• Zionist Union, don’t join Netanyahu - Opinion - Israel News | Haaretz

    By David Ricci
    http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.651681

    It’s clear Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants center-left Zionist Union to join his next government. But why Zionist Union would want to do that is murky at best: Zionist Union - and Israel - have much to lose from such a partnership.

    First, it would be bad for the center-left party. It would demoralize many of that party’s 786,000 voters who rejected a right-wing worldview in the March 17 election. These voters know Zionist Union cannot improve a Netanyahu government. No matter who joins him, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud associates - to say nothing of Habayit Hayehudi leader Naftali Bennett and his colleagues - will continue to promote the construction of illegal settlements at the expense of dealing with housing, employment and healthcare problems inside the Green Line, while taking a head-in-the-sand approach to the foreign policy implications of these moves.

  • Discussions secrètes entre Netanyahu et Herzog sur une union nationale : les militants du Camp sioniste sont stupéfaits et angoissés, les ténors ne seraient pas contre. Quelle que soit la solution trouvée, elle suscitera de fortes déceptions et tensions dans certains secteurs de la population

    Likud official : Netanyahu mulling unity government with Herzog - National - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.651679

    Although there have been no coalition talks between Likud and Zionist Union as yet and members of both parties believe that the chances of them forming a government together are slim, there are increasing signs that the parties are considering such a possibility.

    Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has told a senior Likud figure in recent days that he does not reject the idea of a unity government with Zionist Union.

    “Netanyahu understands the importance of a centrist coalition, both domestically and abroad,” the senior figure said. Nevertheless, since the election Netanyahu has consistently denied he would form a coalition with Zionist Union head Isaac Herzog.

    Meanwhile, Zionist Union sources claim that senior Labor faction officials, led by Herzog, have spoken with President Reuven Rivlin about joining a Netanyahu-led government. As far as is known, Rivlin is not dealing with the matter, having decided to avoid getting involved in political processes. Herzog denied having the discussion with Rivlin.

    According to a report on Channel 1, Netanyahu and Herzog met several days ago outside the framework of the routine briefings between the premier and the head of the opposition. According to the report, even their close associates and aides didn’t know about the meeting.

  • Settlements, Iran and Hamas: Hillary Clinton’s Israel policy - Israel News, Ynetnews
    http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4646394,00.html

    Settlements, Iran and Hamas: Hillary Clinton’s Israel policy
    After finally announcing her bid for the US presidency, Ynet takes a look back at Clinton’s positions on Israel, starting from her time as a first lady, then as a senator, until leading US foreign policy as secretary of state.
    Yitzhak Benhorin

  • Latest leak exposes Israeli Military Intelligence’s Achilles’ heel - Diplomacy and Defense - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.651339

    The affair of the soldier to be indicted on Sunday in military court over alleged intelligence leaks to right-wing friends reflects the difficulty the Israel Defense Forces Military Intelligence has, as opposed to smaller agencies like the Shin Bet security service or the Mossad, in protecting classified information.

    MI is more vulnerable to leaks because of its broader contact with the outside world. Civilians, new draftees, reserve soldiers – every year more and more people are added to the circle of those exposed to its secrets.

    It seems that the case of the soldier, Ya’akov Sela, shows weaknesses in the system that might be quite common. Relatively rapid initial security vetting, which is not always sufficient to uncover potential security risks; too loose supervision of those already in the intelligence system and who are considered “one of us”; and a lack of strict compartmentalization in day to day work.

    Sela was inducted into the army’s program for ultra-Orthodox soldiers, in which great efforts are made to satisfy the needs of the draftees. He was relatively old, 25, married and a father, had medical problems, and was stationed at a base a few minutes away from his home in the settlement of Bat Ayin. (The fact that a settler from an ultra-Orthodox, nationalistic background was drafted into a program designed for ultra-Orthodox full-time yeshiva students shows the broad interpretation the IDF gives to the term “ultra-Orthodox,” and the possibility that the number of “authentic” ultra-Orthodox serving in the army may be lower than the army claims.)

    Ideal location for leaker

    The Bat Ayin soldier’s convenient assignment to brigade headquarters placed him in an ideal location to collect intelligence information relevant to his friends, who belong to the extreme wing of settlers.

    Sela was in charge of collecting intelligence about the Palestinians, but the Shin Bet and police say he spent a significant amount of time looking into investigations involving so-called “price tag” attacks – violent attacks by settlers against Palestinian, Christian, left-wing Jewish and occasionally army targets – and preparations for the dismantling of illegal settlement construction.

    Because of weaknesses in compartmentalization, it seems Sela was able to obtain a good deal of information without his commanders noticing it in time. Only when police in the Judea and Samaria district became suspicious was the leak discovered and the soldier arrested.

    There have been a few cases in the past of operations and intelligence sergeants in West Bank brigades who were suspected of leaking information, mainly about the evacuation of outposts. About four years ago, when the commander of the IDF forces in the West Bank, Maj. Gen. Nitzan Alon, dared hint that greater care was needed in the sharing of sensitive information of this type, a campaign was launched against him in the settlements that ended only toward the end of his term as general in charge of Central Command.

    The number of settler-soldiers involved in such leaks is apparently very small, but the system is not built to find them ahead of time or monitor them during their service – just as the system had difficulty discovering the leak of documents by the soldier Anat Kam from the office of Yair Naveh, the general in charge of Central Command at the time.

    Clearly the arrest of one suspect should not disqualify soldiers who live in settlements from serving in sensitive posts. But the Sela affair should certainly alert the army that convenient postings close to home should not be the only consideration in intelligence assignments. Moreover, the affair should also lead to improved monitoring so that curiosity, or worse, ideological tendencies, do not expose soldiers to information to which they are not meant to have access.

  • Netanyahu expected to appoint ministers in coming week - National - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.651349

    Far-reaching demands by the Kulanu and Habayit Hayehudi parties had stymied talks before the Passover break, with one Likud MK saying, “Netanyahu will have to take meaningful decisions regarding ministerial appointments at the beginning of next week, or else the negotiations won’t go anywhere.”

    Netanyahu presumably would prefer to wait for the negotiations with Kulanu and Habayit Hayehudi to gel, in order to sign a coalition agreement with all the partners in the incoming government at the same time, rather than going ahead and closing the deal with the parties with which understandings have been reached on most substantive issues – namely, Shas, United Torah Judaism and Yisrael Beiteinu.

    Last Thursday, Netanyahu held a meeting with senior figures in his party over the coalition negotiations. The discussion centered around the demands of Kulanu and Habayit Hayehudi. Likud’s position is that the parties headed by Moshe Kahlon and Naftali Bennett, respectively, are holding firm because they believe Netanyahu cannot form a coalition without them.

    Kulanu and Habayit Hayehudi would appear to be correct in their assessment. Despite loud pronouncements about the possibility of turning to other potential coalition partners, Likud has made it clear that it has no intention of approaching Zionist Union about forming a unity government. One Likud lawmaker said any such claims were a red herring that was part of the negotiating strategy.

    Netanyahu met with Shas chairman Arye Dery last Thursday in an attempt to solve one of the key obstacles to the coalition – the demand by both Shas and Kulanu for authority over the state’s planning and zoning agencies.

    While Dery is expected to serve as interior minister, Kahlon is demanding the transfer of the Israel Land Authority from the Interior Ministry into the hands of his party.

    Likud sources said that since MK Yitzhak Cohen (Shas) is expected to be named deputy finance minister, the ILA could be moved without upsetting either Shas or Kulanu.

    Estimates are that Kahlon’s demands for ministerial portfolios in the coalition negotiations will not derail the finalizing of an agreement with him, and that he is ultimately likely to receive the finance, housing and environmental protection ministries as he demands.

