#mer_

C’est pas le gros drame, mais ça me semble la suite du psycho-drame de Carnon qui veut faire payer le parking du Grand Travers, mais qui est (était ?) bloqué parce que le terrain ne lui appartient pas (ça appartient au Littoral)… : hier donc il faisait 28°, alors évidemment entre les vacances, le week-end et la chaleur, tout #Montpellier s’était donné rendez-vous à la plage. Et la plage familiale de Montpellier, c’est le Grand Travers, entre Carnon et la Grande Motte.

Arrivé là, le parking du Grand Travers (le grand parking gratuit de 1000 places que la municipalité rêve de rendre payant) est fermé, depuis des mois, pour cause de « travaux ». Et l’autre parking (le payant, un peu plus petit), hé ben il est fermé aussi (pourquoi ? on ne sait pas).

Donc hier, toutes les familles de Montpellier en train d’errer pour réussir tenter de trouver une place pour se garer. (Mission impossible : j’ai déposé la familia à la plage et je suis allé dessiner à La Grande Motte.)

(Et pour les ceusses qui ne suivraient pas : Carnon, c’est aussi un de ces bleds qui ne veulent surtout pas faire partie de la Métropole de Montpellier et qui refusent absolument que le tram aille jusqu’à la mer. J’y ai habité pendant mes études : c’est même pas vraiment une ville qui existe avec des habitants : c’est une station balnéaire vide la plupart de l’année, avec des studios à louer l’été. Le reste du temps, c’était la même ambiance que dans 28 Jours plus tard. La seule raison d’être de ce truc, c’est de maximiser le pognon soutiré aux touristes, mais en ne vivant surtout pas là. Et donc, autant que possible, éviter que les habitants de Montpellier et la région viennent profiter de la plage, parce que ce ne sont pas les consommateurs captifs dont on veut.)

Gilets de sauvetage

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/062ac74bd-fb82c6/0I10ddYeWU4X/Fe3soCV9Fcl6pdRjdttdzLmW7QrvuC0zJbnkjvMb.png

« Les îles les plus à l’est leur offrent quelques heures de répit dans leur longue marche.
Chaque île est un point de fuite pour qui, chez lui, n’a plus de perspectives.
Installés dans la torpeur de l’été, que ferons-nous pour eux ? »

▻https://www.cambourakis.com/tout/bd/gilets-de-sauvetage
#Chio #Chios #Grèce #îles #Mer_Egée #Massacre_de_Chio #histoire #hospitalité #tourisme #migrations #asile #réfugiés
#BD #bande_dessinée #livre

Male Mediterraneo
▻https://www.antiwarsongs.org/canzone.php?id=67755&lang=it

2023 Carico Residuale

Mediterraneo
▻https://www.antiwarsongs.org/canzone.php?id=67756&lang=it

2015 Quello che resta

Mediterraneo
▻https://www.antiwarsongs.org/canzone.php?id=67754&lang=it

2017 Hienas

Naufragio a Cutro
▻https://www.antiwarsongs.org/canzone.php?id=67741&lang=it

Testo di Giovanna Balestreri Musica da Deportees di Woody Guthrie Arrangiamento e interpretazione di...

Senza frontiere: La criminalizzazione dei cosiddetti #scafisti nel 2023

1. Dati e monitoraggio della cronaca
Numero di fermi

Come negli anni precedenti, nel 2023 abbiamo monitorato sistematicamente la cronaca sulle notizie degli arresti dei cosiddetti scafisti. Abbiamo registrato 177 arresti negli ultimi 12 mesi (rispetto ai 171 arresti nel 2021 e ai 261 arresti nel 2022). Una dichiarazione di Piantedosi che sostiene che “550 scafisti” sono stati arrestati nel biennio 2022-23 – visto che nell’aprile il governo ha rivendicato c. 350 fermi per 2022 – ci fa stimare un totale di 200 fermi nel 2023. Dal 2013, quindi, sono state fermate ormai circa 3.200 persone.

Il numero di arresti nel 2023 non solo è inferiore in termini assoluti rispetto agli anni precedenti, ma mostra una diminuzione ancora più significativa in termini relativi. Nel 2023, circa 157.000 persone sono arrivate in Italia via mare, il che significa che sono state arrestate circa tre persone ogni 2.000 arrivi. Nel 2021 e nel 2022, il tasso di criminalizzazione era due volte questo.

Esistono diverse ragioni che potrebbero spiegare questa diminuzione. La più significativa sembra essere un cambiamento di politica ad Agrigento e Lampedusa nel non effettuare arresti sistematici dopo gli sbarchi, concentrandosi invece su casi specifici che coinvolgono accuse di morti durante il viaggio, torture e, per la prima volta, pirateria. Ci teniamo ad aggiungere che – appoggiando il lavoro dell’associazione Maldusa – stiamo seguendo casi in cui le persone sono accusate dei suddetti reati, che hanno suscitato in noi importanti dubbi sulla correttezza delle accuse e sulle modalità con cui vengono portati avanti questi procedimenti penali che spesso sembrano vere e proprie sperimentazioni giuridiche. È anche evidente che le autorità ad Agrigento effettuano continuamente arresti di persone, soprattutto cittadini tunisini, che, essendo rientrati in Italia dopo espulsioni precedenti, sono imputati del reato di violazione del divieto di reingresso. Questo dimostra una manipolazione molto evidente del diritto penale come mezzo per sostenere le ingiuste politiche di chiusura e respingimento.

https://arciporcorosso.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Location-of-the-criminalization-of-Italy-migrant-boat-drivers-in-Italy-2023-4.png

Luoghi di fermo e il decreto Piantedosi

In secondo luogo, l’anno scorso è stata attuata una nuova strategia nella guerra italiana contro le navi di soccorso delle ONG, a cui sono stati assegnati porti di sbarco in tutta Italia (il decreto Piantedosi). Un effetto collaterale è che spesso i luoghi che hanno accolto le imbarcazioni non hanno visto tanti sbarchi prima di quest’anno, e sono quindi poco familiari con la criminalizzazione sistematica che si è agita negli ultimi anni. Nei porti settentrionali a volte sono stati disposti gli arresti, che spesso poi non sono stati convalidati dai Giudici locali, che non hanno ritenuto neppure di disporre una misura cautelare dato che le prove contro gli imputati erano troppo deboli. Mentre ad Agrigento e nei porti del Nord possiamo forse notare una certa resistenza alla solita politica degli arresti sistematici dei capitani, lo stesso non si può dire in altre parti d’Italia. Nella Sicilia orientale e in Calabria un alto numero di persone è stato arrestato e incarcerato. Augusta ha registrato 28 arresti, Siracusa 11; Crotone ha visto 24 arresti e Roccella 18. E come si può vedere dalla mappa, questo modello si replica in altri porti delle stesse zone.

https://arciporcorosso.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Number-of-people-arrested-following-boat-landings-as-reported-in-the-Italian-press.-Source-Arci-Porco-Rosso-and-borderline-europe-%E2%80%98From-Sea-to-Prison-project.-2.png

Nazionalità

Nel 2023, come nel 2021 e nel 2022, le autorità hanno preso di mira in particolare i cittadini egiziani, identificandone almeno 60 come capitani. Ciò è notevolmente diverso da quanto avveniva prima del 2020, quando gli egiziani avevano smesso di essere la principale nazionalità criminalizzata. Questa inversione di tendenza ha visto circa 300 cittadini egiziani arrestati dal 2020, la maggior parte dei quali probabilmente è ancora nelle carceri italiane.

Un cambiamento significativo delle nazionalità delle persone arrestate registrato nel 2023 è invece l’importante aumento della criminalizzazione delle persone migranti provenienti dai paesi asiatici, che ammontano a circa 40 persone fermate quest’anno.

Con riferimento alla rotta ionica, che arriva in Calabria – la stessa utilizzata dalla barca che è tragicamente affondata vicino a Cutro – nel 2021 la maggior parte delle persone arrestate come capitani proveniva da Russia e Ucraina. Con l’inizio della guerra, sono arrivate molte meno persone con queste nazionalità, mentre abbiamo assistito ad un allarmante aumento della persecuzione dei cittadini turchi nel 2022. Nell’ultimo anno, invece, abbiamo assistito a pochi arresti di persone provenienti dall’Europa orientale o dalla Turchia, e molti di più di persone provenienti dagli stati dell’Asia centrale.

Va detto che la diminuzione dei fermi eseguiti dalla Procura di Agrigento dovrebbe essere letta alla luce della massiccia operazione posta in essere dalla polizia tunisina, con la benedizione e il finanziamento dell’Europa, contro i cosiddetti trafficanti a Sfax. I governi si vantano di ben 750 fermi nel paese nordafricano negli ultimi tre mesi, accanto a strategie violente di intercettazione e refoulement, come denunciato sia da Amnesty che dal Forum tunisino per i diritti economici e sociali. Anche in Egitto, l’inasprimento della legge nazionale contro i ‘trafficanti’ ha portato a diffusi arresti e processi ingiusti. Ad esempio, l’11 giugno 2023, una campagna di arresti ingiustificati per “smuggling” ha portato alla morte, alla città di Marsa Matruh, di un cittadino egiziano per colpi di arma da fuoco inferti dalla polizia, come ha denunciato Refugees Platform in Egypt. A livello dell’UE, si provano invece ad affinare gli strumenti legali, accrescendo le infrastrutture di controllo e criminalizzazione della frontiera e proponendo emendamenti – come quelli presentati in occasione del lancio dell’Alleanza globale contro il traffico di migranti – al cosiddetto Facilitators Package (in italiano “pacchetto facilitatori”).

È chiaro quindi che, mentre festeggiamo alcune limitate vittorie, non possiamo negare che il “trafficante/scafista” rimane il capro espiatorio per eccellenza in Europa e non solo.
2. Un anno di casi e udienze

Attualmente seguiamo la situazione di 107 persone accusate di essere ‘scafisti’, 66 delle quali sono ancora in carcere. Dei detenuti, 32 si trovano in Sicilia e 16 in Calabria; gli altri sono sparsi in tutta Italia. Come ci si aspetterebbe dagli arresti degli ultimi anni, quasi la metà delle persone detenute che seguiamo proviene dall’Africa del Nord (30 su 44), mentre la maggior parte di quelle provenienti dall’Africa occidentale con cui siamo in contatto sono ormai libere (23 su 30). Siamo anche in contatto con 24 persone provenienti da paesi asiatici (tra cui Turchia, Palestina e i paesi ex-sovietici), la maggior parte delle quali è ancora detenuta.
Cutro

E’ trascorso poco meno di un anno da quando quasi 100 persone hanno perso la vita nelle acque di Cutro, in Calabria. Il Governo ha reagito non solo con finta commozione e decreti razzisti, ma anche, come quasi sempre accade, con un processo contro i cosiddetti scafisti. Insieme alle realtà calabresi, seguiamo attentamente i processi contro Khalid, Hasab, Sami, Gun e Mohamed, sopravvissuti al naufragio e provenienti dalla Turchia e dal Pakistan: ora si devono difendere contro il Ministero dell’Interno, il Consiglio dei Ministri e la Regione Calabria che si sono costituiti parti civili nel processo penale. Le istituzioni governative, anche se non esiste un fondo per questo, chiedono un risarcimento superiore a un milione di euro per danni al turismo e all’immagine: come se la tragedia del massacro di Cutro fosse questa.
Processi

Sono diversi i procedimenti penali che siamo riusciti a seguire da vicino, offrendo il nostro supporto ad avvocatə e persone criminalizzate, e, in alcuni casi, andando personalmente alle udienze.

