person:michel aoun

  • Entretien de l’ambassadeur saoudien à Beyrouth avec le Safir:

    The Saudi flexibility coincided with the appointment of Tammam Salam to head the cabinet. This appointment appeared to represent the ’key’ that re-opened the closed doors between Al-Riyadh and the former majority forces and that froze the ’tourism veto’ against Lebanon by reactivating the Saudi and Gulf flights to Beirut. This raises several questions concerning the dimensions of this transformation and its future extent.

    “Al-Asiri told As-Safir that the Kingdom is not in a state of estrangement with any Lebanese part ’and I have been in touch with all the domestic political forces ever since I was appointed in Beirut…’ Concerning his recent meeting with Minister Gibran Bassil, Al-Asiri indicated that the atmosphere was a positive one and ’General Michel Aoun is welcome and so is any other Lebanese figure regardless of its political affiliation.’ He added with a smile: ’Our relationship with General Aoun was severed for a while perhaps because when our brothers at the Free Patriotic Movement are angry with some domestic sides, their anger reflects on us. Now however, we are back to communicating with them.’

    “What about the relationship with Hezbollah. Al-Asiri said that he is in constant communication with Hezbollah through different means. He added that the differences over some political ideas with the party is not a problem and is rather a healthy and natural thing… And on whether he expects to hold a meeting soon with a delegation from Hezbollah, Al-Asiri said: ’Our doors and hearts are open. The Party is welcome…’ And on where they stand with regards to the Resistance weapons, Al-Asiri only said: This is a Lebanese domestic issue.

    • Antoine Hayek, dans An-Nashra, interprète la position de l’ambassadeur saoudien dans le cadre d’un remodelage régional de l’influence saoudienne et iranienne. L’anecdote de la tour Khalifa, détruite par un seul missile iranien, vise à montrer que les pays du Golfe ne peuvent se permettre le moindre début d’hostilité avec l’Iran et que l’heure est venue, sous le patronage américain et russe, de se répartir mieux les rôles : à l’Arabie le leadership sunnite, pourvu que les chiites soient reconnus comme une composante importante dans la région.

      “An Arab diplomat who has been working at the United Nations for decades, said that while he was accompanying a senior American diplomat on an official visit to the Dubai Emirate to meet with a senior Gulf prince – whose opinion is valued in his country – and during a very secret meeting held in a hotel overlooking Burj al-Arab, the American official, and after praising the construction wave in the Emirate, expressed his admiration towards the aforementioned tower for showing signs of economic growth. After a period of silence, the Arab prince responded by saying: “You see this great tower, it would take one Iranian missile to destroy it to the ground and bring back the image of the barren desert.”

      “The statements of the Arab prince did not go down easily, considering that the veteran American diplomat relayed in the report he raised to his country’s Department of State the opinion of the Gulf prince. Therefore, this comment was deeply debated and discussed by the Department of State, which eventually reached the conclusion that the Arab and Gulf states did not want any military war with Iran, in order to protect their economic and oil interests, considering that any miscalculation could take the Gulf and oil states decades backward. Indeed, this is true in light of the Iranian missile capability which exceeds the military capabilities of all the Gulf states combined. Hence, the ongoing maneuvers between Iran on one hand and Washington on the other, should not exceed the point of exerting pressures to earn the largest possible concessions.

      “The Arab-UN diplomat said that what pushed him to reveal this incident was to confirm that the developments witnessed on the Lebanese arena during the past weeks was the result of an Iranian-Saudi understanding which saw the light under joint American-Russian tutelage, after the American-Iranian talks went beyond the limits of the nuclear file by far, i.e. tackled the nature of the Iranian role as the policemen of the Gulf and the guarantor of its security, that of its neighbors and the Strait of Hormuz, in parallel to the progress along the course of the American-Russian talks over the Syrian crisis. Speaking of Lebanon, the diplomat considered that nothing drastic will be achieved in the few coming days or weeks, indicating that the solutions were awaiting the advancement of the Saudi-Iranian understanding.

      “At a time when the first is trying to strip its “frenemy” Qatar of the Sunni card…, the second is stressing the necessity of maintaining the Iranian Shi’i branch throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, including in Lebanon. Consequently, Tehran does not mind the Saudi step or seeing Hezbollah contacting the Kingdom, as long as the Saudi demand is limited to the Sunni card and not the Islamic one in general… However, what concerns the diplomat is the mystery surrounding the Qatari position which is refusing to relinquish this Sunni card, even if in favor of the interests of the largest and richest Gulf state. Hence, the regional and international focus is now on Doha’s reaction, especially after it burned many of its cards in the fire of the Syrian crisis, which has been ablaze for more than two years.”

      http://www.elnashra.com/news/show/607569/%C3%91%C3%8F%C3%89-%C3%87%C3%A1%C3%9D%C3%9A%C3%A1-%C3%87%C3%A1%C3%9E%C3%98


  • Lebanon Cabinet : Hezbollah and Suleiman Change the Equation
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-cabinet-hezbollah-and-suleiman-change-equation

    To their surprise, March 14 discovered that Hezbollah was not at all prepared to sacrifice their Aounist ally. The Shia party is reported to have even asked for a veto share – one-third of the cabinet – for March 8 and the FPM. Otherwise, Hezbollah sources said, the minority can rule on its own, while they and their allies will become the opposition.

    Those close to Hezbollah say the party is far more at ease these days given the new developments taking place in Syria. To begin with, the party no longer feels the need to hide that some of its fighters are involved in Syria, even though it is under the guise of protecting Lebanese villages and Shia shrines.

