schrödinger

feed me, seymour

  • #RIP Robert Taylor, founder of the idea of the internet

    https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/technology/robert-taylor-innovator-who-shaped-modern-computing-dies-at-85.html

    His seminal moment came in 1966. He had just taken a new position at the Pentagon — director of the Information Processing Techniques Office, part of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as ARPA — and on his first day on the job it became immediately obvious to him what the office lacked and what it needed.

    At the time, ARPA was funding three separate computer research projects and using three separate computer terminals to communicate with them. Mr. Taylor decided that the department needed a single computer network to connect each project with the others.

    His idea led to the Arpanet, the forerunner of the internet.

  • Adieu Darknet, bonjour Librenet
    (#podcast #France_Culture 29/03/2017)

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/la-methode-scientifique/adieu-darknet-bonjour-librenet

    Qu’est-ce que le Darknet, ou plutôt les darknets ? A quoi et pour qui servent-ils ? Sur quoi reposent-ils ? L’anonymat conféré est-il garanti ? Que peut-on y trouver ?

    C’est l’endroit désigné de tous les vices, de toutes les horreurs, de toutes les abominations : vente de drogue, trafic d’armes, tueurs à gages, organes en soldes sans oublier l’indispensable espace de tous les complots, terroristes au premier chef. Tel est le Darknet dans l’imaginaire populaire. Son nom dit d’ailleurs toute son obscurité. Mais si le Darknet n’était pas que le lieu virtuel de toutes les criminalités ? Si le Darknet était également un lieu de résistance à l’Internet commercial, un lieu de protection des données, un lieu où votre vie privée n’est pas cédée au moins offrant avec le bébé et l’eau du bain ? Et si, tout compte fait, ce Darknet devait être rebaptisé Librenet ?

    https://media.radiofrance-podcast.net/podcast09/14312-29.03.2017-ITEMA_21274941-3.mp3

    #darknet #dark_web #deep_web
    #silk_road

  • BiTS - Big Data (mais pas que)

    A l’heure où des groupes privés utilisent le big data avec une acuité redoutable pour des résultats qui bouleversent l’ordre du monde, qu’en est-il des dystopies autrefois annoncées par la S.F. ? N’a-t-elle rien vu venir ou ne l’a-t-on pas suffisamment écoutée ?

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wSC8oAFjRM

    #ARTE #BiTS
    #Black_Mirror
    #Mr._Robot
    #1984
    #Hannes_Grassegger
    #Cambridge_Analytica https://cambridgeanalytica.org

  • NIST is trying to improve indoor localisation

    https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2017/04/indoor-gps-apps-closer-reality-new-nist-challenge

    There are no smartphone apps for indoor navigation, but new data collected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)—and a competition to find the app developers who can make the best use of it—may help solve the problem.

    A NIST-led research team spent more than 18 months collecting data from four different smartphone models to facilitate the development of indoor navigation apps. The data, which includes smartphone sensor readings, radio frequency (RF) signal strengths and GPS fixes, should help developers create better apps to assist users in finding their way inside unfamiliar buildings.
    Such “indoor localization” tools could help emergency responders find victims—or each other—when seconds count. They also could assist with locating specific works of art in large museums or misplaced equipment in hospitals, factories, or warehouses.

    PerfLoc user guide

    https://perfloc.nist.gov/perfloc-user-guide.php

    #NIST
    #geolocation

  • American Congress approves for ISPs to sell your browsing history

    With this comes an end to the privacy rules established by the FCC during Obama, less than a year ago, and where ISPs first had to ask your permission

    http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/10/27/fcc-adopt-new-broadband-customer-privacy-rules/92822596

    Reaction of the EFF:

    https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/03/congress-sides-cable-and-telephone-industry

    If the bill is signed into law, companies like Cox, Comcast, Time Warner, AT&T, and Verizon will have free rein to hijack your searches, sell your data, and hammer you with unwanted advertisements. Worst yet, consumers will now have to pay a privacy tax by relying on VPNs to safeguard their information.

