person:ayman zawahiri

  • Are the U.S. and Allies Getting Too Cozy With Al Qaeda’s Affiliate in Syria?
    http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2015/07/24/are-the-u-s-and-allies-getting-too-cozy-with-al-qaedas-affilia

    Reporting on al Nusra’s recent victories in Idlib, Charles Lister at Brookings reported:

    “Several commanders involved in leading recent Idlib operations confirmed to this author that the U.S.-led operations room in southern Turkey, which coordinates the provision of lethal and non-lethal support to vetted opposition groups, was instrumental in facilitating their involvement in the operation from early April onwards. That operations room — along with another in Jordan, which covers Syria’s south — also appears to have dramatically increased its level of assistance and provision of intelligence to vetted groups in recent weeks.

    Whereas these multinational operations rooms have previously demanded that recipients of military assistance cease direct coordination with groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, recent dynamics in Idlib appear to have demonstrated something different. Not only were weapons shipments increased to the so-called “vetted groups,” but the operations room specifically encouraged a closer cooperation with Islamists commanding frontline operations.” [emphasis added]

    As news of the coalition victories spread, the Wall Street Journal published a piece entitled “To US Allies, Al Qaeda Affiliate in Syria Becomes the Lesser Evil” that reinforces the possibility some U.S. military leaders also see such collaboration with al Qaeda as a legitimate option. The author of the article spoke with retired US Admiral James Stavridis , a recent Supreme Allied Commander of NATO who oversaw the 2011 Libya campaign. Discussing the new role of key US allies backing a coalition that includes the al Qaeda affiliate, the Admiral compared the relationship to partnering with Stalin in World War II:

    “It is unlikely we are going to operate side by side with cadres from Nusra, but if our allies are working with them, that is acceptable. If you look back to World War II, we had coalitions with people that we had extreme disagreements with, including Stalin’s Russia,” said Mr. Stavridis, now dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Boston.

    “I don’t think that is a showstopper for the U.S. in terms of engaging with that coalition.” [emphasis added]

    It is important to note that the head of al Nusra though indicating an unwillingness to attack the West for now, still pledges allegiance to Ayman Zawahiri, the long time deputy to Osama Bin Laden, and currently the official head of Al Qaeda. In addition, human rights groups have pointed to al Nusra’s “systematic and widespread violations including targeting civilians, kidnappings, and executions.” Al Nusra has engaged in lethal car bombing attacks targeting civilians and they have actively recruited child soldiers. Like ISIS, al Nusra has treated women and girls in areas they control particularly harshly. In addition to strict and discriminatory rules on dress, employment and freedom of movement there have been abductions of women and even executions of at least one woman accused of adultery.

    Despite all this, retired Adm. Stavridis isn’t the only commentator who finds our allies’ involvement with al Nusra ‘acceptable’. The prominent foreign policy journal, Foreign Affairs published a piece this year entitled “Accepting Al Qaeda: The Enemy of the United States’ Enemy.” The author, Barak Mendelsohn, makes the case that al Qaeda staying “afloat” is better for US interests, citing threats to US allies from Iran and the Islamic State. A couple weeks later Lina Khatib , the director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, wrote in a piece that “Nusra’s pragmatism and ongoing evolution mean that it could become an ally in the fight against the Islamic State”.

    #blanchiment_de_Qaïda

  • Alain Chouet : « L’Etat islamique manquera bientôt de ressources humaines et financières » | Oumma.com
    http://oumma.com/211647/alain-chouet-letat-islamique-manquera-bientot-de-ress

    Comment expliquez-vous que la presse francophone n’ait parlé que tardivement de cette scission d’Al-Qaida, aujourd’hui à la tête de l’Etat islamique. On sait pourtant que depuis la mort de Ben Laden, certains djihadistes ont refusé de prêter allégeance à Zawahiri.

    Alain Chouet : La réalité est que, depuis 2002 et l’offensive alliée contre le régime Taliban d’Afghanistan et ses protégés djihadistes, Al-Qaïda relève plus du mythe que de la réalité. C’est un mythe qui a été entretenu par le fait que tout contestataire dans le monde musulman, quelles que soient ses motivations et ses objectifs, a bien compris qu’il devait se réclamer de l’organisation qui avait épouvanté l’Amérique s’il voulait être pris au sérieux. C’est un mythe qui a été entretenu par certains dirigeants des pays musulmans qui ont bien compris qu’ils devaient coller l’étiquette Al-Qaïda sur leurs opposants s’ils voulaient pouvoir les réprimer tranquillement. C’est enfin un mythe qui a été entretenu par les dirigeants et les médias d’un certain nombre de pays occidentaux pour légitimer leur politique sécuritaire intérieure et extérieure.

    Mais dans la galaxie salafiste, tout le monde sait bien que Al-Qaïda se résumait depuis 2003 à un Ben Laden réfugié dans un « resort » des services pakistanais et à un sentencieux Ayman Zawahiri distribuant les bons et les mauvais points de djihadisme et s’appropriant verbalement des actes de violence commis un peu partout dans le monde qu’il n’avait ni commandités, ni prescrits ni contrôlés.

    Il était difficile pour des djihadistes ambitieux de remettre en cause la figure emblématique de Ben Laden mais plus facile de s’affranchir de la tutelle morale de Zawahiri. En particulier pour des chefs de bande locaux qui n’avaient que faire du « djihad mondial » sans bénéfice immédiat et souhaitaient plutôt se bâtir un petit sultanat local où ils pourraient exercer un pouvoir sans partage et rançonner la population. C’est ce type de raisonnement, joint aux aléas des rivalités locales et des surenchères entre l’Arabie et le Qatar, qui a poussé un Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi à rejeter le parrainage d’Al-Qaïda et - comme on dit en France - à s’autoproclamer « Calife à la place du Calife ».