person:zeev elkin

إسرائيل تعطل مشروعا ألمانياً لإنشاء مكب نفايات في الضفة الغربية .. بعد رفض الحكومة الألمانية للشرط الإسرائيلي بان تستخدمه المستوطنات لان المشروع مخصص للدول النامية وليس المتقدمة | رأي اليوم
▻https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/%d8%a5%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a6%d9%8a%d9%84-%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%b7%d9%84-%d9%8

Israël bloque un projet allemand pour la création d’une décharge en Cisjordanie après que le refus par les autorités allemandes qu’elle soit utilisée également par les colonies car le projet est réservé aux pays en voie de développement.

#israël #palestine

Putin’s Syrian dilemma: Back Israel or Iran?

All of the Russian president’s achievements in Syria could come crashing down unless he answers this one fundamental question

Anshel Pfeffer Feb 19, 2018

Russian President Vladimir Putin thought he could succeed where the U.S.’s then-President Barack Obama failed. Pacify Syria, rescue the regime of his client, President Bashar Assad, and balance the conflicting interests of Iran and Israel in the war-torn country. All this he did with a relatively small investment: the deployment of a couple of dozen aircraft and 2,000 men. As foreign campaigns go, it was power projection on the cheap. The United States on a similar mission would have used a force 10 times the size – aircraft carrier groups and hundreds of fighter jets, aerial tankers and electronic warfare planes. Not to mention boots on the ground.
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But Russia could pull it off thanks to the cannon fodder supplied by Iran. Tens of thousands of Shi’ite mercenaries, mainly refugees from Afghanistan, propped up Assad’s failing battalions. Hezbollah fighters came from Lebanon to carry out the more difficult operations. Russia made do with small teams of special-force troops and, where more muscle was needed, its own mercenaries.
It was a relatively small investment with few casualties and not, as some predicted two years ago, a rerun of the Soviet Union’s disastrous occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

President Vladimir Putin addressing Russian troops at Hemeimeem air base during a surprise visit to Damascus, December 12, 2017.Mikhail Klimentyev/AP
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>> Iran and the Assad regime are drawing a line in Syria’s skies | Analysis <<

With perfect timing, and taking advantage of the vacuum left by Obama’s decision not to get involved in Syria, Putin had put Russia back on the geopolitical map. He made a surprise visit to Damascus in December to declare: Mission accomplished. He should have learned from former U.S. President George W. Bush never to say that – because now everything is starting to fall apart for the Russians.

A serviceman holds a portrait of Russian air force pilot Roman Fillipov, who was killed after his aircraft was shot down over rebel-held territory in Syria, February 8, 2018.\ HANDOUT/ REUTERS
There was last month’s Sochi conference, where attempts to agree a political process for Syria’s future under Assad, with the usual farce of elections, failed even before the delegates arrived. Turkey has launched a large-scale incursion into northwestern Syria, in an attempt to prevent Kurdish YPG (People’s Protection Units) forces from establishing a military presence on its border. Meanwhile, the Turks are clashing with the Iranians as well, and as of Monday with regime forces too.
Much more worrying for Russia is that in the east of the country, another Kurdish force – the Syrian Democratic Forces, which also includes Arab, Turkmen, Assyrian and Armenian forces – is widening its control of areas once held by the Islamic State. The SDF is now the only player in Syria with U.S. military support: During a clash 10 days ago between the SDF and regime forces working together with Russian mercenaries, the United States launched a devastating airstrike. The Kremlin still won’t acknowledge any casualties, but unofficial reports from Russia claim that as many as 200 Russian mercenaries died.
And then last week there was the first direct confrontation between Israel and Iran.
The Turkish front is less concerning for Putin, since it doesn’t directly threaten Russia’s main interests. The clashes in the northeast are a much larger problem as they are sending coffins back home to Russia – the last thing Putin needs before the presidential election in mid-March.
For now at least, the Israeli-Iranian front may not directly put Russian personnel in the line of fire. But it is a much greater threat to the Assad regime itself. Damascus is close to the Israeli border and Assad, with Iranian encouragement, is trying to assert himself by firing anti-aircraft missiles at Israel Air Force planes.
>> Delve deeper into the week’s news: Sign up to Chemi Shalev’s weekly roundup
For the past two and a half years, the deal between Jerusalem and Moscow was simple: Israel allowed Russia to resupply Assad’s army and help the regime – through aerial bombardments of rebel-held areas, indiscriminately killing thousands of civilians – to retake large swaths of territory. Russia, meanwhile, turned a blind eye as Israel continued its periodic attacks on convoys and depots of Iranian-supplied weapons destined for Hezbollah. Russia collaborated with Iran in reviving the regime, while not intervening when Israel struck at Iran’s proxies.
When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that Russia prevent Iran’s forces from building permanent bases on Syrian soil, Putin tried to strike a compromise. Iran continued entrenching its Shi’ite militias, but at the same time didn’t come too close to the Israeli border or begin building large bases.