    Article en français:

    https://seenthis.net/messages/584526

  • Counter-Mapping Surveillance: A Critical Cartography of Mass Surveillance Technology After Snowden | van der Vlist | Surveillance & Society
    http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/countermapping

    Abstract

    This article critically examines mass surveillance technology revealed by Snowden’s disclosures. It addresses that we do not only live in a society where surveillance is deeply inscribed but more urgently, that it is increasingly difficult to study surveillance when its technologies and practices are difficult to distinguish from everyday routines. Considerably, many of the technologies and systems utilised for surveillance purposes were not originally designed as proper surveillance technologies. Instead, they have effectively become surveillance technologies by being enrolled into a particular surveillant assemblage. Three contributions are made towards critical scholarship on surveillance, intelligence, and security. First, a novel empirical cartographic methodology is developed that employs the vocabularies of assemblages and actor–networks. Second, this methodology is applied to critically examine global mass surveillance according to Snowden. Multiple leaked data sources have been utilised to trace actors, their associations amongst each other, and to create several graphical maps and diagrams. These maps provide insights into actor types and dependence relations described in the original disclosed documents. Third, the analytical value of three ordering concepts as well as the logistics of surveillance are explored via notable actors and actor groups. In short, this contribution provides empirical cartographic methods, concepts, and analytical targets for critically examining surveillance technology and its particular compositions. It addresses challenges of resisting mass surveillance and some forms of data activism, and calls for the continuing proliferation of counter-maps to facilitate grounded critique, to raise awareness, and to gain a foothold for meaningful resistance against mass surveillance.

    (article accessible)

    http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/downloadSuppFile/countermapping/283
    Fig. 1 Network diagram of the entire actor–network. Nodes represent distinct actors; edges are associations between those actors, based on traces found in the NSA/CSS Manual and ACLU’s NSA Documents database. Nodes: 240; edges: 378; type: directed graph; filter: none. Node ranking: by degree; colour-coding: by actor type; layout: ForceAtlas2 (Jacomy 2011; Jacomy et al. 2012).

  • Google launches #Guetzli, a new open source JPEG encoder that creates high quality JPEG images with file sizes 35% smaller than currently available methods

    https://research.googleblog.com/2017/03/announcing-guetzli-new-open-source-jpeg.html

    #compression #image_compression

    Guetzli [guɛtsli] — cookie in Swiss German — is a JPEG encoder for digital images and web graphics that can enable faster online experiences by producing smaller JPEG files while still maintaining compatibility with existing browsers, image processing applications and the JPEG standard. From the practical viewpoint this is very similar to our Zopfli algorithm, which produces smaller PNG and gzip files without needing to introduce a new format, and different than the techniques used in RNN-based image compression, RAISR, and WebP, which all need client changes for compression gains at internet scale.

  • next Vault 7 episode : « Dark Matter »

    https://wikileaks.org/vault7/darkmatter/releases

    Among others, these documents reveal the “Sonic Screwdriver” project which, as explained by the CIA, is a “mechanism for executing code on peripheral devices while a Mac laptop or desktop is booting” allowing an attacker to boot its attack software for example from a USB stick “even when a firmware password is enabled”. The CIA’s “Sonic Screwdriver” infector is stored on the modified firmware of an Apple Thunderbolt-to-Ethernet adapter.

    “DarkSeaSkies” is “an implant that persists in the EFI firmware of an Apple MacBook Air computer” and consists of “DarkMatter”, “SeaPea” and “NightSkies”, respectively EFI, kernel-space and user-space implants.

    Documents on the “Triton” MacOSX malware, its infector “Dark Mallet” and its EFI-persistent version “DerStarke” are also included in this release. While the DerStarke1.4 manual released today dates to 2013, other Vault 7 documents show that as of 2016 the CIA continues to rely on and update these systems and is working on the production of DerStarke2.0.

    Also included in this release is the manual for the CIA’s “NightSkies 1.2” a “beacon/loader/implant tool” for the Apple iPhone. Noteworthy is that NightSkies had reached 1.2 by 2008, and is expressly designed to be physically installed onto factory fresh iPhones. i.e the CIA has been infecting the iPhone supply chain of its targets since at least 2008.

    #CIA #firmware
    #Vault_7

  • Sideways dictionary - an analogies-based dictionary to explain tech jargon.

