person:mubarak

  • Best analysis of the situation in the Middle East so far: “Theocratic regimes back secularists; tyrannies promote democracy; the US forms partnerships with Islamists; Islamists support Western military intervention. Arab nationalists side with regimes they have long combated; liberals side with Islamists with whom they then come to blows. Saudi Arabia backs secularists against the Muslim Brothers and Salafis against secularists. The US is allied with Iraq, which is allied with Iran, which supports the Syrian regime, which the US hopes to help topple. The US is also allied with Qatar, which subsidizes Hamas, and with Saudi Arabia, which funds the Salafis who inspire jihadists who kill Americans wherever they can”
    Source : http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/nov/08/not-revolution/?pagination=false
    #Iran #Iraq #Syria #Qatar #USA #Hamas #Egypt #democracy


  • The Egyptian opposition: from protestors to revolutionaries? | openDemocracy

    http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/maha-abdelrahman/egyptian-opposition-from-protestors-to-revolutionaries

    In the first decade of the 21st century, Egyptian activists within blossoming yet embryonic labour and prodemocracy movements, participated in groups and networks that were characterised by decentralised and fluid organisational structures, diffuse boundaries and dependence on members rather than a centralised leadership - all features typical of new social movements

    #tradeunion #labour #prodemocracy movements #opposition #egypt


  • « An Obstacle of Democratic Change. »
    http://www.correspondents.org/node/2488

    Professor Abul-Magd, how do you view the status of the military under the Second Republic?

    To begin with, there is no second republic. We still live under the same authoritarian regime, supported by Mubarak, which is based on a one-party monopoly of power, a neo-liberal economy, repressive practices carried out by the police against opponents, and restrictions imposed on the media and civil society organizations.

    Mubarak regime’s main loyalists still exist and operate along the same policy. Therefore, we cannot claim that there is a Second Republic, but we may say the Muslim Brotherhood has inherited Mubarak’s authoritarian regime.

    The Second Republic will be born when the elements and mechanisms needed to change Egyptian society’s economic, political and social structure are made available. So, I can say the military enjoys the same position and plays the same roles it used to play under Mubarak, and has even grown more powerful and become a formidable obstacle of democratic change.


  • U.S. Practiced Torture After 9/11, Nonpartisan Review Concludes
    http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/world/us-practiced-torture-after-9-11-nonpartisan-review-concludes.html

    The sweeping, 577-page report says that while brutality has occurred in every American war, there never before had been “the kind of considered and detailed discussions that occurred after 9/11 directly involving a president and his top advisers on the wisdom, propriety and legality of inflicting pain and torment on some detainees in our custody.” The study, by an 11-member panel convened by the Constitution Project, a legal research and advocacy group, is to be released on Tuesday morning.

    #torture #guerre


  • Did We Get the Muslim Brotherhood Wrong? - Marc Lynch | Foreign Policy
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/10/did_we_get_the_muslim_brotherhood_wrong?print=yes

    It has become clear that the Brotherhood was more profoundly shaped by its inability to actually win power than has generally been recognized. Almost every aspect of its organization, ideology, and strategy was shaped by the limits Mubarak placed upon it. The revolution removed those boundaries — and the Brotherhood has struggled badly to adapt. Its erratic, incompetent, and often incomprensibly alienating behavior since the revolution comes in part from having utterly lost its bearings in a new institutional environment. The chance to rule forced it to confront a whole range of contradictions that Mubarak’s domination had allowed the group to finesse.

    ...

    ... I recall sitting in Deputy Supreme Guide Khairet al-Shater’s office in late 2011 being shown what appeared to be comprehensive, detailed plans for economic development and institutional reform. It seemed plausible at that point that a Brotherhood government would quickly get things moving again and establish itself as a centrist Islamist majority party, like Turkey’s ruling AK Party. Yet it has utterly failed to do so. What went wrong?

    One part of the answer lies in something else the academics got right: factional politics inside the Brotherhood. Put simply, the years immediately preceding the Egyptian revolution had produced a Brotherhood leadership and organization almost uniquely poorly adapted to the challenges of a democratic transition. The regime cracked down hard on the Brotherhood following its electoral success in 2005, arresting a wide range of its leaders (including currently prominent personalities such as Morsy and Shater), confiscating its financial assets, and launching intense media propaganda campaigns.

