• Prise en charge des affections longue durée : ce qui se passe depuis Sarkozy est gravissime – Libération
    https://www.liberation.fr/societe/sante/prise-en-charge-des-affections-longue-duree-ce-qui-se-passe-depuis-sarkoz
    https://www.liberation.fr/resizer/4fQQZ9rz3r0YowjSgNoBgjb3AD0=/1200x630/filters:format(jpg):quality(70):focal(2371x1106:2381x1116)/cloudfront-eu-central-1.images.arcpublishing.com/liberation/IZ7SLVPTYNA2XKRFYHLV6N4EKM.jpg

    « La protection sociale est plus un coût dans la compétitivité internationale qu’un avantage », expliquait l’économiste Eric Le Boucher dans le Figaro en 2006, alors que Nicolas Sarkozy entamait sa longue marche vers la présidentielle, avec son slogan fétiche « Travailler plus pour gagner plus », et parmi les mesures phares de son projet néolibéral la mise en place de franchises sur les soins, au nom de la responsabilisation… des cancéreux, des accidentés du travail, des diabétiques et des insuffisants rénaux. « Y a-t-il une assurance sans franchise ? » demandait-il, goguenard, devant un public conquis. Dix-huit ans plus tard, le travail de sape a bien avancé. Les franchises sur les soins ont été adoptées en 2007, malgré une forte mobilisation et la grève des soins entamée par Bruno-Pascal Chevalier, militant du sida aujourd’hui décédé. Le périmètre des affections de longue durée (ALD) bénéficiant d’une prise en charge à 100 % a été redéfini, à la baisse, avec la sortie de l’hypertension artérielle (HTA) sévère, ce qui a touché des millions de personnes, au motif que la HTA n’était pas une maladie, mais un facteur de risque. Qu’importe la cohérence financière, car évidemment traiter les maladies chroniques dès le départ pour éviter leur aggravation abaisse le coût final pour la collectivité. Qu’importe l’écart d’espérance de

  • In cerca di te. Solo me ne vo’ …
    https://www.meltingpot.org/2024/03/in-cerca-di-te-solo-me-ne-vo

    Tirò un lungo e profondissimo respiro, ma non si mosse. Il mento attaccato al petto, la testa gli era rotolata sulla spalla come un macigno. Era una pena al cuore guardarlo. Se fosse esistita una bilancia per misurare la tristezza dentro quel suo sguardo sconsolato gliene avrebbero trovata a quintali, quasi avesse la calamita per attirare su di sé tutte le disgrazie di questo mondo. Il viso giovane mostrava i segni di una sofferenza antica e certamente ingiusta per la sua età, che però non oscurava, al contrario addolciva, i bei lineamenti marcati. Di quel suo aspetto tribolato Ali San

    #Notizie #Italia #Migrazioni #Racconti_di_vita #Sara_Forcella

  • The #Rainforest_Tribunal

    “The forest is gone – where is the money?” – Malaysian indigenous leaders, anti-corruption activists and international experts cover alleged corruption and environmental crimes under the late Malaysian politician Abdul Taib Mahmud in this explosive new film

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggeWljY7VVo


    #forêt #Malaysia #justice #justice_transformatrice #film #film_documentaire #déforestation #Sarawak #Bruno_Manser_Fonds #Malaisie #peuples_autochtones #Penan

  • I dati che raccontano la guerra ai soccorsi nell’anno nero della strage di Cutro

    Nel 2023 le autorità italiane hanno classificato come operazioni di polizia e non Sar oltre mille sbarchi, per un totale di quasi 40mila persone, un quarto degli arrivi via mare. Dati inediti del Viminale descrivono la “strategia” contro le Ong e l’intento di creare l’emergenza a Lampedusa concentrando lì oltre i due terzi degli approdi.

    Nell’anno della strage di Cutro (26 febbraio 2023) le autorità italiane hanno classificato come operazioni di polizia oltre 1.000 sbarchi, per un totale di quasi 40mila persone, poco più di un quarto di tutti gli arrivi via mare. Questo nonostante gli effetti funesti che la confusione tra “law enforcement” e ricerca e soccorso ha prodotto proprio in occasione del naufragio di fine febbraio dell’anno scorso a pochi metri dalle coste calabresi, quando morirono più di 90 persone, e sulla quale sta indagando la Procura di Crotone.

    Quello degli eventi strumentalmente classificati come di natura poliziesca in luogo del soccorso, anche dopo i fatti di Cutro, è solo uno dei dati attraverso i quali si può leggere come è andata lo scorso anno nel Mediterraneo. È possibile farlo dopo aver ottenuto dati inediti dal ministero dell’Interno, che rispetto al passato ha fortemente ridotto qualità e quantità degli elementi pubblicati nel cruscotto statistico giornaliero e nella sua rielaborazione di fine anno.

    Prima però partiamo dai dati noti. Nel 2023 sono sbarcate sulle coste italiane 157.651 persone (il Viminale talvolta ne riporta 157.652, ma la sostanza è identica). Il dato è il più alto dal 2017 ma inferiore al 2016, quando furono 181.436. Le prime cinque nazionalità dichiarate al momento dello sbarco, che rappresentano quasi il 50% degli arrivi, sono di cittadini della Guinea, Tunisia, Costa d’Avorio, Bangladesh, Egitto. I minori soli sono stati 17.319.

    E qui veniamo ai dati che ci ha trasmesso il Viminale a seguito di un’istanza di accesso civico generalizzato. La stragrande maggioranza delle persone sbarcate è partita nel 2023 dalla Tunisia: oltre 97mila persone sulle 157mila totali. Segue a distanza la Libia, con 52mila partenze, quasi doppiata, e poi più dietro la Turchia (7.150), Algeria, Libano e finanche Cipro.

    Come mostrano le elaborazioni grafiche dei dati governativi, ci sono stati mesi in cui dalla Tunisia sono sbarcate anche oltre 20mila persone. Una tendenza che ha conosciuto una brusca interruzione a partire dal mese di ottobre 2023, quando gli sbarchi in quota Tunisia, al netto delle condizioni meteo marine, sono crollati a poco meno di 1.900, attestandosi poco sotto i 5mila nei due mesi successivi.

    Tradotto: l’ultimo trimestre dello scorso anno ha visto una forte diminuzione degli sbarchi provenienti dalla Tunisia, Paese con il quale Unione europea e Italia hanno stretto il “solito” accordo che prevede soldi e forniture in cambio di “contrasto ai flussi”, ovvero contrasto ai diritti umani. È lo schema libico, con le differenze del caso. Il ministro Matteo Piantedosi il 31 dicembre 2023, intervistato da La Stampa, ha rivendicato la bontà della strategia parlando di “121.883 persone” (dando l’idea di un conteggio analitico e quotidiano) “bloccate” grazie alla “collaborazione con le autorità tunisine e libiche”.

    Un altro dato utilissimo per capire come “funziona” la macchina mediatica della presunta “emergenza immigrazione” è quello dei porti di sbarco. Il primo e incontrastato porto sul quale lo scorso anno è stata scaricata la stragrande maggioranza degli sbarchi è Lampedusa, con quasi 110mila arrivi (di cui “solo” 7.400 autonomi) contro i 5.500 di Augusta, Roccella Jonica, i 4.800 di Pantelleria e i 3.800 di Catania. In passato non è sempre stato così. Ma Lampedusa è troppo importante per due ragioni: dare in pasto all’opinione pubblica l’idea di una situazione esplosiva e ingestibile, bloccando i trasferimenti verso la terraferma (vedasi l’estate 2023), e contemporaneamente convogliare quanti più richiedenti asilo potenziali possibile nella macchina del trattenimento dell’hotspot.

    Benché in Italia si sia convinti che a soccorrere le persone in mare siano solo le acerrime nemiche Ong, i dati, ancora una volta, confermano il loro ruolo ridotto a marginale dopo anni di campagne diffamatorie, criminalizzazione penale e vera e propria persecuzione amministrativa. Nel 2023, infatti, gli assetti delle Organizzazioni non governative hanno salvato e sbarcato in Italia neanche 9mila persone. Poco più del 5% del totale. Anche nei mesi più intensi degli arrivi la quota delle Ong è stata limitata.

    Come noto, le poche navi umanitarie intervenute sono state deliberatamente indirizzate verso porti lontani. Il primo per numero di persone sbarcate è stato Brindisi (quasi 1.400 sbarcati su 9mila), ovvero 285 miglia in più rispetto al Sud-Ovest della Sicilia. Segue Lampedusa con 980, vero, ma poi ci sono Carrara (535 miglia di distanza in più dalla Sicilia), Trapani, Salerno, Bari, Civitavecchia, Ortona.

    Non è facile dire quanti giorni di navigazione in più questa “strategia” brutale abbia esattamente determinato. Un esperto operatore di ricerca e soccorso in mare aiuta a fare due conti a spanne: “Le navi normalmente viaggiano a meno di dieci nodi, calcolando una velocità di sette nodi andare a Brindisi implica circa 41 ore in più rispetto ai porti più vicini del Sud della Sicilia, come ad esempio Pozzallo. E per arrivare a Pozzallo dalla cosiddetta ‘SAR 1’, a Ovest di Tripoli, partendo da una distanza dalla costa libica di circa 35 miglia, tra Zuara e Zawiya, ci vogliono circa 24 ore”.

    Una recente analisi di Sos Humanity -ripresa dal Guardian a metà febbraio- ha stimato che questo modus operandi delle autorità italiane possa aver complessivamente fatto perdere alle navi delle Ong 374 giorni di operatività. Nell’anno in cui sono morte annegate ufficialmente almeno 2.500 persone e intercettate dalle milizie libiche e riportate indietro, sempre ufficialmente, quasi 17.200 (con l’ancora una volta dimostrata complicità dell’Agenzia europea Frontex). Ma sono tempi così oscuri che ostacolare le “ambulanze” è divenuto un vanto.

    https://altreconomia.it/i-dati-che-raccontano-la-guerra-ai-soccorsi-nellanno-nero-della-strage-

    #statistiques #débarquement #Italie #migrations #réfugiés #chiffres #sauvetage #ONG #SAR #search-and-rescue #Méditerranée #Lampedusa #law_enforcement #2023 #Tunisie #Libye #externalisation #accord #urgence #hotspot

  • La resistenza del Sulcis contro la colonizzazione verde
    https://irpimedia.irpi.eu/senzasegnale-sardegna-sulcis-energie-rinnovabili

    Nuovi investimenti infrastrutturali e un mercato fuori controllo hanno portato il sud ovest della #Sardegna al centro del mercato speculativo per le rinnovabili, ma la popolazione si oppone L’articolo La resistenza del Sulcis contro la colonizzazione verde proviene da IrpiMedia.

    #Ambiente #Diritti #Lavoro #Agricoltura #Energia #Spesa_pubblica
    https://irpimedia.irpi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/senzasegnale-sulcis-panorama-2.mp4


    https://irpimedia.irpi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/senzasegnale-sulcis-panorama-1-1.mp4

  • Quand le #comité_d’éthique du #CNRS se penche sur l’#engagement_public des chercheurs et chercheuses

    #Neutralité ? #Intégrité ? #Transparence ?

    Le Comité d’éthique du CNRS rappelle qu’il n’y a pas d’#incompatibilité de principe, plaide pour un « guide pratique de l’engagement » et place la direction de l’institution scientifique devant les mêmes obligations que les chercheurs.

    Avec la crise climatique, la pandémie de covid-19, l’accroissement des inégalités, le développement de l’intelligence artificielle ou les technologies de surveillance, la question de l’#engagement public des chercheurs est d’autant plus visible que les réseaux sociaux leur permettent une communication directe.

    Cette question dans les débats de société n’est pas nouvelle. De l’appel d’#Albert_Einstein, en novembre 1945, à la création d’un « #gouvernement_du_monde » pour réagir aux dangers de la #bombe_atomique à l’alerte lancée par #Irène_Frachon concernant le #Médiator, en passant par celle lancée sur les dangers des grands modèles de langage par #Timnit_Gebru et ses collègues, les chercheurs et chercheuses s’engagent régulièrement et créent même des sujets de #débats_publics.

    Une question renouvelée dans un monde incertain

    Le #comité_d'éthique_du_CNRS (#COMETS) ne fait pas semblant de le découvrir. Mais, selon lui, « face aux nombreux défis auxquels notre société est confrontée, la question de l’engagement public des chercheurs s’est renouvelée ». Il s’est donc auto-saisi pour « fournir aux chercheurs des clés de compréhension et des repères éthiques concernant l’engagement public » et vient de publier son #rapport sur le sujet [PDF].

    Il faut dire que les deux premières années du Covid-19 ont laissé des traces dans la communauté scientifique sur ces questions de prises de paroles des chercheurs. Le COMETS avait d’ailleurs publié en mai 2021 un avis accusant Didier Raoult alors que la direction du Centre avait rappelé tardivement à l’ordre, en août de la même année, et sans le nommer, le sociologue et directeur de recherche au CNRS Laurent Mucchielli, qui appelait notamment à suspendre la campagne de vaccination.

    Le COMETS relève que les chercheurs s’engagent selon des modalités variées, « de la signature de tribunes à la contribution aux travaux d’ONG ou de think tanks en passant par le soutien à des actions en justice ou l’écriture de billets de blog ». Il souligne aussi que les #réseaux_sociaux ont « sensiblement renforcé l’exposition publique des chercheurs engagés ».

    La présidente du comité d’éthique, Christine Noiville, égrène sur le site du CNRS, les « interrogations profondes » que ces engagements soulèvent :

    « S’engager publiquement, n’est-ce pas contraire à l’exigence d’#objectivité de la recherche ? N’est-ce pas risquer de la « politiser » ou de l’« idéologiser » ? S’engager ne risque-t-il pas de fragiliser la #crédibilité du chercheur, de mettre à mal sa réputation, sa carrière ? Est-on en droit de s’engager ? Pourrait-il même s’agir d’un devoir, comme certains collègues ou journalistes pourraient le laisser entendre ? »

    Pas d’incompatibilité de principe

    Le comité d’éthique aborde les inquiétudes que suscite cet engagement public des chercheurs et pose franchement la question de savoir s’il serait « une atteinte à la #neutralité_scientifique ? ». Faudrait-il laisser de côté ses opinions et valeurs pour « faire de la « bonne » science et produire des connaissances objectives » ?

    Le COMETS explique, en s’appuyant sur les travaux de l’anthropologue #Sarah_Carvallo, que ce concept de neutralité est « devenu central au XXe siècle, pour les sciences de la nature mais également pour les sciences sociales », notamment avec les philosophes des sciences #Hans_Reichenbach et #Karl_Popper, ainsi que le sociologue #Max_Weber dont le concept de « #neutralité_axiologique » – c’est-à-dire une neutralité comme valeur fondamentale – voudrait que le « savant » « tienne ses #convictions_politiques à distance de son enseignement et ne les impose pas subrepticement ».

    Mais le comité explique aussi, que depuis Reichenbach, Popper et Weber, la recherche a avancé. Citant le livre d’#Hilary_Putnam, « The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays », le COMETS explique que les chercheurs ont montré que « toute #science s’inscrit dans un #contexte_social et se nourrit donc de #valeurs multiples ».

    Le comité explique que le monde de la recherche est actuellement traversé de valeurs (citant le respect de la dignité humaine, le devoir envers les animaux, la préservation de l’environnement, la science ouverte) et que le chercheur « porte lui aussi nécessairement des valeurs sociales et culturelles dont il lui est impossible de se débarrasser totalement dans son travail de recherche ».

    Le COMETS préfère donc insister sur les « notions de #fiabilité, de #quête_d’objectivité, d’#intégrité et de #rigueur de la #démarche_scientifique, et de transparence sur les valeurs » que sur celle de la neutralité. « Dans le respect de ces conditions, il n’y a aucune incompatibilité avec l’engagement public du chercheur », assure-t-il.

    Liberté de s’engager... ou non

    Il rappelle aussi que les chercheurs ont une large #liberté_d'expression assurée par le code de l’éducation tout en n’étant pas exemptés des limites de droit commun (diffamation, racisme, sexisme, injure ...). Mais cette liberté doit s’appliquer à double sens : le chercheur est libre de s’engager ou non. Elle est aussi à prendre à titre individuel, insiste le COMETS : la démarche collective via les laboratoires, sociétés savantes et autres n’est pas la seule possible, même si donner une assise collective « présente de nombreux avantages (réflexion partagée, portée du message délivré, moindre exposition du chercheur, etc.) ».

    Le comité insiste par contre sur le fait que, lorsque le chercheur s’engage, il doit « prendre conscience qu’il met en jeu sa #responsabilité, non seulement juridique mais aussi morale, en raison du crédit que lui confère son statut et le savoir approfondi qu’il implique ».

    Il appuie aussi sur le fait que sa position privilégiée « crédite sa parole d’un poids particulier. Il doit mettre ce crédit au service de la collectivité et ne pas en abuser ».

    Des #devoirs lors de la #prise_de_parole

    Outre le respect de la loi, le COMETS considère, dans ce cadre, que les chercheurs et chercheuses ont des devoirs vis-à-vis du public. Notamment, ils doivent s’efforcer de mettre en contexte le cadre dans lequel ils parlent. S’agit-il d’une prise de parole en nom propre ? Le thème est-il dans le domaine de compétence du chercheur ? Est-il spécialiste ? A-t-il des liens d’intérêts ? Quelles valeurs sous-tendent son propos ? Le #degré_de_certitude doit aussi être abordé. Le Comité exprime néanmoins sa compréhension de la difficulté pratique que cela implique, vu les limites de temps de paroles dans les médias.

    Une autre obligation qui devrait s’appliquer à tout engagement de chercheurs selon le COMETS, et pas des moindres, est de l’asseoir sur des savoirs « robustes » et le faire « reposer sur une démarche scientifique rigoureuse ».

    Proposition de co-construction d’un guide

    Le COMETS recommande, dans ce cadre, au CNRS d’ « élaborer avec les personnels de la recherche un guide de l’engagement public » ainsi que des formations. Il propose aussi d’envisager que ce guide soit élaboré avec d’autres organismes de recherche.

    La direction du CNRS à sa place

    Le Comité d’éthique considère en revanche que « le CNRS ne devrait ni inciter, ni condamner a priori l’engagement des chercheurs, ni opérer une quelconque police des engagements », que ce soit dans l’évaluation des travaux de recherche ou dans d’éventuelles controverses provoquées par un engagement public.

    « La direction du CNRS n’a pas vocation à s’immiscer dans ces questions qui relèvent au premier chef du débat scientifique entre pairs », affirme-t-il. La place du CNRS est d’intervenir en cas de problème d’#intégrité_scientifique ou de #déontologie, mais aussi de #soutien aux chercheurs engagés « qui font l’objet d’#attaques personnelles ou de #procès_bâillons », selon lui.

    Le comité aborde aussi le cas dans lequel un chercheur mènerait des actions de #désobéissance_civile, sujet pour le moins d’actualité. Il considère que le CNRS ne doit ni « se substituer aux institutions de police et de justice », ni condamner par avance ce mode d’engagement, « ni le sanctionner en lieu et place de l’institution judiciaire ». Une #sanction_disciplinaire peut, par contre, être envisagée « éventuellement », « en cas de décision pénale définitive à l’encontre d’un chercheur ».

    Enfin, le Comité place la direction du CNRS devant les mêmes droits et obligations que les chercheurs dans son engagement vis-à-vis du public. Si le CNRS « prenait publiquement des positions normatives sur des sujets de société, le COMETS considère qu’il devrait respecter les règles qui s’appliquent aux chercheurs – faire connaître clairement sa position, expliciter les objectifs et valeurs qui la sous-tendent, etc. Cette prise de position de l’institution devrait pouvoir être discutée sur la base d’un débat contradictoire au sein de l’institution ».

    https://next.ink/985/quand-comite-dethique-cnrs-se-penche-sur-engagement-public-chercheurs-et-cherc

    • Avis du COMETS « Entre liberté et responsabilité : l’engagement public des chercheurs et chercheuses »

      Que des personnels de recherche s’engagent publiquement en prenant position dans la sphère publique sur divers enjeux moraux, politiques ou sociaux ne constitue pas une réalité nouvelle. Aujourd’hui toutefois, face aux nombreux défis auxquels notre société est confrontée, la question de l’engagement public des chercheurs s’est renouvelée. Nombre d’entre eux s’investissent pour soutenir des causes ou prendre position sur des enjeux de société – lutte contre les pandémies, dégradation de l’environnement, essor des technologies de surveillance, etc. – selon des modalités variées, de la signature de tribunes à la contribution aux travaux d’ONG ou de think tanks en passant par le soutien à des actions en justice ou l’écriture de billets de blog. Par ailleurs, le développement des médias et des réseaux sociaux a sensiblement renforcé l’exposition publique des chercheurs engagés.

