• En février 1988, un des faits d’armes de la #NSA : incident naval juste au sud de Sébastopol

    USS Caron (DD-970) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    In February 1988, Caron operating with Yorktown, entered Soviet 12 miles (19 km) territorial waters limit in the Black Sea off the Crimean Peninsula. Under international law, this act could be permissible if the ship was progressing from one point in international waters to another point in international waters via the shortest course possible, but according to the Soviet Union, it was the right of the USSR to authorize or prohibit travel in selected areas within the 12 mile limit. The United States however did not recognize the Soviet’s claim in this case. To prevent it from becoming accepted precedent, the US Navy claimed that it had sailed warships through such areas at regular intervals in the past, although no reference was provided.
    On this occasion, Caron had on board a Ship’s Signal Exploitation Spaces (SSES) system, operated by a crew of 18, supporting the U.S. National Security Agency . This system was capable of recording data on Soviet defense radars and communications.

    Vidéos des éperonnages
    USS Caron

    (insupportable musique d’époque Back in the USSR )
    USS Yorktown

    (diverses autres séquences à la suite, en marge de YT)

    Le JT de l’époque (filmé maison sur la télé, qualité médiocre) qui voit clairement dans les images précédentes l’agression soviétique .

    On notera que dès cette époque reculée, la NSA/le gouvernement états-unien ne disait pas vraiment les choses et niait la mission d’espionnage électronique.

    Enfin, une très intéressante mise en perspective dans le cadre des missions FON ( Freedom of Navigation ) visant à imposer le droit de passage inoffensif dans les eaux territoriales à la suite de la convention sur le droit de la mer de Montego Bay (décembre 1982), ratifiée par la France en 1996 et jamais par les États-Unis…

    Diplomacy at sea : US Freedom of Navigation operations in the Black Sea , W. J. Aceves, Naval War College, pp. 59-82 (1993)
    Dont voici la conclusion

    This review of the Freedom of Navigation program reveals that the Black Sea operations were successful on several levels. First, FON operations pushed the Soviet Union into formal negotiations on the right of innocent passage. According to the State Department, “the Soviets entered into a serious effort to reconcile our divergent views ofthe right ofinnocent passage only after the February 1988 Black Sea FON operation”,,74 As a result ofthese negotiations, the Soviet Union amended its internal regulations and rescinded its strict
    limitations on innocent passage.
    The long-term implications ofthe Black Sea FON operations are even more
    significant. They affirmed the provisions ofthe 1982 LOS Convention relating to the traditional uses ofthe oceans, and as a result maximized the freedom of maritime movement.
    At the same time, the development ofinternational law has been shaped and influenced by the diverse strategic concerns of the United States. Throughout its history, the United States has been aware ofits heavy dependence on free and unimpeded passage through the world’s oceans. America’s geographic position, the location ofits major allies, its dependence on international trade, and the importance of the oceans as sources of food, energy, and minerals provide a compelling rationale for this traditional reliance on the freedom of the seas?S This dynamic, whereby strategy dictates the formation and development of international law, is clearly evident in the Freedom of Navigation program- wherein the United States has closely guarded both navigation and overflight rights throughout the world’s oceans under the rubric ofthe freedom ofthe seas.

    Enfin, le lieu de l’incident (d’après le document précédent)