publishedmedium:the american interest

  • Trump Fast Tracks Saudi Arms Sales - The American Interest
    https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/07/trump-fast-tracks-saudi-arms-sales

    Some of the reported arms packages are new, like a deal to deploy the THAAD missile defense system in Saudi Arabia; others look to be fulfillments of contracts that were stalled or suspended under the Obama administration. But the particulars of the deals are less significant than the symbolism.

    Trump’s first foreign trip as president will be to Saudi Arabia, before he heads on to Israel. By expediting these sales ahead of the Saudi summit, the administration is making a clear statement of its priorities in the Middle East—and sending a signal to Iran. After years of estrangement from the Obama administration, Secretary Mattis has been looking for early ways to shore up lost credibility with our Gulf allies. This is a high-profile way to do just that, and the message will not be lost in Tehran.

    #Etats-Unis #Arabie_saoudite #Iran

  • A Snag in China’s “String of Pearls” Strategy - The American Interest
    http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/01/09/a-snag-in-chinas-string-of-pearls-strategy

    The race came down to the wire, but today Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa conceded to Maithripala Sirisena. It marks the end of a decade of Rajapaksa’s rule, under which Sri Lanka grew increasingly close with China. Bloomberg reports:

    The [election] result, considered improbable just two months ago, risks disrupting President Xi Jinping’s moves to increase China’s presence in the Indian Ocean. China has invested heavily in Sri Lanka over the past decade and supported Rajapaksa in the face of U.S.-led inquiries into human rights abuses allegedly committed during the end of a 26-year civil war. […]

    Under Rajapaksa, China became the island’s top investor, biggest government lender and second-biggest trading partner. Xi visited Sri Lanka last year to promote his so-called Silk Road trade route rejuvenation project, which is backed by a $40 billion infrastructure fund and includes a maritime route encompassing the island.

    That’s because Colombo was key to his “string of pearls” strategy, a plan to establish a series of friendly ports and bases that enabled Beijing to project naval power farther afield and to ensure fast and safe sea trade across the Indian Ocean region. Now that plan may have met a setback:

    [New President] Sirisena, who deserted Rajapaksa in November to lead the opposition bloc, has promised to establish “equal relations” between China, India, Pakistan and Japan.

    “China certainly will not have the uncritical support of the Sri Lankan government that it had under Rajapaksa,” said Jehan Perera, executive director of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, a group that promotes ethnic reconciliation.

    China certainly won’t give up on Sri Lanka and walk away from its investments, but this could be a serious loss for Beijing’s strategy. Like a chain, a string of pearls is only as strong as its weakest link.

    Fin 2013, une première escale de sous-marin chinois, deux autres en 2014, des rumeurs de base navale…

    Chinese Submarines and Indian ASW in the Indian Ocean / ISN
    http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=186083

    How to deal with Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean has become a practical question for India. In December 2013, China let it be known that one of its nuclear attack submarines would sail through the Indian Ocean over the following two months. It was the first time that China confirmed such a transit. At the time, many thought it would be a relatively rare occurrence. But over the last couple of months, two more submarines appear to have made similar transits, after they were spotted making five-day long port calls in Sri Lanka.
    (…)
    Either way, the two port calls suggested that China might send more submarines (and with greater frequency) into the Indian Ocean in the future. Naturally, that has heightened Indian concerns about Chinese power in the region. But even more troubling to India was Sri Lanka’s readiness to welcome those submarines, in spite of Indian reservations. After the first port call, New Delhi expressed to Colombo its concerns about such submarines visiting Sri Lankan ports. Colombo dismissed India’s qualms, contending that Chinese submarines were no different than the other 230 foreign warships that visited Sri Lanka this year. Many Indian observers saw the rebuff as a sign that Sri Lanka had decided to cozy up to China. A few even argued that Sri Lanka had violated the 1987 peace accord between it and India in which Colombo agreed that its ports would “not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests.

    En plus, c’est pour la bonne cause, puisque les sous-marins chinois viennent contribuer à la lutte anti-piraterie dans l’Océan Indien…

  • The Much-Too-Special Relationship - The American Interest
    http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/19/the-much-too-special-relationship

    Some of you Americans may think your financial centre has captured key domains of the policymaking apparatus in Washington—and you’d be right—but in a large, complex democracy it has not and cannot capture many others. We Brits have just over 60 million people, a far smaller democratic counterweight, and banking assets equivalent to over 400 percent of GDP, which is a multiple of the figure for the United States. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney recently crooned over the prospect that, on current growth rates, this might rise to 900 percent by 2050.

    Thus, hard though it may be to believe, the City’s political capture of Britain is deeper and more encompassing than anything that could ever be tolerated on the American side of the pond. Indeed, the #City of London’s “capture” of Britain goes far deeper than so far suggested.