The #EUborderguard deployment in Albania will support border checks and frontier surveillance to prevent unauthorized border crossings into the European Union and fight criminality. EBCG teams will be stationed on the border with Greece.
European Border and Coast Guard: Launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU
Today, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, in cooperation with the Albanian authorities, is launching the first ever joint operation on the territory of a neighbouring non-EU country. As of 22 May, teams from the Agency will be deployed together with Albanian border guards at the Greek-Albanian border to strengthen border management and enhance security at the EU’s external borders, in full agreement with all concerned countries. This operation marks a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and its Western Balkan partners, and is yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.
The launch event is taking place in Tirana, Albania, in the presence of Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Edi Rama, Albanian Prime Minister and Sandër Lleshaj, Albanian Interior Minister.
Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, said: "With the first ever deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams outside of the EU, we are opening an entirely new chapter in our cooperation on migration and border management with Albania and with the whole Western Balkan region. This is a real game changer and a truly historical step, bringing this region closer to the EU by working together in a coordinated and mutually supportive way on shared challenges such as better managing migration and protecting our common borders.”
Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, said: “Today we mark a milestone for our agency and the wider cooperation between the European Union and Albania. We are launching the first fully fledged joint operation outside the European Union to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.”
While Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders, the European Border and Coast Guard is able to lend both technical and operational support and assistance. The European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to support the Albanian border guards in performing border checks at crossing points, for example, and preventing unauthorised entries. All operations and deployments at the Albanian border with Greece will be conducted in full agreement with both the Albanian and Greek authorities.
At the start of the operation, the Agency will be deploying 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and 1 thermo-vision van from 12 EU Member States (Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.
Strengthened cooperation between priority third countries and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will contribute to the better management of irregular migration, further enhance security at the EU’s external borders and strengthen the Agency’s ability to act in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, while bringing that neighbourhood closer to the EU.
▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2591_en.htm
#externalisation
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos in Albania at the official launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU
Ladies and Gentlemen,
We are here today to celebrate an important achievement and a milestone, both for Albania and for the EU.
Only six months ago, here in Tirana, the EU signed the status agreement with Albania on cooperation on border management between Albania and the European Border and Coast Guard. This agreement, that entered into force three weeks ago, was the first agreement ever of its kind with a neighbouring country.
Today, we will send off the joint European Border and Coast Guard Teams to be deployed as of tomorrow for the first time in a non-EU Member State. This does not only mark a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and Western Balkan partners, it is also yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.
The only way to effectively address migration and security challenges we are facing today and those we may be confronted with in the years to come is by working closer together, as neighbours and as partners. What happens in Albania and the Western Balkans affects the European Union, and the other way around.
Joint approach to border management is a key part of our overall approach to managing migration. It allows us to show to our citizens that their security is at the top of our concerns. But effective partnership in ensuring orderly migration also enables us, as Europe, to remain a place where those in need of protection can find shelter.
Albania is the first country in the Western Balkans with whom the EU is moving forward with this new important chapter in our joint co-operation on border management.
This can be a source of pride for both Albania and the EU and an important step that brings us closer together.
While the overall situation along the Western Balkans route remains stable with continuously low levels of arrivals - it is in fact like night and day when compared to three years ago - we need to remain vigilant.
The Status Agreement will help us in this effort. It expands the scale of practical, operational cooperation between the EU and Albania and hopefully soon with the rest of the Western Balkan region.
These are important elements of our co-operation, also in view of the continued implementation of the requirements under the visa liberalisation agreement. Visa-free travel is a great achievement, which brings benefits to all sides and should be safeguarded.
Together with Albanian border guards, European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to perform border checks at crossing points and perform border surveillance to prevent unauthorized border crossings and counter cross-border criminality.
But, let me be clear, Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders. European Border and Coast Guard Teams may only perform tasks and exercise powers in the Albanian territory under instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards of the Republic of Albania.
Dear Friends,
When it comes to protecting our borders, ensuring our security and managing migration, the challenges we face are common, and so must be our response.
The European Border and Coast Guard Status Agreement and its implementation will allow us to better work together in all these areas. I hope that these agreements can be finalised also with other Western Balkans partners as soon as possible.
I wish to thank Prime Minister Edi Rama, the Albanian authorities, and the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Fabrice Leggeri and his team for their close cooperation in bringing this milestone achievement to life. I also want to thank all Member States who have contributed with staff and the personnel who will be part of this first deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams in a neighbouring country.
With just a few days to go before the European Elections, the need for a more united and stronger European family is more important than ever. We firmly believe that a key priority is to have strong relations with close neighbours, based on a clear balance of rights and obligations – but above all, on genuine partnership. This includes you, fellow Albanians.
Albania is part of the European family.Our challenges are common. They know no borders. The progress we are witnessing today is another concrete action and proof of our commitment to bring us closer together. To make us stronger.
Externalisation: Frontex launches first formal operation outside of the EU and deploys to Albania
The EU has taken a significant, if geographically small, step in the externalisation of its borders. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, has launched its first Joint Operation on the territory of a non-EU-Member State, as it begins cooperation with Albania on the border with Greece.
After the launch of the operation in Tirana on 21 May a deployment of 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and a thermo-vision van started yesterday, 22 May (European Commission, link). Twelve Member States (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) have contributed to the operation.
New agreements
The move follows the entry into force on 1 May this year of a Status Agreement between the EU and Albania on actions carried out by Frontex in that country (pdf). Those actions are made possible by the conclusion of operational plans, which must be agreed between Frontex and the Albanian authorities.
The Status Agreement with Albania was the first among several similar agreements to be signed between the Agency and Balkan States, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia.
The nascent operation in Albania will give Frontex team members certain powers, privileges and immunities on Albanian territory, including the use of force in circumstances authorised by Albanian border police and outlined in the operational plan.
Frontex does not publish operational plans whilst operations (which can be renewed indefinitely) are ongoing, and documents published after the conclusion of operations (usually in response to requests for access to documents) are often heavily-redacted (Ask the EU, link).
Relevant articles
Article 4 of the Status Agreement outlines the tasks and powers of members of Frontex teams operating in Albanian territory. This includes the use of force, if it is authorised by both the Frontex team member’s home Member State and the State of Albania, and takes place in the presence of Albanian border guards. However, Albania can authorise team members to use force in their absence.
Article 6 of the Status Agreement grants Frontex team members immunity from Albanian criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction “in respect of the acts performed in the exercise of their official functions in the course of the actions carried out in accordance with the operational plan”.
Although a representative of Albania would be informed in the event of an allegation of criminal activity, it would be up to Frontex’s executive director to certify to the court whether the actions in question were performed as part of an official Agency function and in accordance with the Operational Plan. This certification will be binding on the jurisdiction of Albania. Proceedings may only continue against an individual team member if the executive director confirms that their actions were outside the scope of the exercise of official functions.
Given the closed nature of the operational plans, this grants the executive director wide discretion and ensures little oversight of the accountability of Agency team members. Notably, Article 6 also states that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses. This immunity does not, however, extend to the jurisdiction of team members’ home Member States, and they may also waive the immunity of the individual under Albanian jurisdiction.
Right to redress
These measures of immunity alongside the lack of transparency surrounding documents outlining team members’ official functions and activities (the operational plan) raise concerns regarding access to redress for victims of human rights violations that may occur during operations.
Human rights organisations have denounced the use of force by Frontex team members, only to have those incidents classified by the Agency as par for the course in their operations. Cases include incidents of firearm use that resulted in serious injury (The Intercept, link), but that was considered to have taken place according to the standard rules of engagement. This opacity has implications for individuals’ right to good administration and to the proper functioning of accountability mechanisms.
If any damage results from actions that were carried out according to the operational plan, Albania will be held liable. This is the most binding liability outlined by the Status Agreement. Albania may only “request” that compensation be paid by the Member State of the team member responsible, or by the Agency, if acts were committed through gross negligence, wilful misconduct or outside the scope of the official functions of the Agency team or staff member.
Across the board
The provisions regarding tasks, powers and immunity in the Status Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia and Serbia are all broadly similar, with the exception of Article 6 of the agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. This states:
“Members of the team who are witnesses may be obliged by the competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina… to provide evidence in accordance with the procedural law of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
The Status Agreement with Serbia, an early draft of which did not grant immunity to team members, is now consistent with the Agreement with Albania and includes provisions stating that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses.
It includes a further provision that:
“...members of the team may use weapons only when it is absolutely necessary in self-defence to repel an immediate life-threatening attack against themselves or another person, in accordance with the national legislation of the Republic of Serbia”.
▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/may/fx-albania-launch.htm
La police des frontières extérieures de l’UE s’introduit en Albanie
Frontex, l’agence chargée des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, a lancé mardi en Albanie sa première opération hors du territoire d’un de ses États membres.
Cette annonce de la Commission européenne intervient quelques jours avant les élections européennes et au moment où la politique migratoire de l’UE est critiquée par les candidats souverainistes, comme le ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini ou le chef de file de la liste française d’extrême droite, Jordan Bardella, qui a récemment qualifié Frontex d’« hôtesse d’accueil pour migrants ».
Cette opération conjointe en Albanie est « une véritable étape historique rapprochant » les Balkans de l’UE, et témoigne d’une « meilleure gestion de la migration et de la protection de nos frontières communes », a commenté à Tirana le commissaire chargé des migrations, Dimitris Avramopoulos.