    This took a toll on the internal balance of power inside the Brotherhood as advocates of political participation found themselves on the defensive against the more conservative faction, which preferred to focus on social outreach and religious affairs. In 2008, conservatives were declared the winners in all five seats being contested in by-elections to replace empty seats on the Brotherhood’s highest official body, the Guidance Council; reformists cried foul. The next year, in new elections to the council again marred by serious procedural violations, the most prominent reformist member, Abdel Monem Abou el-Fotouh, and a key intermediary between the factions, Mohammed Habib, lost their long-held seats. Supreme Guide Mohammed Mehdi Akef, an old-guard conservative who had nonetheless maintained a careful balance between the factions, later stepped down and was replaced by little-known conservative Mohammed Badie. Over the next few years, a number of leading members of the reformist faction left the Brotherhood or were excluded from positions of influence.

    When the revolution broke out, then, the Brotherhood had already driven away many of its most politically savvy and ideologically moderate leaders. Its leadership had become dominated by cautious, paranoid, and ideologically rigid conservatives who had little experience at building cross-ideological partnerships or making democratic compromises. One-time reformists such as Essam el-Erian and Mohammed el-Beltagy had made their peace with conservative domination and commanded little influence on the movement’s strategy. It is fascinating to imagine how the Brotherhood might have handled the revolution and its aftermath if the dominant personalities on the Guidance Bureau had been Abou el-Fotouh and Habib rather than Shater and Badie — but we’ll never know.



  • Fingers, Foreign Elements, and the Former Regime

    http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/fingers-foreign-elements-and-former-regime

    “It’s easy for a government to blame the media, foreign elements, and the former regime. However neither the media, foreign ‘elements’, or the former regime can be blamed for a constitutional declaration giving the president sweeping powers, for failing to reform a virtually unchanged security apparatus, or failing to seriously seek input from opposition or even advisors who have since resigned.

    His message has changed from one of unity to aggressive assertions in the name of protecting the revolution. His speeches do not reflect a country experiencing internal struggle, but a fantasized one unified against an 84 year old former dictator in a prison hospital and unnamed external forces allegedly armed with molotov cocktails, attacking party offices, and torturing detained activists.”


  • Hazem Kandil · Deadlock in Cairo · LRB 21 March 2013
    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n06/hazem-kandil/deadlock-in-cairo

    When you consider the central importance of the security services to the old regime, it is remarkable how well they have done so far. Not a single police officer has been charged with a single offence before or after the revolt. (...) Egypt’s infamous State Security Investigations Service was simply renamed Egyptian Homeland Security without any change in its powers. Even though repression and torture continued, Morsi never missed an opportunity to praise the patriotism of the Interior Ministry, which he claims has already been reformed.

    Part of the reason Egypt’s security establishment has landed on its feet is that it has been careful to bide its time. It seems willing to refrain from full-blown ‘pacification’ until the revolutionaries come to learn that the only alternative to police repression is chaos. It hasn’t been entirely passive . It has stirred up and ambushed protesters at carefully selected times and places, engaging them in short, brutal battles and leaving dozens of bodies behind. After each incident, investigations have been carried out, unnamed ‘third parties’ blamed and the matter shelved. One such episode occurred in February last year at Port Said Stadium. Determined to punish the football fans – the Ultras – for spearheading street battles against the police, the Interior Ministry bussed in thugs from the capital and, after blocking all the stadium’s exits, unleashed them against the unsuspecting fans. In little more than an hour, 79 people were killed and at least a thousand injured. A court ruling was scheduled for 26 January this year, and a clear indictment of the security service plot was expected, especially after hints from the presidency that such a ruling might provide the legal basis for a purge and restructuring of the security apparatus. Instead, 21 civilians were sentenced to death and the police were exonerated.

    Violence erupted around the country and the riot police didn’t hold back, killing fifty demonstrators and injuring hundreds more. People were further enraged by a YouTube video showing a middle-aged demonstrator called Hamada Saber being stripped naked, trampled on by police in heavy boots and dragged along the tarmac. A few days later, a young activist called Mohamed al-Guindy was allegedly tortured to death in a police station. Morsi commended the Interior Ministry’s effectiveness, and appeared on television waving his fist defiantly and threatening troublemakers with harsher measures.

    For security officers, the message was clear: under the Brotherhood, they could carry on as usual. This was hardly surprising. An organisation obsessed with conspiracies cooked up by ‘enemies of Islam’, and aspiring to spread piety throughout society, is bound to appreciate a formidable police force. The security services know, then, that they have a good friend in the Brotherhood. But they’re also open to counter-offers from members of the old regime – better the devil they know, as the loyalists tell them. (...).

    So while military officers have had to make tough choices, their counterparts in the security services have survived the revolution’s first wave by alternating strategically between permissiveness and repression. In this way they have managed, on the one hand, to make plain to the military the drawbacks of giving in to the revolutionaries, while, on the other, proving to the highest political bidder that security men are still perfectly capable of committing any atrocities that might be demanded of them. And it is under the shadow of these two mighty institutions that the three contenders for political supremacy have jockeyed for power.