      Dans le même temps, de forts questionnements s’expriment dans le monde de la recherche. Nombreux sont ceux qui s’interrogent sur les modalités de l’engagement public, son opportunité et son principe même. Ils se demandent si et comment s’engager publiquement sans mettre en risque leur réputation et les valeurs partagées par leurs communautés de recherche, sans déroger à la neutralité traditionnellement attendue des chercheurs, sans perdre en impartialité et en crédibilité. Ce débat, qui anime de longue date les sciences sociales, irrigue désormais l’ensemble de la communauté scientifique.

      C’est dans ce contexte que s’inscrit le présent avis. Fruit d’une auto-saisine du COMETS, il entend fournir aux chercheurs des clés de compréhension et des repères éthiques concernant l’engagement public.

      Le COMETS rappelle d’abord qu’il n’y a pas d’incompatibilité de principe entre, d’un côté, l’engagement public du chercheur et, de l’autre, les normes attribuées ou effectivement applicables à l’activité de recherche. C’est notamment le cas de la notion de « neutralité » de la science, souvent considérée comme une condition indispensable de production de connaissances objectives et fiables. Si on ne peut qu’adhérer au souci de distinguer les faits scientifiques des opinions, il est illusoire de penser que le chercheur puisse se débarrasser totalement de ses valeurs : toute science est une entreprise humaine, inscrite dans un contexte social et, ce faisant, nourrie de valeurs. L’enjeu premier n’est donc pas d’attendre du chercheur qu’il en soit dépourvu mais qu’il les explicite et qu’il respecte les exigences d’intégrité et de rigueur qui doivent caractériser la démarche scientifique.

      Si diverses normes applicables à la recherche publique affirment une obligation de neutralité à la charge du chercheur, cette obligation ne fait en réalité pas obstacle, sur le principe, à la liberté et à l’esprit critique indissociables du travail de recherche, ni à l’implication du chercheur dans des débats de société auxquels, en tant que détenteur d’un savoir spécialisé, il a potentiellement une contribution utile à apporter.

      Le COMETS estime que l’engagement public doit être compris comme une liberté individuelle et ce, dans un double sens :

      -- d’une part, chaque chercheur doit rester libre de s’engager ou non ; qu’il choisisse de ne pas prendre position dans la sphère publique ne constitue en rien un manquement à une obligation professionnelle ou morale qui lui incomberait ;

      -- d’autre part, le chercheur qui s’engage n’a pas nécessairement à solliciter le soutien de communautés plus larges (laboratoire, société savante, etc.), même si le COMETS considère que donner une assise collective à une démarche d’engagement présente de nombreux avantages (réflexion partagée, portée du message délivré, moindre exposition du chercheur, etc.).

      S’il constitue une liberté, l’engagement nécessite également pour le chercheur de prendre conscience qu’il met en jeu sa responsabilité, non seulement juridique mais aussi morale, en raison du crédit que lui confère son statut et le savoir approfondi qu’il implique. En effet, en s’engageant publiquement, le chercheur met potentiellement en jeu non seulement sa réputation académique et sa carrière, mais aussi l’image de son institution, celle de la recherche et, plus généralement, la qualité du débat public auquel il contribue ou qu’il entend susciter. Le chercheur dispose d’une position privilégiée qui crédite sa parole d’un poids particulier. Il doit mettre ce crédit au service de la collectivité et ne pas en abuser. Le COMETS rappelle dès lors que tout engagement public doit se faire dans le respect de devoirs.

      Ces devoirs concernent en premier lieu la manière dont le chercheur s’exprime publiquement. Dans le sillage de son avis 42 rendu à l’occasion de la crise du COVID-19, le COMETS rappelle que le chercheur doit s’exprimer non seulement en respectant les règles de droit (lois mémorielles, lois condamnant la diffamation, l’injure, etc.) mais aussi en offrant à son auditoire la possibilité de mettre son discours en contexte, au minimum pour ne pas être induit en erreur. A cet effet, le chercheur doit prendre soin de :

      situer son propos : parle-t-il en son nom propre, au nom de sa communauté de recherche, de son organisme de rattachement ? Quel est son domaine de compétence ? Est-il spécialiste de la question sur laquelle il prend position ? Quels sont ses éventuels liens d’intérêts (avec telle entreprise, association, etc.) ? Quelles valeurs sous-tendent son propos ? ;
      mettre son propos en perspective : quel est le statut des résultats scientifiques sur lesquels il s’appuie ? Des incertitudes demeurent-elles ? Existe-t-il des controverses ?

      Le COMETS a conscience de la difficulté pratique à mettre en œuvre certaines de ces normes (temps de parole limité dans les médias, espace réduit des tribunes écrites, etc.). Leur respect constitue toutefois un objectif vers lequel le chercheur doit systématiquement tendre. Ce dernier doit également réfléchir, avant de s’exprimer publiquement, à ce qui fonde sa légitimité à le faire.

      En second lieu, les savoirs sur lesquels le chercheur assoit son engagement doivent être robustes et reposer sur une démarche scientifique rigoureuse. Engagé ou non, il doit obéir aux exigences classiques d’intégrité et de rigueur applicables à la production de connaissances fiables – description du protocole de recherche, référencement des sources, mise à disposition des résultats bruts, révision par les pairs, etc. Le COMETS rappelle que ces devoirs sont le corollaire nécessaire de la liberté de la recherche, qui est une liberté professionnelle, et que rien, pas même la défense d’une cause, aussi noble soit-elle, ne justifie de transiger avec ces règles et de s’accommoder de savoirs fragiles. Loin d’empêcher le chercheur d’affirmer une thèse avec force dans l’espace public, ces devoirs constituent au contraire un soutien indispensable à l’engagement public auquel, sinon, il peut lui être facilement reproché d’être militant.

      Afin de munir ceux qui souhaitent s’engager de repères et d’outils concrets, le COMETS invite le CNRS à élaborer avec les personnels de la recherche un guide de l’engagement public. Si de nombreux textes existent d’ores et déjà qui énoncent les droits et devoirs des chercheurs – statut du chercheur, chartes de déontologie, avis du COMETS, etc. –, ils sont éparpillés, parfois difficiles à interpréter (sur l’obligation de neutralité notamment) ou complexes à mettre en œuvre (déclaration des liens d’intérêt dans les médias, etc.). Un guide de l’engagement public devrait permettre de donner un contenu lisible, concret et réaliste à ces normes apparemment simples mais en réalité difficiles à comprendre ou à appliquer.

      Le COMETS recommande au CNRS d’envisager l’élaboration d’un tel guide avec d’autres organismes de recherche qui réfléchissent actuellement à la question. Le guide devrait par ailleurs être accompagné d’actions sensibilisant les chercheurs aux enjeux et techniques de l’engagement public (dont des formations à la prise de parole dans les médias).

      Le COMETS s’est enfin interrogé sur le positionnement plus général du CNRS à l’égard de l’engagement public.

      Le COMETS considère que de manière générale, le CNRS ne devrait ni inciter, ni condamner a priori l’engagement des chercheurs, ni opérer une quelconque police des engagements. En pratique :

      – dans l’évaluation de leurs travaux de recherche, les chercheurs ne devraient pas pâtir de leur engagement public. L’évaluation de l’activité de recherche d’un chercheur ne devrait porter que sur ses travaux de recherche et pas sur ses engagements publics éventuels ;

      – lorsque l’engagement public conduit à des controverses, la direction du CNRS n’a pas vocation à s’immiscer dans ces questions qui relèvent au premier chef du débat scientifique entre pairs ;

      – le CNRS doit en revanche intervenir au cas où un chercheur contreviendrait à l’intégrité ou à la déontologie (au minimum, les référents concernés devraient alors être saisis) ou en cas de violation des limites légales à la liberté d’expression (lois mémorielles, lois réprimant la diffamation, etc.) ; de même, l’institution devrait intervenir pour soutenir les chercheurs engagés qui font l’objet d’attaques personnelles ou de procès bâillons.

      – au cas où un chercheur mènerait des actions de désobéissance civile, le CNRS ne devrait pas se substituer aux institutions de police et de justice. Il ne devrait pas condamner ex ante ce mode d’engagement, ni le sanctionner en lieu et place de l’institution judiciaire. A posteriori, en cas de décision pénale définitive à l’encontre d’un chercheur, le CNRS peut éventuellement considérer que son intervention est requise et prendre une sanction.

      Plus généralement, le COMETS encourage le CNRS à protéger et à favoriser la liberté d’expression de son personnel. Il est en effet de la responsabilité des institutions et des communautés de recherche de soutenir la confrontation constructive des idées, fondée sur la liberté d’expression.

      Si le CNRS venait à décider de s’engager en tant qu’institution, c’est-à-dire s’il prenait publiquement des positions normatives sur des sujets de société, le COMETS considère qu’il devrait respecter les règles qui s’appliquent aux chercheurs – faire connaître clairement sa position, expliciter les objectifs et valeurs qui la sous-tendent, etc. Cette prise de position de l’institution devrait pouvoir être discutée sur la base d’un débat contradictoire au sein de l’institution.

      Pour télécharger l’avis :
      https://comite-ethique.cnrs.fr/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AVIS-2023-44.pdf

      https://comite-ethique.cnrs.fr/avis-du-comets-entre-liberte-et-responsabilite-engagement-public

      #avis

  • FROM LIBYA TO TUNISIA : HOW THE EU IS EXTENDING THE PUSH-BACK REGIME BY PROXY IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

    On August 21, 2023, the rescue ship Aurora from Sea Watch was detained by the Italian authorities after refusing to disembark survivors in Tunisia as ordered by the Rome MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center), a country which by no means can be considered a place of safety.

    This episode is just one example of the efforts of European states to avoid arrivals on their shores at all costs, and to evade their responsibility for reception and #Search_and_Rescue (#SAR). Already in 2018, the European Commission, with its disembarkation platform project, attempted to force sea rescue NGOs to disembark survivors in North Africa. While this project was ultimately unsuccessful as it stood, European states have endeavored to increase the number of measures aimed at reducing crossings in the central Mediterranean.

    One of the strategies employed was to set up a “push-back by proxy regime”, outsourcing interceptions at sea to the Libyan Coast guards, enabling the sending back of people on the move to a territory in which their lives are at risk, undertaken by Libyan border forces under the control of the EU authorities, in contravention of principle of non-refoulement, one of the cornerstones of international refugee law. Since 2016, the EU and its member states have equipped, financed, and trained the Libyan coastguard and supported the creation of a MRCC in Tripoli and the declaration of a Libyan SRR (search and rescue region).

    This analysis details how the European Union and its member states are attempting to replicate in Tunisia the regime of refoulement by proxy set up in Libya just a few years earlier. Four elements are considered: strengthening the capacities of the Tunisian coastguard (equipment and training), setting up a coastal surveillance system, creating a functional MRCC and declaring a Tunisian SRR.
    A. Building capacity of the Garde Nationale Maritime
    Providing equipment

    For several decades now, Tunisia has been receiving equipment to strengthen its coast guard capabilities. After the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Italy-Tunisia cooperation deepened. Under the informal agreement of April 5, 2011, 12 boats were delivered to the Tunisian authorities. In 2017, in a joint statement by the IItalian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Tunisian counterpart, the two parties committed to “closer cooperation in the fight against irregular migration and border management,” with a particular focus on the maritime border. In this context, the Italian Minister declared Italy’s support for the modernization and maintenance of the patrol vessels supplied to Tunisia (worth around 12 million euros) and the supply of new equipment for maritime border control. On March 13, 2019, Italy also supplied Tunisia with vehicles for maritime border surveillance, sending 50 4-wheelers designed to monitor the coasts.

    Recently, Germany also started to support the coast guard more actively in Tunisia, providing it with equipment for a boat workshop designed to repair coast guard vessels in 2019. As revealed in an answer to a parliamentary question, in the last two years, the Federal Police also donated 12 inflatable boats and 27 boat motors. On the French side, after a visit in Tunis in June 2023, the Interior Minister Gérard Darmanin announced 25 million euros in aid enabling Tunisia to buy border policing equipment and train border guards. In August 2023, the Italian authorities also promised hastening the provision of patrol boats and other vehicles aimed at preventing sea departures.

    Apart from EU member states, Tunisia has also received equipment from the USA. Between 2012 and 2019, the Tunisian Navy was equipped with 26 US-made patrol boats. In 2019, the Tunisian national guard was also reinforced with 3 American helicopters. Primarily designed to fight against terrorism, the US equipment is also used to monitor the Tunisian coast and to track “smugglers.”

    Above all, the supply of equipment to the Tunisian coastguard is gaining more and more support by the European Union. Following the EU-Tunisia memorandum signed on July 16, 2023, for which €150 million was pledged towards the “fight against illegal migration”, in September 2023, Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million “to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment.”

    In a letter to the European Council, leaked by Statewatch in October 2023, the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to the Tunisian coast guards: “Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operation and others will be repaired by the end of the year.”
    Trainings the authorities

    In addition to supplying equipment, the European countries are also organizing training courses to enhance the skills of the Tunisian coastguard. In 2019, Italy’s Interior Ministry released €11 million to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the crossing of people on the move from Tunisia, and to provide training to local security forces involved in maritime border control.

    Under the framework of Phase III of the EU-supported IBM project (Integrated Border Management), Germany is also organizing training for the Tunisian coast guards. As revealed in the answer to a parliamentary question mentioned before, the German Ministry of Interior admitted that 3.395 members of the Tunisian National Guard and border police had been trained, including within Germany. In addition, 14 training and advanced training measures were carried out for the National Guard, the border police, and the coast guard. These training sessions were also aimed at learning how to use “control boats.”

    In a document presenting the “EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia” for the year 2021, the European Commission announced the creation of a “coast guard training academy.” In Tunisia, the project consists of implementing a training plan, rehabilitating the physical training environment of the Garde Nationale Maritime, and enhancing the cooperation between Tunisian authorities and all stakeholders, including EU agencies and neighboring countries. Implemented by the German Federal Police and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the project started in January 2023 and is supposed to run until June 2026, to the sum of 13,5 million EUR.

    Although the European Commission underlines the objective that “the Training Academy Staff is fully aware and acting on the basis of human rights standards” the increase in dangerous maneuvers and attacks perpetrated by the Tunisian coast guard since the increase in European support leaves little doubt that respect for human rights is far from top priority.

    On November 17, 2023, the ICMPD announced on its Linkedin account the inauguration of the Nefta inter-agency border management training center, as a benefit to the three agencies responsible for border management in Tunisia (Directorate General Directorate of Borders and Foreigners of the Ministry of the Interior, the General Directorate of Border Guard of the National Guard and the General Directorate of Customs).
    B. Setting up a coastal surveillance system

    In addition to supplying equipment, European countries also organize training courses to enhance the skills of European coastguards in the pursuit of an “early detection” strategy, which involves spotting boats as soon as they leave the Tunisian coast in order to outsource their interception to the Tunisian coastguard. As early as 2019, Italy expressed its willingness to install radar equipment in Tunisia and to establish “a shared information system that will promptly alert the Tunisian gendarmerie and Italian coast guard when migrant boats are at sea, in order to block them while they still are in Tunisian waters.” This ambition seems to have been achieved through the implementation of the system ISMaris in Tunisia.
    An Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance (ISMaris)

    The system ISMaris, or “Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance”, was first mentioned in the “Support Programme to Integrated Border Management in Tunisia” (IBM Tunisia, launched in 2015. Funded by the EU and Switzerland and implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the first phase of the program (2015-2018) supported the equipment of the Garde Nationale Maritime with this system, defined as “a maritime surveillance system that centralizes information coming from naval assets at sea and from coastal radars […] [aiming] to connect the sensors (radar, VHF, GPS position, surveillance cameras) on board of selected Tunisian Coast Guard vessels, control posts, and command centers within the Gulf of Tunis zone in order for them to better communicate between each other.”

    The implementation of this data centralization system was then taken over by the “Border Management Programme for the Maghreb Region” (BMP-Maghreb), launched in 2018 and funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Tunisia component, funded with €24,5 million is implemented by ICMPD together with the Italian Ministry of Interior and designed to “strengthen the capacity of competent Tunisian authorities in the areas of maritime surveillance and migration management, including tackling migrant smuggling, search and rescue at sea, as well as in the coast guard sphere of competence.” With the BMP programme, the Tunisian Garde Maritime Nationale was equipped with navigational radars, thermal cameras, AIS and other IT equipment related to maritime surveillance.
    Data exchange with the EU

    The action document of the BMP program clearly states that one of the purposes of ISMaris is the reinforcement of “operational cooperation in the maritime domain between Tunisia and Italy (and other EU Member States, and possibly through EUROSUR and FRONTEX).” Established in 2013, the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) is a framework for information exchange and cooperation between Member States and Frontex, to prevent the so-called irregular migration at external borders. Thanks to this system, Frontex already monitors the coast regions off Tunisia using aerial service and satellites.

    What remains dubious is the connection between IS-Maris and the EU surveillance-database. In 2020, the European Commission claimed that ISMariS was still in development and not connected to any non-Tunisian entity such as Frontex, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) or the Italian border control authorities. But it is likely that in the meantime information exchange between the different entities was systematized.

    In the absence of an official agreement, the cooperation between Frontex and Tunisia is unclear. As already mentioned in Echoes#3, “so far, it has not been possible to verify if Frontex has direct contact with the Tunisian Coast Guard as it is the case with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even if most of the interceptions happen close to Tunisian shores, some are carried out by the Tunisian Navy outside of territorial waters. […] Since May 2021 Frontex has been flying a drone, in addition to its different assets, monitoring the corridor between Tunisia and Lampedusa on a daily basis. While it is clear that Frontex is sharing data with the Italian authorities and that Italian authorities are sharing info on boats which are on the way from Tunisia to Italy with the Tunisian side, the communication and data exchanges between Frontex and Tunisian authorities remain uncertain.”

    While in 2021, Frontex reported that “no direct border related activities have been carried out in Tunisia due to Tunisian authorities’ reluctance to cooperate with Frontex”, formalizing the cooperation between Tunisia and Frontex seems to remain one of the EU’s priorities. In September 2023, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Poland, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. During this visit, briefings were held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and where all threads from surveillance from ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together.

    However, as emphasized by Mathias Monroy, an independent researcher working on border externalization and the expansion of surveillance systems, “Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex.”

    This does not prevent the EU from continuing its efforts. In September 2023, in the wake of the thousands of arrivals on the island of Lampedusa, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reaffirmed, in a 10-point action plan, the need to have a “working arrangement between Tunisia and Frontex” and to “step up border surveillance at sea and aerial surveillance including through Frontex.” In a letter written by the European Commission in reply to the LIBE letter about the Tunisia deal sent on the Greens Party initiative in July 2023, the EU also openly admits that IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far and that more surveillance equipment is to come.

    To be noted as well is that the EU4BorderSecurity program, which includes support to “inter-regional information sharing, utilizing tools provided by Frontex” has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.
    C. Supporting the creation of a Tunisian MRCC and the declaration of a Search and rescue region (SRR)
    Building a MRCC in Tunisia, a top priority for the EU

    In 2021, the European Commission stated the creation of a functioning MRCC in Tunisia as a priority: “Currently there is no MRCC in Tunisia but the coordination of SAR events is conducted by Tunisian Navy Maritime Operations Centre. The official establishment of a MRCC is a necessary next step, together with the completion of the radar installations along the coast, and will contribute to implementing a Search and rescue region in Tunisia. The establishment of an MRCC would bring Tunisia’s institutional set-up in line with the requirements set in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) of 1979 (as required by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation IMO).”

    The objective of creating a functioning Tunisian MRCC is also mentioned in a European Commission document presenting the “strategy for the regional, multi-country cooperation on migration with partner countries in North Africa” for the period 2021-2027. The related project is detailed in the “Action Document for EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia (2021),” whose overall objective is to “contribute to the improvement of respective state services through the institutional development of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres” in the North Africa region. The EU also promotes a “regional approach to a Maritime Rescue Coordination Center,” that “would improve the coordination in the Central Mediterranean in conducting SAR operations and support the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks in Libya and Tunisia.”

    The Tunisia component of the programs announces the objective to “support the establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, [… ] operational 24/7 in a physical structure with functional equipment and trained staff,” establishing “cooperation of the Tunisian authorities with all national stakeholders, EU agencies and neighbouring countries on SAR.”