    The party is also said to be quite comfortable about the trajectory of events in Syria, where the regime has managed to regain the initiative on the ground and has scored a series of gains across the country against opposition fighters.

    The developments next door mean that Hezbollah is not under any pressure to quickly form a new government, for time is increasingly on its side.

    Certes à classer au rayon « Supputations politico-policiennes », mais tu sais bien que j’ai faible pour ce genre de choses libano-libanaises…


  • Ibrahim al-Amin sur la campagne contre les aounistes au Liban, et sur l’importance pour le Hezbollah de maintenir son alliance avec eux : Lebanon : Michel Aoun, You’re Not Alone
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-michel-aoun-you%E2%80%99re-not-alone

    Ultimately, however, what matters most is what Hezbollah decides to do. The challenge before the party’s leaders is to make sure that Aoun is not left to fend for his own, for this will be an all-around disaster for the Resistance, as well as its martyrs and supporters.

    Pour qu’al-Amin en arrive à invoquer les martyrs de la Résistance, il faut qu’il trouve le sujet suffisamment grave…


  • Lebanon: Tammam Salam’s Path to Prime Minister
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-tammam-salam%E2%80%99s-path-prime-minister

    How did Lebanon and Saudi Arabia’s power brokers decide on Tammam Salam as the country’s next prime minister? Al-Akhbar explains how former prime minister Mikati’s calculations failed him and paved the way for Salam’s rise.

    When former prime minister Fouad Siniora delivered his speech to the massive crowds at the funeral of Wissam al-Hassan, the assassinated intelligence chief, standing next to him was none other than Tammam Salam.

    Last night, Siniora and Salam were side-by-side once again, this time at Saad Hariri’s downtown mansion. The Arab and international signal had been given to begin negotiations on a new prime minister. With that, MP Salam is now the next prime minister in waiting.


  • Puisque le nom de Tammam Salam circule pour être le prochain Premier ministre libanais, j’ai effectué une recherche dans les #cablegate de #Wikileaks. A priori, rien de bien intéressant.

    05BEIRUT654, Lebanon Biographies of Potential Prime Ministers, 3 mars 2005
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05BEIRUT654.html

    Tammam Salam, former Member of Parliament
    –----------------------------------------

    ¶7. Salam was born in Beirut in 1945. The Salam family is one of the prominent traditional Sunni political families of Beirut. His late father was one of the heroes of Lebanon’s independence in 1943. Hariri’s political and financial powers undermined the role of the Salam family in Beirut. He is the son of former Prime Minister Saeb Salam.

    Salam was elected a Member of Parliament in 1996. He lost his seat in 2000 because of the late Prime Minister Hariri’s efforts against him. Salam was trying to mend fences with the Hariri camp in early 2005, ahead of the Spring Parliamentary elections. When Speaker Berri launched his response to the Bristol opposition group meetings, Salam participated in Berri’s counterpart conclave known as “Ain Tineh.” Salam abstained from attending the subsequent meeting “Ain Tineh II” after Hariri’s assassination.

    08BEIRUT1699, Lebanon: Jumblatt peased with his U.S. visit, 28 novembre 2008
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08BEIRUT1699.html

    ¶13. (C) Jumblatt worried that the recent wave of Lebanese officials visiting Syria would continue indefinitely. Hamadeh noted that President Sleiman asked Defense Minister Elias Murr to visit his counterpart in Damascus, but wondered why Culture Minister Tammam Salam needed to go now as well. “We should not send too many at one time,” said Hamadeh.

    09BEIRUT495, Lebanon: UNRWA director says Nahr al-Barid reconstruction must begin now, 30 avril 2009
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BEIRUT495.html

    HISTORY HOLDS UP CONSTRUCTION
    –----------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Another issue that has come up recently is the discovery of an archaeological site on the grounds of the Nahr al-Barid camp. Two, 3,000 year-old sarcophagi were discovered on the camp site. According to Lebanese law, the GOL is responsible for preserving the site. There exists a number of options on how to do this. However, UNRWA favors leaving the site as is and building around/above the archaeological find (known as back-filling), as it is the quickest and easiest option. Minister of Culture, Tammam Salam’s recommendation on how to preserve the site is needed before construction can begin. Lombardo asked the Ambassador to speak with Salam to urge him to support this option.

    09BEIRUT967, Legal challenge adds delays to Nahr al-Barid reconstruction, 27 août 2009 http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09BEIRUT967.html

    LATE-BREAKING LEGAL CHALLENGE FROM AOUN
    –------------------

    ¶2. (C) In mid-August, Michel Aoun filed a lawsuit with the Shura court requesting an injunction against the backfilling of recently discovered Roman ruins underneath areas of the Nahr al-Barid (NAB) Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli. The basis for the suit is how to best preserve the remains of the Roman village discovered during rubble and UXO removal. The Directorate General of Antiquities (DGA) earlier in the year carried out a extensive survey at the site and, with cabinet approval, agreed that construction could continue if the ruins were “backfilled” with compressed soil at least one meter above the tallest portion of the ruins after UXO and rubble removal. Caretaker Culture Minister Tammam Salam told us on August 25 that Aoun was demanding the GOL relocate the camp to new land, an option already studied and rejected due to the cost and procedural delays in appropriating the land. Salam described Aoun’s demand as disingenuous since, were the GOL to appropriate new land, Aoun would accuse the GOL of instituting a permanent resettlement plan or “tawteen” for the refugees, a policy universally rejected across the Lebanese political spectrum. One of the issues being considered by the court is whether Aoun has legal standing for the suit, either as a private citizen or an MP.

