region:north caucasus

  • What did Tillerson’s Russia trip achieve?

    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/04/tillerson-lavrov-russia-meeting.html

    ❝Moscow also seized the moment of direct contact with the top US diplomat to clarify its own positions. On Syria, the departure of President Bashar al-Assad was and remains a non-starter for Russia. What neither Lavrov nor Putin would probably say to Tillerson, but do expect him to understand, is that Russia has invested so much into Syria now, politically and militarily, that Moscow’s primary concern is less about Assad than about the principle, power and prestige of maintaining its position. Hence, any plan that might move Moscow from this standing would have to involve some face-saving mechanism that the Kremlin could package as a win-win internationally, and as a “decision made in Russia’s best interest” domestically.

    So far, the US vision has been to get Russia on board by offering Moscow an opportunity to “play a constructive role in the humanitarian and political catastrophe in the Middle East.” That approach misses a critical point in Russian political psychology: The Kremlin believes it has already stepped up as a constructive player to counter the increasingly destructive forces unleashed by the United States. This belief — no matter how uncomfortably it sits with anyone — is not entirely groundless. Many players in the region perceive Russia in this capacity, even if it’s just for their own political reasons.

    A senior Russian diplomat speaking with Al-Monitor not for attribution said: “[Russia] stepping aside from Assad would mean, among other things, an ultimate win for the US regime-change policy. It would indicate that no matter how long you resist this policy, you’ll be made to surrender. That’s a serious red line in Russia’s foreign policy thinking, the one that President Putin cannot afford to be crossed — not for all the tea in China, or should I say, a chocolate cake in Mar-a-Lago?”

    Therefore, Tillerson’s statement on the importance of Assad’s departure in a “structural, organized manner” is seen in Moscow as a positive outcome. It leaves open the prospect of returning to the political process that was underway for several months before the gas attack and the airstrikes.

    However, it might be much more difficult to achieve now, as the parties focus on reinforcing their respective and contradictory narratives. Reports of US intelligence intercepting communications between Syrian military and chemical experts about preparations for a sarin nerve gas attack in Idlib are a powerful argument for the audience that shares the “American narrative” — as Moscow sees it. However, it is producing counternarratives on the Russian side. One such narrative, according to the Russian Defense Ministry, suggests that of all “12 facilities that stored Syrian chemical weapons, 10 were destroyed in the timeline between 2013 and 2016 under the watch of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons … [while] the remaining two compounds are out of reach for the Syrian government since they are located in the territory controlled by the so-called opposition.”

    Also, as Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, put it: “The recitation of mantras on the necessity of Assad’s departure” won’t budge Moscow’s position an inch, nor will it help with a political solution to the Syria crisis. On the contrary, it will only reinforce Russia’s position on Assad. So far, Moscow has been operating on the principle of presumed innocence and calling for an “unbiased probe” into the Syria attack. To Russia, a refusal to have such an investigation would show that the case against Assad is being pursued for political rather than humanitarian reasons.

    Remarkably, a recent Mir interview with Putin indicates Moscow hasn’t reached a concrete conclusion on exactly who perpetrated the attacks. Putin’s statement that it could have been the Syrian opposition or the Islamic State (IS) is based primarily on the opposition’s hope of saving itself in a losing battle and on previous IS chemical attacks in Iraq. On factual grounds, however, Russia’s arguments look as shaky as the West’s “confidence” that Assad did it. Yet this state of affairs leaves enough space for US-Russia cooperation on investigating the case, if only inspired by a solid political will.

    Though it seems counterintuitive, Russia’s veto of the UN resolution on Syria proposed by the United States, the UK and France hours after the Tillerson-Lavrov press conference is an important sign of Russia’s commitment to work with the United States. Deputy Russian UN Ambassador Vladimir Safronkov explained the veto by saying the resolution assigned guilt “before an independent and objective investigation” could be conducted.

    However, Russia probably had decided to veto the resolution even before Tillerson and Lavrov met, to give itself more time to think through the negotiation results. Moscow wanted to come up with a fresh proposal at the UN that would reflect a more engaging approach for both US and Russian interests. Hence came Safronkov’s heated and scandalous lashing out against British diplomat Matthew Rycroft, whom he accused of trying to derail a potential agreement on Syria and Assad’s fate that Moscow had hoped to reach with Washington. "Don’t you dare insult Russia!” he said at the UN Security Council meeting April 12.

    Rycroft had accused Moscow of supporting Assad’s “murderous, barbaric” regime.

    In general, the visit left a feeling in Moscow that the initiatives Lavrov and Tillerson discussed will face intense scrutiny in Washington. The confrontational rhetoric flying from both capitals will remain prevalent. But the parties have articulated a need and agreed on some — though not many — concrete steps toward managing the situation. It’s not likely to lead to a “great-power alliance” or help both parties accomplish much together. But it might be just what’s needed to take the two back from the brink of a direct military clash and spare the world even more uncertainty. Given the current circumstances, this might be the most comfortable paradigm for the bilateral relations — at least until Putin and Trump meet face to face.

    MAXIM A. SUCHKOV
    Editor, Russia-Mideast 
    Maxim A. Suchkov, PhD is the Editor of Al-Monitor’s Russia-Mideast coverage as well as an expert of the Russian International Affairs Council. He is also an Associate Professor of International Relations and Deputy Director for Research at the School of International Relations, Pyatigorsk State University based in the North Caucasus, Russia. Formerly he was a Fulbright visiting fellow at Georgetown University (2010-11) and New York University (2015). He is the author of the “Essays on Russian Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and the Middle East.” On Twitter: @Max_A_Suchkov

    #Russie #Syrie #Etats-Unis

  • Special Report: How Russia allowed homegrown radicals to go and fight in Syria
    http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-militants-specialreport-idUSKCN0Y41OP

    Four years ago, Saadu Sharapudinov was a wanted man in Russia. A member of an outlawed Islamist group, he was hiding in the forests of the North Caucasus, dodging patrols by paramilitary police and plotting a holy war against Moscow.