L’Albanie espère convaincre les États membres d’ouvrir des négociations d’adhésion ce printemps, ce qui lui avait été refusé l’an passé. Son premier ministre Edi Rama a salué « un pas très important dans les relations entre l’Albanie et l’Union européenne » et a estimé qu’il « renforçait également la coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité ».
À partir de 22 mai, Frontex déploiera des équipes conjointes à la frontière grecque avec des agents albanais.
La Commission européenne a passé des accords semblables avec la Macédoine du Nord, la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui devraient également entrer en vigueur.
Tous ces pays sont sur une des « routes des Balkans », qui sont toujours empruntées clandestinement par des milliers de personnes en route vers l’Union européenne, même si le flux n’est en rien comparable avec les centaines de milliers de migrants qui ont transité par la région en quelques mois jusqu’à la fermeture des frontières par les pays de l’UE début 2016.
Ce type d’accord « contribuera à l’amélioration de la gestion de la migration clandestine, renforcera la sécurité aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et consolidera la capacité de l’agence à agir dans le voisinage immédiat de l’UE, tout en rapprochant de l’UE les pays voisins concernés », selon un communiqué de la Commission.
Pour éviter de revivre le chaos de 2015, l’Union a acté un renforcement considérable de Frontex. Elle disposera notamment d’ici 2027 d’un contingent de 10 000 garde-frontières et garde-côtes pour aider des pays débordés.
European Border and Coast Guard Agency began to patrol alongside the Albanian-Greek border in late May (►https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118). Similar agreements have recently been concluded with Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina but Albania is the first country to start implementing programs aimed at blocking refugees entering the EU. Bilten states that Frontex employees can carry arms and fight “against any kind of crime, from” illegal migration “to theft of a car or drug trafficking”. Frontex’s mission is not time-bound, i.e. it depends on the EU’s need. The Albanian authorities see it as a step forward to their membership in the Union.
Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa dobrodosli, le 10.06.2019
L’article original:
Što Frontex radi u Albaniji?
Nakon što je Europska unija službeno zatvorila “balkansku migrantsku rutu”, očajni ljudi počeli su tražiti nove puteve. Jedan od njih prolazi kroz Albaniju, a tamošnja se vlada odrekla kontrole nad vlastitom granicom u nadi da će time udobrovoljiti unijske dužnosnike.
Agencija za europsku graničnu i obalnu stražu, Frontex, počela je krajem prošlog mjeseca patrolirati uz albansko-grčku granicu. Već prvog dana, raspoređeno je pedesetak policajaca iz različitih zemalja članica EU koji bi se u suradnji s albanskim graničarima trebali boriti protiv “ilegalne migracije”. Iako je slične dogovore Unija nedavno sklopila sa zemljama poput Srbije, Sjeverne Makedonije, Crne Gore te Bosne i Hercegovine – a sve s ciljem blokiranja mogućnosti izbjeglica da uđu na područje EU – Albanija je prva zemlja u kojoj je počela provedba tog programa. Zaposlenici Frontexa ne samo da smiju nositi oružje, već imaju i dozvolu da se bore protiv bilo koje vrste kriminala, od “ilegalnih migracija” do krađe automobila ili trgovine drogom. Također, njihova misija nije vremenski ograničena, što znači da će Frontexovi zaposlenici patrolirati s albanske strane granice dok god to Unija smatra potrebnim.
Unatoč nekim marginalnim glasovima koji su se žalili zbog kršenja nacionalne suverenosti prepuštanjem kontrole nad granicom stranim trupama, javnost je reagirala bilo potpunom nezainteresiranošću ili čak blagom potporom sporazumu koji bi tobože trebao pomoći Albaniji da uđe u Europsku uniju. S puno entuzijazma, lokalni su se mediji hvalili kako su u prva četiri dana Frontexovi zaposlenici već ulovili 92 “ilegalna migranta”. No to nije prvo, a ni najozbiljnije predavanje kontrole nad granicom koje je poduzela albanska vlada. Još od kasnih 1990-ih i ranih 2000-ih jadranskim i jonskim teritorijalnim vodama Republike Albanije patrolira talijanska Guardia di Finanza. Tih se godina albanska obala često koristila kao most prema Italiji preko kojeg je prelazila većina migranata azijskog porijekla, ne samo zbog blizine južne Italije, već i zbog slabosti državnih aparata tijekom goleme krize 1997. i 1998. godine.
Helikopteri Guardije di Finanza također kontroliraju albansko nebo u potrazi za poljima kanabisa i to sve u suradnji s lokalnom državnom birokracijom koja je sama dijelom suradnica dilera, a dijelom nesposobna da im se suprotstavi. No posljednjih godina, zbog toga što su druge rute zatvorene, sve veći broj ljudi počeo se kretati iz Grčke preko Albanije, Crne Gore i BiH prema zemljama EU. Prema Međunarodnoj organizaciji za migracije, granicu je prešlo oko 18 tisuća ljudi, uglavnom iz Sirije, Pakistana i Iraka. To predstavlja povećanje od sedam puta u odnosu na godinu ranije. Tek manji dio tih ljudi je ulovljen zbog nedostatka kapaciteta granične kontrole ili pak potpune indiferencije prema ljudima kojima siromašna zemlja poput Albanije nikada neće biti destinacija.
Tranzitna zemlja
Oni koje ulove smješteni su u prihvatnom centru blizu Tirane, ali odatle im je relativno jednostavno pobjeći i nastaviti put dalje. Dio njih službeno je zatražio azil u Albaniji, ali to ne znači da će se dulje zadržati u zemlji. Ipak, očekuje se da će ubuduće albanske institucije biti znatno agresivnije u politici repatrijacije migranata. U tome će se susretati s brojnim pravnim i administrativnim problemima: kako objašnjavaju lokalni stručnjaci za migracije, Albanija sa zemljama iz kojih dolazi većina migranata – poput Sirije, Pakistana, Iraka i Afganistana – uopće nema diplomatske odnose niti pravne predstavnike u tim zemljama. Zbog toga je koordiniranje procesa repatrijacije gotovo nemoguće. Također, iako sporazum o repatrijaciji postoji s Grčkoj, njime je predviđeno da se u tu zemlju vraćaju samo oni za koje se može dokazati da su iz nje došli, a većina migranata koji dođu iz Grčke nastoji sakriti svaki trag svog boravka u toj zemlji.
U takvoj situaciji, čini se izvjesnim da će Albanija biti zemlja u kojoj će sve veći broj ljudi zapeti na neodređeno vrijeme. Prije nekih godinu i pol dana, izbila je javna panika s dosta rasističkih tonova. Nakon jednog nespretnog intervjua vladinog dužnosnika njemačkom mediju proširile su se glasine da će se u Albaniju naseliti šesto tisuća Sirijaca. Brojka je već na prvi pogled astronomska s obzirom na to da je stanovništvo zemlje oko tri milijuna ljudi, ali teorije zavjere se obično šire kao požar. Neki od drugorazrednih političara čak su pozvali na oružanu borbu ako dođu Sirijci. No ta je panika zapravo brzo prošla, ali tek nakon što je vlada obećala da neće primiti više izbjeglica od onog broja koji bude određen raspodjelom prema dogovoru u Uniji. Otad zapravo nema nekog osobitog antimigrantskog raspoloženja u javnosti, unatoč tome što tisuće ljudi prolazi kroz zemlju.
Europski san
Odnos je uglavnom onaj indiferencije. Tome pridonosi nekoliko stvari: činjenica da je gotovo trećina stanovništva Albanije također odselila u zemlje Unije,1 zatim to što ne postoje neke vjerske i ultranacionalističke stranke, ali najviše to što nitko od migranata nema nikakvu namjeru ostati u zemlji. No zašto je albanska vlada tako nestrpljiva da preda kontrolu granice i suverenitet, odnosno zašto je premijer Edi Rama izgledao tako entuzijastično prilikom ceremonije s Dimitrisom Avramopulosom, europskim povjerenikom za migracije, unutrašnje poslove i državljanstvo? Vlada se nada da će to ubrzati njezin put prema članstvu u Europskoj uniji. Posljednjih pet godina provela je čekajući otvaranje pristupnih pregovora, a predavanje kontrole nad granicom vidi kao još jednu ilustraciju svoje pripadnosti Uniji.
S druge strane, stalna politička kriza koju su izazvali studentski protesti u prosincu 2018., te kasnije bojkot parlamenta i lokalnih izbora od strane opozicijskih stranaka, stavlja neprestani pritisak na vladu. Očajnički treba pozitivan znak iz EU jer vodi političku i ideološku borbu protiv opozicije oko toga tko je autentičniji kulturni i politički predstavnik europejstva. Vlada naziva opoziciju i njezine nasilne prosvjede antieuropskima, dok opozicija optužuje vladu da svojom korupcijom i povezanošću s organiziranim kriminalom radi protiv europskih želja stanovništva. Prije nekoliko dana, Komisija je predložila početak pristupnih pregovora s Albanijom, no Europsko vijeće je to koje ima zadnju riječ. Očekuje se kako će sve ovisiti o toj odluci. Ideja Europe jedno je od čvorišta vladajuće ideologije koja se desetljećima gradi kao antipod komunizmu i Orijentu te historijska destinacija kojoj Albanci stoljećima teže.