    ¶3. (C) The GOL filed an appeal to Aoun’s lawsuit, caretaker Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar confirmed to Ambassador on August 14. Najjar said that both Aoun and the GOL had one month to prepare their cases. Meanwhile, on August 25 caretaker PM Siniora met with Salam, the DGA, the secretary general of the cabinet and a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) representative to “consolidate” the government’s position before presenting their appeal to the court later in September. Salam, who underscored earlier acceptance by some members of the opposition of the DGA’s proposal, noted that two of the three judges on the State Council, which must rule on the appeal, are Aoun supporters. On August 26 UNRWA’s Deputy Director for Lebanon Roger Davies told the Ambassador the court had ordered the previously agreed-upon work on backfilling to cease while the case is adjudicated. Only archeological surveying, rubble and UXO removal will continue. Davies said that Siniora had advised UNRWA on August 26 to obey the instruction, which asserting that the GOL was “100 percent behind” the NAB reconstruction project. Davies told us August 27 that UNRWA planned to order its contractor to cease backfilling operations on August 31. According to Regional UNRWA Director Filipo Grandi, the end of October was previously the projected date to complete the clearance work and begin constructing building foundations.

    09BEIRUT973, With cabinet negotiations stalled, Hariri hints at brinkmanship, 28 août 2009
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09BEIRUT973.html

    AOUN THE PROBLEM?
    OR HARIRI?
    –----------------

    ¶4. (C) The General does not fold easily, however, and underscored that his demands are firm and he will not “visit” anyone, adding cheekily that if “someone” wants to negotiate, he can visit the broad terrace of Aoun’s house. Caretaker Minister of Culture and Future Party stalwart Tammam Salam told the Ambassador August 25 that despite being “unstable,” Aoun is extremely intelligent, a political animal who does his homework and commits himself to a plan. “Even his allies can’t reel him in,” said Salam. “With or without the blessing of Syria, he will do what he wants.” Alain Aoun explained to PolChief August 26 that the General’s obstinacy was the result of Hariri’s marginalizing him (reftel) and insisted Hariri will need to find a way to meet with the General in order to move forward.

    ¶5. (C) Hariri has remained stoic in his responses to Aoun’s recent rants, winning praise from his allies, including Salam, who assessed that his performance has been “perfect” to date. Nonetheless, Hariri’s attempts to isolate Aoun have brought criticism from the opposition (reftel). Opposition MP Yassine Jaber, who is closely allied to Nabih Berri’s Amal party, suggested Hariri should have started negotiating with Aoun from the beginning instead of expecting Hizballah to push him. Indeed, Raad has insisted consistently in his public comments that Hizballah is Aoun’s ally, but not his mediator.

    […]

    OUTSIDE FORCES
    –-------------

    ¶9. (C) Many contacts still contend that the Hariri-Aoun spat cannot be the only thing holding up the government and that outside pressures are the real source of stalemate. Salam suggested that Syria, working from a strengthened regional and international position, must be working to freeze the process. Jaber assessed that the Egyptians had been interfering in Lebanon’s cabinet formation to serve its own regional interests. Numerous Embassy interlocutors insist that nothing can move forward in Lebanon until the Saudis and Syrians return to the negotiating table. The mood of many is summed up by Jumblatt’s comment to the Ambassador that Lebanon cannot form a government “while Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting from Yemen to Iraq.”

    09BEIRUT1214, New lebanese cabinet announced, 10 novembre 2009
    http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09BEIRUT1214.html

    ¶7. (U) The following ministers were not returned in the new cabinet: Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, Deputy Prime Minister Issam Abou Jamra, Finance Minister Mohammad Chatah, Social Affairs Minister Mario Aoun, Industry Minister Ghazi Zoayter, Tourism Minister Elie Marouni, Culture Minister Tammam Salam, Environment Minister Antoine Karam, Minister of the Displaced Raymond Audi, Administrative Reform Minister Ibrahim Shamseddine, Youth and Sports Minister Talal Arslan, Education Minister Bahia Hariri, Foreign Affairs Minister Fawzi Salloukh, Energy and Water Minister Alain Tabourian, Agriculture Minister Elie Skaff, State Minister Ali Qanso, State Minister Khaled Qabbani, and State Minister Nassib Lahoud.


  • Admire un peu comment toutes ces puissances étrangères défendent l’« indépendance du Liban » tout en décidant ouvertement qui sera son prochain Premier ministre :
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon-mikati-shuffled-out-pm-game

    Hariri’s allies in the West, such as the US, France, and Britain, however, support the return of Mikati to the Grand Serail. People who met the Ambassadors heard clear words to that effect. But Hariri’s close allies, who exert the strongest influence, are still silent.

    The Saudis have not yet come out clearly against Mikati.


  • La question du pétrole et du gaz au centre des enjeux de la constitution d’un futur gouvernement. Walid Jounblatt pose ses conditions. Intéressant article qui fournit la liste des sociétés ayant candidaté pour une pré-qualification et une carte des futures blocs de concession
    [Oil & Gas Updates] : Weekly Roundup, April 1st, 2013 | Middle East Strategic Perspectives
    http://www.mestrategicperspectives.com/2013/03/31/oil-gas-updates-weekly-roundup-april-1st-2013

    Well ahead of these consultations, the Ministry of Energy and Water seems to be emerging as one of the main issues of contention, with some aspiring to control it and others seeking to prevent opponents from controlling it. Not surprising given the stakes: he who controls the Ministry of energy controls the oil and gas sector, and, if these resources are developed, ensures a leading role in governing the country [Link in French]. In an interview published in Lebanese daily al-Akhbar on 29/03, Druze leader Walid Joumblat, whose supposed centrism in a polarized political system has turned him into a potential kingmaker, has laid down his conditions for the next government. The most important of these is excluding FPM ministers from retaining the Ministry of Energy and Water and the Ministry of Telecommunications. Natural resources, he said, cannot be kept in the hands of “absurd parties”, without providing more concrete comments or observations on Gebran Bassil’s record at the ministry.

