Israel seeks to isolate Gaza from Lebanon, but it’s easier said than done
By Meron Rapoport in Tel Aviv, Israel | 25 September 2024 | Middle East Eye
▻https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-seeks-isolate-gaza-lebanon-its-easier-said-done
(...) The attacks on Lebanon enjoy broad support in Israel, not only among Netanyahu’s supporters but also in the military establishment and centre-left opposition.
Yair Lapid, the head of the opposition; Benny Gantz, Netanyahu’s former partner in the war cabinet; and Yair Golan, leader of the Zionist left-wing Democrats party, have all been supportive of these moves.
This Zionist centre-left has always been influenced by the army’s positions, and now, when the military and Netanyahu are joining forces, it accepts the assumption that there is a need to reinstate Israel’s deterrence.
The centre-left does not offer a vision of a political settlement with the Palestinians and only wants “calm”, and it believes this could be achieved through deterrence vis a-vis Hezbollah.
A ground invasion not in Israel’s interest
Yet it seems that a ground invasion of southern Lebanon to push Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force beyond the Litani River may not fit Israel’s intentions at the moment.
What Netanyahu and the army want now is to pressure Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire in Lebanon, renouncing its support to Palestinians in Gaza, without having to send ground forces into Lebanon. Deter Lebanon, not occupy it, as it did with Gaza in the 15 years before 7 October.
Since the ground invasion of Gaza in late October, Palestinian fighters have killed nearly 350 Israeli soldiers and wounded thousands, according to the Israeli military. Taking territory in southern Lebanon could extract a much higher price in soldiers, as the geography there is much more complicated than in Gaza and Hezbollah is much better equipped than Hamas.
Invading Lebanon would probably drag Israel into a long war, and a long war contradicts the very idea of deterrence, according to which aerial bombing can replace ground operations. (...)
What hides behind the escalation
The real goal of Israel behind the recent escalation is to pressure Hezbollah directly, by military force, or indirectly through intermediaries, to reach a ceasefire agreement. By achieving this, Israel seeks to divide Hezbollah from its ally Hamas.
In this sense, pushing the Radwan Force beyond the Litani River and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 are secondary for Netanyahu. He needs a ceasefire in the north to have a free hand in the Gaza Strip.
Yet the bottom line is that by this escalation, Netanyahu wishes to bring Israel back to the place it was on 6 October.
As before 7 October, Netanyahu is ready to accept that Hamas will continue to rule Gaza, though weakened after the Israeli invasion and without any international legitimacy.
As long as this is the case, Israel will not be pushed to negotiate any political agreement with the Palestinians, and blocking such negotiations, let alone any peace deal with the Palestinians has always been Netanyahu’s goal.
In the north, Netanyahu could present a ceasefire with Hezbollah as a victory, even at the price of the lives of Israeli captives in Gaza. Netanyahu’s supporters have already given up on the effort to bring them back alive, and many of those who now go to the streets against Netanyahu with a demand for a “deal now” may settle for a victory over Hezbollah. (...)