Israeli soldiers in the northern Golan Heights after an Iranian drone penetrated Israeli airspace and was shot done, February 10, 2018.Gil Eliahu
That balance can no longer hold. The decision by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to send a drone into Israeli airspace in the early hours of Saturday February 10, followed by Israel’s retaliation against the Iranian command unit that launched the drone and the ensuing air battle between Israeli fighter jets and Syrian air defense batteries, was proof that Russia can no longer contain the interests of all the different sides within Syria.
Putin has utilized “hybrid warfare” – a combination of military power, deniable proxies and cyberattacks – to destabilize neighboring countries like Georgia and Ukraine, which tried to get too close to the West. Relatively small investments for major gain.
But just like Russian interference with the U.S. presidential election, where the Kremlin wanted only to undermine America’s democratic process but never actually believed it could help get Donald Trump elected, he may have gone too deep. What was supposed to be an exercise in troublemaking is, despite Trump’s reluctance, now a full-blown confrontation with the U.S. intelligence services.
Managing a multitrack Middle East policy and engaging simultaneously with all of the regional players takes time, resources and, especially, experience. Until recently, the United States had the combination of seasoned diplomats, military and intelligence officers – with extensive contacts and time spent in the region – to maintain such a complex operation.
Under President Trump, many of these professionals have left the administration, and there is no clear sense of direction from the White House for those remaining. But the lack of any real U.S. presence or policy doesn’t mean someone else can just come along and take over its traditional role.
It’s not just that the Kremlin doesn’t have anything resembling this kind of network. Putin’s centralized way of doing business means that every decision goes through him in Moscow. This isn’t helping Russia keep a handle on evolving events on the ground, but it is an advantage for Netanyahu – who is currently the regional player with the best personal relationship with Putin.
There are currently two schools of thought within the Israeli intelligence community. The skeptics believe Putin will not give up on his Shi’ite boots on the ground and will ultimately limit Israel’s freedom to operate in the skies above Syria – pushing Israel to make a difficult choice between sitting on the sidelines while Iran and Hezbollah build up their outposts or confronting Russia as well. The optimists believe Putin knows Israel has the power to jeopardize its achievements and threaten the Assad regime, and will therefore rein in the Iranians.
Netanyahu’s team has been working closely with the Russian president for years, and the two leaders speak regularly on the phone and meet every few months. When they’re on their own, with just fellow Likud lawmaker Zeev Elkin to interpret, does Netanyahu openly threaten to destabilize the Assad regime? Probably not. The implied threat is enough.
Putin will have to make the call on Israel or Iran soon – or risk losing all he has invested in Syria.