- Tra le vittorie ottenute non possiamo non citare la recentissima sentenza di assoluzione emessa dalla Corte di Appello di Messina in favore di Ali Fabureh, un giovane ragazzo gambiano che era stato erroneamente condannato dal Tribunale di Messina a 10 anni di carcere senza che – come appurato dalla Corte – avesse mai preso un timone in mano. E sempre a Messina abbiamo registrato un’altra importante vittoria: si è, infatti, concluso con una sentenza di assoluzione anche il procedimento penale iniziato due anni fa contro 4 persone accusate di aver condotto un peschereccio con a bordo centinaia di persone ed essere responsabili della morte di 5 di esse. Tra le persone assolte c’è A., che attualmente è ospitato presso l’associazione Baobab, e con cui continuiamo a rimanere in contatto. Un’altra importante vittoria di quest’anno è stata raggiunta a febbraio a Palermo, quando il Tribunale ha assolto 10 persone accusate di art. 12 TUI, riconoscendo loro lo stato di necessità per le violenze subite in Libia e aprendo la strada, si spera, a un maggior riconoscimento di questa causa di giustificazione. La sentenza è ora definitiva.
- Purtroppo non tutti i procedimenti seguiti si sono conclusi positivamente, a dimostrazione del fatto che, anche se qualche passo nella direzione giusta è stato fatto, ne restano ancora tanti da compiere. Spesso può succedere che il processo contro due imputati nello stesso procedimento, ha avuto esiti diversi. Questo è stato il caso in un processo nei confronti di due cittadini senegalesi al Tribunale di Agrigento, che ha disposto l’archiviazione per uno di loro, mentre per l’altro il processo continua.
– Altre volte è stata emessa una sentenza di condanna senza assoluzioni o archiviazioni. Questo è il caso della riprovevole condanna di 7 anni inflitta dal Tribunale di Locri a Ahmid Jawad, magistrato afghano che ancora lotta per dimostrare che era un semplice passeggero dell’imbarcazione che dalla Turchia l’ha condotto in Italia. E’ anche la situazione di Ahmed, che si è visto rigettare l’appello proposto alla Corte di Appello di Palermo avverso la sentenza di condanna del Tribunale di Agrigento.
- Inoltre, non possiamo non mostrare indignazione e preoccupazione per i casi, come quello di E. (egiziano) al tribunale di Locri e M. e J. (del Sierra Leone) a Reggio Calabria, con cui siamo in contatto, a cui è stata applicata la nuova fattispecie di reato di cui all’art. 12 bis TUI, introdotta con il decreto Cutro, che prevede pene ancora più elevate. Seguiamo il loro processo da lontano: a gennaio, il tribunale di Locri ha rigettato la richiesta di remissione alla Corte Costituzionale presentata dagli avvocati per contestare l’art 12 bis.

Centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio (CPR)

I problemi per le persone accusate di essere ‘scafisti’ non finiscono a fine pena, e anche con riferimento alla detenzione nei CPR abbiamo seguito casi che hanno avuto esiti molto diversi. Siamo felicə che gli ultimi due casi seguiti si siano conclusi in modo positivo. Nel mese di dicembre, infatti, una donna ucraina e un uomo tunisino entrambə codannatə per art. 12 TUI, sono statə scarceratə, rispettivamente dalle carceri di Palermo e di Caltagirone, senza essere deportatə presso i centri di detenzione. Sicuramente nel primo caso ha inciso la nazionalità della persona, mentre nel secondo il sovraccaricamento dei centri.

Purtroppo non sempre è stato possibile evitare il CPR. Molte persone seguite, nonostante la richiesta asilo presentata tempestivamente, sono state trattenute nei centri di detenzione, chi per pochi giorni, chi per due mesi. Per circostanze che sembrano spesso fortuite, la maggior parte è riuscita ad uscire e, anche se con poche prospettive di regolarizzarsi, possono vivere in “libertà” in Italia.

Purtroppo, per due persone seguite le cose sono andate diversamente. La macchina burocratica ha mostrato il suo volto più spietato e sono stati rimpatriati prima che avessero la possibilità di ricevere un aiuto più concreto; oggi si trovano in Gambia e Egitto. Nell’ultimo caso, la situazione è ancora più preoccupante perché era stato assolto dal Tribunale di Messina; nonostante ciò, all’uscita dal carcere lo aspettava la deportazione.
Misure alternative

Quest’anno è stato particolarmente significativo in termini del superamento del regime ostativo alle misure alterantive alla detenzione posto dall’art. 4 bis o.p., che si applica a chi subisce una condanna per art. 12 TUI. Abbiamo infatti registrato i primi casi in cui le persone incarcerate che seguiamo hanno potuto accedere a misure alternative alla detenzione. Questo è stato il caso di B., che ha ottenuto dal Tribunale di Sorveglianza di Palermo l’affidamento in prova ai servizi sociali in provincia di Sciacca. Adesso che ha raggiunto il fine pena si è stabilito lì, in poco più di un mese ha aggiunto i suoi obiettivi personali: ha un lavoro e una rete sociale. E questa è la storia anche di A., e O., che hanno fatto accesso alle misure alternative presso la comunità Palermitana Un Nuovo Giorno. Rimaniamo, invece, in attesa dell’esito della seconda istanza di accesso per M., cugino di B., con cui tentiamo dal 2022, e che speriamo possa presto vedere il cielo oltre le quattro mura.

Abbiamo anche seguito 6 persone, tra cui i 3 accusati palestinesi che l’estate scorsa sono entrati in sciopero della fame, che sono riusciti ad accedere agli arresti domiciliari, che pur non essendo oggetto dell’art. 4 bis o.p., nel corso degli anni sono comunque rimasti difficili da ottenere. Queste vittorie sono state possibili grazie ai tentativi, a volte ripetuti, dellə loro avvocatə difensorə, e alle offerte di ospitalità di un numero crescente di realtà conosciute.

È bello vedere che qualcuno riesce a sgusciare attraverso alcune crepe di questo meccanismo. Certamente lavoreremo per continuare ad allargarle, anche se sappiamo che questo strumento può solo alleviare la sofferenza di alcune persone, e certamente non riparare i danni subiti per la loro detenzione.
3. Rete

Per noi è fondamentale ribadire che è solo grazie a una rete forte, impegnata, diffusa e informata, che questo lavoro è possibile. Anche quest’anno, possiamo dire di aver avuto il grandissimo piacere di collaborare con realtà diverse, in tanti luoghi, da Torino a Napoli, da Lampedusa a Londra, da Roma a Bruxelles e New York.

In particolare, segnaliamo la campagna recentemente avviata Free #Pylos 9, promossa della rete Captain Support, per le persone arrestate in seguito al massacro di Pylos in Grecia. Negli ultimi mesi abbiamo inoltre avuto modo di conoscere realtà solidali a Bruxelles, tra cui PICUM, che ha organizzato a fine novembre un incontro di scambio sulle pratiche di criminalizzazione attuate intorno al controllo della migrazione. Qui abbiamo avuto l’opportunità di aprire insieme una conversazione sul lancio della nuova Alleanza Globale Europea contro il Traffico di Migranti, che stava avvenendo proprio in quei giorni.

A New York a novembre abbiamo partecipato alla conferenza dell’Università di Columbia sulla criminalizzazione della migrazione nel mondo, e abbiamo presentato il nostro lavoro al centro sociale Woodbine, insieme ad altri gruppi locali impegnati nella lotta contro le frontiere.

Qua in Italia, se da un lato il decreto Piantedosi ha ottusamente costretto le navi ONG a sbarcare in diversi porti d’Italia (come abbiamo scritto nei paragrafi sopra), dall’altro ha contribuito a catalizzare la consapevolezza sugli arresti allo sbarco in diverse città. Grazie al lavoro di alcunə avvocatə e individui solidali a Napoli, e con il supporto della Clinica Legale Roma 3, le persone arrestate agli sbarchi in Campania hanno avuto accesso a un supporto indipendente ed esaustivo.

L’evento Capitani Coraggiosi, organizzato da Baobab Experience alla Città dell’Altra Economia a Roma, ha visto proiezione del film Io Capitano di Matteo Garrone (ora fra i candidati agli Oscar), e un dibattito col regista e con altre persone impegnate in questa lotta. Qui è stata lanciata la campagna in vista della presentazione della richiesta di revisione del caso di Alaji Diouf, che ha subito una condanna di 7 anni per il reato di favoreggiamento. Adesso, Alaji chiede che sia fatta giustizia sul suo caso, come affermato nel suo intervento dopo la proiezione del film “Io Capitano”, quando ha detto “Tutto quello che succede dopo, da lì parte davvero il film. […] ora che sono libero voglio far conoscere al mondo la verità”.

‘Dal mare al carcere’
un progetto di Arci Porco Rosso e borderline-europe
4° report trimestrale 2023.

Leggete il report ‘Dal mare al carcere’ (2021), e i seguenti aggiornamenti trimestrale, al www.dal-mare-al-carcere.info.

Ringraziamo Iuventa Crew, Sea Watch Legal Aid e Safe Passage Fund che hanno supportato il nostro lavoro nel 2023. Vuoi sostenerlo anche tu? Puoi contribuire alla nostra raccolta fondi.

▻https://arciporcorosso.it/senza-frontiere
#scafista #criminalisation_de_la_migration #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Arci_Porco_Rosso #Italie #chiffres #statistiques #2023 #justice #procès #détention_administrative #rétention #Cutro

FROM LIBYA TO TUNISIA : HOW THE EU IS EXTENDING THE PUSH-BACK REGIME BY PROXY IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

On August 21, 2023, the rescue ship Aurora from Sea Watch was detained by the Italian authorities after refusing to disembark survivors in Tunisia as ordered by the Rome MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center), a country which by no means can be considered a place of safety.

This episode is just one example of the efforts of European states to avoid arrivals on their shores at all costs, and to evade their responsibility for reception and #Search_and_Rescue (#SAR). Already in 2018, the European Commission, with its disembarkation platform project, attempted to force sea rescue NGOs to disembark survivors in North Africa. While this project was ultimately unsuccessful as it stood, European states have endeavored to increase the number of measures aimed at reducing crossings in the central Mediterranean.

One of the strategies employed was to set up a “push-back by proxy regime”, outsourcing interceptions at sea to the Libyan Coast guards, enabling the sending back of people on the move to a territory in which their lives are at risk, undertaken by Libyan border forces under the control of the EU authorities, in contravention of principle of non-refoulement, one of the cornerstones of international refugee law. Since 2016, the EU and its member states have equipped, financed, and trained the Libyan coastguard and supported the creation of a MRCC in Tripoli and the declaration of a Libyan SRR (search and rescue region).

This analysis details how the European Union and its member states are attempting to replicate in Tunisia the regime of refoulement by proxy set up in Libya just a few years earlier. Four elements are considered: strengthening the capacities of the Tunisian coastguard (equipment and training), setting up a coastal surveillance system, creating a functional MRCC and declaring a Tunisian SRR.
A. Building capacity of the Garde Nationale Maritime
Providing equipment

For several decades now, Tunisia has been receiving equipment to strengthen its coast guard capabilities. After the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Italy-Tunisia cooperation deepened. Under the informal agreement of April 5, 2011, 12 boats were delivered to the Tunisian authorities. In 2017, in a joint statement by the IItalian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Tunisian counterpart, the two parties committed to “closer cooperation in the fight against irregular migration and border management,” with a particular focus on the maritime border. In this context, the Italian Minister declared Italy’s support for the modernization and maintenance of the patrol vessels supplied to Tunisia (worth around 12 million euros) and the supply of new equipment for maritime border control. On March 13, 2019, Italy also supplied Tunisia with vehicles for maritime border surveillance, sending 50 4-wheelers designed to monitor the coasts.

