liotier

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  • @liotier
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    Do civilian casualties cause counterinsurgents to fail ?
    ▻https://warisboring.com/do-civilian-casualties-cause-counterinsurgents-to-fail #war #guerre #COIN #contre_insurrection #counterinsurgency

    “All four studies that argue insurgent leaders make the decision on which side to support find that civilian killings had no substantial effect on outcomes.

    However, the six studies that assume “civilian agency” in war produces mixed conclusions. Kocher and colleagues, Lyall and colleagues, and Condra and Shapiro find that civilian deaths are bad for counterinsurgents.

    However, Lyall’s 2009 study of Russian artillery strikes in Chechnya finds that civilian deaths are actually helpful. However, his 2010 study of Russian/Chechen sweeping operations during the same war finds that intentional killings are only helpful for co-ethnic counterinsurgents and detrimental for foreign troops.

    Finally, Kalyvas’ study on Germany’s recruitment efforts during the occupation of Greece finds that civilian killings had no real effect on outcomes.”

    liotier CC BY-SA
    • @nidal
      Nidal CC BY

      Her findings boil down to this. During civil wars with more than two armed groups — think Syria — insurgent leaders decide who to ally with based on two factors. The alliance should increase the likelihood of winning. However, the alliance must also allow for the insurgent leader to gain a significant amount of political power once the war ends. If it becomes clear during the course of the war that this will not happen, the insurgent leader will switch sides.

      This phenomenon holds true even if it’s clear that the alliance is about to win the war. That is, unless it becomes clear that an insurgent group has become so dominant that no alliance formation could possibly challenge it. If this occurs, insurgent groups will bandwagon to the winning side.

      Insurgent leaders gauge the relative power in their coalition mainly based on battlefield performance, according to Christia. Ethnicity, religion, political goals and treatment of co-ethnic civilians, have no bearing on the decision to switch sides.

      In fact, Christia shows that insurgent leaders “pick allies whose support will result in optimizing their wartime returns, and then look to their identity repertoires for characteristics shared with their allies while not shared with their foes.” This propaganda is unimportant to insurgent leaders, but “serve as important signals to the rank and file.”

      Nidal CC BY
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