    #Liban
    #gaz
    #pétrole


  • Un petit point sur l’une des deux raisons invoquées pour la démission de Mikati :

    – Le général Achraf Rifi, chef des Forces de sécurité intérieure, atteint l’âge de la retraite ; l’homme est très proche du 14 Mars. Prochainement également, le chef de l’armée, Jean Kahwagi semble-t-il apprécié du Hezbollah.

    Le Futur a proposé une loi pour prolonger les deux mandants :
    http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Mar-22/211132-rifi-downbeat-over-term-extension-prospects.ashx

    The Future parliamentary bloc has written an urgent draft law to change the mandatory retirement age for several high-ranking security officials who are set to reach mandatory retirement age this year, including Rifi and Lebanese Army Commander Gen. Jean Kahwagi.

    – Pas question pour le Hezbollah et les aounistes de prolonger Rifi, qui est leur bête noire dans plusieurs affaires :
    http://www.lorientlejour.com/category/Derni%C3%A8res+Infos/article/806628/Prorogation_du_mandat_de_Rifi_%3A_vers_une_demission_du_gouvernement_

    Le ministre d’Etat, Ahmad Karamé, a averti vendredi que le gouvernement pouvait tomber si le mandat du général Achraf Rifi à la tête des Forces de sécurité intérieure (FSI) n’était pas prorogé lors du Conseil des ministres qui se tient cet après-midi.

    Pour Kahwagi, le Hezbollah serait favorable, mais pas Aoun :
    http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2013/Mar-19/210664-future-seeks-extension-of-rifi-kahwagi-terms.ashx

    Both Hezbollah and ally Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun oppose extending Rifi’s term, given his affiliation with the Future Movement.

    Similarly, some March 14 groups are said to oppose lengthening Kahwagi’s term because of his perceived closeness to Hezbollah. The Islamist party backs adding to Kahwagi’s mandate, but Aoun does not.

    Je n’ai pas trouvé les raisons de l’opposition des aounistes à Kahwagi.

    – Joumblatt prétend qu’il était prévu de remplacer Rifi par le général Ali Hajj, bête noire du clan Hariri :
    http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/76691-jumblat-reveals-plan-to-replace-rifi-with-ali-hajj-it-s-all-about-pr

    He revealed a plan that consists of replacing Internal Security Forces chief Asraf Rifi with General Ali Hajj.

    Hajj a déjà 58 ans, alors pour remplacer Rifi qui atteint les 59 ans fatidiques le 1er avril, je ne vois bien pas l’intérêt de provoquer des tensions énormes pour seulement quelques mois à la tête des FSI.

    – Pour succéder à Rifi, Roger Salem : « mais Salem est grec catholique ».
    http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2013/Mar-19/210664-future-seeks-extension-of-rifi-kahwagi-terms.ashx

    If Rifi’s term is not extended, ISF Deputy Commander Brig. Roger Salem will become acting head of the ISF until a new director-general is appointed, although Salem too will reach retirement age in only three months. Custom dictates that a Sunni holds the top post at the ISF, but Salem is a Greek Catholic.

    Et pour remonter plus loin sur le background de l’affaire :
    – Achraf Rifi bloquant l’accès du ministre des télécoms, puis refusant d’obéir aux ordres directs du ministre de l’intérieur ; sur fond de réseau téléphonique suspect :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/18989
    – le #cablegate révélait comment Achraf Rifi était très impliqué dans la création de la milice de Saad Hariri :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/15268

    The second issue Jumblatt raised was Saad’s reported training of Sunni militias in Lebanon (allegedly 15,000 members in Beirut and more in Tripoli). In establishing his own “security agencies” in Beirut and Tripoli, Saad was being badly advised by “some people,” Jumblatt said, such as ISF General Ashraf Rifi. In his meeting with Jumblatt, Hassan admitted having knowledge that members of Saad’s Future Movement were being trained. Hassan reportedly opposed such training, but “people around Saad” (i.e., Rifi) were telling him to go ahead.

    L’homme est donc particulièrement central pour les projets américains au Liban, et il semble tout de même totalement inimaginable que le bonhomme bénéficie du moindre traitement de faveur de la part d’un gouvernement auquel il a déjà très ouvertement désobéi (allant jusqu’à la confrontation physique avec un ministre).


  • Le chantage des pétromonarchies contre le Liban continue:
    http://mediaramalb.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/mediarama-293.pdf

    Les Etats du Golfe ont aussi accentué leurs pressions sur le Liban. Le signal a été donné avec les réactions démesurées de capitales du Golfe aux propos du général Michel Aoun sur la situation à Bahreïn, la semaine dernière. Une délégation du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG) a soulevé cette affaire lors d’une rencontre cette semaine avec le président Michel Sleiman. Au passage, la délégation du CCG a mis en garde le Liban contre le non–respect de la politique de dissociation par certaines parties, en allusion au Hezbollah. Alors que les amis du Golfe au Liban sont impliqués à tous les niveaux dans la crise syrienne, et cela depuis le début des troubles.

    Par ailleurs, et selon le quotidien Al Akhbar, les Emirats arabes unis ont recommandé à leurs ressortissants de ne pas se rendre au Liban et demandent à ceux qui souhaitent s’y rendre de remplir un formulaire assurant qu’ils le font à leur entière responsabilité.

