Les conclusions du juge Bate dans le cadre de la plainte de Nasser Al-Aulaqi, père de #Anwar_Al-Aulaqi, contre Barack Obama, Robert Gates et Leon Panetta :
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Al-Aulaqi-Decision-Granting-Motion-to-Dismiss-120710.pdf
On August 30, 2010, plaintiff Nasser Al-Aulaqi (“plaintiff”) filed this action, claiming that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA (collectively, “defendants”) have unlawfully authorized the targeted killing of plaintiff’s son, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen currently hiding in Yemen who has alleged ties to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”). Plaintiff seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from intentionally killing Anwar Al-Aulaqi “unless he presents a concrete, specific, and imminent threat to life or physical safety, and there are no means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize the threat.”
Procès carrément étonnant.
Stark, and perplexing, questions readily come to mind, including the following: How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death? Can a U.S. citizen — himself or through another — use the U.S. judicial system to vindicate his constitutional rights while simultaneously evading U.S. law enforcement authorities, calling for “jihad against the West,” and engaging in operational planning for an organization that has already carried out numerous terrorist attacks against the United States? Can the Executive order the assassination of a U.S. citizen without first affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever, based on the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of a terrorist organization? How can the courts, as plaintiff proposes, make real-time assessments of the nature and severity of alleged threats to national security, determine the imminence of those threats, weigh the benefits and costs of possible diplomatic and military responses, and ultimately decide whether, and under what circumstances, the use of military force against such threats is justified? When would it ever make sense for the United States to disclose in advance to the “target” of contemplated military action the precise standards under which it will take that military action? And how does the evolving AQAP relate to core al Qaeda for purposes of assessing the legality of targeting AQAP (or its principals) under the September 18, 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force?
