organization:al-qaeda

  • Alain Chouet : « L’Etat islamique manquera bientôt de ressources humaines et financières » | Oumma.com
    http://oumma.com/211647/alain-chouet-letat-islamique-manquera-bientot-de-ress

    Comment expliquez-vous que la presse francophone n’ait parlé que tardivement de cette scission d’Al-Qaida, aujourd’hui à la tête de l’Etat islamique. On sait pourtant que depuis la mort de Ben Laden, certains djihadistes ont refusé de prêter allégeance à Zawahiri.

    Alain Chouet : La réalité est que, depuis 2002 et l’offensive alliée contre le régime Taliban d’Afghanistan et ses protégés djihadistes, Al-Qaïda relève plus du mythe que de la réalité. C’est un mythe qui a été entretenu par le fait que tout contestataire dans le monde musulman, quelles que soient ses motivations et ses objectifs, a bien compris qu’il devait se réclamer de l’organisation qui avait épouvanté l’Amérique s’il voulait être pris au sérieux. C’est un mythe qui a été entretenu par certains dirigeants des pays musulmans qui ont bien compris qu’ils devaient coller l’étiquette Al-Qaïda sur leurs opposants s’ils voulaient pouvoir les réprimer tranquillement. C’est enfin un mythe qui a été entretenu par les dirigeants et les médias d’un certain nombre de pays occidentaux pour légitimer leur politique sécuritaire intérieure et extérieure.

    Mais dans la galaxie salafiste, tout le monde sait bien que Al-Qaïda se résumait depuis 2003 à un Ben Laden réfugié dans un « resort » des services pakistanais et à un sentencieux Ayman Zawahiri distribuant les bons et les mauvais points de djihadisme et s’appropriant verbalement des actes de violence commis un peu partout dans le monde qu’il n’avait ni commandités, ni prescrits ni contrôlés.

    Il était difficile pour des djihadistes ambitieux de remettre en cause la figure emblématique de Ben Laden mais plus facile de s’affranchir de la tutelle morale de Zawahiri. En particulier pour des chefs de bande locaux qui n’avaient que faire du « djihad mondial » sans bénéfice immédiat et souhaitaient plutôt se bâtir un petit sultanat local où ils pourraient exercer un pouvoir sans partage et rançonner la population. C’est ce type de raisonnement, joint aux aléas des rivalités locales et des surenchères entre l’Arabie et le Qatar, qui a poussé un Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi à rejeter le parrainage d’Al-Qaïda et - comme on dit en France - à s’autoproclamer « Calife à la place du Calife ».


  • Syria and Iraq : Why US policy is fraught with danger
    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-and-iraq-us-policy-is-fraught-with-danger-9722276.html
    Patrick Cockburn

    En Irak, le nouveau gouvernement est à peine moins sectaire que le précédent,

    The new [Iraqi] government may be less divisive than the old one – it would be difficult to be more – but only to a limited degree.

    ... the Sunni are more terrified of the return of vengeful Iraqi government forces than they are of Isis.

    They have reason to be frightened since revenge killing of Sunni are taking place in Amerli, the Shia Turkoman town whose two-month siege by Isis was broken last month by Shia and Kurdish fighters aided by US air strikes. Mass graves of Shia truck drivers murdered by Isis are being excavated and local Sunni are being killed in retaliation. The family of a 21-year-old Sunni man abducted by militiamen was soon afterwards offered his headless body back in return for $2,000 (£1,240).

    In the 127 villages retaken by the Kurds from Isis under the cover of US air strikes, the Sunni Arab population has mostly fled and is unlikely to return. Often Sunni houses are burnt by Shia militiamen and in one village Kurdish fighters had reportedly sprayed over the word “apostate” placed there by Isis and instead written “Kurdish home”.

    (...)

    En Syrie, la #CIA, peu convaincue par les « modérés » des wahhabites, a constitué ses propres « modérés »,

    Isis will be difficult to defeat in Iraq because of Sunni sectarian solidarity. But the reach of Isis in Iraq is limited by the fact that Sunni Arabs are only 20 per cent of the 33 million population. In Syria, by way of contrast, Sunni Arabs make up at least 60 per cent of Syrians, so Isis’s natural constituency is larger than in Iraq. Motorised Isis columns have been advancing fast here, taking some 35 per cent of the country and inflicting defeats both on other Syrian opposition fighters, notably Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate, and on the Syrian army. Isis is now within 30 miles of Aleppo, the largest city in Syria before the war.

    (...)

    The US is now desperately trying to persuade Turkey to close the border effectively, but so far has only succeeded in raising the price charged by local guides taking people across the frontier from $10 to $25 a journey.

    (...)

    ... Mr Obama (...) will (...) step up a pretence that there is a potent “moderate” armed opposition in Syria, capable of fighting both Isis and the Syrian government at once. Unfortunately, this force scarcely exists in any strength and the most important rebel movements opposed to Isis are themselves jihadis such as #Jabhat_al-Nusra, #Ahrar_al-Sham and the #Islamic_Front. Their violent sectarianism is not very different to that of Isis.

    Lacking a moderate military opposition to support as an alternative to Isis and the Assad government, the US has moved to raise such a force under its own control. The Free Syrian Army (FSA), once lauded in Western capitals as the likely military victors over Mr Assad, largely collapsed at the end of 2013. The FSA military leader, General Abdul-Ilah al Bashir, who defected from the Syrian government side in 2012, said in an interview with the McClatchy news agency last week that the CIA had taken over direction of this new moderate force. He said that “the leadership of the FSA is American”, adding that since last December US supplies of equipment have bypassed the FSA leadership in Turkey and been sent directly to up to 14 commanders in northern Syria and 60 smaller groups in the south of the country. Gen Bashir said that all these FSA groups reported directly to the CIA. Other FSA commanders confirmed that the US is equipping them with training and weapons including TOW anti-tank missiles.

    It appears that, if the US does launch air strikes in Syria, they will be nominally in support of the FSA which is firmly under US control. The US is probably nervous of allowing weapons to be supplied to supposed moderates by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies which end up in the hands of Isis. The London-based small arms research organisation Conflict Armament Research said in a report this week that anti-tank rockets used by Isis in Syria were “identical to M79 rockets transferred by Saudi Arabia to forces operating under the Free Syrian Army umbrella in 2013”.

    In Syria and in Iraq Mr Obama is finding that his policy of operating through local partners, whose real aims may differ markedly from his own, is full of perils.

    • For US, finding right allies in Syria will be tough
      Hannah Allam
      http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/09/11/239590_turkish-aid-to-al-qaida-linked.html

      Yet the Syrian Opposition Coalition, the closest thing Obama has to an alternative to the Assad government, called the explosion that killed the jihadists a deliberate attempt to “silence the voice of #moderation.” Only in polarized Syria, with the Islamic State skewing the curve, could such a group seriously be considered mainstream.

      #Syrie #modérés

    • Joshua Landis :
      http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/15/why-syria-is-thegordianknotofobamasantiisilcampaign.html

      U.S. intelligence estimates that Syrian rebels are organized into more than 1,500 groups of widely varying political leanings. They control a little less than 20 percent of Syrian territory. Those designated as moderate rebel forces control less than 5 percent of Syria. To arm and fund them without first unifying them under a single military and political command would be to condemn Syria to rebel chaos.

