurge/TRMinute
    13/02/18 1 Enes Abdulrezzak (boy, 11) Turkey drowned when boat sunk in the Evros River on Turkish-Greek border; son of teacher fleeing crackdown in Turkey Reu./TDEMD/IOM Turkey/TurkeyPurge/TRMinute
    12/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown drowned, body found near Port of Cabopino in Málaga (ES) Hoy/LV/Onda/IOM
    12/02/18 1 N.N. (girl) unknown presumed drowned, unspecified location in the Strait of Gibraltar between Morocco and Spain Caminando/IOM
    11/02/18 5 N.N. unknown drowned, bodies found 22 miles off Cape of Three Forks in Nador (MA); 29 survivors Caminando/EPress/IOM
    11/02/18 1 N.N. unknown drowned, body found off Bahara beach, Ouled Boughalem, 90 km east of Mostaganem (DZ) ElW/AlgériePresse/IOM
    10/02/18 1 N.N. (man) unknown drowned, body found at Zeralda beach, near Algiers (DZ) Alg24/IOMAlgeria
    09/02/18 3 N.N. (3 men) unknown died of hypothermia, 27 miles off Alboran Island in Alboran Sea between Morocco and Spain; 32 survivors SalvaM/Caminando/IOM
    09/02/18 7 N.N. unknown presumed drowned, bodies retrieved in Zuwara (LY) IOM Libya
    08/02/18 1 N.N. unknown drowned, body found off Kaf Lasfer beach, between Sidi Lakhdar and Hadjadj, 36 km east of Mostaganem (DZ) ElW/Réf/IOM

  • African migrants report torture, slavery in Algeria

    Dozens of Africans say they were sold for labour and trapped in slavery in Algeria in what aid agencies fear may be a widening trend of abusing migrants headed for a new life in Europe.

    Algerian authorities could not be reached for comment and several experts cast doubt on claims that such abuses are widespread in the north African country.

    The tightly governed state has become a popular gateway to the Mediterranean since it became tougher to pass through Libya, where slavery, rape and torture are rife. [nL8N1JX57L] [nL8N1R32QD]

    Amid a surge in anti-migrant sentiment, Algeria since late last year has sent thousands of migrants back over its southern border into Niger, according to the United Nations Migration Agency (IOM), where many tell stories of exploitation.

    The scale of abuse is not known, but an IOM survey of thousands of migrants suggested it could rival Libya.

    The Thomson Reuters Foundation heard detailed accounts of forced labour and slavery from an international charity and a local association in Agadez, Niger’s main migrant transit hub, and interviewed two of the victims by telephone.

    “The first time they sold me for 100,000 CFA francs ($170),” said Ousmane Bah, a 21-year-old from Guinea who said he was sold twice in Algeria by unknown captors and worked in construction.

    “They took our passports. They hit us. We didn’t eat. We didn’t drink,” he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation. “I was a slave for six months.”

    Accounts of abuse are similar, said Abdoulaye Maizoumbou, a project coordinator for global charity Catholic Relief Services. Of about 30 migrants he met who were deported from Algeria, about 20 said they had been enslaved, he said.

    In most cases, migrants said they were sold in and around the southern city of Tamanrasset shortly after entering the country, often by smugglers of their own nationality, he said.

    Some said they were tortured in order to blackmail their parents into paying the captors, but even when the money arrived they were forced to work for no pay, or sold, said Maizoumbou.

    One man told the Thomson Reuters Foundation he slept in a sheep pen and suffered beatings if an animal got sick or dirty.

    “They would bring out machetes and I would get on my knees and apologise and they would let it go,” said Ogounidje Tange Mazu, from Togo.

    The IOM in Algeria has received three reports this year from friends and relatives of African migrants held hostage and forced to work in the country. “It’s probably just an indication that it is happening. How big it is we don’t know,” said its chief of mission Pascal Reyntjens.
    TWO SIDES TO THE STORY

    Several analysts considered it unlikely that slavery was widespread in Algeria, since the country has a functioning judiciary and strong police force - unlike Libya.

    Algerian authorities could not be reached for comment, but a senior official said last week the country is facing a “surge of migration” and needs more help. [nL5N1ST568]

    In a statement this month, the government rejected reports from a U.N. human rights team that its mass deportations of migrants were inhuman, saying that it is doing what is necessary to ensure the safety of its citizens.

    “I would be very surprised that (slavery) would be allowed to happen in Algeria,” said Issandr El Amrani, North Africa project director for the International Crisis Group.

    “The situation is just not comparable to Libya,” he added.

    But in the ghettos of Agadez, Niger’s main transit hub, some people told a different story.

    “What happens in Algeria surpasses what happens in Libya,” said Bachir Amma, a Nigerien ex-smuggler who runs a football club and a local association to inform migrants of the risks.

    Migrants in Libya are often starved and beaten by armed groups, and there have been reports of “open slave markets” where migrants are put on sale, according to the U.N. human rights office. [nL8N1R32QD]

    Amma said he had spoken with more than 75 migrants back from Algeria, the majority of whom described slave-like conditions.

    “NGOs don’t know about this because they’re too interested in Libya,” he told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

    In 2016, the IOM surveyed about 6,300 migrants in Niger, most of whom had returned from Algeria and Libya. Sixty-five percent of those who had lived in Algeria said they had experienced violence and abuse, compared to 61 percent in Libya. An estimated 75,000 migrants live in Algeria, the IOM said.

