person:marc owen jones

  • Are Twitter Bots on Yemen and Bahrain Hashtags linked to News Broadcaster Saudi 24? | Marc Owen Jones
    https://marcowenjones.wordpress.com/2016/07/12/are-twitter-bots-on-yemen-and-bahrain-hashtags-linked-to-ne

    This morning, some fellow Tweeps alerted me to the use of similar bots on the #Yemen hashtag, so I did some preliminary tests. Sure enough, the same bots on the #Bahrain hashtag are using the Yemen hashtag to promote the idea of Iranian influence in Yemen, a common trope in Gulf politics. The accounts are indeed the same, and some have changed from Tweeting about Bahrain to tweeting about Yemen. Many still continue to tweet on the #Bahrain hashtag. The most common Tweets on the Yemen hashtag are;

    العوين:مجئ الخوميني هو بداية الشر و اشعال الحروب في المنطقة https://t.co/wkYWbGT3eG#الشيخ_عيسي_قاسم #ايران #Iran #حزب_الله #yemen #Iraq

    (translation: The appearance of Khomeini was the beginning of evil and the spread of wars in the region #Shaykh_Isa_Qasim, #Hezbollah, #Yemen, #Iraq, #Iran

    توجيهات خادم الحرمين بايصال رسالة المملكة للعالم كله ومنها برنامج الإمامة في الخارج https://t.co/QZif2VH3PP#ايران #Iran #حزب_الله #yemen (The custodian of the holy mosques sends a message to the whole world….)

    Of the 11,541 Tweets pulled from the Twitter API over an approximately 48 hour period, around 2,493 appear to be from bot accounts. In the sample, there were approximately 1172 individual bot accounts engaged in polluting the Yemen hashtag with the above tweets. You can see the spreadsheet data here. I have used the same methodology as in previous posts, but have not got into it here (happy to answer questions though)

    The role of Saudi24?
    What is interesting about virtually all the videos analysed on the #Bahrain and Yemen hashtag is that they contain links almost exclusively to the YouTube channel Saudi 24. Saudi 24 is a satellite channel that I am still trying to find more information on. Their Twitter account was set up in July 2012, before the automated Twitter activated seemed to begin. Their live link can be found here. Their website can be found here. The email address given on their Twitter bio is Info@saudi24.tv. They joined YouTube in January 2015, after many of the bot account had been created (On Youtube they have 12,501 subscribers and over 3,743,929 views ). This appears to be the Twitter account of the main presenter, Mohammad Rashid. Their rhetoric seems loosely aligned with state rhetoric. They are anti Islamic State, but antagonistic towards Iran, and sectarian towards the Shia. At the moment the link is speculative, but it does seem unusual that the bots should almost exclusively choose news clips from Saudi 24, when there are plenty to choose from that broadcast a particularly anti-Shia, anti-Iran, sectarian agenda.

  • The Automation of Sectarianism: Are Twitter Bots Spreading Sectarianism in the Gulf? | Marc Owen Jones
    https://marcowenjones.wordpress.com/2016/06/21/the-automation-of-sectarianism

    The relevant thing is that hundreds of what seem to be automated Twitter accounts are repeating propaganda that conflates acts of violence, terrorism, and unrest, with both Arab Shia and Iran. This strongly suggests that institutions, people, or agencies, with significant resources, are deliberately creating divisive, anti-Shia sectarian propaganda and disseminating it in a robotic, but voluminous fashion. The problems here are numerous, yet such accounts can not only contribute to sectarianism (hard to infer causal relations from this), but create the impression that polices, such as the denationalisation of Isa Qasim, have widespread popular support.

    It is also interesting to note that among the many hashtags used by these accounts are Da’ish, the derogatory term used to describe the Islamic State. It could be that they wish to tap into that wider audience, in the hope that the message gets out – entirely possible given the generous hashtagging the accounts engage in. While the notion of bot accounts is probably not news to anyone, the evidence here hopefully highlights that much online sectarian discourse is perhaps inflated by those groups or individuals with specific ideological agendas, and the means to do so. Of course we know PR and reputation management companies offer such services, yet their work is often done secretively and behind close doors. Would be interesting to find out who is behind this.

    • Et la suite :
      "Twitter reacted to that discovery by suspending around 1,800 suspected robotic accounts, but hundreds more are still busy tweeting. Besides supporting the government of Bahrain, their tweets express sectarian and anti-Shia views – often in offensive language.

      Marc Owen Jones continued to investigate and has now produced another report which explains in detail why the hundreds of sectarian and pro-government accounts posting under the #bahrain hashtag are almost certainly fakes.

      One reason for suspicion is that the relevant Twitter accounts were created in batches. For example, around 100 accounts were created over four consecutive days in August 2013. Another batch – of 200 accounts – was created between 6 and 11 June 2014.

      (etc., etc. Et il y a des gens qui passent beaucoup de temps à faire de super enquêtes quantitatives sur les tendances de Tweets... http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2016/june/robots-overrun-bahrain-hashtag.htm#sthash.8KTeF98L.fKeHHFZs.dpbs

  • Bahrain on Video : Police Interrogation of Youth Making False Confession Goes Viral - IBTimes UK
    http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/478263/20130613/bahrain-video-police-youth-ali-marhoon-torture.htm

    Bahrain on Video: Police Interrogation of Youth Making False Confession Goes Viral

    [...]
    The footage, uploaded by Bahrain’s security officer Abdulrahman Al Mannai, depicts the interrogation on a young man called Hussain Jamil Jaffar Ali Marhoon, from Hamad Town.

    Repris par la presse

    • Le commentaire de Marc Owen Jones

      Also, if this evidence is used by the courts and seen as admissible, surely Isa Qassim and Ali Salman will be arrested for inciting violence? If they are not, then is the evidence in its entirety void? Will be interesting to see how MOI handle this. Lastly, in an interesting point raised by activist Sayed Yousif, is this video recorded in the same room as those with CCTV cameras installed following BICI recommendations? Presumably, this interrogation should have been caught on CCTV too…

      http://marcowenjones.wordpress.com/2013/06/11/policeman-leaks-video-showing-what-looks-like-a-forced-conf

    • Bahrain police launch probe into interrogation footage | GulfNews.com
      http://m.gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-police-launch-probe-into-interrogation-footage-1.1196046

      “An immediate investigation has been launched into a video being circulated showing the confession of a detainee on being incited to kill policemen,” Public Security Chief Major General Tareq Al Hassan said. “Legal steps have been taken and the suspects have been suspended from work and referred to investigation,” he said in remarks posted on the interior ministry’s Twitter account.

      The code obliges officers to abide by 10 principles, including the limited use of force and a policy of zero tolerance towards torture and mistreatment.