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  • Puisque le nom de Tammam Salam circule pour être le prochain Premier ministre libanais, j’ai effectué une recherche dans les #cablegate de #Wikileaks. A priori, rien de bien intéressant.

    05BEIRUT654, Lebanon Biographies of Potential Prime Ministers, 3 mars 2005
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05BEIRUT654.html

    Tammam Salam, former Member of Parliament
    –----------------------------------------

    ¶7. Salam was born in Beirut in 1945. The Salam family is one of the prominent traditional Sunni political families of Beirut. His late father was one of the heroes of Lebanon’s independence in 1943. Hariri’s political and financial powers undermined the role of the Salam family in Beirut. He is the son of former Prime Minister Saeb Salam.

    Salam was elected a Member of Parliament in 1996. He lost his seat in 2000 because of the late Prime Minister Hariri’s efforts against him. Salam was trying to mend fences with the Hariri camp in early 2005, ahead of the Spring Parliamentary elections. When Speaker Berri launched his response to the Bristol opposition group meetings, Salam participated in Berri’s counterpart conclave known as “Ain Tineh.” Salam abstained from attending the subsequent meeting “Ain Tineh II” after Hariri’s assassination.

    08BEIRUT1699, Lebanon: Jumblatt peased with his U.S. visit, 28 novembre 2008
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08BEIRUT1699.html

    ¶13. (C) Jumblatt worried that the recent wave of Lebanese officials visiting Syria would continue indefinitely. Hamadeh noted that President Sleiman asked Defense Minister Elias Murr to visit his counterpart in Damascus, but wondered why Culture Minister Tammam Salam needed to go now as well. “We should not send too many at one time,” said Hamadeh.

    09BEIRUT495, Lebanon: UNRWA director says Nahr al-Barid reconstruction must begin now, 30 avril 2009
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BEIRUT495.html

    HISTORY HOLDS UP CONSTRUCTION
    –----------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Another issue that has come up recently is the discovery of an archaeological site on the grounds of the Nahr al-Barid camp. Two, 3,000 year-old sarcophagi were discovered on the camp site. According to Lebanese law, the GOL is responsible for preserving the site. There exists a number of options on how to do this. However, UNRWA favors leaving the site as is and building around/above the archaeological find (known as back-filling), as it is the quickest and easiest option. Minister of Culture, Tammam Salam’s recommendation on how to preserve the site is needed before construction can begin. Lombardo asked the Ambassador to speak with Salam to urge him to support this option.

    09BEIRUT967, Legal challenge adds delays to Nahr al-Barid reconstruction, 27 août 2009 http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09BEIRUT967.html

    LATE-BREAKING LEGAL CHALLENGE FROM AOUN
    –------------------

    ¶2. (C) In mid-August, Michel Aoun filed a lawsuit with the Shura court requesting an injunction against the backfilling of recently discovered Roman ruins underneath areas of the Nahr al-Barid (NAB) Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. The basis for the suit is how to best preserve the remains of the Roman village discovered during rubble and UXO removal. The Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA) earlier in the year carried out a extensive survey at the site and, with cabinet approval, agreed that construction could continue if the ruins were “backfilled” with compressed soil at least one meter above the tallest portion of the ruins after UXO and rubble removal. Caretaker Culture Minister Tammam Salam told us on August 25 that Aoun was demanding the GOL relocate the camp to new land, an option already studied and rejected due to the cost and procedural delays in appropriating the land. Salam described Aoun’s demand as disingenuous since, were the GOL to appropriate new land, Aoun would accuse the GOL of instituting a permanent resettlement plan or “tawteen” for the refugees, a policy universally rejected across the Lebanese political spectrum. One of the issues being considered by the court is whether Aoun has legal standing for the suit, either as a private citizen or an MP.

    ¶3. (C) The GOL filed an appeal to Aoun’s lawsuit, caretaker Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar confirmed to Ambassador on August 14. Najjar said that both Aoun and the GOL had one month to prepare their cases. Meanwhile, on August 25 caretaker PM Siniora met with Salam, the DGA, the secretary general of the cabinet and a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) representative to “consolidate” the government’s position before presenting their appeal to the court later in September. Salam, who underscored earlier acceptance by some members of the opposition of the DGA’s proposal, noted that two of the three judges on the State Council, which must rule on the appeal, are Aoun supporters. On August 26 UNRWA’s Deputy Director for Lebanon Roger Davies told the Ambassador the court had ordered the previously agreed-upon work on backfilling to cease while the case is adjudicated. Only archeological surveying, rubble and UXO removal will continue. Davies said that Siniora had advised UNRWA on August 26 to obey the instruction, which asserting that the GOL was “100 percent behind” the NAB reconstruction project. Davies told us August 27 that UNRWA planned to order its contractor to cease backfilling operations on August 31. According to Regional UNRWA Director Filipo Grandi, the end of October was previously the projected date to complete the clearance work and begin constructing building foundations.

    09BEIRUT973, With cabinet negotiations stalled, Hariri hints at brinkmanship, 28 août 2009
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09BEIRUT973.html

    AOUN THE PROBLEM?
    OR HARIRI?
    –----------------

    ¶4. (C) The General does not fold easily, however, and underscored that his demands are firm and he will not “visit” anyone, adding cheekily that if “someone” wants to negotiate, he can visit the broad terrace of Aoun’s house. Caretaker Minister of Culture and Future Party stalwart Tammam Salam told the Ambassador August 25 that despite being “unstable,” Aoun is extremely intelligent, a political animal who does his homework and commits himself to a plan. “Even his allies can’t reel him in,” said Salam. “With or without the blessing of Syria, he will do what he wants.” Alain Aoun explained to PolChief August 26 that the General’s obstinacy was the result of Hariri’s marginalizing him (reftel) and insisted Hariri will need to find a way to meet with the General in order to move forward.