    ($1 = 582.8800 CFA francs)


    https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN1IV1R5-OZATP
    #Algérie #torture #esclavage #esclavage_moderne #migrations #asile #réfugiés #migrants_sub-sahariens

  • Rapport sur l’état des relations #UE - #Algérie dans le cadre de la #PEV rénovée

    Suite aux efforts communs d’harmonisation menés par les Etats membres et l’UE, plus de 507’000 visas de court séjour ont été délivrés à des ressortissants algériens, ce qui place l’Algérie parmi les 7 premiers pays bénéficiaires de tels visas dans le monde. Un renforcement de la coopération entre l’Algérie et les Etats membres en matière de réadmission d es migrants algériens reconnus en situation irrégulière est nécessaire, en témoigne un taux de retour effectif de seulement 17% en 2016 , selon les statistiques européennes (21’925 décisions de retour pour seulement 3745 retours effectifs). Les difficultés principales concernent l’identification des ressortissants en situation irrégulière par les autorités algériennes et la délivrance de laissez-passer consulaires par ces dernières aux personnes concernées, condition préalable à leur réadmission. Pour mémoire, l’Algérie a conclu des accords bilatéraux dans ce domaine avec plusieurs Etats membres de l’UE, et l’UE a un mandat pour la négociation d’un accord de réadmission depuis 2000, mais l’Algérie n’a à ce jour pas confirmés on accord quant au démarrage de négociations en la matière .

    (p.13)

    https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/rapport_sur_l27etat_des_relations_ue-algerie_2018.pdf
    #Europe #EU #accords_de_réadmission #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #sans-papiers #déboutés #visas #taux_d'expulsion #Politique_européenne_de_voisinage
    cc @isskein

    • Report on the state of EU-Algeria relations: implementing a partnership rich in challenges and opportunities

      Between March 2017 and April 2018, the EU and Algeria demonstrated their desire to deepen their political dialogue and cooperation in all partnership areas.

      That is the conclusion of the progress report on the state of EU-Algeria relations published today by the European Commission services and the European External Action Service with a view to the 11th EU-Algeria Association Council in Brussels on 14 May 2018.

      The dialogue has been stepped up through many high-level visits and has been deepened, in particular in the sectors of security, the fight against terrorism, and energy. Tangible progress has also been made in numerous areas ranging from justice, agriculture and fisheries to research and civil protection, in a bilateral or regional framework.

      High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini said: ‘Since the March 2017 Association Council, our relations have been stepped up on both bilateral and regional questions. Our partnership is progressing and consolidating. Based on the constitutional review of 2016, the reform of the political governance system in Algeria remains at the heart of our partnership and has the support of the EU for its implementation, in particular in the fields of justice and participatory democracy. We are also building a relationship of trust with regard to security, aimed at regional stability and the fight against terrorism, to the benefit of our citizens.’

      Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, added: ‘The EU is ready to continue support for reforms, in particular those aimed at diversifying the Algerian economy. We are confident that EU support will help to improve the business climate and develop entrepreneurship. It is in Algeria’s interest and in the EU’s interest too. We hope that this cooperation, which is aimed at strengthening the Algerian economy, will help us to overcome our trade differences and will pave the way to more European investment that will create jobs in the country.’

      The report identifies the progress made by Algeria and the European Union in the areas of mutual interest identified by their Partnership Priorities since they were adopted in March 2017: i) governance and fundamental rights; ii) socio-economic development and trade; iii) energy, environment and climate change; iv) strategic and security dialogue; and v) the human dimension, migration and mobility.

      By means of this report, the European Union reiterates its willingness to boost the EU-Algeria partnership still further and support Algeria in these numerous areas.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3564_en.htm

  • .:Middle East Online:: :.
    http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=88300

    Sixteen percent of teenage girls who marry in Morocco do so under the legal age of 18 compared to no more than 3 percent in Algeria and Tunisia who have the same minimum age for women, according to activists.

    Morocco had hoped to curb child marriages by raising the legal age to 18 from 16 in 2004, yet numbers since then have surged nearly 50 percent to 27,205 in 2016, justice ministry data shows. Activists say the number is higher.

    #maroc

  • Syrian Metal Is War - Full Documentary - YouTube

    Finalement le voilà le docu. J’avais complètement craqué sur ce merveilleux couple de musiciens syriens, leur voyage en forme d’épopée de Syrie aux Pays-Bas où ils se découvrent tout à coup... réfugiés !

    A ne rater sous aucun prétexte

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZP_HV-R-KGg&feature=youtu.be

    Thank you all for your unrelenting support since I started this project a little over four years ago. This film is intended to shed light and preserve the memories of metal artists and fans in war-torn Syria. It was filmed between mid-2013 and late 2014. The film is in no means extensive; it was filmed with a mobile phone and DSLR. Production, travelling, filming, and editing were minimal and utilized DIY methods. It was a personal endeavour and hence naturally limited to my own resources. The footage and project traveled with me across continents, starting in Syria and following through to Algeria, Turkey, Greece, and the Netherlands. I carried it with me while applying for asylum, and it kept me going despite being entirely depleted of both will and resources to continue. Sam Zamrik believed in the project since its conception and its possible effects in bringing exposure to this small, down-trodden Syrian community. He worked on the linguistic presentation of the film, including interviews, translations, and creative writing. Through crowd funding efforts, our friends in Switzerland managed to raise enough money for gear to edit and actually finish the film. Having finalized the film, my intent was to submit it to international festivals, since they would bring the most exposure to the artists. The intended runtime was two hours, but, having to accommodate festivals standards, I cut that to an hour and a half. Despite doing that, it wasn’t accepted. After several tries, I decided to bring the film to its audience; those who are truly interested, who have donated and supported us, and those in the film themselves. The film is now on YouTube. It is accessible to everyone for free. It now belongs to you and what you make of it. Having said that, we will be wholeheartedly accepting donations to the film, as opposed to ticket sales or any revenue. Lastly, we hope you all enjoy the film. Thank you all, Monzer Darwish. Syrian Metal Is War is a mosaic anthology of the different realities and personal experiences of metalheads in a war-torn Syria, the consequences they brought about, and the outpour of hope from destruction and chaos among peers who have only music and war in common.

  • Algeria prohibits ‘immigration’ of doctors – Middle East Monitor
    https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180129-algeria-prohibits-immigration-of-doctors

    The National Council of the Deanship of Algerian Doctors issued instructions prohibiting all hospitals and health institutions from issuing work and good conduct certificates it immigrants.

    These instructions coincided with the new facilities announced by France to Algerian doctors and the recognition of their certificates that will enable them to work abroad.