    You can up vote or down vote the various analogies given.
    You can add analogies. (but only with an existing Google, Twitter of Facebook account)

    it’s like a dictionary, but using analogies instead of definitions. Use it as a tool for finding and sharing helpful analogies to explain technology. Because if everyone understands technology better, we can make technology work better for everyone.

    https://sidewaysdictionary.com

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TFkl_SoThnY

    A project by The Washington Post and Jigsaw, Alphabet’s technology incubator (previously Google Ideas)

    #dictionary #dictionnaire #comment_expliquer_à_grand-mêre

  • How a Snowdenista Kept the NSA Leaker Hidden in a Moscow Airport
    (February 2015, Sara Corbett)

    Describes Wikileaks’ editor Sarah Harrison who was hiding with Edward Snowden in Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport for nearly six weeks in summer 2013. Where exactly is unknown, and many reporters have been searching them at the airport for weeks, even buying business class tickets just to have access to VIP lounges.

    She was living in Australia, but left immediately when called by Julian Assange who asked her if she could take up the mission of escaping Snowden safely from Hong Kong.

    http://www.vogue.com/article/sarah-harrison-edward-snowden-wikileaks-nsa

    If her job was to help keep Snowden safe and hidden, she did it masterfully. For 39 days, the two managed to camp out in the airport transit zone, foiling the media hordes trying to find them. TV crews patrolled the restaurants and pay-to-enter VIP lounges. Reporters grilled airport staff about what they knew, which was invariably nothing. “I’ve spent up to eighteen hours a day beyond passport control and security looking for Snowden,” an ABC News employee reported glumly in a blog post a week into the hunt. “There is an irrational fear, even late at night, that the moment I call it quits he’ll come strolling down the hall. . . .”

    [...]

    Harrison says she didn’t actually meet Snowden until they climbed into a car together on Sunday morning to head to the airport. Harrison was dressed in jeans and flip-flops. Snowden, too, looked casual. The idea was that they might pass for a young couple headed off on vacation. On the drive, they said very little. “I was just so nervous and concentrated on the next steps,” she remembers.

    They boarded the Moscow-bound Aeroflot plane, and it wasn’t until the plane was airborne that Snowden turned to her and spoke what was almost his first complete sentence: “I didn’t expect that WikiLeaks was going to send a ninja to get me out.”

    Harrison says that she and Snowden disembarked in Moscow and went to check in for their next flight, which is when they learned of his canceled passport. Citing “security reasons,” she won’t provide specific details about where they stayed during the days that ensued, saying only that they shared a single, windowless room, did their laundry in the sink, watched movies on their laptops, and quickly grew tired of airport food. “If I have to ever eat another Burger King meal, I’ll die,” she says.

    #Snowden

    • Je dois dire que je me demande vraiment comment Snowden n’est pas devenu fou à Cheremetievo. J’ai passé à plusieurs reprises, à l’aller ou au retour en Mongolie, des attentes de correspondances en salle de transit pouvant aller jusqu’à 10 heures et je dois dire que ça a toujours été une épreuve particulièrement déprimante.


      (prise sur un témoignage de transit en 2016 http://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1344251 )

      Les lieux, quoique rénovés, n’ont pas tellement changé (la dernière fois, c’était en 2003) si ce n’est qu’ils ont (ENFIN !) viré les épouvantables « poêles à frire » du plafond (apparemment, des sections de pipelines circulaires de différentes longueurs qui « ornaient » le plafond en continu sur la totalité de l’espèce de coursive circulaire…

      Pendant tout le temps (plus d’un mois !) où il est resté là-bas, je me disais comment fait-il ?. J’avais fini par me convaincre qu’il avait forcément été exfiltré de la zone avant qu’il ne pète définitivement un cable… Bon peut-être que le nouveau plafond était plus supportable, après tout.

    • @simplicissimus :

      J’avais fini par me convaincre qu’il avait forcément été exfiltré de la zone avant qu’il ne pète définitivement un cable…

      Ce n’est pas improbable.
      Selon les récits il aurait passé son temps dans une chambre sans fenêtres dans la zone de transit. Le seul hôtel dans cette zone en 2013 était le Vozdushny V-Express Capsule Hotel, situé à côté d’un Burger King qui venait d’ouvrir.
      Or, selon une interview d’un garçon travaillant à la réception, il n’était pas possible de rester à l’hôtel (tarif à l’heure) pour plus d’un jour. Snowden y aurait passé 39 jours. Donc ou bien cette règle avait été abrogée pour Snowden, ou bien Sarah Harrison n’a pas dit la vérité sur le fait qu’ils y sont restés pendant 39 jours.