    Pour sa part, la chaine de télévision panarabe Al-Mayadeen rapporte que des investisseurs saoudiens ont retiré des banques libanaises près d’un milliard de dollars après la dernière réunion du Conseil de coopération du Golfe.


  • Lebanese Politics’ Double Standards | Moulahazat | A Lebanese Political Blog
    http://moulahazat.com/2013/02/27/lebanese-politics-double-standards

    That’s the second time in one week that Michel Aoun endorses the single district with proportional representation electoral law. What is quite shocking here is that Aoun has been pushing for the Orthodox Gathering Law for quite a while, and that the two laws have compelete opposite consequences (See [here] for the single district law and [here] for the Orthodox law). Another major difference is that the single district law brings the Christians 38.4% of the MPs (The parliament quotas stay the same 50% -50%) while the Orthodox Law gives Christians the power to elect 50%. It’s really very weird to see Aoun endorsing the Single district law after refusing over and over again any electoral law that doesn’t give the power to Christians to elect all their MPs. But why is Aoun endorsing the single district law?

    #Liban
    #élections


  • Regarding the comments by Michel Aoun supporting the ’revolution’ in Bahrain:

    “Arab diplomatic sources told Asharq al-Awsat that there is a major discrepancy between the Gulf support received by the head of the Change and Reform bloc and his latest position concerning the events in Bahrain. The sources said that Aoun received commercial contracts related to Gulf energy companies following the events that took place in Beirut in 2008. This took place specifically in Doha where the Lebanese political forces had all met to mend the differences.

    “The sources that preferred to remain anonymous said that the business affairs of the Lebanese MP [i.e. Aoun] are not limited to these contracts that he obtained in Doha. Companies owned by Michel Aoun reportedly have a large number of assets in some Gulf companies. The source preferred not to define these companies in order not to create an escalation. The source described the statements of Aoun concerning Bahrain as being “provocative.” -

    Asharq al-Awsat


  • Prime Minister Najib Mikati phoned his Bahraini counterpart Sunday evening to express Lebanon’s respect for Bahrain’s sovereignty after critical remarks by Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun provoked an angry response from the Gulf kingdom. Amid the political fallout over Aoun’s remarks, Bahraini Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid bin Abdullah alKhalifa said his country had arrested eight nationals in a militant cell with links to Iran, Iraq and Lebanon

    The Daily Star

    Read more: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2013/Feb-18/206849-mikati-calls-bahrain-pm-after-aoun-sparks-row.ashx#ixzz2LEvTrsR


  • J’avais repéré cet article d’Elie Hajj hier sur AL-Monitor, et je m’étais demandé ce que c’était que ce tissu de fadaises. Angry Arab confirme aujourd’hui qu’il s’agit d’une théorie du complot répandue par le bureau de presse Hariri. On a déjà vu cette théorie totalement loufoque hier dans L’Orient-Le Jour, évidemment reprise par le député Daher, et réfutée par l’armée et le Akhbar :
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/lebanon-sunnis-feel-threatened-arsal.html

    However what is transpiring behind the scenes is the most worrisome. Apparently there is a plan at work on the ground, in political corridors, and within the media designed to strike the Future Movement and Sunni hardliners in Lebanon, which is based on the following:

    Plotting the events in Arsal and provoking a response from the locals, which in turn allows them to claim that Arsal is a hotbed of fundamentalist jihadists, specifically from the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra.  The objective of all this is to seal off Arsal and prevent its people from supporting the rebels in Syria. It justifies Hezbollah’s weapons by saying that there are illegal hotbeds, which pose security threats outside the areas controlled by Hezbollah. This will require political action on the basis that there is targeted community in Lebanon.

    Residents of Arsal claim that the military patrol included Hezbollah personnel, citing evidence that others were killed aside from the sergeant and the captain. One of the dead could possibly be the man for whom Hezbollah held a funeral in Arabsalim in the south on Sunday, whom they claim died in Syria.

    They exaggerate the actions of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir and his tourist convoy to the mountains of the Keserwan District a week ago to make him appear as if he speaks for the Sunnis when in reality he does not. In response they organize popular movements in support of the army and its leadership in Christian and Shiite areas, as happened after the killing of Sheik Abdul-Wahed in Akkar. They also launch a media campaign targeting and insulting a particular Lebanese group.

    Pour mémoire, chaque fois qu’il se passe quelque chose de grave au Liban, on trouvera un député du 14 Mars pour expliquer que c’est une provocation du Hezbollah pour humilier les sunnites ou les chrétiens. C’est une sorte d’automatisme.
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/future-movement%E2%80%99s-tripoli-rally-enduring-failure

    Kabbara scaled new heights in this regard when he charged that the murderer of the young girl Myriam al-Ashkar on the beach at Alma was an intelligence officer sent by Hezbollah and Syria to spy on the Maronite Church!


  • Après le oui de Nasrallah à la proposition de loi du rassemblement orthodoxe, le débat se poursuit dans la consternation générale des observateurs.
    http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/797847/Nasrallah%3A_Oui_au_projet_de_loi_lectorale_orthodoxe.html

    Le Hezbollah a levé hier l’ambigüité qui pouvait encore planer au sujet de ses options législatives en annonçant qu’il votera en faveur du projet de loi électorale dite orthodoxe élaboré par Élie Ferzli et appuyé par le Courant patriotique libre du général Michel Aoun.
    Le projet de loi prévoit que chaque communauté votera pour ses propres députés, dans le but de réaliser une parité absolue entre les deux corps électoraux chrétien et musulman.