    Sources within Kulanu have recently mentioned the party’s No. 2, MK Yoav Galant, as a surefire candidate for a cabinet position, and No. 3, Eli Alaluf, or Kahlon crony and former Bezeq CEO Avi Gabay (who was not a Knesset candidate) as possible candidates for the party’s third cabinet spot.

    Beyond the issue of the Israel Land Authority, there are a number of outstanding disagreements between the various parties that are making the finalizing of the coalition agreement difficult.

    For example, there is a great deal of daylight between the positions of Habayit Hayehudi and Yisrael Beiteinu on the issue of abolishing reforms to the Jewish conversion process. Likud is not a party to this dispute.

    Meanwhile, Likud has yet to rule on the demands by both Shas and Habayit Hayehudi for the Religious Affairs Ministry, and those of both Habayit Hayehudi and Yisrael Beiteinu for the Foreign Ministry. Likud figures say the latter portfolio will remain with Yisrael Beiteinu, but Habayit Hayehudi still insists that its chairman, Naftali Bennett, must be the next foreign minister.

    The issue of who heads the powerful Knesset Finance Committee has also not been resolved, but sources in Likud said they expected that Kahlon will eventually agree that MK Moshe Gafni (United Torah Judaism) should retain the position.

    Members of both the Habayit Hayehudi and Kulanu negotiating teams agreed that the ball is in Netanyahu’s court. “We have submitted most of our demands, and the Likud team said they’d give us an answer soon. We’re waiting,” said one negotiator.

    Netanyahu and Likud received an initial 28 days to form a coalition, with that deadline set to expire on April 22.

  • Syrie : les Palestiniens pour une opération militaire conjointe avec le régime à Yarmouk
    http://www.romandie.com/news/Syrie-les-Palestiniens-pour-une-operation-militaire-conjointe-avec-le-regime-a-/582741.rom

    Damas - Les organisations palestiniennes ont accepté jeudi pour la première fois de coordonner des opérations militaires avec l’armée syrienne pour repousser le groupe État islamique du camp de Yarmouk, dans le sud de Damas, a indiqué l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP).

    L’effort palestinien sera complémentaire avec le rôle de l’Etat syrien pour nettoyer le camp Yarmouk des terroristes, a affirmé jeudi à Damas le dirigeant de l’OLP Ahmad Majdalani.

    Cette déclaration intervient au lendemain d’une réunion d’Ahmad Majdalani avec toutes les organisations palestiniennes à l’exception d’Aknaf Beit al-Maqdess, proche du Hamas, et hostile au régime. Il n’a pas été possible de joindre ce mouvement pour connaître sa position.

    Lors de la réunion palestinienne, nous nous sommes mis d’accord sur la création d’une chambre d’opérations commune composée de forces syriennes, des mouvements palestiniens qui le souhaitent et qui ont une forte présence à l’intérieur du camp Yarmouk ou dans son périmètre pour mener cette opération militaire, a dit M. Majdalani, l’émissaire du président palestinien Mahmoud Abbas venu spécialement de Ramallah, en Cisjordanie, pour régler cette question.

  • Eau : crise humanitaire au #Proche-Orient, par @marclaime
    http://blog.mondediplo.net/2015-04-09-Eau-crise-humanitaire-au-Proche-Orient

    Pendant que de violents affrontements continuent de déchirer la Syrie et l’Irak, des millions de personnes déplacées pâtissent toujours des conflits au Liban, en Israël et dans les territoires palestiniens occupés. Les ressources hydriques et les systèmes vieillissants d’alimentation en #eau approchent du point de rupture, selon un rapport du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) rendu public le 25 mars 2015, ce qui augure d’une crise humanitaire sans précédent dans toute la région.

  • Israël : Orange épinglée pour ses liens avec l’armée et son implication dans l’attaque de Gaza de cet été - Ali Abunimah - Electronic Intifada http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/how-orange-telecom-supported-israels-massacre-gaza

    The Israeli affiliate of Orange, the French multinational telecom company, provided direct material support to Israeli soldiers who participated in the deadly assault on Gaza last summer.

  • Qatar lending Palestinians $100m to pay salaries - Diplomacy and Defense - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.651102

    The Palestinian Authority said Wednesday it had received a $100 million loan from Qatar to help pay civil servants salaries and alleviate an economic crisis triggered by a row with Israel over taxes.

    PA President Mahmoud Abbas, who is visiting the Gulf state, issued a statement thanking Qatar for the loan. There was no immediate confirmation or comment from Qatari officials.

    Israel collects taxes on behalf of the Palestinian Authority but suspended payments of some $130 million a month in January to protest at moves by the Palestinians to join the International Criminal Court.

    Palestinian membership of the ICC started on April 1, opening the way for possible law suits against Israel for alleged war crimes tied to its lengthy occupation of territory the Palestinians want for an independent state.

    Following widespread criticism by Western allies, Israel earlier this month released some of the frozen tax revenue, but withheld a portion of the cash, saying it was money Palestinians owed for utilities and health care supplied by Israel.

    Abbas said the deductions amounted to a third of the total sum that Israel owed and refused to accept any of the money, threatening to go to the ICC over the issue.

    An official at Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office confirmed that Israel had deducted money to cover the Palestinians’ electricity, water and health bills and was “willing to transfer back to the Palestinian Authority the sum that was returned whenever it wishes.”

  • Palestinian refugees in Yarmouk find themselves at Ground Zero of jihadist battle - Middle East - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.651108

    Once an oasis of calm, the camp in south Damascus is now under siege, torn between militants from Islamic State, armed opposition groups and forces that are loyal to the Assad regime.
    By Jack Khoury

    The battles for control of the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus, which has been in the headlines over the past week after most of it was seized by Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL), disclose the power struggles between the militias that ostensibly constitute the armed opposition to the regime of President Bashar Assad as well as Palestinian groups in the refugee camps in Syria and in Lebanon.

    It is clear that the Palestinian refugees in the camp are paying the heaviest price for the unrest. The overwhelming majority of the camp’s inhabitants have been repeatedly forced to relocate to different camps, which has placed their dreams of returning to Palestine even further from their reach.

    Yarmouk was once Syria’s largest Palestinian refugee camp, with a population of 180,000. In contrast to the refugee camps that were established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in Lebanon and in Jordan, after Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 or the 1967 Six-Day War, the Yarmouk camp was established in 1957. The Syrian government gathered all of the Palestinian refugees who were living in the Golan Heights, in the area surrounding Damascus and a few other locations in Syria into an area of 2.11 square kilometers, eight kilometers south of the southernmost reaches of Damascus.

  • ISIS turns on its creator, a marginalized, drained al-Qaida - Middle East - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.651107

    Ideology is far from the best to tool to use when attempting to decipher the constantly shifting kaleidoscope of Jihadist alliances, from Syria to Afghanistan.
    By Zvi Bar’el

    A special event is rocking jihadist groups these days. This week, for the first time in twenty years, The Afghani Taliban published the life story of their leader Mullah Omar. Omar, who hosted and protected Osama Bin Laden before the attacks on September 11, took great care for many years to remain undercover, fostering a secretive, mysterious image. He was known to very few people, his photo was never published and his lifestyle and whereabouts were unknown.

    Thus the publication of his history, education and numerous feats against the “American enemy” is an exceptional occurrence evoking much interest, particularly due to its timing. According to Afghani and Pakistani pundits who follow Islamic organizations in the two countries, the reason for shedding the layer of mystery around Omar is the increasing defection of senior Taliban leaders towards the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) organization, based on their sense that the Taliban leader can no longer fulfill the prime mission of the group, that he is disconnected from his followers and mainly because Taliban funding sources are drying up.

    Other sections of the Taliban oppose the attempts at reconciliation with the Afghani government, concerned that this reconciliation – the success of which is doubtful – will isolate the Taliban from their power bases. This requires that Mullah Omar appear in public, presenting himself as the only leader in the eyes of the Taliban, thus trying to stanch the flow of deserters going to the “ISIS caliphate of Khorasan,” which is portraying itself as the sole representative of Islamist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and India.