    ¶5. (C) Hariri has remained stoic in his responses to Aoun’s recent rants, winning praise from his allies, including Salam, who assessed that his performance has been “perfect” to date. Nonetheless, Hariri’s attempts to isolate Aoun have brought criticism from the opposition (reftel). Opposition MP Yassine Jaber, who is closely allied to Nabih Berri’s Amal party, suggested Hariri should have started negotiating with Aoun from the beginning instead of expecting Hizballah to push him. Indeed, Raad has insisted consistently in his public comments that Hizballah is Aoun’s ally, but not his mediator.

    […]

    OUTSIDE FORCES
    –-------------

    ¶9. (C) Many contacts still contend that the Hariri-Aoun spat cannot be the only thing holding up the government and that outside pressures are the real source of stalemate. Salam suggested that Syria, working from a strengthened regional and international position, must be working to freeze the process. Jaber assessed that the Egyptians had been interfering in Lebanon’s cabinet formation to serve its own regional interests. Numerous Embassy interlocutors insist that nothing can move forward in Lebanon until the Saudis and Syrians return to the negotiating table. The mood of many is summed up by Jumblatt’s comment to the Ambassador that Lebanon cannot form a government “while Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting from Yemen to Iraq.”

    09BEIRUT1214, New lebanese cabinet announced, 10 novembre 2009
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09BEIRUT1214.html

    ¶7. (U) The following ministers were not returned in the new cabinet: Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, Deputy Prime Minister Issam Abou Jamra, Finance Minister Mohammad Chatah, Social Affairs Minister Mario Aoun, Industry Minister Ghazi Zoayter, Tourism Minister Elie Marouni, Culture Minister Tammam Salam, Environment Minister Antoine Karam, Minister of the Displaced Raymond Audi, Administrative Reform Minister Ibrahim Shamseddine, Youth and Sports Minister Talal Arslan, Education Minister Bahia Hariri, Foreign Affairs Minister Fawzi Salloukh, Energy and Water Minister Alain Tabourian, Agriculture Minister Elie Skaff, State Minister Ali Qanso, State Minister Khaled Qabbani, and State Minister Nassib Lahoud.



  • Ibrahim al-Amine commente dans le Akhbar la publication de nouveaux documents #Wikileaks, qui mettent en cause des dignitaires chiites collaborant avec l’ambassade américaine contre le Hezbollah. Al-Amine est semble-t-il très remonté contre « les traîtres ». Je suppose que ça sortira prochainement dans la version anglaise.
    http://al-akhbar.com/node/167331

    في ردود الفعل المنظورة وغير المنظورة على نشر «الأخبار» وثائق جديدة من «ويكيليكس» عن بعض الشخصيات الشيعية اللبنانية، يبدو أن بيننا من لم يتعلم الدرس، ولم يخجل من نفسه أمام نفسه وأمام أولاده وإخوته وأهله. ويبدو أكثر أن بيننا من تجاوز حد الوقاحة الى حد الجرم في إشهار ارتباطه المشبوه مع المجرم الاميركي. ألا يعتقد هؤلاء، (أم أنهم يحتاجون الى مفسر وإلى دليل) بأن علاقتهم بالسفارات الأميركية في لبنان، ومشاركتهم الإدارة الأميركية العمل ضد المقاومة في لبنان، ما هو إلا وجه واضح وفاضح من التعامل مع إسرائيل؟


  • Conflit en Colombie : La Norvège au centre des efforts de paix - Ouverture début octobre 2012 à Oslo des pourparlers de paix

    La presse a annoncé que Jan Egeland, Jennifer Schirmer et Dag Nylander sont "nommés" pour faciliter les pourparlers de paix qui devraient débuter à Oslo en octobre 2012. Deux d’entre eux n’étaient apparemment pas au courant, mais il se disent heureux d’avoir été choisis... Seront présents des représentants des FARC et de l’ELN et Juan Manuel Santos qui représentera les autorités colombiennes.

    Jennifer Schirmer est chercheur au Centre pour l’environnement et le développement de l’Université d’Oslo, et travaille depuis 10 ans sur des projets de paix en Colombie.

    Jan Egeland a une longue expérience des pourparlers de paix. Homme politique et diplomate, il est aujourd’hui Conseiller spécial des Nations unies sur les questions de prévention et de règlement des conflits avec le rang de Secrétaire général adjoint

    Dag Nylander est un ancien chargé d’affaires de l’ambassade de Norvège à Bogota , il a été de 2009 à 2011 "représentant spécial pour le ministère des affaires étrangères en relation avec les questions liées au processus de paix en Colombie".

    Il est cité dans un câble diplomatique confidentiel rendu public par Wikileaks daté d’avril 2007 (quelques jours avant la reprise des pourparlers de paix qui ont eu lieu à Cuba) qui révèle comment les chancelleries occidentales à Bogota essayaient de faire pression sur l’ELN pour amener au moins ceux de leurs membres "qui n’avaient pas commis d’atrocités".

    Voir le câble ici ---> http://leaks.hohesc.us/?view=07BOGOTA2283

    Selon NTB, l’ambassadeur de Norvège à Cuba, John Petter Opdahl, sera sans doute présent à une réunion entre le gouvernement colombien et les représentants des FARC à La Havane le week-end. Le Venezuela sera aussi présent aux côtés de Cuba et de la Norvège.

    Jennifer Schirmer signale toute fois : « il y a un groupe de personnes, autour de l’ancien président Álvaro Uribe, qui n’est pas du tout dans l’état d’esprit de discuter des conditions de la paix. Ils prétendent encore que les FARC et l’ELN ne sont pas fiables, et "qu’on ne négocie pas avec les terroristes." »

    Juan Mauel Santos et l’ex-président Álvaro Uribe ont été des alliés politiques très proches, mais ont profondément divergé dans leur approche des groupes de la guérilla (FARC et ELN).

    http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.8298690

    Publisert 29.08.2012

    Utnevnes som Colombia-meglere – har ikke blitt spurt
    Stridsvogn, Colombia. I nærmere 50 har krigen mellom colombianske myndigheter og de venstreorienterte geriljaene holde landet i et voldelig jerngrep. Nå kan det bære mot slutten, med hjelp fra Norge.

    Jan Egeland, Jennifer Schirmer og Dag Nylander navngis som tilretteleggere for fredssamtaler i Colombia. To av dem er ikke spurt, men stiller gjerne.