    Le président de la République Michel Sleimane voit dans la loi proposér par le rassemblement orthodoxe une

    loi « dont la teneur serait moindre que celle de la loi de 1960, en ce sens qu’elle entretiendrait non seulement un tri sur base confessionnelle, mais favoriserait en plus l’émergence de blocs extrémistes au sein de chaque communauté »

    http://www.lorientlejour.com/category/Liban/article/798121/Sleiman_appelle_a_une_nouvelle_loi_electorale_mixte%2C_a_partir_du_pr

    Intéressante analyse sur le blog Moulahazat | A Lebanese Political Blog

    A Closer Look At The Orthodox Gathering Law- Part I : Why It’s Unconstitutional « Moulahazat | A Lebanese Political Blog
    http://moulahazat.com/2013/01/27/a-closer-look-at-the-orthodox-gathering-law-part-i-why-its-unconstitutio

    The OG law pushes the Lebanese political system further into sectarianism, while the constitution forbids that. It clearly asks for a secular lower house and for the abolishment of sectarianism. And again, yes, the 1960 law is a sectarian one which goes against article 95, but it’s a de-facto law and the presence of any law that shares the same level of sectarianism should be tolerated. However replacing it with a more sectarian electoral law is a major violation to the constitution, to the Taef agreement and to what they represent.

    #Liban
    #élections
    #proportionnelle


  • Le piège électoral | À La Une | L’Orient-Le Jour
    http://www.lorientlejour.com/category/%C3%80+La+Une/article/795533/Le_piege_electoral.html

    Et si, au final, le projet de loi électorale dit « grec-orthodoxe » passait ? La question était absurde il y a quelques semaines encore, tant ce projet, qui prévoit en gros que chaque communauté élise ses députés, paraît aux antipodes de ce qui est généralement et publiquement prôné au Liban. Mais d’une manœuvre à l’autre, l’idée est en train de faire son chemin.

    Le CPL, fossoyeur des espoirs réformistes jusqu’au bout ?


  • Article sur la couverture de la guerre à #Gaza par les télévisions libanaises

    MTV’s Distorted Gaza Lexicon
    The weeklong aggression on Gaza could not shake the monotony of Lebanese television channels, most of which stuck to their Turkish soaps, pathetic children’s programs, and cooking shows.
    ...
    The only station giving the issue its full merit had been #al-Mayadeen, the satellite news channel launched in June 2012 by former #al-Jazeera reporter #Ghassan_Ben_Jeddo.
    The great majority of local channels have failed both professionally and morally by failing to cover a crisis happening just across the Lebanese border.
    ...

    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/mtv%E2%80%99s-distorted-gaza-lexicon


  • Et maintenant, les alliés 8 Mars du Hezbollah prétendent qu’ils aimaient et respectaient Wissam al-Hassan. M’enfin !

    Hassan a été enregistré, avec Saad Hariri, en train d’entraîner le faux témoin Muhammad Zuhair al-Siddiq pour convaincre Gerhard Lehmann de l’implication syrienne dans l’enquête du TSL :
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FcfphNZrWy0


    (Le même Lehmann qui, lui, a été filmé en train d’empocher avec gourmandise une liasse de billets pour, selon le Hezbollah, fuiter des éléments de l’enquête à la presse.)

    L’année dernière, il y a eu un très grave accrochage entre le ministre Charbel Nahas des télécoms et la branche d’information des FSI. La rumeur disait que les services de Wissam Hassan opéraient un réseau de communication occulte destiné à l’espionnage, et les aounistes en ont fait tout un pataquès.
    http://seenthis.net/messages/18989

    Dans une autre affaire, un cablegate cite Joublatt indiquant que Hassan était certainement à l’origine de la mise en accusation du Hezbollah par le TSL :
    http://seenthis.net/messages/15268

    Charles Ayoub, Ibrahim al-Amine, le PCL, les aounistes, déclarant soudainement leur respect pour le travail du « martyre » Hassan, c’est carrément grotesque. Prétendre qu’il entretenait de bonnes relations avec les syriens me semble également stupide.


  • Quand Michel Aoun menaçait Wissam el-Hassan d’être « carbonisé »…

    L’arrestation de Michel Samaha a semble-t-il beaucoup affecté ou enragé son associé depuis 1980, le général Michel Aoun. L’officier qui a livré le Liban aux Israéliens, le bourreau du camp palestinien de Tall al-Za’atr, connu pour être un obsédé de pouvoir rêvant d’arriver à la présidence de la République libanaise sur des chars du clan Assad.

    Multipliant les mises en garde contre la présence d’Al-Qaïda au Liban et le fanatisme des sunnites, Michel Samaha et Michel Aoun endossaient innocemment les habits de blanche neige.

    Découvrant le vrai visage de Michel Samaha et ses mentors Syriens qui préparaient des attentats au Liban dans le but de provoquer des dissensions confessionnelles, le Liban a été sous le choc, mais pas Michel Aoun qui va enchainer les compagnes de dénigrement contre le général Wissam el-Hassan accusé d’être à l’origine de l’arrestation.

    En regardant cette vidéo, on est sidéré d’entendre Michel Aoun s’emporter violemment contre Wissam el-Hassan, allant jusqu’à le menacer d’être « carbonisé » en l’interpellant par ce sermon assez clair et explicite « التوتر العالي بيفحموا ». Ce qu’on peut traduire par « qui touche à la haute tension risque d’être carbonisé ».

    Lire la suite …

    http://chahidslimani.over-blog.com


  • Lebanese Christian leader says escapes assassination
    http://www.euronews.com/newswires/1666844-lebanese-christian-leader-says-target-of-assassination

    Michel Aoun, head of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), was returning to Beirut on Saturday evening when one of the cars in his convoy was shot at in the mainly Sunni city of Sidon, a statement on the FPM website said.