Israeli minister to push plan aimed at reducing number of Arabs in Jerusalem - Israel News - Haaretz.com
▻https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.819566
▻https://www.haaretz.com/polopoly_fs/1.819564.1509218424!/image/685357042.PNG_gen/derivatives/size_1496xAuto/685357042.PNG

https://www.haaretz.com/polopoly_fs/1.819568.1509219803!/image/1545489831.jpg_gen/derivatives/headline_1200x630/1545489831.jpg

#Jerusalem Affairs Minister Zeev Elkin has unveiled his proposal for the municipal division of Jerusalem, which would see several Arab neighborhoods beyond the West Bank separation barrier split off from the Jerusalem municipality and be placed under the jurisdiction of one or more new council administrations.

#colonisation #israël #palestine #confiscation #dépossession

Israël envisage de boycotter l’Europe (sic) ...

▻http://www.lecourrier.ch/113361/israel_envisage_de_boycotter_l_europe_sic

Et voila que le vice-ministre israélien des Affaires étrangères Zeev Elkin annonce qu’Israël ne participera pas au projet de coopération scientifique « Horizon 2010 », que l’Europe a mis en place et auquel les centres de recherche israéliens ont été conviés. Pour le gouvernement d’extrême droite, il était important de réagir fermement à la récente décision européenne de boycotter (très partiellement, cela dit) les colonies juives en Cisjordanie

[...]

Selon Benjamin Netanyahou, ce n’était pas à l’Europe de définir les frontières d’Israël (sic). Le premier ministre a déclaré qu’il s’opposerait à tout accord avec l’Union européenne qui inclurait un « article territorial » établissant une distinction entre Israël et les colonies.

[...]

La décision de rompre une part des relations avec l’Union européenne peut faire sourire : Israël a bien plus besoin de l’Europe que le contraire, et plusieurs diplomates postés à Jérusalem ont réagi en déclarant, certes loin des micros, « chiche ! »

[...]

les présidents ont mis en garde le ministre des implications catastrophiques de suspendre la coopération israélo-européenne dans le cadre de la recherche : « le vice-ministre a été surpris par les données présentées par les présidents et par le volume des pertes financières, au cas où les accords de coopération seraient rompus. »

Pauvre Elkin, qui croyait que c’était la recherche scientifique européenne qui s’écroulerait si Israël décidait de la boycotter !

[...]

cet incident en dit long sur l’arrogante stupidité et l’aveuglement d’un gouvernement d’extrême droite qui accentue de jour en jour l’isolement international de l’Etat hébreu.

#Michel_Warschawski #israël #extrême-droite #colonisation #occupation

Colonies israéliennes : Israël souhaite « mener un dialogue créatif » avec l’UE - Monde - tdg.ch
▻http://www.tdg.ch/monde/Israel-souhaite-mener-un-dialogue-creatif-avec-l-UE-/story/13733337

Prêt à un « dialogue créatif »

Vendredi, le vice-ministre israélien des Affaires étrangères, Zeev Elkin, a néanmoins adopté un ton plus diplomatique. Il a proposé de « mener un dialogue créatif » avec les Européens sur les restrictions décidées par Bruxelles, qui remettent selon lui en cause la souveraineté israélienne.

« Nous comprenons leur position. Nous la rejetons, nous ne l’apprécions pas, mais ils sont dans leur droit en ce qui concerne l’usage de leur argent », a-t-il dit à la radio publique israélienne.

Israël/ Palestine: un Etat ? Deux Etats ?

La chaîne israélienne Channel 2 aborde une question qui n’est pas neuve : la solution des deux Etats, réactivée par le processus d’Oslo il y a une vingtaine d’années, est-elle encore applicable ? L’Etat unique, binational, où cohabiteraient Israéliens et Palestiniens, juifs et musulmans, n’est-elle pas la solution qui finira par s’imposer par lassitude, par manque d’imagination, de confiance ou de courage, à cause de la colonisation des territoires palestiniens qui rend impossible la viabilité d’un futur Etat palestinien, etc ? Ce qui ressort des entretiens préparés par Channel 2 est l’incrédulité générale des personnes interrogées. En Israël à droite comme à gauche, on n’est sûr que d’une chose : il n’y aura pas deux Etats indépendants. Ce processus est voué à l’échec. « Il se peut que le train ait déjà quitté la gare », comme l’indique l’ancien ministre de gauche Yossi Sarid.