      The U.S. is arming and funding 12 to 14 militias in northern Syria and 60 more groups in the south, according to the head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition. These militias have not, thus far, been particularly successful on the battlefield, and none has national reach. Most are based on one charismatic commander or a single region and have not articulated clear ideologies. All depend on foreign money.

      The vast majority of Syria’s rebel groups have been deemed too Islamist, too sectarian and too anti-democratic by the U.S. — and these are the groups ranged against the ISIL. They span the Salafist ideological gamut, from al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front to the 40,000-strong conglomeration of rebel forces united under the banner of the Islamic Front. Despite U.S. skepticism, some of the Sunni Arab regimes Obama has courted as key allies in the anti-ISIL effort have worked with these groups.

      Gulf countries reportedly poured money into the Islamic Front until the U.S. convinced them to stop. Islamic Front leaders decried democracy as the “dictatorship of the strong” and called for building an Islamic state. Zahran Alloush, the military chief of the Islamic Front spooked Americans by insisting that Syria be “cleansed of Shias and Alawites.” The newly appointed head of Ahrar al-Sham and the political chief of the Islamic Front earned his stripes in the ranks of the Iraqi insurgency fighting the U.S.

      Turkey insists that the U.S. arm these anti-ISIL Islamist rebel groups, including the Nusra Front. Disagreement over which rebels to back is one of the reasons Ankara has refused the U.S. requests to use Turkish territory to train rebel forces and as a base from which to carry out attacks on ISIL. The United States’ principal allies simply do not agree on which rebel forces are sufficiently moderate to qualify for support.


  • Taking on ISIS

    Economic and Political Weekly
    http://www.epw.in/editorials/taking-isis.html

    Taking on ISIS

    Vol - XLIX No. 36, September 06, 2014 Editorials

    There is just no easy and clear way to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

    Actions by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have contributed to a deterioration of the already catastrophic Syrian civil war and the possible disintegration of Iraq. There is no question that this radical Islamist group, which thrives on medieval methods, primeval ideologies and brutality, has to be militarily defeated. How it is to be done is a difficult issue. The outcome of any event, even if it leads to the defeat of the ISIS, seems to be one that is going to be bloody, chaotic and one of further despair for the long-suffering people of Iraq and Syria.

    The rise of the ISIS has been facilitated by a number of forces and circumstances, each having its own set of consequences. The US invasion of Iraq and the post-occupation policy of dismantling the secular state apparatus in the country in the hope that a dependent nation could be created allowed the seeds of Al Qaida to be sowed on the back of Sunni anger against the new establishment. The sectarian attitude of the Shia-dominated governments led by Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister fanned the rising waves of Sunni resistance so much so that former Ba’athist forces sought an alliance with the battle-hardened ISIS which had made significant advances in the Syrian civil war.

    The Syrian civil war had provided ISIS the opportunity to utilise the “great game” played by various proxy forces intending to destabilise the Ba’athist regime of Bashar al-Assad. Suffused with finances and weaponry supplied to the Syrian opposition by various groups – financiers from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar – and helped by Turkish indulgence in allowing foreign recruits to the ISIS cause to get free passes through the Turkish-Syrian border, the group over-ran resistance from the Syrian regime and took control over a large area in northern Syria. The US also played its role in funding the rebellion against the Syrian regime, only to see the ISIS and other allied forces reap most of the largesse.

    Presently, the ISIS has control over one-third of Iraq and a significant number of towns, cities, and oil refineries in Syria, and has established a “de facto” state. The ISIS sought to expand its territory into the northern and oil-rich areas controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) beginning with the capture of Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul. In doing so, it subjected Iraqi minorities – for example, the Yazidis – to brutality. The Yazidis were driven into refuge in the Sinjar Mountains, as the Kurdish peshmerga (armed militia of the KRG) withdrew protection when it could not take on the better-armed ISIS. It was left to the Kurdish militias from Syria and Turkey – the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the socialist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – to rescue a large number of Yazidis, even as the US finally swung into action to protect its KRG allies and assets. The pluralist and feminist YPG, an offshoot of the PKK’s Syrian affiliates, has remained the most effective force against the ISIS advance in Syria.

    Despite ideological differences, the Kurdish peshmerga has now formed a tentative alliance with the PKK and the YPG – even as the US has sought to help the alliance to take on the ISIS in northern Iraq. It is an uncomfortable position for the US; it has proscribed and categorised the PKK as a “terrorist” organisation. The PKK, which seeks a loose transborder confederation of Kurdish areas, persists with insurgency in Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member, although the two are also engaged in a tortuous peace process.

    The US seems to have a Janus-faced policy towards the ISIS. In Syria, the US prefers the heat to remain on the Assad government and is reluctant to recognise the threat the ISIS (and other Islamist forces such as the Al Qaida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra) poses to Syrian unity. This has meant that the ISIS has used its territorial acquisitions as buffers. With its financial resources and US-sourced weaponry captured from the Iraqi army, it is a formidable opponent to the Syrian government.

    Iraq and Syria are in shambles. The inability of the Iraqi government to stem the advance of the ISIS has emboldened the KRG to assert its autonomy even more and has increased the prospects of Kurdish irredentism. The radical Sunni character of the ISIS coupled with its attacks on the Shia community has worsened the already poor relations between the two communities in Iraq. The Iraqi citizenry has no desire for further US involvement, which should rule out US unilateralism. Besides, it is the unstated policy of the US to eventually balkanise Iraq and Syria (Iran’s ally) that has resulted in the rise of the ISIS in the first place, even as this was not intended. The US antipathy towards Syria and differences in the UN Security Council do not guarantee any agreement resulting in a reasonable resolution on intervention. The Gulf monarchies realise the threat that the ISIS poses to their own retrograde monarchies but are unable to look beyond their antipathy towards their geopolitical enemy, Iran. Yet it is clear that the only way ISIS can be militarily defeated is if the Syrian regime, the Iraqi government, the Kurds and Iran (which too sees the rise of ISIS as a threat) are empowered and unitedly take on the new caliphate.


  • Décapitation du mouvement Ahrar Al Sham
    http://www.madaniya.info/2014/09/10/decapitation-du-mouvement-ahrar-al-sham

    Quatre des principaux dirigeants d’Ahrar Al Sham ont été tués dans cet attentat qui a eu lieu dans la province d’Idlib. Ses quatre dirigeants sont : Hassan Aboud, fondateur et Emir du mouvement, Abou Talha al Ghab, responsable militaire, Abou Ayman Ram Hamdan, ancien chef de la brigade Badr et responsable de la planification d’Ahram Al Sham ainsi que Abou Abdel Malek al Shari’, son responsable religieux, selon un décompte établi par le site Madaniya sur la base d’informations recueillies sur le terrain.

    Au moins 46 chefs et responsables du groupe salafite djihadiste Ahrar Al Sham ont péri mardi 9 juin dans cet attentat qui s’est produit alors que les dirigeants salafistes tenaient une réunion dans la cave d’une maison super protégée appartenant à Abou Ayman Ram Hamdan, ancien chef de la brigade Badr et responsable de la planification à Ahram Al Sham.

    • On lit ceci :

      L’administration américaine tente de restructurer l’opposition armée syrienne dans le nord du pays. Le secrétaire général de la coalition syrienne de l’opposition pro occidental Nasr al Hariri, a, quant à lui, estimé que cet attentat constituait une « pénétration sécuritaire de grande envergure », qualifiant Ahrar Al Sham de groupe modéré.

