Rumor

sur Mastodon : @erverd@sciences.re

  • Lebanon 2.0.2.2. The Future we are bracing for
    https://synaps.network/post/lebanon-crisis-regime-dystopia

    Stimulant exercice d’anticipation d’un lent affaissement libanais, troublant de vraisemblance. Je retiens ici les aspects infrastructurels mais les dimensions politiques internes et relatives à l’aide internationale sont aussi très bien vues. Ce texte est en fait une analyse très pertinente et clinique de la situation présente...

    >A BROKEN SUPPLY CHAIN

    Having plundered dollar reserves to finance an import-hungry economy, Lebanon’s government and financial sector have now reined in their spending. Although the country remains desperate for foreign goods, banks have stopped providing lines of credit to importers. They make exceptions for clients they know personally, advance only small amounts, and demand to be repaid in full within a month. They also charge high fees, to compensate for the fact that they no longer extend revenue-generating loans. 

    Meanwhile, importers complain that foreign suppliers have grown wary of the Lebanese market, which they see as too small, risky, and confusing to be worth their time. Those willing to do business insist on payments made in advance through reputable international banks, which also charge high fees, citing rising compliance costs related to corruption and money laundering. While importers hope to gain a discount by paying suppliers upfront, they must in fact purchase smaller quantities at higher prices—reflecting a shrinking Lebanese market and reduced access to hard currency. 

    Fuel is now scarce and, for most, prohibitively expensive. The central bank only furnishes small amounts of dollars to the cartel of private importers who supply the country’s gas stations. These family-based companies, who developed their own ports, storage infrastructure, and fleet of tanker trucks during the civil war, are deeply connected to the political class. They sell oil at global market value to whomever can still afford it. Payments are made on the spot, in cash, before offloading. Many gas stations, especially in poor and remote areas, have shut down, because they cannot generate enough income to manage such payments. Those that remain in operation pay a premium for deliveries that are smaller in volume, and thus costlier to everyone. The increasingly unstable pace of shipments from abroad creates yet more uncertainty, with interruptions sometimes affecting even the most fortunate. 

    Fuel shortages wreak havoc on Lebanon’s already decrepit electricity sector. The country’s largest producer, Electricite du Liban, barely manages to supply a daily average of six hours of power on the grid. Private generator companies fail to make up the shortfall. Many have gone out of business, because their revenues do not cover the rocketing costs of diesel and maintenance—and their subscribers cannot meet the resulting price hikes. Nor can most households afford to invest in alternatives such as smaller generators or solar panels. Electricity on demand has thus become the preserve of an elite living in self-sufficient compounds. For the rest of society, the national grid is more essential than ever. However, the rush to use machines and recharge batteries during the few hours available leads to frequent overload, making even those windows unreliable. Warehoused medicine and foodstuffs regularly perish due to lapses in cold storage. 

    Without power, the internet is more unstable than ever. The antennas needed for mobile communication demand electricity; as it dwindles, so does 3G coverage—especially in remote parts of the country. In parallel, the infrastructure itself is in decline, due to a combination of poor maintenance and the looting of cables by people keen to resell the copper they contain. Such disintegration triggers Lebanon’s first true internet blackouts, some of which are localized while others are nationwide. Like electricity, an internet rush occurs whenever the service is restored, as people compete over the same diminishing bandwidth. Employees struggle to work remotely, even as fuel shortages make commuting difficult. Although prices haven’t changed, the most vulnerable are increasingly hard-pressed to stay connected; many have either sold their devices or are simply unable to repair or replace them. 

    Access to water is another casualty, for much the same reasons. This sector remains massively dependent on multiple forms of pumping—from wells, through pipes, into trucks, and onto roofs. All these processes hinge on fuel, and have thus become exorbitantly expensive. Inequalities have deepened: between upstream and downstream villages, between neighborhoods enjoying more or less tap water, or between farmers, many of whom are forced to abandon their work. People have adapted by turning to less clean sources of water. The consequences for public health can already be felt, with worrying increases in food poisonings, hygiene-related ailments, and water-borne illnesses. 

    To make things worse, gaps in the supply chain extend to pharmaceuticals. Medicine imports are dominated by yet another cartel, which has historically glutted the market with overpriced brand medicine heavily subsidized by the government, at the expense of any local industry. The latter would take years to build from the ground up, and only then with the help of regulatory reforms that Lebanon’s oligarchs continue to reject. The market has adapted in corrosive ways: Political factions procure essential medication through their own networks, for their base, and only intermittently; people avoid doctor consultations and hospital visits, preferring to save their money for self-prescribed treatments; and counterfeit drugs make their way into even reputable pharmacies. First-rate, broad-spectrum antibiotics, which Lebanon has long overused, are just a memory, leaving Lebanese increasingly exposed to infectious diseases.