organization:international labor organization

  • No Jobs and Bad Jobs

    Article très intéressant sur le marché du travail en Egypte et le chômage des jeunes. Le rôle de l’Etat, les secteurs porteurs, l’économie parallèle et les assurances y sont abordés. Tout comme des solutions pour faire évoluer la situation et des perspectives.

    Cet article me fait penser aux parcours de plusieurs personnages du livre « L’arche de Noé » de Khaled Al Khamissi (chronique à lire prochainement dans Le Monde diplomatique).

    Youth employment issues pose a threat to Egypt’s democratic transition. Persistent high unemployment rates among youth, the increasing deterioration of the quality of jobs available with no social protection and the growth in employment informality are central policy challenges in Egypt.
    (...)
    Research has repeatedly shown that unemployment in Egypt is primarily a problem of youth insertion to labor market. (...) However, unemployment is not the only problem in Egypt’s labor market. There are two main issues that unemployment figures fail to capture. The first is what is termed by the World Bank as “joblessness.” (...) (and) the quality of jobs available for youth.
    (...)
    Jobs that offer financial stability, employment security and social protection are rare in Egypt.
    (...)
    Job creation is central to any meaningful discussion of youth employment issues. While the government can no longer be the main employer of youth in Egypt, it is the role of the government to enable an environment in which the private sector can develop to its full potential and play a role in generating employment and decent jobs. (...)
    The fact that most young people are working in the informal economy and not contributing to pension schemes urges policy interventions in this area.
    (...)
    There is also a growing interest worldwide in micro-insurance schemes that are provided by cooperatives, unions, non-governmental organizations, self-help groups, and the private sector.
    (...)
    Finally, it is important for youth to have a voice in the process of addressing their employment issues. Engagement with youth, particularly those working within the informal economy, is central to a youth-focused policy framework for employment. Fragmentation and limited avenues for advocacy has meant that youth are absent from the policy process. Violence and angry demonstrations have been the only means for them to be heard.

    http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=280


  • Spinneys Union Leader Assaulted
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/spinneys-union-leader-assaulted

    Moukheiber Habshi, a member of the founding committee of the Spinneys-Lebanon workers union, was assaulted Monday night by attackers who told him to leave the union or “we’ll break your bones,” Habshi said.

    The attack was the latest in a series of incidents aimed at sabotaging union activity in the retail giant, which operates seven large supermarkets around Lebanon.

    The Spinneys union applied for registration with the Ministry of Labor at the end of July and is planning to hold elections soon. Its recent establishment was considered a victory for labor rights activists against the management of Spinneys-Lebanon whose exploitative practices were documented by the International Labor Organization.



  • The Political Economy of the Egyptian Uprising | Stephen Maher (Monthly Review)
    http://monthlyreview.org/2011/11/01/the-political-economy-of-the-egyptian-uprising

    Not long after Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Hosni Mubarak would resign his post as President, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton flew to Egypt to congratulate the Egyptian people on a job well done. The revolutionaries had accomplished their goal, she said. Everyone could go home and feel proud of their historic achievement and leave the cleaning up to the responsible adults—the United States and the closely allied Egyptian military, which has ruled Egypt since 1952. To prove that there were no hard feelings against the Egyptians for overthrowing one of the closest and most important U.S. allies in the Arab world, the IMF, World Bank, the G8, and the United States itself—the very entities responsible for supporting Mubarak’s thirty-year rule and imposing draconian neoliberal programs on Egypt—have extended as much as $15 billion in aid and credit to Egypt and Tunisia to assist in their transitions to democracy. This generosity begs the question: why are Western governments, and the international financial institutions (IFIs) that are closely linked to them, falling over one another to show their generosity to the revolutionaries and to display their support for progress in the Middle East? Source: Monthly (...)


  • À lire absolument: The Political Economy of the Egyptian Uprising -Monthly Review
    http://monthlyreview.org/2011/11/01/the-political-economy-of-the-egyptian-uprising

    There was considerable economic growth in Egypt under Mubarak. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita rose about fourfold between 1981 and 2006 (in purchasing power parity terms, which is a method of comparing economic activity among countries by keeping the current currency exchange rates among the countries constant). However, this growth was accompanied by rising inequality that “reached levels not before seen in Egypt’s modern history” by the time of Mubarak’s resignation.2 Despite increases in production and wealth, real wages did not rise in tandem, and in many cases actually declined. Egypt’s minimum wage, for instance, has remained unchanged for twenty-six years in the face of increased productivity and significant inflation, particularly in the price of wage goods. Most workers work long hours (according to the ILO, the average Egyptian works forty-eight hours per week) and earn a wage that will not pay for basic necessities. It is not uncommon for employers to simply not pay their employees at all. In short, the neoliberal programs served to consolidate the power of Egypt’s ruling class and concentrate the country’s vast new wealth in the hands of the richest, who gained an increasing portion of a rapidly growing pie while the lower classes saw their share decline (see Charts 1 and 2 for details).