Neoliberalna rekonstrukcija ekonomije i društva gotovo je uvijek legitimirana tvrdnjama kako su to nužni – iako bolni – koraci prema integraciji u Europsku uniju. Uspješnost ove ideologije ilustrira činjenica da otprilike 90% ispitanih u različitim studijama podržava Albansku integraciju u EU. U toj situaciji ne čudi ni odnos prema Frontexu.
v. la new Frontex Regulation (octobre 2019) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/806961
Frontex expands operations in EU neighbouring countries
After Albania and Montenegro, the EU Commission has concluded a Frontex status agreement with Serbia, to be followed by Northern Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A first deployment of the EU border troops has meanwhile been increased.
The European Commission has now also signed an arrangement with Serbia on „cooperation on border management“. The so-called status agreement regulates the implementation of „Joint Operations“ with the EU border agency Frontex at the common borders with the European Union. It was already published by the Commission in January and has now been ratified by the Serbian Parliament. Kosovo’s territory is excluded.
The objectives of the agreement include the fight against irregular migration and cross-border crime in accordance with the Frontex Regulation. The EU also promises „increased technical and operational assistance“ to the Serbian border police.
Model status agreement for „priority third countries“
The negotiations with Serbia followed a model status agreement approved by the Commission under the „European Migration Agenda“ for operational cooperation with „priority third countries“. The Commission first concluded a status agreement with Albania a year ago, followed by a similar agreement with Montenegro on 7 October this year. Further status agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Macedonia have been negotiated but still need to be ratified by the national parliaments. The European Parliament must also give its assent.
Once all five status agreements have been signed, Frontex could be deployed throughout the whole Western Balkans with the exception of Kosovo. The EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, describes the agreements as „yet one more step towards bringing the Western Balkan region closer to the EU“. All countries concerned are considered candidates for EU membership and the agreement to the Frontex operations is intended to facilitate the negotiations.
However, this rapprochement is likely to be damaged by the decision of the French government to refuse negotiations on EU membership to Northern Macedonia and Albania despite fulfilling the necessary conditions. The North Macedonian parliament could therefore delay the planned Frontex agreement. The same applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which France’s President Macron described as a „ticking time bomb“ for returning jihadists.
Police powers and immunity
The border police officers sent by Frontex from the EU Member States receive a special identity card from the country of deployment and wear their own uniforms with a blue Frontex armband. They will also carry weapons, ammunition and equipment from their sending state and may use force.
The troops enjoy immunity during Frontex operations. If a criminal offence is found, it will be prosecuted by the jurisdiction of the Member State of origin. Frontex team members also enjoy full protection against civil and administrative prosecution in the State of operation. The latter will also be liable for any damage caused by a member of the team during „all acts performed in the exercise of the official functions“.
Deployment plan agreed with Greece
Following the conclusion of the status agreement with Albania, it took six months for Frontex to launch its by now „first-ever joint operation“ on the territory of a neighbouring third country. According to Frontex, the governments in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia have sent personnel to a total of 16 patrol vehicles and one thermovision car.
According to the operational plan, which Frontex says is agreed with the Greek government, the operation will take place along the entire „green“ border and, in addition to border surveillance in the sections Sopik, Çarçovë, Leskovik, Shtikë, Kapshticë and Livadhja, will include border control at the Albanian-Greek crossing points Kakavija, Tre Urat (Çarçovë), Kapshticë, Rips and Qafe Bote. Frontex has set up support offices in Gjirokaster, Kakavija and Kapshticë to coordinate operations.
In the meantime, the operation, which started with 50 EU officials, has grown to 66. One sixth comes from the German Federal Police, which also brought along six of the twelve patrol vehicles currently in use. In addition to operational border control, training measures are also planned in Albania. The operation will also facilitate the exchange of operational information and „best practices“.
No Albanian human rights groups involved
The new Frontex Regulation will apply from 4 December. The border agency will be then granted more powers and will set up a border troop of 10,000 border guards. The measures taken by Frontex should be observed by a Fundamental Rights Officer, among others. Frontex has also set up a Consultative Forum with non-governmental organisations to advise the Agency on how to prevent infringements.
For „Joint Operations“ in third countries, the Consultative Forum recommends involving human rights groups active there in the operational plan. However, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, which sends eleven officers to Albania, has „no knowledge“ of the involvement of Albanian non-governmental organisations. The German Government also does not know which Albanian organisations might be asked to participate.
►https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/25/frontex-expands-operations-in-eu-neighbouring-countries
Infographic - Border management: agreements with non-EU countries
Turkey’s Policy in the Balkans: More than Neo-Ottomanism
There is a fundamental misperception with regard to Turkey’s relationship with the Balkans. Turkey is not external to the region, the way Russia is for instance. Its history and geographic location make it a part of southeast Europe. Millions of Turks have their family roots in what was once known as ‘Turkey-in-Europe.’ This includes the founder of the republic, the Salonika-born Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Ties run deep at the political, economic, and societal levels.
All those connections have drawn Turkey to the Balkans, especially after the end of the Cold War. The notion that Turks are now coming back does not hold. Closer engagement in the region started under President Turgut Özal in the early 1990s. But back then, Turkey balanced between bilateralism and multilateralism. It invested in economic and security ties with friendly countries such as Albania, Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria while adhering to NATO as its response to the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. What changed under the Justice and Development (AK) Party, notably over the past decade, is the switch to bilateralism. That is understandable given the cracks in relations between Ankara and the West. All the same, it is concerning since it is coinciding with the push against the EU and NATO by Russia, which leverages history, religious identity and anti-Western rhetoric to legitimize its actions.
Pundits and politicians often use ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ to describe Turkey’s forays. The label can be often misleading. Yes, Turkish President Recep Erdogan praises the Ottoman Empire and its legacy, domestically and beyond Turkey’s borders. But so did his predecessors in office. Within the country, liberals and Islamist conservatives alike all rediscovered the Ottomans from the 1980s onwards in questioning the Kemalist political order. The government has been reaching out to Balkan Muslims through TIKA, the Turkish developmental agency, and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) for decades.
Neo-Ottomanism is therefore the packaging, not the substance. Turkey’s objective is not to recreate the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. That is far beyond the country’s resources and capacity. The region is gravitating in economic, social, institutional and political terms to the West. What we have instead is Erdogan using the Balkans to make a case that he is the leader of the wider (Sunni) Muslim community in Europe and the Middle East. The main audience is his electorate in Turkey and only secondly Muslims abroad. The pre-election rally he held in Sarajevo in the run-up to last year’s presidential and parliamentary elections is a case in point.
But Turkish policy in the Balkans cannot be reduced to the promotion of Islamic solidarity. Erdogan’s main achievement is the fact that he has built relations with leaders from countries that are majority non-Muslim. In October 2017, for instance, he was welcomed in Serbia by President Aleksandar Vucic. The visit gave some credence to complaints by Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims) that Turkey loves to talk brotherhood in Bosnia but when it comes to investing money it goes for Serbia. Similarly, Erdogan has strong links to Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who hosted the EU-Turkey summit a year ago. Bulgaria and Serbia are interested in hosting an extension of the TurkStream gas pipeline, a joint Russo-Turkish venture. Greece’s Alexis Tsipras also received the red carpet treatment during his latest visit to Turkey where he discussed ideas on decreasing tensions in the Aegean.
Despite its quest for strategic autonomy, Turkey is still partnering with Western institutions. In addition, Ankara has been supportive of the Prespa Agreement and newly renamed North Macedonia’s accession to NATO, its quarrels with the U.S. and other key members of the Alliance notwithstanding. Collectively, EU members Romania, Bulgaria and Greece account for the bulk of Turkish trade with southeast Europe, with the Western Balkans trailing far behind. Greece and Bulgaria see Turkey as key to stemming the flow of asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and further afield. They are highly supportive of the EU-Turkey deal on migration from March 2016, renewed last year.
Does the authoritarian system built by Erdogan pose an ideological challenge in the Balkans? Perhaps yes. For instance, pressure on governments to close educational institutions and surrender, without due process, members of the Fethullah Gülen community, which is implicated in the coup attempt in July 2016, undermine the rule of law. At the same time, the authoritarian drift observed in the Balkans is an indigenous product. It is not imported from Vladimir Putin’s Russia nor from Turkey under its new ‘sultan’.
▻https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/turkeys-policy-balkans-more-neo-ottomanism-22835
Report to the EU Parliament on #Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017
A recent report by Frontex, the EU’s border agency, highlights the ongoing expansion of its activities with non-EU states.
The report covers the agency’s cooperation with non-EU states ("third countries") in 2017, although it was only published this month.
See: Report to the European Parliament on Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017: ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-ep-third-countries-coop-2017.pdf (pdf)
It notes the adoption by Frontex of an #International_Cooperation_Strategy 2018-2020, “an integral part of our multi-annual programme” which:
“guides the Agency’s interactions with third countries and international organisations… The Strategy identified the following priority regions with which Frontex strives for closer cooperation: the Western Balkans, Turkey, North and West Africa, Sub-Saharan countries and the Horn of Africa.”
The Strategy can be found in Annex XIII to the 2018-20 Programming Document: ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf (pdf).
The 2017 report on cooperation with third countries further notes that Frontex is in dialogue with Senegal, #Niger and Guinea with the aim of signing Working Agreements at some point in the future.
The agency deployed three Frontex #Liaison_Officers in 2017 - to Niger, Serbia and Turkey - while there was also a #European_Return_Liaison_Officer deployed to #Ghana in 2018.
