product:su-24

  • Turkey detains alleged killer of Russian pilot downed over Syria border — RT News
    https://www.rt.com/news/337904-turkey-russian-pilot-killer

    Turkish ultranationalist Alparslan Celik, who bragged about killing the pilot of a Russian Su-24 bomber downed by the Turkish Air Force on the Syrian border last November, has been arrested in his home country.
    Celik was detained on Wednesday evening while he was dining at a restaurant in the city of Izmir in western Turkey, the Hurriyet newspaper reported.

    The reasons for the arrest of the radical weren’t disclosed.

    Celik was arrested along with 13 other people, according to the paper.
    […]
    Celik is a Turkish citizen, the son of a former district mayor elected from Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and a member of the party’s unofficial youth military arm, Bozkurtlar.

    Moscow demanded that Ankara arrest Celik and try him for the killing of the Russian pilot, and for being a member of an unlawful armed group.
    However, Turkey ignored the demand and the ultranationalist has continued to give interviews and travel freely in Turkey and across the border into Syria.

  • A lire cet article sur le site du WINEP, ce genre de think tank où quand dans une phrase pour évoquer le gouvernement israélien on utilise la métonymie « Jérusalem » plutôt que « Tel Aviv ». Reste que l’article évoque la question épineuse de la coordination russo-israélienne en Syrie et l’ambiguïté de l’accord dont la forme (tacite ou plus formalisé) ou le contenu ne sont pas encore bien connus. Pour l’instant la Russie tolère des opérations israéliennes en Syrie et Israël n’a pas réagi au viol de son espace aérien par la chasse russe, la confrontation n’étant dans l’intérêt d’aucun des deux mais cela pourrait changer sous la pression des évènements, s’alarme l’auteur qui imagine des scénarios pouvant amener à des incidents dangereux :
    Israeli-Russian Coordination in Syria : So Far So Good ?
    http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/israeli-russian-coordination-in-syria-so-far-so-good
    Extrait :

    In the longer term, two main trends will challenge Israeli-Russian coordination. The first is Iran and Hezbollah’s objective to expand their presence in the Golan Heights. In mid-October, Hezbollah and Syrian forces pushed back rebels in Quneitra and regained control over a number of important military posts. Since then, the Assad regime and its partners have intensified their operations in the south, taking more ground with the help of Russian airstrikes. Although the scope of these airstrikes is still small compared to operations in northern and central Syria, any expansion of Hezbollah and Iranian proxies in Quneitra or western Deraa province would be considered a threat to Israel. And if Russia facilitates such advancement with its airpower, Jerusalem’s ability to react will be more limited (see Policy Watch 2514, “Russia in Southern Syria: Israeli and Jordanian Concerns”).

    Another trend often belittled by Israeli policymakers is Russia’s deepening relations with Hezbollah and Iran. The intervention’s unremarkable results thus far have shown Moscow that the air campaign has its limits without a capable ground force. In that regard, Hezbollah and Iranian forces have proven to be instrumental on some fronts, with both reportedly helping to recover one of the downed pilots after the Su-24 shootdown. Such operations will bring the Russian coalition members closer together, and as the fighting continues, Moscow might discover that its relations with Hezbollah and Iran outweigh its silent agreement to allow Israeli airstrikes against them. In that scenario, Israeli pilots would quite suddenly find themselves under threat from sophisticated Russian air defenses.

    • Les frappes israéliennes récentes (depuis l’implication militaire directe des Russes) en Syrie contre le Hezbollah et l’armée syrienne sont par ailleurs considérées comme établies par l’auteur :

      Last month saw numerous reports about Israeli airstrikes in Syria targeting Hezbollah arms transfers to Lebanon. These included an alleged October 30 attack on a ballistic missile facility near al-Qutayfah run by the Syrian army’s 155th Brigade (the so-called “Scud brigade”), as well as a November 11 strike against a target close to Damascus International Airport. Similarly, opposition and pro-regime sources reported Israeli strikes on the night of November 23 that killed eight Hezbollah fighters and five Syrian soldiers in the Qalamoun area.