    “I have been exposed to three assassination attempts (in the past) and the perpetrators were discovered,” the website quoted Aoun as saying. “This is the fourth and we hope they will be revealed.”

    Interior Minister Marwan Charbel said a shot was fired at one of several decoy vehicles driving slightly in advance of the convoy carrying Aoun himself. The bullet passed close to one of the people in the car, Charbel told Reuters.


  • Je vous traduis ce court billet d’Angry Arab à propos de Robert Fisk :
    http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2012/09/robert-fisk.html

    Je le répète depuis des années : Robert Fisk n’est pas fiable, il est fainéant, ses reportages ne peuvent pas être crus et il a tendance à inventer des choses. Je ne le trouvais pas fiable quand il écrivait contre le régime syrien, et je ne le trouve pas fiable maintenant qu’il écrit des articles qui vont dans le sens des intérêts du régime. Mais ce qui est amusant, c’est que les groupies de la « Révolution syrienne » faisaient la promotion des articles de Fisk au début du soulèvement quand il était très critique envers le régime, mais l’ont désormais déclaré un shabbih officiel depuis qu’il est sympathique avec le régime. Cohérence, M. Watson, cohérence.

    Pour ma part, j’ai comme Angry Arab renoncé à lire Fisk depuis 2005 concernant le Liban à cause de son alignement sur le 14 Mars, et ses « analyses » à base de « confidences » de Walid Joumblatt. Ce type a tout de même affirmé que Rafic Hariri avait reconstruit le Liban avec son propre argent !

    De fait, je n’ai aucune sorte de confiance pour ses récents articles à Alep. Comme je le répète à chaque fois, le seul intérêt que je vois là, c’est de constater que, concernant la Syrie, certaines choses peuvent être écrites et publiées, y compris par des gens qui ont basé leur récente vision du Liban et de la Syrie sur la reproduction sans distance des élucubrations de Marwan Hamadé.


    • Prochain départ à la retraite de Saïd Mirza
      http://www.lorientlejour.com/category/Liban/article/769989/Prochain_depart_a_la_retraite_de_Said_Mirza.html

      C’est à la fin de ce mois de juillet que le procureur général près la Cour de cassation, Saïd Mirza, fera valoir ses droits à la retraite. Le magistrat, qui a entamé ses adieux par une visite à Baabda, continuera donc d’exercer ses fonctions pour quelques jours encore, aussi bien comme procureur de la République que comme vice-président du Conseil supérieur de la magistrature.

    • Mirza’s Tenure Ends with No Successor in Sight — Naharnet
      http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/48276

      Media sources said that Judge Samir Hammoud is expected to become the acting General Prosecutor due to seniority awaiting the cabinet’s decision regarding the issue.

      In June, President Michel Suleiman approved a decree referred by Prime Minister Najib Miqati and drafted by Justice Minister Shakib Qortbawi to appoint five judges to the Higher Judicial Council for three non-renewable years.

      The HJC is formed of 10 members in which the head of the council, the General Prosecutor and the head of the Judicial Inspection Board are appointed by a decree issued by the cabinet.

      […]

      However, sharp differences between Suleiman and Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun have prevented the cabinet from making the appointment of the head of the HJC, which is a Maronite position.

    • Cabinet unlikely to tackle judicial appointments
      http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Jul-24/181731-cabinet-unlikely-to-tackle-judicial-appointments.ashx

      Disagreements over judicial appointments will likely mean another top post goes unfilled as General Prosecutor Saeed Mirza’s prepares to retire next week.

      According to sources, Cabinet is unlikely during its session Wednesday, to appoint a replacement to Mirza, who will leave his position on July 30.

      Mirza is a member of the Higher Judicial Council and currently serves as its acting head, a post that has been vacant since Ghaleb Ghanem’s retirement over a year ago.

      The appointment has been held up for months with Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun and President Michel Sleiman favoring different candidates.

      As a stopgap measure, Judge Samir Hammoud could take over for Mirza as acting general prosecutor while the judge who is directly below Mirza in the Higher Judicial Council could become the acting head of the body, a judicial source told The Daily Star.


  • Diffamons, diffamons, il en restera toujours quelque chose :
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/2012/jul/10/egypt-morsi-military-showdown-parliament-live#block-27

    4.16pm: Syria: The Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, regarded as sympathetic to the Assad regime, appears to have been given the Syrian government’s minutes of the Assad-Annan meeting yesterday.

    Diffamons, diffamons :
    ArabSaga : Minutes of Assad-Annan new truce deal
    http://arabsaga.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/minutes-of-assad-annan-new-truce-deal.html

    Known as Syria’s mouthpiece, Beirut’s daily al-Akhbar…



  • Eclairage : Lorsque « le complot » pointe son nez... | Politique Liban | L’Orient-Le Jour
    http://www.lorientlejour.com/category/Liban/article/760095/Eclairage_%3A_Lorsque_%3C%3C+le_complot+%3E%3E_pointe_son_nez....html

    S’il y a donc des conclusions à tirer des derniers événements, elles se résument aux yeux du 8 Mars à trois : le Hezbollah et le 8 Mars ne comptent pas se laisser entraîner dans un affrontement avec les sunnites. Ni les provocations verbales ni la fermeture des routes, notamment celles du Sud et de la Békaa vitales pour la résistance, ne le pousseront à modifier son attitude.