    At the other end of the Middle East there have been recent reports that Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri is considering stepping down as the group’s leader. These reports claim that he has transmitted messages to various branches of the group, releasing them from their vows of allegiance to the group, calling on them to join other Islamist groups, including Islamic State, and continue operating within them. The most detailed such report comes from Ayman Din, a former Al-Qaida operative, who left the organization in the 1990s but still maintains close ties to Islamic groups.

    In an interview to the London daily Al-Khayat, he related that al-Zawahiri feels he can no longer compete with Islamic State. Even though he’s succeeded in setting up three new branches - in Somalia (the al- Shabab organization), in Egypt’s Sinai and in India - the internal conflicts within these branches, including the most important one in Yemen, where some of his operatives crossed the lines and joined Islamic State, have transformed Al-Qaida into a secondary and even marginal group.

    In Syria too, in which Al-Qaida operates through its proxy Jabhat al-Nusra, headed by Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, al-Qaida’s situation is not great. Jabhat al-Nusra linked up with al-Qaida at a late stage of the civil war in Syria, following a bitter clash between al-Joulani and Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi, who headed Al-Qaida in Iraq before arriving in Syria, was told by al-Zawahiri to return to Iraq and conduct operations from there, leaving Jabhat al-Nusra to conduct the war in Syria. Al- Baghdadi, who was already in control of many areas of Syria, rejected this demand and in effect announced the severing of his links with al-Qaida, heaping abuse at al-Zawahiri in the process.

    However, it seems that the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra is also facing a serious dilemma. Qatar, which has financed and fed the group for years, wants the group to dissociate itself from al-Qaida and join what are mistakenly labeled the “moderate” groups. The objective of this is to remove Jabhat al-Nusra from the U.S. Administration’s list of terrorist groups, thus allowing Qatar to support it directly without causing itself any embarrassment. It would thus join the common struggle against Islamic State and Syrian president Bashar Assad.

    However, Jabhat al-Nusra, which controls several strategic areas such as parts of the Syrian city of Idlib, parts of the Golan Heights and the Daraa area, has yet to make a choice. The group can’t see any advantage in dissociating from al-Qaida, which would force it to join the fighting alongside groups that differ from it ideologically, and possibly even having to share control over areas it already holds and from which it currently reaps financial profits.

    On the other hand, rejecting Qatar’s demands risks losing the financial support it enjoys. If Qatar convinces Turkey to join the attempts to budge Jabhat al-Nusra, its refusal may also block the vital free passage to and from Turkey, now available to its fighters. These calculations illustrate the fact that loyalty to al-Qaida or its absence is not dependent on ideological grounds but on pragmatic considerations that relate to the group’s very survival. The faction is therefore considering setting up a new group with a different name, which will allow its removal from the list of terrorist groups and secure its funding. However, such a move may lead to further splitting of the group, which will weaken it militarily and thus debilitate its bargaining power vis-à-vis Qatar.

    Jabhat al-Nusra was dealt another severe blow this week when it lost the battle for the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in southern Damascus. The most significant armed group within the camp is the Hamas-affiliated Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis. As such, it is supported by the Muslim Brothers in Syria, the rivals of Jabhat al-Nusra. This rivalry played well into the hands of Islamic State - and according to some reports, al-Nusra activists even assisted Islamic State fighters in their battles with the Hamas-linked group.

    It’s doubtful whether these moves by Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaida, were coordinated with or reported to Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is ideologically far removed from both Islamic State and the Muslim Brothers. The constantly shifting kaleidoscope that presents new patterns of alliances - often illogical - between different groups, makes the exact pigeonholing of each group irrelevant. It no longer makes any difference if Jabhat al-Nusra is linked to al-Qaida or is even financed by it, if in some local arenas it cooperates with Islamic State while in others it fights it. This is also how one should relate to the “pledge of allegiance” to Islamic State, taken by more than 30 Islamic groups across the world, or to the abandonment of al-Qaida by some of these groups. Islamic State needs these allegiances in order to portray itself as the largest and strongest organization, and in order to depose - if not to eradicate - al-Qaida as a competing organization. This is the same manner in which al-Qaida operated before a competitor that now threatens its existence grew within its own ranks.

    At the outset, Osama Bin Laden distinguished between two kinds of enemies. The nearby ones; those Arab or Muslim regimes who are not implementing Islam correctly - and the distant enemy, mainly the West, intent on disseminating its culture and controlling Islamic states while endangering their religious values. The fight against the two enemies must be waged in parallel, determined Bin Laden. Following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the distant enemy became much more accessible due to its presence in these occupied countries. This fact helped al-Qaida recruit supporters based not only on religious grounds but on national ones, thus mobilizing thousands of volunteers across Muslim nations for a war against the occupying Western armies.

    Subsequently, Bin Laden set up branches in most Muslim nations, basing them on local radical and terrorist groups whose main aim was to fight local regimes - but who also provided activists for international operations. On this al-Qaida infrastructure, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is basing his widespread control network. With such a structure, Islamic State can afford to suffer defeat in one country or region, but its infrastructure will continue to exist, continuing to absorb local al-Qaida branches.

  • Le boycott d’Israël est plus urgent que dans le cas de l’Afrique du Sud, affirme un vétéran de l’anti-apartheid
    Adri Nieuwhof – The Electronic Intifada – 6 avril 2015 -
    http://bdsfrance.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3596%3Ale-boycott-disrael-es

    Farid Esack, professeur d’études islamiques à l’université de Johannesburg, s’est trouvé confronté à de fortes objections de la part du lobby sioniste de France contre une série de conférences sur le parallèle entre l’apartheid israélien et l’apartheid sud-africain. À cause de cette pression, il lui a été interdit de prendre la parole à des initiatives prévues à Paris et à Toulouse.

    Vétéran de campagnes contre le racisme, Esack s’est fait également le champion de la défense des droits des femmes et des personnes atteintes du SIDA. Il a été nommé commissaire à l’égalité des sexes par le regretté Nelson Mandela. Il est actuellement président de BDS Afrique du Sud, un groupe qui soutient l’appel palestinien pour le boycott, le désinvestissement et les sanctions contre Israël.

    J’ai parlé avec Esack de sa tournée de conférences en France.

    Adri Nieuwhof : Vous êtes venu en France pour une tournée de conférences et vous avez eu l’interdiction de prendre la parole à certaines occasions. Pouvez-vous nous dire ce qu’il s’est passé ?

    Farid Esack : Il y a eu d’énormes pressions sur toutes les sept universités où je devais intervenir. Seule l’université de Paris-Sorbonne m’a interdit de prendre la parole. L’université a argué qu’elle le faisait pour des raisons techniques parce que les formulaires qu’il fallait remplir pour demander une salle ne l’avaient pas été correctement. Les étudiants ont essayé de négocier avec l’université pendant une semaine pour corriger l’erreur, ce qui a été refusé par l’université.

    Je pense que pour la Sorbonne, le mauvais remplissage du formulaire n’a été qu’un prétexte. Les étudiants ont fait valoir que le syndicat des étudiants remplissait ces formulaires depuis des années. Et que dans le passé, l’université n’avait jamais attiré leur attention sur la moindre erreur. La seule explication plausible à laquelle nous arrivons, c’est que derrière mon interdiction se cache la pression du syndicat des étudiants juifs de France.

    Il m’a été aussi interdit de m’exprimer lors d’une réunion publique à Toulouse, dans une salle municipale, par le maire de Toulouse et ce, sur la base des mêmes allégations exprimées dans les lettres aux universités. Où il est dit essentiellement que je suis un antisémite, et que moi, en tant président du BDS Afrique du Sud, j’avais soutenu et/ou fomenté des actions de protestions violentes en Afrique du Sud.

