organization:jamestown foundation

  • Putin and Latvia’s Latgale: Ethnicity as Explanation Vs. Ethnicity as Excuse | The Jamestown Foundation

    http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43948&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=de5a8ca1cabc

    Putin and Latvia’s Latgale: Ethnicity as Explanation Vs. Ethnicity as Excuse
    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 97
    May 26, 2015 04:35 PM Age: 22 hrs
    By: Paul Goble

    Vladimir Putin’s use of ethnicity to justify his actions in Ukraine has been widely accepted in the West but not commonly understood. That is to say, his claims that he can intervene on behalf of ethnic Russians or others that he feels are close to his “Russian world” are accepted as somehow plausible or even legitimate if the Kremlin can point to anyone in those groups who feels that he or she needs Moscow’s intervention. But what is not understood is that in virtually all cases where Putin presents himself as a defender of some group or community, the vast majority of its members do not want his defense and certainly do not want to become part of his country.

    #lettonie #latgale #russie

  • Ukraine Rapidly Dismantling Gazprom’s Supply Monopoly | The Jamestown Foundation
    http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43764&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=30ee75ae8f38

    Gazprom had traditionally supplied almost 100 percent of independent Ukraine’s annual gas imports. Gazprom accounted for 95 percent of Ukraine’s imports as late as 2013. Gazprom’s share in 2014 was still dangerously high, at almost 75 percent of Ukraine’s gas imports, but the country procured the remainder through reverse flows from Europe. Of 19.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas that Ukraine imported in 2014, Russia supplied 14.5 bcm; whereas 5.1 bcm entered Ukraine through interconnections from Slovakia (3.6 bcm), Poland (0.9 bcm), and Hungary (0.6 bcm). Gazprom’s share could have been higher in 2014, but Moscow had suspended all gas deliveries to Ukraine from June through October 2014 (Interfax, April 1, 2, 2015).

    Meanwhile, pipeline capacity expansion in Slovakia made it possible for Ukraine to increase gas import volumes from that direction significantly; and the “reverse” gas was winning in the price competition over Gazprom’s (see below). In February 2015, the reverse flow from Europe exceeded the direct flow from Russia for the first time in terms of monthly volumes (Interfax, March 4); and the trend looks set to continue on a quarterly and annual basis.

    In the first quarter of 2015 (January 1–March 31), Ukraine procured 3.65 bcm from European markets (almost entirely via Slovakia), exceeding the 2.16 bcm imported from Gazprom during the quarter just past. Compared with the first quarter of 2014, when Gazprom’s market share stood at 100 percent in Ukraine, the change in the first quarter of 2015 looks downright revolutionary in terms of Ukraine’s supply diversification (Ukrinform, UNIAN, April 2).

    According to the energy ministry and Naftohaz, Ukraine plans to import 26 bcm of gas during the calendar year 2015, with Gazprom to account for 40 percent and European suppliers for 60 percent of that annual volume (Dzerkalo Tyzhnya, Zn.ua, April 4; Ukrinform, UNIAN, April 6).

    Cependant,…

    Conversely, the gas flow in reverse from Europe to Ukraine enables Slovakia to retain its status as a transit country. That reverse flow consists mainly of Russian gas originally sold by Gazprom to European companies and re-sold by these to Ukraine via Slovakia. Of these, the Velke Kapusany-Uzhhorod connection could have provided the “big reverse” option to Ukraine, with a volume of 30 bcm annually. That option envisages a dedicated use of one of Eustream’s four parallel lines in Slovakia, or at least unimpeded access to it, and connecting with Velke Kapusany-Uzhhorod for the “big reverse transit” to Ukraine. That access has not worked out as needed, however. Eustream seems to be constrained in its decisions by the terms of its transit contract with Gazprom (Naturalgaseurope.com, accessed March 7).

  • Gazprom Agreements on South Stream Breach EU Law; Bulgaria and Serbia Ask EU to Negotiate with Russia | The Jamestown Foundation

    http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41736&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=d

    The construction of the South Stream natural gas pipeline was effectively put on hold after the European Commission (EC) announced that Russia’s bilateral agreements with Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, Greece and Austria were in breach of European Union law. Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, director for energy markets at the European Commission, told a meeting at the European Parliament on December 4 that the inter-governmental agreements must be renegotiated from scratch.

    The EC warned that if Russia refuses to renegotiate the contract conditions, the five EU member states and Serbia, which is a member of the EU-backed Energy Community, must suspend implementation of their agreements with Gazprom or will face heavy penalties (Capital Weekly, EurActiv, December 5; Duma, Sofia News Agency, December 6).