The report boasts of assisting the Commission in implementing informal agreements on return (as opposed to democratically-approved readmission agreements):
"For instance, we contributed to the development of the Standard Operating Procedures with #Bangladesh and the “Good Practices for the Implementation of Return-Related Activities with the Republic of Guinea”, all forming important elements of the EU return policy that was being developed and consolidated throughout 2017."
At the same time:
“The implementation of 341 Frontex coordinated and co-financed return operations by charter flights and returning 14 189 third-country nationals meant an increase in the number of return operations by 47% and increase of third-country nationals returned by 33% compared to 2016.”
Those return operations included Frontex’s:
“first joint return operation to #Afghanistan. The operation was organised by Hungary, with Belgium and Slovenia as participating Member States, and returned a total of 22 third country nationals to Afghanistan. In order to make this operation a success, the participating Member States and Frontex needed a coordinated support of the European Commission as well as the EU Delegation and the European Return Liaison Officers Network in Afghanistan.”
▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-third-countries.htm
#externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers
#Balkans #Turquie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Afrique_du_Nord #Afrique_sub-saharienne #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Guinée #Sénégal #Serbie #officiers_de_liaison #renvois #expulsions #accords_de_réadmission #machine_à_expulsion #Hongrie #Belgique #Slovénie #réfugiés_afghans
EP civil liberties committee against proposal to give Frontex powers to assist non-EU states with deportations
The European Parliament’s civil liberties committee (LIBE) has agreed its position for negotiations with the Council on the new Frontex Regulation, and amongst other things it hopes to deny the border agency the possibility of assisting non-EU states with deportations.
The position agreed by the LIBE committee removes Article 54(2) of the Commission’s proposal, which says:
“The Agency may also launch return interventions in third countries, based on the directions set out in the multiannual strategic policy cycle, where such third country requires additional technical and operational assistance with regard to its return activities. Such intervention may consist of the deployment of return teams for the purpose of providing technical and operational assistance to return activities of the third country.”
The report was adopted by the committee with 35 votes in favour, nine against and eight abstentions.
When the Council reaches its position on the proposal, the two institutions will enter into secret ’trilogue’ negotiations, along with the Commission.
Although the proposal to reinforce Frontex was only published last September, the intention is to agree a text before the European Parliament elections in May.
The explanatory statement in the LIBE committee’s report (see below) says:
“The Rapporteur proposes a number of amendments that should enable the Agency to better achieve its enhanced objectives. It is crucial that the Agency has the necessary border guards and equipment at its disposal whenever this is needed and especially that it is able to deploy them within a short timeframe when necessary.”
European Parliament: Stronger European Border and Coast Guard to secure EU’s borders: ▻http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190211IPR25771/stronger-european-border-and-coast-guard-to-secure-eu-s-borders (Press release, link):
“- A new standing corps of 10 000 operational staff to be gradually rolled out
- More efficient return procedures of irregular migrants
- Strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries
New measures to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to better address migratory and security challenges were backed by the Civil Liberties Committee.”
See: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council: ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-libe-report-frontex.pdf (pdf)
The Commission’s proposal and its annexes can be found here: ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-soteu-jha-proposals.htm
▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-new-frontex-libe.htm
European Border and Coast Guard: Agreement reached on operational cooperation with Montenegro
Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos and Minister of the Interior of Montenegro Mevludin Nuhodžić, initialled a status agreement that will allow European Border and Coast Guard teams to be deployed in Montenegro.
Once the agreement enters into force, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will be able to assist Montenegro in border management and carry out joint operations with Montenegro, in particular in the event of a sudden change in migratory flows.
Today’s agreement is the fifth agreed with a partner country in the Western Balkans, marking yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.
▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/european-border-coast-guard-agreement-reached-operational-cooperation-mont
#Frontex #Monténégro #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #partenariat #accord
ping @isskein
Border management: EU signs agreement with Montenegro on European Border and Coast Guard cooperation
Today, the European Union signed an agreement with Montenegro on border management cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The agreement was signed on behalf of the EU by Maria Ohisalo, Minister of the Interior of Finland and President of the Council and Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, and on behalf of Montenegro by Minister of the Interior, Mevludin Nuhodžić.
The objective of this agreement is to allow Frontex to coordinate operational cooperation between EU Member states and Montenegro on the management of the borders that the European Union and Montenegro have in common. The signing of this agreement is yet another demonstration of the deepening and expanding cooperation with Montenegro. It will bring benefits for both parties, in particular in enhancing border management activities.
Maria Ohisalo, Minister of the Interior of Finland
Today, we are further strengthening our border cooperation with Montenegro, taking yet one more step towards bringing the Western Balkan region closer to the EU. The migratory and security challenges we face are common and our response must be joint too.
Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship
This agreement allows Frontex to assist Montenegro in border management, carry out joint operations and deploy teams in the regions of Montenegro that border the EU, subject to Montenegro’s agreement.
These activities aim at tackling illegal immigration, in particular sudden changes in migratory flows, and cross-border crime, and can involve the provision of increased technical and operational assistance at the border.
Strengthened cooperation between priority third countries and Frontex will contribute to tackling illegal immigration and further enhance security at the EU’s external borders.
Next steps
The draft decision on the conclusion of the agreement was sent to the European Parliament, which needs to give its consent for the agreement to be concluded.
Background
Today’s status agreement is the second such agreement to be concluded with a partner country, after a similar agreement was signed with Albania in October 2018. Negotiations with Montenegro were concluded on 5 July 2018 and the draft status agreement was initialled by Commissioner Avramopoulos and Montenegro Interior Minister Mevludin Nuhodžić in February 2019. The Council then authorised the signature of the agreement on 19 March 2019.
Similar status agreements have also been initialled with North Macedonia (July 2018), Serbia (September 2018) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (January 2019) and are pending finalisation.
Frontex launched the first-ever joint operation on the territory of a neighbouring non-EU country in Albania on 22 May this year.
Frontex can carry out deployments and joint operations on the territory of neighbouring non-EU countries, subject to the prior conclusion of a status agreement between the European Union and the country concerned.
Earlier this year, following a proposal by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council agreed to reinforce the European Border and Coast Guard. This will allow for joint operations and deployments to take place in countries beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.
Cooperation with third countries is an important element of the European integrated border management concept. This concept is applied through a four-tier access model which includes: measures in third countries, measures with neighbouring third countries, border control measures and measures within the Schengen area.
▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2019/10/07/border-management-eu-signs-agreement-with-montenegro-on-european-bo
On October 7, the European Union signed an agreement (▻https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/2019/10/07/border-management-eu-signs-agreement-with-montenegro-on-european-bo) with Montenegro on border management. The agreement was signed between Montenegro and Frontex (EU Border and Coast Guard Agency), allowing Frontex to support Montenegro in the border management process, conducting joint operations and recruiting teams in the region to monitor the border. The aim of the agreement is to curb illegal migration, as the EU itself states “in the wake of sudden changes in migrant flows”. The role of Frontex’s mission has never been completely clear, and it remains unclear what the specific role of Frontex officers will be in this case - what their responsibilities and the scope of their activities will be. The presence of Frontex is always justified by the EU’s argument for strengthening security, but the only security we see strengthened in this aspect is the security of Fortress Europe, but not the security of people - both those trying to cross the border and access the asylum system and those living in border areas. Let’s not forget about the cages (▻https://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/ovo-na-slici-su-migranti-koje-je-policija-u-bih-zatvorila-u-kaveze) in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina, with migrants in them, awaiting deportation to Montenegro.
Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa Dobrodosli, le 14.10.2019
#Spomeniks, les #monuments de la discorde
Bataille idéologique autour des « spomeniks », c’est un #reportage long format de @daphne tourné en #Serbie, en #Croatie et en #Bosnie-Herzégovine où les ultras-nationalistes se réapproprient les monuments de la #résistance contre les nazis, et tentent de réécrire l’histoire de la #Seconde_Guerre_mondiale… comme le révèle le photographe @albertocampiphoto. Depuis une dizaine d’années, ce photographe du collectif @wereport sillonne l’ex-Yougoslavie à la recherche des #mémoriaux des #partisans anti-fascistes.
http://scd.rfi.fr/sites/filesrfi/imagecache/rfi_16x9_1024_578/sites/images.rfi.fr/files/aef_image/spomenik-1_ok_0.jpg 
http://scd.rfi.fr/sites/filesrfi/imagecache/aef_image_original_format/sites/images.rfi.fr/files/aef_image/spomenik-12_ok_0.jpg ping @reka
The regional platform Inappropriate Monuments was created to establish a framework for the long-term collaboration of organisations from the EU and the Western Balkans dealing with the revalorisation and protection of their anti-fascist heritage and monument heritage connected with the Peoples’ Liberation Struggle (NOB). Members of the platform include: Group of architects, Belgrade, The History Museum of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Sarajevo, Modern Gallery (MG+MSUM), Ljubljana and Social Fringe: interesting untold stories (SF:ius), Zagreb.
With the collapse of Yugoslavia the interest in this heritage practically disappeared and the status of the monuments became the subject of controversy and a target of revisionism. Protection is inadequate; there are no clearly developed criteria for their restoration or strategies for revalorisation. Many of the monuments are partially or permanently destroyed, and others are neglected and left to ruin. Research made in the successor countries are not integrated and difficult to access – there has never been a complete register of the monuments. Initiatives aimed at the protection of NOB monuments have, until now, mainly emerged outside of official channels, for example under the initiative of individuals. These individuals then face a number of difficulties including their own shortcomings and the lack of interest from legislators in supporting them.