    • oui c’est très bien, sur le rôle de la dette en particulier :

      Despite the long [anticapitalist] struggle laid out above, according to the Western ideological narrative the Egyptian uprising was largely directed against a handful of corrupt individuals who prevented capitalism from functioning properly, and therefore demanded the imposition of “normal,” “democratic” capitalism. From this perspective, the Egyptian revolution was pro-market! Keeping to this carefully constructed narrative, President Obama announced a $1 billion debt swap (widely misreported as debt forgiveness), in which the United States agreed to reduce Egypt’s debt burden so long as Egypt agrees to use the money in accordance with Washington’s wishes. And Obama made it crystal clear just what those wishes are:
      “…the goal must be a model in which protectionism gives way to openness, the reigns of commerce pass from the few to the many, and the economy generates jobs for the young. America’s support for democracy will therefore be based on ensuring financial stability, promoting reform, and integrating competitive markets with each other and the global economy.”


  • Lebanon and the Arab Revolts: A New Social Contract? | Al Akhbar English
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-and-arab-revolts-new-social-contract

    The situation in Syria may also pose difficulties for the Lebanese economy. The round table’s assessment of Lebanon’s woes during the Arab Spring focuses on its relationship with its neighbor: “The effects of the winds blowing from Syria seem to be the biggest concerning the historical connection between the two countries.”

    The report suggests that “a Syria under sanction would have a negative impact” in Lebanon. Meanwhile, “American policies are not clear now and no one can guess what the next phase might bring… the fact that banking systems are exposed, and especially Lebanese banks, should not be overlooked.”


  • Why Mubarak is Out
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/516/why-mubarak-is-out

    Mubarak is already out of power. The new cabinet is composed of chiefs of Intelligence, Air Force and the prison authority, as well as one International Labor Organization official. This group embodies a hard-core “stability coalition” that will work to bring together the interests of new military, national capital and labor, all the while reassuring the United States. Yes, this is a reshuffling of the cabinet, but one which reflects a very significant change in political direction. But none of it will count as a democratic transition until the vast new coalition of local social movements and internationalist Egyptians break into this circle and insist on setting the terms and agenda for transition.

    I wonder how this Fulbright Post-Doctoral scholar living in California managed to detail in full the situation in Egypt without even once mentioning the influence of the United States and Israel into the upheaval mix. Vraiment, chapeau bas.

    • Yep, c’est assez vrai. Le passage que tu cites contient tout de même la mention « reassuring the United States » ; tu as des mentions qui évoquent aussi ça : « But the military has been marginalized since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords with Israel and the United States. Accords with Israel and the United States. Since 1977, the military has not been allowed to fight anyone. Instead, the generals have been given huge aid payoffs by the US. » ; l’influence américaine et israélienne me semble plus ou moins implicite dans ce texte.

      Mais je suis d’accord, c’est suffisamment implicite pour ne pas être clair. L’influence semblerait se diffuser, indirectement, par la simple adhésion à des intérêts économiques sectoriels dérivant de la relation avec les États-Unis et Israël. Mais quand tu lis (ailleurs) l’importance des formations effectuées en permanence aux États-Unis, se contenter d’évoquer des intérêts économiques est carrément léger.

      Cela dit, je trouve les paragraphes présentant la structure des rapports de force (différents services de police, armée, renseignements) particulièrement clairs et intéressants, vu qu’ici on n’a rigoureusement aucune info là-dessus.

      Sinon, le passage sur les services rendus par les Égyptiens aux Nations-Unies est soporifique.

    • Je parlais en fait du rôle des EU et d’Israël quant aux évènements récents, et de leur aide documentée depuis au moins 2007 aux groupes égyptiens dits de ’société civile’ qui mènent la barque.
      Sinon, je trouve aussi que c’est un bon article de référence sur les différentes factions égyptiennes. Quant au passage sur les services rendus aux Nations-Unies, je n’ai que LOL a dire :)


  • Le site Jadaliyya publie un très intéressant article d’un certain Paul Amar. Il s’agit, essentiellement, d’un panorama des forces en présence en Égypte. Si vous ne devez lire qu’un article aujourd’hui, celui-là me semble un bon candidat...

    Why Mubarak is Out
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/516/why-mubarak-is-out-

    Many international media commentators – and some academic and political analysts – are having a hard time understanding the complexity of forces driving and responding to these momentous events. This confusion is driven by the binary “good guys versus bad guys” lenses most use to view this uprising. Such perspectives obscure more than they illuminate. There are three prominent binary models out there and each one carries its own baggage:  (1) People versus Dictatorship: This perspective leads to liberal naïveté and confusion about the active role of military and elites in this uprising. (2) Seculars versus Islamists: This model leads to a 1980s-style call for “stability” and Islamophobic fears about the containment of the supposedly extremist “Arab street.” Or, (3) Old Guard versus Frustrated Youth: This lens imposes a 1960s-style romance on the protests but cannot begin to explain the structural and institutional dynamics driving the uprising, nor account for the key roles played by many 70-year-old Nasser-era figures.

    To map out a more comprehensive view, it may be helpful to identify the moving parts within the military and police institutions of the security state and how clashes within and between these coercive institutions relate to shifting class hierarchies and capital formations. I will also weigh these factors in relation to the breadth of new non-religious social movements and the internationalist or humanitarian identity of certain figures emerging at the center of the new opposition coalition.

    #Égypte