      Sur le site de l’hôtel les prix ne sont indiqués que pour max 24h :

      http://v-exp.ru/en/price

      46 rooms in a transit zone (after immigration control) of Terminal E on the 3rd floor. Capsule Hotel is in the ideal location for transit passengers as you don’t have to leave the secure part of the terminal.

      vue des chambres :

      http://v-exp.ru/en/about/terminal-e

      Aussi, Il y a un Novotel quelques km plus loin de l’aéroport, utilisé par les services secrets pour des débiefings, et selon un ancien agent de la KGB, eux ne sont pas empêchés d’entrer et sortir la zone de transit.

      source : Epstein 2017, « How America Lost its Secrets », p.256

      https://books.google.be/books?id=G4iIDAAAQBAJ&pg=PT258&lpg=PT258&dq=%22i+learned+from+a+former+

      L’hypothèse d’Epstein :

      The possibility that Snowden was staying elsewhere would help explain the futile search for him by a large number of reporters over those thirty-nine days.

      [...]

      Despite this intensive search [of reporters and paid airport employees], none of them found a single person who had seen Snowden, although his image was constantly shown on airport TV screens.

  • “There is no such thing as absolute privacy in America,” the FBI director, James Comey, has declared after the disclosure of a range of hacking tools used by the CIA.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/08/fbi-james-comey-privacy-wikileaks-cia-hack-espionage

    “All of us have a reasonable expectation of privacy in our homes, in our cars, and in our devices. But it also means with good reason, in court, government, through law enforcement, can invade our private spaces,” Comey said at the conference on Wednesday. “Even our memories aren’t private. Any of us can be compelled to say what we saw … In appropriate circumstances, a judge can compel any of us to testify in court on those private communications.”

    #wikileaks #CIA #FBI #James_Comey #privacy

  • Snapchat n’a rien inventé : Polaroid Fade to Black

    C’était des instantanés pour les Polaroid SX-70, conçues pour disparaitre dans les 24h.

    http://www.popphoto.com/polaroid-fade-to-black-film-made-photos-that-disappeared-way-before-snapch

    The image started off looking like a black-and-white photo with a greenish tint. The image would continue to develop, getting darker and darker over the course of 24 hours or so (depending on variables like the freshness of the chemicals and the temperature of the atmosphere) until it was completely black.

    Il était possible d’arrêter ce processus de noircissement, en découpant le contour de la photo, l’ouvrir et séparer les deux faces afin de laisser sécher les agents chimiques de développement.

    Le film :


    Technique :

    http://www.gommamag.com/v5/files/imgs/gommadownloads/FADETOBLACK_Techniques_v1.pdf

    #photography #photographie

  • Uber avoue utiliser un logiciel secret pour éviter les forces de l’ordre
    http://www.lalibre.be/economie/libre-entreprise/uber-avoue-utiliser-un-logiciel-secret-pour-eviter-les-forces-de-l-ordre-58b

    Uber, déjà montré du doigt dans plusieurs affaires ces derniers jours, a avoué vendredi l’existence d’un logiciel secret destiné notamment à éviter que ses chauffeurs ne soient contrôlés par les autorités. Uber a avoué utiliser ce logiciel surnommé « Greyball » après un article du New York Times qui en révélait l’existence. Selon un communiqué de service de réservation de voitures avec chauffeur, cet outil était utilisé dans les villes où il n’était pas interdit, et son objectif principal était de protéger les (...)

    #Uber #algorithme

    • Greyball and the VTOS program were described to The New York Times by four current and former Uber employees, who also provided documents. The four spoke on the condition of anonymity because the tools and their use are confidential and because of fear of retaliation by Uber.

      [...]

      One technique involved drawing a digital perimeter, or “geofence,” around the government offices on a digital map of a city that Uber was monitoring. The company watched which people were frequently opening and closing the app — a process known internally as eyeballing — near such locations as evidence that the users might be associated with city agencies.

      Other techniques included looking at a user’s credit card information and determining whether the card was tied directly to an institution like a police credit union.

      [...]

      If users were identified as being linked to law enforcement, Uber Greyballed them by tagging them with a small piece of code that read “Greyball” followed by a string of numbers.

      When someone tagged this way called a car, Uber could scramble a set of ghost cars in a fake version of the app for that person to see, or show that no cars were available. Occasionally, if a driver accidentally picked up someone tagged as an officer, Uber called the driver with instructions to end the ride.