Recently, Germany also started to support the coast guard more actively in Tunisia, providing it with equipment for a boat workshop designed to repair coast guard vessels in 2019. As revealed in an answer to a parliamentary question, in the last two years, the Federal Police also donated 12 inflatable boats and 27 boat motors. On the French side, after a visit in Tunis in June 2023, the Interior Minister Gérard Darmanin announced 25 million euros in aid enabling Tunisia to buy border policing equipment and train border guards. In August 2023, the Italian authorities also promised hastening the provision of patrol boats and other vehicles aimed at preventing sea departures.

Apart from EU member states, Tunisia has also received equipment from the USA. Between 2012 and 2019, the Tunisian Navy was equipped with 26 US-made patrol boats. In 2019, the Tunisian national guard was also reinforced with 3 American helicopters. Primarily designed to fight against terrorism, the US equipment is also used to monitor the Tunisian coast and to track “smugglers.”

Above all, the supply of equipment to the Tunisian coastguard is gaining more and more support by the European Union. Following the EU-Tunisia memorandum signed on July 16, 2023, for which €150 million was pledged towards the “fight against illegal migration”, in September 2023, Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million “to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment.”

In a letter to the European Council, leaked by Statewatch in October 2023, the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to the Tunisian coast guards: “Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operation and others will be repaired by the end of the year.”
Trainings the authorities

In addition to supplying equipment, the European countries are also organizing training courses to enhance the skills of the Tunisian coastguard. In 2019, Italy’s Interior Ministry released €11 million to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the crossing of people on the move from Tunisia, and to provide training to local security forces involved in maritime border control.

Under the framework of Phase III of the EU-supported IBM project (Integrated Border Management), Germany is also organizing training for the Tunisian coast guards. As revealed in the answer to a parliamentary question mentioned before, the German Ministry of Interior admitted that 3.395 members of the Tunisian National Guard and border police had been trained, including within Germany. In addition, 14 training and advanced training measures were carried out for the National Guard, the border police, and the coast guard. These training sessions were also aimed at learning how to use “control boats.”

In a document presenting the “EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia” for the year 2021, the European Commission announced the creation of a “coast guard training academy.” In Tunisia, the project consists of implementing a training plan, rehabilitating the physical training environment of the Garde Nationale Maritime, and enhancing the cooperation between Tunisian authorities and all stakeholders, including EU agencies and neighboring countries. Implemented by the German Federal Police and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the project started in January 2023 and is supposed to run until June 2026, to the sum of 13,5 million EUR.

Although the European Commission underlines the objective that “the Training Academy Staff is fully aware and acting on the basis of human rights standards” the increase in dangerous maneuvers and attacks perpetrated by the Tunisian coast guard since the increase in European support leaves little doubt that respect for human rights is far from top priority.

On November 17, 2023, the ICMPD announced on its Linkedin account the inauguration of the Nefta inter-agency border management training center, as a benefit to the three agencies responsible for border management in Tunisia (Directorate General Directorate of Borders and Foreigners of the Ministry of the Interior, the General Directorate of Border Guard of the National Guard and the General Directorate of Customs).
B. Setting up a coastal surveillance system

In addition to supplying equipment, European countries also organize training courses to enhance the skills of European coastguards in the pursuit of an “early detection” strategy, which involves spotting boats as soon as they leave the Tunisian coast in order to outsource their interception to the Tunisian coastguard. As early as 2019, Italy expressed its willingness to install radar equipment in Tunisia and to establish “a shared information system that will promptly alert the Tunisian gendarmerie and Italian coast guard when migrant boats are at sea, in order to block them while they still are in Tunisian waters.” This ambition seems to have been achieved through the implementation of the system ISMaris in Tunisia.
An Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance (ISMaris)

The system ISMaris, or “Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance”, was first mentioned in the “Support Programme to Integrated Border Management in Tunisia” (IBM Tunisia, launched in 2015. Funded by the EU and Switzerland and implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the first phase of the program (2015-2018) supported the equipment of the Garde Nationale Maritime with this system, defined as “a maritime surveillance system that centralizes information coming from naval assets at sea and from coastal radars […] [aiming] to connect the sensors (radar, VHF, GPS position, surveillance cameras) on board of selected Tunisian Coast Guard vessels, control posts, and command centers within the Gulf of Tunis zone in order for them to better communicate between each other.”

The implementation of this data centralization system was then taken over by the “Border Management Programme for the Maghreb Region” (BMP-Maghreb), launched in 2018 and funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Tunisia component, funded with €24,5 million is implemented by ICMPD together with the Italian Ministry of Interior and designed to “strengthen the capacity of competent Tunisian authorities in the areas of maritime surveillance and migration management, including tackling migrant smuggling, search and rescue at sea, as well as in the coast guard sphere of competence.” With the BMP programme, the Tunisian Garde Maritime Nationale was equipped with navigational radars, thermal cameras, AIS and other IT equipment related to maritime surveillance.
Data exchange with the EU

The action document of the BMP program clearly states that one of the purposes of ISMaris is the reinforcement of “operational cooperation in the maritime domain between Tunisia and Italy (and other EU Member States, and possibly through EUROSUR and FRONTEX).” Established in 2013, the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) is a framework for information exchange and cooperation between Member States and Frontex, to prevent the so-called irregular migration at external borders. Thanks to this system, Frontex already monitors the coast regions off Tunisia using aerial service and satellites.

What remains dubious is the connection between IS-Maris and the EU surveillance-database. In 2020, the European Commission claimed that ISMariS was still in development and not connected to any non-Tunisian entity such as Frontex, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) or the Italian border control authorities. But it is likely that in the meantime information exchange between the different entities was systematized.

In the absence of an official agreement, the cooperation between Frontex and Tunisia is unclear. As already mentioned in Echoes#3, “so far, it has not been possible to verify if Frontex has direct contact with the Tunisian Coast Guard as it is the case with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even if most of the interceptions happen close to Tunisian shores, some are carried out by the Tunisian Navy outside of territorial waters. […] Since May 2021 Frontex has been flying a drone, in addition to its different assets, monitoring the corridor between Tunisia and Lampedusa on a daily basis. While it is clear that Frontex is sharing data with the Italian authorities and that Italian authorities are sharing info on boats which are on the way from Tunisia to Italy with the Tunisian side, the communication and data exchanges between Frontex and Tunisian authorities remain uncertain.”

While in 2021, Frontex reported that “no direct border related activities have been carried out in Tunisia due to Tunisian authorities’ reluctance to cooperate with Frontex”, formalizing the cooperation between Tunisia and Frontex seems to remain one of the EU’s priorities. In September 2023, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Poland, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. During this visit, briefings were held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and where all threads from surveillance from ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together.

However, as emphasized by Mathias Monroy, an independent researcher working on border externalization and the expansion of surveillance systems, “Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex.”

This does not prevent the EU from continuing its efforts. In September 2023, in the wake of the thousands of arrivals on the island of Lampedusa, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reaffirmed, in a 10-point action plan, the need to have a “working arrangement between Tunisia and Frontex” and to “step up border surveillance at sea and aerial surveillance including through Frontex.” In a letter written by the European Commission in reply to the LIBE letter about the Tunisia deal sent on the Greens Party initiative in July 2023, the EU also openly admits that IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far and that more surveillance equipment is to come.

To be noted as well is that the EU4BorderSecurity program, which includes support to “inter-regional information sharing, utilizing tools provided by Frontex” has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.
C. Supporting the creation of a Tunisian MRCC and the declaration of a Search and rescue region (SRR)
Building a MRCC in Tunisia, a top priority for the EU

In 2021, the European Commission stated the creation of a functioning MRCC in Tunisia as a priority: “Currently there is no MRCC in Tunisia but the coordination of SAR events is conducted by Tunisian Navy Maritime Operations Centre. The official establishment of a MRCC is a necessary next step, together with the completion of the radar installations along the coast, and will contribute to implementing a Search and rescue region in Tunisia. The establishment of an MRCC would bring Tunisia’s institutional set-up in line with the requirements set in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) of 1979 (as required by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation IMO).”

The objective of creating a functioning Tunisian MRCC is also mentioned in a European Commission document presenting the “strategy for the regional, multi-country cooperation on migration with partner countries in North Africa” for the period 2021-2027. The related project is detailed in the “Action Document for EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia (2021),” whose overall objective is to “contribute to the improvement of respective state services through the institutional development of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres” in the North Africa region. The EU also promotes a “regional approach to a Maritime Rescue Coordination Center,” that “would improve the coordination in the Central Mediterranean in conducting SAR operations and support the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks in Libya and Tunisia.”

The Tunisia component of the programs announces the objective to “support the establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, [… ] operational 24/7 in a physical structure with functional equipment and trained staff,” establishing “cooperation of the Tunisian authorities with all national stakeholders, EU agencies and neighbouring countries on SAR.”

This project seems to be gradually taking shape. On the website of Civipol, the French Ministry of the Interior’s service and consultancy company, a new project entitled “Support for Search and Rescue Operations at Sea in Tunisia” is mentioned in a job advertisement. It states that this project, funded by the European Union, implemented together with the GIZ and starting in September 2023, aims to “support the Tunisian authorities in strengthening their operational capacities (fleet and other)” and “provide support to the Tunisian authorities in strengthening the Marine Nationale and the MRCC via functional equipment and staff training.”

In October 2023, the German development agency GIZ also published a job offer for a project manager in Tunisia, to implement the EU-funded project “Support to border management institution (MRCC)” in Tunisia (the job offer was deleted from the website in the meantime but screenshots can be shared on demand). The objective of the project is described as such: “improvement of the Tunisia’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity through reinforced border management institutions to conduct SAR operations at sea and the fight against migrant smuggling and human being trafficking by supporting increased collaboration between Tunisian actors via a Maritime RescueCoordination Centre (MRCC).”

According to Mathias Monroy, other steps have been taken in this direction: “[the Tunisian MRCC] has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.”

The establishment of a functional MRCC represents a major challenge for the EU, with the aim to allow Tunisia to engage actively in coordination of interceptions. Another step in the recognition of the Tunisian part as a valid SAR actor by the IMO is the declaration of a search and rescue region (SRR).
The unclear status of the current Tunisian area of responsibility

Adopted in 1979 in Hamburg, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR – Search & Rescue Convention) aimed to establish an international search and rescue plan to encourage cooperation and coordination between neighboring states in order to ensure better assistance to persons in distress at sea. The main idea of the convention is to divide seas and oceans into search and rescue zones in which states are responsible for providing adequate SAR services, by establishing rescue coordination centers and setting operating procedures to be followed in case of SAR operations.

Whereas Tunisia acceded to the treaty in 1998, this was not followed by the delimitation of the Tunisian SAR zone of responsibilities nor by regional agreements with neighboring states. It is only in 2013 that Tunisia declared the limits of its SRR, following the approval of the Maghreb Convention in the Field of Search and Rescue in 2013 and by virtue of Decree No. 2009-3333 of November 2, 2009, setting out the intervention plans and means to assist aircraft in distress. In application of this norm, Tunisian authorities are required to intervene immediately, following the first signal of help or emergency, in the limits of the Tunisia sovereign borders (12 nautical miles). This means that under national legislation, Tunisian authorities are obliged to intervene only in territorial waters. Outside this domain, the limits of SAR interventions are not clearly defined.