  • Egyptian Leftist Bloc Leader Calls Morsi ’New Mubarak’ -

    Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/morsi-new-mubarak-opposition-leader-hamdeen-sabahi.html

    “I disagree with those who demand the return of the military to power. Egyptians should [determine] their political life, and the military has to enable them in doing so while it fights any dangers and puts an end to the spread of violence,” he added.
    Sabahi believes the military is being forced to interfere not because of popular demands but because of the “oppressive policies of Mohammed Morsi and his government that refuses to interact with the people and their peaceful protests.”


  • Egyptian Leftist Bloc Leader Calls Morsi ’New Mubarak’ -

    Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/morsi-new-mubarak-opposition-leader-hamdeen-sabahi.html

    “I disagree with those who demand the return of the military to power. Egyptians should [determine] their political life, and the military has to enable them in doing so while it fights any dangers and puts an end to the spread of violence,” he added.
    Sabahi believes the military is being forced to interfere not because of popular demands but because of the “oppressive policies of Mohammed Morsi and his government that refuses to interact with the people and their peaceful protests.”


  • Mohamed Morsi appelle l’opposition au dialogue, qui refuse. Critique du président, risque de « chaos », intervention de l’armée, voici ce que disait Mohamed El Baradei il y a quelques jours.

    Mr ElBaradei : "We need to send a message loud and clear to the people here and outside of Egypt that this is not a democracy, that we have not participated in an uprising two years ago to end up with a recycling of the [Hosni] Mubarak regime.

    “Torture is still there, abduction is still there, a lack of social justice is still there.”

    He said elections should not be held in April in a society that was “completely polarised”.

    To do so, he said, would risk setting the country on a “road to total chaos and instability” and that the intervention of the army might then be common sense, to stabilise the situation until the political process could be resumed.

    He said : “If Egypt is on the brink of default, if law and order is absent, [the army] have a national duty to intervene.”

    Mr ElBaradei said the basic problem was that Mr Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood had spent 80 years in opposition, and was now “intoxicated with power”.

    http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21566270



  • Manifestations, black bloc, « terrorisme sexuel » à Tahrir (20 viols en 3 heures), arrestations arbitraires, violences policières, activistes retrouvés morts, instabilité politique : la situation en Egypte deux ans après le début de la révolution, par Vanessa Descouraux.

    http://www.franceinter.fr/emission-le-zoom-de-la-redaction-manifestations-en-egypte

    Egypte : après Mohamed El Guindy, un second activiste retrouvé mort.
    http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/missing-activist-found-bound-naked-tortured-desert
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/04/egyptian-protester-dies-suspected-torture


  • https://umfnyc.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/blackblocanon.jpg?w=660&h=330&crop=1
    Lessons From the Egyptian Insurrection: Communization, Strategy, and Solidarity « build the party
    https://umfnyc.wordpress.com/2013/01/31/lessons-from-the-egyptian-insurrection-communization-strategy-and-

    In the past week, Egypt has seen the rapid spread of insurrectional violence, beginning January 25th with the 2-year anniversary of Mubarak’s fall, intensifying with the death sentences handed down to 21 Al-Masry ultras from Port Said and the subsequent declaration of a state of emergency on January 27th in provinces along the Suez Canal. Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Ismaili, and Cairo have seen extensive clashes and the defiance of all curfews, with Port Said effectively seceding and military leaders warning of a state collapse. Within this fold, an explicitly revolutionary force has announced itself, calling itself Black Blocairo, Black Block Egypt, or simply the Black Bloc, pointing beyond the use of the black mask and violence as a tactic and towards a more organized and explicitly insurrectional position in North Africa; learning from the years of revolt and refusing to let go, they are pushing things forward when others would choose to give up.

    While security forces have lost control of the streets in some cities, their absence does not beget a revolution, and in parallel the state proper may not be in control, but this does not mean that government –as opposed to the government— does not function. A revolution has to abolish everything, as much through insurrection as through communization.

    #BuildTheParty #BlackBloc #égypte


  • http://www.merip.org/why-anti-mursi-protesters-are-right

    From the day Mubarak was deposed, the Muslim Brothers have shown disdain for other opposition groups and little interest in building consensus on a road map for the political transition and the fundamentals of the new political order. Instead, they pushed for speedy elections, knowing they were poised to win a near majority, and emerged as an elected power broker rather than a partner in a democratic revolution.

    the battle in Egypt is indeed one between a democracy that reflects the country’s political diversity and a remodeled authoritarianism, led by the Muslim Brothers and their allies, that seeks to circumscribe it.