     Doctors were surprised by the instructions of the National Council of the Deanship, which requires the suspension of the granting of work and good conduct certificates for doctors and freezing the submission of files until the issuance of other instructions, without specifying the reasons behind this or the period of suspension.

    Al-Shorouq reported that the number of Algerian doctors in France amounted to more than 15,000 which is equivalent to 25 per cent of the competent medical staff, in addition to doctors in various countries of the European Union.

  • ’We look at them like donkeys’: What Israel’s first ruling party thought about Palestinian citizens -

    Quand Ben Gourion et le parti travailliste israélien (la “gauche”) qualifiaient des Palestiniens d’Israël d’ “ânes” et réfléchissait sur la manière de les expulser

    Israel’s first ruling party, Mapai, was torn about the status of Arabs who remained in the country after the War of Independence; almost 70 years later, the ’Arab question’ has yet to be answered
    By Adam Raz Jan 13, 2018
    read more: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.834355

    “The Arab question in Israel” was the term used in the top ranks of Mapai, the ruling party in the young State of Israel – and forerunner of Labor – to encapsulate the complex issue that arose after the War of Independence of 1948-49. In the wake of the fighting, and the armistice agreements that concluded the war, about 156,000 Arabs remained within Israel (out of an estimated 700,000 before the war), accounting for 14 percent of the nascent state’s population. So it was with some justification that Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett stated in a meeting of Mapai Knesset members and the party’s senior leadership, on June 18, 1950, that “this is one of the fundamental questions of our policy and of the future of our country.” He added that the issue was one “that will determine the direction of the country’s morality,” for “our entire moral stature depends on this test – on whether we pass it or not.”
    Almost 70 years later, the “Arab question in Israel” continues to pose a conundrum for politicians when they address the issue of the status of Palestinian citizens of Israel (or, as they are often imprecisely called, “Israeli Arabs”).
    The minutes of the meetings held by Mapai, which are stored in the Labor Party Archive in Beit Berl, outside Kfar Sava, attest to the deep dispute in the party over two conflicting approaches concerning the Arabs in Israel. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and his associates – Moshe Dayan (Israel Defense Forces chief of staff 1953-1958) and Shimon Peres, at the time a senior official in the Defense Ministry – urged a policy of segregation and a hard hand against what he argued was a communal threat to national security; while Sharett and other Mapai leaders – Pinhas Lavon, Zalman Aran, David Hacohen and others – promoted a policy of integration.

    The disagreement between Ben-Gurion and Sharett mirrored the respective approaches held by the two regarding the Arab world in general. Sharett was critical of Ben-Gurion’s policy, which he said, held that “the only language the Arabs understand is force,” and called for an approach that preferred the “matter of peace.” Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, then a Knesset member, and later Israel’s second president (1952-1963), summed up succinctly the alternatives in a meeting of the Mapai MKs several weeks later, on July 9, 1950: “The question is the attitude the state takes toward the minorities. Do we want them to remain in the country, to be integrated in the country, or to get out of the country We declared civic equality irrespective of race difference. Does this refer to a time when there will be no Arabs in the country? If so, it’s fraud.”
    ’Transfer’ option
    The discussions within the party were quite freewheeling, even if speakers frequently expressed concern of leaks to the press, which could have lead to international pressure on Israel to improve the treatment of its Arab citizens. Indeed, the future of the relations between the peoples who inhabited the country demanded weighty political decisions. Among the issues in question: the right to vote, the Absentees’ Property Law, the status of the Arab education system, membership of Arab workers in the Mapai-affiliated Histadrut federation of labor, and more.

    One proposition that arose frequently in the discussions was that of a “transfer” – the expulsion of the Arabs who continued to reside in Israel – a term that some found grating already then. In the June 1950 meeting, Sharett took issue with the allegation, voiced by Ben-Gurion and his supporters, that the Arabs in Israel were a “fifth column.” That was a simplistic assumption, Sharett said, “which needs to be examined.” As he saw it, the fate of the relations between the two peoples depended overwhelmingly on the Jews. “Will we continue to fan the flames?” Sharett asked, or try to douse them? Even though a high-school education was not yet mandatory under law (and the state was not obligated to offer one), a large number of the Jewish youth in the country attended high school, and Sharett thought that the state should establish high schools for the Arabs as well. Israel needs “to guarantee them their cultural minimum,” he added.
    For political reasons, the segregationists tended to ignore the difference between the Arabs living in Israel and those who were left on the other side of the border following the war, many of whom made attempts to “infiltrate” and return to their homes. Sharett took the opposite view: “A distinction must be made between vigorous action against Arab infiltration” and “discrimination against Arabs within the country.”