    #énergie #gazprom #southstream #gaz #gazoducs #guerre_du_gaz #nabucco

  • Royal Rivalry in the Levant: Saudi Arabia and Qatar Duel over Syria | The Jamestown Foundation
    http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41249&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=4

    Due to Syria’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah – a bloc known as the “Resistance Axis” – the uprising in Syria quickly assumed geopolitical overtones. The insurrection in Syria afforded the GCC a chance to undercut Iranian influence in the Middle East. In this regard, the resort to sectarian vitriol by the Sunni-led monarchies and affiliated clergy emphasizing the Shi’a pedigree of the Islamic Republic and the prominent Alawite face of the Ba’athist regime was calibrated to stir up religious tensions between Sunni and Shi’a believers. The provision of support for radical Islamist movements, especially ultraconservative Salafist groups, has been central to the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Consequently, the positions of Saudi Arabia and Qatar are often portrayed interchangeably when it comes to their shared goal of toppling the Ba’athist regime. Their fellow GCC allies, particularly the Sunni-led monarchies representing the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as wealthy private donors, religious associations and ordinary individuals, have likewise provided extensive moral, financial and logistical support to the political and armed factions struggling against the Ba’athist regime (al-Monitor, July 2; The National [Abu Dhabi], February 3). Saudi Arabia in particular saw the uprising in Syria as an opportunity to undermine the Hezbollah-led March 8 coalition in Lebanon while strengthening the March 14 coalition headed by the Sunni-led Future Movement.

  • RAMZY MARDINI (a Middle East analyst at the Jamestown Foundation and a former State Department official) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/opinion/after-assad-chaos.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0

    L’opposition syrienne officialisée par les « amis du peuple syrien », qui est-elle ? A coté des « djihadistes », des Ahmed Chalabi.

    ...[the] new opposition coalition formed in Doha, Qatar (...) is facing the prospect of defections and, worse, disintegration. Narrow interests are taking precedence; Islamists are overpowering secularists; exiles are eclipsing insiders; and very few members seem to have credibility on the ground back home.

    (...)

    “The U.S. is empowering the Ahmad Chalabis of Syria,” argued one prominent dissident, referring to the Iraqi expatriate who presented himself, before the 2003 American invasion, as a leader with the political legitimacy to take over from Saddam Hussein. Many of Syria’s opposition leaders are acting like Chalabists: frustrating practical negotiations out of opportunism rather than principle, in the hopes of securing the spoils that will come when the Assad regime falls.

    The coalition’s president, Sheik Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib, has emerged as a symbolic figurehead. A former imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, Mr. Khatib lacks the experience to play the jarring game of opposition politics. And Riad Seif, a key American ally and longstanding dissident in Syria, is being marginalized. Both leaders have been sidelined by the expatriate businessman Mustafa Sabbagh, whose moneyed Syrian Business Forum is suspected of being a Qatari front group. Mr. Sabbagh is virtually unknown to most Syrians because he has long been based outside Syria and lacks the respect of veteran dissidents.

    Syria’s minorities are also underrepresented. Syria’s Kurdish parties have not joined the coalition, and only three Christians are members. Two represent the Assyrians, but have spent decades in Europe; the other, the S.N.C.’s president, George Sabra, is viewed first and foremost as a communist. The majority of Syria’s 2.5 million Christians, who are ethnic Syriacs, aren’t represented at all. Bassam Ishak, a prominent Syriac, was barred from joining it. Mr. Ishak’s résumé didn’t include loyalty to the S.N.C., which has practically become a prerequisite for membership.

    (...)

    The best hope for Syria’s future is a political settlement, not armed victory. But without a truly representative opposition, that hope will remain elusive.

  • Approche originale et intéressante: The Jamestown Foundation: Syrian Tribal Networks and their Implications for the Syrian Uprising
    http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39452&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=6

    Tribal participation in the uprising from its inception is well documented and is celebrated by the Syrian opposition. During the incipient phase of the uprising, the first “Day of Rage” demonstration against the Syrian government in the ethnically mixed, heavily tribal eastern city of Hasakah on February 5, 2011, was conducted by networks of tribesmen from the Jabbour, Ta’i, and the Ounaiza tribal confederations. [4] The “Union of Arab Syrian Clans and Tribes,” an Aleppo-based opposition group claiming to represent more than 50 percent of Syria’s tribal population, announced its existence via YouTube on March 11, 2011. [5] One of the first nationwide Friday demonstrations organized by opposition groups inside of Syria, held on June 10, 2011, was called the “Friday of the Tribes” in recognition of the role that tribesmen played in leading resistance to the Syrian government (al-Jazeera, June 10, 2011). Many Syrian tribal leaders, such as Shaykh Nawwaf al-Bashir, an important leader of the large Baggara tribe and a former member of the Syrian Parliament, are active members of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) (al-Jazeera, January 16). Recently, a group of Syrian tribesmen and shaykhs in exile in Istanbul created the “Assembly of Tribes,” claiming to represent 40 percent of Syrian tribesmen (al-Arabiyya, April 16).

    In addition to their political role in the Syrian opposition, Syrian tribesmen also participate in the armed groups that fight the Assad government, particularly the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and its affiliates. These tribesmen predominately fight the Syrian military on the local level, in the areas where they reside, relying on young tribesmen who defected from the Syrian military for materiel and tactical advice. [6] Further, the tribes of northeastern and eastern Syria, such as the Shammar, Baggara, Jabbour, Dulaim, and Ougaidat, have close and enduring relationships with their tribal kin in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Anti-Assad regime states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are reported to be using tribal networks to move materiel and weapons into Syria, though this is officially denied (al-Arabiya, March 4). There is also strong evidence that Iraqi tribesmen in particular are moving arms and material as well as fighting alongside their tribal kinsmen against the Assad government in small but growing numbers.[7] The shared cross-border kinship ties possessed by Syrian tribes and networks of tribal youth in Gulf Arab countries present a regional geopolitical complication to the uprising.