A point to underline is that the Tunisian territorial waters overlap with the Maltese SRR. The Tunisian Exclusive Economic Zone – which does not entail any specific duty connected to SAR – also overlaps with the Maltese SRR and this circumstance led in the past to attempts by the Maltese authorities to drop their SAR responsibilities claiming that distress cases were happening in this vast area. Another complex topic regards the presence, in international waters which is part of the Maltese SRR, of Tunisian oil platforms. Also, in these cases the coordination of SAR operations have been contested and were often subject to a “ping-pong” responsibility from the involved state authorities.
Towards the declaration of a huge Tunisian SRR?

In a research document published by the IMO Institute (International Maritime Organization), Akram Boubakri (Lieutenant Commander, Head, Maritime Affairs, Tunisian Coast Guard according to IMO Institute website) wrote that at the beginning of 2020, Tunisia officially submitted the coordinates of the Tunisian SRR to the IMO. According to this document, these new coordinates, still pending the notification of consideration by the IMO, would cover a large area, creating two overlapping areas with neighboring SAR zones – the first one with Libya, the second one with Malta* (see map below):

https://civilmrcc.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/image-4.png

*This delimitation has to be confirmed (tbc). Nothing proves that the coordinates mentioned in the article were actually submitted to the IMO

As several media outlets have reported, the declaration of an official Tunisian SRR is a project supported by the European Union, which was notably put back on the table on the occasion of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2023 between the EU and Tunisia.

During the summer 2023, the Civil MRCC legal team initiated a freedom of information access request to the Tunisian authorities to clarify the current status of the Tunisian SRR. The Tunisian Ministry of Transport/the Office of the Merchant Navy and Ports replied that”[n]o legal text has yet been published defining the geographical marine limits of the search and rescue zone stipulated in the 1979 International Convention for Search and Rescue […]. We would like to inform you that the National Committee for the Law of the Sea, chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, has submitted a draft on this subject, which has been sent in 2019 to the International Maritime Organisation through the Ministry of Transport.” A recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior was sent but no reply was received yet.

Replying in December 2023 to a freedom of information access request initiated by the Civil MRCC, the IMO stated that “Tunisia has not communicated their established search and rescue region to the IMO Secretariat.” However, on November 3, 2023, the Tunisian Ministerial Council adopted a “draft law on the regulation of search and rescue at sea in Tunisia’s area of responsibility.” A text which, according to FTDES, provides for the creation of a Tunisian SAR zone, although it has not yet been published. While the text still has to be ratified by the parliament, it is quite clear that the Tunisian authorities are currently making concrete steps to align on the IMO standards and, by doing so, on the EU agenda.
Conclusion: A EU strategy to escape from its SAR responsibilities

While some analysts have seen the drop in arrivals in Italy from Tunisia in recent months as a sign of the “success” of the European Union’s strategy to close its borders (in November, a drop of over 80% compared to the summer months), in reality, the evolution of these policies proves that reinforcing a border only shifts migratory routes. From autumn onwards, the Libyan route has seen an increase in traffic, with many departing from the east of the country. These analyses fail to consider the agency of people on the move, and the constant reinvention of strategies for transgressing borders.

While condemning the generalization of a regime of refoulement by proxy in the central Mediterranean and the continued brutalization of the border regime, the Civil MRCC aims to give visibility to the autonomy of migration and non-stop solidarity struggles for freedom of movement!

▻https://civilmrcc.eu/from-libya-to-tunisia-how-the-eu-is-extending-the-push-back-regime-by-prox

#push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #externalisation #Tunisie #Libye #EU #UE #Union_européenne #gardes-côtes_libyens #push-back_by_proxy_regime #financement #training #formation #gardes-côtes #MRCC #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #Libyan_SRR #technologie #matériel #Integrated_Border_Management #surveillance #Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance (#ISMaris) #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) #Border_Management_Programme_for_the_Maghreb_Region #Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa #EUROSUR #Frontex #ISMariS #Search_and_rescue_region (#SRR)

ping @_kg_

18 aprile
►https://www.antiwarsongs.org/canzone.php?id=67661&lang=it

(2017) Album: Una valle che brucia

18 aprile 2015. Naufragio nel canale di Sicilia di una barca di...

#Frontex, Cutro è un ricordo sbiadito: sorvegliare dall’alto resta la priorità

Un anno dopo la strage, l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera investe ancora su velivoli per sorvolare il Mediterraneo. Dal 2016 a oggi la spesa supera mezzo miliardo di euro. Una strategia dagli esiti noti: più respinti e più morti

Frontex è pronta a investire altri 158 milioni di euro per sorvegliare dall’alto il Mediterraneo. A un anno dal naufragio di Steccato di Cutro (KR), costato la vita a 94 persone, la strategia dell’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere esterne europee non cambia. Anzi, si affina con “occhi” sempre più efficaci per rintracciare e osservare dall’alto le imbarcazioni in difficoltà. “Si continua a pensare che Frontex sia un’innocua gregaria degli Stati, senza responsabilità -spiega Laura Salzano, docente di diritto dell’Ue presso l’Università di Barcellona-. Ma in mare, sempre di più, le sue attività hanno conseguenze dirette sulla vita delle persone”.

Lo racconta, in parte, anche la strage di Cutro del 26 febbraio 2023. Alle 22.26 della sera prima infatti fu l’Agenzia, attraverso il velivolo “Eagle 1”, a individuare per prima la “Summer love” e a segnalarla, quand’era a circa 40 miglia delle coste crotonesi, al Frontex coordination centre. Da Varsavia le coordinate della nave furono girate alle autorità competenti: tra queste anche l’International coordination centre (ICC) di Pratica di mare (RM) in cui, allo stesso tavolo, siedono le autorità italiane e la stessa Agenzia che ha il dovere di monitorare quello che succede. “Nonostante fosse noto che c’erano persone nella ‘pancia della nave’ e il meteo stesse peggiorando, si è deciso di attivare un’operazione di polizia e non di ‘ricerca e soccorso’ -spiega Salzano-. Questa classificazione a mio avviso errata è responsabilità anche dell’Agenzia”. Un errore che potrebbe aver inciso anche sul ritardo nei soccorsi.

Lo stabilirà la Procura di Crotone che, a metà gennaio 2024, non ha ancora chiuso le indagini sulla strage. Qualcosa di quanto successo quella sera, però, si sa già, perché il processo contro i presunti manovratori dell’imbarcazione è già in fase di dibattimento. “La prima barca della Guardia costiera -spiega Francesco Verri, avvocato di decine di familiari delle vittime- arriva sul luogo del naufragio alle 6.50, quasi tre ore dopo il naufragio: salva due persone ma recupera anche il cadavere di un bambino morto di freddo. Perché ci hanno impiegato così tanto tempo per percorrere poche miglia nautiche? Sulla spiaggia la pattuglia è arrivata un’ora e 35 minuti dopo il naufragio. Da Crotone a Cutro ci vogliono dieci minuti di macchina”. Domande a cui dovranno rispondere le autorità italiane.

Al di là delle responsabilità penali, però, quanto successo quella notte mostra l’inadeguatezza del sistema dei soccorsi di cui la sorveglianza aerea è un tassello fondamentale su cui Frontex continua a investire. Con importi senza precedenti.

Quando Altreconomia va in stampa, a metà gennaio, l’Agenzia sta ancora valutando le offerte arrivate per il nuovo bando da 158 milioni di euro per due servizi di monitoraggio aereo: uno a medio raggio, entro le 151 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza (budget di 100 milioni), l’altro a lungo raggio che può superare le 401 miglia di distanza (48 milioni).

▻https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/i/web/post/658926323750966119

Documenti di gara alla mano, una delle novità più rilevanti riguarda i cosiddetti “Paesi ospitanti” delle attività di monitoraggio: si prevede infatti espressamente che possano essere anche Stati non appartenenti all’Unione europea. In sostanza: il velivolo potrebbe partire da una base in Tunisia o Libia; e, addirittura, si prevede che un host country liaison officer, ovvero un agente di “contatto” delle autorità di quel Paese, possa salire a bordo dell’aeromobile. “Bisogna capire se sarà fattibile operativamente -sottolinea Salzano-. Ma non escludere questa possibilità nel bando è grave: sono Paesi che non sono tenuti a rispettare gli standard europei”.

Mentre lavora per dispiegare la sua flotta anche sull’altra sponda del Mediterraneo, Frontex investe sulla “qualità” dei servizi richiesti. Nel bando si richiede infatti che il radar installato sopra il velivolo sia in grado di individuare (per poi poter fotografare) un oggetto di piccole dimensioni a quasi dieci chilometri di distanza e uno “medio” a quasi 19. Prendendo ad esempio il caso delle coste libiche, più la “potenza di fuoco” è elevata più il velivolo potrà essere distante dalle coste del Nordafrica ma comunque individuare le imbarcazioni appena partite.

La distanza, in miglia nautiche, che l’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex nel novembre 2023 prevede tra l’aeroporto di partenza del velivolo e l’area di interesse da sorvolare è di 401 miglia. Nella prima gara riguardante questi servizi, pubblicata dall’agenzia nell’agosto 2016, la distanza massima prevista era di 200 miglia

Frontex sa che, oltre alla componente meccanica, l’efficienza “tecnica” dei suoi droni è fondamentale. Per questo il 6 e 7 settembre 2023 ha riunito a Varsavia 16 aziende del settore per discutere delle nuove frontiere tecnologiche dei “velivoli a pilotaggio remoto”. A presentare i propri prodotti c’era anche l’italiana Leonardo Spa, leader europeo nel settore aerospaziale e militare, che già nel 2018 aveva siglato un accordo da 1,6 milioni di euro per fornire droni all’Agenzia.

L’ex Finmeccanica è tra le 15 aziende che hanno vinto i bandi pubblicati da Frontex per la sorveglianza aerea. Se si guarda al numero di commesse aggiudicate, il trio formato da DEA Aviation (Regno Unito), CAE Aviation (Stati Uniti) ed EASP Air (Spagna) primeggia con oltre otto contratti siglati. Valutando l’importo delle singole gare, a farla da padrone sono invece due colossi del settore militare: la tedesca Airbus DS e la Elbit System, principale azienda che rifornisce l’esercito israeliano, che si sono aggiudicate in cordata due gare (2020 e 2022) per 125 milioni di euro. Dal 2016 a oggi, il totale investito per questi servizi supera i cinquecento milioni di euro.

“La sorveglianza è una delle principali voci di spesa dell’Agenzia -spiega Ana Valdivia, professoressa all’Oxford internet institute che da anni analizza i bandi di Frontex- insieme a tutte le tecnologie che trasformano gli ‘eventi reali’ in dati”. E la cosiddetta “datificazione” ha un ruolo di primo piano anche nel Mediterraneo. “La fotografia di una barca in distress ha un duplice scopo: intercettarla ma anche avere un’evidenza digitale, una prova, che una determinata persona era a bordo -aggiunge Valdivia-. Questa è la ‘sorveglianza’: non un occhio che ci guarda giorno e notte, ma una memoria digitale capace di ricostruire in futuro la nostra vita. Anche per i migranti”. E per chi è su un’imbarcazione diretta verso l’Europa è vitale a chi finiscono le informazioni.