    AN : Que s’est-il passé après l’interdiction ?

    FE : Il est apparu que la Sorbonne était parvenue à un accord tacite avec la police pour que je sois autorisé à parler à l’extérieur de la porte principale de l’université. Debout devant moi, il y avait une vingtaine de personnes de la sécurité pour nous empêcher d’entrer. J’avais des militants sur ma gauche et des militants sur ma droite. Mais ce qui est très intéressant, c’est que le proviseur adjoint de l’université est venu m’accueillir et me dire qu’il regrettait que l’université avait interdit ma conférence publique. Il est resté toute la durée de ma conférence et ensuite, il m’a remercié.

    À Toulouse, nous avons aussi résisté à l’interdiction. J’ai pris la parole à l’extérieur du lieu prévu.

    http://seenthis.net/messages/358514

  • Erdogan in Tehran: Turkey wants to dance at every Mideast wedding - From breaking off with Israel and Syria, to the rift with Egypt and confrontations with the U.S., Turkey’s foreign policy has suffered blow after blow. Would a nuclear deal with Iran help Turkey reposition itself in the region?
    By Zvi Bar’el | Apr. 8, 2015 |Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.650923

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rohani looked on Tuesday like two hedgehogs trying to mate. Their statements during a press conference, at which no questions were allowed, sounded as if every comma in them had been very carefully programmed.

    “We need to undertake this mediation to stop the bloodshed in Iraq and Syria,” declared Erdogan, who refrained from mentioning Turkey’s involvement with the anti-Iran coalition that’s operating against the Houthis in Yemen. “I don’t care if they are Sunnis or Shi’ites being killed, they are all Muslims,” said the Turkish president, who, unlike Iran, is demanding that Syrian President Bashar Assad be removed from power as a condition for his joining the western coalition against the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS.

    These are not the only disputes between Turkey and Iran. Two weeks ago, Erdogan declared that Iran’s goal is to seize control of the region and that it must be stopped. As a result, 65 members of the Iranian parliament demanded that their president cancel Erdogan’s visit to Tehran. Moreover, Turkey positioned itself Saudi Arabia in the war against the Houthis in Yemen. The Saudis see Turkey as an ally in the Sunni axis it seeks to establish against Iran. The high price that Turkey is paying Iran for natural gas is also angering Erdogan, who promised to buy more gas if Iran would agree to lower it.

    But along with these differences, Iran and Turkey have many common interests. Trade between the two countries is worth some $14 billion and, at least according to their statements, they intend to triple its scope. The two countries see eye to eye on the risk posed by the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, and Turkey is also the major supplier of consumer goods to Iraq, which is under Iran’s patronage.

    Despite the chronic mutual suspicion, the economic and diplomatic ties with Iran are especially important to Turkey, which realizes the enormous potential opportunities if a nuclear agreement is signed with the world powers that lifts the sanctions imposed on Iran. The legitimacy that Iran would receive would allow Turkey to purchase large quantities of crude oil at a competitive price, integrate into the Iranian auto industry, and win huge construction tenders that are expected to be issued.

    At the same time, Turkey is not relinquishing the new ties that have developed with Saudi Arabia. These are liable to bring reconciliation with Egypt, from which Turkey has been cut off since Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi seized power in July 2013. Just before he left for Iran, Erdogan received the Saudi crown prince and interior minister, Mohammend bin Nayef, who asked for an assurance that Turkey would not deviate from the agreements reached between the two countries when Erdogan visited Riyadh last month, particularly with regard to cooperating in the war in Yemen.

    Once again, Turkey is trying to dance at all the weddings and reposition itself in the Middle East. So far, its foreign policy has suffered blow after blow: the breaks with Israel and Syria; major losses in Libya; the rift with Egypt; the cold winds from Saudi Arabia; and confrontation with the United States over Turkey’s refusal to join the coalition against ISIS. Turkish commentators hastened to compare Iran, which is liable to play a significant, if not primary role in the regional diplomatic games, to Turkey, which has lost its regional anchors; between Iran, whose president uses Twitter and Facebook, and Turkey, where the government has ordered the online social networks blocked. These are still far-fetched comparisons; Iran still has a long way to go just to get to the limited human rights that exist in Turkey. But in a region where images play a crucial role in the branding of nations, Iran is earning lots of credit points while Turkey is being pushed to the sidelines.

  • Recension de Pour les musulmans d’Edwy Plenel par Al Kanz : « Pourquoi il faut lire et faire lire le livre d’Edwy Plenel » http://www.al-kanz.org/2015/04/07/edwy-plenel

    (...) apprendre qu’une nouvelle personnalité médiatique semble parler au nom des musulmans n’a pas suscité en nous un enthousiasme débordant. Même s’il s’agit d’un journaliste comme Edwy Plenel.

    Avec les musulmans, non à la place des musulmans

    Le climat d’islamophobie décomplexée dans lequel nous vivons depuis quelques années, entretenu à dessein par nombre de partis politiques et de médias, a entrainé dans la communauté musulmane défiance et désamour à l’encontre notamment des journalistes.

    En outre, Chalghoumi et consorts ont fini de consommer le divorce en subtilisant systématiquement une parole si rarement accordée. Difficile dans ces conditions de ne pas être sur ses gardes lorsque ces native informant sont remplacés par un tout aussi porte-parole version sympathique : dans les deux cas la parole est confisquée.

    Ainsi, de prime abord, on a beau s’appeler Edwy Plenel, lorsque l’on publie un ouvrage intitulé « Pour les musulmans », l’adhésion n’est pas immédiate… jusqu’à ce que l’on aborde et lise l’ouvrage. Là c’est la, bonne, surprise.

    Disons deux mots sur la forme. Le bouquin se lit vite et bien, aisément d’une traite. La plume de Penel est heureuse, limpide et pédagogique. Le fondateur de Mediapart écrit comme il parle : on retrouve dans ses mots la vivacité de son regard qui pétille lorsqu’il se lance dans une tirade passionnée. S’il convoque ça et là l’histoire et autres références d’érudition, le lecteur qui les ignore ne sera pas pénalisé. Mais le plus intéressant est évidemment ailleurs.

    Un livre avec les musulmans, non à leur place

    Edwy Plenel évite l’écueil que nous redoutions : à aucun moment, il ne se fait porte-parole des musulmans. Il ne parle jamais à la place des musulmans. Son « pour » est un « avec ». Mieux, le journaliste dit ce que nous sommes très nombreux à dire depuis des années. Mais lui n’est pas musulman : de fait, l’objection facile, inepte et fallacieuse de la victimisation tombe immédiatement à l’eau ; cette fameuse victimisation que l’on pointe dès lors que vous dénoncez, par des faits, l’islamophobie qui ronge la France. On peut aussi penser que son propos sera, pour la même raison, plus audible que celui de tout autre musulman qui tient le même discours.

    « Pour les musulmans », ce pour est un avec.

    L’auteur lie l’islamophobie à la question sociale. « Sous la question musulmane, écrit-il, se joue la question française. » Et d’être convaincu que redonner de l’espoir, du bonheur, un avenir à cette France crispée et violentée par une oligarchie qui règne sur le pays depuis des décennies fera reculer cette haine contre les musulmans. Certes, il ne faut pas être naïf. La baisse du chômage ne convertira pas les haineux à un amour ardent à l’endroit des musulmans.

    Sous la question française se joue la question musulmane

    Pour autant, ce qu’écrit Edwy Plenel ne peut que convaincre a minima les musulmans. Combien de hadiths nous enjoignent à nous soucier de nos voisins comme de nos proches. Si l’on considère uniquement ce commandement divin, il apparaît clairement que cette question française, dont parle Plenel, est un devoir tout à la fois moral, civique, personnel et même religieux. L’injonction à faire le bien autour de soi, à donner de sa personne, de ses biens, à mettre en pratique les appels à l’altruisme, au partage, apparaissent alors comme une réponse à l’islamophobie.