    David Ben-Gurion. Fritz Cohen / GPO
    Ranking figures such as Sharett and Lavon, who was defense minister in 1954-55, viewed positively a further exodus of Arabs from the country, but only “by peaceful means.” Sharett vehemently objected to the position taken by Dayan, who not only wanted to bring about a situation in which there would be fewer Arabs in Israel, but sought to achieve this through active expulsion. In Sharett’s view, “We must not strive to do this by a wholesale policy of persecution and discrimination.” Sharett spoke of “distinctly unnecessary forms of cruelty, which are tantamount to an indescribable desecration of God’s name.”
    Dayan, notwithstanding the fact that he was serving in the army at the time – as head of Southern Command – participated in Mapai’s political meetings and helped set public policy. He was one of the leaders of the aggressive stance against the country’s Arabs and was against a proposal that they should serve in the army (an idea that came up but was shelved). He opposed granting the Arabs “permanent-citizenship certificates,” opposed compensating those who had been dispossessed of their land, and in fact opposed every constructive action that could contribute to bridge-building between the peoples. “Let’s say that we help them live in the situation they are in today” and no more, he proposed.
    Dayan’s approach remained consistent over the years, and conflicted with the view taken by Sharett and the stream in Mapai that he represented. Speaking in the same June 1950 meeting, Dayan asserted, “I want to say that in my opinion, the policy of this party should be geared to see this public, of 170,000 Arabs, as though their fate has not yet been sealed. I hope that in the years to come there will perhaps be another possibility to implement a transfer of these Arabs from the Land of Israel, and as long as a possibility of this sort is feasible, we should not do anything that conflicts with this.”
    Dayan also objected to Sharett’s proposals to improve the level of education among the country’s Arabs. “It is not in our interest to do that,” he said. “This is not the only question on which the time for a final solution has not yet arrived.”
    Zalman Aran, a future education minister, objected to the military government that had been imposed on Israel’s Arabs at the time of statehood and remained in effect until 1966. Under its terms, Arabs had to be equipped with permits both to work and to travel outside their hometowns, which were also under curfew at night. “As long as we keep them in ghettos,” Aran said, no constructive activity will help. Lavon, too, urged the dismantlement of the military government. In 1955, a few months after resigning as defense minister, he savaged the concept at a meeting in Beit Berl. “The State of Israel cannot solve the question of the Arabs who are in the country by Nazi means,” he stated, adding, “Nazism is Nazism, even if carried out by Jews.”
    Even earlier, Lavon was a sharp critic of the line taken by Dayan and other advocates of transfer. At a meeting of another Mapai leadership forum, on May 21, 1949, he said acidly, “It’s well known that we socialists are the best in the world even when we rob Arabs.” A few months later, on January 1, 1950, in another meeting, he warned, “It is impossible to take action among the Arabs when the policy is one of transfer. It is impossible to work among them if the policy is to oppress Arabs – that prevents concrete action. What is being carried out is a dramatic and brutal suppression of the Arabs in Israel... Transfer is not on the cards. If there is not a war, they will not go. Two-hundred thousand Arabs will be citizens in terms of voting... As the state party, we must set for ourselves a constructive policy in the Arab realm.”
    Back in December 1948, during the discussions on granting the right to vote for the Constituent Assembly – Israel’s first parliamentary institution, which was elected in January 1949, and a month later became the “Israel Knesset” – Ben-Gurion agreed to grant the right to vote to the Arabs who had been in the country when a census was taken, a month earlier. About 37,000 Arabs were registered in the census. The decision to enfranchise them apparently stemmed from party-political considerations. The thinking was that most of them would vote for Mapai.
    This assessment was voiced in the discussions on the Citizenship Law in early 1951, when Ben-Gurion expressed the most assertive opinion. He refused to grant the right to vote to the Arabs who were living in the country lawfully (as Sharett demanded) but who had been elsewhere during the census (because they had fled or had been expelled in the wake of the war); or to those Arabs who resided in the “Triangle” (an area of Arab towns and villages on the Sharon plain), which was annexed to Israel only in April 1949, under the armistice agreement with Jordan. “Is there no country in the world that has two types of citizens in elections [meaning voting and non-voting],” Ben-Gurion asked rhetorically in a meeting of Mapai MKs on February 20, 1951.

    Moshe Dayan. Fritz Cohen / GPO
    In the view of Sharett, who submitted a conflicting draft resolution, it would not be possible to defend “this situation in regard to ourselves and in regard to these Arabs, and in regard to the Arabs in Israel as a whole and in terms of world public opinion. Accordingly, I suggest granting them the right to vote... Discriminate only against the Arabs who entered Israel without permission.”
    Sharett maintained that Ben-Gurion had not given consideration to the root of the problem. “Terrible things” were being done against Arabs in the country, he warned. “Until a Jew is hanged for murdering an Arab for no reason, in cold blood, the Jews will not understand that Arabs are not dogs but human beings.” Sharett’s view carried the day in the vote, and the Arabs in the Triangle voted in the elections.
    In the July 9, 1950, meeting, MK David Hacohen disputed the argument that discrimination against the Arabs and the institution of the military government were essential for the country’s security. Assailing the Absentees’ Property Law – a series of measures that allowed the state to expropriate land and homes abandoned by Palestinians who were displaced during the war, even if they subsequently returned to the country – he said, “I don’t know whether it was clear to us all, when we voted, how grave it is.” He noted that, “According to the law, when an Arab dies, his property does not go to his wife but to the Custodian of Absentees’ Property It is inconceivable for us to declare equality of all citizens and at the same time have a law like this on the books.”
    Apparently, no one took issue with the next comparison Hacohen drew: “These laws that we are coming up with in regard to Israel’s Arab residents cannot even be likened to the laws that were promulgated against the Jews in the Middle Ages, when they were deprived of all rights. After all, this is a total contrast between our declarations and our deeds.”
    A similar approach was voiced during the same meeting by Zalman Aran, who viewed Mapai’s handling of the Arabs as a “process of despair” that must be rejected instead of finding excuses for it.
    “Morally, if we are a movement that does not lie, and we do not want to lie, we are here living a total lie,” he said. “All the books and articles that have been written, and the speeches made internally and for external consumption, are groundless when it comes to implementation. I am not talking about the attitude of individuals in the country toward the Arabs. I am talking about a [policy] line. I reject this line, which has emerged within society and has a thousand-and-one manifestations. I do not accept all the excuses that have been put forward.”
    Taking issue with Dayan’s approach, Aran compared the situation of the Arabs in Israel with the situation of Jews in other countries. “On the basis of what we are doing here to the Arabs, there is no justification for demanding a different attitude toward Jewish minorities in other countries I would be contemptuous of Arabs who would want to form ties with us on the basis of this policy. We would be lying in the [Socialist] Internationale, we are lying to ourselves and we are lying to the nations of the world.”
    Dayan – still an officer in uniform, it must be remembered – objected to the opinions voiced by Hacohen and Aran, and saw no reason to draw a distinction between the Arab public in Israel and Arabs in enemy countries. “I am far more pessimistic about the prospect of viewing these Arabs as loyal,” he countered.