  • [#book] The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia’s Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries
    (Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, 2015)

    http://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/book/hardcover/the-red-web/9781610395731

    On the eighth floor of an ordinary-looking building in an otherwise residential district of southwest Moscow, in a room occupied by the Federal Security Service (FSB), is a box the size of a VHS player marked SORM. The Russian government’s front line in the battle for the future of the Internet, SORM is the world’s most intrusive listening device, monitoring e-mails, Internet usage, Skype, and all social networks.

    But for every hacker subcontracted by the FSB to interfere with Russia’s antagonists abroad—such as those who, in a massive denial-of-service attack, overwhelmed the entire Internet in neighboring Estonia—there is a radical or an opportunist who is using the web to chip away at the power of the state at home.

    Drawing from scores of interviews personally conducted with numerous prominent officials in the Ministry of Communications and web-savvy activists challenging the state, Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan peel back the history of advanced surveillance systems in Russia. From research laboratories in Soviet-era labor camps, to the legalization of government monitoring of all telephone and Internet communications in the 1990s, to the present day, their incisive and alarming investigation into the Kremlin’s massive online-surveillance state exposes just how easily a free global exchange can be coerced into becoming a tool of repression and geopolitical warfare. Dissidents, oligarchs, and some of the world’s most dangerous hackers collide in the uniquely Russian virtual world of The Red Web.

    The Red Web: Russia and the Internet

    https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2015/10/red-web

    The Internet in Russia is a battleground between activists who would use it as a tool of political and cultural freedom and government officials who see it as a powerful instrument of political control, write investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan in their new book The Red Web. For now, the government appears to be winning the battle.

    Soldatov and Borogan trace the underlying conflict back to official anxiety in the Soviet era about the hazards of freedom of information. In the 1950s, the first Soviet photocopy machine was physically destroyed at the direction of the government “because it threatened to spread information beyond the control of those who ruled.”

    [...]

    In a chapter devoted to the case of Edward Snowden, the authors express disappointment in Snowden’s unwillingness to comment on Russian surveillance or to engage with Russian journalists. “To us, the silence seemed odd and unpleasant.”

    More important, they say that Snowden actually made matters in Russia worse.

    Snowden may not have known or realized it, but his disclosures emboldened those in Russia who wanted more control over the Internet,” they write.

    Because the Snowden disclosures were framed not as a categorical challenge to surveillance, but exclusively as an exposure of U.S. and allied practices, they were exploited by the Russian government to legitimize its own preference for “digital sovereignty.”

    Snowden provided “cover for something the Kremlin wanted all along– to force Facebook, Twitter, and Google’s services, Gmail and YouTube, to be subject to Russian legislation, which meant providing backdoor access to the Russian security services.”

    [...]

    The Red Web provides a salutary reminder for Western readers that the so-called U.S. “surveillance state” has hardly begun to exercise the possibilities of political control implied in that contemptuous term. For all of its massive collection of private data, the National Security Agency — unlike its Russian counterparts — has not yet interfered in domestic elections, censored private websites, disrupted public gatherings, or gained unrestricted access to domestic communications.

    #Snowden #Edward_Snowden
    #surveillance #NSA #FSB

    • https://www.ft.com/content/7efff020-5642-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2

      The authors also chart the history of #SORM, a system as sinister as its ugly acronym suggests. The Sistema Operativno-Rozysknikh Meropriyatiy, or System of Operative Search Measures, has been giving the FSB, successor to the KGB, a back door to spy on internet communications since 1998. At one point, Soldatov the younger comes eye to eye with a Sorm device. “The heavy metal door was opened, and Andrei quietly stepped inside a small room, packed with equipment on the racks. One of them had a small black box. It was labelled Sorm. It had a few cables and a few lights. Andrei was told that when the small green lamp was illuminated on the box, the FSB guys on the eighth floor have something to do. As he looked down, Andrei saw the small green lamp winking.”

      But Sorm was not born in 1998, the year Mr Putin became head of the FSB: as Soldatov and Borogan establish through interviews with KGB sources and engineers, the ancestors of the black box were in fact Soviet-era phone-tapping systems. To develop them, the KGB enlisted some of its enemies; in a prison lab near Moscow, dissident Lev Kopelev was set to work on speech-recognition techniques.

      [...]

      And yet, in its efforts to gain the upper hand over the internet, Russia’s security apparatus appears clumsy, with activists outsmarting some of the intrusive surveillance. If the book has one shortcoming, it is that it fails to offer a conclusive explanation for this. The authors state that the regime is helpless in the face of a decentralised network. “Information runs free like water or air on a network, not easily captured,” they say.