    Rabibocher le lien social, se soucier de son voisin, être acteur dans son quartier, sa ville, appliquer les enseignements de l’islam, être mieux musulman, voilà assurément une partie de la solution pour soigner la France bien malade.

    Bref, Pour les musulmans est un livre à lire et à faire lires à ses proches et amis non musulmans, ce pour une raison assez simple : Plenel formule pertinemment ce que, selon nous, une écrasante majorité des musulmans de France pense. Donner à lire cet ouvrage permettra peut-être de renouer un dialogue parasité par les prêcheurs de haine de l’extrême droite aux socialistes qui ont entrepris de faire du muslim bashing l’expédient par excellence.

  • Hamas election call could put UN initiative at risk - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/israel-abbas-pa-elections-hamas-dahlan-un-resolution.html

    Yet, the current strife between Hamas and Fatah is not directly linked to the 2007 coup. While Hamas leaders do not deny that the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades forcefully expelled the security forces and took over the official national institutions in Gaza, the issue of the coup apparently ended the day the Palestinian unity government was formed, with both sides expressing their desire to bury the hatchet and declaring that they had turned over a new leaf. According to the reconciliation agreement, following which the unity government was formed in June 2014, a joint committee was supposed to prepare the PA for elections within six months — a period that ended in early 2015.

    In recent weeks, and especially after Abbas’ call for outside intervention in Gaza, Hamas has concluded that the only explanation is that Abbas is looking for any excuse to avoid elections in the PA. Sami Abu Zuhri, the movement’s spokesman in Gaza, said April 2, “Abbas was chosen in an agreement between the Palestinian factions to be the chairman for a specified period of time. His term is over, and he would do well to know his limitations.”

    Having been elected to the position in democratic elections after the passing of former Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat in 2004, Abbas has been in office for more than 10 years. Holding elections now, amid a diplomatic campaign for international recognition of a Palestinian state, could prove hard for him for a number of reasons.

    Even if he were to win the elections in a landslide, just holding such elections would officially make Hamas part and parcel of the Palestinian government. In that case, not only would Abbas have to take into account the demands by Hamas members to participate in governing and determining foreign policy, but it might also drive away potential supporters of the UN move he has been carefully orchestrating for a very long time.

    Abbas is also apprehensive of another enemy lurking in the wings, waiting impatiently for an opportunity to get back in the ring. Former Fatah senior official Mohammed Dahlan, the president’s nemesis, has been rallying more and more supporters in the West Bank and Gaza. Having himself started a historic reconciliation process with Hamas, Dahlan has no intention of sitting idly by if elections are held, potentially posing a significant threat to Abbas’ re-election. Over the past year, Dahlan has raised tens of millions of dollars from Gulf states. This money, which was intended to alleviate the plight of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, has elevated him to savior status.

    Dahlan has been carefully planning his return to center stage. Having recently met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, he has reprogrammed his trajectory to return to the Fatah movement from which he was ousted on the orders of Abbas. It remains unclear whether at this stage it will be enough to garner support that will seriously jeopardize the president’s standing. However, when Dahlan openly said in a March 2 interview with Newsweek that he was going to run against Abbas, saying, “If there’s an election tomorrow, I’ll go back,” he left Abbas with no room to take unnecessary risks.

    While the Palestinians are preparing for their UN moves and Abbas and other senior PA officials threaten to appeal to the International Criminal Court, the stalemate in the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas puts the Palestinian president in a bind. In the absence of elections, his legal status as PA president is questionable, but he is concerned that Hamas might once again exploit the democratic process it trampled violently eight years ago. He does not have a lot of time to vacillate.

    As someone wishing to champion historic moves in the coming year, he will have to call the shots on a number of key issues relating to the character of the Palestinian state that he wants to establish with the support of the UN. He will have to decide whether the future state will be democratic, whether it will include the Gaza Strip and whether Hamas will be part of the official government.

  • La résolution proposée par la France inclut la reconnaissance d’Israël en tant qu’Etat juif

    France set to propose new Palestinian state resolution at UN - Israel News, Ynetnews
    http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4645117,00.html

    The draft would define the pre-1967 borders as a reference point for talks but allow room for exchanges of territory, designate Jerusalem as the capital of both Israel and a Palestinian state and call for a fair solution for Palestinian refugees.
     
    The French proposal also includes a requirement for Palestinian recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state,” the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas informed the Executive Committee of the PLO. That recognition is an Israeli demand that Abbas has rejected in the past.

  • Le yoyo de la politique israélienne : de l’art de ménager la chèvre et le chou en se tirant une balle dans le pied, avant de retourner sa veste, pour sauver les apparences, en vue de réaliser toujours le même but : grignoter des territoires

    Habayit Hayehudi pushing legislation to increase settlement construction - National - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium-1.650790

    In coalition negotiations with Likud on Monday, Habayit Hayehudi demanded that the new government’s guidelines include support for a bill to alter the Israeli justice system, and an increase in construction of settlements in the West Bank.

    The right-wing, largely religious party tried to advance this legislation in the previous government, but failed.

    Habayit Hayehudi’s representatives in the coalition negotiations demanded the advance of legislation to weaken the judiciary in relation to the Knesset. One of their demands was to enable the Knesset to reenact a law that the High Court of Justice had struck down because it contradicted the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

    They also insisted on reducing the number of Supreme Court judges on the Judicial Appointments Committee and thus increase the influence of the politicians on the panel. The Likud’s representatives said they would examine the request and respond in the next few days.

    Both parties said they were examining how to draft Habayit Hayehudi’s demand to include an increase in settlement construction in the government’s guidelines.

    MK Yariv Levin, a member of Likud’s negotiation team, said he would advance the changes in the Judicial Appointments Committee as part of broader legislation he was planning to change “the face of Israel’s justice system.”

    The two parties also agreed to advance legislation restricting NGOs – in effect, leftist NGOs – from raising funds from foreign states. The final draft submitted by Habayit Hayehudi stipulates that an NGO seeking a tax exemption for a contribution from a foreign state will require the approval of the defense and foreign ministers and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

    Habayit Hayehudi sources said no real progress was made on Monday but they believed Likud was interested in the party’s joining the coalition. During the campaign, Habayit Hayehudi, headed by Naftali Bennett, claimed that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu preferred a coalition with Zionist Union.

    The two sides are scheduled to meet again next Monday.

  • Will Iran deal pave way for unity government? - National - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.650638

    Opposition MK Eitan Cabel’s statement of support of the prime minister’s stance on Iran raises suspicions in the Zionist Union that the stage is being set for the party to join the coalition.

    Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely to try to get the Zionist Union to join his coalition within the next few weeks, but the chances of this actually happening are slim, say party sources.

    “Netanyahu is stressed out; he is worried about the response from the United States and the European Union if he establishes a narrow right-wing government, which is why there’s a good chance he will turn to us in the coming weeks,” one party source said.

    But another source said that the struggle against a nuclear Iran could be the key common ground for the establishment of a unity government with Netanyahu. “The odds of our establishing a coalition with Netanyahu are low,” the source said. “But if there is a sincere desire on both sides to establish a joint government, the struggle against the nuclear agreement and the need to repair Israel’s ties with the United States could make it easier for [co-party leader Isaac] Herzog to explain to his voters the problematic step of joining Netanyahu.”

    Because of the speculation regarding contacts with Likud, Zionist Union is very suspicious of any expression of support for Netanyahu from within its ranks. Thus some in the party wondered whether a Facebook post Sunday by faction chairman Eitan Cabel, in which he expressed support for Netanyahu’s stance on the nuclear deal reached with Iran, was meant to facilitate the party’s entrance into the coalition.