    Det er colombianske aviser som navngir Egeland, Nylander og Schirmer som mulige tilretteleggere for konkrete fredssamtaler mellom myndighetene, anført av president Juan Manuel Santos, og FARC-geriljaen.

    #colombie #norvège #négociations-de-paix #pourparlers-de-paix #amérique-du-sud


  • Il n’y a rien d’intéressant dans les #cablegate : seulement la description des préparatifs de « coup démocratique » pour destituer Lugo, dès mars 2009 : PARAGUAYAN POLS PLOT PARLIAMENTARY PUTSCH
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09ASUNCION189.html#

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Rumors persist that discredited General and UNACE party leader Lino Oviedo and ex-president Nicanor Duarte Frutos are now working together to assume power via (mostly) legal means should President Lugo stumble in coming months. Their goal: Capitalize on any Lugo mis-steps to break the political deadlock in Congress, impeach Lugo and assure their own political supremacy. While many predicted political shenanigans in March during the traditional social protest season that accompanies the opening of Congress, little has come of it (largely because Lugo has been careful not to provide the political or legal rope with which to hang him, thus depriving Oviedo and Duarte the numbers in Congress for their supposed “democratic coup”). But that could change quickly here. Mid-March outrage over multi-million dollar subsidies for sesame growers via a discredited NGO was considered as a possible ground for impeachment before Lugo walked away from the program (though the controversy continues). For a president already facing many challenges — internal political struggles, corruption, and the perception that his own leadership style is ineffective — Lugo must now also worry about making a mis-step that could be his last. END SUMMARY.


  • La Jamaa Islamiyah libanaise dans le cablegate.

    Suite au très intéressant article de Scarlett Haddad dans l’Orient-Le Jour consacré à la Jamaa Islamiyah libanaise, que j’ai signalé hier :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/54941
    j’ai fait une recherche dans le #cablegate pour voir si on en trouve des mentions.

    Je n’ai pas trouvé grand chose, mais c’est intéressant : je note que les chrétiens confessionnalistes du 14 Mars soutiennent explicitement l’idée d’une alliance avec la Jamaa Islamiyah.

    9 juin 2008 : MARCH 14 SECURITY MOST IMPORTANT TO CARETAKER SOCIAL AFFAIRS MINISTER NAYLA MOUAWAD AND SON http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08BEIRUT865.html

    In Sidon, the support of MP Bahia Hariri, Saad’s aunt, and the group Jamaa Islamiyah would be important. Nayla relayed that representatives from Jamaa Islamiyah in Sidon visited her the previous month to argue that Hamas is separate from Hizballah. She characterized the politburo’s chief in Lebanon, Ali Sheikh Ammar, as “moderate.”

    2 juillet 2008 : 08BEIRUT963, LEBANON : JUMBLATT REPORTS SAUDIS FOCUSED ON ELECTIONS, RESTRUCTURING THEIR SUPPORT
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08BEIRUT963.html

    Repeating what caretaker Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad told us (reftel), Jumblatt believes it is worth the risk to ally with Sunni group Jamaa Islamiyah because it could mean support for March 14 in Sidon and in the north.

    17 avril 2009 : 09BEIRUT445, LEBANON : MARCH 14 CHRISTIANS STILL FACE INTERNAL CHALLENGES
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BEIRUT445.html

    He [Samir Geagea] added that Saad still needed to negotiate with Jamaa Islamiya, which felt it lost a seat to Siniora’s candidacy in Sidon, and is hoping Saad will “award” the group with a seat in another district.

    14 mai 2009 : 09BEIRUT535, LEBANON : SAAD HARIRI CONFIDENT ON ELECTIONS PROSPECTS
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09BEIRUT535.html

    Hariri said his Future Movement had reached an agreement with Sunni Islamist party Jamaa Islamiya, which will not pursue having candidates in Sidon or anywhere besides Tripoli. The party would keep its candidates there in order to draw away voters from other Islamist parties.


  • IAEA : AMANO READY FOR PRIME TIME
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09UNVIEVIENNA478.html

    In a meeting with Ambassador on the eve of the two-week Board of Governors (BoG) and General Conference (GC) marathon of mid-September, IAEA Director General-designate Yukiya Amano thanked the U.S. for having supported his candidacy and took pains to emphasize his support for U.S. strategic objectives for the Agency. Amano reminded Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make concessions to the G-77, which correctly required him to be fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on every key strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.

    #cablegate #amano #aiea #nucléaire #iran


  • 06BEIRUT489 - 21 février 2006 - Mgle01: Gol Judicial Team Prepares For Un Discusssions On International Tribunal
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06BEIRUT489.html

    Legal restrictions on an international tribunal: Rizk and Sadr said that, after much study, they have reluctantly concluded that Lebanese parliamentary action will be required to establish the tribunal. Whatever the bilateral agreement with the UN, parliamentary endorsement is needed.

    #cablegate #tsl


  • #cablegate : Tiens, je n’avais pas remarqué celui-ci (dans un câble pourtant très important par ailleurs) : ici, le Ministre des télécommunications Marwan Hamadeh prend bien soin de préciser :
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08BEIRUT523.html

    The LBC story was not planted by the GOL, nor planned, but in Hamadeh’s opinion it was no bad thing to get the story out there.

    Parce que sinon, il arrivait au gouvernement libanais de « placer » et « préparer » des histoires sur la LBC ?


  • Pour mémoire : en août 2007 (avec un an d’avance), Hamadeh fait mine de découvrir le réseau de communication du Hezbollah. Les américains écrivent « découvert » entre guillemets et expliquent qu’en gros, tout le monde connaît déjà l’existence de ce réseau.
    #cablegate : LEBANON : HIZBALLAH TELEPHONE NETWORK ’DISCOVERED’
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/08/07BEIRUT1301.html#

    The Ministry of Telecommunications announced it had
    found an illegal telecom network established and operated by
    Hizballah in the parts of Lebanon Hizballah controls.
    Minister of Telecom Marwan Hamadeh initially said the GOL
    would react “fiercely” to what he portrayed as a surprising
    discovery. Embassy contacts indicate privately, however,
    that the existence of the alternate system was well known.
    An ad hoc government committee of four ministries was
    investigating, but two weeks after the announcement of the
    discovery, there was no decision on what action, if any the
    GOL would take. The system links villages in the south to
    the southern suburbs of Beirut, and may also link the Biqaa’
    and even downtown Beirut. Hamadeh says that he will not take
    action without full GOL support.