  • The Global Surveillance Industry
    (July 2016)

    https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/global_surveillance.pdf

    This report is about electronic surveillance technologies used to identify, track, and monitor individuals and their communications for intelligence gathering and law enforcement purposes.

    [...]

    This report aims to map modern electronic surveillance technologies, their trade, the companies which manufacture and export them, and the regulation governing their trade. By doing so, it aims to increase understanding about the surveillance industry in order to foster accountability as well as the development of comprehensive safeguards and effective policy.

    #surveillance
    #Privacy_International

  • DNSmessenger Malware uses DNS TXT records and PowerShell to create a backdoor for Command & Control communication

    DNS was already being used for data exfiltration, but now also as a way for malware to talk to C2 servers to obtain PowerScript instructions.

    This allows the attacker to use DNS communications to submit new commands to be run on infected machines and return the results of the command execution to the attacker, in a way that evades many security mechanisms and go undetected.

    The infection is spread through a Word document pretending to be protected by McAfee, and asking you to Enable Content (allow macros) to be viewed.

    Technical details are found here:

    http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/03/dnsmessenger.html

    #Talos
    #DNS
    #malware
    #PowerScript

    • Researchers uncover PowerShell Trojan that uses DNS queries to get its orders

      https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/03/researchers-uncover-powershell-trojan-that-uses-dns-queries-to-get-its-

      The backdoor periodically makes DNS requests to one of a series of domains hard-coded into the script. As part of those requests, it retrieves TXT records from the domain, which contain further PowerShell commands—commands that are executed but never written to the local system. This “fourth stage” script is the actual remote control tool used by the attacker. “Stage 4 is responsible for querying the C2 servers via DNS TXT message requests to ask what commands to execute,” Edmund Brumaghin told Ars via e-mail. “If a command is received, it is then executed and the output or results of the command are communicated back to the C2 server. This basically gives the attacker the ability to execute any Windows or application commands available on the infected host.”

  • JPMorgan Software Does in Seconds What Took Lawyers 360,000 Hours

    The program, called COIN, for Contract Intelligence, does in seconds and without errors the mind-numbing job of interpreting commercial-loan agreements, something that consumed 360,000 hours of work each year by lawyers and loan officers.

    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-28/jpmorgan-marshals-an-army-of-developers-to-automate-high-finance

    Another program called X-Connect, which went into use in January, examines e-mails to help employees find colleagues who have the closest relationships with potential prospects and can arrange introductions.

    [...]

    While growing numbers of people in the industry worry such advancements might someday take their jobs, many Wall Street personnel are more focused on benefits. A survey of more than 3,200 financial professionals by recruiting firm Options Group last year found a majority expect new technology will improve their careers, for example by improving workplace performance.

    [...]

    the company keeps tabs on 2,000 technology ventures, using about 100 in pilot programs that will eventually join the firm’s growing ecosystem of partners. For instance, the bank’s machine-learning software was built with Cloudier Inc., a software firm that JPMorgan first encountered in 2009.

    #artificial_intelligence #intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA
    #finance

  • We’re Halfway to Encrypting the Entire Web
    https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/02/were-halfway-encrypting-entire-web

    The movement to encrypt the web has reached a milestone. As of earlier this month, approximately half of Internet traffic is now protected by HTTPS. In other words, we are halfway to a web safer from the eavesdropping, content hijacking, cookie stealing, and censorship that HTTPS can protect against.

  • Edward Snowden’s Long, Strange Journey to Hollywood
    (Irina Alexander, August 2016)

    A long but interesting read about how Oliver Stone’s “Snowden” came to be.

    Oliver Stone, director
    Moritz Borman, the producer
    Anatoly Kucherena, Snowden’s Russian lawyer
    Ben Wizner, Snowden’s lawyer at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)

    https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/magazine/edward-snowdens-long-strange-journey-to-hollywood.html

    On “Snowden,” he and Borman became so preoccupied with American government surveillance that they had their Los Angeles offices swept for bugs more than once.

    ...