      Ahrar Al Sham (Les Hommes Libres du Levant) entretient de bonnes relations aussi bien avec les Américains que les Qataris qu’avec Al Qaida, l’organisation d’Ayman Al Zawahiri, le successeur d’Oussama Ben Laden.

      Quel lien entrenait Ahrar Al Sham avec l’EI ?

    • Lu aussi dans un article que je ne retrouve plus que Foley aurait été « vendu » 50 000 dollars à l’EI par un groupe armé « soutenu par les Etats-Unis ». Quelqu’un a-t-il une référence ?

    • Selon Al Akhbar, pour Ayman al Thawahiri, Abboud était l’égal de Joulani et Baghdadi (quand ce dernier était encore au sein d’al Qaeda).
      تفجير غامض يبيد قيادة « أحرار الشام » | الأخبار
      http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/215293

      وتُعتبر «حركة أحرار الشام» صاحبة شبكة متداخلة من العلاقات الاستخباراتية. وسبق لحسان عبود أن أكد أنها «سبقت في نشأتها الجيش الحر، حيث تمَّ تشكيلها في شهر أيار عام 2011، ولكنها استمرّت بإعداد خلاياها سراً حتى لحظة الإعلان عن تشكيل الكتائب في نهاية عام 2011». وكانت «الحركة» في مرحلة سابقة واحدة من أغنى الجماعات المسلحة في سوريا، وهي أكبر المجموعات التي ساهمت في بسط السيطرة على مدينة الرقة، قبل أن تنسحب منها إثر سيطرة تنظيم «الدولة الإسلامية» عليها. وقامت «الحركة» حينها بالسيطرة على مقرِّ البنك المركزي والذي قُدرت الأموال الموجودة فيه حينها بخمسة مليارات ليرة سورية. كما تحتفظ بعلاقات استثنائية مع «جبهة النصرة»، ويمكن اعتبارها وجهاً آخر لها. واضطلعت «أحرار الشام» بدور أساسي في الحرب التي شنتها «الجبهة الإسلامية»، و«جبهة النصرة» ضد «داعش». وكان لاغتيال أحد أبرز قادتها محمد بهايا (أبو خالد السوري، الذي كان مندوب زعيم تنظيم القاعدة أيمن الظواهري في سوريا) عاملاً مؤثراً في تأجيج «الحرب الأهلية الجهادية».
      وكانت «أحرار الشام» أوّل من استقبل «جهاديين» من خارج البلاد، تحت مسمى «المهاجرين». وقد وضعت لنفسها «نهجاً جهادياً» مزجت فيه خُلاصات من مختلف «المدارس الجهادية»، مثل «الطليعة المقاتلة»، و«تنظيم القاعدة»، وسواها. وتؤكد مصادر «جهادية» لـ«الأخبار» أن «في عنق الشهيد أبو عبد الله الحموي بيعة لزعيم تنظيم القاعدة أيمن الظواهري»، وسبق للأخير أن وضع في إحدى كلماته كلّاً من عبود، وأبو بكر البغدادي، وأبو محمد الجولاني على قدم المساواة. وكان عبود واحداً من «الإسلاميين» المعتقلين في سجن صيدنايا، الذين أُفرج عنهم في حزيران 2011.


  • How our allies in Kuwait and Qatar funded Islamic State - Telegraph
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/kuwait/11077537/How-our-allies-in-Kuwait-and-Qatar-funded-Islamic-State.html

    n the great jihadi funding bazaar that is the Gulf state of Kuwait, there’s a terror finance option for every pocket, from the private foundations dealing in tens of millions to the more retail end of the market. Give enough for 50 sniper bullets (50 dinars, about £110), promises the al-Qaeda and Islamic State-linked cleric tweeting under the name “jahd bmalk”, and you will earn “silver status”. Donate 100 dinars to buy eight badly needed mortar rounds, and he’ll make you a “gold status donor”.
    As the jihadi funders hand out loyalty cards, the West has belatedly realised that some of its supposed friends in the Gulf have been playing the disloyalty card. Had Kuwait not been freed by American, British and allied troops in 1991, it would presumably now still be the “19th province” of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. But the emirate has repaid the Western blood and treasure spent in its liberation by becoming, in the words of David Cohen, the US undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, the “epicentre of funding for terrorist groups in Syria”.
    Islamic State (Isil), with its newly conquered territory, oilfields and bank vaults, no longer needs much foreign money. But its extraordinarily swift rise to this point, a place where it threatens the entire region and the West, was substantially paid for by the allies of the West. Isil’s cash was raised in, or channelled through, Kuwait and Qatar, with the tacit approval and sometimes active support of their governments.
    Though this has not yet been widely understood in Europe, it is no secret. Throughout 2013 and the earlier part of this year, on TV stations, websites and social media in Kuwait and Qatar, the jihadis openly solicited money for weapons and troops, much as charities in Britain might seek donations for tents and food. One of the main Oxfams of jihad is a group called the Kuwait Scholars’ Union (KSU), which ran a number of major fundraising drives, including the “Great Kuwait Campaign”, raising several million dollars for anti-aircraft missiles, rocket-propelled grenades and fighters. Some of the money went to Isil and some to the al-Qaeda front Jabhat al-Nusra, Isil’s ally until this February.
    “By Allah’s grace and his success, the Great Kuwait Campaign announces the preparation of 8,700 Syrian mujahideen,” announced the KSU’s president, Nabil al-Awadi, in June 2013. “The campaign is ongoing until 12,000 are prepared.” The same year, the KSU ran the “Liberate the Coast” fundraising campaign to help pay for a sectarian massacre of hundreds of civilians in the Syrian port of Latakia. One of the KSU’s fundraisers, Shafi al-Ajmi, tweeted that the donations would go “to buy what is needed to expel the Safavids”, an insulting term for Shia. Last month, he was designated a funder of terrorism by the US.
    Related Articles
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    The Kuwaiti government’s response to the KSU and other terror funders has been “permissive,” as Mr Cohen puts it. That is very diplomatic language. In fact, as recently as January, Kuwait appointed as its minister of justice one Nayef al-Ajmi, a man who has actually appeared on fundraising posters for the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front.
    Qatar, too, has a serious problem. Its government denied a statement last month by the German development minister, Gerd Mueller, that it bankrolls Isil directly. But Mr Cohen says that “press reports indicate that the Qatari government is supporting extremist groups operating in Syria”. There is no doubt, too, that key institutions and officials of the Qatari government have hosted and supported individuals who back Isil, including Harith al-Dari, a designated terrorist and leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) in Iraq.
    This June, as Isil took over Mosul, the AMS praised the “great victories achieved by the revolutionaries”. As they put it: “You have already seen how a great many of the media outlets have colluded, from the first instance of the start of your revolution, and worked on the demonisation of the revolution and distorting its image.” Only a month after Washington designated al-Dari as a sponsor of the group that became Isil, he was allowed to meet the Emir of Qatar. He has made numerous visits there since; the US designation of al-Dari as a terrorist mentions Qatar as an alternative location for him.
    At least two other men designated as al-Qaeda funders, Hajjaj al-Ajmi and Hamid al-Ali, have been officially invited by Qatar’s Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs to deliver sermons from government-controlled mosques calling for jihad in Syria, and donations to it. As Isil swept through Iraq this summer, Ali praised the “great cleaning of Iraq” and the “revolution of our ummah [the Muslim people] against the hateful occupier enemy”.
    Only in July, both the KSU’s Nabil al-Awadi and a man now banned from Britain as an Isil recruiter, Mohammed al-Arifi, were invited to address a Ramadan festival in Qatar co-organised by the Aspire Zone Foundation, the government-controlled body that played a major part in Qatar’s successful bid for the World Cup.
    Qatar and Kuwait, Sunni-majority states, have been helping, or at least not hindering, Isil because they saw it as a proxy counterweight to their Shia rival, Iran, and the Iranian-backed Assad regime. But like many governments before them, including America in Afghanistan, they have now discovered that the would-be puppets tend to cut loose from the puppetmasters. “Some leaders believed they could use terrorists as hired mercenaries, but suddenly found themselves stuck with terrorists who used the opportunity to advance their own interests and agenda,” in the bitter words of Ahmed Jarba, head of the moderate Syrian rebels.
    Alarmed by the savagery of Isil, and the growing hostility of the US, Kuwait, in particular, has started to crack down, sacking its jihadi justice minister and removing citizenship from a number of terror funders, including Nabil al-Awadi. But it is plainly too late. Armed with the loot of half the Iraqi military, Isil doesn’t need its Gulf patrons to buy it sniper rounds any more.
    And even before Isil started threatening the West, this was already more than a Kuwaiti or Qatari problem. As The Telegraph reported last weekend, Nabil al-Awadi is, or has been, partly resident in the UK. Until last year, he was director of the al-Birr private school in Birmingham and is described as a UK resident on his Companies House entry, with a past address in Brixton Hill, south London. He has close links with the hardline al-Muntada mosque in Parson’s Green, west London, whose imam and director are co-directors of the al-Birr school.
    After The Telegraph report, al-Awadi indignantly protested that he had “not travelled to Britain since 2011,” a denial rather undermined by his own tweets which repeatedly describe visits to Britain subsequent to that date. Several of the visits were to al-Muntada, which also raises funds for Syria – exclusively for “humanitarian purposes”, it insists.
    Al-Muntada has close links to British mosques accused of radicalising young people into Isil, including al-Manar in Cardiff, attended by Nasser Muthana and Reyaad Khan, the first Britons to appear in an Isil propaganda video. Both mosques have also organised events with Mohammed al-Arifi, the now-banned extremist cleric accused of grooming the two young Cardiff men.
    Al-Muntada’s former imam, Haitham al-Haddad, is one of the most active radical preachers in the country, reportedly a principal target of the Government’s new “anti-extremism orders” aimed at those not directly involved in violence but who voice extremist views. Al-Muntada, too, has been closely supported by Qatari money; the UK branch held its annual meeting in the Qatari capital, Doha, on March 31, 2013, and its school has been bankrolled by Qatari finance.
    Before we get too censorious about foreign politicians who back extremists, it is worth mentioning, too, that al-Muntada has picked up quite a few British political endorsements. Andy Slaughter, its local Labour MP, praised its “outstanding track record of supporting others” and said he was “very proud to be associated with it”. Stephen Timms, deputy chairman of Labour’s interfaith group, said: “I know how much effort al-Muntada puts into its community relations.”
    Richard Barnes, Boris Johnson’s then deputy mayor, praised it as “one of the world’s foremost Muslim charities”. And al-Muntada was sent good wishes, too, by a spokesman acting on behalf of none other than the deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg.
    As Qatar and Kuwait buy up more and more of Britain, maybe it is time to start asking a few more questions about what they really stand for


