DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT THE KURDS, IRAQ, AND IRAN
▻https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/debunking-myths-about-the-kurds-iraq-and-iran
The Kurdish referendum in Iraq has failed spectacularly, despite predictions of beckoning independence. Many who relied on the trope that “statehood was not a matter of if but when” were shocked and unprepared for the referendum’s outcomes. Erroneous assumptions and policy prescriptions are now driving post-referendum analyses. Pundits, analysts, and the media are depicting the rapid re-taking of Kirkuk by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and other “disputed territories” as “a cataclysmic betrayal,” an “assault on the Kurds,” and another “victory for Iran.” While the U.S. policy response has thus far been measured – seeking to diffuse tensions and remain focused on defeating ISIL – some officials are calling to re-assess military support to Iraqi forces if attacks against Kurds continue. Others are pressing for more direct support to the Kurdistan Regional Government as a means of preventing further conflict and countering Iranian influence.
These voices ostensibly have the right priority – stabilization – but suffer from faulty assumptions about the actual sources of instability. Tensions between Baghdad and Erbil may have flared after the referendum, but they are rooted in the unresolved territorial and political issues of post-2003 Iraq. While it is certainly true that Iran and its militias have gained influence in Iraq, this influence is the result of a weak Iraqi state and was emboldened by the referendum, not by Baghdad’s effort to exercise its federal authority. As I discussed in this week’s episode of the War on the Rocks podcast, the solution is to reinforce Iraqi state sovereignty, Iraq’s regional relations, and recent trends toward a civil state. This includes negotiating disputed territories and filling political, economic, and security gaps that are enabling Iran and undisciplined militias to thrive.
Kurdish leaders have themselves to blame for their current predicament, not the United States. Despite statements by the U.S. government expressing concern about the potential destabilizing effects of the referendum and advising the Kurdistan Regional Government to postpone it, Masoud Barzani refused. Instead, his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) stepped up its lobbying efforts in Washington and other capitals. Kurdish media outlets also selectively published statements from U.S. congressmen and former U.S. officials indicating their support for the Kurds, leading local populations to believe the referendum had U.S. backing. In my conversations with various Kurdish groups in Erbil and Suleymaniya the week before the referendum, many stated that Washington “would eventually support the referendum given the strong U.S. and Israeli ties.” Another common sentiment was that the KRG was “too important to fail” and that the United States would eventually defend the Kurds against any post-referendum threat.