    [Wizner said] that Snowden wasn’t profiting from Stone’s film in any way. “One hard-and-fast rule Ed always had was, I’m not selling my life rights,” Wizner said. Snowden’s participation in a Hollywood movie would only fuel the claims of his critics — that he was a narcissist eager to cash in. That said, Stone’s film would be seen by millions of people, which meant it could sway public opinion. “We were choosing between two bad options,” Wizner said.

    ...

    Wizner had negotiated veto control over any footage featuring Snowden in the film. After we spoke, the lawyer says he asked Borman to put that in writing. He also reiterated that if Stone took a reporter along, Snowden would not participate. Stone and I eventually reached a compromise: I wouldn’t observe the shoot, but I could still come and meet Kucherena.

    ...

    Anticipating a homesick Snowden, [Stone’s co-writer] hauled over a duffel bag packed with the stuff of Americana dreams: Kraft macaroni and cheese, Jell-O cups, Oreos, Pepperidge Farm cookies, Twizzlers, peanut butter, Spam, an Orioles baseball cap and a pair of Converse sneakers. “It was like delivering a care package to a kid at summer camp,” [he said.] He also slipped in a copy of “The Odyssey” translated by his grandfather “I thought it was appropriate, since Ed was on his own kind of odyssey trying to get home.”

    ...

    Wizner, who is 45, has been at the A.C.L.U. since 2001. Before Snowden, he tried to bring several suits to increase oversight over the intelligence community. Wizner likes to say that he spent a decade banging his head against a wall, and then Snowden came along and brought that wall down. Snowden had not only revealed the scope of the surveillance apparatus, but also that top government officials routinely misled the public about it. Since becoming Snowden’s advocate, Wizner has become a figure of not insignificant geopolitical importance. Those revelations have since formed a critical backdrop for legislative reforms, and there are few things that irritate Wizner more than claims that threaten to tarnish Snowden’s character and their common cause.

    It would not be a stretch to say that for Wizner, Kucherena has become a bit of a liability. Since 2013, the Russian lawyer has announced that Snowden landed a job at a major Russian website — news that turned out to not be true — and has supplied the news media with photos of his client enjoying his new life in Russia, attending an opera at the Bolshoi Theater and cheerfully hugging a dog named Rick. (Rick later turned out to be the dog of one of Kucherena’s friends). Now Kucherena had sold a novel to Stone, making it seem as if the director had to pay a Russian fixer to have access to Snowden — or worse, that Snowden was somehow under the lock and key of the Russian authorities, lent to Stone for a Hollywood movie.

    ...

    According to Wizner, [Snowden] leads a free existence in Russia, making appearances via live video and publishing op-eds against Russia’s human rights violations. “I think people are inclined to believe that Russia would never let him stay there unless he was paying for it in some way,” Wizner said. “But it’s just not true. Not only is he not cooperating, but he’s actually being critical.”

    ...

    Oliver Stone, Edward Snowden, Anatoly Kucherena and Kieran Fitzgerald in Kucherena’s office in Moscow.


    The shoot took place at Kucherena’s dacha. The day went long. Stone’s idea was to interview Snowden and capture an affecting moment that would give the film its dramatic ending. But the first takes were stiff. “Ed is used to answering questions on a level of intelligence,” Stone said. “But I was interested in the emotional, which is difficult for him.”

    ...

    “Suddenly this little creature comes teetering in — so fragile, so lovely, such a charming, well-­behaved, beautiful little man,” the cinematographer, Anthony Dod Mantle, told me. “He’s like an old soul in a very young body. He’s got fingers like violins.” Filming Snowden reminded Mantle of shooting other men with outsize reputations and slight builds. “It’s like Bono or Al Pacino,” he added. “Those guys are teeny-­weenies. But if you isolate him into a frame, he can be as big as anybody else.”

    ...

    Convinced that making the film on American soil would be too risky, Stone decided to film in Germany, where Borman was able to score some tax subsidies. With roughly 140 script pages to shoot in 54 days, the crew sprinted from Munich to Washington, to Hawaii, to Hong Kong, and then back to Munich. Often, Mantle wouldn’t get to see locations before he had to film in them. To cut costs, the suburbs of Munich had to stand in for rural Maryland and Virginia, with German extras cast as Americans. “Thank God the Germans act like Americans,” Stone said.