  • Implosion du plus ancien fief islamo-terroriste
    http://www.argotheme.com/organecyberpresse/spip.php?article2280

    Le Pakistan et l’Afghanistan, deux pays voisins ayant une frontière commune indéfinissable, montagneuse, inaccessible et incontrôlable, sont un refuge idéal pour le terrorisme. Cette région est le plus grand fief où la coalition « Al-Qaïda-Talibans » est la mieux consolidée et dans le Monde. Le Pakistan, l’un des grands pays musulmans, est le 2ème, après l’Iran, à avoir un Etat islamique où le citoyen sachant réciter le coran a un meilleur statut que celui reconnu pour scientifique ou universitaire… (...)

    Monde, informations, actualité, international, politique, relations, diplomatie, affaires étrangères,

    / Terrorisme , islamisme , Al-Qaeda , politique , , #fait_divers,_société,_fléau,_délinquance,_religion,_perdition, Afrique, Monde Arabe, islam, Maghreb, Proche-Orient,, Afghanistan, Talibans, (...)

    #Monde,informations,_actualité,_international,_politique,_relations,_diplomatie,_affaires_étrangères, #Terrorisme_,_islamisme,Al-Qaeda,politique,_ #Afrique,_Monde_Arabe,_islam,_Maghreb,_Proche-Orient, #Afghanistan,_Talibans,_Karzaï,_USA #Arabie_Saoudite,_Qatar,_Moyen-Orient,_monarchies,_arabes,_musulmans


  • Saudi Arabia arrests 88 over ‘imminent attack’ - FT.com
    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80bcd8bc-32ab-11e4-a5a2-00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=crm/email/201493/nbe/MiddleEast/product&siteedition=intl#axzz3CIUWNJGX

    Saudi Arabia has arrested 88 people suspected of planning what the interior ministry says was an “imminent attack” amid rising concerns over the threat from Sunni jihadis in Syria and neighbouring Iraq.
    The arrests of the suspected al-Qaeda affiliates, which had been planned for many months, were announced on the same day that it emerged a gas pipeline had been set alight in a clash between security forces and gunmen near the Shia town of Awamiya in the country’s eastern province.



  • To really combat terror, end support for Saudi Arabia | Owen Jones | Comment is free | The Guardian
    http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/31/combat-terror-end-support-saudi-arabia-dictatorships-fundamentalism

    Take Qatar. There is evidence that, as the US magazine The Atlantic puts it, “Qatar’s military and economic largesse has made its way to Jabhat al-Nusra”, an al-Qaida group operating in Syria. Less than two weeks ago, Germany’s development minister, Gerd Mueller, was slapped down after pointing the finger at Qatar for funding Islamic State (Isis).

    While there is no evidence to suggest Qatar’s regime is directly funding Isis, powerful private individuals within the state certainly are, and arms intended for other jihadi groups are likely to have fallen into their hands. According to a secret memo signed by Hillary Clinton, released by Wikileaks, Qatar has the worst record of counter-terrorism cooperation with the US.

    And yet, where are the western demands for Qatar to stop funding international terrorism or being complicit in the rise of jihadi groups? Instead, Britain arms Qatar’s dictatorship, selling it millions of pounds worth of weaponry including “crowd-control ammunition” and missile parts. There are other reasons for Britain to keep stumm, too. Qatar owns lucrative chunks of Britain such as the Shard, a big portion of Sainsbury’s and a slice of the London Stock Exchange.

    Then there’s Kuwait, slammed by Amnesty International for curtailing freedom of expression, beating and torturing demonstrators and discriminating against women. Hundreds of millions have been channelled by wealthy Kuwaitis to Syria, again ending up with groups like Jabhat al-Nusra.

    Kuwait has refused to ban the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, a supposed charity designated by the US Treasury as an al-Qaida bankroller. David Cohen, the US Treasury’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, has even described Kuwait as the “epicentre of fundraising for terrorist groups in Syria”. As Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, an associate fellow at Chatham House, told me: “High profile Kuwaiti clerics were quite openly supporting groups like al-Nusra, using TV programmes in Kuwait to grandstand on it.” All of this is helped by lax laws on financing and money laundering, he says.

