• U.S. Navy Releases Investigation Report on ’Preventable’ USS Fitzgerald and USS John S McCain Collisions – gCaptain

    The fatal collisions involving two U.S. Navy destroyers in the Seventh Fleet’s Area of Responsibility this year could have been prevented, the Navy said in a collision report released Wednesday.

    The Navy released today the 71-page report detailing the events and actions that led to the separate fatal collisions involving the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) with commercial vessels.

    Three U.S. Navy investigations concerning each of these incidents are now complete, the Navy said.
    Both of these accidents were preventable and the respective investigations found multiple failures by watch standers that contributed to the incidents,” said Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson. “We must do better.”

    Already as a result of the collisions, the Navy has dismissed a number of high-ranking officers, including the commanders of both destroyers as well as the commander of the Seventh Fleet.

    Le rapport est là (pas encore lu, juste le résumé fourni par gCaptain)

    Déjà sur les 2 cartes fournies :
    USS Fitzgerald

    Illustration of Approximate Collision Location. Credit : U.S. Navy

    Un refus de priorité « tribord » caractérisé, avec manœuvre désespérée de dernière minute, la règle étant d’ailleurs de s’y prendre à l’avance et de passer derrière

    USS John S McCain

    Illustration of Approximate Collision Location. Credit : U.S. Navy

    C’est bien une avarie de barre qui provoque l’abattée sur la gauche qui aboutit à couper la route du navire marchand. On notera que le McCain est à 20 nœuds, soit au moins 2 fois plus vite que l’Alnic MC et ce dans le dispositif de séparation de trafic. Le McCain tente de corriger en jouant sur le différentiel entre ses deux lignes d’arbres d’hélice, en ralentissant babord mais conservant l’allure à tribord. Apparemment, mais il faut lire, la barre de secours n’était pas armée…

    Je ne sais pas ce que diront les tribunaux mais la responsabilité des navires marchands ne paraît pratiquement pas du tout engagée.

    • ah oui ! pour l’USS John S McCain

      With regard to procedures, no one on the Bridge watch team, to include the commanding officer and executive officer, were properly trained on how to correctly operate the ship control console during a steering casualty.

      Pas d’entraînement à l’avarie de barre ! on rêve…

    • U.S. Navy orders back-to-basics reforms after deadly collisions

      What happened was a gradual erosion of the margins of safety,” Admiral John Richardson, who as the chief of naval operations is the Navy’s top uniformed officer, told a news briefing, as he unveiled the results of the broad Navy review.

      Rising pressure to meet demands for more and more Navy operations, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, led those in command to rationalize declining standards that ranged from basic seamanship to operational safety, Richardson said.

      The Navy’s review called for reforms that will cost between $400 and $500 million over the next five to six years, including periodic, standardized assessments of seamanship and bolstering training of navigation fundamentals.

      It also involved ensuring back-to-basics measures like ensuring sailors get enough sleep. The Navy said fatigue was a contributing factor in the Fitzgerald and John S. McCain collisions.

      Senator Roger Wicker, the chairman of the Senate Seapower Subcommittee, said the Navy needed more ships to meet the demands for operations at sea. Boosting the size of the Navy is a key objective of Republican President Donald Trump.

      We are asking too few ships to do too many things,” said Wicker, a Republican.
      During the summer, there was speculation that cyber warfare might have been to blame for the repeated mishaps, which stunned the Pentagon. The Navy, during its investigations, ruled out the possibility that hacking was to blame.

      These ships in the 7th Fleet did not master the fundamentals,” Richardson said.

    • Ouaouh, pour le John S McCain, c’est encore plus monstrueux que ce que laisse entendre la rapide synthèse ci-dessus. C’est du pur délire, du début à la fin : il n’y a jamais eu d’avarie de barre, c’était juste le bazar, mais grave !

      At 0519, the Commanding Officer noticed the Helmsman (the watchstander steering the ship) having difficulty maintaining course while also adjusting the throttles for speed control. In response, he ordered the watch team to divide the duties of steering and throttles, maintaining course control with the Helmsman while shifting speed control to another watchstander known as the Lee Helm station, who sat directly next to the Helmsman at the panel to control these two functions, known as the Ship’s Control Console. See Figures 3 and 4. This unplanned shift caused confusion in the watch team, and inadvertently led to steering control transferring to the Lee Helm Station without the knowledge of the watch team. The CO had only ordered speed control shifted. Because he did not know that steering had been transferred to the Lee Helm, the Helmsman perceived a loss of steering.

      Steering was never physically lost. Rather, it had been shifted to a different control station and watchstanders failed to recognize this configuration. Complicating this, the steering control transfer to the Lee Helm caused the rudder to go amidships (centerline). Since the Helmsman had been steering 1-4 degrees of right rudder to maintain course before the transfer, the amidships rudder deviated the ship’s course to the left.

      Additionally, when the Helmsman reported loss of steering, the Commanding Officer slowed the ship to 10 knots and eventually to 5 knots, but the Lee Helmsman reduced only the speed of the port shaft as the throttles were not coupled together (ganged). The starboard shaft continued
      at 20 knots for another 68 seconds before the Lee Helmsman reduced its speed. The combination of the wrong rudder direction, and the two shafts working opposite to one another in this fashion caused an un-commanded turn to the left (port) into the heavily congested traffic area in close proximity to three ships, including the ALNIC. See Figure 5.

      Although JOHN S MCCAIN was now on a course to collide with ALNIC, the Commanding Officer and others on the ship’s bridge lost situational awareness. No one on the bridge clearly understood the forces acting on the ship, nor did they understand the ALNIC’s course and speed relative to JOHN S MCCAIN during the confusion.

      Approximately three minutes after the reported loss of steering, JOHN S MCCAIN regained positive steering control at another control station, known as Aft Steering, and the Lee Helm gained control of both throttles for speed and corrected the mismatch between the port and starboard shafts. These actions were too late, and at approximately 0524 JOHN S MCCAIN crossed in front of ALNIC’s bow and collided. See Figure 6.