    Cabel vehemently denied this, noting that he had expressed support for the premier solely with regard to the deal with Iran announced late last week following intensive negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland. “On this issue only, I stand behind Benjamin Netanyahu,” Cabel wrote on his Facebook page.

    “With all the criticism of the way he handled the campaign against the agreement-in-progress, the bottom line is that his struggle is correct.”

    Cabel added that he refused to join “the chorus of applause for the agreement with Iran. The truth is, it gives me sleepless nights. President Obama promised yesterday that ‘if the Iranians cheat we will know,’ but isn’t that exactly what the Americans promised after the agreement with North Korea?” This is not a matter of left or right, Cabel added.

    “When a mad, religious regime, with a proven record of terror and deception, receives permission to get within touching distance of a nuclear bomb, I am very worried. And when those who are meant to ensure that the agreement isn’t broken have a proven record of contempt for the red lines that they themselves set, I’m doubly worried,” Cabel wrote.

    In contrast to Netanyahu’s hard line on the accord with Iran, Zionist Union leaders Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni have refused to criticize the United States and have called for an improvement of mutual ties following the signing of the framework agreement. “We need to work closely with the powers, and in particular with the United States, over the coming days in order to roll back Iran’s nuclear program and prevent it from getting nuclear weapons,” the two said in a statement published immediately after the framework agreement was announced last week. They added that “it is necessary to rebuild our cooperation with the United States because it is the most important factor in defending the security interests of Israel and the region.”

  • The three benefits of ending the U.S.’s cold war with Iran - Opinion - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.650483
    By Peter Beinart

    Right now, a thousand pundits and politicians are debating the details of Thursday’s framework nuclear deal with Iran. That’s fine. I think the details are far, far better than the alternative—which was a collapse of the diplomatic process, a collapse of international sanctions as Russia and China went back to business as usual with Tehran, and a collapse of the world’s ability to send inspectors into Iran. But ultimately, the details aren’t what matters. What matters is the potential end of America’s 36-year-long cold war with Iran.

    For the United States, ending that cold war could bring three enormous benefits. First, it could reduce American dependence on Saudi Arabia. Before the fall of the shah in 1979, the United States had good relations with both Tehran and Riyadh, which meant America wasn’t overly reliant on either. Since the Islamic Revolution, however, Saudi Arabia has been America’s primary oil-producing ally in the Persian Gulf. After 9/11, when 19 hijackers—15 of them Saudis—destroyed the Twin Towers, many Americans realized the perils of so great a dependence on a country that was exporting so much pathology. One of the unstated goals of the Iraq War was to give the United States a large, stable, oil-producing ally as a hedge against the uncertain future of the House of Saud.

    What George W. Bush failed to achieve militarily, Barack Obama may now be achieving diplomatically. In recent weeks, American hawks have cited Saudi anxiety about a potential Iran deal as reason to be wary of one. But a big part of the reason the Saudis are worried is because they know that as U.S.-Iranian relations improve, their influence over the United States will diminish. That doesn’t mean the U.S.-Saudi alliance will disintegrate. Even if it frays somewhat, the United States still needs Saudi oil and Saudi Arabia still needs American protection. But the United States may soon have a better relationship with both Tehran and Riyadh than either has with the other, which was exactly what Richard Nixon orchestrated in the three-way dynamic between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing in the 1970s. And today, as then, that increases America’s leverage over both countries.

    Over the long term, Iran may also prove a more reliable U.S. ally than Saudi Arabia. Iranians are better educated and more pro-American than their neighbors across the Persian Gulf, and unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran has some history of democracy. One of the biggest problems with America’s Mideast policy in recent years has been that, from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan to Egypt, the governments the United States supports preside over populations that hate the U.S. Thursday’s nuclear deal, by contrast, may pave the way for a positive relationship with the Iranian state that is actually undergirded by a positive relationship with the Iranian people.

    Which brings us to the second benefit of ending America’s cold war with Iran: It could empower the Iranian people vis-à-vis their repressive state. American hawks, addled by the mythology they have created around Ronald Reagan, seem to think that the more hostile America’s relationship with Iran’s regime becomes, the better the United States can promote Iranian democracy. But the truth is closer to the reverse. The best thing Reagan ever did for the people of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. was to embrace Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1987, American hawks bitterly attacked Reagan for signing the INF agreement, the most sweeping arms-reduction treaty of the Cold War. But the tougher it became for Soviet hardliners to portray the United States as menacing, the tougher it became for them to justify their repression at home. And the easier it became for Gorbachev to pursue the policies of glasnost and perestroika that ultimately led to the liberation of Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.

    Iranian President Hassan Rohani, like Gorbachev, wants to end his country’s cold war with the United States because it is destroying his country’s economy. And like Gorbachev, he is battling elites who depend on that cold war for their political power and economic privilege. As Columbia University Iran expert Gary Sick recently noted, Iran’s hardline Revolutionary Guards “thrive on hostile relations with the U.S., and benefit hugely from sanctions, which allow them to control smuggling.” But “if the sanctions are lifted, foreign companies come back in, [and] the natural entrepreneurialism of Iranians is unleashed.” Thus “if you want regime change in Iran, meaning changing the way the regime operates, this kind of agreement is the best way to achieve that goal.”

    The best evidence of Sick’s thesis is the euphoric way ordinary Iranians have reacted to Thursday’s agreement. They’re not cheering because they want Iran to have 6,000 centrifuges instead of 20,000. They’re cheering because they know that opening Iran to the world empowers them, both economically and politically, at their oppressors’ expense.

    Finally, ending the cold war with Iran may make it easier to end the civil wars plaguing the Middle East. Cold wars are rarely “cold” in the sense that no one gets killed. They are usually proxy wars in which powerful countries get local clients to do the killing for them. America’s cold war with the U.S.S.R. ravaged countries like Angola and El Salvador. And today, America’s cold war with Iran is ravaging Syria and Yemen.

    When America’s relationship with the Soviet Union thawed, civil wars across the world petered out because local combatants found their superpower patrons unwilling to send arms and write checks. The dynamic in the Middle East is different because today’s cold war isn’t only between Iran and the United States, it’s also between Iran and Sunni Arab powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, neither of which seems particularly interested in winding down the civil wars in Syria and Yemen. Still, a different relationship between the United States and Iran offers a glimmer of hope. In Syria, for instance, one reason Iran has staunchly backed Bashar al-Assad is because it fears the fierce hostility of his successors. The United States cannot entirely alleviate that fear, since some of the groups battling Assad—ISIS, most obviously—are fiercely hostile to Iran and to Shiites in general. But if Iran’s leaders knew that at least the United States would try to ensure that a post-Assad government maintained good relations with
    Tehran, they might be somewhat more open to negotiating a transfer of power in Syria.

    Clearly, the United States should push for the best nuclear deal with Iran that it possibly can. But it’s now obvious, almost three decades after Reagan signed the INF deal with Gorbachev, that it’s not the technical details that mattered. What mattered was the end of a cold war that had cemented Soviet tyranny and ravaged large chunks of the world. Barack Obama has now begun the process of ending America’s smaller, but still terrible, cold war with Iran. In so doing, he has improved America’s strategic position, brightened the prospects for Iranian freedom and Middle Eastern peace, and brought himself closer to being the kind of transformational, Reaganesque president he always hoped to be.

    This article was first published in The Atlantic

  • U.S.: Deal with Iran shouldn’t include clause about recognition of Israel - Diplomacy and Defense - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.650486

    The U.S. rejected Saturday Israel’s demand that the final deal between the world powers and Iran regarding its nuclear program would include recognition of “Israel’s right to exist,” Fox News reported.

    State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf told reporters that the deal is “an agreement that is only about the nuclear issue,” and that it doesn’t deal with any other issues.

    “Nor should it,” she added.

    On Friday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that any final agreement with Iran include the aforementioned clause, a day after negotiators in Switzerland announced a framework for a nuclear deal.