    But don’t expect any concerted action from the British government. Kuwait is “an important British ally in the region”, as the British government officially puts it. Tony Blair has become the must-have accessory of every self-respecting dictator, ranging from Kazakhstan to Egypt; Kuwait was Tony Blair Associates’ first client in a deal worth £27m. Britain has approved hundreds of arms licences to Kuwait since 2003, recently including military software and anti-riot shields.

    And then, of course, there is the dictatorship in Saudi Arabia. Much of the world was rightly repulsed when Isis beheaded the courageous journalist James Foley. Note, then, that Saudi Arabia has beheaded 22 people since 4 August. Among the “crimes” that are punished with beheading are sorcery and drug trafficking.

    Around 2,000 people have been killed since 1985, their decapitated corpses often left in public squares as a warning. According to Amnesty International, the death penalty “is so far removed from any kind of legal parameters that it is almost hard to believe”, with the use of torture to extract confessions commonplace. Shia Muslims are discriminated against and women are deprived of basic rights, having to seek permission from a man before they can even travel or take up paid work.

    Even talking about atheism has been made a terrorist offence and in 2012, 25-year-old Hamza Kashgari was jailed for 20 months for tweeting about the prophet Muhammad. Here are the fruits of the pact between an opulent monarchy and a fanatical clergy.

    This human rights abusing regime is deeply complicit in the rise of Islamist extremism too. Following the Soviet invasion, the export of the fundamentalist Saudi interpretation of Islam – Wahhabism – fused with Afghan Pashtun tribal code and helped to form the Taliban. The Saudi monarchy would end up suffering from blowback as al-Qaida eventually turned against the kingdom.



  • Syrian rebels strengthen hold over Israel border region
    Senior Israeli official says rebels currently don’t pose a threat to Israeli security.
    By Amos Harel and Jack Khoury | Aug. 31, 2014 Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.613246

    Syrian rebel groups strengthened their hold over the Syrian side of the Quneitra Crossing — located on the frontier between Syrian and Israeli controlled parts of the Golan Heights – over the weekend and managed to repel attacks by Syrian forces loyal to President Bashar Assad.

    The rebels kidnapped dozens of Fiji soldiers, members of the UN observer force stationed in the Golan Heights and are maintaining a siege on a second UN stronghold manned by Philippine soldiers. Officials in the Israeli security services said that it is a relatively moderate militia, the Free Syria Army, that controls the Syrian side of the border crossing, and that the Nusra Front, which is affiliated with Al-Qaida currently pose no threat. Despite this, Israeli forces in the Golan Heights are on relatively high alert due to the recent developments.

    Some 300 members from different groups participated in the taking of the Quneitra Crossing. This varied force was led by the Free Syria Army and with only a small number of Nusra Front members. The government forces that held the crossing before sustained losses in life and retreated to the north to areas controlled by the government. Over the weekend the Syrian army conducted several artillery barrages on the crossing area and tried to retake the area unsuccessfully. Israeli security officials characterized this attempt as "pathetic.”


  • Une façon de lire cette dépêche circule : dans les combats qui opposaient des soldats syriens et Al Qaeda pour le contrôle d’un poste frontière, Israël a choisi de bombarder les soldats syriens, permettant ainsi à Al Qaeda de prendre le contrôle du point de passage entre un territoire contrôlé par Israël et la Syrie.
    Syrie : l’unique passage menant au Golan tombe aux mains des rebelles
    http://www.france24.com/fr/20140827-passage-menant-golan-tombe-mains-rebellion-syrienne-israel-syrie

    L’unique point de passage entre Israël et la Syrie est le théâtre de nouveaux affrontements. Mercredi 27 août, la branche syrienne d’Al-Qaïda et des groupes rebelles ont pris à l’armée syrienne le passage de Qouneitra, reliant la partie syrienne du plateau du Golan à celle occupée par Israël. Les combats ont fait plus de 20 morts parmi les soldats syriens et quatre parmi les rebelles, selon l’Observatoire syrien des droits de l’Homme (OSDH).

    « Le Front Al-Nosra et d’autres groupes rebelles ont pris le passage de Qouneitra et les combats avec l’armée syrienne continuent de faire rage dans les environs », a précisé le directeur de l’OSDH, Rami Abdel Rahmane. Al-Nosra et différents groupes rebelles ont annoncé le jour même le lancement de la bataille de « libération » de ce point stratégique. Puis des groupes rebelles, dont le Front des révolutionnaires de Syrie (non islamiste), ont tweeté la « libération » du passage.

    […]

    Lors des combats, un soldat israélien a été blessé par des tirs en provenance de Syrie, selon une porte-parole de Tsahal, qui a « bombardé deux positions de l’armée syrienne dans le plateau du Golan syrien », a indiqué un communiqué.

    • Israel ‘Alarmed’ by al-Qaeda Presence on Syria Border
      DM Tries to Blame Iran
      by Jason Ditz, September 02, 2014
      http://news.antiwar.com/2014/09/02/israel-alarmed-by-al-qaeda-presence-on-syria-border

      After years of loudly cheering al-Qaeda-linked rebels as a great improvement over the Assad government, Israeli officials are now expressing “alarm” http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/02/us-syria-crisis-israel-idUSKBN0GX1QX20140902 at the takeover of the lone border crossing with Syria by al-Qaeda’s Jabhat al-Nusra.

      Israel was cheering this progress only last week, and the military continues to insist they don’t think al-Qaeda has “any intention of attacking Israel http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/.premium-1.613760,” but that such problems might come about later on.

      Indeed, Israel was so fine with the takeover of the border region last week that they launched strikes on Syrian military bases that were in the middle of fighting against that takeover, nominally over a stray artillery shell entering Israeli-occupied territory on the border.

      Some officials are now saying that it is “only a matter of time” before al-Qaeda and Israel are at odds, because al-Qaeda has always viewed Israeli military forces as a legitimate target.

      Still, if you’re going to blame somebody, you might as well blame Iran, right? That’s the position of Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, who claimed that al-Qaeda’s gains had “Iran’s fingerprints” on them http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4566867,00.html, even though Iran is already in the Syrian war on the opposite side, backing the Assad government.

      It’s incredible, because Israel’s whole argument for preferring al-Qaeda to Assad has always been that the former isn’t allied to Iran, and the later is. Now, they’re trying to present Iran as backing both, so that whoever wins, they can #blame it on #Iran.

      Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is apparently of this mind too, claiming Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and ISIS are all part of the “same Islamist terror network” that is plotting against Israel. Hezbollah, an ally of Iran, has been fighting alongside the Assad government, and its operations over the last year have been almost exclusively against ISIS and al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front.


  • Iraq: on the frontline with the Shia fighters taking the war to Isis | World news
    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/24/iraq-frontline-shia-fighters-war-isis/print

    In Baghdad a senior Shia politician, whose own party has started arming and equipping a militia force of its own, said that he feared the Shia were becoming as radical as the enemy they were fighting. "We are in the process of creating Shia al-Qaida radical groups equal in their radicalisation to the Sunni Qaida.