The goals of the platform are to connect institutions and independent organisations to strengthen their capacity and distribute the results of research projects in order to advocate for a regulated international strategy regarding anti-fascist heritage. Through activities carried out by the platform including: research and mapping heritage monuments, interviewing people and representatives of the institutions responsible for their erection and maintenance, holding workshops for students, conferences for experts and exhibitions and art conferences, the platform will examine the economic, political and ideological conditions surrounding the emergence of monuments, monument complexes and memorial complexes. It will also examine their contemporary reception and the conditions under which this occurs. Considering the growing interest and fetishisation of NOB monuments in western countries, and socialist heritage in general, the platform is seeking possible models of revitalisation and methods of management. Through a comparative analysis of the situation in former Yugoslavia, the platform aims to draw parallels between the transitional periods of the members of the former state and the treatment of heritage monuments connected to NOB and the anti-fascist struggle, thereby showing that these processes can only be explained through interactive research.
The web-portal, inapropriatemonuments.org is conceived as an on-line database for the activities of the platform and its members and as a virtual archive of documents and photographs.
Avec une carte
Why I don’t like the term “#Western_Balkans”
“Western Balkans” is a label born 15 years ago that has certainly not helped – if anything it has slowed down – the path of south-east Europe towards the EU. A comment
cc @reka
Article en italien :
▻https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Balcani-notizie/Perche-non-mi-piace-il-termine-Balcani-occidentali-187621
cc @albertocampiphoto @wizo
Recently, I had the following conversation with an American friend of mine:
– I want to visit the Western Balkans this summer! Where do you think I should go first?, he asked me.
_Brussels, I couldn’t help but reply.
:-)
C’est pourtant simple, les Balkans orientaux sont restés… orientaux (et donc, orthodoxes), comme l’Empire romain dont ils faisaient partie. D’ailleurs, les grands blonds germains n’y sont pas allés…
(du moins, après les tout premiers en 378 (Andrinople !!!), les plus… orientaux (!) sur la carte ci-dessous) heureusement, ils ont terminé à l’ouest (Toulouse puis péninsule Ibérique)
Lack of birth certificates leaves Roma children in Balkans at risk of statelessness and without healthcare or education
Living without documents is having a profound impact on thousands of Roma living in the Western Balkans and Ukraine, warns a report from the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ISI), and the European Network on Statelessness (ENS).
The report calls on governments in the region to focus attention on statelessness among Roma and to reform complex civil registration procedures which hinder access to crucial documents needed to prove their identity and nationality. It highlights that leaving Romani children without a birth certificate means that they are growing up without a nationality. Because of this, thousands of Roma are left struggling to access key services such as education, healthcare and housing.
One Romani man in Macedonia told the researchers “I have not gone to school. I went once, but when they asked for a birth certificate, I was very ashamed and left. I never went back…”.
The research reveals the immense impact of the protracted wars following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, coupled with the systemic exclusion and discrimination of Roma, on their lives, a fact made worse if they can’t prove their nationality. Being forced to leave their homes during the war, sometimes without any documents, left Roma struggling to navigate complex procedures and to produce necessary records to solve their documentation issues when they return home. Additionally, institutional racism and pervading antigypsyism identified in some research countries puts up barriers which hinder Romani access to their basic rights as citizens.
The research also points to some of the positive work in the region done by civil society organisations in cooperation with governments and UNHCR to simplify civil registration procedures, fill the gaps in legislation and raise awareness about the importance of addressing the issue. Such efforts show that it is possible to tackle statelessness with a proactive approach in line with the recommendations set out in this report, which lays out a road map for countries to follow to end statelessness in the region.
The report also issues a call to the European Commission to make stamping out the problem of statelessness and antigypsyism a priority issue when countries negotiate their membership of the Union.
1. “Roma Belong – Statelessness, Discrimination and Marginalisation of Roma in the Western Balkans and Ukraine” report was produced by the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), the European Network on Statelessness (ENS) and the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ISI), in collaboration with country project partners Tirana Legal Aid Society (TLAS – Albania), Vaša prava BiH Association (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Macedonian Young Lawyers Association (MYLA – Macedonia), Mladi Romi (Montenegro), Praxis (Serbia) and Desyate Kvitnya (Ukraine).
2. Embargoed copies of the report are available on request. Please email Jan Brulc at jan.brulc@statelessness.eu
3. The launch event will take place on the 26 October at a regional conference at the Marriot Hotel in Skopje (Plostad Makedonija 7). The full conference programme is available online.❞
For enquiries please email ENS Head of Communications Jan Brulc on jan.brulc@statelessness.eu or +44 7522 525673 or Jonathan Lee, ERRC Communications Coordinator on jonathan.lee@errc.org or +36 30 500 2118
Restrictive EU policies are putting refugee children at risk, says new report from Save the Children
In a new report, Save the Children warns that restrictive EU migration policies risk pushing children underground.
About 800,000 children applied for asylum in the EU over the last two years. 150,000 of them were unaccompanied, arriving in Europe either completely alone or without a family member. In this new policy report, Keeping Children at the Centre, the NGO Save the Children looks at the risks children face both on the way to and inside Europe, and the restrictive measures that make it difficult for them to receive the protection – and investment - they need.
As the debate around migration heats up again ahead of another EU Council meeting on 19 and 20 October there is much at stake for migrant and refugee children.
“Two years ago, everybody panicked because 10,000 migrant children allegedly went missing,” says Save the Children’s EU Director, Ester Asin. “Today, national and EU policies have become even more restrictive, and many more children risk not having papers, or going underground.”
Children trying to cross borders in the Western Balkans are often the victims of violent pushbacks by border staff, making them use even more clandestine and dangerous routes. In the Greek #hotspots children are kept, sometimes in conditions which are similar to prisons, waiting on decisions on their asylum claims, in some cases for more than a year. Save the Children has witnessed #suicide attempts and self-harm among children as young as nine years old in the Greek hotspots (refugee reception centres). Mental health issues are widespread among migrant and refugee children across Europe. In Sweden last February, seven refugee children attempted to kill themselves, three of them succeeded.
“Whilst we are pleased to see an increased commitment by the European Commission and Member States to protect children in migration, this will have little effect when they are balanced by border procedures leading to children spending long periods in detention centres; being issued temporary permits which offer them more insecurity; or returning them to countries where their safety cannot be guaranteed,” says Asin.
Reports from Save the Children’s national programmes show that children’s fear of being returned to the country where they came from or, in some cases, to a third country they have never known might push them underground. Many Afghan children living in Sweden, for example, grew up in Iran. They are now being sent back to #Afghanistan, a country with which they have no links, and of which they have no memory.
Many European countries are taking advantage of the notion of a ‘migration crisis’ and the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment to take in even fewer asylum-seekers than before the crisis started. Today Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Slovenia and Poland take in fewer asylum-seekers than in 2012-2013, while Greece and Italy account for nearly one third of all asylum applications.
Estin added: “Children pay a huge price for this acute lack of solidarity. They either face hardship and insecurity in the EU, or risk their lives at sea and in the desert by taking more dangerous routes due to a rise in checkpoints and border control, supported by the EU.”
Lien vers le rapport:
▻https://www.savethechildren.net/sites/default/files/KEEPING%20CHILDREN%20AT%20THE%20CENTRE%202017_%20DEF_%20LOW_%202__.
Atlas of Challenges and Opportunities in European Neighbourhoods
CIST – Collège international des sciences du territoire
▻http://www.gis-cist.fr/en/portfolio/atlas-of-challenges-and-opportunities-in-european-neighbourhoods
▻https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-28521-4
Pierre Beckouche, Pierre Besnard & Hugues Pecout (eds.), Springer, 2016
▻https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-28521-4.pdf
This atlas provides a macro-regional overview of the areas that surround the European Union, from the Sahara to the Middle East, Western Balkans to European Russia, Turkey to the Arctic. Detailing key socio-economic data as well as developmental trends, the maps provide a comprehensive territorial analysis at local scale and explore the potential for regional integration and cooperation.
These pioneering maps examine challenges that threaten this wide yet inter-connected region, including environmental concerns in the North, political unrest in the East, social factors in the Western Balkans, and the upheaval in the Mediterranean since the Arab spring. Coverage investigates such key countries and areas as Libya, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Ukraine, as well as explores such essential issues as Europe’s energy procurement. In addition, it also presents a comparison with other world regions such as East Asia and North America.
In the end, readers discover that territorial integration faces many shortcomings, but that deep regional cooperation would be a key driver for the EU’s sustainable future.
This atlas features the main results of the “Integrated Territorial Analysis of the Neighbourhoods” research project undertaken by ESPON (The European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion). It provides scholars, local authorities and NGOs involved in cross-border cooperation, companies interested in energy, agriculture, water, transportation and communication, and interested readers with key insights into this important region.
Report : Western Balkans route not closed, just diverted via Bulgaria – EURACTIV.com
►https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/report-western-balkans-route-not-closed-just-diverted-via-bulgaria
Don, l’Europe essaye de fermer les corridors (ou « routes ») migratoires.
A report by a German think tank reveals the deficiencies of the deal with Turkey to stem the flow of refugees to Europe. Migration is on the menu of the two-day summit starting today (22 June).
Migration will be discussed on Friday (23 June), the second day of the summit. According to diplomats decisions are not expected at this stage, but a frank discussion “on the external aspects” is very likely to take place.
