• A Idleb, la monnaie turque remplace une livre syrienne en chute libre
    https://www.ouest-france.fr/economie/idleb-la-monnaie-turque-remplace-une-livre-syrienne-en-chute-libre-6869

    Bien entendu, c’est pour « protéger la province d’Idleb », pourtant « bastion jihadiste et rebelle » que les Turcs imposent l’usage de leur monnaie nationale. N’allez surtout pas imaginer une annexion de facto du type de celle du nord de Chypre !

    Les autorités du nord-ouest de la Syrie ont commencé à remplacer la livre syrienne, en chute libre, par la monnaie turque dans les transactions courantes afin de protéger la province d’Idleb, ultime grand bastion jihadiste et rebelle, de l’effondrement économique, a déclaré lundi à l’AFP un responsable local.

    Cette décision intervient avant l’entrée en vigueur mercredi d’une loi américaine baptisée « César » qui impose de nouvelles sanctions au régime syrien et ses alliés, ce qui devrait, selon des analystes, plomber davantage une livre syrienne à la dérive.

    • Des compléments ici :

      https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/06/turkey-syria-ankara-pouring-turkish-lira-alleviate-sanctions.html

      Syria experts note that the Turkish lira’s replacement of the Syrian pound in a region of several million people would deal further blows to the Syrian economy. Still, one needs to ask here whether Turkey’s currency move is merely propaganda or a step toward economic annexation.

      Small inflows of Turkish liras into the Syrian market could be of little relevance to the notion of a Turkish lira zone. Unless further steps are taken to that effect, current decisions to use the Turkish lira might boil down to propaganda. No doubt, paying members of the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in liras is something that serves Ankara’s interests. An expanded usage of the Turkish lira would appease objections to salaries in Turkish liras and make it easier for Ankara to finance allied groups and covert operations in the region. The lira, however, needs to be convertible, meaning that it has to be used in trade, including imports and exports. And some serious conundrums emerge here.

      Most goods flowing into the areas that Turkey seized through operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring and Spring Shield are coming from Turkey. In Idlib, for instance, 95% of such goods come from Turkey and only 5% from government-controlled areas. Yet 90% of Idlib’s sales go to government-held areas and only 10% to Turkey.

      So, the Syrian pound inevitably comes into play in commercial exchanges in cities controlled by Damascus where the Turkish lira is of little relevance. In other words, exports to Turkey have to increase to the level of imports so that the use of the lira could gain significance. And any expectation that Turkish-controlled areas could fully sever their economic ties with government-controlled regions is hardly realistic.