    “By arming the community and creating all these regiments of militias, I am scared that my sect and community will burn. Our Shia project was building a modern, just state but now it’s all been taken by the radicals. Think of 20 years ahead – these are all schools graduating militias, creating a mutant that is killing people, that is amassing weapons. Where will they go when the fight is over here? They will take their wars and go to Saudi and Yemen. Just like the Sunni jihadis migrated, so will the Shia militias.”


  • ISIS Atrocities Started With Saudi Support for Salafi Hate - Ed Husain
    http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/isis-atrocities-started-with-saudi-support-for-salafi-hate.html

    Let’s be clear: Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram, the Shabab and others are all violent Sunni Salafi groupings. For five decades, Saudi Arabia has been the official sponsor of Sunni Salafism across the globe.


  • Khaleej Times - 21 August, 2014

    A Kuwaiti, Hajjaj bin Fahd Al-Ajmi, considered a financier of Al-Nusra Front, a Syrian rebel group linked to Al-Qaeda, was arrested yesterday on his return from a visit to Qatar, activists said.

    They said on Twitter that Ajmi, 26, was arrested at Kuwait airport.

    The UN Security Council last Friday placed Ajmi and five other Islamists on an Al-Qaeda sanctions list, imposing a travel ban and assets freeze. They are accused of providing money, fighters and weapons to extremist groups.

    In early August, the United States also imposed sanctions on Ajmi and two other Kuwaitis for allegedly raising money for Al-Nusra Front.


  • Quand le front Al Nusra était « pathétique » ou pourrait être « une manipulation du régime » (archives mars 2012) : Les Echos - L’islam dans la révolution syrienne : 3 questions à Thomas Pierret
    http://archives.lesechos.fr/archives/cercle/2012/03/27/cercle_45041.htm

    Ayman al-Zawahiri a déclaré qu’il soutenait la révolution syrienne. En outre, un groupe djihadiste, Jabhat Al-Nusra Li-Ahl Al-Sham, s’est récemment constitué et des rumeurs circulent au sujet de la libération d’Abu Musab al-Suri. Faut-il craindre que la Syrie devienne un nouveau front d’Al-Qaida ?

    La question est éminemment politique puisque le régime syrien use de cette thématique pour délégitimer l’opposition. Après son échec en Irak, il est logique qu’Al-Qaida cherche en Syrie un nouveau terrain de djihad. De ce point de vue, le pays constitue une cible idéale puisqu’un mouvement de contestation majoritairement sunnite y est écrasé dans le sang par un régime alaouite et allié à l’Iran chiite, le tout sous le regard impuissant des pays occidentaux. Malgré cela, Al-Qaida n’est pas (encore ?) devenue un acteur significatif dans le conflit. L’écrasante majorité des opérations menées contre les forces du régime le sont par des brigades se réclamant de l’Armée syrienne libre. Or ces dernières usent d’une symbolique islamo-nationaliste très différente du salafisme-djihadisme d’Al-Qaida. Les efforts de Jabhat al-Nusra (« le Front du soutien ») pour se donner une présence médiatique sont pour l’instant pathétiques : il s’agit d’une une poignée de vidéos de mauvaise qualité et contenant peu d’images originales, si bien qu’elles ne permettent pas de lever les doutes concernant la réalité de cette organisation. L’administration américaine a pointé Al-Qaida du doigt suite aux attentats menés contre les sièges des renseignements syriens à Damas et Alep en décembre et janvier dernier. Les Américains ne savent en réalité pas grand-chose des responsables de ces attentats et l’accusation paraît surtout destinée à permettre à Washington de se laver les mains du dossier syrien. Al-Qaida est certes un coupable potentiel mais les attaques peuvent tout aussi bien être le fait d’opposants non djihadistes. On ne peut pas non plus exclure une manipulation du régime sur le modèle algérien.

    Utilisé dans la théorie du complot de Burgat/Caillet publiée par l’Ifpo en juin 2012, (re)signalée récemment par @souriyam :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/286112#message286294


  • Obama déclare la guerre au Daash (EIIL ou ISIS)
    http://www.argotheme.com/organecyberpresse/spip.php?article2255

    Apparu en 2006, dans les zones autour de Bagdad, comme un groupe irakien mineur et localement confiné à la capitale, menant la lutte contre les troupes britanniques et américaines, arrivées avec l’invasion en 2003, l’EIIL s’est toujours revendiqué d’Al-Qaïda. La proclamation du Califat « EIIL » est aussi la déclaration d’une base ouverte pour tous les terroristes… Les combattants islamistes transitent en se déplaçant dans les organisations régionales. L’ISIS (EIIL et Daash) est devenu l’une des plus (...)

    Monde, informations, actualité, international, politique, relations, diplomatie, affaires étrangères,

    / Terrorisme , islamisme , Al-Qaeda , politique , , #Irak,_prison,_pétitions,_chiite,_sunnite,_journaliste, Obama, USA, Israël, Proche-Orient, Palestine , Afrique, Monde Arabe, islam, Maghreb, (...)

    #Monde,informations,_actualité,_international,_politique,_relations,_diplomatie,_affaires_étrangères, #Terrorisme_,_islamisme,Al-Qaeda,politique, #Obama,_USA,_Israël,_Proche-Orient,_Palestine #Afrique,_Monde_Arabe,_islam,_Maghreb,_Proche-Orient,


  • En toute logique, la France a livré plus d’armes à Al Qaeda et ses alliés en Syrie qu’à… l’armée libanaise.

    Hollande confirme la livraison d’armes aux rebelles en Syrie
    http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2014/08/20/97001-20140820FILWWW00093-hollande-confirme-la-livraison-d-armes-aux-rebell

    Dans un entretien au Monde, le président de la République confirme pour la première fois que la France à soutenu la « rébellion syrienne démocratique » en lui livrant des armes. Il s’agit de "matériel conforme aux engagements européens", selon le président, qui avait livré des armes « de même nature » aux Kurdes d’Irak récemment.

    (Évidemment, un journaliste pas trop hargneux aurait pu demander au président d’expliciter de qui il parle, quand il évoque une « rébellion syrienne démocratique ».)


  • Israeli propaganda starts to wear thin | Opinion , Columnist | THE DAILY STAR
    http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Columnist/2014/Aug-18/267484-israeli-propaganda-starts-to-wear-thin.ashx#axzz3AmMxZhbl

    Resisting and reversing Israeli actions forms the core of Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s strategies, therefore the Israeli spin masters try at all costs to prevent anyone abroad from seeing these Lebanese and Palestinian groups as having been born primarily to fight back against Israel’s excessive occupation and colonization. The easiest way to do this in the fact-light minds of many Western citizens and politicians is simply to associate Hamas and Hezbollah with Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Taliban.


  • Ça pique les yeux à force : à aucun moment l’article de l’AFP, pourtant repris partout, n’essaie de dire qui sont ces rebelles à Alep.
    Syrie : la survie des rebelles mise à mal dans la bataille du Nord
    http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/syrie-la-survie-des-rebelles-mise-a-mal-dans-la-bataille-du-nord-17-08-2014-

    La rébellion syrienne soutenue par les Occidentaux joue sa propre survie face à l’avancée à la fois des djihadistes et des troupes de Bachar el-Assad vers ses bastions dans la région septentrionale d’Alep, selon analystes et opposants.

    Est-ce qu’il ne s’agirait pas du Front islamique, de l’armée des Moudjahidine et du Front al Nusra, c’est-à-dire Al Qaeda et ses alliés réunis dans le groupement Ahl Al-Sham (pour « combattre le régime nusayrite » annonçait la formation).