On Wednesday (21 June), the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung released a 26-page report, pointing out at the fragility of the situation since the EU-Turkey deal, which in theory closed the Western Balkans route.
War is brewing in the Balkans again –the West can’t afford to turn a blind eye any longer
Comments from EU official Johannes Hahn suggest that the long ignored western Balkans is now drawing the EU’s attention.
Older Syrian Refugee Dies Waiting for Family Reunification
Fatima, 62 years old, fled persecution and the destruction of her city of Aleppo, Syria, with the dream of reuniting with her daughter and grandchildren in Germany. She survived the treacherous journey to Greece, but border restrictions in the Western Balkans stranded her there. She died last week in Athens, still waiting to reunite with her family.
Enough is enough: deaths on the western Balkans route
IRR News continues its investigation into violations and deaths at EU borders, focusing on seven deaths in the Serbian, Hungarian and Bulgarian border zones.
Violence at the Hungarian border
This winter, as temperatures dropped to 20 below zero, the level of violence at Hungary’s border with Serbia increased sharply, with many describing acts that can be only seen as torture. People of all ages, some as young as 13, were beaten, stripped naked and ordered to lie face-down in the mud, snow or water for as long as an hour. Their clothing was taken or destroyed. Water poured down their necks. Eyes pepper sprayed. Batons struck against genitals. Forced selfies with laughing officers. All this performed by people in “dark blue uniforms” – official Hungarian border police.
Over the past two years, the Hungarian government has been running a “xenophobic scapegoating campaign" against migration, according to the Helsinki Committee. A 175 kilometer long fence has been setup along the Serbian-Hungarian border, while parallel efforts have been made to prevent the possibility of getting asylum through legal paths.
Meanwhile in Serbia, the number of refugees significantly exceeds the country’s accommodation capacity and is still growing. During one of the harshest winters in years, up to 2000 people have had no alternative but to sleep rough outdoors – on the streets of Belgrade or in the forests of the north. Without a safe place to stay in Serbia and no legal way to travel backwards, they’ve been stuck in limbo.
For most of them, attempting irregular crossings has become the only option. Nearly all of those who tried encountered systematic brutality and humiliation regardless of their gender, age or nationality.
Numerous cases of beatings, dog bites and other abuses at the hands of Hungarian border police have been reported by human rights organisations and activists during the past year. From January 2016 to February 2017, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) treated over a hundred people in Belgrade alone with intentional injuries allegedly perpetrated by the Hungarian border patrols.
Although the Hungarian authorities deny all the accusations, the enormous scale and clear pattern of violence leave no doubt: these are not just rare and isolated acts of brutality.
The stories in this video were collected during January and February 2017. During these 2 months we’ve interviewed more than 20 victims of abuse following human rights reporting guidelines. Informally, we’ve talked with many more.
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nYxb2rtAohQ
Monitoring human rights violations at the Hungarian border
Sonia Nandzik of the Serbian volunteer group #Fresh_Response describes how the group has responded to the increasing savagery of Hungarian police at the border.
http://www.irr.org.uk/app/uploads/2017/03/boot-print-768x431.jpg 
http://www.irr.org.uk/app/uploads/2017/03/IMG_4805-768x512.jpg 
http://www.irr.org.uk/app/uploads/2017/03/IMG_4811.jpg
Germany migrants: Record number opt to leave - most to Balkans
Germany’s Sueddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) daily got the January-November data from the Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Most of the migrants went back to the Western Balkans.
Albanians formed the largest group - 15,000. The numbers from Serbia, Iraq and #Kosovo totalled about 5,000 each.
Last year 890,000 asylum seekers reached Germany - a record influx.
In 2016, Germany deported 25,000 migrants. Those arriving from the Western Balkans generally have no right to stay in Germany.
The BAMF says increasing numbers of asylum seekers are also returning voluntarily to Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan.
▻http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38449841
#asile #migrations #réfugiés #retour_au_pays #Allemagne #Irak #Serbie #Afghanistan #Iran #Albanie #retour
Syrian refugees in Germany contemplate return home
Some Syrian refugees in Germany have made arrangements to return home voluntarily. DW has spoken to a few of these refugees about the challenges they face.
▻http://www.dw.com/en/syrian-refugees-in-germany-contemplate-return-home/a-37305045
#Syrie #réfugiés_syriens
Refugees and vulnerable migrants in Europe
This edition of Humanitarian Exchange is dedicated to the humanitarian response to the influx of refugees and vulnerable migrants into Europe over the past year.
One of the most notable features of the European response, as Pamela DeLargy notes in her lead article, is the central role volunteers have played – in stark contrast to the much slower response of international agencies and donors.
Laetitia de Radigues and Ludovico Gammarelli give an overview of the European Commission’s response.
Key findings of research led by Coventry University on the complex picture of migration into Greece are summarised by Heaven Crawley.
Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Richard Mallett highlight the limitations of deterrence policies in determining people’s migration choices.
Amelia Stoenescu and colleagues report on International Organisation for Migration (IOM) data and information-sharing systems to track movements in the Western Balkans.
Gareth Walker discusses the challenges of addressing the health needs of mobile populations.
Returning to the issue of volunteerism, John Borton reflects on the potential implications for humanitarian action.
Emma Eggink and Melinda McRostie give a first-hand account of the evolution of the Starfish Foundation, a grassroots volunteer initiative on Lesvos.
The contribution of Hellenic Red Cross volunteers is highlighted by Kate Latimir.
Rachel Erskine and Katie Robertson outline RedR’s training programme for volunteers.
In a pair of articles, Elodie Francart, Michaël Neuman and Angélique Muller reflect on Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)’s experience in Brussels and northern France in engaging with NGOs, volunteer groups, municipal officials and political activists.
Alexandre Le Clève, Evangeline Masson-Diez and Olivier Peyroux underline the predicament of unaccompanied children in camps in northern France and along the Channel coast.
Minh Tram Le and colleagues highlight the importance of infant and young child feeding for refugees stranded in Greece.
The edition ends with articles by Emily Whitehead and Theo Hannides and colleagues reflecting on the findings from an independent evaluation of the Start Network’s collaborative response and the findings of Start-funded research on the information and communication needs of refugees in Greece and Germany.
▻http://odihpn.org/magazine/refugees-vulnerable-migrants-europe
#asile #migrations #réfugiés #personnes_vulnérables #vulnérabilité
Renewable energy in the Balkans: enough bad
Despite the commitments defined by the Energy Community Treaty, most of the investments in the energy sector in the Western Balkans are still directed to coal plants
▻http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Balkans/Renewable-energy-in-the-Balkans-enough-bad-172389
How migration flows are changing
Migration from the Middle East and Africa to Europe has various drivers, but the conflicts in this part of the world accounts for the greater part of the flows. Eighty-five percent of those who arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean since 1 January are from three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. These are among the deadliest conflicts surrounding Europe.
▻http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_migration_flows_are_changing
#routes_migratoires #itinéraires_migratoires #asile #migrations #réfugiés
Q&A : How closed borders detour migrant routes
All eyes were on Hungary when it constructed the first border fence on the Western Balkans route in summer 2015 in an attempt to stop migrants and refugees from entering its territory. The fence, however, did not stop the flow, it detoured the people - and so did several other fences built along both the external EU borders as well as within the Schengen area. Despite the limited effect of physically closed borders to stem the flow or solve the migration crisis, countries along the so-called ‘Western Balkans route’ keep on introducing similar measures.
▻http://www.icmpd.org/news-centre/news-detail/qa-how-closed-borders-change-migrant-routes
Refugee crisis: Arrivals rocket in Italy amid warnings Turkey deal could force migrants on more dangerous routes
The number of refugees arriving in Italy is rising sharply amid fears that a controversial deal struck with Turkey could force asylum seekers to take longer and more dangerous routes to Europe.
UN Women assesses the needs of women migrants and refugees in Serbia and fYR Macedonia
“The advance of ISIS terrified me. I bid farewell to my husband and sold my business in order escape with my daughter. I wanted her to be able to continue her studies in law and live a good life in peace. After years of conflict and unrest in Syria, this has become impossible,” said 48-year-old Sawsan from Hama, Syria.
http://www2.unwomen.org/~/media/headquarters/images/sections/news/stories/2016/refugeecentresgreecemacedonia_nov2015__mnd4300_675x450.jpg?v=1&d=20160113T233644?la=en 
http://www2.unwomen.org/~/media/headquarters/images/sections/news/stories/2016/refugeecentresgreecemacedonia_nov2015__mnd4343_675x450.jpg?v=1&d=20160113T234230?la=en Le rapport complet:
Gender Assessment of the Refugee and Migration Crisis in Serbia and fYR Macedonia
In 2015 over one million women and men sought asylum in Western Europe. The vast majority transited from Turkey to Greece and traveled through the Western Balkans to reach destination countries further north. For the countries of the Western Balkans, especially for fYR Macedonia and Serbia this was the first time they were confronted with such a massive refugee flow since the Yugoslav wars. The governments had to quickly scale up their response with the support of UN agencies and international organizations. This publication is a gender analysis of the response in fYR Macedonia and Serbia which looks at the main risks that women and girl refugees face; classifies the services available for women; determines which barriers exist to access services and information for women and recommends how gender issues can be mainstreamed in the national and international response.