    This project seems to be gradually taking shape. On the website of Civipol, the French Ministry of the Interior’s service and consultancy company, a new project entitled “Support for Search and Rescue Operations at Sea in Tunisia” is mentioned in a job advertisement. It states that this project, funded by the European Union, implemented together with the GIZ and starting in September 2023, aims to “support the Tunisian authorities in strengthening their operational capacities (fleet and other)” and “provide support to the Tunisian authorities in strengthening the Marine Nationale and the MRCC via functional equipment and staff training.”

    In October 2023, the German development agency GIZ also published a job offer for a project manager in Tunisia, to implement the EU-funded project “Support to border management institution (MRCC)” in Tunisia (the job offer was deleted from the website in the meantime but screenshots can be shared on demand). The objective of the project is described as such: “improvement of the Tunisia’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity through reinforced border management institutions to conduct SAR operations at sea and the fight against migrant smuggling and human being trafficking by supporting increased collaboration between Tunisian actors via a Maritime RescueCoordination Centre (MRCC).”

    According to Mathias Monroy, other steps have been taken in this direction: “[the Tunisian MRCC] has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.”

    The establishment of a functional MRCC represents a major challenge for the EU, with the aim to allow Tunisia to engage actively in coordination of interceptions. Another step in the recognition of the Tunisian part as a valid SAR actor by the IMO is the declaration of a search and rescue region (SRR).
    The unclear status of the current Tunisian area of responsibility

    Adopted in 1979 in Hamburg, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR – Search & Rescue Convention) aimed to establish an international search and rescue plan to encourage cooperation and coordination between neighboring states in order to ensure better assistance to persons in distress at sea. The main idea of the convention is to divide seas and oceans into search and rescue zones in which states are responsible for providing adequate SAR services, by establishing rescue coordination centers and setting operating procedures to be followed in case of SAR operations.

    Whereas Tunisia acceded to the treaty in 1998, this was not followed by the delimitation of the Tunisian SAR zone of responsibilities nor by regional agreements with neighboring states. It is only in 2013 that Tunisia declared the limits of its SRR, following the approval of the Maghreb Convention in the Field of Search and Rescue in 2013 and by virtue of Decree No. 2009-3333 of November 2, 2009, setting out the intervention plans and means to assist aircraft in distress. In application of this norm, Tunisian authorities are required to intervene immediately, following the first signal of help or emergency, in the limits of the Tunisia sovereign borders (12 nautical miles). This means that under national legislation, Tunisian authorities are obliged to intervene only in territorial waters. Outside this domain, the limits of SAR interventions are not clearly defined.

    A point to underline is that the Tunisian territorial waters overlap with the Maltese SRR. The Tunisian Exclusive Economic Zone – which does not entail any specific duty connected to SAR – also overlaps with the Maltese SRR and this circumstance led in the past to attempts by the Maltese authorities to drop their SAR responsibilities claiming that distress cases were happening in this vast area. Another complex topic regards the presence, in international waters which is part of the Maltese SRR, of Tunisian oil platforms. Also, in these cases the coordination of SAR operations have been contested and were often subject to a “ping-pong” responsibility from the involved state authorities.
    Towards the declaration of a huge Tunisian SRR?

    In a research document published by the IMO Institute (International Maritime Organization), Akram Boubakri (Lieutenant Commander, Head, Maritime Affairs, Tunisian Coast Guard according to IMO Institute website) wrote that at the beginning of 2020, Tunisia officially submitted the coordinates of the Tunisian SRR to the IMO. According to this document, these new coordinates, still pending the notification of consideration by the IMO, would cover a large area, creating two overlapping areas with neighboring SAR zones – the first one with Libya, the second one with Malta* (see map below):

    *This delimitation has to be confirmed (tbc). Nothing proves that the coordinates mentioned in the article were actually submitted to the IMO

    As several media outlets have reported, the declaration of an official Tunisian SRR is a project supported by the European Union, which was notably put back on the table on the occasion of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2023 between the EU and Tunisia.

    During the summer 2023, the Civil MRCC legal team initiated a freedom of information access request to the Tunisian authorities to clarify the current status of the Tunisian SRR. The Tunisian Ministry of Transport/the Office of the Merchant Navy and Ports replied that”[n]o legal text has yet been published defining the geographical marine limits of the search and rescue zone stipulated in the 1979 International Convention for Search and Rescue […]. We would like to inform you that the National Committee for the Law of the Sea, chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, has submitted a draft on this subject, which has been sent in 2019 to the International Maritime Organisation through the Ministry of Transport.” A recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior was sent but no reply was received yet.

    Replying in December 2023 to a freedom of information access request initiated by the Civil MRCC, the IMO stated that “Tunisia has not communicated their established search and rescue region to the IMO Secretariat.” However, on November 3, 2023, the Tunisian Ministerial Council adopted a “draft law on the regulation of search and rescue at sea in Tunisia’s area of responsibility.” A text which, according to FTDES, provides for the creation of a Tunisian SAR zone, although it has not yet been published. While the text still has to be ratified by the parliament, it is quite clear that the Tunisian authorities are currently making concrete steps to align on the IMO standards and, by doing so, on the EU agenda.
    Conclusion: A EU strategy to escape from its SAR responsibilities

    While some analysts have seen the drop in arrivals in Italy from Tunisia in recent months as a sign of the “success” of the European Union’s strategy to close its borders (in November, a drop of over 80% compared to the summer months), in reality, the evolution of these policies proves that reinforcing a border only shifts migratory routes. From autumn onwards, the Libyan route has seen an increase in traffic, with many departing from the east of the country. These analyses fail to consider the agency of people on the move, and the constant reinvention of strategies for transgressing borders.

    While condemning the generalization of a regime of refoulement by proxy in the central Mediterranean and the continued brutalization of the border regime, the Civil MRCC aims to give visibility to the autonomy of migration and non-stop solidarity struggles for freedom of movement!

    https://civilmrcc.eu/from-libya-to-tunisia-how-the-eu-is-extending-the-push-back-regime-by-prox

    #push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #externalisation #Tunisie #Libye #EU #UE #Union_européenne #gardes-côtes_libyens #push-back_by_proxy_regime #financement #training #formation #gardes-côtes #MRCC #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #Libyan_SRR #technologie #matériel #Integrated_Border_Management #surveillance #Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance (#ISMaris) #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) #Border_Management_Programme_for_the_Maghreb_Region #Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa #EUROSUR #Frontex #ISMariS #Search_and_rescue_region (#SRR)

    ping @_kg_

  • Postacute Sequelae of #SARS-CoV-2 in #Children | Pediatrics | American Academy of Pediatrics
    https://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article/doi/10.1542/peds.2023-062570/196606/Postacute-Sequelae-of-SARS-CoV-2-in-Children?autologincheck=redire
    /UI/app/svg/umbrella/logo.svg

    The coronavirus disease 2019 (#COVID-19) pandemic has caused significant medical, social, and economic impacts globally, both in the short and long term. Although most individuals recover within a few days or weeks from an acute infection, some experience longer lasting effects. Data regarding the postacute sequelae of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infection (PASC) in children, or long COVID, are only just emerging in the literature. These symptoms and conditions may reflect persistent symptoms from acute infection (eg, cough, headaches, fatigue, and loss of taste and smell), new symptoms like dizziness, or exacerbation of underlying conditions. Children may develop conditions de novo, including postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome, myalgic encephalomyelitis/chronic fatigue syndrome, autoimmune conditions and multisystem inflammatory syndrome in children. This state-of-the-art narrative review provides a summary of our current knowledge about PASC in children, including prevalence, epidemiology, risk factors, clinical characteristics, underlying mechanisms, and functional outcomes, as well as a conceptual framework for PASC based on the current National Institutes of Health definition. We highlight the pediatric components of the National Institutes of Health-funded Researching COVID to Enhance Recovery Initiative, which seeks to characterize the natural history, mechanisms, and long-term health effects of PASC in children and young adults to inform future treatment and prevention efforts. These initiatives include electronic health record cohorts, which offer rapid assessments at scale with geographical and demographic diversity, as well as longitudinal prospective observational cohorts, to estimate disease burden, illness trajectory, pathobiology, and clinical manifestations and outcomes.

    • COVID-19 disproportionately affects Black, Indigenous, and people of color communities, families living in rural communities, and/or communities facing economic hardships. Although most individuals recover within a few days or weeks after an acute severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infection (SARS-CoV-2) infection, some experience longer lasting effects. Given that ∼20% of COVID cases in the United States are in children, and that current pediatric postacute sequelae of SARS CoV-2 (PASC) prevalence estimates are 10% to 20%, PASC is estimated to affect up to 5.8 million children, representing a significant community impact.

      [...]

      The specific effect of adverse social drivers of health (SDoH) on the development of PASC have not been well studied; however, many SDoH have greatly increased during the pandemic, including housing and food insecurity, reduced family income, and disrupted access to health care and educational resources. Adverse SDoH have been associated with increased rates of physical and mental health problems in children, and can contribute to the development or exacerbation of illnesses via decreased immunologic functioning secondary to the effects of chronic stress and poor nutrition.

  • Vivre et lutter dans un monde toxique. #Violence_environnementale et #santé à l’âge du #pétrole

    Pour en finir avec les success stories pétrolières, voici une histoire des territoires sacrifiés à la transformation des #hydrocarbures. Elle éclaire, à partir de sources nouvelles, les #dégâts et les #luttes pour la santé au XXe siècle, du #Japon au #Canada, parmi les travailleurs et travailleuses des enclaves industrielles italiennes (#Tarento, #Sardaigne, #Sicile), auprès des pêcheurs et des paysans des « #Trente_Ravageuses » (la zone de #Fos / l’étang de# Berre, le bassin gazier de #Lacq), ou encore au sein des Premières Nations américaines et des minorités frappées par les #inégalités_environnementales en #Louisiane.
    Ces différents espaces nous racontent une histoire commune : celle de populations délégitimées, dont les plaintes sont systématiquement disqualifiées, car perçues comme non scientifiques. Cependant, elles sont parvenues à mobiliser et à produire des savoirs pour contester les stratégies entrepreneuriales menaçant leurs #lieux_de_vie. Ce livre expose ainsi la #tension_sociale qui règne entre défense des #milieux_de_vie et #profits économiques, entre santé et #emploi, entre logiques de subsistance et logiques de #pétrolisation.
    Un ouvrage d’une saisissante actualité à l’heure de la désindustrialisation des #territoires_pétroliers, des #conflits sur la #décarbonation des sociétés contemporaines, et alors que le désastre de #Lubrizol a réactivé les interrogations sur les effets sanitaires des dérivés pétroliers.

    https://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/vivre-et-lutter-dans-un-monde-toxique-collectif/9782021516081

    #peuples_autochtones #pollution #toxicité #livre

    • Ces territoires sacrifiés au pétrole

      La société du pétrole sur laquelle s’est bâtie notre prospérité ne s’est pas faite sans sacrifices. Gwenola Le Naour et Renaud Bécot, co-directeurs d’un ouvrage sur ce sujet, lèvent le voile sur les dégâts causés par cette « pétrolisation » du monde, en France et à l’étranger.

      Si le pétrole et ses produits ont permis l’émergence de notre mode de vie actuel, l’activité des raffineries et autres usines de la pétrochimie a abîmé les écosystèmes et les paysages et a des effets de long terme sur la santé humaine. Dans le livre qu’ils ont coordonné, Vivre et lutter dans un monde toxique (Seuil, septembre 2023), Gwénola Le Naour et Renaud Bécot lèvent le voile sur les dégâts causés par cette « pétrolisation » du monde, selon leurs propres mots. Ils ont réuni plusieurs études de cas dans des territoires en France et à l’étranger pour le démontrer. Un constat d’autant plus actuel que la société des hydrocarbures est loin d’être révolue : la consommation de pétrole a atteint un record absolu en 2023, avec plus de 100 millions de barils par jour en moyenne.

      À la base de votre ouvrage, il y a ce que vous appelez « la pétrolisation du monde ». Que recouvre ce terme ?
      Gwenola Le Naour1. Dans les années 1960, s’est développée l’idée que le pétrole était une énergie formidable, rendant possible la fabrication de produits tels que le plastique, les textiles synthétiques, les peintures, les cosmétiques, les pesticides, qui ont révolutionné nos modes de vie et décuplé les rendements agricoles. La pétrolisation désigne cette mutation de nos systèmes énergétiques pendant laquelle les hydrocarbures se sont imposés partout sur la planète et ont littéralement métamorphosé nos territoires physiques et mentaux.

      L’arrivée du pétrole et de ses dérivés nous est le plus souvent présentée comme une épopée, une success story. On a mis de côté la face sombre de cette pétrolisation, avec ses territoires sacrifiés comme Fos-sur-Mer, qui abrite depuis 1965 une immense raffinerie représentant aujourd’hui 10 % de la capacité de raffinage de l’Hexagone, ou Tarente, dans le sud de l’Italie, où se côtoient une raffinerie, une usine pétrochimique, un port commercial, une décharge industrielle et la plus grande aciérie d’Europe.

      Comment des territoires entiers ont-ils pu être ainsi abandonnés au pétrole ?
      Renaud Bécot2. L’industrie du pétrole et des hydrocarbures n’est pas une industrie comme les autres. Les sociétés pétrolières ont été largement accompagnées par les États. Comme pour le nucléaire, l’histoire de l’industrie pétrolière est étroitement liée à l’histoire des stratégies énergétiques des États et à la manière dont ils se représentent leur indépendance énergétique. L’État a soutenu activement ces installations destinées à produire de la croissance et des richesses. Pour autant, ces industries ne se sont pas implantées sans résistance, malgré les discours de « progrès » qui les accompagnaient.

      Des luttes ont donc eu lieu dès l’installation de ces complexes ?
      G. L. N. Dès le début, les populations locales, mais aussi certains élus, ont compris l’impact que ces complexes gigantesques allaient avoir sur leur environnement. Ces mobilisations ont échoué à Fos-sur-Mer ou au sud de Lyon, où l’installation de la raffinerie de Feyzin et de tout le complexe pétrochimique (le fameux « couloir de la chimie ») a fait disparaître les bras morts du Rhône et des terres agricoles... Quelques-unes ont cependant abouti : un autre projet de raffinerie, envisagé un temps dans le Beaujolais, a dû être abandonné. Il est en revanche plus difficile de lutter une fois que ces complexes sont installés, car l’implantation de ce type d’infrastructures est presque irréversible : le coût d’une dépollution en cas de fermeture est gigantesque et sans garantie de résultat

      Les habitants qui vivent à côté de ces installations finissent ainsi par s’en accommoder… En partie parce qu’ils n’ont pas d’autre choix, et aussi parce que les industriels se sont efforcés dès les années 1960-1970 et jusqu’à aujourd’hui de se conduire en « bons voisins ». Ils négocient leur présence en finançant par exemple des infrastructures culturelles et/ou sportives. Sans oublier l’éternel dilemme entre les emplois apportés par ces industries et les nuisances qu’elles génèrent. Dans le livre, nous avons qualifié ces arrangements à l’échelle des districts pétrochimiques de « compromis fordistes territorialisés ».

      Que recouvre ce terme de compromis ?
      R. B. En échange de l’accaparement de terres par l’industrie et du cortège de nuisances qui l’accompagne, les collectivités locales obtiennent des contreparties qui correspondent à une redistribution partielle des bénéfices de l’industrie. Cette redistribution peut être régulière (via la taxe professionnelle versée aux communes jusqu’en 2010, notamment), ou exceptionnelle, après un accident par exemple. Ainsi, en 1989, après une pollution spectaculaire qui marque les habitants vivant près de Lubrizol en Normandie, l’entreprise a versé 100 000 francs à la municipalité du Petit-Quevilly pour qu’elle plante quatre-vingts arbres dans la ville...

      Mais ce type de compromis a également été très favorable aux industries en leur offrant par exemple des allégements fiscaux de long terme, comme en Sicile près de Syracuse où se situe l’un des plus grands sites chimiques et pétrochimiques qui emploie plus de 7 000 personnes, voire une totale exonération fiscale comme en Louisiane, sur les rives du Mississippi. Des années 1950 aux années 1980, pas moins de 5 000 entreprises sur le sol américain – majoritairement pétrochimiques, pétrolières, métallurgiques ainsi que des sociétés gazières – ont demandé à bénéficier de ces exonérations, parmi lesquelles les sociétés les plus rentables du pays telles que DuPont, Shell Oil ou Exxon...

      Ces pratiques, qui se sont développées surtout lors des phases d’expansion de la pétrochimie, rendent plus difficile le retrait de ces industries polluantes. Les territoires continuent de penser qu’ils en tirent un bénéfice, même si cela est de moins en moins vrai.

      On entend souvent dire, concernant l’industrie pétrolière comme le nucléaire d’ailleurs, que les accidents sont rares et qu’on ne peut les utiliser pour remettre en cause toute une industrie… Est-ce vraiment le cas ?
      G. L. N. On se souvient des accidents de type explosions comme celle de la raffinerie de Feyzin, qui fit 18 morts en 1966, ou celle d’un stock de nitrates d’ammonium de l’usine d’engrais AZF à Toulouse en 2001, qui provoqua la mort de 31 personnes – car ils sont rares. Mais si l’on globalise sur toute la chaîne des hydrocarbures, les incidents et les accidents – y compris graves ou mortels pour les salariés – sont en réalité fréquents, même si on en entend rarement parler au-delà de la presse locale (fuites, explosions, incendies…). Sans oublier le cortège des nuisances liées au fonctionnement quotidien de ces industries, telles que la pollution de l’air ou de l’eau, et leurs conséquences sur la santé.

      Pour qualifier les méfaits des industries pétrochimiques, sur la santé notamment, vous parlez de « violence lente ». Pouvez-vous expliquer le choix de cette expression ?
      G. L. N. Cette expression, créée par l’auteur nord-américain Rob Nixon, caractérise une violence graduelle, disséminée dans le temps, caractéristique de l’économie fossile. Cette violence est également inégalitaire car elle touche prioritairement des populations déjà vulnérables : je pense notamment aux populations noires américaines de Louisiane dont les générations précédentes étaient esclaves dans les plantations…

      Au-delà de cet exemple particulièrement frappant, il est fréquent que ces industries s’installent près de zones populaires ou touchées par la précarité. On a tendance à dire que nous respirons tous le même air pollué, or ce n’est pas vrai. Certains respirent un air plus pollué que d’autres. Et ceux qui habitent sur les territoires dévolus aux hydrocarbures ont une qualité de vie bien inférieure à ceux qui sont épargnés par la présence de ces industries.

      Depuis quand la nocivité de ces industries est-elle documentée ?
      G. L. N. Longtemps, les seules mesures de toxicité dont on a disposé étaient produites par les industriels eux-mêmes, sur la base des seuils fixés par la réglementation. Pourtant, de l’aveu même de ceux qui la pratiquent, la toxicologie est une science très imparfaite : les effets cocktails ne sont pas recherchés par la toxicologie réglementaire, pas plus que ceux des expositions répétées à faibles doses sur le temps long. De plus, fixer des seuils est à double tranchant : on peut invoquer les analyses toxicologiques pour protéger les populations, l’environnement, ou les utiliser pour continuer à produire et à exposer les gens, les animaux, la nature à ces matières dangereuses. Ainsi, ces seuils peuvent être alternativement présentés comme des seuils de toxicité, ou comme des seuils de tolérance… Ce faisant, la toxicologie produit de l’imperceptibilité.

      R. B. Des études alternatives ont cependant commencé à émerger, avec des méthodologies originales. Au Canada, sur les territoires des Premières Nations en Ontario, au Saskatchewan précisément, une étude participative a été menée au cours de la décennie 2010 grâce à un partenariat inédit entre un collectif de journalistes d’investigation et un groupe de chercheurs. En distribuant très largement des kits de mesure, peu coûteux et faciles d’utilisation, elle a permis de démontrer que les populations étaient exposées aux sulfures d’hydrogène, un gaz toxique qui pénètre par les voies respiratoires. Grâce à cette démarche participative, des changements de règlementation et une meilleure surveillance des pollutions ont été obtenus. Il s’agit d’une réelle victoire qui change la vie des gens, même si l’industrie n’a pas été déplacée.