    Moshe Sharett. Frank Scherschel
    Flawed democracy
    During the same period of a decade-plus when Ben-Gurion was premier, a political battle raged in Mapai over the continued existence of the military government. Ben-Gurion persistently defended the military government, which he saw as a “deterrent force” against the Arabs in Israel. In a meeting of the Mapai Secretariat on January 1, 1962, he railed against the “dominant naivete” of those, such as Sharett and Aran, who do not understand the Arabs, and warned of the possible consequences: “There are people living under the illusion that we are like all the nations, that the Arabs are loyal to Israel and that what happened in Algeria cannot happen here.”
    He added, “We view them like donkeys. They don’t care. They accept it with love...” To loosen the reins on the Arabs would be a great danger, he added: “You and your ilk” – those who support the abolition of the military government or making it less stringent – “will be responsible for the perdition of Israel.” A decade earlier, on January 15, 1951, Shmuel Dayan, Moshe Dayan’s father, a Mapai leader and longtime Knesset member, had voiced similar sentiments in a meeting of Mapai MKs. The Arabs, he said, “could be good citizens, but it’s clear that at the moment they become an obstacle, they will constitute a terrible danger.”
    A decade later, Aran offered an opposite assessment of the situation. Speaking at a meeting of the Mapai Secretariat in January 1962, he maintained that it was the military government that “is exacerbating the situation.” He also rejected the Algeria analogy. On the contrary, he thought, the existence of the military government would not delay an Arab uprising but would only spur it. He reiterated his critique of the early 1950s a decade later. He was against a situation in which the Arabs are “second-class” citizens who lack rights like the Jews, and he was critical of both himself and his colleagues: “We accepted this thing, we became accustomed to it... We took it in stride... It’s hard to swallow... No Arab in the State of Israel is able, needs to, is capable of – whatever you give him economically, educationally – accepting that he is a second-class citizen in this country. I think that the world does not know the true situation. If it did, it would not let us keep going on this way.”
    Already then, Finance Minister Levi Eshkol, under whose term as prime minister the military government would be abolished, foresaw the dire consequences: “It would not surprise me if something new suddenly emerges, that people will not want to rent a stable – or a room – to an Arab in some locale, which is the [logical] continuation of this situation. Will we be able to bear that?”
    One person who was not impressed by such arguments was the deputy defense minister, Shimon Peres. In a Mapai Secretariat meeting on January 5, 1962, he maintained that in practice, the military government “is not a strain on the Arabs.” The military government, he added, was [effectively] created by the Arabs, “who endanger Israel and as long as that danger exists, we must meet it with understanding.” In contrast, Isser Harel, head of the Shin Bet security service (1948-1952) and the Mossad (1952-1963), stated in 1966, days after resigning as Eshkol’s adviser for intelligence and security, that “the military government is not a security necessity, and therefore there is no need for its existence. The army should not be dealing with the Arab citizens. That is a flaw in terms of our democracy” (quoted in the daily Maariv, July 10, 1966). That had been the view of the security hawks, including Yigal Allon, since the early 1950s.
    Over the years, it was claimed that the military government had served as a tool in Mapai’s hands for reinforcing its rule, both by giving out jobs and by distributing benefits, and also by intervening in election campaigns through the creation of Arab factions within existing parties that were convenient for the ruling party (and suppressing opponents on the other side). This is not the venue to discuss that allegation – for which evidence exists – but it’s worth noting one of the motifs of the hard-hand policy, which preserved the segregation between Arabs and Jews, as expressed candidly by Ben-Gurion in the meeting of the Mapai Secretariat on January 5, 1962: “The moment that the difference between Jews and Arabs is eliminated, and they are at the same level If on that day there does not exist a regime in a world where there are no more wars, I do not have the shadow of a doubt that Israel will be eradicated and no trace will remain of the Jewish people.”

    Adam Raz
    Haaretz Contributor

  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network
    http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/hrsl

    The High Resolution Settlement Layer (HRSL) provides estimates of human population distribution at a resolution of 1 arc-second (approximately 30m) for the year 2015. The population estimates are based on recent census data and high-resolution (0.5m) satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe. The population grids provide detailed delineation of settlements in both urban and rural areas, which is useful for many research areas—from disaster response and humanitarian planning to the development of communications infrastructure. The settlement extent data were developed by the Connectivity Lab at Facebook using computer vision techniques to classify blocks of optical satellite data as settled (containing buildings) or not. CIESIN used proportional allocation to distribute population data from subnational census data to the settlement extents. The population data have been developed for 18 countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Ghana, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Rwanda, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, and Uganda. Read more about the project here.

    ici une image de Cape Town :

    #population #urban_matter #datasource #cartographie

  • MIGRATORY FLOWS IN NOVEMBER : ARRIVALS DOWN IN ITALY AND GREECE, RISE IN SPAIN
    http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/news/migratory-flows-in-november-arrivals-down-in-italy-and-greece-rise-in

    http://frontex.europa.eu/thumb/Images_News/2017/B33I4720.prop_300x.fe14a18856.JPG

    In November, 13 500 irregular border crossings were detected on the four main migratory routes into the EU, 27% fewer than a year ago.

    The total number of migrants detected on these routes in the first eleven months of this year fell by 62% to around 186 500 from the same period in 2016.

    Central Mediterranean

    The number of migrants arriving in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route in November fell by a tenth from the previous month to 5 300 due to worse weather conditions, following a usual seasonal pattern.

    The total number of arrivals for the first 11 months of 2017 dropped by a third to around 116 400 compared to the same period of last year. Nigerians made up the largest number of irregular migrants coming to Italy so far this year, accounting for one of every seven arrivals. They were followed by nationals of Guinea, Ivory Coast and Bangladesh.

    Western Mediterranean

    Spain continued to see a high number of irregular migrants, with 3 900 arriving in November, more than three times the figure from a year ago. This was also the highest monthly number of migrants detected on this route since Frontex began collecting data in 2009.

    More than half of the migrants were nationals of Algeria and Morocco, whose numbers have been on the rise since the middle of this year. Most of the remaining migrants on this route come from Western Africa.

    Between January and November, there were more than 21 100 detections of irregular border crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, up 140% from the same period of last year.