    #egypte #brotherhood #muslim #revolution


  • 10 Reasons Countries Fall Apart

    http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/173-sovereign/52061-10-reasons-countries-fall-apart.html

    By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
    Foreign Policy
    July/August 2012

    Economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, authors of Why Nation Fails, bring an interesting perspective to the question of “failed states” by focusing on domestic institutions and the role of political and economic elites. By giving concrete examples of what they call “extractive” economic institutions, they shed light on the following disincentives to growth: the endemic lack of property rights in North Korea, forced labor and coercion in Uzbekistan, the former professional caste system in apartheid South Africa, the elite’s monopolistic control of the economy in Mubarak’s Egypt or its rejection of new technologies in 19th Century Russia and Austria, the absence of effective centralized state and system of laws in Somalia, the government’s weak control over the territory in Colombia or its inability to provide public services in Peru, the political exploitation of rural populations in Bolivia, and the intense extraction of natural resources in Sierra Leone. While these are undoubtedly central to understand why some states fall apart, the two economists only present part of the picture, as they tend to neglect that these countries are not isolated but included in complex geopolitical dynamics.

    #états-défaillants #failed-states


  • Egypt: Non–profit media collective secures crowd–funding | The Barefoot Technologist
    http://barefootintocyberspace.com/2012/11/09/too-much-information-links-for-week-ending-9-november

    Mosireen, a non–profit media collective in Downtown Cairo “born out of the explosion of citizen media and cultural activism in Egypt during the revolution” has used the crowd–funding platform IndieGoGo to secure $40,000 of funding from over 350 donors. The sum is a significant contribution to its $60,000/year running costs for providing workspaces, editing facilities and screenings for independent media producers. The money raised will be supplemented by membership fees from service users, collected on a pay–what–you–can basis.

    Mosireen: Independent Media Collective in Cairo. | Indiegogo
    http://www.indiegogo.com/Mosireen

    Tahrir Cinema is an open-air screening of revolutionary footage that takes place in Tahrir Square, presenting the products of Egyptian citizen journalism as filmed in protests, strikes and sit-ins. The footage shown at Tahrir cinema represents an alternative media that is open for everyone to film, produce and interact with.

    http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7017/6591168895_ff51d53f21.jpg

    #crowdfunding #journalisme #egypte


  • Leading FJP member resigns in protest at Morsi’s letter to Israel
    http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/56278/Egypt/Politics-/Leading-FJP-member-resigns-in-protest-at-Morsis-le.aspx

    In the presidential letter, Morsi, who resigned from the Brotherhood upon becoming president, chose to address Peres as “great and good friend”, according to the Times of Israel, which published a copy of the letter.

    “We thought that Mubarak and his gang are the traitors, but it turned out to be that the circle of treason is much bigger. If Mubarak was Israel’s treasure, then Morsi is their loyal friend, as described by his letter,” added El-Hamrawi.

    New Egyptian ambassador brings Israel ’message of peace’
    http://www.timesofisrael.com/new-egyptian-ambassador-brings-israel-a-message-of-peace

    “Great and good friend,” Egypt’s Islamist president, Mohammed Morsi, wrote in the letter to his Israeli counterpart, “being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the cordial relations which so happily exist between our two countries, I have selected Mr. Atef Mohamed Salem Sayed El Ahl to be our ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.” Morsi closed his letter, which largely followed standard diplomatic language for the exchange of ambassadors, by expressing “highest esteem and consideration.”


  • Signalé par Angry Arab : comment Clinton et Obama obéissent aux ordres des émiratis
    http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/arab-spring-proves-a-harsh-test-for-obamas-diplomatic-skill.html

    The lingering resentment over Mr. Mubarak’s ouster had another apparent consequence. Mrs. Clinton’s criticism of the military intervention in a Paris television interview angered officials of the United Arab Emirates, whose military was also involved in the Bahrain operation and who shared the Saudis’ concern about the Mubarak episode.

    The Emiratis promptly threatened to withdraw from the coalition then being assembled to support a NATO-led strike against Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader. The Emiratis knew they were needed to give the coalition legitimacy. They quickly named their price for staying on board, according to Arab and Western diplomats familiar with the episode: Mrs. Clinton must issue a statement that would pull back from any criticism of the Bahrain operation. 

    The statement, hastily drafted and vetted by Emirati and American officials, appeared soon afterward, in the guise of a communiqué on Libya.

