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Avec cette carte, une analyse à lire. Avant cet extrait, analyse des bombardements iraniens en soulignant l’aspect « théâtral » de l’opération, destiné selon l’auteur à permettre une négociation.
As a very brief summary, Israel has invaded Lebanon three major times since the ‘70s. The 1978 and 1982 invasions were essentially due to claimed attacks by Palestinian groups based in Lebanon. In 1978 Israel went up to the Litani River roughly at the Tyre latitude in southern Lebanon, and in 1982 they made it all the way to the north past the Awali River, besieging the capital of Beirut. Both times the UN eventually expelled them back south.
In 2006 they tried again to go all the way to the Litani—but this time they weren’t facing the PLO, but Hezbollah for the first time. One of the key differences is Hezbollah was armed with large amounts of ATGMs, which the PLO didn’t have, nullifying Israel’s armor and tank advantage. This time IDF could not even get past a few miles into southern Lebanon before giving up. The battle of Bint Jbeil was the main battle, only a couple kilometers from the border:
Both sides were able to claim ‘victory’ however because, in Israel’s case, they claimed to have destroyed a large amount of Hezbollah rockets and infrastructure in widespread strikes throughout the country.
I mention this important fact because I can see the current conflict potentially going the same way. You see, the Middle East has a way of being redundant, when you study its long history. Many of the conflicts replay over and over again in similar fashion, with similar ever-inconclusive results. For instance, much of the current Gaza invasion that Israel has been perpetrating since last October has the hallmarks of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, and yet that one likewise ultimately accomplished nothing.
To understand geostrategy and geopolitics, one must understand that both side’s aims are to appear victorious, particularly in frozen-style conflicts where no truly decisive victories are possible for a variety of reasons. As such, each side strives to posture and affect some kind of big moral or political victory. In Netanyahu’s case, he would love to present some kind of victory to fortify his weakening rule.
Thus, there’s a strong chance that Israel could go in, do some damage as always, and amid mounting international pressure, withdraw under the guise of some “major victory” based on claims of disabled Hezbollah infrastructure, etc. Meanwhile, Hezbollah merely has to keep the IDF from advancing to some key point like the Litani River, and credible victory can be claimed for them, no matter the losses. Iran can then chime in and say their ‘overwhelming attack’ knocked out so much Israeli infrastructure as to have thwarted the whole campaign. It’s really a theater of sorts, with nothing of note being accomplished in the end.
Israel’s objectives make no logical sense and are not realistically achievable. That is, the chief stated objective of creating a buffer zone such that northern Israel can be secure from Hezbollah rocket attacks in order to facilitate the return of Israeli citizens. But any such settlement cannot possibly last because it would require Israel to devote inordinate forces to occupying all of southern Lebanon indefinitely. And if they were to withdraw, then Hezbollah can immediately resume acting as before. That’s not to mention the fact that Hezbollah has longer range capabilities such that pushing them back to the Litani would not accomplish much, as that’s a mere 23km from the border, a distance easily covered by around 50% of Hezbollah’s rocket types.
Thus, most likely Israel will take a few border villages, then if they cannot suck Iran into a giant regional war, backdoor emergency agreements will be struck by the US to prevent having to go to war against Iran. Israel would then save face by withdrawing under shallow claims of some obscure ‘victory’ with a list of phony Hezbollah assets destroyed, etc. At the same time, Israel will probably get a bunch of secret concessions from the historically weak US administration in exchange for saving the US from having to do heavy lifting against Iran.
I agree with this take:
That being said, we have now entered October, the fateful month of the great October Surprise and various awaiting black swans that threaten to spoil the election one way or another, under the elites’ guiding hand. So it’s not completely out of the realm of possibility that the Israeli conflict can somehow spark into something much larger and uncontrollable to fulfill the needed script.