      Qu’en est-il des effets sur la santé de tous ces polluants ? Sont-ils documentés ?
      G. L. N. En France, les seuls travaux menés à ce jour l’ont été autour du gisement de gaz naturel de Lacq, exploité de 1957 à 2013 dans les Pyrénées. Une première étude, conduite en 2002 par l’université, concluait à un surrisque de cancer. Deux autres études ont été lancées plus récemment : une étude de mortalité dévoilée en 2021, qui montre une plus forte prévalence des décès par cancer, et une étude de morbidité toujours en cours. À Fos-sur-Mer, l’étude « Fos Epseal », conduite entre 2015 et 20223, s’est basée sur les problèmes de santé déclarés par les habitants. Ses résultats révèlent que près des deux-tiers des habitants souffrent d’au moins une maladie chronique – asthme, diabète –, ainsi que d’un syndrome nez-gorge irrités toute l’année qui n’avait jamais été identifié jusque-là.

      R. B. Ce que soulignent les collectifs qui évoquent des problèmes de santé liés à l’industrie pétrochimique – maladies chroniques de la sphère ORL, diabètes, cancers, notamment pédiatriques, etc. –, c’est la difficulté de prouver un lien de corrélation entre ces maladies et telle ou telle exposition toxique.

      L’épidémiologie conventionnelle ne le permet pas, en tout cas, car elle travaille à des échelles larges, sur de grands nombres, et est mal adaptée à un déploiement sur de plus petits territoires. C’est pourquoi les collectifs militants et les scientifiques qui travaillent avec eux doivent faire preuve d’inventivité, en faisant parfois appel aux sciences humaines et sociales, avec des sociologues qui vont recueillir des témoignages et trajectoires d’exposition, des historiens qui vont documenter l’histoire des lieux de production…

      Cela suppose aussi la mise au point de technologies, d’outils qui permettent de mesurer comment et quand les gens sont exposés. Cela nécessite enfin une coopération de longue haleine entre chercheurs de plusieurs disciplines, militants et populations. Car l’objectif est d’établir de nouveaux protocoles pour mieux documenter les atteintes à la santé et à l’environnement avec la participation active de celles et ceux qui vivent ces expositions dans leurs chairs.

      https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/articles/ces-territoires-sacrifies-au-petrole

  • The COVID-safe strategies Australian scientists are using to protect themselves from the virus - ABC News
    https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-01-21/covid-safe-strategies-australian-scientists-virus-infection/103335466
    https://live-production.wcms.abc-cdn.net.au/ad2eada4eaabdc63ab704f3797c8a95b?impolicy=wcms_crop

    Some commentators have described this situation — the crashing of wave after wave of COVID-19, a steady drip, drip, drip of death and mounting chronic illness — as the “new normal”. But other experts insist it doesn’t have to be, and that continuing on the current trajectory is unsustainable — especially in light of data showing that COVID has decreased life expectancy, will cost the global economy an estimated $US13.8 trillion by 2024, and is decimating the lives of millions of people who have developed long COVID.

    Meanwhile, studies continue to pile up showing COVID-19 can cause serious illness affecting every organ system in the body, even in vaccinated people with seemingly mild infections. It can cause cognitive decline and dysfunction consistent with brain injury; trigger immune damage and dysfunction; impair liver, kidney and lung function; and significantly increases the risk of cardiovascular disease and diabetes. Then there’s long COVID, a debilitating disease that robs fit and high-functioning people of their ability to think, work and exercise.

    All of this is why governments must invest in long-term strategies for managing COVID-19 into the future, experts say — particularly by introducing standards for indoor air quality. But until then, they say, Australians can and should take precautions against COVID-19 to reduce transmission and protect their health. And doing so is relatively simple: it just takes a little planning, preparation and common sense.

    Here, three of Australia’s leading COVID-19 experts share their personal COVID safety strategies and reflect on what must happen if we’re to blunt the growing health crisis the pandemic is causing — and prepare for the next one.

    • When the COVID-19 pandemic hit Australia in 2020, Associate Professor Stuart Turville had been working in the Kirby Institute’s level-three physical containment (PC3) lab, researching another well-known RNA virus: HIV. His team quickly pivoted to #SARS-CoV-2, capturing the virus and characterising it very quickly. Still today when the NSW Ministry of Health’s genomic surveillance unit identifies a new variant of interest, Dr Turville, a virologist, will use a swab from a positive case and grow the virus to understand its mutations and virulence.

      Scientists working in the PC3 lab must wear robust personal protective equipment primarily for respiratory safety. Before he enters the lab Dr Turville dons several layers of gear: a full-face Powered #Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) mask, a collar with its own HEPA filter ("it’s like being in a scuba suit"), two pairs of gloves, a disposable Tyvek suit, a generic gown that is laundered after use, booties, gumboots and little plastic socks that go over the boots. “Not only could [getting infected] impact our research colleagues and the general community,” he says, “but we could also take the virus home.”

      For Dr Turville, the risk of taking #COVID-19 home was particularly serious. In 2020 he was caring for his elderly father who had heart problems and his mother was also at risk of severe disease. If he brought the virus into his dad’s aged care facility, it would be put into lockdown and “he would be eating cold meals in his room alone”. “So for me personally it was incredibly important to maintain that protection and ensure I remained negative,” he says. “I’ve still only got it once — I got it from undergraduate teaching, which will teach me.”

      As for how he protects himself outside the lab, day to day? For starters, “As a scientist I don’t get out much,” he jokes. He drives to work, avoiding crowded public transport. If he’s going on an overseas trip, he’ll plan to get a booster vaccine four weeks before he gets on a plane. “I know from the studies that we do and other people do that if you get a new formulation vaccine you’re going to encourage the mature B cells to generate better cross-reactive antibodies,” he says, “and so you’re going to have better protection if you’re exposed to [COVID-19].”

      A man wearing a green lab gown stands against the wall in a corridor, next to a blue clinical smock
      Political support for genomic surveillance work is “shrinking”, says Stuart Turville.(Supplied: Richard Freeman, UNSW)
      If someone in his family gets sick, he says, they immediately isolate themselves. “It’s only happened once or twice where one of us has been positive but they’ve generally been isolated to one room and wearing a P2 mask” to protect the rest of the household. “Another thing we’ve been doing, which has been somewhat of a side benefit of looking after my father in aged care, is RAT testing before going into those facilities — even though we might be asymptomatic,” he says. “I think it’s really a situation of common sense in the context: if you don’t feel well, you isolate, you keep germs to yourself.”

      Still, Dr Turville is acutely aware of the vitriol frequently directed at people who promote COVID-19 safety. Strangers will circulate photographs of him in his lab kit, particularly on social media, to mock him: “They’ll say, ’Oh, this guy is an idiot, why is he using that, he shouldn’t fear [the virus] anymore’.” This both puzzles and amuses him. “It’s my job; I’m not going to bring it home when I have a sick father — pull your head in,” he says. “Unfortunately there is a lot of negativity towards people who choose to protect themselves. We never really saw that in the HIV era — there was never really a pushback on condom use.”

      Then again, the differences between how the two pandemics — HIV/AIDS and COVID-19 — were managed in Australia are probably quite instructive, says Dr Turville. With HIV, experts and health ministers collectively built a strong public health strategy that they strove to protect from politics. “When we look at COVID, it was political from the start and continues to be,” he says. We also now lack a “mid to long-term plan to navigate us through” this next phase of COVID-19: “Some argue that we are no longer in the emergency phase and need to gear down or simply stop,” he says. “But should we stop, and if not, what do we gear down to as a longer-term plan?”

      Three scientists wearing white Tyvek suits and full face PAPR masks working in a physical containment lab
      Stuart Turville and his colleagues working in the Kirby Institute’s PC3 laboratory.(Supplied: Richard Freeman, UNSW)
      Perhaps one reason Australia lacks a long-term plan for managing COVID-19 is the complexity of instigating one in light of the community’s collective trauma. The first couple of years of the pandemic were stressful and frightening and as much as border closures, lockdowns and other restrictions saved tens of thousands of lives in 2020 and 2021, they are still resented by some people whose livelihoods or mental health suffered — and who now push back against precaution. This backlash is so fierce in pockets of the community that some seem to conflate any kind of protective action with lockdowns.

      “There might have been some things we went too hard with but I think we have to look at it in perspective,” Dr Turville says. “We didn’t have those really, really dark months in Australia — we never had the mass graves like we saw in Italy or New York. We got a scare during [the] Delta [wave] and that helped get us our really high vaccination rates … But my worry now is, are we stepping away too soon?”

      Aside from much of the general public abandoning measures like masking, he says, political support for genomic surveillance work is also now “shrinking”. And without the critical data it generates, he says, there’s a risk scientists like him will miss new, more dangerous variants. “I think there’s a lot of patting on the back at the moment — job well done. And that’s nice, but I think it’s somewhat job well done, there goes the rug,” he says. “I think it’s the apathy that’s the concern. And I think it’s coming top-down, it’s coming very much from the government. I just don’t understand why, like we had with HIV, there can’t be a mid-term strategy.”

      ’Air is out of mind until it’s a problem’

      Robyn Schofield, aerosol scientist at Melbourne University

      A woman with blue eyes, short dark hair and green earrings smiles as a busy city rushes around her
      Robyn Schofield is an atmospheric chemist and aerosol scientist at Melbourne University.(ABC News: Danielle Bonica)
      Associate Professor Robyn Schofield can rattle off data on the harms and benefits of clean indoor air as breezily as if she were reciting her own phone number. We breathe in about eight litres of air a minute. We consume 14 kilograms of air a day. Our lungs have the surface area of half a tennis court. Globally, nine million people die from air quality issues every year. In Australia, she says, it’s somewhere between 3,000 and 11,000 deaths — “way more than the road toll”. But people generally don’t know any of that, she says. “They don’t appreciate how important breathing is until it’s hard to do. It’s like the air: you can’t see it, so it’s out of mind until it’s a problem.”

      In 2020, the air became a massive problem. The main way COVID-19 spreads is when an infected person breathes out droplets or aerosol particles containing the virus — think about aerosols as behaving similarly to smoke, lingering in the air potentially for hours. An atmospheric chemist and aerosol scientist at Melbourne University, Dr Schofield quickly began working with respiratory specialists to understand how to reduce the risk of viral transmission by improving the ventilation and filtration of indoor air.

      What she still finds thrilling is that indoor air quality can be assessed with a battery-powered CO2 monitor; popular devices like the Aranet cost about $300 but some companies are developing tech to allow smartphones to do the same. And the investment is worth it, many argue, because it can help you avoid catching COVID-19. It’s also good for productivity, with studies showing higher CO2 levels decrease cognitive performance. If CO2 is 800 parts per million, Dr Schofield says, 1 per cent of the air being inhaled has been breathed out by someone else — and is therefore a good proxy for infection risk.

      A woman pulls a 3M Aura respirator and an Aranet CO2 monitor out of her black handbag
      Dr Schofield’s COVID-safety kit includes an N95 respirator and a CO2 monitor.(ABC News: Danielle Bonica)
      One of the findings from the past few years she finds “most exciting”, however, is the role of relative humidity in indoor spaces. When relative humidity is below 40 per cent, Dr Schofield says, the risk of catching COVID-19 increases. (A good sign of that, for those who wear contact lenses, is dry eyes, which she says is “a really good indication that you should get out!”) “Because you are becoming the moisture source. Your mucous membranes — which are protecting you from getting COVID or the doses you acquire — are giving up that moisture, and so it’s easier to be infected.”

      Dr Schofield is particularly concerned with preventing infection in healthcare settings. She bravely spoke out last year when, while being treated for breast cancer at Peter Mac in Melbourne, the hospital decided to relax its masking policy for patients. “COVID cases were actually rising at the time, so it was a bad call,” she says. “And it was then reversed.” But she was still “disgusted” and lost respect for the hospital’s leadership, she says: she expected that staff would understand the science of COVID-19 transmission and take steps to protect vulnerable patients.

      A woman wearing a black top prepares to put on a white N95 respirator as people dine at outdoor cafe tables behind her
      Dr Schofield chooses restaurants with outdoor dining areas when eating out.(ABC News: Danielle Bonica)
      Even before she was diagnosed with cancer, Dr Schofield was taking precautions — for starters, she knows where the “most risky settings” are. Trains, planes and automobiles are big red zones: “Buses are actually the worst,” she says, because they recirculate air without filtering it. She regularly uses nasal sprays, wears an N95 respirator when she’s indoors with other people — in meetings at work, for instance — and makes sure air purifiers are switched on. “If I walk into a space, I will also open windows. I just go around and open them,” she says. “Because actually, no one’s going to tell me not to.”

      When eating out, she chooses restaurants that have outdoor dining areas: a newly revamped boathouse in the Melbourne suburb of Kew is a favourite of hers, and Korean barbecue is “always excellent”, she says, because there are generally extractor fans at each table. It’s all about good ventilation — clean air. “I always take my Aranet [CO2 monitor] along, and if you sit close enough to the kitchen, the kitchen fans are very effective.”

      All of these issues point to an urgent need for governments to develop indoor air standards, Dr Schofield says — for air quality to be regulated and monitored, just like food and water are. Before the pandemic, in 1998, the economic cost to the Australian economy of poor indoor air was $12 billion per year — $21.7 billion in 2021 money. “So why aren’t we learning from that, and moving forward?” she says. “This is not about going back to 2019, it’s about having the future we deserve in 2030.”

      ’We’re living in a public health ’Barbieland’

      Brendan Crabb, chief executive of the Burnet Institute

      professor brendan crabb
      The lack of action against COVID is fundamentally a problem of a lack of leadership, says Brendan Crabb.(Image: Supplied by Burnet institute)
      Four years into the COVID-19 pandemic we’re living in a “public health Barbieland”, says Professor Brendan Crabb, director and chief executive of the Burnet Institute. Too many of us are playing “make-believe” that life has returned to “normal”, he says, and there’s an “enormous disconnect” in the community: a failure to grasp both the true scale of COVID circulating and the impact of infections on our health and longevity.

      Australia recorded more than 28,000 excess deaths between January 2022 and July 2023, he says. “These are unheard of numbers, people who wouldn’t have otherwise died, let alone the hundreds of thousands in hospital — we don’t know exactly because no one publishes the numbers.” Then there are the hundreds of millions globally with long COVID-19, the risk of which increases with each infection. “I find what we know about COVID concerning enough to call it an elevated public health crisis,” Professor Crabb says. “And we need sustainable solutions to that now and in the longer term.”

      Long COVID will take your health, your wealth — then it will come for your marriage
      Long COVID is not just destroying people’s health. Behind closed doors, in homes across Australia and abroad, it is irreversibly changing relationships — sometimes for the better, too often for worse.

      An illustration in blue and pink colours shows a woman sitting alone in a room looking out a window
      Read more
      The lack of action against COVID-19, Professor Crabb says, is fundamentally a problem of a lack of leadership. “The most common thing said to me is, ’Brendan, I really do trust what you and others are saying. But if there was a real problem the prime minister, the government, would be telling us that,’” he says. “I don’t think people are all of a sudden profoundly individualistic and don’t care about COVID anymore — that they’re suddenly willing to take massive risks and hate the idea of vaccines and masks. I just don’t think they’re being well led on this issue.”

      A crucial factor shaping Australians’ apathy towards COVID-19 in 2024, Professor Crabb believes, was Chief Medical Officer Paul Kelly’s statement in September 2022 that the virus was no longer exceptional. “It is time to move away from COVID exceptionalism, in my view, and we should be thinking about what we do to protect people from any respiratory disease,” Professor Kelly said at a press conference. Those comments, Professor Crabb says, have never been turned around. “If I’m right — and I say that was a profoundly wrong statement — then that has to be corrected by the same people.”

      He also points a finger at two unhelpful ideas. “There is a strong belief, I think, by the chief medical officer and many others that once we got vaccinated, infection was our friend,” he says. Australia’s vaccine program was highly successful, Professor Crabb says. Most people were inoculated against COVID-19 before large numbers were infected. “If we were the US, we’d have had 80,000 deaths … [instead] we had 1,744 deaths in the first two years,” he says. But while vaccination broadly protects against severe illness and death, it does not protect against (re)infection or the risk of acute and chronic health problems.

      The other idea is hybrid immunity, which holds that vaccination and infection provides superior protection against severe outcomes compared to immunity induced by vaccination or infection alone. For Professor Crabb, the concept is flawed: first, because it encourages infection, which he believes should be avoided, and second, because it does not work — at least not with the predictable emergence of new variants like JN.1 which are capable of evading population immunity. “Immunity is good,” he says. “But it’s not good enough.”

      A panel of participants at the Clean Air Forum in Parliament House, with air purifiers and a CO2 monitor around the room
      Brendan Crabb took his portable air purifier to the Clean Air Forum at Parliament House last year, where there were also large purifiers in the room and a CO2 monitor on the desk.(Supplied: Stuart Kinner)
      In a perfect world, Professor Crabb says, political leaders would speak regularly about the pressure on health systems, about deaths, and about the potential health consequences for children, which are often overlooked. “And then underneath that they’d set a blueprint for action around the tools we currently have being properly implemented: a vaccine program, a clean air program, advice around wearing masks when you can’t breathe clean air, and testing so you can protect those around you and get treated.” But who speaks matters, too: “If it’s not [coming from] the prime minister, if it’s not the premiers — if it’s not consistent — it’s probably not going to cut through.”

      In the meantime, he says, people can and should take precautions — they can be leaders in their community, and start conversations with their employers and kids’ schools. For him, in addition to getting current booster vaccines, it means using a toolkit he built with his wife who, as a paediatrician who works in a long COVID-19 clinic in Melbourne, comes face to face with the harm the virus is doing every day. The kit includes a well-fitted N95 mask, a CO2 monitor and a portable air purifier. “It’s another line [of defence],” he says. “If you’re in a restaurant, say, and … you’ve got a few people around you, putting one of those on the table, blowing in your face, is a good idea.”

      Masks, he adds, should be worn in crowded places or spaces with poor ventilation. Of course, the topic sometimes sparks heated debate. A Cochrane review which last year suggested masks do not work was later found to be inaccurate and misleading and subject to an apology. But the damage it did was significant. Since then a vicious culture war has raged, much to the dismay of respected scientists who continue to make the point: numerous studies show high-quality, well-fitted N95 and P2 respirators prevent infection when they’re worn correctly and consistently.

      Professor Crabb’s home is also as “airborne safe” as he can make it. An “enormous amount of transmission” occurs in homes, he says. And his analysis of excess deaths from COVID-19 between January 2022 and March 2023 paints a striking picture: Moving down the east coast from Queensland, excess deaths increase, with Tasmania recording the highest proportion — last year it was more than double that of Queensland. “There’s no way Queensland has better COVID strategies than Victoria,” he says. “So very likely it’s to do with less time spent in poorly ventilated indoor spaces.”

      Ultimately, strong evidence supporting the benefits of clean air is why Professor Crabb believes the future of COVID-19 — and other pandemics to come — is regulating indoor air quality: a responsibility for governments, public institutions and workplaces. “That’s where we are really headed, and that’s where I think there’s strong interest at a government level,” he says. “Of course everyone is stressed about what that will cost, but … let’s at least have the conversation. We have to move towards an airborne future. How you do that in economically sensible ways is a separate discussion — whether we do it or not should not be up for discussion, and the gains are enormous.”

      #santé #prévention #CO2 #masque #purificateur_d'air #purificateur_d'air_portable

    • Ultimately, strong evidence supporting the benefits of clean air is why Professor Crabb believes the future of COVID-19 — and other pandemics to come — is regulating indoor air quality: a responsibility for governments, public institutions and workplaces. “That’s where we are really headed, and that’s where I think there’s strong interest at a government level,” he says.

    • Oui, d’ailleurs, à propos de la « régulation de la qualité de l’air intérieur, responsabilité des gouvernements, institutions publiques et lieux de travail », à Davos, ils montrent l’exemple pour la deuxième année consécutive. Le capitalisme, ça vous gagne.

    • Me serais-je mal fait comprendre ? Les purificateurs ne sont pas partout, hélas. Juste dans des endroits « stratégiques » où les dominants protègent leurs intérêts et pérennisent leurs privilèges. Un air pur et exempt de tout agent pathogène, ça se « mérite ».

    • Oui, c’est bien ce dont je parle. L’année dernière, on avait vu les images accablantes de tous des dispositifs de purification d’air pour Davos, pendant que les autres grenouillent dans les miasmes.

      On a vu aussi que « Stan » avait eu une maousse subvention qui avait dû manquer aux actions sociales pour entièrement refaire son système de ventilation.

      Je me demandais donc si on avait de nouveau vu Davos se protéger consciencieusement perdant que les dirigeants racontent à leurs peuples respectifs que la pandémie, faut vivre avec.

