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  • The Problem of Anonymous Vanity Searches
    (Christopher Soghoian)

    This paper explores privacy problems related to search behavior conducted using public search engines. Specifically it exposes problems related to unintentional information leakage through a vanity search - which is a search for information about one’s self. We begin by discussing recent events which have made this problem extremely topical. [./.] We show that technologies such as TrackMeNot may expose their users more through their attempts to create cover traffic than if they had not been used in the first place. We further identify how anonymizing proxies such as Tor are themselves not enough to protect vanity searches, and discuss several other potential solutions, none of which are ideal or 100% foolproof. [./.] We highlight the inherent information asymmetry in the relationship between search engines and their users which makes it almost impossible to create cover traffic good enough to blend into. We conclude by exploring other avenues for protecting user privacy online.

    [...]

    it was possible for journalists from the New York Times to reveal the identity of user 4417749 to be Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old widow from Lilburn, Georgia after linking together all of her vanity searches contained in AOL’s pseudonymized records.

    [...]

    Users have struck a Faustian bargain of sorts with the major search engines. They seem to be willing to put up with advertising and a wholesale loss of privacy, assuming that they are even aware that it is happening, for free access to the services that search engines offer.

    [...]

    – Primary: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953673
    – Backup: http://www.docdroid.net/9wzv/ssrn-id953673.pdf.html

    #Privacy
    #Identity
    #Anonymity #Anonymous
    #Google #search
    #vanity
    #TrackMeNot
    #Tor