Ces entretiens sont programmés au moment où les Etats unis tentent de relancer des négociations qui justement doivent conduire à créer « deux Etats, Israël et Palestine, vivant côte à côte et en sécurité ».

Thursday, June 6, 2013
By Dahlia Scheindlin
|Published June 3, 2013

Israel’s mainstream Channel 2 starts to question the two-state solution

▻http://972mag.com/israels-mainstream-channel-2-starts-to-question-the-two-state-solution/72627

What does it mean when the Israeli mainstream elite questions the two-state solution, which up until now has enjoyed practically unquestioned stature in Israeli society? An analysis.
Israel’s Channel 2 aired a lengthy item (starting around 30 minutes in) on Friday evening, asking a shocking question: Is the two-state solution still viable? This question is already a cliché among various shades of the Left. It started some years ago when desperate two-state activists hoped the Israeli public could be frightened by the encroaching concept of one state, to get a move-on with two-state negotiations. When that didn’t happen, a more heated debate took root, about whether to abandon the attachment to the two-state concept altogether in light of changing reality on the ground, and consider other models — usually some form of confederation. Neither of those angles has managed to generate urgency among either the complacent Israeli public (complacent at least when it comes to the conflict), or within the general public discourse.
Then along comes Danny Kushmaro, the much-loved anchor of high-rated Friday night prime time news, on Channel 2 — the highest rated television station. The fact that the question was targeted in such a precise manner, and asked with little hint of political bias to the left or the right by an absolutely mainstream presenter represents a surprising level of attention devoted to a topic that so many prefer to avoid. It might be too much to consider this a breakthrough – but it does mean that the question is no longer a marginal argument within an isolated Left, talking to itself.
Kushmaro consulted with figures on both the Left and the Right, including Yossi Sarid, Meron Benvenisti and Zeev Elkin (Likud Beitenu, deputy foreign minister). It is particularly poignant to see Sarid, former Meretz granddad, former education minister and highly associated with the two-state camp, say how skeptical he is becoming about whether it is realistic anymore. “It could be,” he says, with obvious discomfort, “that the train has already left.”
Kushmaro then ventured to the other side. Veteran Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki explained that even though Palestinians still pay lip service to the two-state concept, they are increasingly convinced it will never happen. That’s because, “no one wants it, but it is the reality. We, Israelis and Palestinians live in a one-state reality.”

The item explains that Palestinians are airing ideas like this more and more, “even those who were once two-state figureheads.” These include Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei), the former Palestinian prime minister who was associated with the Oslo process. The latter is shown talking about the failure of the two-state solution and saying, “there will be no alternative but one state. No alternative.”
“The world is closing in on us,” says a Palestinian man in a bright pink polo shirt on the street. “If we have the same rights, the same life and equality, so why not?” It is not clear whether he means the same rights he has today, or the same Israelis enjoy – I believe he probably meant the latter. Another man says that given the predicted failure of any future negotiations, “we’ll ask [to be ruled by] Israel. It’s easier for us. If Israel will rule, it will be easier for us in this situation.”

Maybe Palestinians have tasted democracy enough to become convinced that what the PA is offering them, never mind Hamas, is unsalvageable as a foundation for democratic government. Israeli racism? It’s better than Israeli occupation, and they probably feel can live with it as long as there are democratic foundations to demand better. Maybe for them, Israeli rule cannot possibly make their status quo worse, but at least it offers the possibility of something many of them simply lack: citizenship. Somewhere.
Tzipi Livni is presented as the lone two-state warrior fighting against a wall (so to speak) of cynical politicians in her government. She states that she is convinced Netanyahu wants negotiations to end the conflict. I’m not.

Zeev Elkin meanwhile was cagey, musing that no one can predict the future. Meron Benvenisti – a left winger – is convinced that two states will never happen.