  • Avec mon #maroquin, j’avais l’air d’un #con... :-D :-D :-D

    "Prime aux #sarkozystes et entre-soi #parisien : les #cocus du #gouvernement #Attal

    Sur le papier, le gouvernement rajeunit par l’entremise de Gabriel Attal et se droitise à travers des prises de guerre, comme Rachida Dati et Catherine Vautrin. En réalité, rien ne change. Ces pseudo-bouleversements font des déçus parmi les « oubliés » de la Macronie… et surtout parmi les Français. (...)"

    #politique #France #Tartuffe #Guignol_s_Band #escamoteur #bonneteau #jeu_de_dupe #humour #farce #seenthis #vangauguin

    https://www.marianne.net/politique/gouvernement/gouvernement-attal-en-depit-des-apparences-le-macronisme-na-pas-du-tout-re

  • L’empreinte étatique de la mémoire
    https://laviedesidees.fr/Gensburger-Qui-pose-les-questions-memorielles

    Sarah Gensburger bat en brèche l’idée d’un État dépassé par la fragmentation et la multiplication des demandes mémorielles. L’État est le principal créateur de nos cadres mémoriels, les utilisant même comme un puissant moyen de réaffirmation de sa légitimité. À propos de : Sarah Gensburger, Qui pose les questions mémorielles ?, CNRS Éditions

    #Histoire #mémoire
    https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/pdf/20240115_gensburger.pdf
    https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/docx/20240115_gensburger.docx

    • Qui pose les questions mémorielles

      Depuis plusieurs décennies, le langage de la «  mémoire  » est devenu dominant pour dire les rapports sociaux au passé. «  Demandes sociales de mémoire  » et «  concurrence des mémoires  » se seraient substituées au grand récit national, plaçant les pouvoirs publics en position d’arbitre entre des aspirations éclatées et rivales.
      C’est cette vision convenue, source de tant d’articles, de rapports ou d’essais, que cette vaste enquête entend mettre à l’épreuve des faits. Qui pose les questions mémorielles ?
      Quels sont les acteurs et les actrices qui parlent de «  mémoire  » au sein de l’État ou en relation avec lui ? Depuis quand, à propos de quoi et de quelles manières ? Avec quelles réalisations concrètes et quels résultats ?
      Multipliant les points d’observation, ce travail retrace l’émergence de la mémoire comme secteur d’action publique, ouvre la «  boîte noire  » de l’État, interroge la constitution et le développement des associations mémorielles, étudie les pratiques mises en œuvre à différents niveaux et questionne leurs effets attendus – ou inattendus. Autant de facettes d’une véritable sociologie de la mémoire qui prend le contrepied de nombre d’évidences partagées.

      https://www.cnrseditions.fr/catalogue/histoire/qui-pose-les-questions-memorielles
      #Etat #mémoire #livre #Sarah_Gensburger

  • Francia. In piazza contro la legge Darmanin
    https://www.meltingpot.org/2024/01/francia-in-piazza-contro-la-legge-darmanin

    La discussione provocata dalla legge sull’immigrazione continua a essere al centro del dibattito politico francese. Alle dimissioni della ormai ex Prima ministra Elizabeth Borne, famosa per aver fatto ricorso all’articolo 49.3 della Costituzione francese per ben 23 volte nel corso del suo mandato (in particolare per far passare la tanto contestata riforma delle pensioni), è seguita pochi giorni fa la nomina di Gabriel Attal, che ha provocato non poche polemiche. Attal è infatti stato definito come «un puro prodotto del macronismo», mentre gli/le attivisti/e di Contre Attaque descrivono tale nomina come “pinkwashing neoliberale e grottesco”. Il neo Primo ministro (...)

    #Notizie #Sara_Corsaro

  • Méditerranée : le nouveau navire de Sea-Watch porte secours à 119 migrants, dont un enfant de 3 ans - InfoMigrants
    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54124/mediterranee--le-nouveau-navire-de-seawatch-porte-secours-a-119-migran

    Méditerranée : le nouveau navire de Sea-Watch porte secours à 119 migrants, dont un enfant de 3 ans
    Par La rédaction Publié le : 26/12/2023
    L’équipage du Sea-Watch 5 a secouru 119 exilés, dont 32 mineurs, lors du réveillon de Noël. À l’issue du sauvetage, le navire s’est vu attribuer le port de Marina di Carrara, à plus de 1 150 kilomètres du lieu des sauvetages. Le but des autorités ? « Éloigner les navires de sauvetage de la zone d’opération afin de ne plus pouvoir secourir les personnes en détresse », dénonce l’ONG. À l’heure où des millions de familles s’apprêtaient à fêter Noël, le réveillon s’est déroulé en pleine mer Méditerranée pour l’équipage du Sea-Watch 5. Le 24 décembre dans la soirée, les humanitaires ont porté secours à 119 migrants en détresse, dont 32 mineurs, répartis sur deux canots au large de la Tunisie. Le plus jeune rescapé est âgé de 3 ans seulement.
    La première opération a permis de secourir 55 personnes entassées dans un canot pneumatique. Lors du second sauvetage, 64 autres exilés ont été secourus. Si tous les naufragés sont sains et saufs, « nombre d’entre eux souffrent d’épuisement, de déshydratation et de brûlures chimiques dues aux mélanges de carburant et d’eau de mer qui se forment dans les petits bateaux », précise un communiqué. Tous ont été pris en charge sur le pont du Sea-Watch 5, tout nouveau navire de l’ONG allemande. Parti d’Espagne en novembre dernier, il peut accueillir jusqu’à 500 naufragés.
    Le soir des sauvetages, le navire était stationné au sud de l’île italienne de Lampedusa. Il avait participé, la veille, aux recherches d’un bateau de pêche chargé d’environ 150 personnes. Ce dernier a finalement été secouru par deux patrouilleurs des garde-côtes italiens. Quelques heures après les deux opérations de secours du 24 décembre, les autorités italiennes ont assigné au Sea-Watch 5 le port de Marina di Carrara, dans l’extrême nord de l’Italie. Soit à plus de 1 150 km du lieu de sauvetage. « Le but de ces ports reculés est d’éloigner les navires de sauvetage de la zone d’opération afin de ne plus pouvoir secourir les personnes en détresse », dénonce l’ONG sur X (ex-Twitter). Aucun navire humanitaire ne sillonne actuellement la zone de recherche et de sauvetage (SAR zone) située au large de la Libye.
    L’attribution des ports de débarquement est ordonnée dans le cadre du décret Piantedosi, qui régit les activités des navires d’ONG en mer. Depuis sa mise en application, il y a un an, il complique considérablement le travail des humanitaires. Une de ses mesures oblige par exemple les associations à se rendre « sans délai » au port de débarquement assigné par les autorités italiennes juste après un premier sauvetage. Mais en partant immédiatement après l’opération de secours, les navires laissent « la zone déserte, les États européens ayant renoncé à leurs responsabilités de sauvetages en mer, déplorait auprès d’InfoMigrants en novembre Margot Bernard, coordinatrice de projet adjointe à bord du Geo Barents de Médecins sans frontières (MSF). C’est une grande source de frustration pour nous, et surtout, cela nous fait craindre une augmentation des naufrages invisibles », ces embarcations « fantômes » qui sombrent en mer sans que personne ne le sache. Dans la nuit du 14 au 15 décembre, 61 personnes sont mortes noyées au large des côtes libyennes. Alertés au sujet du naufrage de l’embarcation dans la soirée, aucun pays – Italie, Malte, Libye – ne s’est rendu sur place. Ce n’est que plusieurs heures plus tard, sur ordre de l’Italie, qu’un navire commercial est finalement intervenu pour porter secours à 25 rescapés, qui ont ensuite été ramenés en Libye. L’Ocean Viking de SOS Méditerranée se trouvait près du lieu du naufrage seulement 24 heures auparavant. Mais le navire humanitaire, qui avait porté assistance à 26 personnes le 13 décembre, avait été forcé de quitter la zone par les autorités italiennes : Rome lui avait attribué le port de Livourne (nord-ouest de l’Italie), distant d’un millier de kilomètres, pour y débarquer les migrants. SOS Méditerranée avait pourtant averti sur X que son absence en mer pourrait avoir de lourdes conséquences, alors qu’une « tempête de force 8 » était prévue ce week-end du 15 décembre. D’après le porte-parole du bureau de coordination méditerranéen de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), Flavio di Giacomo, « 2 271 personnes sont mortes en Méditerranée centrale en 2023, soit 60 % de plus qu’au cours de la même période l’année dernière ».

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#OIM#UE#italie#libye#mediterranee#traversee#sante#ONG#SAR#sauvetage

  • Mucosal boosting enhances vaccine protection against #SARS-CoV-2 in macaques | Nature
    https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06951-3

    Here we show that intratracheal boosting with a bivalent Ad26 based SARS-CoV-2 vaccine results in substantial induction of mucosal humoral and cellular immunity and near complete protection against SARS-CoV-2 BQ.1.1 challenge. 40 previously immunized rhesus macaques were boosted with a bivalent Ad26 vaccine by the intramuscular, intranasal, and intratracheal routes or with a bivalent mRNA vaccine by the intranasal route. Ad26 boosting by the intratracheal route led to substantial expansion of mucosal neutralizing antibodies, IgG and IgA binding antibodies, and CD8+ and CD4+ T cell responses, which exceeded those induced by Ad26 boosting by the intramuscular and intranasal routes. Intratracheal Ad26 boosting also led to robust upregulation of cytokine, NK, T and B cell pathways in the lung. Following high-dose SARS-CoV-2 BQ.1.1 challenge, intratracheal Ad26 boosting provided near complete protection, whereas the other boosting strategies proved less effective. Protective efficacy correlated best with mucosal humoral and cellular immune responses. These data demonstrate that novel immunization strategies induce robust mucosal immunity, suggesting the feasibility of developing vaccines that block respiratory viral infections.

    #vaccin_muqueux

  • Inhaled #SARS-CoV-2 vaccine for single-dose dry powder aerosol immunization | Nature
    https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06809-8

    (Chez les animaux)

    […] findings support the use of this inhaled vaccine as a promising multivalent platform for fighting #COVID-19 and other respiratory infectious diseases.

    #vaccin_muqueux

  • La prise d’une association prébiotiques/probiotiques a amélioré les symptômes du #post-covid

    A synbiotic preparation (SIM01) for post-acute #COVID-19 syndrome in Hong Kong (RECOVERY) : a randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial - The Lancet Infectious Diseases
    https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(23)00685-0/abstract

    Methods

    In this randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial at a tertiary referral centre in Hong Kong, patients with PACS according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention criteria were randomly assigned (1:1) by random permuted blocks to receive SIM01 (10 billion colony-forming units in sachets twice daily) or placebo orally for 6 months. Inclusion criterion was the presence of at least one of 14 PACS symptoms for 4 weeks or more after confirmed #SARS-CoV-2 infection, including fatigue, memory loss, difficulty in concentration, insomnia, mood disturbance, hair loss, shortness of breath, coughing, inability to exercise, chest pain, muscle pain, joint pain, gastrointestinal upset, or general unwellness. Individuals were excluded if they were immunocompromised, were pregnant or breastfeeding, were unable to receive oral fluids, or if they had received gastrointestinal surgery in the 30 days before randomisation. Participants, care providers, and investigators were masked to group assignment. The primary outcome was alleviation of PACS symptoms by 6 months, assessed by an interviewer-administered 14-item questionnaire in the intention-to-treat population. Forward stepwise multivariable logistical regression was performed to identify predictors of symptom alleviation. The trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT04950803.

    Findings

    Between June 25, 2021, and Aug 12, 2022, 463 patients were randomly assigned to receive SIM01 (n=232) or placebo (n=231). At 6 months, significantly higher proportions of the SIM01 group had alleviation of fatigue (OR 2·273, 95% CI 1·520–3·397, p=0·0001), memory loss (1·967, 1·271–3·044, p=0·0024), difficulty in concentration (2·644, 1·687–4·143, p<0·0001), gastrointestinal upset (1·995, 1·304–3·051, p=0·0014), and general unwellness (2·360, 1·428–3·900, p=0·0008) compared with the placebo group. Adverse event rates were similar between groups during treatment (SIM01 22 [10%] of 232 vs placebo 25 [11%] of 231; p=0·63). Treatment with SIM01, infection with omicron variants, vaccination before COVID-19, and mild acute COVID-19, were predictors of symptom alleviation (p<0·0036).

    Interpretation

    Treatment with SIM01 alleviates multiple symptoms of PACS. Our findings have implications on the management of PACS through gut microbiome modulation. Further studies are warranted to explore the beneficial effects of SIM01 in other chronic or post-infection conditions.

    #covid_long #long_covid

    • Sont gentils les probiotiques c’est cher et pas remboursé. La généraliste et la gynéco sont très fan, en plus tous les jours tu gobes leur truc et t’as le sentiment d’être une pharmacie sur jambes.

  • COVID-19 et dysrégulation immunitaire : Résumé et ressources | Andrew Ewing
    https://cabrioles.substack.com/p/covid-19-et-dysregulation-immunitaire

    L’infection par le COVID-19 a plusieurs effets très préoccupants sur le système immunitaire qui pourraient facilement conduire à favoriser d’autres agents pathogènes et à aggraver les conséquences des réinfections par le COVID-19. Ce dysfonctionnement ou vieillissement du système immunitaire est au moins l’un des scénarios les plus probables expliquant les récentes vagues de maladies comme le VRS, la grippe, le streptocoque A et d’autres infections.

    Andrew Ewing est professeur de chimie et de biologie moléculaire à l’université de Göteborg, spécialisé dans la compréhension des bases de la communication entre les cellules du cerveau, et membre élu de l’Académie suédoise des sciences. Il est actif au sein du forum Vetenskaps en Suède, a cosigné/écrit des articles dans des périodiques suédois, norvégiens, français et américains, dont TIME, a fait partie de l’équipe qui a rédigé l’article du consensus Delphi sur le COVID-19 dans Nature, ainsi qu’un article dans Humanities and Social Sciences Communications.

    #Covid #système_immunitaire (effondrement du) #immunodéficience

    • La dysrégulation immunitaire est considérée par beaucoup comme une manifestation du COVID Long, mais elle se produit chez les patient·es après un COVID-19 sévère, modéré et léger. Le COVID Long est généralement défini par des symptômes, cependant, la dysrégulation immunitaire est souvent difficile à diagnostiquer en tant que symptôme. Bien que sa prévalence ne soit pas encore connue, l’association de la dysrégulation immunitaire avec le COVID Long indique qu’elle est au moins de l’ordre de 10% et qu’elle pourrait être considérablement plus importante.

      La prévalence des infections aiguës par le COVID-19 a été incroyablement élevée, ce qui a eu des conséquences considérables pour l’humanité. Les réinfections sont de plus en plus fréquentes, endommageant le système immunitaire et l’affaiblissant avant que les infections suivantes ne se produisent. Pendant cette période, et avec la possibilité d’une persistance virale démontrée par de nombreuses études, le système immunitaire n’est pas aussi fort et est plus sensible à d’autres agents pathogènes.

      Le SARS-CoV-2 provoque un dysfonctionnement immunitaire par le biais de plusieurs mécanismes directs et indirects, notamment la destruction d’importantes catégories de cellules immunitaires innées et adaptatives. Le taux de renouvellement des cellules sanguines d’un individu est un facteur qui détermine le caractère transitoire ou grave des dommages.

    • Vous croyez qu’il faudrait les prévenir, les infectiologues en carton pâte, que ce n’est pas le masque qui crée la « dette immunitaire » mais #SARS-CoV2 lui même ?

      L’infection par le COVID-19 a plusieurs effets très préoccupants sur le système immunitaire qui pourraient facilement conduire à favoriser d’autres agents pathogènes et à aggraver les conséquences des réinfections par le COVID-19. Ce dysfonctionnement ou vieillissement du système immunitaire est au moins l’un des scénarios les plus probables expliquant les récentes vagues de maladies comme le VRS, la grippe, le streptocoque A et d’autres infections. En revanche, la dette immunitaire n’est pas considérée comme une explication viable, car l’augmentation de ces maladies se poursuit dans les pays qui ont déjà connu des flambées la saison dernière et voient l’immunité diminuer pour bon nombre de ces maladies. Une autre préoccupation sérieuse à ce stade est que les infections répétées par le COVID-19 pourraient conduire à l’épuisement des cellules T CD8+ cytotoxiques, ce qui pourrait avoir des effets en aval sur d’autres maladies comme les cancers, car les cellules T jouent un rôle essentiel dans la limitation de la prolifération tumorale et il a été démontré qu’elles peuvent se différencier et devenir dysfonctionnelles.

    • Il a été démontré que chaque réinfection augmentait le risque cumulé de décès, d’hospitalisation et de séquelles dans de multiples systèmes d’organes, tant dans la phase aiguë que dans la phase post-aiguë. Cela montre que le système immunitaire n’est pas suffisamment protecteur pour limiter les dommages causés par de nouvelles infections par le COVID-19 ou d’autres infections, même après vaccination. Il s’agit d’un problème grave si nous sommes continuellement réinfecté·es avant que le système immunitaire ne se rétablisse à chaque fois.

      Donc, mis à part que le vaccin protège contre les formes graves et peut éventuellement faire baisser la charge virale, j’en suis à me demander si une nouvelle dose est bien pertinente. Le masque reste la meilleure protection contre les réinfections, non ?

    • Comme la plupart des gens sont totalement dés-incités de se re-vacciner, on va bientôt avoir la réponse : de + en + de gens sont à poil devant les variants.

      Le vaccin ne protège pas contre les réinfections de manière absolue, mais ça doit bien atténuer les chances quand même, surtout au début.
      Et vu la saleté en face, même 25% de protection, je prendrais (mais on ne sait pas).

      En fait, comme je le rabâche depuis 3 ans, faute de politique de santé publique, rien n’est réellement efficace dans une propagation yolo en population générale.

      Donc, la meilleure stratégie reste ceinture et bretelle pour limiter les risques de se retrouver le cul à l’air.

      Autrement dit : vaccin à jour + FFP2 + distanciation sociale au maximum possible selon les configurations perso × pro.

      On va me dire : « c’est pas tenable à long terme, surtout sans perspective d’amélioration ».

      Je te réponds : « ce qui m’a l’air pas du tout tenable, c’est d’avoir gagné un #Covid_Long à la loterie de portnawak généralisé et de se coltiner peut-être bien à vie des handicaps, dégradations et limitations diverses et variées de ta santé, sans l’ombre d’une solution thérapeutique. La seule bonne nouvelle étant que le probable raccourcissement de ton espérance de vie devrait te délivrer plus vite que prévu et te faire rater la fin du monde climatique. »

      Surtout que maintenant que les malades comme prévu commencent à peser dur sur les systèmes de santé, on est en train de finir le bazardement du bousin.

      D’où la nouvelle politique suisse de dire que les gens vont s’immuniser en tombant malades.
      https://www.rts.ch/info/suisse/14523106-lactuelle-vague-de-covid-en-suisse-favorisera-une-immunite-collective-r

    • Je rêve ou tu es en train de demander des avis médicaux sur internet ? :-)

      Pour ma part je conseille #ceinture_et_bretelles ; pas entendu qui que ce soit de sérieux dire le contraire.

      EDIT : tout comme monolecte !

    • L’actuelle vague de Covid en Suisse favorisera une immunité collective renforcée
      💩

      Les cas de Covid-19 sont à nouveau en hausse. Du point de vue de la défense immunitaire collective, selon le président de la Commission fédérale pour les vaccinations Christophe Berger, la vague actuelle est, dans une certaine mesure, bienvenue.

      La recrudescence actuelle est sous contrôle, précise Christophe Berger dans la NZZ am Sonntag ce dimanche. S’il déplore les cas de maladies, il souligne que cette vague fait en quelque sorte partie du concept de la politique d’immunisation actuelle. Le but de celui-ci est d’éviter les cas lourds et mortels en lien avec le coronavirus.

      Cet hiver, la vaccination est donc recommandée uniquement pour les personnes à risques d’infection sévère, c’est-à-dire les personnes âgées de 65 ans ou plus, ou souffrant de certaines maladies chroniques.
      Nouvelle stratégie face au Covid-19

      Pour le reste de la population, aucune vaccination n’est recommandée. Elle n’offre qu’une protection faible et de courte durée contre les formes bénignes, explique l’Office fédéral de la santé publique sur son site internet.

      Selon les experts, cités par la presse alémanique, en raison de contaminations ou de vaccinations antérieures, près de 98 % de la population possède déjà des anticorps.

      Selon Christophe Berger, il est important que cette immunité de base persiste, non plus grâce à la vaccination mais à une contamination.