Recommendations to Government, UN and NGO counterparts include: to strengthen coordinated action on mainstreaming of gender-responsive programming and advocacy; and increase national capacity to effectively respond to the specific needs, priorities of and protection risks facing refugee and migrant women and girls. The report also calls for more attention to be paid to gender based violence and establishment of referal mechanisms; women only spaces along the transit route; the provision of more information on transit that women can easily access; and the collection and use of sex-disaggreagated data for planning and operations.
▻http://www2.unwomen.org/~/media/field%20office%20eca/images/publications/serbia/publication%20cover%20gender%20assesment%20refugeef.png?d=20160112T163
►http://eca.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2016/01/gender-assessment-of-the-refugee-and-migration-crisis-in-serbia-and-fyr
#parcours_migratoire #itinéraire_migratoire
Réfugiés : en attendant #Frontex, scènes de chaos à la #frontière entre la #Grèce et la #Macédoine
Depuis l’instauration du #tri entre « réfugiés de guerre » et « migrants économiques », la situation ne fait qu’empirer à la frontière gréco-macédonienne. Alors que la Macédoine continue d’installer une clôture de barbelés, les affrontements sur le terrain deviennent quotidiens, tandis que les passeurs font leur grand retour. Témoignages.
UNHCR concerned by violence at Greek border, calls for improved security
UNHCR is deeply concerned about the tension and violence at the border between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and calls on the authorities of both countries to manage the border in a manner consistent with human rights and refugee-protection principles.
As a result of restrictions by the authorities along the Western Balkans route to the admission of refugees and migrants from countries other than Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, tensions have been rising at Idomeni, on the Greek side of the border, in recent days. These tensions have lead on several occasions to violence and a temporary closure of the border.
In this context, UNHCR is saddened by the death of a Moroccan man at the border today under as yet unclear circumstances. This tragic incident further underlies the need for the authorities to take appropriate action. We are calling on the Greek authorities to restore security as a matter of priority in order to ensure the protection of those in need and the safety of humanitarian workers and volunteers.
Transportation has been made available for the refugees and migrants who have been refused admission into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to return to Athens, where reception facilities and assistance are available and UNHCR staff is present to offer individual advice and legal counselling on a case-by-case basis.
UNHCR reiterates its concerns over the consequences of border restrictions currently implemented by several countries in the Balkans. UNHCR recommends profiling people based on their protection needs and not on their nationality. UNHCR and other organisations have called on the concerned states to re-establish coordination and response mechanisms agreed at the Western Balkans Summit on 8 October and the Leaders’ Meeting on 25 October 2015.
Macedonia: Tear gas and rubber bullets as border tensions mount
Amid increasing tension and violent clashes in the policing of refugees and migrants protesting at the Greek-Macedonian border, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia) border police must show restraint and comply fully with international policing standards, said Amnesty International today.
▻http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/macedonia-tear-gas-and-rubber-bullets-as-border-tensions-mount
Tout est prêt pour l’arrivée de Frontex à #Idomeni
(photo de Giorgos Moutafis)
A Idomeni, en Grèce, la rage et l’amertume des migrants « économiques »
Il a le poing levé, prêt à jeter une pierre… et puis non. Finalement, il renonce, refuse de s’abandonner au sentiment d’injustice qui ne le quitte plus depuis dix jours qu’il est bloqué dans le tout petit village grec d’Idomeni, à la frontière avec la Macédoine. Ayoub a 20 ans. Il est marocain, titulaire d’une licence en administration de systèmes et réseaux. « J’ai tant sacrifié pour arriver jusqu’ici, soupire-t-il. Je ne vais pas maintenant me transformer en animal et lancer des pierres à des familles syriennes. »
▻http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/12/05/a-idomeni-en-grece-la-rage-et-l-amertume-des-migrants-economiques_4825252_32
#tri
Refugee electrocuted touching railway cables as protests break out on Greek-Macedonian border
A refugee has been electrocuted to death at the Greek-Macedonian border during the second day of clashes between police and refugees in the area.
▻http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-electrocuted-touching-railway-cables-as-protests-break-out-on
#police #violences_policières #mourir_aux_frontières
Thousands still at Greek-FYR Macedonia border
Thousands of refugees and migrants were stuck at the border between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on Friday following tense protests which prevented anyone from crossing for more than 24 hours.
Idomeni : les portes de l’Europe ferment.
Il y a quelques mois, personne ne connaissait Idomeni, petite communequi borde la longue ligne ferroviaire au nord de la Grece, la reliant à la Macédoine. Au printemprs, lorsque le flux migratoire s’est intensifié, la voie des réfugiés s’est dessinée. Une traversée en canot de la Turquie aux îles grecques de Kos, Lesbos, Leros... Un ferry escale direction Athènes. Le train ou le bus jusqu’a Idomeni. Aux confins de la Grèce, ils passaient alors sans difficultés, un passage légal et ouvert, tout comme sur le reste de la route des Balkans, à condition d’avoir le « sésame », une injonction à quitter le territoire qui paradoxalement, autorise à circuler dans le pays. Construction d’une clôture Le 20 novembre, cette voie s’est brisée.
Urgent: Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia are separating migrants due to their (supposed) nationalities
Posted by movebus on November 19, 2015 in Croatia, EU, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia
Since yesterday the states of Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia are separating migrants due to their (supposed) nationalities by racial profiling. Obviously the IOM and UNHCR are collaborating with the governments in this issue.
The goal of the governments is to prevent those from entering their countries, who are not of (supposedly) Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan origin and to weaken the power of the migration movement. It is not clear what will happen now to those who are separated and prevented from entrance. It is not recommended to sign any paper, which you cannot read. Always ask for translation into your language and ask what are the consequences of signing.
There were reports from the Greek-/Macedonian border, that people who had lost their Greek registration papers had to show their ID to enter into Macedonia. This can be very difficult and problematic, so keep an eye on your Greek papers.
We demand to immediately put an end to the practice of racial profiling and to guarantee freedom of movement for everybody!
▻http://live.w2eu.info/croatia/11/19/urgent-macedonia-serbia-croatia-and-slovenia-are-separating-migrants-due
#Balkans #migrations #réfugiés #fermeture_des_frontières #asile #Grèce #Macédoine #frontières
Greek-Macedonian border crossing (Idomeni)
Posted by movebus on November 19, 2015 in EU, Greece, Macedonia
After being closed today, the border from Greece to Macedonia/FYROM was opened again. But still according to our observations, only persons of (supposed) Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi nationality are allowed to enter Macedonia. It is not clear yet, what is going to happen to those who are rejected at the border.
▻http://live.w2eu.info/macedonia/11/19/greek-macedonian-border-crossing-idomeni
Les pays des Balkans imposent « une ségrégation nationale » à leurs frontières
OXFORD, 19 novembre 2015 (IRIN) - Au moins trois pays de la route des Balkans - la principale voie empruntée par les migrants et les réfugiés qui tentent de rejoindre le nord de l’Europe depuis la Grèce - ont pris la décision soudaine d’introduire des contrôles frontaliers, autorisant uniquement l’entrée de ressortissants de certaines nationalités sur leur territoire.
▻http://www.irinnews.org/fr/reportfrench.aspx?ReportID=102230
"Rotta balcanica" chiusa ai «migranti economici»
Bloccata la «rotta balcanica» per i rifugiati che non fuggono da Siria, Afghanistan e Iraq. Per Slovenia, Croazia, Serbia e Macedonia i cittadini di altri paesi sono “migranti economici” e verranno respinti. Francesco Martino (OBC) per il GR di Radio Capodistria [20 novembre 2015]
La prima a muoversi è stata la Serbia, che nel pomeriggio di mercoledì scorso ha annunciato che nel paese possono ora entrare soltanto rifugiati e richiedenti asilo che provengono da Siria, Afghanistan e Iraq. Poi si è mossa la Macedonia, che ha annunciato misure equivalenti e ha fatto i primi passi per alzare una barriera al confine con la Grecia.
A seguire, sono arrivati gli annunci di Croazia e Slovenia: i cittadini di paesi come il Marocco, il Bangladesh, lo Sri Lanka, l’Algeria, il Congo o il Pakistan da oggi verranno considerati “migranti economici” e come tali verranno respinti alle frontiere.
La decisione a catena, come un effetto domino, sottolinea le forti preoccupazioni di tutti i paesi lungo la cosiddetta “rotta balcanica”, percorsa quest’anno da centinaia di migliaia di profughi e migranti per cercare rifugio nei paesi dell’Europa centrale, Germania in testa.
Con l’inverno alle porte, il timore è quello di non riuscire a gestire la presenza sul medio e lungo periodo di un alto numero di migranti, che fino ad oggi, grazie alla relativa permeabilità delle frontiere, hanno avuto la possibilità di raggiungere la propria destinazione finale.
Reazioni fortemente negative sono arrivate dall’Alto commissariato ONU per i rifugiati. Per l’UNHCR, la discriminazione alle frontiere sulla base esclusiva della nazionalità è assolutamente inaccettabile. “Ad ogni rifugiato deve essere garantito il diritto, che è personale, di poter presentare la propria domanda di protezione umanitaria”, ha ricordato Melita Sunijć, portavoce dell’organizzazione.
▻http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/Media/Multimedia/Rotta-balcanica-chiusa-ai-migranti-economici
Balkan countries close borders to ’economic migrants’
Four countries along the migratory route in the western Balkans have in one day closed their borders to all migrants except those from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, in a move that each justified because of restrictions imposed by the next country in the chain.