    • Plus généralement, sur les arrangements saoudo-américain (comprenant les EAU qui participèrent à l’invasion de Bahreïn), qui vît les Américains fermer les yeux sur l’invasion de Bahreïn tandis que le couple Qatar-Arabie saoudite se débrouillait pour obtenir l’aval de la Ligue arabe pour une opération en Libye, on peut lire l’étonnant article de Pepe Escobar. Je me permets d’en poster la longue traduction que j’avais faite à l’époque :

      Mis à nu : l’accord américano-saoudien sur la Libye
      par Pepe Escobar / 2 Avril 2011
      Source Asia Times Online
       : http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MD02Ak01.html

      « Vous envahissez Bahreïn. Nous dégageons Mouammar Kadhafi en Libye. » C’est, en résumé, l’essence de l’accord conclu entre l’administration Obama et la Maison des Saoud. Deux sources diplomatiques aux Nations Unies ont confirmé, indépendamment l’une de l’autre, que Washington, via la secrétaire d’Etat Hillary Clinton, avait donné le feu vert à l’Arabie saoudite pour envahir Bahreïn et pour écraser le mouvement pro-démocratie dans leur voisinage, en échange d’un vote « oui » de la Ligue arabe pour une zone d’exclusion aérienne en Libye – la justification principale avancée pour la résolution 1973 au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

      La révélation est venue de deux diplomates différents, un européen et un membre du groupe des BRIC, et a été faite séparément à un universitaire américain et à Asia Times Online. Etant donné le protocole diplomatique, leurs noms ne peuvent être révélés. Un des diplomates disait : « C’est la raison pour laquelle nous ne pouvons pas soutenir la résolution 1973. Nous soutenions que la Libye, Bahreïn et le Yémen étaient des cas similaires, et appelions à une mission d’enquête. Nous maintenons notre position officielle selon laquelle la résolution n’est pas claire, et pourrait être interprétée d’une manière belliciste ».

      Comme Asia Times Online l’avait rapporté, l’approbation complète de la Ligue arabe pour une zone d’exclusion aérienne est un mythe. Sur la totalité des 22 membres, seuls 11 étaient présents au vote. Six d’entre eux étaient membres du Conseil de Coopération du Golfe (C.C.G.), le club des royaumes/émirats soutenus par les USA, parmi lesquels l’Arabie saoudite est le chef de meute. La Syrie et l’Algérie étaient contre. L’Arabie saoudite n’avait plus qu’à « persuader » trois autres membres pour obtenir le vote.

      Traduction : seuls neuf des vingt-deux membres de la Ligue arabe ont voté pour une zone d’exclusion aérienne. Le vote a été essentiellement une opération dirigée par l’Arabie saoudite, avec le secrétaire général de la Ligue arabe Amr Moussa désireux de peaufiner son CV pour Washington, avec l’idée de devenir le prochain président égyptien.

      Ainsi, au début, y avait-il la grande révolte arabe de 2011. Puis, inexorablement, est venue la contre-révolution américano-saoudienne.

      Que les profiteurs se réjouissent

      Les impérialistes humanitaires vont nous parler massivement d’une « conspiration », comme ils nous avaient raconté que le bombardement de la Libye avait empêché un hypothétique massacre à Benghazi. Ils défendront la Maison des Saoud – déclarant qu’elle a agi pour contrer la subversion iranienne dans le Golfe ; manifestement le « devoir de protection des populations » ne s’applique pas au peuple de Bahreïn. Ils vont promouvoir une Libye post-Kadhafi comme nouvelle Mecque – pétrolière – des droits de l’homme, avec en prime l’espionnage américain, les opérations clandestines, les forces spéciales et les affairistes douteux.

      Leurs déclarations ne changeront pas les faits réels sur le terrain – la situation résulte du sale jeu américano-saoudien. Asia Times Online avait déjà démontré à qui profitait une intervention étrangère en Libye (voir l’article « There’s no business like war business », du 30 mars). Les acteurs sont constitués du Pentagone (via l’Africom), de l’OTAN, de l’Arabie saoudite, de Moussa de la Ligue arabe, et du Qatar. En ajout à la liste, la dynastie al-Khalifa du Bahreïn, assortie de marchands d’armes, et de suspects néo-libéraux habituels désireux de privatiser tout ce qui peut l’être dans la nouvelle Libye – même l’eau. Et ne parlons même pas des vautours occidentaux planant au-dessus de l’industrie pétrolière et gazière libyenne.

      S’est révélée, par-dessus tout, l’ahurissante hypocrisie de l’administration Obama, vendant comme une opération humanitaire un grossier coup d’Etat géopolitique concernant l’Afrique du nord et le Golfe persique. Quant au fait d’une nouvelle guerre américaine contre une nation musulmane, il ne s’agirait que d’une « action militaire cinétique ».