    • Je rêve ou tu es en train de demander des avis médicaux sur internet ? :-)

      Bah oui, carrément @fil. J’ai des doutes sur l’innocuité de ces vaccins à ARN messager. Je m’en rapporte à mon expérience personnelle (qui ne vaut pas grand chose mais c’est du vécu) ; à chaque injection, je suis quand même bien cogné. A quoi cela est-il dû, je ne sais pas et je n’ai pas non plus vraiment cherché.
      Donc oui, l’attitude la plus « safe » est ceinture et bretelle. Question interaction sociale, pas trop de soucis avec ça vu que nous nous « ensauvageons » un peu plus chaque jour ...

      Ceci dit @monolecte, si même la Suisse baisse la garde et adopte la raclette attitude, oui, il y a de quoi flipper parce que, en principe, iels sont plutôt de nature méfiante voire un tantinet parano les citoyen·nes de la Confédération ...
      [edit] : après, les grands chefs ne représentent qu’une faible proportion de la population et les laquais médiatiques qui les relaient n’ont pour seule préoccupation que d’aller à la gamelle.

    • Donc, un machin prévu pour obtenir une bonne réponse immunitaire donne une bonne réponse immunitaire… 🤷‍♀️

      Perso, j’ai + flippé quand un des vaccins a donné que dalle comme réponse. Vu les zinzins qui trainent jusque dans les officines, j’ai passé 6 mois (non, quand même pas !) à me demander si je n’étais pas tombée sur une antivaxxx qui m’avait filé du liquide phy en ricanant.

      Oui, en santé publique (si on peut encore appeler ça comme ça), ce sont les assurantiels qui ont pris le pouvoir. Autrement dit : à combien tu estimes ta précieuse santé et combien t’es prêt à raquer ?

      Les gueux, ils vont profiter des bienfaits des méthodes « naturelles », comme au bon vieux temps de l’espérance de vie à 35 ans.

  • Le dessous des images. Derniers instants avant le naufrage

    Au large de la Grèce, une équipe de garde-côtes survole et capture cette scène depuis un hélicoptère. Des centaines de migrants appellent au secours depuis un chalutier. La plupart ne survivront pas au naufrage. Mais à quoi a servi cette image ? Présenté par Sonia Devillers, le magazine qui analyse les images de notre époque.

    Ce cliché du 13 juin 2023 est repris dans toute la presse internationale. Les autorités grecques ont photographié ce bateau de pêche qu’ils savent bondé et fragile, et dont les passagers sont affamés et déshydratés. Pourtant, ils ne seront pas capables de les secourir. La responsabilité des garde-côtes sera mise en cause par médias et ONG. Arthur Carpentier, journaliste au Monde et coauteur d’une enquête sur ce naufrage, nous explique en quoi les images ont permis de reconstituer le drame. Le chercheur suisse Charles Heller nous aide à comprendre l’impact médiatique, politique et symbolique des images de migrants et de naufrages en Méditerranée.

    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/110342-133-A/le-dessous-des-images

    Citation de #Charles_Heller :

    « Ces #images cristallisent toutes les #inégalités et les #conflits du monde dans lequel on vit. Elles nous disent aussi la #normalisation de la #violence des #frontières, sur la large acceptation de dizaines de milliers de #morts aux frontières européennes, et en #Méditerranée en particulier »

    #naufrage #migrations #réfugiés #mer #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Grèce #reconstruction #Pylos #géolocalisation #architecture_forensique #images #mourir_en_mer #morts_en_mer #garde-côtes #Frontex #reconstitution #SAR #mer_Egée #border_forensics #domination #imaginaire #invasion #3_octobre_2013 #émoi #émotions #normalisation_de_la_violence

    ping @reka

    • Frontex report into Greek shipwreck suggests more deaths could have been prevented

      A Frontex report suggesting that many of the deaths caused by the shipwreck off the Greek coast near Pylos last June could have been prevented was released by the Aegean Boat Report NGO on their X feed yesterday evening (January 31).

      Investigations into what happened to the Adriana, an overcrowded fishing vessel carrying some 750 people from Libya to Italy that sank off the coast of Greece on June 13, are ongoing.

      However, a report produced by the European Border Agency Frontex — marked “sensitive” and dated December 1, 2023 — was posted to X (formerly known as Twitter) late on January 31.

      The report was posted by Aegean Boat Report, an organization working with migrants in the eastern Mediterranean.

      In their post on X, they thank freelance Brussels-based journalist Eleonora Vasques for “making it available to the public.” Frontex told InfoMigrants in an email that they had released the report via their “Transparency Office.” They added that the “release wass part of a Public Access to Documents request, an important process that allows us to share information with the public.”

      Vasques writes regularly for the European news portal Euractiv. One of her latest reports looks into what happened in the Cutro shipwreck off Italy almost a year ago. The story was also sourced back to an internal Frontex report, which concluded that more lives could have potentially been saved if the response from Frontex and the Italian coast guard had been different.

      https://twitter.com/ABoatReport/status/1752800986664448090

      Long and detailed report

      The 17-page Pylos report from Frontex is redacted in parts and goes into great detail about what happened and which authorities and merchant ships were involved. It also compares timelines from various authorities, NGOs and media organizations.

      In the email to InfoMigrants, Frontex continued that they “strive to make such documents available in our Public Register of Documents as promptly as possible.” The Press Spokesperson Krzysztof Borowski wrote that the “Pylos tragedy is a stark reminder of the challenges and dangers faced at sea. We at Frontex share the profound concern and sadness of the public regarding this heartbreaking event.” He finished by saying: “Our thoughts are with all those affected by this tragedy, and we remain dedicated to our mission of safeguarding lives while ensuring border security.”
      Committment to ’assess cases more thoroughly

      Although the report finds that Frontex “followed applicable procedures”, it admitted that “going forward and based on a reviewed assessment methodology ... the team … should assess similar cases more thoroughly against the need to issue a Mayday alert.”

      A Mayday alert is a radio distress signal used at sea.

      The report appears to suggest that more could have been done on the day to prevent such a huge loss of life.

      According to the Frontex report posted on X, “in the hours following the sighting of Adriana, Frontex made three attempts to follow up on the case, by suggesting additional Frontex Surveillance Aircraft (FSA) sorties.”

      Frontex writes that “no reply was received by the Greek authorities to Frontex’ repeated offers until Adriana’s shipwreck.”

      Frontex made an initial statement on June 16 expressing “shock and sadness” at the events off Pylos.
      ’Greek authorities failed to timely declare a search and rescue situation’

      Although the investigating office at Frontex underlines that it is “not in a position to conclude what caused Adriana’s capsizing and shipwreck … it appears that the Greek authorities failed to timely declare a search and rescue and to deploy a sufficient number of appropriate assets in time to rescue the migrants.”

      The report stated that Frontex “regrets the lack of information provided by the Greek authorities to its enquiry but still expects to receive updates from the national investigations in progress.”

      According to Frontex’ timeline of the incident, the agency first learned about the existence of the fishing vessel carrying migrants on June 13 at around 10:12 UTC, or around 13:12 in Greek summer time. They spotted the vessel from their aerial surveillance plane Eagle 1. About four hours later, another update was sent to the fundamental rights monitor, but according to the report, nothing “out of the ordinary” was flagged regarding the vessel at this point.

      The next paragraph jumped to June 14 at 06.19 UTC, when the fundamental rights monitor received “another update … notifying that Adriana sank overnight and a SAR [Search and Rescue] was in progress.”
      ’Serious Incident Report’ launched by Frontex on June 26

      In the following days, the Office for Fundamental Rights at Frontex monitored the aftermath of the incident, states the report.

      They studied “Frontex’ own sightings of Adriana” along with “statements by Greek officials, and initial information reported in the media.”

      Frontex launched a “Serious Incident Report (SIR) on June 26, “to clarify the role of Frontex in the incident as well as the legality and fundamental rights compliance of the assistance to the boat in distress, and the coordination and conduct of rescue operation by national authorities.”

      According to a summary of that work, the first mention of the Adriana came from the Italian control authorities in Rome at 08:01 UTC on June 13.

      At that point, Rome’s search and rescue authorities contacted Greece’s authorities and Frontex about “a fishing vessel with approximately 750 migrants on board, known to be sailing within the Greek Search and Rescue Region at 06:51 UTC.” At that point, Rome had already alerted the authorities to “reports of two dead children on board.”

      After receiving this report, Frontex wrote that it directed its plane Eagle 1, which was already in the air, to fly over the fishing vessel “even though the vessel lay outside the normal patrolling route.”

      The report said the Eagle 1 spotted the “heavily overcrowded” vessel at 09:47 UTC and informed the Greek authorities. Ten minutes later, the plane left the area due to low fuel and returned to base.
      Italian authorities report Adriana ’adrift’ long before Greek authorities do

      By 13:18, Rome’s search and rescue authorities provided an update of the situation to Greek authorities and Frontex. At that point, they said the boat was “reported adrift” and had “seven people dead on board.”

      At 14:54, Frontex reportedly received an email from the NGO Watch The Med – Alarm Phone alerting Frontex, JRCC Piraeus, the Greek Ombudsman’s Office, UNHCR and others to the new location of the fishing boat. In that email, Alarm Phone stated there were “several very sick individuals, including babies” among the approximately 750 people on board and that the boat was “not able to sail.”

      About 30 minutes later, this email was forwarded by Frontex to the Greek National Coordination Center and JRCC Piraeus, and it was sent on to the Fundamental Rights Office.

      About an hour later, Frontex contacted the Greek authorities to request an update on the situation. Frontex also offered to deploy a surveillance aircraft to check on the ship’s current position, but reports it received no reply.

      Just under two and a half hours later, the Greek authorities did request that Frontex support them “in the detection of a migrant boat within the maritime area south of Crete, as part of another SAR operation.” This turned out to be a sailing boat with about 50 people on board.
      ’No reply was received’

      Later that evening, Frontex contacted the Greek authorities twice more and said no reply was received.

      At 23:20 UTC, Frontex redirected the plane that had been helping with the fishing boat off Crete to the last known position of the fishing vessel.

      The timeline moves to June 14. At 02:46 UTC, Frontex informs the Greek authorities that its plane was headed towards the last position of the fishing vessel. It says it received no reply from the Hellenic authorities.

      Over an hour passed before the plane, this time the Heron 2, reached the “operational area” where it spotted “nine maritime assets (eight merchant vessels and one Hellenic Coast Guard patrol vessel) and two helicopters involved in a large-scale SAR operation.” At that point, states Frontex in the report “no signs of the fishing vessel were spotted.”

      At 05:31, Frontex told the Greek authorities that its plane Heron 1 was about to leave the operation, but offered Eagle 1, which was already airborne, to help with the SAR operation. The Greek authorities replied over two hours later that “no further aerial surveillance support was needed for the time being.”
      No mention of dead bodies on board in Greek timeline

      The Frontex report then includes a similar timeline from the Greek authorities. In the Greek version, there is no initial mention of dead bodies on board. They say they established contact with those on board and “no request for assistance was addressed to the Greek authorities.”

      Although the Italians reported that the vessel was already adrift around 13:18 UTC, according to the Frontex report, in the Greek version, the vessel is “still sailing with a steady course and speed” at 15:00 UTC.

      Around that same time, a Maltese flagged commercial vessel approaches the fishing boat to supply them with food and water, as requested by the Greek authorities. According to the Greek report, the people on board were repeatedly asked if they were facing “any kind of danger” or were “in need of additional support.” Their answer, according to Greece, was “they just wanted to continue sailing towards Italy.”

      30 minutes later, again according to JRCC Piraeus, via satellite phone contact, those on board said they wanted to keep sailing.

      At 18:00, the boat was approached again. According to the report, the migrants “accepted water” from the Greek-flagged commercial vessel that approached them, but “threw the rest of the supplies into the sea.” This approach and refusal of assistance carried on into the evening.
      Adriana ’still holding a steady course and speed’

      At 19:40 UTC, according to the Greek report, a Greek coast guard vessel approached the fishing vessel and “remained at a close distance in order to observe it.” It was still holding a “steady course and speed, without any indications of sailing problems.”

      It was only at 22:40 UTC, according to the Greek report, that the fishing vessel “stopped moving and informed the Greek authorities that they had an engine failure.”

      A Greek coast guard vessel then immediately approached the vessel to assess the situation. Less than an hour later — at 23:04 UTC, but 02:04 local time on June 14 — the Greek report notes that the fishing vessel “took an inclination to the right side, then a sudden inclination to the left side and again a great inclination to the right side, and eventually capsized.”

      They said "people on the external deck fell in the sea and the vessel sunk within 10-15 minutes.” At that point, the Hellenic coast guard “initiated a SAR operation.”

      The Frontex report then notes “alleged discrepancies” between the various timelines and survivor statements given to the media.

      They say that many of the survivors reported that the Greek coast guard “tied ropes onto the fishing vessel in an effort to tow it,” which allegedly caused it to destabilize and capsize.

      In the past, the Greek coast guard have tied and towed vessels successfully towards safety.

      However, while the Greek coast guard acknowledged that one rope was attached around three hours before the boat sank to ascertain passengers’ conditions, there was “no attempt to tow it.”

      The rope, say the Greeks, was removed by the migrants on board just a few minutes later and the coast guard vessel moved a distance away to continue observation.
      Was Adriana stationary prior to capsizing or not?

      The BBC and several other media outlets also reported at the time that prior to capsizing and sinking, the fishing vessel had not moved for several hours.

      This is consistent with the Frontex timeline, which mentions the Italian authorities’ warnings that the boat was adrift the day before it eventually capsized.

      Later in the report, Frontex notes that many of the “alternative and complementary timelines” put together by international NGOs and journalists are “credible” as they quote “more than one source for each statement.”

      The Frontex report looks into the question of whether or not the Adriana was drifting for several hours before sinking.

      It concludes that the Faithful Warrior, one of the merchant tankers sent to assist, was tracked between 17:00 and 20:00 and was “likely stationary or moving at extremely slow speed (less than 1 knot),” indicating that the Adriana was probably not sailing normally until shortly before it capsized as the Greek report claimed.

      The report also consulted “maritime experts to gain insight into issues pertaining to stability when a trawler of Adriana’s type is overloaded with human cargo.” Although their consultations were not precise due to a lack technical data, the experts indicated that the amount of people on board could have destabilized the boat or affected its stability.
      Testimony from survivors

      A Frontex team took testimonies from survivors after the shipwreck. They said they were told there were between 125 and 150 Syrians on board, including five women and six children.

      Around 400-425 Pakistanis were on board, the report said, most of whom were placed on the lower decks. The access ladders had been removed, making it impossible for them to exit.

      There were also between 150 and 170 Egyptians and about 10 Palestinians on board. The alleged smugglers were all said to be Egyptians and enforced discipline with pocket knives.

      Numerous fights broke out on board, particularly after food ran out a few days into sailing. At some point, the captain allegedly suffered a heart attack and the boat was “drifting without engine for extended periods of time.” On day four, June 12, six people were reported to have died, and others had resorted to drinking urine or sea water.

      On day five, June 13, some migrants said they received supplies from two vessels and “at night … were approached by a small boat that they were asked to follow.”

      They said they could not do this because of their engine malfunction. Several of the migrants also allege that attempts were made to tow the vessel — presumably by the Hellenic coast guard, they said.

      Survivors also said that at one point, a boat tied a rope to the front of the Adriana and started “making turns”. This, they said, “caused the migrants to run to one side, their vessel started rocking, and eventually capsized within 15 minutes.”

      Only people on the upper decks were able to jump into the water.
      Greek authorities leave ’detailed questions answered’

      In July, Frontex said it approached the Greek authorities with a “detailed set of questions” but most of its questions were left unanswered.

      In conclusion, the Frontex Fundamental Rights Office concluded that although Frontex “upheld” all its “applicable procedures,” in the light of the information that had already been transmitted and similar situations in which Mayday alerts had been issued, the assessment could have been different and the process for issuing Mayday alerts in the future “needs to be reviewed.”

      The report admits that “at the time of the initial sighting [of the Adriana] by Eagle 1, there was reasonable certainty that persons aboard … were threatened by grave and imminent danger and required immediate assistance.”

      They also say the “resources mobilized by the [Greek] authorities during the day … were not sufficient for the objective of rescuing the migrants.”

      Frontex adds that the Greek authorities appear to have “delayed the declaration of SAR operation until the moment of the shipwreck when it was no longer possible to rescue all the people on board.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/54928/frontex-report-into-greek-shipwreck-suggests-more-deaths-could-have-be

  • Le #village_sous_la_forêt, de #Heidi_GRUNEBAUM et #Mark_KAPLAN

    En #1948, #Lubya a été violemment détruit et vidé de ses habitants par les forces militaires israéliennes. 343 villages palestiniens ont subi le même sort. Aujourd’hui, de #Lubya, il ne reste plus que des vestiges, à peine visibles, recouverts d’une #forêt majestueuse nommée « Afrique du Sud ». Les vestiges ne restent pas silencieux pour autant.

    La chercheuse juive sud-africaine, #Heidi_Grunebaum se souvient qu’étant enfant elle versait de l’argent destiné officiellement à planter des arbres pour « reverdir le désert ».

    Elle interroge les acteurs et les victimes de cette tragédie, et révèle une politique d’effacement délibérée du #Fonds_national_Juif.

    « Le Fonds National Juif a planté 86 parcs et forêts de pins par-dessus les décombres des villages détruits. Beaucoup de ces forêts portent le nom des pays, ou des personnalités célèbres qui les ont financés. Ainsi il y a par exemple la Forêt Suisse, le Parc Canada, le Parc britannique, la Forêt d’Afrique du Sud et la Forêt Correta King ».

    https://www.villageunderforest.com

    Trailer :

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISmj31rJkGQ

    #israel #palestine #carte #Israël #afrique_du_sud #forêt #documentaire

    #film #documentaire #film_documentaire

    (copier-coller de ce post de 2014 : https://seenthis.net/messages/317236)

    • Documentary Space, Place, and Landscape

      In documentaries of the occupied West Bank, erasure is imaged in the wall that sunders families and communities, in the spaces filled with blackened tree stumps of former olive groves, now missing to ensure “security,” and in the cactus that still grows, demarcating cultivated land whose owners have been expelled.

      This materiality of the landscape becomes figural, such that Shehadeh writes, “[w]hen you are exiled from your land … you begin, like a pornographer, to think about it in symbols. You articulate your love for your land in its absence, and in the process transform it into something else.’’[x] The symbolization reifies and, in this process, something is lost, namely, a potential for thinking differently. But in these Palestinian films we encounter a documenting of the now of everyday living that unfixes such reification. This is a storytelling of vignettes, moments, digressions, stories within stories, and postponed endings. These are stories of interaction, of something happening, in a documenting of a being and doing now, while awaiting a future yet to be known, and at the same time asserting a past history to be remembered through these images and sounds. Through this there arises the accenting of these films, to draw on Hamid Naficy’s term, namely a specific tone of a past—the Nakba or catastrophe—as a continuing present, insofar as the conflict does not allow Palestinians to imagine themselves in a determinate future of place and landscape they can call their own, namely a state.[xi]

      In Hanna Musleh’s I’m a Little Angel (2000), we follow the children of families, both Muslim and Christian, in the area of Bethlehem affected by the 2000 Israeli armed forces attacks and occupation.[xii] One small boy, Nicola, suffered the loss of an arm when he was hit by a shell when walking to church with his mother. His kite, seen flying high in the sky, brings delighted shrieks from Nicola as he plays on the family terrace from which the town and its surrounding hills are visible in the distance. But the contrast between the freedom of the kite in this unlimited vista and his reduced capacity is palpable as he struggles to control it with his remaining hand. The containment of both Nicola and his community is figured in opposition to a possible freedom. What is also required of us is to think not of freedom from the constraints of disability, but of freedom with disability, in a future to be made after. The constraints introduced upon the landscape by the occupation, however, make the future of such living indeterminate and uncertain. Here is the “cinema of the lived,”[xiii] of multiple times of past and present, of possible and imagined future time, and the actualized present, each of which is encountered in the movement in a singular space of Nicola and his kite.


      http://mediafieldsjournal.squarespace.com/documentary-space-place-and-la/2011/7/18/documentary-space-place-and-landscape.html;jsessioni
      #cactus #paysage

    • Memory of the Cactus

      A 42 minute documentary film that combines the cactus and the memories it stands for. The film addresses the story of the destruction of the Palestinian villages of Latroun in the Occupied West Bank and the forcible transfer of their civilian population in 1967. Over 40 years later, the Israeli occupation continues, and villagers remain displaced. The film follows two separate but parallel journeys. Aisha Um Najeh takes us down the painful road that Palestinians have been forcefully pushed down, separating them in time and place from the land they nurtured; while Israelis walk freely through that land, enjoying its fruits. The stems of the cactus, however, take a few of them to discover the reality of the crime committed.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DQ_LjknRHVA

    • Aujourd’hui, j’ai re-regardé le film « Le village sous la forêt », car je vais le projeter à mes étudiant·es dans le cadre du cours de #géographie_culturelle la semaine prochaine.