      Although Syrian media reports of Israeli strikes should generally be taken with a grain of salt, several factors indicate that they could be accurate in this case. In addition to the exceptionally large number of such reports in recent weeks, other sources have noted a recent increase in arms shipments from Iran to Hezbollah. Moreover, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has confirmed twice in the past month that Israel is operating across the border. On December 1 he stated, “We operate in Syria from time to time to prevent it turning into another front against us. We act, of course, to prevent the transfer of deadly weaponry from Syria to Lebanon.”

    • La conclusion est une série de recommandations aux autorités israéliennes qui consistent à tenter de maintenir et d’accentuer la coopération avec la Russie tout en balançant cela par une communication militaire plus intense avec les USA si jamais des tensions avec la Russie risquaient de limiter la liberté de manœuvre militaire israélienne en Syrie :

      Planning for the long term, Israel should maintain close contact with its American partner on these issues. If Moscow eventually decides to stop looking the other way when Israel operates in Syria, Jerusalem may face some tough choices. Accordingly, it is crucial to keep updating Washington in case of any change in relations with Russia, since Israel would need the United States to convey to Moscow the same redlines that Israel has laid out — namely, preventing Iran and Hezbollah from opening a new front in the Golan, and preventing the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah. U.S. support on these issues might convince the Russians to keep tolerating Israeli strikes on Hezbollah.

      Finally, it is worth noting that Israel’s communication with the Kremlin since the intervention began is only a tactical coordination, not a strategic realignment. Although Russia seems to be respecting Israel’s redlines in Syria, this is not because Moscow sees Jerusalem as an indispensable ally, but rather because Israel’s actions in Syria have not interfered with Moscow’s plans as of yet. Many Israeli officials no doubt hope that the situation will remain as it is, but they also realize that Russia and Israel are not equal partners. The minute that Israel’s actions interfere with Russian interests, its relative freedom of operation will diminish significantly.

  • What Is Russia Bombing in Syria? - Syria in Crisis - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
    http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=61493

    Syrian dissidents now rush to blame Putin for every airstrike in the country, but evidence is often lacking. Identifying which specific attacks can be attributed to Russian pilots is made more difficult by the fact that Assad’s air force operates in the same airspace, aided by Russian reconnaissance. While Putin has upheld at least some pretense of distinguishing the radical jihadis from other insurgent factions, Assad makes no distinction at all among the armed groups opposing him.

    It is hard to tell a Syrian strike from a Russian strike, not least because both nations use similar or even identical equipment. Russian-made jets and helicopters, including Su-24 fighter-bombers and Mi-24 helicopters, have been deployed in Syrian skies by both Assad and Putin. But the Russian expeditionary force also includes more advanced Sukhoi models (Su-25, Su-30, and Su-34), which are not known to be in Assad’s inventory. So if these planes were used in a particular airstrike, chances are they were Russian-piloted.

  • Russian jet’s passes near U.S. ship in Black Sea ’provocative’ : Pentagon | Reuters
    http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/14/us-usa-russia-blacksea-idUSBREA3D15Q20140414

    A Russian fighter aircraft made repeated low-altitude, close-range passes near a U.S. ship in the Black Sea over the weekend, the Pentagon said on Monday, condemning the action at a time of heightened U.S.-Russian tensions over Ukraine.

    “This provocative and unprofessional Russian action is inconsistent with their national protocols and previous agreements on the professional interaction between our militaries,” said Colonel Steve Warren, a Pentagon spokesman.

    Warren said a Russian Su-24 aircraft, or Fencer, made 12 passes at low altitude near the USS Donald Cook, a destroyer that has been in the Black Sea since April 10. It appeared to be unarmed, he told reporters.

    The incident lasted 90 minutes and took place on Saturday evening while the U.S. ship was conducting a patrol in international waters in the western Black Sea, Warren said. The ship is now in a Romanian port.