    “Israel will not accept a deal that will allow a state that calls for its destruction to acquire nuclear weapons,” he said in a statement to the press.

    Asked about the demand, White House spokesman Eric Schultz said he had not seen the specific request but was aware of Israel’s ongoing concerns.

    “We understand his position,” Schultz told reporters aboard Air Force One, “The president would never sign onto a deal that he felt was a threat to the state of Israel.”

    Meanwhile, Iranian President Hassan Rohani, in a televised speech, on Friday hailed the framework as “a first step towards productive interactions with the world.”

  • « Oui, les musulmans sont en accord avec la République »
    https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/print/718 31.03.2015, par Nadia Marzouki

    La plupart des médias et des politiques continuent de diffuser l’image de musulmans tiraillés entre leur supposée identité religieuse et leur adhésion aux valeurs de la République. La chercheuse Nadia Marzouki nous explique pourquoi cette vision n’est pas fondée.
    Parmi les nombreuses interrogations suscitées par les attentats de janvier, la question de la prétendue incompatibilité de l’islam avec la laïcité est, une fois de plus, apparue au premier plan. Face à la énième réitération de ce débat dans les champs médiatique et politique, on sent une certaine lassitude, voire du découragement, chez les chercheurs spécialistes de l’islam en France. Car cela fait au moins depuis les années 1990 que les enquêtes de sciences sociales ont fait apparaître la non-pertinence de questions du type « peut-on réformer l’islam ? » ou « l’islam est-il compatible avec… ? ». Ce que montrent tous ces travaux, c’est que la question de la sécularisation n’a de sens que lorsqu’elle est posée au niveau des pratiques concrètes et que, de ce point de vue, la majorité des musulmans français s’accommodent très bien des règles de la laïcité. Plutôt que demander si l’islam est compatible avec la laïcité ou comment le réformer, il convient aujourd’hui de se demander pourquoi le fait accompli de la sécularisation des musulmans français est toujours en question.

    Le débat public repose encore largement sur une conception caricaturale du rapport que les musulmans entretiendraient au dogme, à la norme et à l’autorité. Dès lors que l’on envisage la subjectivité musulmane comme intégralement déterminée par son obéissance à un corpus théologique, à une autorité religieuse ou a une communauté d’origine, l’obsession actuelle des journalistes et responsables politiques pour la question de la réforme de la théologie et de l’éducation des imams se comprend mieux. Pourtant, les enquêtes de sciences sociales n’ont cessé de montrer comment la migration a produit non pas un repli identitaire et communautaire, mais une déconnexion importante entre la quête de religiosité et la culture dite d’origine1. Dans son livre sur les imams en France2, le sociologue Romain Sèze parle de « bricolage » et de « braconnage » pour décrire le rapport des imams et de leurs fidèles à la norme religieuse. Les imams jouent un rôle essentiel dans la déconnexion entre religion et culture d’origine, en rejetant un grand nombre de pratiques comme relevant de la « tradition » et en appelant à une contextualisation des principes du droit islamique. Beaucoup d’entre eux recourent au raisonnement par analogie (al-qiyās) afin de redéfinir certaines normes. Loin du fantasme de l’islam rigoriste et communautaire, Romain Sèze décrit la religion qu’enseignent les imams comme un islam « fragile ».

    L’enquête de Christine Rodier 3 sur les pratiques de consommation halal menée auprès d’une population habitant en Moselle depuis les années 1970 et originaire du sud du Haut Atlas marocain montre également en quoi aborder l’application d’une règle religieuse dans la seule perspective de la soumission est erroné. La sociologue fait apparaître toute la part d’individualisme, d’inventivité et de réflexivité qui caractérise l’appropriation de cette prescription. Elle déplore le simplisme des oppositions binaires entre le halal et la laïcité ou la modernité. L’adoption de cette pratique, loin d’être un indice de communautarisation ou de rejet de la laïcité, reflète l’individualisation importante de la religiosité. À la différence des premières générations de musulmans, chez les jeunes générations de pratiquants, le halal est devenu un « concept éthique à la base d’une hygiène de vie qui va au-delà de la simple prescription alimentaire 4 ».
     

    Il y a une forte part d’individualisme et d’inventivité dans la consommation halal des jeunes générations.
    Ceux que Christine Rodier décrit comme des « mangeurs consommateurs » se distinguent de leurs aînés en ce qu’ils « désirent manger des plats dits français auxquels ils s’identifient (comme la plupart des jeunes de cette classe d’âge), étant eux-mêmes nés sur sol français ». À côté de cette figure du « consommateur », Christine Rodier évoque également celles du mangeur « revendicatif », qui trouve que ses parents ne sont pas assez pieux, et celle de l’« ascète », qui souhaite afficher une identité spécifique. Mais, dans les trois cas, manger halal découle d’un choix libre et individuel. Cette pratique révèle un rapport réflexif aux prescriptions et aux normes religieuses « en faveur d’une éthique sollicitant davantage l’engagement personnel et la recherche d’une ascèse 5 ».

    On pourrait multiplier les exemples de travaux de sciences sociales qui font apparaître, à partir de cas différents, ce même processus d’individualisation de la religiosité et d’intégration inventive au contexte laïc républicain. Ainsi de la recherche du sociologue Elyamine Settoul 6 sur l’intégration des Français musulmans dans l’armée française, ou des travaux en cours de Warda Hadjab sur les relations amoureuses entre jeunes musulmans français. Ces derniers parviennent à conjuguer des normes issues de la tradition que veulent leur transmettre les parents et une expérimentation subjective de la vie séculière européenne. L’image de l’islam comme « problème » ou source de conflit est doublement invalidée. D’une part, parce que la majorité des conflits qui naissent de la rencontre de ces normes sont résolus au sein de la famille, de l’environnement amical, de la mosquée, des espaces associatifs, des réseaux sociaux. D’autre part, parce que, pour nombre de ces jeunes, l’appropriation de la norme religieuse est précisément une ressource qui les aide à s’affirmer contre une pression familiale. C’est ainsi qu’ils parviennent à justifier le mariage avec une personne d’une autre origine, voire d’une autre religion, contre l’avis des parents, au nom des valeurs « islamiques » de l’amour ou de la famille.

    Quant aux formes d’expression religieuses les plus piétistes, systématiquement présentées dans les médias sous l’angle de l’oppression de la femme musulmane, elles ne peuvent pas non plus être comprises dans la seule perspective binaire de l’opposition au féminisme ou au sécularisme. Le travail de Claire Donnet sur les pratiques de femmes qui cultivent une forme de piété intégraliste – respect strict des temps de prières, du halal, port du voile… – montre que la recherche de cette féminité pieuse a en réalité deux enjeux : critiquer la conception libérale du féminisme, mais aussi déconstruire les normes machistes et patriarcales au sein de leur propre environnement. Autrement dit, ces femmes mettent en avant leur respect des «  fondamentaux » de l’islam pour pouvoir en parallèle s’affirmer et réaliser différents objectifs : travailler, étudier, prendre la parole…

    Certaines femmes utilisent leur respect des fondamentaux de l’islam pour s’affirmer dans le travail, les études...
    Étudiant la démarche des participantes au site Web islamique féminin Hijab and the City, Claire Donnet affirme que « ces blogueuses, au croisement de multiples rapports de domination, se réapproprient les représentations essentialisées de la femme et s’en servent stratégiquement pour changer leur condition au sein de leur groupe confessionnel. Elles s’insèrent dans l’ordre normatif préexistant pour le changer 7 » Les travaux très riches sur le féminisme islamique font apparaître la même ambivalence face au sécularisme libéral, qui est rejeté en tant qu’il est associé à une forme d’impérialisme culturel, mais dont l’idée centrale – les droits individuels – est acceptée et réappropriée.