      Il y a eu d’intenses spéculations à la fois aux USA et à travers le Moyen-Orient considérant que l’impasse militaire – et l’étroitesse de la « coalition des volontaires » bombardant la famille Kadhafi – pourrait mener Washington, Londres et Paris à se contenter du contrôle sur l’est de la Libye [NdT : la Cyrénaïque] ; une version nord-africaine d’un riche émirat pétrolier du Golfe, en somme. Quant à Kadhafi il aurait été laissé avec une Tripolitaine affamée, nouvelle version de la Corée du Nord.

      Mais si l’on envisage les dernières défections de membres importants du régime, et de plus le désir d’en finir avec ce jeu (« Kadhafi doit partir », selon les propres paroles d’Obama), on voit que Washington, Londres, Paris et Riyad ne se contenteront de rien d’autre que de tout le gâteau. Ceci inclut une base stratégique à la fois pour l’Africom et l’OTAN.

      Rassemblez les suspects inhabituels

      Un aspect des effets du sale accord américano-saoudien est que la Maison Blanche fait tout ce qu’elle peut pour s’assurer que le drame de Bahreïn soit enterré par les médias américains. La nouvelle présentatrice de BBC America, Katty Kay, a eu tout de même la décence de souligner : « ils aimeraient chasser les évènements du Bahreïn de l’actualité car in n’y a pas de réel avantage pour eux à soutenir une rébellion par des chiites ».

      Pour sa part l’émir du Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, est apparu sur al-Jazeera et a déclaré que l’action était nécessaire parce que le peuple libyen était attaqué par Kadhafi. Les journalistes d’al-Jazeera, d’habitude excellents, auraient pu demander poliment à l’émir s’il allait aussi envoyer ses Mirages pour protéger le peuple palestinien d’Israël, ou ses voisins au Bahreïn de l’Arabie saoudite.

      La dynastie al-Khalifa au Bahreïn est un essentiellement un tas de colons sunnites qui ont pris le pouvoir il y a 230 ans. Par la grâce d’un grand accord du XXème siècle, ils devinrent les esclaves serviables de l’empire britannique. Le Bahreïn moderne n’est pas hanté par le spectre d’une poussée de l’Iran ; ceci est un mythe des al-Khalifa (et de la Maison des Saoud).

      Les Bahreïnis, historiquement, ont toujours rejeté l’idée d’être une partie d’une sorte de nation Chiite dirigée par l’Iran. Le mouvement de protestations vient de loin, et fait partie d’un vrai mouvement national – bien au-delà du confessionnalisme sectaire. Pas étonnant que le slogan de l’emblématique Place de la Perle [NdT : à Manama, capitale de Bahreïn] – démoli par l’épouvantable police d’Etat des al-Khalifa – était : « Ni sunnite, ni chiite : bahreïni ».

      Ce que les manifestants voulaient c’était surtout une monarchie constitutionnelle, un parlement légitime, des élections libres et régulières, et la fin de la corruption. A la place ils ont eu le remplacement d’un « Bahreïn des affaires » par un « Bahreïn des balles », et une invasion parrainée par la Maison des Saoud.

      Et la répression continue – invisible dans les grands médias américains. Les utilisateurs de Tweeter hurlent que chacun et son voisin sont en train d’être arrêtés. Selon Nabeel Rajab, président du Centre de Bahreïn pour les Droits de l’Homme, plus de 400 personnes sont soit disparues, soit en détention, certaines d’entre elles « arrêtées à des checkpoints contrôlés par des voyous amenés d’autres pays arabes ou asiatiques – ils portent des masques noirs dans la rue. » Même le blogueur Mahmood al Yousif a été arête à 3 heures du matin, faisant craindre que le même sort ne soit celui de tout bahreïni qui a blogué, tweeté, ou posté sur Facebook des messages en faveur de réformes.

      Le Flic Global est sur la lancée

      “Odyssey Dawn” [NdT : l’intervention américaine en Libye, liée à la résolution 1973] est maintenant finie. Entrez dans le Protecteur Unifié – dirigé par le canadien Charles Bouchard. Traduction : le Pentagone (via l’Africom) se transfère « l’opération militaire cinétique » à lui-même (par le biais de l’OTAN, qui n’est rien d’autre que le Pentagone dirigeant l’Europe). L’Africom et l’OTAN ne sont maintenant plus qu’un.

      Le spectacle de l’OTAN inclura des frappes de missiles aériens et de croisière, un blocus naval de la Libye, et des opérations louches : opérations secrètes au sol d’aide aux « rebelles ». On doit s’attendre à de violents raids d’hélicoptères de combat, comme en Afghanistan-Pakistan, - avec les « dommages collatéraux » conjoints.