    The production itself resembled a covert operation, with a code name (“Sasha” had stuck) and elaborate security protocols. Worried that “Sasha” would be of interest to the N.S.A., Borman and Stone avoided discussing production details by phone or email — “It was all handwritten notes and long walks in the park,” Borman said — and kept the script on air-­gapped computers, ones that have never been connected to the internet. If it had to be mailed, Borman would mix up the pages into four packages, which he would send with four different couriers to four different addresses. “Maybe nobody gave a [expletive],” Borman told me. “Or maybe the N.S.A. is laughing at us like, ‘Look at those idiots — of course we copied everything that came through DHL and FedEx!”

    ...

    In the spring of 2014, Stone flew to Berlin and met with Poitras. The meeting did not go well. According to Poitras, Stone proposed that she delay the release of “Citizenfour,” which she was then in the middle of editing, to time up with his film. “Because his film would be the real movie — because it’s a Hollywood movie,” Poitras told me. “Obviously I wasn’t interested in doing that. To have another filmmaker ask me to delay the release of my film was — well, it was somewhat insulting.”

    ...

    If Poitras had a strong reaction to Stone’s proposal, it was because she had already been hounded by Sony. After the studio optioned Greenwald’s book, Poitras says Sony asked to buy her life rights — an offer she declined. Sony suggested that she come on as a consultant, but when the contract arrived, it stipulated that the studio would have access to Poitras’s tapes and notebooks. “So I’d already gone through that when Oliver came in trying to position himself,” she said.

    ...

    Stone was right about Gordon-­Levitt. His performance is not an interpretation so much as a direct replica of the whistle-­blower’s even demeanor and intonation. Quinto plays Greenwald with such intensity that he appears perpetually enraged. Melissa Leo’s Poitras is in turn warm and protective, almost maternal.

    ...

    Snowden’s N.S.A. boss is unsubtly named Corbin O’Brian, after the antagonist in Orwell’s “1984.” “Most Americans don’t want freedom,” O’Brian tells Snowden. “They want security.

    ...

    Snowden’s many storytellers all tell a similar hero narrative. But if Greenwald’s account is about journalism, Poitras’s is a subtle and artful character study and Kucherena’s is an attempt at the Russian novel — a man alone in a room, wrestling with his conscience — Stone’s is the explicit blockbuster version, told in high gloss with big, emotional music and digestible plot points that will appeal to mass audiences. As Wizner wisely anticipated, it is the narrative most likely to cement Snowden’s story in Americans’ minds.

    ...

    Snowden declined to comment for this article, but Stone told me he had seen the film and liked it. At a screening at Comic-­Con a few months later, Snowden would beam in via satellite to give his somewhat wary approval. “It was something that made me really nervous,” he said of Stone’s film. “But I think he made it work.”

    ...

    Gordon-­Levitt was so moved by Snowden’s story that he donated most of his salary from the film to the A.C.L.U. and used the rest to collaborate with Wizner on a series of videos about democracy.

  • Anatoly Kucherena, Snowden’s Russian lawyer wrote a novel about this story, “The Time of the Octopus” (January 2017)

    In Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport, fugitive US intelligence officer Joshua Kold is held in limbo, unable to leave the airport’s transit area. He is on the run, after blowing the lid off the terrifying reach of covert American global surveillance operations. Will the Russian authorities grant him asylum, or will they hand him over the clutches of the global octopus eager for revenge for his betrayal.

    This book is a fiction, but it is based on Kucherena’s own interviews with Snowden at Sheremetyevo airport, and provides the basis for Oliver Stone’s major Hollywood movie ‘Snowden’.

    It took Kucherena a month to negotiate Snowden’s stay and three months to write “Time of the Octopus.” According to WikiLeaks, Stone paid a million dollars for the book.

    The original book in Russian. “The whole truth about the American agent on the run,” the cover boasts. Also: “Oliver Stone is currently shooting a film based on this book.”:

    The book in English:

    Anatoly Kucherena:

    #book
    #Snowden #Edward_Snowden
    #Oliver_Stone

  • Email exchange between Edward Snowden and former GOP Senator Gordon Humphrey
    (July 2013)

    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/16/gordon-humphrey-email-edward-snowden

    Snowden:

    Further, no intelligence service - not even our own - has the capacity to compromise the secrets I continue to protect. While it has not been reported in the media, one of my specializations was to teach our people at DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] how to keep such information from being compromised even in the highest threat counter-intelligence environments (i.e. China).

    You may rest easy knowing I cannot be coerced into revealing that information, even under torture.

    #Snowden #Edward_Snowden
    #Glenn_Greenwald