    L’affaire du jugement « SAS contre France » 8 est de ce point de vue éclairante. Pour protester contre la loi interdisant le port de la burqa dans l’espace public, une requérante française a saisi la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme de Strasbourg en mettant en avant un argumentaire tout à fait cohérent avec le registre libéral de la défense des droits des individus. Son argument ne consistait en effet pas à se plaindre de l’impossibilité pour elle de vivre enfermée dans sa « communauté » musulmane, mais à dénoncer l’incompatibilité de la loi de 2009 avec des articles précis de la Convention, notamment avec l’article 9 qui défend la liberté religieuse des individus.

    Qu’ils optent pour une stratégie de transformation du religieux en éthique en réinterprétant des normes strictes en valeurs ouvertes, ou au contraire qu’ils défendent une conception plus fondamentaliste du religieux en voulant détacher l’activité pieuse de l’influence des folklores culturels des pays « d’origine », dans les deux cas les musulmans acceptent, voire renforcent, l’idée fondamentale du sécularisme, celle de la séparation entre l’espace du religieux et celui du politique. Paradoxalement, alors que la plupart des musulmans français insistent pour qu’on fasse la distinction entre l’islam comme religion et ce qui relève des traditions ou de la culture d’origine, le débat public et politique repose largement sur l’idée selon laquelle le seul islam acceptable, c’est l’islam folklorisé des instituts de « cultures d’islam » et des festivals de musique soufie, ou l’islam athéisé promu par les intellectuels d’origine musulmane non croyants et non pratiquants.

    Ce malaise à l’égard de la religion comme telle, dès lors qu’elle n’est pas neutralisée en « fait religieux historique » ou en culture folklorique, est contradictoire avec les injonctions à rejeter la communautarisation. Alors que la question de l’institutionnalisation de l’islam revient au centre du débat public, il faut rappeler que l’institutionnalisation étatique, de tradition gallicane, n’implique pas la sécularisation, au contraire. Il paraît plus important et plus urgent de créer les conditions pour que se poursuive le processus en cours d’individualisation et de pluralisation des pratiques de l’islam en France, et de cesser d’assigner les musulmans à une « communauté » d’identité ou de culture, qui devrait pouvoir être unifiée et représentée. Loin des fantasmes de l’islam conquérant et communautaire, il est temps pour les médias et les responsables politiques de voir les musulmans français tels qu’ils sont et tels que les décrivent les chercheurs depuis plusieurs décennies…

     

    Notes
    1.L’Islam mondialisé, Olivier Roy, Le Seuil, 2001.
    2.Être imam en France, Romain Sèze, Éditions du Cerf, 2013.
    3.La Question halal. Sociologie d’une consommation controversée, Christine Rodier, PUF, 2014.
    4. « Manger Halal, pour diversifier ses pratiques alimentaires », Christine Rodier, Le Monde, 20 mars 2012.
    5.Ibid.
    6. « Présence musulmane croissante dans l’armée », Elyamine Settoul, Le Monde, 26 mars 2012.
    7. « Hijab et City et la construction d’une féminité pieuse », Claire Donnet, Actes de colloque, coll. « Fira-HAL-SHS », janvier 2012, pp. 1-9.
    8. Arrêt de Strasbourg, affaire « SAS contre France », 1er juillet 2014.❞

  • Report: Iran financing Hamas’ military force reconstruction efforts - Diplomacy and Defense - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.650525

    Tens of millions of dollars have been transferred to Hamas for the rebuilding of tunnels destroyed by Israel last summer, the Sunday Telegraph reports.

    Iran has allocated millions of dollars to Hamas’ military wing for the rebuilding of the tunnels destroyed by Israel during last summer’s war in Gaza, the Sunday Telegraph reported.

    Citing intelligence sources, the report said Iran was also funding new missile supplies to help restock projectile weapons used by the militant organization to target Israeli civilian population during Israel’s Operation Protective Edge.

    According to Arab media reports, Hamas and Iranian officials have been meeting in Tehran in recent months. The relationship began warming after the Gaza war last summer. Last month, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal met with Iran’s speaker of parliament Ali Larijani, Palestinian sources close to Hamas told Haaretz.

    Ties between Hamas and Tehran were close before the group broke with Syrian President Bashar Assad during the Syrian civil war. Hamas, which belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood axis, had refused to support the Iranian-backed regime’s massacre of the Sunni opposition.

    At the time, Hamas thought that this move wouldn’t exact too high an economic price, thanks to the support it received from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government. That calculation collapsed when Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi was ousted. Egypt’s new government, led by Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi, is waging war on the Brotherhood and all its branches, first and foremost Hamas.

  • Projets urbains financés par le Jewish National Fund en Israël

    Israel’s rich uncle - Israel Opinion, Ynetnews
    http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4643712,00.html

    Israel’s rich uncle
    Op-ed: The JNF is handing out millions to projects across Israel, but some are more controversial than others.

    Of all the cities in Israel, the most enviable is Afula, the capital of the valley. For on Thursday, Afula receives two massive holiday gifts that came as a surprise, as though from the heavens.


    It happens when the board of directors of the Jewish National Fund meets to approve the budget for a long list of projects across the country.

    A perusal of the list reveals some interesting items. Two relate to Afula. The JNF intends to bestow two projects upon Afula – NIS 1.9 million to partially fund a bike path around the city, and NIS 7.72 million for “a peripheral walking route around the Emek Hospital.”

    The bike path is understandable. The JNF has put bike paths in many places, at a similar price; but spending nearly eight million shekels on a trail around a hospital is a little hard to swallow. Does the JNF intend to pave it with diamonds? With gold?

    Will the trail also encompass the Kinneret? How far does the hospital in Afula extend, and why is the Clalit HMO, which owns the hospital, not required to invest a single shekel? (A hospital spokeswoman said this week that the route will be a fitness route around the perimeter fence of 2.5-3 km in length.)

    And why Afula? The answer to that puzzle, says a source in the company, leads to Eli Aflalo, co-chairman of the JNF. Despite his exalted position, Aflalo has never forgotten his beloved city, and if he does forget, there are plenty of others in the organization to remember and who are eager to please.

    The JNF board of directors has 37 members (Microsoft only has 10, but what do they know?). The board members come from a variety of political parties and persuasions, including some that are long gone.

    The JNF’s main income is the sale of land, and the rise in real estate prices of recent years has brought in billions. But the wealth has attracted unwelcome attention: former ministers Yair Lapid and Tzipi Livni demanded the nationalization of the JNF - and its coffers; and those in need of housing slammed it of over the high price of housing. The JNF came to the conclusion that it was better to spend the money, and fast. The list to be approved Thursday represents an expenditure of close to NIS 200 million.

    When the list was discussed by the JNF Finance Committee last Thursday, one member, Matthew Sperber of the Reform Movement objected to the disbursement of JNF funds over the Green Line.

    Sperber claimed that appropriation for settlements makes it difficult for the Jewish National Fund to raise money from donors abroad and would endanger its tax-exempt status. He was joined by five other board members, who wrote an emotional letter of protest. Alon Tal, a representative of the Green Party, spoke personally with the JNF world chairman, Labor Party stalwart Efi Stenzler. “You are endangering the status of the JNF,” Tal warned him.

    The reality in this case is a little more complex. Firstly, the JNF has been handing money to the settlements for years; secondly, the amount - approximately NIS 17 million out of the 200 million - is not unusual, and only part of it is invested in the heart of the West Bank.

    We refused to pay for construction in the settlements, said one of the JNF heads, all projects in the West Bank are environmental, and are open to everyone.

    That made me smile. Anyone who thinks that this new bike path will see Arabs and Jews riding side by side is living in a fantasy; ditto for those who think the parks established by the Jewish National Fund in the settlements will be open to the children of Palestine.

    But why complain when a rich uncle is handing out cash? When it’s offered, do you not take it?