      Un curieux développement est déjà visible. L’OTAN permet délibérément aux forces de Kadhafi de progresser le long de la côte méditerranéenne et de repousser les « rebelles ». Il n’y a pas eu là de frappes aériennes chirurgicales depuis un moment.

      L’objectif est probablement de soutirer des concessions aux ex-du régime et aux anciens libyens en exil qui infestent le Conseil National de Transition libyen (C.N.T.) – un casting de personnages douteux parmi lesquels : l’ancien ministre de la Justice Mustafa Abdel Jalil, l’ancien secrétaire à la planification Mahmoud Jibril (éduqué aux USA et ayant vécu en Virginie), et Khalifa Hifter nouveau « commandant militaire » et pion de la CIA. Le Mouvement de la Jeunesse du 17 Février, mouvement indigène digne de louanges – qui a été à la pointe de la révolte à Benghazi – a été complètement mis à l’écart.

      C’est la première guerre africaine de l’OTAN, comme l’Afghanistan a été la première en Asie centrale et du sud. Maintenant fortement configuré pour être le bras militaire de l’ONU, le Flic Global OTAN est sur sa lancée pour mettre en œuvre son « concept stratégique » approuvé au sommet de Lisbonne en novembre dernier (voir l’article « welcome to NATOstan », Asia Times Online, 20 nov. 2010).

      La Libye de Kadhafi doit être éliminée pour que la Méditerranée – le mare nostrum de l’ancienne Rome – Centcom ou aucune autre des myriades de « partenaires » de l’OTAN. Les autres nations africaines non liées à l’OTAN sont l’Erythrée, la République Démocratique Arabe du Sahara [NdT : le Sahara occidental sous administration marocaine], le Soudan et le Zimbabwe.

      Qui plus est, deux membres de “l’Initiative de Coopération d’Istanbul” de l’OTAN – le Qatar et les Emirats Arabes Unis – sont en train de combattre maintenant aux côtés de l’Africom/OTAN pour la première fois. L’Europe ? C’est trop provincial. “Flic Global”, tel est le bon chemin.

      Selon le double langage officiel de l’administration Obama, les dictateurs qui sont admissibles à une « sensibilisation américaine » – comme Bahreïn ou le Yémen – peuvent se détendre et devraient s’en tirer avec presque rien. Pour ceux qui sont admissibles à une « altération du régime », de l’Afrique au Moyen-Orient et à l’Asie, faîtes attention. Le Flic Global OTAN va venir chez vous. Avec ou sans sale accord.

      Pepe Escobar.


  • Democracy Now ! Interview with Islamic Scholar Tariq Ramadan on the Growing Mideast Protests and « Islam & the Arab Awakening »

    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/7352/democracy-now-interview-with-islamic-scholar-tariq

    Tariq Ramadan sur les révolutions arabes, notamment sur Al-Jazira et le silence sur Bahreïn

    AMY GOODMAN: Who are the petro-monarchists? Which countries?

    TARIQ RAMADAN: The petro-monarchies are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, even Bahrain. Bahrain, we had protests in Bahrain, and they were tortured and repression. We don’t cover this. We didn’t cover this. And no one was saying that the government—it was translated into Shia-Sunni clashes. It’s wrong. There is clearly a lack of democracy there. And we need to come with something which is, don’t tell us that Islam in itself is a problem—is exactly what Barack Obama just said yesterday. If they are with us, protecting our interests, we will deal with them; if not, we will struggle.

    AMY GOODMAN: Al Jazeera’s role in covering the Arab world?

    TARIQ RAMADAN: Yes, I’m talking about it in the book, saying it’s quite—it’s quite—we have to look at the way they were dealing with this, pushing in Egypt, pushing In Tunisia, silent in Bahrain, silent in—so, it’s a selective—

    JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And pushing Libya, as well.

    TARIQ RAMADAN: Exactly. Of course, they were, even, you know, sending armies and people. So, all—you know, Jazeera in itself, perceived as a counter, you know, Fox News Channel, has to be also questioned as to the intention. And we know now—you know, the Arabs and the people in the Arab world are very much supportive of Al Jazeera, taking it as a credible source of news. Now it’s much more questioned by the people. When I was in Tunisia, I say, “What do they want exactly? For whom are they running ? What do they want?” And there is something which is connected to the government. So I think that in all this, it’s clear that it played a very positive role in Egypt by pushing the people. But we need to look at political—the whole scene and the whole region to understand that there are much more questions to be asked about what are the intentions from behind—you know, from supporting some uprisings and forgetting others.

    AMY GOODMAN: Like?