  • The New Somali Studies – The New Inquiry
    https://thenewinquiry.com/the-new-somali-studies

    Burton had arrived in Zeila, his first stop before traveling through the rest of Somaliland and the broader Horn of Africa. He was keenly interested in the culture, beliefs, and practices of the curious “Somali race” that he encountered, and he discovered many things about them. He discovered, for example, that the Somalis of Zeila in 1856 believed that fever was connected to mosquito bites, and he speculated that this “superstition probably arises from the fact that mosquitoes and fevers become formidable about the same time.” He also re-discovered what he already knew: that the difference between “superstition” and “fact” could be traced along racial lines and that knowledge and thought was the realm of the European.

    It would not be until 1880 that a French doctor, Charles Louis Alphonse Laveran, would discover the malaria parasite in Algeria, for which he would win the Nobel Prize. Finally, in 1897, a British medical officer in British India, Ronald Ross, would be credited with discovering that malaria was indeed carried by mosquitos.

    Burton’s condescension still characterizes the encounter between European and Somali. When ethnographic observation was crystallized as a methodology and a science, only Europeans were seen as capable of the rigorous analysis, reason, and knowledge production it required. Somalis existed only as the backdrop for their intelligence and understanding, as superstitious, irrational, unsophisticated, and unscientific.

    #CadaanStudies explores the ways in which these colonial epistemologies continue to be the foundation of the field of Somali Studies. It began in response to the total absence of Somali academics and researchers from the editorial and advisory boards of the newly launched Somaliland Journal of African Studies (SJAS), which claimed to have been founded in collaboration with the University of Hargeisa, since denied by the university. But the hashtag exploded after a member of the advisory board, Markus Hoehne, made his own observations about Somalis:

  • Colonial Postcards and Women as Props for War-Making | The New Yorker

    https://www.newyorker.com/books/second-read/colonial-postcards-and-women-as-props-for-war-making?mbid=social_twitter

    When French colonial armies arrived in Algeria in the early twentieth century, they were accompanied by photographers. France had occupied Algeria since 1830—the occupation would last until 1962—and these photographers wanted to take pictures of Algerian women as they’d imagined them: lounging in harems, smoking hookahs, trapped in the prison of their own homes, topless, sexually available. But when they reached the country, they encountered women whose bodies could not be seen. Veiled from head to toe, with only their eyes visible, Algerian women were inaccessible to the photographers’ gaze.
    The photographers were undeterred. They hired models, often from the margins of society, and paid them to pose and to wear costumes. In their studios, the photographers used props and backdrops to create bedroom interiors, decorated spaces with hookahs and coffee pots and rugs to look like harems, and placed bars on windows to produce a sense of imprisonment. If Algerian women would not take off their veils voluntarily, the photographers would pay them to do so.
    These staged photographs, which became picture postcards, are the subject of “The Colonial Harem,” by Malek Alloula, an Algerian poet and literary critic who died, in 2015, as an exile in Paris. The book, which is dedicated to Roland Barthes, was first published, in French, in 1981; it was translated into English by Myrna and Wlad Godzich five years later. Though the photographs that Alloula examines in the book were staged, they were captioned as if they documented life in Algeria. For example, a photograph of two women viewed through a barred window is labelled “Moorish women at home.” Three separate images of a single woman, in the same outfit, are captioned as if she were three different women, from three different places: “Young Bedouin Woman,” “Young Woman from the South,” “Young Kabyl Woman.” A woman shown in a jewelled and tasselled headpiece, her elaborate dress opened to show her breasts, is captioned “Moorish Woman in Housedress.” The images reveal not Algerian women but the colonial photographer’s fantasies about them. They are an illusion.

    #Algérie #colonisation #femmes

  • Foreign ministry says Africa-Israel Summit postponed due to Palestinian pressure
    Sept. 11, 2017 7:59 P.M. (Updated: Sept. 11, 2017 7:59 P.M.)
    http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=779061

    RAMALLAH (Ma’an) — The Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Monday it was instrumental in leading a boycott campaign against the Africa-Israel Summit planned for next month, after organizers of the summit announced the event was “postponed” without providing a future date.

    Last month, reports emerged that several African countries were planning to boycott the summit. South African Ambassador to Lebanon and Syria Sean Benfeldt reportedly said that the country would not take part because the summit was viewed as a step by Israel to normalize relations between Africa and an “occupation state.” Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania also decided to boycott the gathering.

    A statement released by the Israeli foreign ministry Monday morning said that the decision to “postpone” the event, set to take place in Lome in October, came “following the request of the President of Togo and after mutual consultations with the Prime Minister.”

    #Israfrique

  • Die Karabinieri
    http://www.follow-me-now.de/html/body_die_karabinieri.html

    Die Karabinieri
    (Les Carabiniers)
    Frankreich, Italien 1963, 85 Minuten
    Regie: Jean-Luc Godard

    Drehbuch: Jean-Luc Godard, Jean Gruault, Beniamino Joppolo, Roberto Rossellini
    Musik: Philippe Arthuys
    Director of Photography: Raoul Coutard
    Montage: Agnès Guillemot, Lila Lakshmanan
    Produktionsdesign: Jean-Jacques Fabre

    Darsteller: Albert Juross (Michelangelo), Marino Masé (Ulysses), Catherine Ribeiro (Cleopatra), Geneviève Galéa (Venus), Jean Brassat (erster Karabinieri), Gérard Poirot (zweiter Karabinieri)

    Durch! Rücksichtslos!

    „In dealing with war, I followed
    a very simple rule. I assumed I
    had to explain to children not
    only what war is, but what all
    wars have been from the
    barbarian invasions to Korean
    and Algeria, by way of Fontenoy,
    Trafalgar, and Gettysburg.”
    (Jean-Luc Godard)

    #film #guerre

  • Morocco and Algeria keep building more barriers | The Economist
    http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21725576-fences-make-neighbours-poorer-morocco-and-algeria-keep-building-

    AD Algeria and Morocco honoured their agreement back in 1989 to form an economic union, along with Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, they would be among the Middle East’s largest economies. Their poor border regions would be booming crossroads. Over the decade to 2015, reckons the World Bank, their two economies would each have almost have doubled in size.