      Voici donc quelques citations tirées du film :

      Sur une des boîtes de récolte d’argent pour planter des arbres en Palestine, c’est noté « make wilderness bloom » :

      Voici les panneaux de quelques parcs et forêts créés grâce aux fonds de la #diaspora_juive :

      Projet : « We will make it green, like a modern European country » (ce qui est en étroit lien avec un certaine idée de #développement, liée au #progrès).

      Témoignage d’une femme palestinienne :

      « Ils ont planté des arbres partout qui cachaient tout »

      Ilan Pappé, historien israëlien, Université d’Exter :

      « ça leur a pris entre 6 et 9 mois poru s’emparer de 80% de la Palestine, expulser la plupart des personnes qui y vivaient et reconstruire sur les villes et villages de ces personnes un nouvel Etat, une nouvelle #identité »

      https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iais/staff/pappe

      Témoignage d’un palestinien qui continue à retourner régulièrement à Lubya :

      « Si je n’aimais pas cet endroit, est-ce que je continuerais à revenir ici tout le temps sur mon tracteur ? Ils l’ont transformé en forêt afin d’affirmer qu’il n’y a pas eu de village ici. Mais on peut voir les #cactus qui prouvent que des arabes vivaient ici »

      Ilan Pappé :

      « Ces villages éaient arabes, tout comme le paysage alentour. C’était un message qui ne passait pas auprès du mouvement sioniste. Des personnes du mouvement ont écrit à ce propos, ils ont dit qu’ils n’aimaient vraiment pas, comme Ben Gurion l’a dit, que le pays ait toujours l’air arabe. (...) Même si les Arabes n’y vivent plus, ça a toujours l’air arabe. En ce qui concerne les zones rurales, il a été clair : les villages devaient être dévastés pour qu’il n’y ait pas de #souvenirs possibles. Ils ont commencé à les dévaster dès le mois d’août 1948. Ils ont rasé les maisons, la terre. Plus rien ne restait. Il y avait deux moyens pour eux d’en nier l’existence : le premier était de planter des forêts de pins européens sur les villages. Dans la plupart des cas, lorsque les villages étaient étendus et les terres assez vastes, on voit que les deux stratégies ont été mises en oeuvre : il y a un nouveau quartier juif et, juste à côté, une forêt. En effet, la deuxième méthode était de créer un quartier juif qui possédait presque le même nom que l’ancien village arabe, mais dans sa version en hébreu. L’objectif était double : il s’agissait d’abord de montrer que le lieu était originellement juif et revenait ainsi à son propriétaire. Ensuite, l’idée était de faire passer un message sinistre aux Palestiniens sur ce qui avait eu lieu ici. Le principal acteur de cette politique a été le FNJ. »

      #toponymie

      Heidi Grunebaum, la réalisatrice :

      « J’ai grandi au moment où le FNJ cultivait l’idée de créer une patrie juive grâce à la plantation d’arbres. Dans les 100 dernières années, 260 millions d’arbres ont été plantés. Je me rends compte à présent que la petite carte du grand Israël sur les boîtes bleues n’était pas juste un symbole. Etait ainsi affirmé que toutes ces terres étaient juives. Les #cartes ont été redessinées. Les noms arabes des lieux ont sombré dans l’oubli à cause du #Comité_de_Dénomination créé par le FNJ. 86 forêts du FNJ ont détruit des villages. Des villages comme Lubya ont cessé d’exister. Lubya est devenu Lavie. Une nouvelle histoire a été écrite, celle que j’ai apprise. »

      Le #Canada_park :

      Canada Park (Hebrew: פארק קנדה‎, Arabic: كندا حديقة‎, also Ayalon Park,) is an Israeli national park stretching over 7,000 dunams (700 hectares), and extending from No man’s land into the West Bank.
      The park is North of Highway 1 (Tel Aviv-Jerusalem), between the Latrun Interchange and Sha’ar HaGai, and contains a Hasmonean fort, Crusader fort, other archaeological remains and the ruins of 3 Palestinian villages razed by Israel in 1967 after their inhabitants were expelled. In addition it has picnic areas, springs and panoramic hilltop views, and is a popular Israeli tourist destination, drawing some 300,000 visitors annually.


      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_Park

      Heidi Grunebaum :

      « Chaque pièce de monnaie est devenue un arbre dans une forêt, chaque arbre, dont les racines étaient plantées dans la terre était pour nous, la diaspora. Les pièces changées en arbres devenaient des faits ancrés dans le sol. Le nouveau paysage arrangé par le FNJ à travers la plantation de forêts et les accords politiques est celui des #parcs_de_loisirs, des routes, des barrages et des infrastructures »

      Témoignage d’un Palestinien :

      « Celui qui ne possède de #pays_natal ne possède rien »

      Heidi Grunebaum :

      « Si personne ne demeure, la mémoire est oblitérée. Cependant, de génération en génération, le souvenir qu’ont les Palestiniens d’un endroit qui un jour fut le leur, persiste. »

      Témoignage d’un Palestinien :

      "Dès qu’on mange quelque chose chez nous, on dit qu’on mangeait ce plat à Lubya. Quelles que soient nos activités, on dit que nous avions les mêmes à Lubya. Lubya est constamment mentionnées, et avec un peu d’amertume.

      Témoignage d’un Palestinien :

      Lubya est ma fille précieuse que j’abriterai toujours dans les profondeurs de mon âme. Par les histoires racontées par mon père, mon grand-père, mes oncles et ma grande-mère, j’ai le sentiment de connaître très bien Lubya.

      Avi Shlaim, Université de Oxford :

      « Le mur dans la partie Ouest ne relève pas d’une mesure de sécurité, comme il a été dit. C’est un outil de #ségrégation des deux communautés et un moyen de s’approprier de larges portions de terres palestiniennes. C’est un moyen de poursuivre la politique d’#expansion_territoriale et d’avoir le plus grand Etat juif possible avec le moins de population d’arabes à l’intérieur. »

      https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/avi-shlaim

      Heidi Grunebaum :

      « Les petites pièces de la diaspora n’ont pas seulement planté des arbres juifs et déraciné des arbres palestiniens, elles ont aussi créé une forêt d’un autre type. Une vaste forêt bureaucratique où la force de la loi est une arme. La règlementation règne, les procédures, permis, actions commandées par les lois, tout régulé le moindre espace de la vie quotidienne des Palestiniens qui sont petit à petit étouffés, repoussés aux marges de leurs terres. Entassés dans des ghettos, sans autorisation de construire, les Palestiniens n’ont plus qu’à regarder leurs maisons démolies »

      #Lubya #paysage #ruines #architecture_forensique #Afrique_du_Sud #profanation #cactus #South_african_forest #Galilée #Jewish_national_fund (#fonds_national_juif) #arbres #Palestine #Organisation_des_femmes_sionistes #Keren_Kayemeth #apartheid #résistance #occupation #Armée_de_libération_arabe #Hagana #nakba #exil #réfugiés_palestiniens #expulsion #identité #present_absentees #IDPs #déplacés_internes #Caesarea #oubli #déni #historicisation #diaspora #murs #barrières_frontalières #dépossession #privatisation_des_terres #terres #mémoire #commémoration #poésie #Canada_park

    • The Carmel wildfire is burning all illusions in Israel

      “When I look out my window today and see a tree standing there, that tree gives me a greater sense of beauty and personal delight than all the vast forests I have seen in Switzerland or Scandinavia. Because every tree here was planted by us.”

      – David Ben Gurion, Memoirs

      “Why are there so many Arabs here? Why didn’t you chase them away?”

      – David Ben Gurion during a visit to Nazareth, July 1948


      https://electronicintifada.net/content/carmel-wildfire-burning-all-illusions-israel/9130

      signalé par @sinehebdo que je remercie

    • Vu dans ce rapport, signalé par @palestine___________ , que je remercie (https://seenthis.net/messages/723321) :

      A method of enforcing the eradication of unrecognized Palestinian villages is to ensure their misrepresentation on maps. As part of this policy, these villages do not appear at all on Israeli maps, with the exception of army and hiking maps. Likewise, they do not appear on first sight on Google Maps or at all on Israeli maps, with the exception of army and hiking maps. They are labelled on NGO maps designed to increase their visibility. On Google Maps, the Bedouin villages are marked – in contrast to cities and other villages – under their Bedouin tribe and clan names (Bimkom) rather than with their village names and are only visible when zooming in very closely, but otherwise appear to be non-existent. This means that when looking at Google Maps, these villages appear to be not there, only when zooming on to a very high degree, do they appear with their tribe or clan names. At first (and second and third) sight, therefore, these villages are simply not there. Despite their small size, Israeli villages are displayed even when zoomed-out, while unrecognized Palestinian Bedouin villages, regardless of their size are only visible when zooming in very closely.


      http://7amleh.org/2018/09/18/google-maps-endangering-palestinian-human-rights
      Pour télécharger le rapport :
      http://www.7amleh.org/ms/Mapping%20Segregation%20Cover_WEB.pdf

    • signalé par @kassem :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/317236#message784258

      Israel lifted its military rule over the state’s Arab community in 1966 only after ascertaining that its members could not return to the villages they had fled or been expelled from, according to newly declassified archival documents.

      The documents both reveal the considerations behind the creation of the military government 18 years earlier, and the reasons for dismantling it and revoking the severe restrictions it imposed on Arab citizens in the north, the Negev and the so-called Triangle of Locales in central Israel.

      These records were made public as a result of a campaign launched against the state archives by the Akevot Institute, which researches the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

      After the War of Independence in 1948, the state imposed military rule over Arabs living around the country, which applied to an estimated 85 percent of that community at the time, say researchers at the NGO. The Arabs in question were subject to the authority of a military commander who could limit their freedom of movement, declare areas to be closed zones, or demand that the inhabitants leave and enter certain locales only with his written permission.

      The newly revealed documents describe the ways Israel prevented Arabs from returning to villages they had left in 1948, even after the restrictions on them had been lifted. The main method: dense planting of trees within and surrounding these towns.

      At a meeting held in November 1965 at the office of Shmuel Toledano, the prime minister’s adviser on Arab affairs, there was a discussion about villages that had been left behind and that Israel did not want to be repopulated, according to one document. To ensure that, the state had the Jewish National Fund plant trees around and in them.

      Among other things, the document states that “the lands belonging to the above-mentioned villages were given to the custodian for absentee properties” and that “most were leased for work (cultivation of field crops and olive groves) by Jewish households.” Some of the properties, it adds, were subleased.

      In the meeting in Toledano’s office, it was explained that these lands had been declared closed military zones, and that once the structures on them had been razed, and the land had been parceled out, forested and subject to proper supervision – their definition as closed military zones could be lifted.

      On April 3, 1966, another discussion was held on the same subject, this time at the office of the defense minister, Levi Eshkol, who was also the serving prime minister; the minutes of this meeting were classified as top secret. Its participants included: Toledano; Isser Harel, in his capacity as special adviser to the prime minister; the military advocate general – Meir Shamgar, who would later become president of the Supreme Court; and representatives of the Shin Bet security service and Israel Police.

      The newly publicized record of that meeting shows that the Shin Bet was already prepared at that point to lift the military rule over the Arabs and that the police and army could do so within a short time.

      Regarding northern Israel, it was agreed that “all the areas declared at the time to be closed [military] zones... other than Sha’ab [east of Acre] would be opened after the usual conditions were fulfilled – razing of the buildings in the abandoned villages, forestation, establishment of nature reserves, fencing and guarding.” The dates of the reopening these areas would be determined by Israel Defense Forces Maj. Gen. Shamir, the minutes said. Regarding Sha’ab, Harel and Toledano were to discuss that subject with Shamir.

      However, as to Arab locales in central Israel and the Negev, it was agreed that the closed military zones would remain in effect for the time being, with a few exceptions.

      Even after military rule was lifted, some top IDF officers, including Chief of Staff Tzvi Tzur and Shamgar, opposed the move. In March 1963, Shamgar, then military advocate general, wrote a pamphlet about the legal basis of the military administration; only 30 copies were printed. (He signed it using his previous, un-Hebraized name, Sternberg.) Its purpose was to explain why Israel was imposing its military might over hundreds of thousands of citizens.

      Among other things, Shamgar wrote in the pamphlet that Regulation 125, allowing certain areas to be closed off, is intended “to prevent the entry and settlement of minorities in border areas,” and that “border areas populated by minorities serve as a natural, convenient point of departure for hostile elements beyond the border.” The fact that citizens must have permits in order to travel about helps to thwart infiltration into the rest of Israel, he wrote.

      Regulation 124, he noted, states that “it is essential to enable nighttime ambushes in populated areas when necessary, against infiltrators.” Blockage of roads to traffic is explained as being crucial for the purposes of “training, tests or maneuvers.” Moreover, censorship is a “crucial means for counter-intelligence.”

      Despite Shamgar’s opinion, later that year, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol canceled the requirement for personal travel permits as a general obligation. Two weeks after that decision, in November 1963, Chief of Staff Tzur wrote a top-secret letter about implementation of the new policy to the officers heading the various IDF commands and other top brass, including the head of Military Intelligence. Tzur ordered them to carry it out in nearly all Arab villages, with a few exceptions – among them Barta’a and Muqeible, in northern Israel.

      In December 1965, Haim Israeli, an adviser to Defense Minister Eshkol, reported to Eshkol’s other aides, Isser Harel and Aviad Yaffeh, and to the head of the Shin Bet, that then-Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin opposed legislation that would cancel military rule over the Arab villages. Rabin explained his position in a discussion with Eshkol, at which an effort to “soften” the bill was discussed. Rabin was advised that Harel would be making his own recommendations on this matter.

      At a meeting held on February 27, 1966, Harel issued orders to the IDF, the Shin Bet and the police concerning the prime minister’s decision to cancel military rule. The minutes of the discussion were top secret, and began with: “The mechanism of the military regime will be canceled. The IDF will ensure the necessary conditions for establishment of military rule during times of national emergency and war.” However, it was decided that the regulations governing Israel’s defense in general would remain in force, and at the behest of the prime minister and with his input, the justice minister would look into amending the relevant statutes in Israeli law, or replacing them.

      The historical documents cited here have only made public after a two-year campaign by the Akevot institute against the national archives, which preferred that they remain confidential, Akevot director Lior Yavne told Haaretz. The documents contain no information of a sensitive nature vis-a-vis Israel’s security, Yavne added, and even though they are now in the public domain, the archives has yet to upload them to its website to enable widespread access.

      “Hundreds of thousands of files which are crucial to understanding the recent history of the state and society in Israel remain closed in the government archive,” he said. “Akevot continues to fight to expand public access to archival documents – documents that are property of the public.”

    • Israel is turning an ancient Palestinian village into a national park for settlers

      The unbelievable story of a village outside Jerusalem: from its destruction in 1948 to the ticket issued last week by a parks ranger to a descendent of its refugees, who had the gall to harvest the fruits of his labor on his own land.

      Thus read the ticket issued last Wednesday, during the Sukkot holiday, by ranger Dayan Somekh of the Israel Nature and Parks Authority – Investigations Division, 3 Am Ve’olamo Street, Jerusalem, to farmer Nidal Abed Rabo, a resident of the Jerusalem-area village of Walaja, who had gone to harvest olives on his private land: “In accordance with Section 228 of the criminal code, to: Nidal Abed Rabo. Description of the facts constituting the offense: ‘picking, chopping and destroying an olive tree.’ Suspect’s response: ‘I just came to pick olives. I pick them and put them in a bucket.’ Fine prescribed by law: 730 shekels [$207].” And an accompanying document that reads: “I hereby confirm that I apprehended from Nidal Abed Rabo the following things: 1. A black bucket; 2. A burlap sack. Name of the apprehending officer: Dayan Somekh.”

      Ostensibly, an amusing parody about the occupation. An inspector fines a person for harvesting the fruits of his own labor on his own private land and then fills out a report about confiscating a bucket, because order must be preserved, after all. But no one actually found this report amusing – not the inspector who apparently wrote it in utter seriousness, nor the farmer who must now pay the fine.

      Indeed, the story of Walaja, where this absurdity took place, contains everything – except humor: the flight from and evacuation of the village in 1948; refugee-hood and the establishment of a new village adjacent to the original one; the bisection of the village between annexed Jerusalem and the occupied territories in 1967; the authorities’ refusal to issue blue Israeli IDs to residents, even though their homes are in Jerusalem; the demolition of many structures built without a permit in a locale that has no master construction plan; the appropriation of much of its land to build the Gilo neighborhood and the Har Gilo settlement; the construction of the separation barrier that turned the village into an enclave enclosed on all sides; the decision to turn villagers’ remaining lands into a national park for the benefit of Gilo’s residents and others in the area; and all the way to the ridiculous fine issued by Inspector Somekh.

      This week, a number of villagers again snuck onto their lands to try to pick their olives, in what looks like it could be their final harvest. As it was a holiday, they hoped the Border Police and the parks authority inspectors would leave them alone. By next year, they probably won’t be able to reach their groves at all, as the checkpoint will have been moved even closer to their property.

      Then there was also this incident, on Monday, the Jewish holiday of Simhat Torah. Three adults, a teenager and a horse arrived at the neglected groves on the mountainside below their village of Walaja. They had to take a long and circuitous route; they say the horse walked 25 kilometers to reach the olive trees that are right under their noses, beneath their homes. A dense barbed-wire fence and the separation barrier stand between these people and their lands. When the national park is built here and the checkpoint is moved further south – so that only Jews will be able to dip undisturbed in Ein Hanya, as Nir Hasson reported (“Jerusalem reopens natural spring, but not to Palestinians,” Oct. 15) – it will mean the end of Walaja’s olive orchards, which are planted on terraced land.

      The remaining 1,200 dunams (300 acres) belonging to the village, after most of its property was lost over the years, will also be disconnected from their owners, who probably won’t be able to access them again. An ancient Palestinian village, which numbered 100 registered households in 1596, in a spectacular part of the country, will continue its slow death, until it finally expires for good.

      Steep slopes and a deep green valley lie between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, filled with oak and pine trees, along with largely abandoned olive groves. “New” Walaja overlooks this expanse from the south, the Gilo neighborhood from the northeast, and the Cremisan Monastery from the east. To the west is where the original village was situated, between the moshavim of Aminadav and Ora, both constructed after the villagers fled – frightened off by the massacre in nearby Deir Yassin and in fear of bombardment.

      Aviv Tatarsky, a longtime political activist on behalf of Walaja and a researcher for the Ir Amim nonprofit organization, says the designated national park is supposed to ensure territorial contiguity between the Etzion Bloc and Jerusalem. “Since we are in the territory of Jerusalem, and building another settler neighborhood could cause a stir, they are building a national park, which will serve the same purpose,” he says. “The national park will Judaize the area once and for all. Gilo is five minutes away. If you live there, you will have a park right next door and feel like it’s yours.”

      As Tatarsky describes the blows suffered by the village over the years, brothers Walid and Mohammed al-‘Araj stand on a ladder below in the valley, in the shade of the olive trees, engrossed in the harvest.

      Walid, 52, and Mohammed, 58, both live in Walaja. Walid may be there legally, but his brother is there illegally, on land bequeathed to them by their uncle – thanks to yet another absurdity courtesy of the occupation. In 1995, Walid married a woman from Shoafat in East Jerusalem, and thus was able to obtain a blue Israeli ID card, so perhaps he is entitled to be on his land. His brother, who lives next door, however, is an illegal resident on his land: He has an orange ID, as a resident of the territories.

      A sewage line that comes out of Beit Jala and is under the responsibility of Jerusalem’s Gihon water company overflows every winter and floods the men’s olive grove with industrial waste that has seriously damaged their crop. And that’s in addition, of course, to the fact that most of the family is unable to go work the land. The whole area looks quite derelict, overgrown with weeds and brambles that could easily catch fire. In previous years, the farmers would receive an entry permit allowing them to harvest the olives for a period of just a few days; this year, even that permit has not yet been forthcoming.

      The olives are black and small; it’s been a bad year for them and for their owners.