    Then his fortunes took a dramatic turn. Sharapudinov, 38, told Reuters that in December 2012 Russian intelligence officers presented him with an unexpected offer. If he agreed to leave Russia, the authorities would not arrest him. In fact, they would facilitate his departure.

    “I was in hiding, I was part of an illegal armed group, I was armed,” said Sharapudinov during an interview in a country outside Russia. Yet he says the authorities cut him a deal. “They said: ’We want you to leave.’”

    [...]

    Moscow wanted to eradicate the risk of domestic terror attacks, so intelligence and police officials turned a blind eye to Islamic militants leaving the country.

  • Russia’s Playing a Double Game With Islamic Terror - The Daily Beast
    http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/23/russia-s-playing-a-double-game-with-islamic-terror.html

    Even as America touts its counterterrorism partnerships with Russia, evidence points to the FSB directly feeding Dagestanis to ISIS.
    It is an article of faith among the many critics of the current Russian government that, however unpleasant Vladimir Putin may be, he is still a necessary partner in one crucial field of U.S. foreign policy: cooperation in the war on Islamic terrorism.

    Proof, if it were needed, for how valued this cooperation is among U.S. policymakers came in the conspicuous absence of Alexander Bortnikov, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia’s domestic intelligence agency, from sanctions levied by the Treasury Department against Russian officials. The sanctions targeted bureaucrats involved in both the invasion and occupation of Crimea and the unacknowledged maskirovka war that Moscow is still waging in eastern Ukraine—a war that has drawn amply on the resources of the FSB and has included several “former” FSB officers on the battlefield. Not only was Bortnikov not sanctioned, he was invited by the White House last February as a guest to President Obama’s three-day conference on “countering violent extremism,” whereas the current FBI director, James Comey, was not.
    […]
    It may sound paradoxical—helping the enemy of your friend—but the logic is actually straightforward: Better the terrorists go abroad and fight in Syria than blow things up in Russia. Penetrating and coopting terrorism also has a long, well-attested history in the annals of Chekist tradecraft.

    Milashina makes her case study the village of Novosasitili in Dagestan’s Khasavyurt district. Since 2011, nearly one percent of the total population of Novosasitili has gone to Syria—22 out of 2,500 residents. Of that figure, five were killed and five have returned home. But they didn’t leave Russia, a country notoriously difficult to enter and exit, without outside help. The FSB established a “green corridor” to allow them to migrate first to Turkey, and then into Syria. (Russians, including those living in the North Caucasus, can catch any of the daily non-stop flights to Istanbul and visit Turkey without a visa.)

  • Deadly Gun Battle Erupts In Grozny
    http://www.rferl.org/content/grozny-chechnya-attack-/26724259.html


    A local media building called the Press House is set ablaze following a gun battle with Chechen insurgents in the regional capital, Grozny, on December 4.

    Authorities in Russia’s restive North Caucasus republic of Chechnya say at least nine people have been killed in hours of fighting between militants and security forces in the regional capital, Grozny.

    Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov said on December 4 that several gunmen who occupied a publishing-house building in central Grozny were killed and the building was destroyed by fire.

    Bilan (provisoire)

    Ten security officers killed, up to 20 injured in Grozny operation
    http://www.kyivpost.com/content/russia-and-former-soviet-union/ten-security-officers-killed-up-to-20-injured-in-grozny-operation-374013.h

    Ten officers from law enforcement agencies have been killed during an operation to neutralize militants in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya in Russia’s North Caucasus, a source in North Caucasus security services told Interfax by phone.

  • Ukrainian Refugees Arrival in North Caucasus May Raise Tensions in Region

    As the crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations deepens, Ukrainian refugees are turning up in unlikely locations, such as the North Caucasus. An estimated 200 refugees from eastern Ukraine, who went to North Ossetia, have been put up in local resorts and more are expected to arrive as fighting continues. Refugees are also being used in the Russian propaganda war against Ukraine as well. The Rossiya state TV channel, for example, gave this explanation for why Ukrainian refugees cannot go home: “The new Ukrainian authorities are actively using well-known methods of instilling fear. They kill civilians, shoot at cars with refugees, and now have even started using propaganda leaflets” (Vesti.ru, July 4).

    http://www.jamestown.org/programs/nc/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42612&tx_ttnews[backPid]=24&cHash=d1d6762edd6aa157562

    #Ukraine #réfugiés #migration #Russie #Caucase_du_Nord #Ossétie

  • Violence in the North Caucasus and the Olympics in Sochi 2014 / Upcoming Events / Events / nupi.no / NUPI - NUPI

    http://english.nupi.no/Events/Upcoming-Events/Violence-in-the-North-Caucasus-and-the-Olympics-in-Sochi-2014

    The Olympic Games that are to be held in Sochi, North Caucasus in 2014, are designed to be a manifestation of the reconstruction of Russia and it’s greatness under Putin. This is the region Putin has struggled to control since the fall of the Soviet Union. It was here Putin started his “unification” of Russia in 1999 through the second war in Chechnya.

    Now, after almost 15 years have passed, the situation in North Caucasus is critical. The conflicts between different Russian forces and armed Islamist insurgent groups have become so violent that the situation in Dagestan must be characterized as a state of war. Chechnya is being held under Russian control by Ramzan Kadyrov’s iron fist, but the republic is less Russian than ever.

    #russie #caucase #jo #jeux_olympiques