    En gros : à chaque fois qu’un article se contente d’énoncer « la rébellion syrienne » ou « les rebelles syriens », sans nommer aucun groupe, il est certain qu’on se moque du monde.

    Ici, pour bien marquer le différence entre (nos alliés d’)Al Qaeda et (les méchants d’)ISIS, on est obligé de définir ISIS comme un « groupe ultra-radical » (Al Qaeda étant donc un groupe modérément-radical ?).

    Sinon, au cas où tu n’aurais pas encore l’impression de te faire promener, en mai dernier (il y a 3 mois tout juste), « la rébellion » annonçait qu’elle était « sur le chemin de la victoire » à Alep : Ahl Al-Sham operations room… When the rebels turned the tables of Assad’s siege on Aleppo
    http://lecourrierdumaghrebetdelorient.info/syria/syria-ahl-al-sham-operations-room-when-the-rebels-t

    In Aleppo, things started to change in the rebels’ favor, with striking development of military operations in Ramouseh, that fell between overnight, hence constituting a strong shock to the system and its supporters, as well as cutting across the main supply artery to the areas controlled by the regime in Aleppo. Assad’s forces did not react following the shock of Ramouseh until the rebels started attacking the strategically located village of Fidan, which cuts off the regime’s supply line reaching the city of Sefira in the East.

    The magic is turning against the magician – after desperate attempts of the regime to besiege Aleppo, it ended up with a siege on the regime itself and the Lebanese militias (Hezbollah), the Iraqi and Iranian forces that support Assad.

    […]

    Organization and coordination were and are still not the most important consideration of all revolutionaries in Syria. But once they are achieved, Syrians will step onto the road to victory.


  • Décembre 2012, Fabius défend al-Qaeda/al-Nosra parce que, « sur le terrain, ils font du bon boulot » :
    http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2012/12/13/syrie-pression-militaire-et-succes-diplomatique-pour-les-rebelles_1805889_32

    En revanche, la décision des Etats-Unis de placer Jabhat Al-Nosra, un groupe djihadiste combattant aux côtés des rebelles, sur leur liste des organisations terroristes, a été vivement critiquée par des soutiens de l’opposition. M. Fabius a ainsi estimé, mercredi, que « tous les Arabes étaient vent debout » contre la position américaine, « parce que, sur le terrain, ils font un bon boulot ». « C’était très net, et le président de la Coalition était aussi sur cette ligne », a ajouté le ministre.

    Évidemment, après cela, il est de bon ton de se moquer du petit peuple (notamment arabe) qui croit aux théories du complot.



  • #vidéo The Spread of the Caliphate: The Islamic State (Part 1)

    The Islamic State, a hardline Sunni jihadist group that formerly had ties to al Qaeda, has conquered large swathes of Iraq and Syria. Previously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the group has announced their intention to reestablish the caliphate and declared their leader, the shadowy #Abu_Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the caliph.

    Flush with cash and US weapons seized during recent advances in Iraq, the Islamic State’s expansion shows no sign of slowing down. In the first week of August alone, Islamic State fighters have taken over new areas in northern Iraq, encroaching on Kurdish territory and sending Christians and other minorities fleeing as reports of massacres emerged.

    Elsewhere in territory it has held for some time, the Islamic State has gone about consolidating power and setting up a government dictated by #Sharia law. While the world may not recognize the Islamic State, in the Syrian city of #Raqqa, the group is already in the process of building a functioning regime.

    VICE News reporter Medyan Dairieh spent three weeks embedded with the Islamic State, gaining unprecedented access to the group in Iraq and Syria as the first and only journalist to document its inner workings. In part one, Dairieh heads to the frontline in Raqqa, where Islamic State fighters are laying siege to the Syrian Army’s division 17 base.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsCZzpmbEcs

    #Syrie #ISIS #califat #Etat_islamique #djihadisme #sunnites


  • Jean-Pierre Filiu : « L’État Islamique agit comme un rouleau compresseur »

    http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2014/08/08/01003-20140808ARTFIG00329-jean-pierre-filiu-l-etat-islamique-agit-comme-un-

    « La vision consistant à penser que les dictateurs sont un rempart contre al-Qaida est erronée et dangereuse. Car, à la fin, on a tout : les dictateurs et al-Qaida. »

    Jean-Pierre Filiu est professeur à Sciences Po, spécialiste du Moyen-Orient et auteur, entre autres livres, de Je vous écris d’Alep (Denoël).

    LE FIGARO. - Qu’est-il en train de se passer aujourd’hui en Irak ?

    Jean-Pierre FILIU .- C’est la continuation d’une campagne structurée, planifiée et ordonnée par l’État islamique. Elle a commencé le 10 juin avec la chute de Mossoul, s’est poursuivie par l’instauration du califat puis par l’expulsion des chrétiens, des yazidis et d’autres minorités. Comme les avances de l’État Islamique (EI) n’ont pas été contrées, les djihadistes ont pu mener des opérations simultanées sur les fronts kurde et gouvernemental. Chaque « razzia » alimente l’offensive suivante en permettant aux combattants de s’emparer de nouveaux stocks d’armes. L’armée irakienne étant incapable de réagir et les Kurdes pas encore en mesure de le faire, ça va continuer. La stratégie d’al-Baghdadi a été d’instaurer un califat à cheval sur la Syrie et l’Irak, en utilisant ce qu’on appelle le « management de la terreur ». Aucune armée ne peut lutter lorsque des vagues humaines, mues par la peur, se replient sur les lignes de défense. Quand l’État islamique se concentre sur un objectif, il agit comme un véritable rouleau compresseur.

    http://www.lefigaro.fr/medias/2014/08/08/PHO64297948-1f1f-11e4-8e92-821eb844eaeb-805x453.jpg

    #irak #syrie #isil #eiil

    • Je découvre l’État islamique. Merde, je pensais avoir Internet et être connectée à seenthis pendant mon voyage !

      Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, alias calife Ibrahim de l’Etat islamique - MFI - RFI
      http://www.rfi.fr/mfi/20140718-syrie-irak-abou-bakr-al-baghdadi-calife-etat-islamique

      A quoi correspond le califat de l’Etat islamique ?
      Alors, pour le moment, il est beaucoup plus petit que les califats historiques. Il s’étend à cheval sur la Syrie et l’Irak, entre Alep et la province de Diyala aux portes de Bagdad, sur un territoire grand comme la Jordanie. Une zone qui dispose aussi de nombreux puits de pétrole. C’est une remise en cause complète des frontières coloniales. Des frontières tracées par les accords Sykes-Picot en 1916 sur les ruines de l’empire ottoman. Pour ce qui est du fonctionnement du califat, on sait que la charia y est appliquée de manière très sévère. On y trouve aussi les prémices d’un Etat, à savoir des tribunaux, des impôts, un service de sécurité et même une aide sociale. Et c’est Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi qui occupe la fonction de calife, sous le nouveau nom de calife Ibrahim. Il se positionne donc en dirigeant politique et en commandeur des croyants. Tous les musulmans du monde sont appelés à lui prêter allégeance. Ceux qui refusent seront considérés comme des rebelles, et donc passibles de la peine de mort.

      Et c’est paraît-il un agent israélien. Ben alors, il s’en passe de belles.