Migrants Protest After Macedonia Shuts Them Out
Hundreds of migrants have been protesting for several days at Macedonia’s southern border with Greece against Skopje’s decision only to allow them to transit the country if they come from war-torn states.
▻http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/migrants-protest-after-macedonia-shuts-them-out-11-22-2015-1
EN ▻http://consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/10/15-euco-conclusions
FR ▻http://consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/european-council/2015/10/15-euco-conclusions
extrait concernant les migrations des conclusions du Conseil européen du 15/10/15
1. Tackling the migration and refugee crisis is a common obligation which requires a comprehensive strategy and a determined effort over time in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility. The orientations agreed by Heads of State or Government on 23 September focused on the most pressing issues. Their implementation is advancing rapidly, as evidenced by work undertaken within the Council and by the Commission report of 14 October. This will be kept under close review, including as concerns the financial pledges and possible further needs.
2. Today, the European Council set out the following further orientations:
Cooperating with third countries to stem the flows
a) welcomes the joint Action Plan with Turkey as part of a comprehensive cooperation agenda based on shared responsibility, mutual commitments and delivery. Successful implementation will contribute to accelerating the fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap towards all participating Member States and the full implementation of the readmission agreement. Progress will be assessed in spring 2016. The EU and its Member States stand ready to increase cooperation with Turkey and step up their political and financial engagement substantially within the established framework. The accession process needs to be re-energized with a view to achieving progress in the negotiations in accordance with the negotiating framework and the relevant Council conclusions.
The European Council expressed its condolences to the people of Turkey following the Ankara bomb attack and pledged its support to fight terrorism;
b) ensure effective and operational follow up to the High-level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans Route, with particular emphasis on the management of migratory flows and the fight against criminal networks;
c) achieve concrete operational measures at the forthcoming Valletta Summit with African Heads of State or Government, focusing, in a fair and balanced manner, on effective return and readmission, dismantling of criminal networks and prevention of illegal migration, accompanied by real efforts to tackle root causes and to support the African socio-economic development together with a commitment concerning continued possibilities for legal migration;
d) explore possibilities for developing safe and sustainable reception capacities in the affected regions and providing lasting prospects and adequate procedures for refugees and their families, including through access to education and jobs, until return to their country of origin is possible;
e) ask Member States to further contribute to the efforts made to support UNHCR, World Food Programme and other agencies, as well as to support the EU’s Regional Trust Fund responding to the Syria crisis and the EU Trust Fund for Africa.
Strengthening the protection of the EU’s external borders (building on the Schengen acquis)
f) work towards the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders;
g) make full use of the existing Frontex mandate, including as regards the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams;
h) in accordance with the distribution of competences under the Treaty, in full respect of the national competence of the Member States, enhance the mandate of Frontex in the context of discussions over the development of a European Border and Coast Guard System, including as regards the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams in cases where Schengen evaluations or risk analysis demonstrate the need for robust and prompt action, in cooperation with the Member State concerned;
i) devise technical solutions to reinforce the control of the EU’s external borders to meet both migration and security objectives, without hampering the fluidity of movement;
j) welcome the Commission’s intention to rapidly present a package of measures with a view to improving the management of our external borders.
Responding to the influx of refugees in Europe and ensuring returns
k) in accordance with the decisions taken so far, press ahead with the establishment of further hotspots within the agreed timeframe to ensure the identification, registration, fingerprinting and reception of applicants for international protection and other migrants and at the same time ensure relocation and returns. Member States will support these efforts to the full, in the first place by meeting the calls for expertise from Frontex and EASO for the Migration Management Support Teams to work in hotspot areas and by the provision of necessary resources;
l) further to the first successful relocations, proceed rapidly with the full implementation of the decisions taken so far on relocation as well as our commitments on resettlement and on the functioning of hotspots;
m) at the same time step up implementation by the Member States of the Return Directive and, before the end of the year, create a dedicated return office within Frontex in order to scale up support to Member States;
n) enlarge the Frontex mandate on return to include the right to organise joint return operations on its own initiative, and enhance its role regarding the acquisition of travel documents for returnees;
o) promote the acceptance by third countries of an improved European return laissez-passer as the reference document for return purposes;
p) effectively implement all readmission commitments, whether undertaken through formal readmission agreements, the Cotonou Agreement or other arrangements;
q) further increase leverage in the fields of return and readmission, using where appropriate the “more‐for‐more” principle. In this regard, the Commission and the High Representative will propose, within six months, comprehensive and tailor‐made incentives to be used vis‐à‐vis third countries.
3. The orientations set out above represent a further important step towards our comprehensive strategy, consistent with the right to seek asylum, fundamental rights and international obligations. There are however other important priority actions that require further discussions in the relevant fora, including the Commission proposals. And there is a need for continuing reflection on the overall migration and asylum policy of the EU. The European Council will keep developments under review.
#réfugiés #asile #migrations #Europe #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Frontex #contrôles_frontaliers #Turquie
merci @isskein
Western Balkan Exodus Puts Pressure on Germany and EU - SPIEGEL ONLINE
▻http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/western-balkan-exodus-puts-pressure-on-germany-and-eu-a-1049274.html
Krasniqi is not a war refugee, nor was he persecuted back home. In fact, he has nothing to fear in his native Kosovo. He says that he ran away from something he considers to be even worse than rockets and Kalashnikovs: hopelessness. [...]
... it is difficult to be somebody in Kosovo, unless you have #influence or are part of the #mafia, which is often the same thing. Taken together, the wealth of all parliamentarians in Kosovo is such that each of them could be a millionaire. But Krasniqi works seven days a week as a bartender, and earns just €200 ($220) a month.
But a lack of prospects is not a recognized reason for asylum, which is why Krasniqi’s application was initially denied. The 30,000 Kosovars who have applied for asylum in Germany since the beginning of the year are in similar positions. And the Kosovars are not the only ones. This year, the country has seen the arrival of 5,514 Macedonians, 11,642 Serbians, 29,353 Albanians and 2,425 Montenegrins. Of the 196,000 people who had filed an initial application for asylum in Germany by the end of July, 42 percent are from the former Yugoslavia, a region now known as the Western Balkans.
Europe migrants: Tracing perilous Balkan route to Germany
For many thousands of migrants heading to Europe from the Middle East, the long route to a new life now lies through Greece and the Western Balkans with the ultimate destination in Germany and other northern EU countries.
Fear, fatigue and separation: a journey with migrants willing to risk everything
Smugglers are taking more illegal migrants through the western Balkans, but the route holds great hardships for a group of west Africans heading for Macedonia
On apprend toujours des choses quand on lit les rapports #Frontex (mais mon dieu comme ils sont longs... ces gens à Varsovie, n’ont rien d’autre à faire?)
By far the most commonly used method by irregular migrants in the Western Balkans is a simple crossing of green borders on foot and subsequent transport by car, taxi, van or regular bus lines. This option is cheap, usually does not require facilitators to be present during the crossings and information about optimal places to do the crossing is easily shared among would-be migrants (through the internet, Facebook and web-forums). (Frontex 2014: 27)
–-> et la solution selon Frontex:
Effective surveillance is probably the best tool to counter this method as clearly shown by footage from Albanian border with Montenegro. In one case alone, images of SMARTDEC* cameras installed at green border (railway) with Montenegro enabled Albanian Border Police to detect four migrants who were attempting illegal border-crossing
(oho... Smartdec a détecté 4 migrants... yes! 4!!!)
#SMARTDEC is an electronic border guard for perimeter surveillance in remote areas. Small, wireless, and easily camouflaged detectors that are equipped with a camera and long-lasting batteries. Cameras are linked to motion sensors that relay visual confirmation (semimotion video) in a matter of seconds. The cameras are programmed to only recognise human and vehicular infiltrations.
Et voici le site où l’on parle de Smartdec:
▻http://www.defendec.com/remote-monitoring-system
(regardez les sponsors en bas à droite)
#surveillance #migration #frontière #asile #réfugiés #contrôle_frontalier #technologie
cc @reka @fil
Tiré de ce rapport de Frontex:
►http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/WB_ARA_2014.pdf
(p.27)
ça doit être ça:
Le voilà en oeuvre, au moins je crois:
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iRW5Al7jE6s
Et voilà une image tirée du rapport Frontex (p.28):
Dans ce rapport, d’ailleurs, Frontex parle de « #facilitator » et non pas de « #smuggler »... à vérifier si cela a toujours été le cas, ou si ils ont changé de vocabulaire en cours de route...
Ah non, tiens tiens, quelques paragraphes après :
The arrested person was only responsible for one leg of the journey. Serbian Police suspect that he was in fact hired by smugglers who are probably not on the territory of Serbia.
les deux mots sont utilisés comme synonymes ? Ou alors c’est quoi la différence ?
Tiens tiens tiens, un nouveau mot apparaît « #organisers » :
Collected intelligence by Serbian authorities indicated that organisers were often former non-European migrants staying in Bulgaria or Serbia or were Serbian nationals previously involved in smuggling of goods across the border. Communication between organisers and local facilitators was done using internet and disposable mobile phones.
(p.29)
Et on parle aussi de « #facilitation_services » :
These cases would indicate that facilitation services are organised in stages, relatively inexpensive and often arranged by former migrants. Dismantling such #smuggling_organisations is therefore very difficult.
(p.29)
Et plus loin (facilitators are smuggling people...) —> p.32 :
Along the route, the facilitators, who are involved in the smuggling of irregular migrants, are mainly from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Hungary, Pakistan and Serbia.