  • Et là, le Nouvel Obs te présente : « le salafiste nouveau ». C’est comme l’ancien, mais en mieux.
    http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20111114.OBS4493/nous-pronons-un-salafisme-nouveau.html

    - Nous prônons un « salafisme nouveau » tolérant et qui respecterait le droit des nombreuses confessions de Syrie. Il est vrai que j’ai combattu en Afghanistan et en Bosnie et qu’on me présente donc comme un radical. Mais au cours des 6 années que j’ai purgé dans les geôles de Bachar, j’ai changé. J’ai réinterprété certains versets du Coran. Je ne vous considère plus aujourd’hui comme une infidèle. D’ailleurs regardez je ne vous oblige pas à porter le voile, je m’abstiens juste de vous regarder comme me l’a ordonné mon Dieu…

    Le salafiste nouveau a plein d’avantages sur l’ancien : il respecte Israël et ses principaux ennemis sont l’Iran et le Hezbollah.

    Même Israël que je ne porte pas dans mon cœur n’a pas tué autant de musulmans que Assad en 1982 à Hama. Et puis le régime est associé avec notre principal ennemi : l’ayatollah Khamenei et avec leurs sbires du Hezbollah.

    Et tu sais le plus beau ? Tu n’as même pas besoin de traquer l’opposant syrien en exil menacé par les services secrets au Liban pour le rencontrer. Il te suffit de t’adresser au bureau de presse de Saad Hariri (Qoreitem, Beyrouth), qui t’organisera l’entrevue rapidement, en te fournissant la liste des questions pour lesquelles le salafiste nouveau a été entraîné à répondre sans se tromper.

    Et tu obtiendras une « interview » dans le Nouvel Obs signée Sara Daniel qui sera, presque mot pour mot, la traduction de cette interview du Christian Science Monitor par Nicholas Blanford :
    http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2011/0929/Q-A-with-Syrian-jihadist-Minorities-have-nothing-to-fear-in-post-Assad-Sy

    En réalité, le salafiste nouveau apparaît dans les médias pour appeler à l’intervention étrangère (please, bomb my country). Comme ici :
    A Salafi preacher calls for arming the uprising | Syria Revolts
    http://syriarevolts.wordpress.com/2011/10/02/a-salafi-preacher-calls-for-arming-the-uprising

    For the first time an identifiable, though not prominent, Salafi preacher (Loay az-Zoabi) has expressed the necessity of arming the uprising. Claiming the leadership of an unknown group calling itself ‘Believers participate’, Loay az-Zoabi states he has always advised activists, until now, not to take up arms for themselves but would advise defecting soldiers to use their arms to defends protesters.

    ou plus explicitement dans le CSM :

    CSM: But the international community has all but ruled out a Libya-style intervention.

    ZOUABI: A lack of an international intervention will cause a lot of bloodshed. There will be massacres in Syria.

    Curieusement, à ce moment, Zoabi ne se demande pas si les bombardements humanitaires américains et de l’OTAN destinés à apporter la démocratie en Irak, en Afghanistan et en Libye, ont tué plus, ou moins, de musulmans que Hafez As‘ad et Israël réunis.

    Et ça tombe bien, puisque l’autre « reportage » que publie le Nouvel Obs aujourd’hui, c’est la promo de l’« Armée libre » de Syrie.
    http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20111114.OBS4425/syrie-dans-le-maquis-de-l-armee-libre.html

    Classiquement :
    – c’est bourré d’affirmations à caractère confessionnel reprises sans guillemets par la journaliste :

    Très vite, il constate sur le terrain que ses collègues alaouites exécutent les consignes, tandis que les sunnites tirent le plus souvent en l’air.

    même si l’article tente de minorer ensuite :

    Avant tout, Driss aspire à la liberté de culte : “Avec les Alaouites, lorsqu’on prie dans l’armée, on va en prison.” « Ne t’en prends pas aux Alaouites, mais au régime de Bachar. Ne tombons pas dans le piège d’une guerre confessionnelle », corrige Abou Brahim, d’un ton docte. Mais ces précautions de langage ne dureront pas longtemps.

    – et le Hezbollah en cible constante (tiens donc !) :

    Depuis que le Hezbollah a pris le contrôle du gouvernement libanais, les deux forces agissent en commun pour arrêter les opposants syriens qui tentent de fuir leur pays.

    et donc :

    Dans cette région sunnite du Liban, l’ennemi commun, c’est le chiisme sous toutes ses formes, qu’il revête le visage de Hassan Nasrallah, le chef du Hezbollah, ou celui de Bachar al-Assad. Et au cours du dîner, la conversation dérivera vite sur le dessein caché de l’Iran, le pays du mal qui veut convertir le monde musulman au chiisme.

    • Pour mémoire :
      – Des salafistes syriens rencontrent des chrétiens libanais
      http://seenthis.net/messages/36841

      – Saad Hariri aime les frères musulmans (et Khaddam) :

      2006-08-24 (10 jours après la fin des bombardements israéliens que Saad a subis l’Athénée Plaza de Paris) 06BEIRUT2735 - LEBANON : SAAD HARIRI CALLS FOR SYRIAN REGIME
      http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2735.html#

      If the regime were to fall in Syria, who would
      be there to fill in the vacuum? Perplexed that the Alawites,
      who make up only 7-8 per cent of Syria, could rule so
      exclusively as “a family business” over a vast Sunni
      majority, Saad suggested that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,
      in partnership with ex-regime figures like Abdel Halim
      Khaddam and Hikmet Shehabi (“though he’s still close to the
      regime”), could step into the void. Saad claimed that the
      Syrian Brotherhood is similar in character to Turkey’s
      moderate Islamists. “They would accept a Christian or a woman
      as President. They accept civil government. It’s like
      Turkey in Syria. They even support peace with Israel.”
      Saying that he maintains close contact with Khaddam (in
      Paris) and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader-in-exile Ali
      Bayanuni (in London), Saad urged us to “talk to Bayanuni.
      See what he’s like. You will see wonders.”