    Instead, Algeria grew only by 33% and Morocco by 37%, as both governments instead reinforced their barricades. Their north-west corner of Africa remains “the most separated region on the continent”, says Adel Hamaizia, an Algerian economist. While sub-Saharan countries agree common currencies and trade zones, Algeria digs deeper ditches. Morocco revamps its berms and renews its razor wire. Concrete walls rise on both sides. Frustrated families shout greetings across the divide. Tantalisingly, both have built hundreds of kilometres of east-west highways which stop short of their common border.

    #mur #maroc #algérie

  • The Other Side of Colonialism seen from Algeria - My report for @OrientXXI @WardaMD

    In Algiers, what is commemorated on the 8th of May is not the Allied victory over Nazi Germany but the massacres of Algerian separatists by the French in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata and their areas. More than 70 years later and despite a few politicians’ speeches, the “country of human rights” has never yet been able to recognize the criminal nature of colonization and revise its national narrative.

  • Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

    The Panel’s monitoring of the political transition in Libya has focused on the incomplete implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement in the absence of its endorsement by the House of Representatives. This has undermined the legitimacy of the Government of National Accord, nominated by the Presidency Council. The rival Prime Ministers, Abdallah al-Thinni and Khalifa al-Ghweil, continue to challenge the leadership of the country by the Chair of the Presidency Council, Fayez al-Serraj. The Presidency Council has also had great difficulty in implementing social and economic policies, further strengthening the armed and unarmed opposition to its authority.

    To overcome the political stalemate, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya drafted a new road map in October 2016 to amend the Libyan Political Agreement. This led to a regional dialogue initiative sponsored by Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. However, regional divisions continue to constitute an obstacle to a political solution in Libya.

    The political crisis has been further exacerbated by escalating armed conflict. In spite of the liberation of Sirte and segments of Benghazi from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the overall security situation in Libya has deteriorated. Indicative of the insecurity is the growing competition in Tripoli between Misratah- and Tripoli-affiliated armed groups, which has undermined the authority of the Presidency Council and threatened the safety of the capital’s residents.

    Military operations by the Libyan National Army, the Benghazi Defence Brigades and Misratan armed groups in the south and the oil crescent have exposed local populations to increasing violence, including through air strikes. Further threats to security documented by the Panel have included the recruitment of foreign mercenaries by armed groups and the persistent activity of extremist movements.

    Armed groups, some of which have received a mandate or at least recognition from the House of Representatives or the Presidency Council, have not been subject to any meaningful judicial control. This has further increased their involvement in violations of human rights, including kidnappings, arbitrary detentions and summary executions. Cases investigated by the Panel include abuses against Libyan residents of Tripoli and Benghazi, prisoners of war and migrants.

    The Panel documented several instances in which armed groups were involved in actual or potential violations of the arms embargo. These groups’ continuing access to military equipment and related material is also reflected in the escalation of armed conflicts, notably through air strikes. In that respect, the Panel has documented how armed groups from eastern Libya and Misratah have multiplied their air force capacity through transfers of materiel, the refurbishment of previously unserviceable aircraft and the expansion of military airbases. The foreign support for both factions is also highlighted.

    Furthermore, the Panel found evidence of several deliveries, in violation of the arms embargo, of what is often described as non-lethal materiel. The deployment and use of such materiel in the Libyan context has significantly increased insecurity and has undoubtedly led to additional casualties. This is notably the case for (armoured) vehicles and electronic interception equipment.

    In the absence of arms and ammunition management capacity, the risk of diversion remains a major concern, justifying the need for a robust arms embargo. Libyan armed groups engage in arms trafficking both within the country and across its borders, and Libya remains an important hub for illicit arms flows to neighbouring countries. The Panel has documented arms seizures in the Niger and Tunisia, while the lack of access to seizures in other countries remains a problem.

    The Panel finds that the key financial and economic institutions of Libya remain divided and suffer from a lack of oversight and cases of misappropriation. The Presidency Council has been divided over the organization of and appointments in several institutions, and its decisions have been challenged. As a consequence, the loyalty of staff is still divided between the competing authorities, which have each tried to make their own appointments. The divisions continue to threaten the stability of Libya, as shown by the controversy over Central Bank of Libya policies in Tripoli and several unilateral actions taken by its eastern branch.

    The Panel has identified rival managements and their political backers, who continue to attempt to strengthen their position through various strategies, including legal action and support from armed groups. In Tripoli, the interference of armed groups with the management and finances of institutions such as the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Post, Telecommunication and Information Technology Company is worrying and untenable.

    In contrast to these negative developments, the country’s oil sector has stabilized. The warring parties in the oil crescent have largely refrained from damaging oil installations, and they have consistently given authority over the terminals to the National Oil Corporation management, even though control over the region has changed hands repeatedly. Unfortunately, and despite significant efforts by both their managements, the implementation of an agreement to reunite the eastern and western National Oil Corporations failed. Nevertheless, the efforts have resulted in increased oil production.

    The continuing division of the National Oil Corporation will likely lead to renewed attempts to illicitly export crude oil. Sanctions under resolution 2146 (2014) were successfully implemented on one occasion. Meanwhile, the eastern National Oil Corporation has made a first attempt to smuggle a shipment of oil derivatives out of Libya.

    Armed groups and criminal networks continue to exploit different sources of financing, such as the smuggling of migrants and fuel. The Panel has identified networks along the western coastline, which are active in both.