Nell’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex, si prevede che “il contraente trasferirà i dati a sistemi situati in un Paese terzo se è garantito un livello adeguato di protezione”. “Fanno finta di non sapere che non possono farlo -aggiunge Salzano- non potendo controllare che Paesi come la Tunisia e la Libia non utilizzino quei dati, per esempio, per arrestare le persone in viaggio una volta respinte”. Quello che si sa, invece, è che quei dati -nello specifico le coordinate delle navi- vengono utilizzate per far intervenire le milizie costiere libiche. Per questo motivo i droni si avvicinano sempre di più alla Libia. Se nel 2016 l’Agenzia, nella prima gara pubblicata per questa tipologia di servizi, parlava di area operativa nelle “vicinanze” con le coste italiane e greche, fino a 200 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza, dal 2020 in avanti questa distanza ha superato le 401 miglia.

Lorenzo Pezzani, professore associato di Geografia all’università di Bologna, ha esaminato giorno per giorno i tracciati di “Heron”, il più importante drone della flotta di Frontex: nel 2021 l’attività di volo si è concentrata tra Zuara e Tripoli, il tratto di costa libica da cui partiva la maggior parte delle barche.

“Il numero di respingimenti delle milizie libiche -spiega Pezzani autore dello studio “Airborne complicity” pubblicato a inizio dicembre 2022- cresce all’aumentare delle ore di volo del drone e allo stesso tempo la mortalità non diminuisce, a differenza di quanto dichiarato dall’Agenzia”. Che tramite il suo direttore Hans Leijtens, entrato in carica a pochi giorni dal naufragio di Cutro, nega di avere accordi o rapporti diretti con la Libia. “Se è così, com’è possibile che un drone voli così vicino alle coste di uno Stato sovrano?”, si chiede Salzano. Chi fornirà il “nuovo” servizio per Frontex dovrà cancellare le registrazioni video entro 72 ore. Meglio non lasciare troppe tracce in giro.

▻https://altreconomia.it/frontex-cutro-e-un-ricordo-sbiadito-sorvegliare-dallalto-resta-la-prior
#migrations #réfugiés #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #complexe_militaro-industriel #business #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Cutro #surveillance_aérienne #Leonardo #Elbit_System #Airbus #host_country_liaison_officer #radar #technologie #DEA_Aviation #CAE_Aviation #EASP_Air #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens

Maersk ships in US Navy convoy forced to retreat under Houthi missile attack | TradeWinds
▻https://www.tradewindsnews.com/containers/maersk-ships-in-us-navy-convoy-forced-to-retreat-under-houthi-missile-attack/2-1-1588303

#mer_rouge

Attaques en #mer_Rouge : les Houthis revendiquent une attaque contre un « pétrolier britannique » - La DH/Les Sports+
▻https://www.dhnet.be/actu/monde/2024/01/26/attaques-en-mer-rouge-les-houthis-revendiquent-une-attaque-contre-un-petrolier

La société privée de risques maritimes Ambrey avait rapporté plus tôt qu’un navire avait été touché dans la même zone, signalant un incendie à bord, sans que l’on sache à ce stade s’il s’agit du même incident.

Au port de Marseille, les « effets immédiats » des tensions en mer Rouge
▻https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2024/01/22/au-port-de-marseille-les-effets-immediats-des-tensions-en-mer-rouge_6212330_

https://img.lemde.fr/2024/01/20/0/0/6439/4293/1440/960/60/0/51ef59b_1705749960067-000-347u4z3.jpg

« Globalement, ce n’est pas bon pour nous », reconnaît, de son côté, le président du directoire, Hervé Martel, qui redoute que le détour imposé pousse les #armateurs à privilégier les ports du nord de l’Europe, au détriment de la Méditerranée. Autre crainte partagée par la place portuaire : la possibilité de voir les plus gros #porte-conteneurs passés ces derniers jours par le cap de Bonne-Espérance débarquer l’essentiel de leur chargement avant Marseille. « Les ports marocains pourraient monter en puissance, avec des effets de transbordement », note Christophe Castaner. Alors desservi par des unités plus petites qui caboteraient en #Méditerranée, le Grand #Port maritime de #Marseille se verrait ainsi privé d’une partie du volume de conteneurs qu’il traite habituellement.
Les retards dans les escales ont déjà des effets sur les métiers du GPMM, notamment sur les bassins ouest, dévolus aux marchandises. Les pilotes, habitués à guider une moyenne de cinq porte-conteneurs géants par semaine, ont vu cette partie de leur activité s’effacer pendant une vingtaine de jours. Chez les dockers, les conséquences sont encore plus brutales.

« Depuis le début de 2024, nous en sommes à six jours de travail », assure Christophe Claret, responsable CGT des dockers de Marseille-Fos. « On nous promet des arrivées pour ce week-end et lundi [22 janvier], et un rattrapage pour fin janvier. Mais le mois va être maigre », note le syndicaliste, qui prédit déjà des effets financiers sur l’ensemble de l’environnement portuaire si la baisse d’activité était amenée à se poursuivre.

Augmentation des tarifs de fret

« Tous les secteurs sont touchés par les retards, mais ce sont surtout les activités qui fonctionnent à flux tendu qui subissent des conséquences, analyse Jean-François Suhas, pilote et président du conseil de développement du GPMM. Pour les vracs liquides ou solides, il y a des stocks. Mais il y aura des ruptures ou des délais d’attente allongés pour certains produits comme les voitures, dont beaucoup sont produites en Asie. »

« Actuellement, on a plus de questions que de certitudes », avance prudemment M. Martel. Amal Louis, directrice du développement commercial du Grand Port maritime de Marseille, s’interroge sur les réactions des armateurs : « Vont-ils mettre plus de navires pour maintenir leur capacité de transport sur un trajet allongé ? Marseille va-t-il perdre des rotations ? » Déjà les professionnels du transport maritime ont augmenté leurs tarifs de fret, jusqu’à doubler le coût du conteneur entre Asie et Europe, pour prendre en compte le déroutage d’une partie de leurs navires.

_CMA_CGM, dont le siège mondial est à Marseille, applique ses hausses depuis le 15 janvier. En début de mois, les rebelles houthistes ont annoncé avoir pris pour cible Le Tage, l’un des porte-conteneurs du géant français du transport maritime. Arrivé jeudi 18 janvier dans le port de Constanta (Roumanie), il n’a, selon son propriétaire, subi aucun incident. CMA CGM, qui a détourné une quarantaine de ses navires au plus fort de la menace en #mer_Rouge, mi-décembre, a décidé de continuer à faire passer ses bateaux par la mer Rouge et le canal de Suez, sous la protection de la marine française. Un choix assumé pour continuer d’alimenter les ports méditerranéens, et donc Marseille.
Gilles Rof(Marseille, correspondant)

▻https://justpaste.it/2u8kz

#port_de_Marseille

L’Union européenne examine une éventuelle opération en mer Rouge
15 janvier - 21h32
►https://www.rfi.fr/fr/moyen-orient/20240115-en-direct-les-%C3%A9tats-unis-ont-abattu-un-missile-tir%C3%A9-du-y%C3%A

Avec 12% du commerce mondial, 30% du transit de conteneurs, le détroit de Bab-el-Mandeb est stratégique, en particulier pour le continent européen. Sans surprise, l’Union européenne envisage donc d’y participer au rétablissement de la sécurité de navigation, gravement menacée par les attaques des Houthis yéménites. Les 27 ambassadeurs du Comité politique et de sécurité (Cops) de l’Union européenne en parlent ce demain mardi 16 janvier à Bruxelles, rapporte notre correspondant à Bruxelles, Pierre Bénazet.

Dès le mois de décembre, l’Union européenne envisageait d’élargir à la mer Rouge son opération Atalante de lutte contre la piraterie au large de la Corne de l’Afrique – opération actuellement menée par la frégate espagnole Victoria. Au même moment, l’opération menée par les États-Unis avait obtenu le soutien de six pays de l’Union européenne. Le Danemark et la Grèce dépêchant chacun un navire de guerre et les Pays-Bas des officiers de marine. La France et l’Italie, travaillent « étroitement » avec l’opération Gardien de la Prospérité, mais ont toutes deux annoncé que la frégate Languedoc et la frégate Virginio Fasan resteraient sous commandement national.

De son côté, l’Espagne a pris ses distances car un parti de la coalition gouvernementale, Sumar, gauche radicale, ne veut pas être entraîné dans la politique étrangère des États-Unis. Pour couronner le tout l’Espagne a fini par annoncer samedi son refus de voir l’opération Atalante élargie. L’Union européenne envisage donc une nouvelle opération mais sa mise sur pied n’est pas encore acquise, même si l’Allemagne pousse fortement en sa faveur. Berlin est un peu en porte-à-faux avec ses partenaires européens, ils l’accusent de faire cavalier seul pour l’aide militaire à l’Ukraine.

12% du commerce mondial, ah là ! rien ne va plus, il faut agir, tandis que 30 000 tués dans la bande de Gaza, ça peut attendre.
#UE #Ignominie

Pour l’#agriculture_palestinienne, ce qui se passe depuis le 7 octobre est « un #désastre »

À #Gaza sous les bombes comme en #Cisjordanie occupée, l’#eau est devenue un enjeu crucial, et le conflit met en évidence une #injustice majeure dans l’accès à cette ressource vitale. Entretien avec l’hydrologue Julie Trottier, chercheuse au CNRS.

Des cultures gâchées, une population gazaouie sans eau potable… Et en toile de fond de la guerre à Gaza, une extrême dépendance des territoires palestiniens à l’eau fournie par #Israël. L’inégal accès à la ressource hydrique au Proche-Orient est aussi une histoire d’emprise sur les #ressources_naturelles.

Entretien avec l’hydrologue Julie Trottier, chercheuse au CNRS, qui a fait sa thèse sur les enjeux politiques de l’eau dans les territoires palestiniens et a contribué à l’initiative de Genève, plan de paix alternatif pour le conflit israélo-palestinien signé en 2003, pour laquelle elle avait fait, avec son collègue David Brooks, une proposition de gestion de l’eau entre Israéliens et Palestiniens.

Mediapart : L’#accès_à_l’eau est-il un enjeu dans le conflit qui oppose Israël au Hamas depuis le 7 octobre ?

Julie Trottier : Oui, l’accès à l’eau est complètement entravé à Gaza aujourd’hui. En Cisjordanie, la problématique est différente, mais le secteur agricole y est important et se trouve mal en point.

Il faut savoir que l’eau utilisée en Israël vient principalement du #dessalement d’eau de mer. C’est la société israélienne #Mekorot qui l’achemine, et elle alimente en principe la bande de Gaza en #eau_potable à travers trois points d’accès. Mais depuis le 7 octobre, deux d’entre eux ont été fermés, il n’y a plus qu’un point de livraison, au sud de la frontière est, à #Bani_Suhaila.

Cependant, 90 % de l’eau consommée à Gaza était prélevée dans des #puits. Il y a des milliers de puits à Gaza, c’est une #eau_souterraine saumâtre et polluée, car elle est contaminée côté est par les composés chimiques issus des produits utilisés en agriculture, et infiltrée côté ouest par l’eau de mer.

Comme l’#électricité a été coupée, cette eau ne peut plus être pompée ni désalinisée. En coupant l’électricité, Israël a supprimé l’accès à l’eau à une population civile. C’est d’une #violence extrême. On empêche 2,3 millions de personnes de boire et de cuisiner normalement, et de se laver.