Perhaps the most surprising moment involves the closing lines. Kushmaro who, remember, is a mainstay of mainstream Israel, ends thus: Maybe it really is time to think of alternate approaches, if there are any. Maybe we really are heading towards a bi-national state. [Although] maybe after some apocalyptic event, Gog and Magog, it will happen, there will be two states here. But today, with continued construction in the territories, with the current Israeli leadership and most of the Palestinian leadership – to their dismay or maybe to their joy – the two-state story seems more complicated, not realistic and is becoming almost impossible [sounds of drilling and images of construction in the background] – with every passing day.
Correction appended: the original version referred to Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei) as a former President of the PA – he was prime minister.

http://s1.lemde.fr/image/2013/05/03/534x0/3170730_6_fa04_pour-justifier-ce-changement-semantique-google_a0815dfc87d691952dbd51c5686ab9e2.jpg

Google remplace les « Territoires palestiniens » par la « Palestine »
▻http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/05/03/pour-google-il-y-a-la-palestine-mais-plus-de-territoires-palestiniens_317066

Depuis le mercredi 1er mai, Google a remplacé la mention « Territoires palestiniens » par « Palestine » sur sa page palestinienne, ce qui n’a pas manqué d’agacer les autorités israéliennes.

 Une carte du ministère du Tourisme israélien annexe plus de 60 % de la Cisjordanie article
►http://www.info-palestine.eu/spip.php?article13041
Jonathan Cook

Israël se prépare-t-il à annexer la Zone C, comme l’ont récemment estimé des analystes, et de plus en plus nombreux ?

La réponse m’est donnée lorsque, lors d’une visite à l’office du Tourisme d’Israël à Nazareth, cette semaine, je tombe sur une brochure officielle, « Vos prochaines vacances : Israël ». La brochure est distribuée aux agences de voyage à travers le monde de même qu’aux centaines de milliers de touristes qui arrivent en Israël chaque année.

Sur la carte, établie par le ministère du Tourisme, on voit à la fois Israël et les territoires occupés. Obligeamment, elle reprend l’interprétation d’Israël sur les démarcations territoriales stipulées par les Accords d’Oslo au milieu des années quatre-vingt-dix.

Oslo a divisé la Cisjordanie en trois parties à titre temporaire - pour une période de cinq années -, Israël et les Palestiniens étant censés négocier un accord pour un statut final qui, ce qui était largement admis, conduirait à la création d’un État palestinien en Cisjordanie, Gaza et Jérusalem-Est.
(...)
En outre, ce que les Accords d’Oslo admettaient n’être qu’un contrôle temporaire d’Israël sur la Zone C est devenu en réalité un contrôle permanent – un point que la Cour suprême israélienne a récemment reconnu comme une « occupation prolongée » de la Cisjordanie.

Ce que tout cela signifie, c’est que la question de savoir si Israël va annexer la Zone C est largement théorique. L’annexion a déjà eu lieu, mais pas officiellement. L’avantage de cette méthode discrète d’annexion – ce que le général israélien Moshe Dayan qualifiait autrefois d’ « annexion rampante » - est qu’Israël ne subit aucune pression pour conférer la citoyenneté aux quelques Palestiniens restés en Zone C.

La carte de la brochure nous donne une illustration utile de la pensée israélienne. Elle a été établie par le ministère du Tourisme en 2007, avant que l’actuel gouvernement de droite de Benjamin Netanyahu n’arrive au pouvoir avec dans sa plate-forme, le projet de déchirer les Accords d’Oslo. 2007 était le temps du gouvernement d’Ehud Olmert qui s’était engagé à arriver à un accord avec les Palestiniens sur la base d’une solution à deux États.

La carte nous indique clairement comment les prétendus artisans de la paix israéliens eux-mêmes envisageaient l’avenir des Palestiniens.

http://www.info-palestine.eu/IMG/jpg/map-web.jpg