    Several investigations on the asset freeze show the complexity of the finances available to some listed individuals, the beneficiary ownership of which is hidden behind numerous front men and front companies. They also show that transactions in favour of listed individuals are sometimes handled through large sums of cash. In addition, the Panel investigated stolen Libyan assets that were under the control of a listed individual, or at risk of misappropriation, or both. The identification and possible recovery of all these funds will require significant resources and a dedicated effort. This will require the empowerment of Libyan investigators through an indisputable mandate from an uncontested authority.

    http://reliefweb.int/report/libya/final-report-panel-experts-libya-established-pursuant-resolution-1973-201
    #rapport #Libye #détention #détention_arbitraire #prisonniers_de_guerre #armes #commerce_d'armes #pétrole

    Ici un article sur les paragraphes du rapport qui concernent les #migrations :
    https://migrantsatsea.org/2017/06/14/un-report-documents-extensive-and-grave-human-rights-violations-by-li
    #gardes-côtes #Zawiya #asile #réfugiés #smugglers #passeurs

  • Debunking myths about why people migrate across the Mediterranean
    http://theconversation.com/debunking-myths-about-why-people-migrate-across-the-mediterranean-7

    The myth of ‘destination Europe’

    Many people we interviewed did not even know anything about the EU prior to their arrival. Far from planning his journey with Europe as a destination point, one man from the Ivory Coast told us when we spoke to him in Sicily:

    My idea was not to reach Italy. I didn’t know Italy if not for the football. I never thought to come in Europe, because here I have not family. My family is only in Ivory Coast and Burkina. But is my family who pushed me to go to Mali. In Mali there was a war, then I moved to Algeria, otherwise I would have stayed there. I wasn’t lucky enough to stay in Algeria, if not I would have to stay there. I didn’t want to go in Libya, the situation is too crazy to go there. It [was] really hard … to stay in Libya … all these circumstances pushed me to reach here.

    Such unsustainable living situations were reported by many people who travelled to. In Rome, we interviewed a Palestinian-Syrian refugee who had been born in Libya. He told us:

    At first I didn’t want to come to Europe, I wanted to go to another Arabic country. I thought about doing some business in Libya, but then I discovered that there is no security, I can’t be free over there. There is always danger, for everybody. I have discovered a different reality from what I initially imagined in Libya. They treat everyone like slaves.

    This man’s testimony resonates with recent reports of people being sold as slaves or prostitutes in Libya. Even those people aiming to set up a new life in Turkey reported problems in their journeys that drove them to move on. As an Afghan man told us when we spoke to him in Athens:

    I didn’t care about borders. All I cared about was to save my life, seriously. I thought I could find a safe place and find work and that’s all. Maybe in Turkey. Turkey is a good place. But if they find you are illegal in Turkey they will deport you back to Kabul. This is the reason I came here [to Europe].

    #migration #migrants #Europe

  • Saudi Media: Muslim Leaders Invited to Summit with Trump — Naharnet

    http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/229820

    King Abdullah II of Jordan, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Niger’s Mahamadou Issoufou are among leaders invited by Saudi King Salman for a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump.

    The Arab-Islamic-American Summit will be among a series of talks expected to be held in Riyadh on May 20-21, Saudi officials said.

    Trump has frequently been accused of fueling Islamophobia but aides described his decision to visit Saudi Arabia as an effort to reset relations with the Muslim world.

    There will also be a separate meeting between monarchs of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council and Trump, as well as bilateral talks between the Saudi and U.S. leaders, Riyadh’s Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir has said.

    In addition to heads of state from Jordan, Algeria and Niger, the official Saudi Press Agency reported that Salman asked Yemeni President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi and Morocco’s King Mohammed VI to attend.

    The leaders of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Tunisia have also received invitations, the Arab News daily reported on Wednesday.

  • Borderlands - Power and Peripheries :

    http://prisms.delma.io/borderlands/en

    Signalé ce matin par l’ami @alaingresh que je remercie beaucoup

    “A dynasty is stronger at its centre than it is at its border regions,” ​wrote the 14th-century Maghrebi scholar and statesman Ibn Khaldun.

    Today, his observation continues to inform our understanding of the challenges facing states and societies in the Maghreb.

    Sharing a history of trans-Saharan trading, a patchwork of ethnicities, and modern borders that define post-colonial states, the borderlands between Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are at the nexus of the national and transnational.

    Well before the first ripples of upheaval in Tunisia scattered across the region in 2011, smuggling, extremism, and conflict challenged the perception of these borders as fixed and inviolable. The uprisings that subsequently engulfed the region amplified these powerful transnational currents.

    What follows is the story of borderlands, the often overlooked stage in this regional drama.

  • MEDU - MAPPA INTERATTIVA

    http://esodi.mediciperidirittiumani.org

    Je ne connaissais pas (aussi ce lien : http://www.mediciperidirittiumani.org/en)

    cc @cdb_77

    EXODI is an interactive web map built upon testimonies of 1,000 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa that were collected in nearly three years of activity (2014-2016) by the operators and volunteers of Medici per i Diritti Umani/Doctors for Human Rights (MEDU).They are part of those 730 thousand men, women and children landed on Italian shores in the last 15 years, of which more than half in the last 32 months. The map describes in the simplest and detailed way the Migratory Routes from Sub-Saharan Countries to Italy, the difficulties, the violence, the tragedy and hopes encountered during the trip by the protagonists. This map is addressed to all those who want to understand and deepen the human experience marking our time. In this sense, EXODI is not only a map showing the stages and paths, as well as a report with data and statistics, but above all, a testimony that describes life stories. It is an interactive and in progress web map that will be periodically updated with new testimonies gathered from all those who will share the story of their own journey. The information was collected in Sicily (in the Centres of Special Reception for Asylum Seekers/CAS of Ragusa and in the Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers/CARA of Mineo) and in Rome (in informal reception centres and at Medu Psychè Centre for rehabilitation of victims of torture). Testimonials were also collected in Ventimiglia and Egypt, specifically in Aswan and Cairo. In all these places Medu’s work guarantees social and health support to migrants, first medical assistance as well as medical and psychological rehabilitation services for victims of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. Through updated data EXODI aims also to describe the physical and mental consequences of the journey on the health of an entire generation of young Africans; a journey in which, as a witness said, “you are no longer considered as a human being”.

    #migrations #réfugiés #asile #circulations #itinéraires