Les #stations_d’épuration ne fonctionnent plus non plus, et les #eaux_usées non traitées se répandent ; le risque d’épidémie est considérable.

On parle moins de l’accès aux ressources vitales en Cisjordanie… Pourtant la situation s’aggrave également dans ces territoires.

En effet. Le conflit a éclaté peu avant la saison de cueillette des #olives en Cisjordanie. Pour des raisons de sécurité, craignant de supposés mouvements de terroristes, de nombreux colons ont empêché des agriculteurs palestiniens d’aller récolter leurs fruits.

La majorité des villages palestiniens se trouvent non loin d’une colonie. En raison des blocages sur les routes, les temps de trajet sont devenus extrêmement longs. Mais si l’on ne circule plus c’est aussi parce que la #peur domine. Des colons sont équipés de fusils automatiques, des témoignages ont fait état de menaces et de destruction d’arbres, de pillages de récoltes.

Résultat : aujourd’hui, de nombreux agriculteurs palestiniens n’ont plus accès à leurs terres. Pour eux, c’est un désastre. Quand on ne peut pas aller sur sa terre, on ne peut plus récolter, on ne peut pas non plus faire fonctionner son système d’#irrigation.

L’accès à l’eau n’est malheureusement pas un problème nouveau pour la Palestine.

C’est vrai. En Cisjordanie, où l’eau utilisée en agriculture vient principalement des sources et des puits, des #colonies ont confisqué de nombreux accès depuis des années. Pour comprendre, il faut revenir un peu en arrière...

Avant la création d’Israël, sur ces terres, l’accès à chaque source, à chaque puits, reposait sur des règles héritées de l’histoire locale et du droit musulman. Il y avait des « #tours_d’eau » : on distribuait l’abondance en temps d’abondance, la pénurie en temps de pénurie, chaque famille avait un moment dans la journée pendant lequel elle pouvait se servir. Il y avait certes des inégalités, la famille descendant de celui qui avait aménagé le premier conduit d’eau avait en général plus de droits, mais ce système avait localement sa légitimité.

À l’issue de la guerre de 1948-1949, plus de 700 000 Palestiniens ont été expulsés de leurs terres. Celles et ceux qui sont arrivés à ce qui correspond aujourd’hui à la Cisjordanie n’avaient plus que le « #droit_de_la_soif » : ils pouvaient se servir en cruches d’eau, mais pas pour irriguer les champs. Les #droits_d’irrigation appartenaient aux familles palestiniennes qui étaient déjà là, et ce fut accepté comme tel. Plus tard, les autorités jordaniennes ont progressivement enregistré les différents droits d’accès à l’eau. Mais ce ne sera fait que pour la partie nord de la Cisjordanie.

À l’intérieur du nouvel État d’#Israël, en revanche, la population palestinienne partie, c’est l’État qui s’est mis à gérer l’ensemble de l’eau sur le territoire. Dans les années 1950 et 1960, il aménage la dérivation du #lac_de_Tibériade, ce qui contribuera à l’#assèchement de la #mer_Morte.

En 1967, après la guerre des Six Jours, l’État hébreu impose que tout nouveau forage de puits en Cisjordanie soit soumis à un permis accordé par l’administration israélienne. Les permis seront dès lors attribués au compte-gouttes.

Après la première Intifida, en 1987, les difficultés augmentent. Comme cela devient de plus en plus difficile pour la population palestinienne d’aller travailler en Israël, de nombreux travailleurs reviennent vers l’activité agricole, et les quotas associés aux puits ne correspondent plus à la demande.

Par la suite, les #accords_d’Oslo, en 1995, découpent la Cisjordanie, qui est un massif montagneux, en trois zones de ruissellement selon un partage quantitatif correspondant aux quantités prélevées en 1992 – lesquelles n’ont plus rien à voir avec aujourd’hui. La répartition est faite comme si l’eau ne coulait pas, comme si cette ressource était un simple gâteau à découper. 80 % des eaux souterraines sont alors attribuées aux Israéliens, et seulement 20 % aux Palestiniens.

L’accaparement des ressources s’est donc exacerbé à la faveur de la #colonisation. Au-delà de l’injustice causée aux populations paysannes, l’impact du changement climatique au Proche-Orient ne devrait-il pas imposer de fonctionner autrement, d’aller vers un meilleur partage de l’eau ?

Si, tout à fait. Avec le #changement_climatique, on va droit dans le mur dans cette région du monde où la pluviométrie va probablement continuer à baisser dans les prochaines années.

C’est d’ailleurs pour cette raison qu’Israël a lancé le dessalement de l’eau de mer. Six stations de dessalement ont été construites. C’est le choix du #techno-solutionnisme, une perspective coûteuse en énergie. L’État hébreu a même créé une surcapacité de dessalement pour accompagner une politique démographique nataliste. Et pour rentabiliser, il cherche à vendre cette eau aux Palestiniens. De fait, l’Autorité palestinienne achète chaque année 59 % de l’eau distribuée par Mekorot. Elle a refusé toutefois une proposition d’exploitation d’une de ces usines de dessalement.

Il faut le souligner : il y a dans les territoires palestiniens une #dépendance complète à l’égard d’Israël pour la ressource en eau.

Quant à l’irrigation au goutte à goutte, telle qu’elle est pratiquée dans l’agriculture palestinienne, ce n’est pas non plus une solution d’avenir. Cela achemine toute l’eau vers les plantes cultivées, et transforme de ce fait le reste du sol en désert, alors qu’il faudrait un maximum de biodiversité sous nos pieds pour mieux entretenir la terre. Le secteur agricole est extrêmement consommateur d’eau : 70 à 80 % des #ressources_hydriques palestiniennes sont utilisées pour l’agriculture.

Tout cela ne date pas du 7 octobre. Mais les événements font qu’on va vers le contraire de ce que l’on devrait faire pour préserver les écosystèmes et l’accès aux ressources. L’offensive à Gaza, outre qu’elle empêche l’accès aux #terres_agricoles le long du mur, va laisser des traces de #pollution très graves dans le sol… En plus de la tragédie humaine, il y a là une #catastrophe_environnementale.

Cependant, c’est précisément la question de l’eau qui pourrait avoir un effet boomerang sur le pouvoir israélien et pousser à une sortie du conflit. Le reversement actuel des eaux usées, non traitées, dans la mer, va avoir un impact direct sur les plages israéliennes, car le courant marin va vers le nord. Cela ne pourra pas durer bien longtemps.

▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/040124/pour-l-agriculture-palestinienne-ce-qui-se-passe-depuis-le-7-octobre-est-u

#agriculture #Palestine

España participará finalmente en la misión de EEUU en el Mar Rojo, en representación de la UE
▻https://www.huffingtonpost.es/politica/espana-participara-finalmente-mision-eeuu-mar-rojo-representacion-ueb

En fin de compte, si, l’Espagne participeraà la coalition Prosperity Guardian en Mer rouge. Mais en fait, pas réellement. Enfin si, un peu tout de même.
Ca ne fait pas très sérieux cette coalition...

Al final, sí. España colaborará, a través de la Operación Atalanta de la Unión Europea, con la Operación Guardián de la Prosperidad, liderada por Estados Unidos, para velar por la seguridad de los buques en el Mar Rojo, tal y como Washington anunció hace dos días. Un proyecto con el que se trata de proteger una ruta marítima esencial para Occidente, amenazada ahora por los hutíes de Yemen, aliados de Hamás, que están atacando buques para presionar ante los ataques de Israel a Gaza.

En un mensaje en sus redes sociales, el vicealmirante Ignacio Villanueva Serrano, comandante de la misión Atalanta, la operación naval europea de lucha contra la piratería en el océano Índico, lo ha confirmado en redes. España negó de inicio su participación, anunciada en público por el Pentágono, y afirmó que sólo colaboraría en esa coalición internacional bajo el paraguas de la OTAN o de la UE, en palabras de la ministra portavoz, Pilar Alegría, en el Consejo de Ministros. Al final hay paraguas, el de Bruselas, y por eso España está dentro, indica la Cadena SER.

La duda queda despejada después de que el pasado lunes el secretario de Defensa de EEUU, Lloyd Austin, anunciara en un comunicado que España participaría junto a Reino Unido, Bahréin, Canadá, Francia, Italia, Países Bajos, Noruega y Seychelles en una alianza para abordar conjuntamente los desafíos de seguridad en el sur del Mar Rojo y el Golfo de Adén.

Josep Borrell, el jefe de la diplomacia comunitaria, ha confirmado en las últimas horas que esa decisión se ha adoptado en una reunión extraordinaria del Comité Político y de Seguridad, celebrada este miércoles. En ese foro, donde está representado el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior, los Estados Miembro han acordado contribuir en esa coalición liderada por EEUU en el Mar Rojo y lo harán a través de la Operación Atalanta, que lucha contra la piratería en el océano Índico.

Esa misión está ahora mismo justamente liderada por España, el comandante de esa misión es español, y de hecho, el cuartel general está en Rota. Ese comandante es el vicealmirante Ignacio Villanueva, quien puso un mensaje en sus redes pero que luego ha borrado.

Fuentes militares aclaran a la SER que el hecho de que la operación Atalanta vaya a desplegarse también en el Mar Rojo no significa que España vaya a movilizar a uno de sus buques a la zona. Esa decisión, insisten, aún no está tomada. De hecho, el único que tiene ahora mismo en esa misión en el Indicio, es la fragata Victoria, que desde hace día está dando soporte al carguero búlgaro que fue secuestrado por unos piratas hace ya una semana.

El Estado Mayor de Defensa ha publicado un mensaje en X, antes Twitter, en esta línea: «España tomará en su momento y valorando todas las circunstancias concurrentes, particularmente en el marco de la UE, las decisiones oportunas respecto a una posible participación en la Operación ’Prosperity Guardian’».

EU’s AI Act Falls Short on Protecting Rights at Borders

Despite years of tireless advocacy by a coalition of civil society and academics (including the author), the European Union’s new law regulating artificial intelligence falls short on protecting the most vulnerable. Late in the night on Friday, Dec. 8, the European Parliament reached a landmark deal on its long-awaited Act to Govern Artificial Intelligence (AI Act). After years of meetings, lobbying, and hearings, the EU member states, Commission, and the Parliament agreed on the provisions of the act, awaiting technical meetings and formal approval before the final text of the legislation is released to the public. A so-called “global first” and racing ahead of the United States, the EU’s bill is the first ever regional attempt to create an omnibus AI legislation. Unfortunately, this bill once again does not sufficiently recognize the vast human rights risks of border technologies and should go much further protecting the rights of people on the move.

From surveillance drones patrolling the Mediterranean to vast databases collecting sensitive biometric information to experimental projects like robo-dogs and AI lie detectors, every step of a person’s migration journey is now impacted by risky and unregulated border technology projects. These technologies are fraught with privacy infringements, discriminatory decision-making, and even impact the life, liberty, and security of person seeking asylum. They also impact procedural rights, muddying responsibility over opaque and discretionary decisions and lacking clarity in mechanisms of redress when something goes wrong.