    • Je l’ai déjà écrit plusieurs fois : cette histoire de « révélations » de Snowden à Fars News, c’est du bidon. (Mais à l’inverse, Filiu et ses théories sur « les dictateurs et Al Qaeda », ça commence à faire pitié.)

    • Oui, en plus il a une rolex au poignet. La preuve. L’idée c’est qu’il attire dans son coin tous les djihadistes, tel un joueur de flûte de Hamelin, pour que les USA et Israël puissent faire un grand coup de filet. Bon, je vous laisse, j’ai la saison 3 de Homeland qui m’attend.

    • Juste pour la Rolex, je crois me souvenir que cela a été démenti !
      « Pitoyable », je n’utiliserais pas ce mot, publiquement du moins, mais il y a des choses que je n’ai jamais pu encaisser, en particulier sa comparaison Syrie/Guerre d’Espagne (http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2013/04/02/la-syrie-est-notre-guerre-d-espagne_3152041_3232.html).
      Filiu, et bien d’autres avec lui, intervient résolument comme militant sur cette question (et sur d’autres). C’est son droit le plus strict, mais cela me paraît poser d’importantes questions, surtout pour ceux qui appartiennent à cette (objectivement très bizarre) profession des « spécialistes du monde arabe »... Si leur positionnement n’a jamais très facile ni évident, il me paraît de plus en plus intenable désormais. Ils ne sont pas les seuls, les journalistes « envoyés spéciaux » sont probablement plus critiquables encore, mais leur procès est connu, et souvent fait. Ce n’est pas le cas des « spécialistes », dont les liens institutionnels, idéologiques et autres demeurent largement hors-champ, au profit d’une supposée compétence que l’altère jamais aucun autre intérêt, ou pour être plus gentil, aucune autre « stratégie ». Comme tout discours, il conviendrait que celui des « spécialistes du monde arabe » soit soumis à l’analyse, aussi objective que possible... Mais les rares fois où cela est fait, c’est sur un mode très polémique, qui se place lui-même dans le même type de positionnement (je pense à Asad AbuKhalil pour les USA, ou à Roger Nabaa dans le domaine francophone). La figure publique d’un Gilles Kepel - avec un site dédié à sa médiatisation (http://gilleskepel.tumblr.com) - offrirait par exemple un très riche terrain d’étude. Je lis ainsi son dernier titre, « Passion arabe. Journal 2011-2013 », comme une sorte d’extraordinaire retournement où l’objet, le monde arabe, est devenu faire-valoir du vrai sujet, l’auteur de ces « écrits au jour le jour puis polis et enrichis au cabinet de travail, [qui] aboutissent à ce beau livre, où l humeur vagabonde du randonneur le dispute à l’oeil acéré du chroniqueur, au savoir de l’orientaliste et à la plume de l écrivain, le tout dans une forme alerte et vive, celle même du journal. » (!)

    • C’était une quoi alors ;-) ?
      http://image.almanar.com.lb/french/edimg/2014/MondeArabe/Irak/Baghdadi_Rolex1.jpg
      C’est dingue que sur tant de sujets les universitaires soient si attentifs/ves à ne pas sortir de leur champ de compétences, ne pas user de métaphore, ne pas généraliser, au point que des fois c’est compliqué d’en solliciter qui osent théoriser un peu, alors que sur ce sujet il y a des comparaisons aussi hasardeuses. Je ne sais pas ce que la guerre d’Espagne a en commun avec la Syrie (si je me souviens bien, Franco avait fait un coup à l’encontre d’un gouvernement élu deux ans plus tôt), mais c’est clairement un propos militant à la limite de la littérature, à la Malraux ou BHL.
      Remarque, dans le cas de Filiu, c’est pas l’université mais Sciences po. C’est pas sur les mêmes qualités qu’on y brille.

    • Al Quds hésite entre une Rolex et une Oméga, mais en connait la valeur (3500 livres sterling)…

      http://cdn.alquds.com/sites/default/files/styles/article_image/public/2014/7/7/01f13240_watch.jpg

      http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/513170

      واكتشفت الصحيفة أن ساعة يد البغدادي إما أنها من طراز «روليكس» الفارهة، أو أنها من طراز «أوميغا»، مشيرة إلى أن ثمنها يبلغ نحو 3500 جنيه إسترليني (6 آلاف دولار)، إلا أن الصحيفة لم تتمكن من الجزم بشأن نوع الساعة التي كان يرتديها، مكتفية بالإشارة إلى أنها «تنتمي لواحدة من أشهر الماركات العالمية».


  • Discussion entre Aron Lund, Joshua Landis et Thomas Pierret sur Twitter, démontant l’idée selon laquelle Assad aurait boosté ISIS en Syrie en libérant des salafistes en 2011 :
    https://twitter.com/aron_ld/status/497060184444133376

    Je vous ai fait une traduction de l’échange. J’ai mis en gras trois informations qui sont généralement évacuées des discussions en France, parce qu’elles contredisent justement l’idée d’une manipulation machiavélique :

    Aron Lund : Cette idée qu’Assad a volontairement renforcé ISIS en libérant des salafistes en 2011 semble idiote. La plupart de ceux que l’on sait avoir été graciés sont maintenant au Front islamique, combattant contre l’État islamique.

    Thomas Pierret : L’hypothèse faite par le régime en 2011 était qu’ils allaient rejoindre les réseaux État Islamique/Al Qaeda. Il n’a pas anticipé les groupes moins radicaux tels que Ahrar/Suqur.

    Joshua Landis : Thomas, est-ce nous sommes certains de cela ?

    Thomas Pierret : Les calculs étaient certainement basés sur des réseaux existants, pas sur de nouveaux concepts tels que Ahrar, que personne ne pouvait anticiper.

    Aron Lund : On ne devrait probablement pas présumer de trop de plannification stratégique ni de contrôle, cependant. Certains islamistes ont peut-être été libérés dans le cadre d’une mesure d’administie plus large, d’autres spécifiquement pour semer la merde et radicaliser les rebelles, et il y a certainement aussi des éléments infiltrés. Mais il ne m’apparaît pas évident qu’il s’agit de quelque chose de plus planifié que cela.

    Thomas Pierret : Pas besoin de planification ou d’infiltrateurs. Dans le contexte d’une guerre civile imminente, les conséquences de ces libérations étaient prévisibles et attendues.

    Joshua Landis. Prévisible, mais tous étaient des prisonniers politiques. Les militants des droits de l’Homme demandaient leur libération. Même moi j’étais en faveur de cette libération.

    Thomas Pierret : La nature sélective des libérations (relâcher les jihadistes mais pas quelqu’un d’innoffensif comme Tel Maluhi par exemple) montre que c’était totalement de mauvaise foi.

    Aron Lund : Mais ce n’étaient PAS QUE des jihadistes. Par exemple Ali al-Abdullah et Muhannad Al-Hassani ont tous les deux été libérés lors de l’amnestie de juin. Le point, c’est que tout tout semble être intervenu en même temps : les amnesties, les libérations sélectives, la politique chaotique et réactive.

    Joshua Landis : Je pense que c’est une erreur d’attribuer trop de clairvoyance et de prévoyance à Assad et ses hommes, qui se sont trompés si souvent. Je penche pour la politique réactive.

    (Avertissement : c’est une traduction, et j’ai tenté de rendre l’ensemble plus fluide que les messages en 140 caractères de Twitter. Le lecteur est donc invité à se baser sur les messages originaux référencés s’il veut reprendre ces messages.)