    Deuxième conclusion : il est désormais clair pour le 8 Mars que toutes les parties internes (sans parler de l’opposition syrienne au Nord et dans la Békaa) possèdent des armes, et à Tarik Jdidé, les partisans du courant du Futur ont utilisé des roquettes B7, les dégâts à la permanence de Berjaoui le montrent clairement. De même, le courant du Futur et ses alliés se sont comportés, ajoute le 8 Mars, comme des formations totalitaires refusant la diversité et l’existence d’une force sunnite qui ne partage pas leur point de vue.

    Enfin, lorsque l’armée avait tiré sur des manifestants désarmés proches du Hezbollah et d’Amal qui protestaient contre l’absence de courant électrique dans leur quartier, faisant huit morts parmi eux à Mar Mikhaël, les deux formations s’étaient empressées de multiplier les appels au calme et d’empêcher les habitants chiites du quartier de réagir, alors que de nombreux députés du courant du Futur préfèrent utiliser un discours confessionnel et inciter à la discorde...

    Intéressant commentaire de S. Haddad même si elle minimise les tensions internes au 14 mars me semble t il. Car selon les commentateurs d’Al Akhbar ces jours derniers, il y a aussi une marginalisation du Courant du Futur et de Hariri avec la montée des salafistes tripolitains.
    Voir par exemple Ibrahim al-Amin : http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanon%E2%80%99s-sunni-street-takes-charge

    • Effectivement très intéressant.

      Note qu’elle ne « minimise » pas les tensions internes du 14 Mars : elle n’utilise carrément pas l’expression « 14 Mars » dans son article ! Elle utilise à chaque paragraphe le « 8 Mars » qui dénonce un complot, mais pas le 14 Mars.

      Je pense que, dans la logique du 8 Mars, le 14 Mars n’est qu’un instrument local à des politiques décidées et financées ailleurs (États-Unis, Arabie séoudite, aujourd’hui Qatar…).

      Par ailleurs, ce que décrit Scarlett Haddad est, largement, la lecture qu’on a pu avoir du #cablegate libanais.

    • le 14 Mars n’est qu’un instrument local à des politiques décidées et financées ailleurs (États-Unis, Arabie séoudite, aujourd’hui Qatar…).

      oui, mais pour autant, on perçoit dans les commentaires de ces derniers jours des tiraillements internes au Courant du Futur (entre ceux qui suivent le mouvement voire qui soufflent sur les braises, ceux qui font de la surenchère pour ne pas être marginalisé, comme Harir) et aussi avec les alliés chrétiens : Gemayel demandant que le 14 mars ne se jette pas dans la bataille en Syrie (http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/amin-gemayel-march-14-keep-out-syria) et Geagea qui se demande si ces électeurs vont le suivrent (http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Columnist/2012/May-17/173662-will-tripoli-make-samir-geagea-pay.ashx#axzz1vaTAMpvR)

    • Oui, je suis d’accord.

      Mais l’article de Haddad est basé sur la description d’un complot tel que décrit de longue date par le 8 Mars (dans la continuation de la contre-enquête soutenue par le Hezbollah à propos du meurtre de Hariri, puis de l’enquête internationale et les magouilles de Saad, puis les fuites du cablegate libanais…). Et dans cette logique, certes le 14 Mars est l’acteur local principal, peut-être actuellement en compétition avec des jihadistes à Tripoli, mais quand le 8 Mars dénonce l’« attaque contre le Liban et la Résistance », il décrit bien la source (décision, financement, théorisation…) de cette attaque comme étant en dehors du Liban (Israël, États-Unis, Arabie séoudite…).

      Dans le story-telling 8 Mars, les péripéties électorales de Geagea (et même de Saad) sont des anecdotes propres à faire perdre le fil d’une évolution plus large.


  • Un article qui explique bien les enjeux du mode de scrutin au Liban, et notamment d’un éventuel passage à un scrutin proportionnel.

    Désarmer la proportionnelle | Politique Liban | L’Orient-Le Jour
    http://www.lorientlejour.com//news/article.php?id=756165

    tout l’intérêt de la proportionnelle au Liban est de permettre à des minorités politiques sunnites, chiites et druzes d’accéder au Parlement en ayant reçu les voix de membres de leur propre communauté. Sous le système actuel, tous les députés chiites 14 Mars ont été élus par des voix sunnites et tous les sunnites du 8 Mars par des voix chiites.

    Il conclut, d’un point de vue très 14 marsiste, que

    on a vu comment le contexte propre aux régions chiites, incarné par un verrouillage systématique qu’exerce un tandem disposant de la force des armes, avait non seulement empêché la formation de listes complètes d’opposition dans l’ensemble des circonscriptions concernées, mais aussi rendu la vie dure à quelques candidats isolés n’osant même pas se réclamer du 14 Mars.
    Que l’on soit pour le maintien des armes et du statut particulier du Hezbollah ne dispense pas du devoir d’honnêteté intellectuelle. Or, celle-ci commande d’observer que l’adoption de la proportionnelle dans ce contexte-là aurait très probablement l’effet qu’on en escompte chez les uns et pas chez les autres. Ce serait une injustice de plus et une nouvelle cause de frustration. Le Liban n’en a certainement pas besoin.
    La démocratie et les armes, c’est déjà une équation impossible. Avec la proportionnelle, ce serait un mélange explosif.

    A mon sens, c’est parce qu’il oublie la possibilité d’une circonscription unique qui est la seule option viable pour ce type de mode de scrutin dans un si petit pays compte tenu de la contrainte de respecter des quotas confessionnels. Mais il est vrai que pratiquement aucun parti politique de la scène libanaise n’est en faveur d’un tel élargissement de la joute électorale.
    #Liban
    #élections
    #proportionnelle