    TARIQ RAMADAN: Like Bahrain, for example, as I was saying, and being silent, for example, about what also was happening in Libya, what also is happening in Iraq, and very much nurturing this sense of “be careful, al-Qaeda is there, the terrorists.” You know, it’s also nurturing a mindset. It’s as if, you know, doing the job of “be careful, terrorism is around the corner,” and I think that this is—this is to be questioned.


  • Egypt’s leftist hit back at Brotherhood’s Erian’s anti-left statements - Politics - Egypt - Ahram Online
    http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/50997.aspx

    La gauche en Egypte, notamment celle qui a soutenu la candidature de Morsi au second tour de l’élection présidentielle, condamne les déclarations d’un des conseillers du président

    #Egypte #Frères #gauche


  • Frantz Fanon and the Arab Uprisings: An Interview with Nigel Gibson
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6927/frantz-fanon-and-the-arab-uprisings_an-interview-w

    The Martiniquan intellectual was skeptical of revolutions from above, as was the case with several anti-colonialist movements in the Arab World. Interestingly, while the Arabic translation of the The Wretched of the Earth came out shortly after its publication in French, it omitted many passages because they were critical of the national bourgeoisie. Fifty years later, Fanon is almost absent in public discourses in the Middle East and is still marginal in the Maghreb. The uprisings should have been an excellent opportunity for Arab intellectuals and activists to engage with Fanon’s work on the revolution and the subaltern in the new conjuncture. However, despite the significance of his political philosophy for the current revolts, his books are either out of print or conspicuously absent from many bookstores in the Arab world.


  • Workers politics and the elite politics of “Mahmoud Bey” - Opinion - Ahram Online
    http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/48512.aspx

    Striking workers have two characteristics which make them the true embryo of the political vanguard of our revolution: they unequivocally, without middlemen or pretence,represent the majority and its interests, and are effectively organisingthemselves in the political realm, the world of conflicting interests, as the largest homogenous popular force determined to continue the revolution until itaccomplishes its goals.

    L’avenir du pouvoir et du futur gouvernement dépendra de leur réponse aux revendications ouvrières. Les ouvriers qui ont joué un rôle important dans la révolution semblent se mobiliser à nouveau, comme le confirme aussi cet article paru dans le Washington Post "Egyptian textile strikes highlight economic challenges facing Morsi" (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egyptian-textile-strikes-highlight-economic-challenges-facing-morsi/2012/07/22/gJQALJO12W_story.html)

    Nevertheless, Khaled Ali, a lawyer, activist and failed candidate in the presidential election, warned that his former opponent needed to act swiftly to address the workers’ grievances, as well as meet the nation’s wider expectations.

    “People were anticipating so much from the first 100 days of Morsi, but if he continues like this, if this struggle with the army goes on, I don’t think people will be calm and stable,” he said, after meeting with the striking workers in Mahalla. “These protests are going to consolidate against him, and he will be in a very bad situation.”


  • In Translation : The Revolutionary Youth Coalition’s final report - Blog - The Arabist
    http://www.arabist.net/blog/2012/7/18/in-translation-the-revolutionary-youth-coalitions-final-repo.html

    Il est rare qu’un groupement politique dresse le bilan de son action durant une période révolutionnaire. La coalition des jeunes révolutionnaire (Egypte) l’a fait dans un rapport détaillé.

    @arabist en a fait la traduction en anglais

    On notera, entre autres, l’autocritique concernant la non participation aux élections parlementaires

    Differences in opinion arose over elections. Specifically, some from within the Coalition called for boycotting the elections, which resulted in some of the youth abstaining from running the elections and others from participating at all. In general, participation in parliamentary elections was not ideal, insofar as the Coalition at the time was not able to enter the elections as a group. Some of its members preferred to enter the elections on the Egyptian Bloc list, and some others on the Revolution Continues Alliance list; some entered the elections running for independent seats. This was not conducive to creating a situation whereby everyone that might have been nominated for the list of a single electoral alliance could have run in the elections.

    #Egypte


  • La montée du mouvement ouvrier en Egypte

    The Rise of Egypt’s Workers - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
    http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/28/rise-of-egypt-s-workers/coh8

    The underrepresentation of workers in the first post-Mubarak parliament reflected the broader phenomenon that the forces who worked longest and hardest to overthrow Mubarak did not reap commensurate political rewards.

    Les ouvriers ont joué un rôle majeur dans le renversement de Hosni Moubarak (

    Racines ouvrières du soulèvement égyptien

    , in Le Monde diplomatique , mars 2011), mais il leur reste un long chemin à parcourir. Les grèves en cours, notamment à Mehallah el Kobrah en sont la preuve.

    Voir aussi

    L’Egypte en révolution

    in Le Monde diplomatique de juillet 2011
    http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2011/07/GRESH/20759