The EU’s AI Act could have been a landmark global standard for the protection of the rights of the most vulnerable. But once again, it does not provide the necessary safeguards around border technologies. For example, while recognizing that some border technologies could fall under the high-risk category, it is not yet clear what, if any, border tech projects will be included in the final high-risk category of projects that are subject to transparency obligations, human rights impact assessments, and greater scrutiny. The Act also has various carveouts and exemptions in place, for example for matters of national security, which can encapsulate technologies used in migration and border enforcement. And crucial discussions around bans on high-risk technologies in migration never even made it into the Parliament’s final deal terms at all. Even the bans which have been announced, for example around emotion recognition, are only in place in the workplace and education, not at the border. Moreover, what exactly is banned remains to be seen, and outstanding questions to be answered in the final text include the parameters around predictive policing as well as the exceptions to the ban on real-time biometric surveillance, still allowed in instances of a “threat of terrorism,” targeted search for victims, or the prosecution of serious crimes. It is also particularly troubling that the AI Act explicitly leaves room for technologies which are of particular appetite for Frontex, the EU’s border force. Frontex released its AI strategy on Nov. 9, signaling an appetite for predictive tools and situational analysis technology. These tools, which when used without safeguards, can facilitate illegal border interdiction operations, including “pushbacks,” in which the agency has been investigated. The Protect Not Surveil Coalition has been trying to influence European policy makers to ban predictive analytics used for the purposes of border enforcement. Unfortunately, no migration tech bans at all seem to be in the final Act.

The lack of bans and red lines under the high-risk uses of border technologies in the EU’s position is in opposition to years of academic research as well as international guidance, such as by then-U.N. Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, E. Tendayi Achiume. For example, a recently released report by the University of Essex and the UN’s Office of the Human Rights Commissioner (OHCHR), which I co-authored with Professor Lorna McGregor, argues for a human rights based approach to digital border technologies, including a moratorium on the most high risk border technologies such as border surveillance, which pushes people on the move into dangerous terrain and can even assist with illegal border enforcement operations such as forced interdictions, or “pushbacks.” The EU did not take even a fraction of this position on border technologies.

While it is promising to see strict regulation of high-risk AI systems such as self-driving cars or medical equipment, why are the risks of unregulated AI technologies at the border allowed to continue unabated? My work over the last six years spans borders from the U.S.-Mexico corridor to the fringes of Europe to East Africa and beyond, and I have witnessed time and again how technological border violence operates in an ecosystem replete with the criminalization of migration, anti-migrant sentiments, overreliance on the private sector in an increasingly lucrative border industrial complex, and deadly practices of border enforcement, leading to thousands of deaths at borders. From vast biometric data collected without consent in refugee camps, to algorithms replacing visa officers and making discriminatory decisions, to AI lie detectors used at borders to discern apparent liars, the roll out of unregulated technologies is ever-growing. The opaque and discretionary world of border enforcement and immigration decision-making is built on societal structures which are underpinned by intersecting systemic racism and historical discrimination against people migrating, allowing for high-risk technological experimentation to thrive at the border.

The EU’s weak governance on border technologies will allow for more and more experimental projects to proliferate, setting a global standard on how governments will approach migration technologies. The United States is no exception, and in an upcoming election year where migration will once again be in the spotlight, there does not seem to be much incentive to regulate technologies at the border. The Biden administration’s recently released Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence does not offer a regulatory framework for these high-risk technologies, nor does it discuss the impacts of border technologies on people migrating, including taking a human rights based approach to the vast impacts of these projects on people migrating. Unfortunately, the EU often sets a precedent for how other countries govern technology. With the weak protections offered by the EU AI act on border technologies, it is no surprise that the U.S. government is emboldened to do as little as possible to protect people on the move from harmful technologies.

But real people already are at the centre of border technologies. People like Mr. Alvarado, a young husband and father from Latin America in his early 30s who perished mere kilometers away from a major highway in Arizona, in search of a better life. I visited his memorial site after hours of trekking through the beautiful yet deadly Sonora desert with a search-and-rescue group. For my upcoming book, The Walls have Eyes: Surviving Migration in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, I was documenting the growing surveillance dragnet of the so-called smart border that pushes people to take increasingly dangerous routes, leading to increasing loss of life at the U.S.-Mexico border. Border technologies as a deterrent simply do not work. People desperate for safety – and exercising their internationally protected right to asylum – will not stop coming. They will instead more circuitous routes, and scholars like Geoffrey Boyce and Samuel Chambers have already documented a threefold increase in deaths at the U.S.-Mexico frontier as the so-called smart border expands. In the not so distant future, will people like Mr. Alvarado be pursued by the Department of Homeland Security’s recently announced robo-dogs, a military grade technology that is sometimes armed?

It is no accident that more robust governance around migration technologies is not forthcoming. Border spaces increasingly serve as testing grounds for new technologies, places where regulation is deliberately limited and where an “anything goes” frontier attitude informs the development and deployment of surveillance at the expense of people’s lives. There is also big money to be made in developing and selling high risk technologies. Why does the private sector get to time and again determine what we innovate on and why, in often problematic public-private partnerships which states are increasingly keen to make in today’s global AI arms race? For example, whose priorities really matter when we choose to create violent sound cannons or AI-powered lie detectors at the border instead of using AI to identify racist border guards? Technology replicates power structures in society. Unfortunately, the viewpoints of those most affected are routinely excluded from the discussion, particularly around areas of no-go-zones or ethically fraught usages of technology.

Seventy-seven border walls and counting are now cutting across the landscape of the world. They are both physical and digital, justifying broader surveillance under the guise of detecting illegal migrants and catching terrorists, creating suitable enemies we can all rally around. The use of military, or quasi-military, autonomous technology bolsters the connection between immigration and national security. None of these technologies, projects, and sets of decisions are neutral. All technological choices – choices about what to count, who counts, and why – have an inherently political dimension and replicate biases that render certain communities at risk of being harmed, communities that are already under-resourced, discriminated against, and vulnerable to the sharpening of borders all around the world.

As is once again clear with the EU’s AI Act and the direction of U.S. policy on AI so far, the impacts on real people seems to have been forgotten. Kowtowing to industry and making concessions for the private sector not to stifle innovation does not protect people, especially those most marginalized. Human rights standards and norms are the bare minimum in the growing panopticon of border technologies. More robust and enforceable governance mechanisms are needed to regulate the high-risk experiments at borders and migration management, including a moratorium on violent technologies and red lines under military-grade technologies, polygraph machines, and predictive analytics used for border interdictions, at the very least. These laws and governance mechanisms must also include efforts at local, regional, and international levels, as well as global co-operation and commitment to a human-rights based approach to the development and deployment of border technologies. However, in order for more robust policy making on border technologies to actually affect change, people with lived experiences of migration must also be in the driver’s seat when interrogating both the negative impacts of technology as well as the creative solutions that innovation can bring to the complex stories of human movement.

▻https://www.justsecurity.org/90763/eus-ai-act-falls-short-on-protecting-rights-at-borders

#droits #frontières #AI #IA #intelligence_artificielle #Artificial_Intelligence_Act #AI_act #UE #EU #drones #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #droits_humains #technologie #risques #surveillance #discrimination #transparence #contrôles_migratoires #Frontex #push-backs #refoulements #privatisation #business #complexe_militaro-industriel #morts_aux_frontières #biométrie #données #racisme #racisme_systémique #expérimentation #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #pouvoir #murs #barrières_frontalières #terrorisme

Seul le Bahreïn comme pays arabe .
18 décembre 2023 – 21:45 GMT
►https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/12/18/israel-hamas-war-live-israeli-strikes-on-jabalia-refugee-camp-kill-90

US launches multinational operation in response to Houthi attacks

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has announced the formation of the coalition while on a visit to Bahrain after speaking about it earlier in the day during a press conference with his Israeli counterpart.

The UK, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles and Spain will be participating in the operation, he said, which will include conducting joint patrols in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

It will be called Operation Prosperity Guardian.

Houthi attacks on what they say are Israeli-linked ships in the Red Sea have been ongoing during Israel’s war on Gaza. Earlier, we reported on attacks on two commercial vessels – the Swan Atlantic and MSC Clara – claimed by the Yemeni group. The UK also reported an attempted attack on a ship northeast of Djibouti.

Multiple multinational shipping and oil companies have either rerouted cargo or suspended shipping through the Red Sea altogether, driving fears of the negative effect the attacks could have on the global economy.

غزة.. شكرهم الموساد.. من هي الدول “العربيّة” التي اعترضت صواريخ الحوثيين على إسرائيل؟ وقبّة الكيان تعترض صاروخاً لحماية الأقصى !.. موكب “الفلافل” الرئاسي.. قبرص التركيّة تخشى الهجرة اليهوديّة ولواء أردني مُستغرب من هزيمة جيوش عرب 67 لماذا؟ | رأي اليوم
▻https://www.raialyoum.com/%d8%ba%d8%b2%d8%a9-%d8%b4%d9%83%d8%b1%d9%87%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d9%8

Le Mossad (!) publie la liste des pays qui ont contribué à stopper les attaques des Yéménites...

صفحة “الموساد” الرسميّة على منصّة إكس تنشر قائمة الدول التي اعترضت طائرات مُسيّرة وصواريخ أطلقتها حركة أنصار الله اليمنيّة الحوثيين على إسرائيل، وجاء بينها 3 دول عربيّة، وجاءت كالتالي: أمريكا، فرنسا، السعوديّة، مصر، بريطانيا، الأردن، وشكرت صفحة الموساد تلك الدول.

Pas ceux de la future (?) coalition, donc, ceux qui ont déjà désingué du drone ou du missile, dans l’ordre (israélien) : USA,France (yeah !), A. saoudite, Egypte, GB, Jordanie.

(On n’est pas obligé de les croire sur parole...)

La mer Rouge sous la pression des houthistes yéménites
▻https://archive.ph/2023.12.15-115002/https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/12/15/la-mer-rouge-sous-la-pression-des-houthistes-yemenites_6205987_3210.html

La multiplication des assauts houthistes en mer Rouge affecte d’ores et déjà fortement le commerce maritime d’Israël, dont les bâtiments sont les premières cibles revendiquées des rebelles. Le 9 décembre, le groupe avait déclaré dans un communiqué qu’il « empêcherait le passage des navires à destination de l’entité sioniste » si la nourriture et les médicaments ne pouvaient pas entrer dans la bande de Gaza.

Quels que soient le pavillon des navires ou la nationalité de leurs propriétaires, les bâtiments à destination d’Israël « deviendront une cible légitime pour nos forces armées », précisait la milice yéménite.

Certaines compagnies maritimes ont donc décidé de détourner leurs navires et préfèrent désormais contourner l’Afrique pour rallier la Méditerranée, ajoutant quelque 13 000 kilomètres à leur itinéraire et de dix à quatorze jours de navigation. Près d’une vingtaine de navires israéliens empruntent ainsi actuellement cette longue route, dont des bâtiments de ZIM, le plus gros armateur israélien. L’allemand Hapag-Lloyd et le chinois Cosco ont aussi dérouté des navires. Mais pas le français CMA CGM, numéro trois mondial des porte-conteneurs, qui n’a pas renoncé au passage par la mer Rouge et le canal de Suez, même sans soutien de navires militaires.

[…]

Les attaques des houthistes, principalement au moyen de drones bon marché (entre 10 000 et 50 000 euros pièce) mettent aussi au défi la soutenabilité des moyens engagés par les marines militaires pour les contrer. Ces dernières semaines, l’US Navy et la marine française ont dû tirer des missiles d’une valeur de plusieurs millions d’euros pour protéger leurs bâtiments ou des navires commerciaux. « Quand on “tue” un Shahed [un drone iranien low cost] avec un Aster [le missile français notamment utilisé en mer Rouge], en réalité c’est le Shahed qui a tué l’Aster », a ainsi estimé le chef d’état-major des armées françaises, le général Thierry Burkhard, lors d’un colloque le 7 décembre, à l’Institut Montaigne, à Paris.