      “We come here like thieves to our own land,” says Mohammed, the older brother, explaining that three days beforehand, a Border Police jeep had showed up and chased them away. “I told him: It’s my land. They said okay and left. Then a few minutes later, another Border Police jeep came and the officer said: Today there’s a general closure because of the holiday. I told him: Okay, just let me take my equipment. I’m on my land. He said: Don’t take anything. I left. And today I came back.”

      You’re not afraid? “No, I’m not afraid. I’m on my land. It’s registered in my name. I can’t be afraid on my land.”

      Walid says that a month ago the Border Police arrived and told him he wasn’t allowed to drive on the road that leads to the grove, because it’s a “security road.” He was forced to turn around and go home, despite the fact that he has a blue ID and it is not a security road. Right next to it, there is a residential building where a Palestinian family still lives.

      Some of Walaja’s residents gave up on their olive orchards long ago and no longer attempt to reach their lands. When the checkpoint is moved southward, in order to block access by Palestinians to the Ein Hanya spring, the situation will be even worse: The checkpoint will be closer to the orchards, meaning that the Palestinians won’t be permitted to visit them.

      “This place will be a park for people to visit,” says Walid, up on his ladder. “That’s it; that will be the end of our land. But we won’t give up our land, no matter what.” Earlier this month, one local farmer was detained for several hours and 10 olive trees were uprooted, on the grounds that he was prohibited from being here.

      Meanwhile, Walid and Mohammed are collecting their meager crop in a plastic bucket printed with a Hebrew ad for a paint company. The olives from this area, near Beit Jala, are highly prized; during a good year the oil made from them can fetch a price of 100 shekels per liter.

      A few hundred meters to the east are a father, a son and a horse. Khaled al-‘Araj, 51, and his son, Abed, 19, a business student. They too are taking advantage of the Jewish holiday to sneak onto their land. They have another horse, an original Arabian named Fatma, but this horse is nameless. It stands in the shade of the olive tree, resting from the long trek here. If a Border Police force shows up, it could confiscate the horse, as has happened to them before.

      Father and son are both Walaja residents, but do not have blue IDs. The father works in Jerusalem with a permit, but it does not allow him to access his land.

      “On Sunday,” says Khaled, “I picked olives here with my son. A Border Police officer arrived and asked: What are you doing here? He took pictures of our IDs. He asked: Whose land is this? I said: Mine. Where are the papers? At home. I have papers from my grandfather’s time; everything is in order. But he said: No, go to DCO [the Israeli District Coordination Office] and get a permit. At first I didn’t know what he meant. I have a son and a horse and they’ll make problems for me. So I left.”

      He continues: “We used to plow the land. Now look at the state it’s in. We have apricot and almond trees here, too. But I’m an illegal person on my own land. That is our situation. Today is the last day of your holiday, that’s why I came here. Maybe there won’t be any Border Police.”

      “Kumi Ori, ki ba orekh,” says a makeshift monument in memory of Ori Ansbacher, a young woman murdered here in February by a man from Hebron. Qasem Abed Rabo, a brother of Nidal, who received the fine from the park ranger for harvesting his olives, asks activist Tatarsky if he can find out whether the house he owns is considered to be located in Jerusalem or in the territories. He still doesn’t know.

      “Welcome to Nahal Refaim National Park,” says a sign next to the current Walaja checkpoint. Its successor is already being built but work on it was stopped for unknown reasons. If and when it is completed, Ein Hanya will become a spring for Jews only and the groves on the mountainside below the village of Walaja will be cut off from their owners for good. Making this year’s harvest Walaja’s last.

      https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-is-turning-an-ancient-palestinian-village-into-a-national-p
      https://seenthis.net/messages/807722

    • Sans mémoire des lieux ni lieux de mémoire. La Palestine invisible sous les forêts israéliennes

      Depuis la création de l’État d’Israël en 1948, près de 240 millions d’arbres ont été plantés sur l’ensemble du territoire israélien. Dans l’objectif de « faire fleurir le désert », les acteurs de l’afforestation en Israël se situent au cœur de nombreux enjeux du territoire, non seulement environnementaux mais également identitaires et culturels. La forêt en Israël représente en effet un espace de concurrence mémorielle, incarnant à la fois l’enracinement de l’identité israélienne mais également le rappel de l’exil et de l’impossible retour du peuple palestinien. Tandis que 86 villages palestiniens détruits en 1948 sont aujourd’hui recouverts par une forêt, les circuits touristiques et historiques officiels proposés dans les forêts israéliennes ne font jamais mention de cette présence palestinienne passée. Comment l’afforestation en Israël a-t-elle contribué à l’effacement du paysage et de la mémoire palestiniens ? Quelles initiatives existent en Israël et en Palestine pour lutter contre cet effacement spatial et mémoriel ?

      https://journals.openedition.org/bagf/6779

    • Septembre 2021, un feu de forêt ravage Jérusalem et dévoile les terrassements agricoles que les Palestinien·nes avaient construit...
      Voici une image :

      « La nature a parlé » : un feu de forêt attise les rêves de retour des Palestiniens

      Un gigantesque incendie près de Jérusalem a détruit les #pins_européens plantés par les sionistes, exposant ainsi les anciennes terrasses palestiniennes qu’ils avaient tenté de dissimuler.

      Au cours de la deuxième semaine d’août, quelque 20 000 dounams (m²) de terre ont été engloutis par les flammes dans les #montagnes de Jérusalem.

      C’est une véritable catastrophe naturelle. Cependant, personne n’aurait pu s’attendre à la vision qui est apparue après l’extinction de ces incendies. Ou plutôt, personne n’avait imaginé que les incendies dévoileraient ce qui allait suivre.

      Une fois les flammes éteintes, le #paysage était terrible pour l’œil humain en général, et pour l’œil palestinien en particulier. Car les incendies ont révélé les #vestiges d’anciens villages et terrasses agricoles palestiniens ; des terrasses construites par leurs ancêtres, décédés il y a longtemps, pour cultiver la terre et planter des oliviers et des vignes sur les #pentes des montagnes.

      À travers ces montagnes, qui constituent l’environnement naturel à l’ouest de Jérusalem, passait la route Jaffa-Jérusalem, qui reliait le port historique à la ville sainte. Cette route ondulant à travers les montagnes était utilisée par les pèlerins d’Europe et d’Afrique du Nord pour visiter les lieux saints chrétiens. Ils n’avaient d’autre choix que d’emprunter la route Jaffa-Jérusalem, à travers les vallées et les ravins, jusqu’au sommet des montagnes. Au fil des siècles, elle sera foulée par des centaines de milliers de pèlerins, de soldats, d’envahisseurs et de touristes.

      Les terrasses agricoles – ou #plates-formes – que les agriculteurs palestiniens ont construites ont un avantage : leur durabilité. Selon les estimations des archéologues, elles auraient jusqu’à 600 ans. Je crois pour ma part qu’elles sont encore plus vieilles que cela.

      Travailler en harmonie avec la nature

      Le travail acharné du fermier palestinien est clairement visible à la surface de la terre. De nombreuses études ont prouvé que les agriculteurs palestiniens avaient toujours investi dans la terre quelle que soit sa forme ; y compris les terres montagneuses, très difficiles à cultiver.

      Des photographies prises avant la Nakba (« catastrophe ») de 1948, lorsque les Palestiniens ont été expulsés par les milices juives, et même pendant la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle montrent que les oliviers et les vignes étaient les deux types de plantation les plus courants dans ces régions.

      Ces végétaux maintiennent l’humidité du sol et assurent la subsistance des populations locales. Les #oliviers, en particulier, aident à prévenir l’érosion des sols. Les oliviers et les #vignes peuvent également créer une barrière naturelle contre le feu car ils constituent une végétation feuillue qui retient l’humidité et est peu gourmande en eau. Dans le sud de la France, certaines routes forestières sont bordées de vignes pour faire office de #coupe-feu.

      Les agriculteurs palestiniens qui les ont plantés savaient travailler en harmonie avec la nature, la traiter avec sensibilité et respect. Cette relation s’était formée au cours des siècles.

      Or qu’a fait l’occupation sioniste ? Après la Nakba et l’expulsion forcée d’une grande partie de la population – notamment le nettoyage ethnique de chaque village et ville se trouvant sur l’itinéraire de la route Jaffa-Jérusalem –, les sionistes ont commencé à planter des #pins_européens particulièrement inflammables sur de vastes portions de ces montagnes pour couvrir et effacer ce que les mains des agriculteurs palestiniens avaient créé.

      Dans la région montagneuse de Jérusalem, en particulier, tout ce qui est palestinien – riche de 10 000 ans d’histoire – a été effacé au profit de tout ce qui évoque le #sionisme et la #judéité du lieu. Conformément à la mentalité coloniale européenne, le « milieu » européen a été transféré en Palestine, afin que les colons puissent se souvenir de ce qu’ils avaient laissé derrière eux.

      Le processus de dissimulation visait à nier l’existence des villages palestiniens. Et le processus d’effacement de leurs particularités visait à éliminer leur existence de l’histoire.

      Il convient de noter que les habitants des villages qui ont façonné la vie humaine dans les montagnes de Jérusalem, et qui ont été expulsés par l’armée israélienne, vivent désormais dans des camps et communautés proches de Jérusalem, comme les camps de réfugiés de Qalandiya et Shuafat.

      On trouve de telles forêts de pins ailleurs encore, dissimulant des villages et fermes palestiniens détruits par Israël en 1948. Des institutions internationales israéliennes et sionistes ont également planté des pins européens sur les terres des villages de #Maaloul, près de Nazareth, #Sohmata, près de la frontière palestino-libanaise, #Faridiya, #Kafr_Anan et #al-Samoui sur la route Akka-Safad, entre autres. Ils sont maintenant cachés et ne peuvent être vus à l’œil nu.

      Une importance considérable

      Même les #noms des villages n’ont pas été épargnés. Par exemple, le village de Suba est devenu « #Tsuba », tandis que #Beit_Mahsir est devenu « #Beit_Meir », #Kasla est devenu « #Ksalon », #Saris est devenu « #Shoresh », etc.

      Si les Palestiniens n’ont pas encore pu résoudre leur conflit avec l’occupant, la nature, elle, s’est désormais exprimée de la manière qu’elle jugeait opportune. Les incendies ont révélé un aspect flagrant des composantes bien planifiées et exécutées du projet sioniste.

      Pour les Palestiniens, la découverte de ces terrasses confirme leur version des faits : il y avait de la vie sur cette terre, le Palestinien était le plus actif dans cette vie, et l’Israélien l’a expulsé pour prendre sa place.

      Ne serait-ce que pour cette raison, ces terrasses revêtent une importance considérable. Elles affirment que la cause palestinienne n’est pas morte, que la terre attend le retour de ses enfants ; des personnes qui sauront la traiter correctement.

      https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinion-fr/israel-jerusalem-incendies-villages-palestiniens-nakba-sionistes-reto

      –—

      An Israeli Forest to Erase the Ruins of Palestinian Agricultural Terraces

      “Our forest is growing over, well, over a ruined village,” A.B. Yehoshua wrote in his novella “Facing the Forests.” The massive wildfire in the Jerusalem Hills last week exposed the underpinning of the view through the trees. The agricultural terraces were revealed in their full glory, and also revealed a historic record that Israel has always sought to obscure and erase – traces of Palestinian life on this land.

      On my trips to the West Bank and the occupied territories, when I passed by the expansive areas of Palestinian farmland, I was always awed by the sight of the long chain of terraces, mustabat or mudrajat in Arabic. I thrilled at their grandeur and the precision of the work that attests to the connection between the Palestinian fellah and his land. I would wonder – Why doesn’t the same “phenomenon” exist in the hills of the Galilee?

      When I grew up, I learned a little in school about Israeli history. I didn’t learn that Israel erased Palestinian agriculture in the Galilee and that the Jewish National Fund buried it once and for all, but I did learn that “The Jews brought trees with them” and planted them in the Land of Israel. How sterile and green. Greta Thunberg would be proud of you.

      The Zionist movement knew that in the war for this land it was not enough to conquer the land and expel its inhabitants, you also had to build up a story and an ethos and a narrative, something that will fit with the myth of “a people without a land for a land without a people.” Therefore, after the conquest of the land and the expulsion, all trace of the people who once lived here had to be destroyed. This included trees that grew without human intervention and those that were planted by fellahin, who know this land as they do their children and as they do the terraces they built in the hills.

      This is how white foreigners who never in their lives were fellahin or worked the land for a living came up with the national forestation project on the ruins of Arab villages, which David Ben-Gurion decided to flatten, such as Ma’alul and Suhmata. The forestation project including the importation of cypress and pine trees that were alien to this land and belong to colder climes, so that the new inhabitants would feel more at home and less as if they were in somebody else’s home.

      The planting of combustible cypresses and pines, which are not suited to the weather in this land, is not just an act of national erasure of the Palestinian natives, but also an act of arrogance and patronage, characteristics typical of colonialist movements throughout the world. All because they did not understand the nature, in both senses of the word, of the countries they conquered.

      Forgive me, but a biblical-historical connection is not sufficient. Throughout the history of colonialism, the new settlers – whether they ultimately left or stayed – were unable to impose their imported identity on the new place and to completely erase the place’s native identity. It’s a little like the forests surrounding Jerusalem: When the fire comes and burns them, one small truth is revealed, after so much effort went into concealing it.

      https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-an-israeli-forest-to-erase-the-ruins-of-palestinian-agricultural-t

      et ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/928766

    • Planter un arbre en Israël : une forêt rédemptrice et mémorielle

      Tout au long du projet sioniste, le végétal a joué un rôle de médiateur entre la terre rêvée et la terre foulée, entre le texte biblique et la réalité. Le réinvestissement national s’est opéré à travers des plantes connues depuis la diaspora, réorganisées en scènes signifiantes pour la mémoire et l’histoire juive. Ce lien de filiation entre texte sacré et paysage débouche sur une pratique de plantation considérée comme un acte mystique de régénération du monde.

      https://journals.openedition.org/diasporas/258

  • A New Tool Allows Researchers to Track Damage in #Gaza

    As the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continue to bomb the Gaza Strip, many researchers are attempting to track and quantify the damage to the territory’s buildings, infrastructure and the displacement of the local population.

    A new tool, originally developed to estimate damage in Ukraine, has now been adapted and applied to Gaza. The tool can estimate the number of damaged buildings and the pre-war population in a given area within the Gaza Strip.

    The tool has already been used by a number of media outlets, but it is freely available for anyone to use and we have outlined its key features below.

    The coloured overlay on this map is a damage proxy map indicating the probability of a significant change occurring at particular locations since October 10, 2023. Users can click the “draw polygon” button to draw an area of interest on the map — for example, a particular neighbourhood.

    To understand how the tool works, let’s look at the neighbourhood of Izbat Beit Hanoun, which sustained heavy damage visible in these high-resolution, before-and-after satellite images from Planet:

    The row of apartment complexes in the north of the neighbourhood near the road has been razed. Lower-density areas in the centre and northeast of the neighbourhood have also sustained heavy damage. Airstrikes have also destroyed several of the apartment complexes in the southwest.

    Below is the damage probability map generated by the tool, highlighting many of these areas:

    Drawing a box over this neighbourhood allows us to roughly quantify the number of buildings – and people- affected by the destruction.

    In the neighbourhood of Izbat Beit Hanoun, the tool estimates that there are 321-425 damaged buildings (73 — 97%), displayed with colours above. The tool also estimates that in the area of interest there was a pre-war population of 7,453, of which 4756 – 6304 lived in areas that are now likely to be damaged.
    How it Works

    Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery has been used extensively in academic studies of building damage, and by groups like NASA following the 2020 explosion at the port of Beirut. NASA explains the use of SAR for building damage detection as follows: “SAR instruments send pulses of microwaves toward Earth’s surface and listen for the reflections of those waves. The radar waves can penetrate cloud cover, vegetation, and the dark of night to detect changes that might not show up in visible light imagery. […] When buildings have been damaged or toppled, the amplitude and phase of radar wave reflections changes in those areas and indicate to the satellite that something on the ground has changed.”

    The application above detects damaged areas by measuring the change in the intensity of the radar waves reflected back to the Sentinel-1 satellite before and after October 10, 2023, adjusted for how noisy the signal is in both periods. A more detailed explanation of the algorithm (which was peer-reviewed for a conference) is available here, and a walkthrough (including code) applied to the 2020 Beirut explosion is available here.

    Once likely damaged areas have been identified, the damage probability map is combined with building footprints from Microsoft. Footprints in which significant change has occurred are classified as damaged. This yields a count (and proportion) of estimated damaged buildings within an area.

    To get a rough idea of the number of people affected in a given area, population data are sourced from the LandScan program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The data are provided at the level of 90 metres. These population estimates are generated by merging current data on building structures, occupancy rates and infrastructure. Because these are estimates, they are subject to some level of error. They also predate the current conflict and are thus not meant to be interpreted as a count of actual or potential civilian casualties. You can read more about LandScan data here.
    Accuracy

    To assess the accuracy of the damage detection algorithm, damage points from the UN Satellite Office (UNOSAT) were used for validation. These are generated by manually combing through high-resolution satellite imagery and tagging visibly damaged buildings. Below is the same image of Izbat Beit Hanoun, with UNOSAT damage points overlaid in white.

    In the images above, the colourful overlay is a damage probability map. Darker colours indicate a higher probability that a significant change occurred after October 10, 2023.

    The UNOSAT damage points are available under the “Layers” tab in the top right corner of the tool. It should be noted that UNOSAT carried out the assessment on November 7 and that damage has occurred since then.

    Geolocated Footage

    To get an additional source of validation data, geolocated footage of strikes and destruction in Gaza are available under the “Layers” tab in the top right, and are displayed as blue triangles.

    These are sourced from Geoconfirmed, a community-based geolocating network. Clicking on a geolocated event will open a panel in the top right, showing a brief description of the event, the date, a link to the source media, and a link to the geolocation of the event.

    In the example below, clicking on a geolocated event in the heavily damaged Tal al-Hawa neighbourhood reveals that Gaza City’s International Eye Hospital appears to have been hit by an airstrike.

    Clicking on “Source Media” shows the following image of the eye hospital.

    Clicking on “Geolocation” displays the following tweet, which uses the visible characteristics of the building itself and adjacent buildings to locate the picture.

    Further research confirms that the International Eye Hospital was subsequently completely destroyed.

    It should be noted that the geolocations have not been independently verified by the creators of the tool and are automatically added to the map as they become available. Nevertheless, these geolocations are an important additional source of preliminary information. As of the date of publication, there were 541 geolocated events in the Gaza Strip. The tool automatically adds new geolocations as they become available.
    Important Caveats

    While this tool can help us better understand the devastating impact of IDF strikes on Gaza, there are a number of important caveats to bear in mind when using it.

    The first is that this tool detects any significant changes that have occurred in Gaza since October 10, 2023. The vast majority of these changes are likely related to conflict damage, but not all. For example, placing a large number of tents on a previously open field would be detected, since this would change the amplitude of the signal reflected back to the Sentinel-1 satellite from that patch of land.

    Second, because of the way the algorithm functions, older damage will be more confidently detected than newer damage. Thus, while the tool updates automatically as new imagery becomes available, it may take some time for newer damage to become visible. Other SAR-based methods can produce accurate estimates of damaged areas on a particular date. The Decentralized Damage Monitoring Group is working on such methodologies, with the aim of publicly disseminating damage maps that show not only where damage has occurred, but when.

    Finally, the assessment of population exposure is not a measure of actual or potential civilian casualties. These population estimates predate the most recent conflict in Gaza, and many civilians have fled. The affected population counts represent a ballpark estimate of the number of people who previously lived in areas that are now likely damaged or destroyed.
    Accessing the Tool

    The Gaza Damage Proxy Map uses previously established and tested methodology to provide estimates of damage to buildings. The data is updated approximately one to two times per week as new satellite imagery is gathered by the Sentinel-1 satellite. It therefore represents cumulative damage since October 10, not real-time damage to buildings.

    Although the information provided by the tool is an estimate, it is useful for researchers to quickly gain an overview of damaged areas in the Gaza Strip.

    You can access the Gaza Damage Proxy Map here.

    A similar tool using the same methodology to assess damage in Ukraine following Russia’s full-scale invasion and in Turkey following the February 6 Turkey-Syria earthquake, can be accessed here: https://ee-ollielballinger.projects.earthengine.app/view/gazadamage

    https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2023/11/15/a-new-tool-allows-researchers-to-track-damage-in-gaza

    #imagerie #architecture_forensique #destruction #cartogrphie #visualisation #guerre #images_satellites #images_satellitaires #Synthetic_Aperture_Radar (#SAR) #UNOSAT #géolocalisation #photographie #dégâts #bombardements

    ping @visionscarto