  • Steven Spielberg censored in Lebanon ? - BlogPost - The Washington Post
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/steven-spielberg-censored-in-lebanon/2011/11/09/gIQAmQ7j5M_blog.html

    Film director Steven Spielberg’s name has been covered up on posters advertising the new Tintin film at a cinema in Lebanon, reports Lebanese site Blog Baladi. The blogger took the following photo at Cinema City in Beirut:

    Last year, a U.S. embassy memo released by WikiLeaks revealed that Spielberg had been blacklisted by the Arab League’s Central Boycott Office in 2006 after making a $1 million donation to Israel during the conflict with Lebanon. Representatives from 14 Arab states voted to ban all films related to Spielberg or his Righteous Persons Foundation.

    Mais vraiment, qu’est-ce qu’ils espèrent : il faudrait que Spielberg donne 1 million de dollars « à Israël » pendant que ce pays est en train de raser toutes les infrastructures du Liban et de massacrer sa population civile, et que tout le monde au Liban trouve super-sympa de continuer à payer pour aller voir ses films ?

    Le coup du million de dollars à Israël par Spielberg en 2006, j’étais passé à côté... #cablegate

    07DAMASCUS409, ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT MEETING : SPIELBERG DESIGNATED - 30 avril 2007
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/04/07DAMASCUS409.html#

    The one addition mentioned was film director Steven Spielberg, who was singled out for his USD one million donation to Israel last year during the summer conflict in Lebanon, according to Ajami. The committee banned all films and other products related to Spielberg or his Righteous Persons Foundation, Ajami said. Generic enforcement guidelines given to ALBO members include the banning of DVD imports and airing of Spielberg,s films.


  • 08BEIRUT459 - Lebanon : Defmin Murr On Transforming The Laf To Support Ct Operations, Unscr 1701, Camps - 3 avril 2008 #cablegate
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08BEIRUT459.html

    Elias Murr dans ses œuvres.

    Ici, il explique sa vision de l’armée libanaise : clairement il ne s’agit pas d’une armée de défense, mais uniquement d’une force spéciale de lutte contre le terrorisme.

    Murr was firm when he said, “we don’t need this heavy army that was trained and equipped by the U.S. in 1983. Things have changed since 9/11 and we need to rely more on special forces and fewer heavy brigades. We need light and medium weapons and attack helicopters to back up the grond troops.” Murr surmises that he needs 10-15,000 Special Forces troops organized in 10-15 Special Forces regiments supported by 20-25,000 conventional troops. He thinks that the army’s current end strength of 60,000 is too large for the missions assigned.

    Pour lutter contre le terrorisme, une vision rigoureusement confessionnelle de l’armée libanaise. Donc : pour Murr, beaucoup plus de chrétiens.

    In a somewhat odd exchange, Murr explained that he wanted to increase the number of Christians in the army by recruiting them for SF units. Citing their reliability, trustworthiness and eagerness to apply for SF, Murr (a Greek Orthodox) told us that Christians are ideal for the mission. Noticing some inquisitive looks from his guests, Murr moved to explain why he needs to focus on recruiting Christians.

    Et beaucoup moins de chiites (qui représenteraient une « menace » pour l’armée libanaise) :

    Murr told us that his recruitment efforts over the last two years have netted 20,000 new troops for the Army at the same time that many draftees have been leaving the army. When this process began, the Shia accounted for 58% of the enlisted force; now they comprise 25% of the enlisted ranks. At the same time, Murr has been able to bring the Christians to 25% and the Sunni/Druze component to 50% of the enlisted ranks. Murr assesses that the Shia no longer “pose a threat” to the LAF, even if Nasrallah were to call on them to leave the army.

    Mais bon, c’est une vision du monde toute bushiste qui est à l’œuvre ici :

    According to Murr, “when you want to fight terrorists, you are fighting Sunni and Shia; you need Christians in special forces to do this mission. If you maximize Christians, you will have the best results.”


  • 08BUCHAREST374, ROMANIA: PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY REQUESTS MILITARY - 15 mai 2008 #cablegate
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08BUCHAREST374.html#par3

    ¶3. (S) Finally Dobre shared “sensitive information” obtained by Romania’s Ambassador in Beirut regarding plans for relocating the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp to the West Bank. Dobre said that there was Saudi support for moving the camp out of Lebanon, and he underscored the critical conditions for the 35K-plus refugees. He asked if the U.S. had any information that could be shared.

    ¶4. (S) Comment/Request for guidance: This is an opportunity for us to have the Romanians reinforce select messages on Palestinian-related issues. The new PA representative in Romania, Ahmed Majdalani, interprets his mandate rather pro-actively, and could be surprising interlocutors with his energy. Nonetheless, the MFA is conducting due diligence in their Middle East policy, and would like a U.S. opinion on these issues in order not to get out of synch with us or upset ongoing negotiations. Please provide guidance on the three issues: PA military cooperation agreement, views on PA’s interests in the MPC (or other regional arrangements), and the Nahr al-Bared camp issue to share with the GOR. End comment/request.

    Signalé par @rumor:
    http://seenthis.net/messages/37106#message37122



  • 15 mai 2008 - 08BEIRUT698 - LEBANON : JUMBLATT WANTS TO BE READY FOR THE « NEXT ROUND » (#cablegate)
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08BEIRUT698.html#

    March 14/Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid Jumblatt told us on May 15 that he wants to prepare his Druze PSP fighters by secretly supplying them with weapons, in order to be ready for the “next round” of fighting with Hizballah. He originally planned to delay going to Doha by three or four days for the Arab League-hosted round of talks (scheduled for May 16) with Lebanon’s political leaders so that he could visit his Druze constituents in the north (19 of whom were killed in the clashes with Hizballah) and make a quick stop to see his friends in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, Jumblatt later called Charge to report that he had received the Saudis’ blessing to go to Doha and planned to depart the following day with Saad Hariri.


  • Oui, il arrive que Marwan Hamadé en fasse un tout petit peu trop. Ici, Boris Boillon finit par trouver que le 14 Mars est une bande de gugusses illuminés. (Au rayon #cablegate réjouissant.)

    08PARIS1855 – 8 octobre 2008 - MARCH 14 SHOOTS ITSELF IN FOOT DURING ELYSEE VISIT
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08PARIS1855.html

    While Hamadeh reportedly left reassured, the visit seems to have further soured the Elysee on the March 14th movement. Boillon, who met separately with the entire group, expressed incredulity at the “stupid ideas” (“I’m sorry, but there’s no other word for them”) which had seized the delegation’s imagination. Hamadeh apparently alluded at one point to rumors that the French and Syrian armies are collaborating on a plan for the Syrian military to reassert control over Lebanon. “What world are they living in? Either they’re joking or they’re truly crazy,” Boillon thought to himself at the time. Boillon accused March 14th of living in a fantasy world fueled by a rumor-mongering Lebanese press, much of which is sympathetic to the Lebanese opposition. “Of course the opposition is going to claim that France is backing them, that’s part of the game,” said Boillon, who insisted that the March 14th leadership should be smart enough not to believe such tripe. But the reality, he lamented, is that March 14th is part and parcel of a political culture mired in navel-gazing and paranoia.


  • 14 décembre 2009 - 09BEIRUT1318 - HARIRI’S DAMASCUS TRIP COMPLICATED BY SYRIAN (#cablegate)
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09BEIRUT1318.html#

    SUMMARY: Lebanese Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar confirmed on December 10 that the GOL had received “warrants” for 23 former and current Lebanese officials and journalists to appear before the Syrian judiciary. The warrants were issued in connection with a case brought in a Syrian court by former General Jamil al-Sayyed, who alleges that those named provided false testimony that led to his detention for four years in connection with the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The official reaction from the GOL has been deliberately muted, according to Naji Abi Assi, DG of the Presidency. Mohammad Chatah, a senior advisor to PM Saad Hariri, characterized the issue as Syria seeing how far it could go without provoking a reaction from Hariri. Some in Hariri’s inner circle have dismissed the warrants as “theatrical,” but are upset that the PM has not reacted. The warrants complicate preparations for Hariri’s planned visit to Damascus. The names of those listed in the warrants are detailed in paragraph 7. End Summary.

    THOSE SUMMONED
    –-------------

    ¶7. (SBU) According to the press, the 23 Lebanese named in the warrants are as follows:

    Former ministers (3)
    –-------------------
    Marwan Hamadeh, former Minister of Telecommunications,
    current MP
    Charles Rizk, former Minister of Justice
    Hassan el-Sabeh, former Minister of the Interior

    Former MPs (1)
    –-------------
    Elias Attallah

    Judges (3)
    –---------
    Sa’id Mirza, Chief Prosecutor
    Sakr Sakr, Military Prosecutor
    Elias Eid

    Internal Security Forces personnel (5)
    –-------------------------------------
    Director General Ashraf Rifi
    Wissam al-Hassan
    Samir Shehadeh
    Houssam al-Tanoukhi
    Khaled Mahmoud

    Lebanese journalists (8)
    –-----------------------
    Fares Khashan, formerly with Al-Mustaqbal
    Hani Hammoud, media advisor to PM Hariri
    Omar Harkous, Al-Mustaqbal
    Salam Moussa, independent
    Ayman Shrouf, independent
    Hassan Sabra, Al-Shira’a Magazine
    Zahra Badran, independent
    Nadim Monla, Future TV

    Miscellaneous (3)
    –----------------
    Johnny Abdo, former Lebanese ambassador to France
    Brigadier General (retired) Mohammad Farshoukh
    Adnan Baba


  • 6 juin 2007 – LEBANON : PROMINENT BEIRUT CHRISTIAN TALKS
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07BEIRUT812.html#

    ¶3. (C) Discussing other Christian leaders, Ashqar, a Kataib regional commander under Bashir Gemayel, described Samir Geagea as an “extremist.” Ashqar said there was, and still is, “no democracy” in the Lebanese Forces (LF) under Geagea. He said Geagea’s unwillingness to compromise in the current political environment is unhelpful to the future of the country. Ashqar also repeated the oft-used Christian opposition accusation that Geagea sold the Christian community to the Sunnis when he allied with Sunni leader Saad Hariri.

    FREEDOM PARTY
    –------------

    ¶4. (C) Ashqar was hesitant to discuss the political party that LF veterans formed to oppose Geagea, but he provided poloff general details about the group, called “Freedom” in Arabic. According to Ashqar — a leading member of the party — the Freedom group proposes a “real partnership” in Lebanon. They support a new electoral law with smaller, more representative, districts. (COMMENT: Ashqar judges the Syrian-imposed election law as the reason why he has not won election to the Lebanese parliament. The “Ghazi Kenaan” electoral law groups Beirut’s Christian area, Ashrafieh, with two predominantly Sunni neighborhoods, allowing the Hariri slate — which won in the other two districts — to sweep the Beirut district in 2005. End Comment.) Although Ashqar describes the Aoun-Hizballah Memorandum of Understanding as a “good paper” because it represents dialogue between sects, he calls Hizballah’s weapons “a problem” and claims the state should control all arms. Freedom supports a solution to the issue of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon; Ashqar argues that the Lebanese Government, not the Arab League, should have

    #cablegate #liban


  • Suite aux révélations de Wikileaks (#cablegate), le directeur général d’Al Jazeera, Wadah Khanfar, vient à l’instant d’annoncer sa démission.

    Les USA font censurer le site web d’Al Jazeera
    http://www.numerama.com/magazine/19772-les-usa-font-censurer-le-site-web-d-al-jazeera.html

    Depuis, la situation s’est un peu détendue, mais visiblement aussi grâce à la bonne volonté d’Al Jazeera de censurer ses reportages dans un sens qui plaise davantage aux Etats-Unis. En tout cas sur son site Web. C’est en effet ce que démontre un câble diplomatique révélé par Wikileaks, daté de novembre 2010, qui révèle que le directeur général d’Al Jazeera, Wadah Khanfar, avait eu rendez-vous avec des officiels américains (PAO) et qu’il avait accepté de modifier un reportage photo sur la bataille sanglante de Tal Afar, en Iraq :

    Le câble incriminé :
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DOHA1765.html

    Khanfar said the most recent website piece of concern to the USG has been toned down and that he would have it removed over the subsequent two or three days.

    • Angry Arab: resignation of Waddah Khanfar
      http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2011/09/resignation-of-waddah-khanfar.html?spref=tw

      The director-general of Aljazeera, Waddah Khanfar, has resigned. He has shaped the direction of the network since 2003 although I know for a fact that the Emir of Qatar has a hands-on role in directing the network. As for the resignation: it came only days after Al-Akhbar in Lebanon (and other newspapers and news sites in the region) published translations of Wikileaks in which Khanfar was admitting to US officials that he was toning down criticisms of US in Aljazeera media outlets. I don’t predict a shift in the network’s coverage. I met Khanfar only once a year ago: he is very smart and dynamic but is associated with the Islamists trend and is accused (especially by female anchors) of bringing in very conservative influences and officials.

    • Démission/éviction du directeur général d’Al-Jazeera, la “chaîne islamiste”… | Culture et politique arabes
      http://cpa.hypotheses.org/2961

      Quand on regarde Al-Jazeera (en langue arabe) aujourd’hui, on est surtout frappé par le fait que la chaîne est certes très engagée sur les révolutions arabes, mais de manière extrêmement partisane. Sa couverture des événements, guère éloignée d’un simple discours de propagande dans certains cas, fait qu’elle apparaît de moins en moins comme la meilleure chaîne d’information de la région, et de plus en plus comme le bras armé médiatique de la politique extérieure du Qatar. Ce que pourrait bien conformer la nomination du nouveau directeur général, cheikh Ahmed Jassem Ben Mohamed Al Thani, un homme venu des milieux de l’industrie pétrolière, sans la moindre expérience des médias, mais fort proche du régime…


  • 21 mai 2007: The seduciton of the widow Hariri: hopes for premiership dashed by family, Saudi Arabia (encore un câble réjouissant du #cablegate):
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07BEIRUT707.html

    Further to something we first mentioned in the 4/23/07 daily sitrep, beach resort owner and political gadfly Roger Edde has pursued a far-fetched plan to achieve his long-shot goal of becoming Lebanon’s next president: he has dangled before the eyes of Rafiq Hariri’s Paris-based widow Nazek the prize of becoming Prime Minister herself. Edde claims to have won the blessings of a less-than-salubrious triumvirate — Syria, Hizballah, and President Emile Lahoud — for his plan to have a Nazek Hariri-run technocratic cabinet replace that of Fouad Siniora now, with Edde’s own selection as president to follow in the autumn. Edde also claimed to have unspecified USG support, supposedly acquired via contacts of his Amcit wife. The appeal for Nazek would be the opportunity to kick out the usurper Siniora, whom she finds loathsome, and restore what she sees as the rightful Hariri presence in the Grand Serail. MP Saad Hariri and Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja separately told the Ambassador on 5/19 that both the Hariri family and Saudi Arabia have vetoed the idea; Talking by phone with French Ambassador Bernard Emie (who was with Ambassador Feltman at the time), Hariri legal advisor Basile Yared reported from Paris on 5/19 that the idea was “dead.” Dead but not buried: Walid Jumblatt, suspicious of Nazek’s hatred of Siniora, remains nervous that something “fishy” (Jumblatt’s preferred adjective for anything benefiting Syria) is up. End summary.


  • 19 décembre 2008, câble (#cablegate #liban) explosif ; l’actuel premier ministre Mikati discute avec l’ambassadrice américaine au Liban. Les Américains commentent la rencontre ainsi : Mikati se présente à eux comme un « ennemi du Hezbollah », attendant l’occasion de redevenir Premier ministre.

    En voici les passages les plus intéressants.

    Lebanon : With DAS Hale, Mikati calls Hizballah a “Tumor” needing removal
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08BEIRUT1773.html

    Responding to a question about the prime minister post in the event of a March 8 victory, Mikati said he would refuse the position under the circumstances because he would not be representing the Sunni population. Citing the unsuccessful governments of Salim Hoss and Omar Karami, Mikati said becoming prime minister without the full support of the Sunni community would always result in failure. Mikati said he was “not ready to fail.”

    [...]

    Describing President Michel Sleiman as quiet and unchallenging, Mikati said he had not yet seen in Lebanon the results of Sleiman’s efforts, domestically or from his many trips abroad. However, Mikati assessed Sleiman was trying to demonstrate his wisdom and judgment before serving as arbitrator, the traditional role of Lebanon’s presidents. According to Mikati, once Sleiman is arbitrator, he can govern. Nonetheless, Mikati described as “worrisome” a December 17 conversation with Sleiman in which the President said his job was easier than what he had expected. Mikati told DAS Hale and the Ambassador he had counseled Sleiman to create strong state institutions to counter Hizballah’s mini-state.

    The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Maronite Patriarch, traditional strongholds of presidential support, are not stalwartly pro-Sleiman, according to Mikati. He described the LAF as polarized toward March 8 with most officers supporting Hizballah and opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun. Mikati described Sleiman as unsure he had the LAF’s full support. Fear of fracturing the army had probably also prevented then LAF Commander Sleiman from taking any drastic decision between 2005 and 2008, Mikati said.

    [...]

    Mikati, speaking as a “statesman,” argued Lebanon could not survive with a Hizballah mini-state. Regardless of his personal views on the group, Mikati said he was expecting Hizballah to bring Lebanon to a “sad ending.” He assessed that Hizballah was just like a tumor that, whether benign or malignant, must be removed.

    [...]

    On Hizballah’s goals in Lebanon, Mikati assessed Iran was using the group to create a military base on the Mediterranean. Ayatollah Khomeini’s goal to export the Islamic revolution to the west required a launching point, which, according to Mikati, is Lebanon. This goal will take time but Hizballah is patient, he said. DAS Hale told Mikati that peace with Israel was the most direct way to counter such intentions. Mikati agreed that peace with Israel would be a “happy ending,” but questioned whether Syria would make an agreement without Iranian permission.

    [...]

    Mikati argued that neutralizing Syria would enable the GOL to “gain time” on Hizballah.

    [...]

    Talking with the Ambassador before DAS Hale’s arrival, Mikati described the Russian gift of MIG-29 fighter planes – which received extensive local media coverage in recent days – as “strange.” He questioned whether Defense Minister Murr asked specifically for the planes or if the Russians had chosen independently to offer them. Mikati said the planes would be “impossible” to maintain and small helicopters would have been more useful for the LAF.

    Comment: Mikati clearly was presenting himself for our benefit as a foe of Hizballah, as he is looking forward to potential opportunities to return to the Prime Ministry. End comment.


  • Dis tonton Sam, tu peux pas éteindre Al Jazeera s’il te plaît ? | kitetoa
    http://reflets.info/dis-tonton-sam-tu-peux-pas-eteindre-al-jazeera-sil-te-plait

    C’est l’histoire d’un roitelet. Le roi Hamad ben Issa al-Khalifa. C’est l’histoire d’un type qui a réprimé dans le sang les manifestations populaires. Au point que même le personnel médical craquait. C’est l’histoire d’un type qui a fait appel à son puissant voisin, l’Arabie Saoudite pour écraser la révolte naissante. Ce qui a immédiatement taire toutes les démocraties occidentales. Et partant, à peu près tous les media, personne, ou presque, ne relayant désormais les événements du royaume. Wikileaks vient de dévoiler un étrange câble dans lequel notre roitelet demande tranquillement aux Etats-Unis s’ils ne pourraient pas, juste couper le sifflet à Al Jazeera : THE AMIR ALSO LAID INTO AL JAZEERA WITH EVEN MORE THAN HIS USUAL GUSTO. HE DECLAIMED AT LENGTH ON HOW DANGEROUS THIS STATION IS, HOW IT IS ESSENTIALLY ONE-SIDED PROPAGANDA, AND ALLEGED THAT THE AL JAZEERA CORRESPONDENT IN KABUL (HE WAS SOME UNCERTAIN HERE, IT COULD HAVE BEEN KANDAHAR) IS ACTUALLY NOT A JOURNALIST, BUT


  • Microsoft et Ben Ali : Wikileaks confirme les soupçons d’une aide pour la surveillance des citoyens Tunisiens | Reflets
    http://reflets.info/microsoft-et-ben-ali-wikileaks-confirme-les-soupcons-d-une-aide-pour-la-su

    « un marché win-win » auprès de l’ambassade américaine : Microsoft obtient l’arrêt des initiatives liées au logiciel libre au sein du gouvernement Tunisien et la mention explicite de Microsoft dans la loi de finance Tunisienne, en contrepartie le gouvernement Tunisien obtient la possibilité, via une autorité de certification qu’il contrôle, de réaliser des contrefaçon de certificats SSL lui permettant de voler les identifiants et les mots de passe des citoyens Tunisiens à travers de fausses pages Gmail, Facebook, Live.com, etc.

    Septembre 2006 : 06TUNIS2424 - MICROSOFT INKS AGREEMENT WITH GOT #cablegate
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TUNIS2424.html

    Additionally, future GOT tenders for IT equipment will specify that the equipment must be Microsoft compatible, which is currently prohibited by the Tunisian open software policy.

    [...]

    Despite the drawn-out negotiations, Smaoui stated that reaching an agreement was “vital” for Microsoft. The fact that the government relied on open source software drastically limited business in Tunisia and prevented Microsoft from participating in GOT tenders.

    [...]

    Comment: Although the agreement has been hailed as a triumph for intellectual property rights, the negotiations and the brokered deal itself reveal a more complicated reality. Microsoft was able to broker the final agreement by appealing to GOT unemployment sensitivities as well as by adapting to the realities of doing business in Tunisia. Even as the goal of expanding employment opportunities for handicapped Tunisians is worthy, the program’s affiliation with Leila Ben Ali’s charity is indicative of the backroom maneuvering sometimes required to finalize a deal. Microsoft’s reticence to fully disclose the details of the agreement further highlights the GOT emphasis on secrecy over transparency. In theory, increasing GOT law enforcement capability through IT training is positive, but given heavy-handed GOT interference in the internet, Post questions whether this will expand GOT capacity to monitor its own citizens. Ultimately, for Microsoft the benefits outweigh the costs. End Comment.


  • Juillet 2009 : la « vraie raison » pour laquelle le gouvernement israélien n’autorise pas l’entrée de « produits de luxe » à Gaza. Terrorisme d’État. #cablegate
    09TELAVIV1507 - STAFFDELS MAKOVSKY AND BENAIM’S MEETING WITH MOD CHIEF OF STAFF HERZOG : GAZA, SMUGGLING, ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN COOPERATION, WEST BANK SECURITY AND MOVEMENT AND ACCESS
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TELAVIV1507.html

    Herzog admitted that Israel faces a policy dilemma in Gaza. Hamas is in control and nothing should be done to strengthen it, but there are also real humanitarian needs that must be addressed. After Operation Cast Lead, the GOI decided to open up a bit on the flow of humanitarian assistance but to be more cautious about reconstruction. Shalit’s continued captivity and Hamas’ refusal to allow the ICRC to see him was also a factor for Israelis. Herzog noted that the MOD frequently had to defend the shipment of humanitarian supplies before the High Court of Justice, since activists for Shalit’s release repeatedly petitioned the court to block relief supplies or cash transfers. Israeli public opinion is the real reason the GOI will not allow “luxury” goods through the crossings, only staples. Herzog noted, however, that there is no hunger in Gaza and adequate electricity.