#Frontex and the pirate ship

The EU’s border agency Frontex and the Maltese government are systematically sharing coordinates of refugee boats trying to escape Libya with a vessel operated by a militia linked to Russia, human trafficking, war crimes and smuggling.

Tareq Bin Zeyad (TBZ) is one of the most dangerous militia groups in the world. It is run by Saddam Haftar, the powerful son of East Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. The group has been operating a vessel, also called TBZ, in the Central Mediterranean since May, during which it has intercepted more than 1,000 people at sea off the coasts of Libya and Malta and returned them to Libya.

Experts say the militia would not have been able to find the refugee boats without help from surveillance planes. We analysed several interceptions carried out by the TBZ boat in Maltese waters. These are known as ‘pullbacks’ and are illegal according to Maritime experts. We found that TBZ receives coordinates from EU planes in three ways:

– Direct communication through a Frontex mayday alert. On 26 July, a Frontex plane issued a mayday (a radio alert to all vessels within range used in cases of immediate distress) in relation to a refugee boat. TBZ answered within minutes. Frontex only informed the nearby rescue authorities of Italy, Libya and Malta after issuing the mayday. They did not intervene. Frontex admitted the plane had to leave the area after an hour, leaving the fate of the refugees in the hands of a militia. It would take TBZ another six hours to reach the boat and drag people back to Libya.

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LE0sq_RKY0&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.lighthouserepor

– Indirect communication through Tripoli. Frontex routinely shares refugee vessel coordinates with the Libyan authorities. In Frontex’s own system, they recorded that on 16 August the coordinates they shared with Tripoli were handed over to TBZ and led to an interception.

– Direct communication with Malta’s Armed forces. On 2 August, a pilot with a Maltese accent was recorded giving coordinates to TBZ. Hours later, the TBZ vessel was spotted by NGOs near the coordinates. Malta’s armed forces did not deny the incident.

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zaFlaXtS4c

Both Frontex and Malta say their aim when sharing the coordinates is to help people in distress.

Responding to our questions on the 26 July mayday, Frontex said its experts decided to issue the alert because “the vessel was far away from the shoreline, it was overcrowded, and there was no life-saving equipment visible.”

However, in all of the cases we analysed there were safer options: merchant ships were sailing nearby -– much closer than the TBZ ship – and NGO vessels or the Maltese or Italian coast guards could have assisted.

According to international law expert Nora Markard “Frontex should have ensured that someone else took over the rescue after the distress call – for example one of the merchant ships, which would have been on site much faster anyway.”

Markard added: “Frontex knows that this situation is more of a kidnapping than a rescue. You only have to imagine pirates announcing that they will deal with a distress case. That wouldn’t be right either.”

The TBZ is described by the EU as a militia group affiliated with warlord Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army in confidential documents obtained by this investigation. We also found confidential reports showing that EU states are aware of the illicit nature of many of TBZ’s activities – including human trafficking. The group was described in an EU report as being supported by Russian private military group PCM-Wagner.

Frontex declined to comment on whether TBZ was an appropriate partner.
METHODS

We obtained confidential EU documents, tracked position data from European surveillance aircraft and cargo ships, monitored social media of militia members on board the TBZ vessel, spoke to insider sources in EU and Libya institutions and reached out to linguistic experts to analyse a radio communication.

We were able to speak to seven refugees who were dragged back to Libya by the TBZ and gave harrowing accounts of mistreatment.
STORYLINES

All the refugees we spoke to reported abuse at the hands of the militia, including torture, forced labour and ransom payment. One of them, Syrian Bassel Nahas*, described a three-week ordeal that he did not think he would survive.

He said TBZ crew shaved his eyebrows and lashes and mutilated his head. “They beat us until our bodies turned black,” he said. “Then they threw our bodies in the water”.

https://www.lighthousereports.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/TBZ-at-Benghazi-harbour-980x663.png

Bassel said he and other refugees were left in the Benghazi harbour next to the docked vessel for hours overnight, the salt burning their wounds, before they took him out at 4am and beat him more.

Finally, Bassel recounts, the armed men made him wear an orange prisoner suit and stand against a wall. They opened fire, laughing as he collapsed. It was only when he regained consciousness and checked his body for blood that he realised the bullets hadn’t hit him.

A Frontex drone was filming Bassel’s boat while it was intercepted by TBZ several days before, on 18 August. Bassel recounts the moment the militia approached: “We told them to leave us alone, that we had children and women on board. But they accused us of having weapons and drugs and opened fire on our boat.”

Frontex claims that due to poor visibility on that day “detailed observations were challenging”. The same drone spotted Bassel’s vessel two days before its interception by TBZ and shared coordinates with Malta and Greece.

Frontex declined to comment on whether its coordinates were used to intercept Bassel’s vessel and on allegations of torture and human rights abuses by TBZ.

Jamal*, a Syrian from the southwestern province of Deraa, recalls that after being intercepted at sea on 25 May he was taken “to a big prison” where they were beaten “with sticks and iron” and all their belongings – “[their] passports, [their] cell phones” – were confiscated. “There was no water available in the prison. We drank in the bathroom. They fed us rice, soup or pasta in small quantities. We were held for 20 days by the Tariq bin Ziyad brigade,” he said.

Several people report that they were forced to work to earn their freedom. “What this brigade did to us was not authorised, it was slavery. They sold us to businessmen so that we would work for them for free,” said Hasni, who was intercepted on 7 July by the TBZ.

►https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/frontex-and-the-pirate-ship

#Malte #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #réfugiés #Russie #Libye #Tareq_Bin_Zeyad (#TBZ) #milices #collaboration #Saddam_Haftar #Khalifa_Haftar #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #pull-backs #sauvetage (well...) #PCM-Wagner #drones

COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE DU MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES
Paris, le 12 décembre 2023
12.12.2023_Interception par la Frégate multi-missions (FREMM) Languedoc en mer Rouge.pdf
▻https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/ministere-armees/12.12.2023_Interception+par%20la%20Fr%C3%A9gate%20multi-missions%20%28F

Interception par la Frégate multi-missions (FREMM) Languedoc en mer Rouge.

Dans la soirée du lundi 11 décembre, le pétrolier Strinda (pavillon Norvégien) a été victime d’une attaque aérienne complexe provenant du Yémen provoquant un incendie à bord.

La FREMM Languedoc qui patrouillait dans la zone a intercepté et détruit un drone menaçant directement le Strinda. La FREMM s’est ensuite placée en protection du bâtiment touché, empêchant la tentative de détournement du navire.
L’incendie à bord du Strinda a pu être maîtrisé. Aucun blessé n’est à déplorer.

L’USS Mason a ensuite escorté le Strinda vers le golfe d’Aden hors de la zone de menaces.

La FREMM Languedoc a repris sa patrouille vers le Nord.

La FREMM Languedoc est engagée dans le Golfe d’Aden et le sud de la mer Rouge depuis
le 8 décembre afin de contribuer à la sûreté maritime et à la liberté de navigation des navires (environ 20 000 navires de commerce transitent dans cette zone chaque année).

#mer_Rouge

Beyond borders, beyond boundaries. A Critical Analysis of EU Financial Support for Border Control in Tunisia and Libya

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/bc40e5d2a-3c51e6/pw1GsGJt4170/01Ns0KgPV4Pl91rFF5IrvPERJoIpRNbDGOllF5gV.png

In recent years, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have intensified their effort to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching their borders. One strategy to reach this goal consists of funding programs for third countries’ coast guards and border police, as currently happens in Libya and Tunisia.

These programs - funded by the #EUTF_for_Africa and the #NDICI-Global_Europe - allocate funding to train and equip authorities, including the delivery and maintenance of assets. NGOs, activists, and International Organizations have amassed substantial evidence implicating Libyan and Tunisian authorities in severe human rights violations.

The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament commissioned a study carried out by Profundo, ARCI, EuroMed Rights and Action Aid, on how EU funding is linked to human rights violations in neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia and Libya.

The study answers the following questions:

- What is the state of EU funding for programs aimed at enhancing border control capacities in Libya and Tunisia?
- What is the human rights impact of these initiatives?
- What is the framework for human rights compliance?
- How do the NDICI-Global Europe decision-making processes work?

The report highlights that the shortcomings in human rights compliance within border control programs, coupled with the lack of proper transparency clearly contradicts EU and international law. Moreover, this results in the insufficient consideration of the risk of human rights violations when allocating funding for both ongoing and new programs.

This is particularly concerning in the cases of Tunisia and Libya, where this report collects evidence that the ongoing strategies, regardless of achieving or not the questionable goals of reducing migration flows, have a very severe human rights impact on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

Pour télécharger l’étude:
►https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

►https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

#Libye #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #aide_financières #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #rapport #trust_fund #profundo #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument #droits_humains #gestion_des_frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #fonds_fiduciaire #IVCDCI #IVCDCI-EM #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_libyens #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #EUTFA #coût #violence #crimes_contre_l'humanité #impunité #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #naufrages

Le dessous des images. Derniers instants avant le naufrage

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/bc40e5d2a-3c51e6/ELcQlWFswQSj/FnPyPqDi4AztmVjQUUYf4A1NP41Jd1ufonHv6zU3.png

Au large de la Grèce, une équipe de garde-côtes survole et capture cette scène depuis un hélicoptère. Des centaines de migrants appellent au secours depuis un chalutier. La plupart ne survivront pas au naufrage. Mais à quoi a servi cette image ? Présenté par Sonia Devillers, le magazine qui analyse les images de notre époque.

Ce cliché du 13 juin 2023 est repris dans toute la presse internationale. Les autorités grecques ont photographié ce bateau de pêche qu’ils savent bondé et fragile, et dont les passagers sont affamés et déshydratés. Pourtant, ils ne seront pas capables de les secourir. La responsabilité des garde-côtes sera mise en cause par médias et ONG. Arthur Carpentier, journaliste au Monde et coauteur d’une enquête sur ce naufrage, nous explique en quoi les images ont permis de reconstituer le drame. Le chercheur suisse Charles Heller nous aide à comprendre l’impact médiatique, politique et symbolique des images de migrants et de naufrages en Méditerranée.

▻https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/110342-133-A/le-dessous-des-images

Citation de #Charles_Heller :

« Ces #images cristallisent toutes les #inégalités et les #conflits du monde dans lequel on vit. Elles nous disent aussi la #normalisation de la #violence des #frontières, sur la large acceptation de dizaines de milliers de #morts aux frontières européennes, et en #Méditerranée en particulier »

#naufrage #migrations #réfugiés #mer #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Grèce #reconstruction #Pylos #géolocalisation #architecture_forensique #images #mourir_en_mer #morts_en_mer #garde-côtes #Frontex #reconstitution #SAR #mer_Egée #border_forensics #domination #imaginaire #invasion #3_octobre_2013 #émoi #émotions #normalisation_de_la_violence

ping @reka

El mar. El muro

Agost del 2023, missió del vaixell Astral d’#Open_Arms al Mediterrani central. Les periodistes Mercè Folch i Anna Surinyach acompanyen voluntaris i tripulació durant una setmana intensa en què els rescats s’encavalquen els uns darrere dels altres. En pocs dies, l’ONG ha pogut salvar la vida de més d’un miler de persones. D’altres no han tingut la mateixa sort i se’ls ha perdut la pista per sempre.

▻https://www.ccma.cat/3cat/proleg/audio/1188520

#naufrage #sauvetage #audio #podcast #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée