/shia-forces-iraqi-army-and-the-perils-o

  • ’Shi’a Forces’, ’Iraqi Army’, and the Perils of Sect-Coding
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/25064/shia-forces-iraqi-army-and-the-perils-of-sect-codi

    Controversial semantics are of course not unique to sect-coding and the Middle East. Consider the role of religious identity in whether an event is labeled a “terrorist attack” or a “mass shooting.” However, there has been a strange ubiquity and persistence about the sect-coding of all things Iraqi since 2003 (a pattern that has been replicated with Syria). Thirteen years after regime change, even some of the world’s most esteemed academics can casually refer to the Iraqi army as “Shiʿa forces.”

    There is no need to debate the undeniable relevance of sectarian identity in post-2003 Iraq. Nor is there much uncertainty about the centricity of sect to many in Iraq’s political classes (and not just the Shiʿas amongst them). However, this should not be grounds for the sect-coding of all things related to the Iraqi state—let alone all things related to Iraq. Yet all too often, that is precisely what we see. More to the point is the fact that what drives this sort of sect-coding is far more serious than just an objective assessment of the perceived balance of power between sect-centric forces. Rather, it is a value judgment on the legitimacy of the post-2003 Iraqi state.

    Rightly or wrongly, the national is generally viewed if not equated with legitimacy, legality, and modernity. As such, to sect-code a government or arm of the state is to de-nationalize and hence delegitimize it. Nowhere is this more the case than in Iraq where the legitimacy of the state has been violently contested since 2003. That contest means that one cannot use terms like “Shiʿa forces”, “Shiʿa government,” and the like without appearing to take sides in the contentious debate about the legitimacy of the Iraqi state. And in a way the reverse is similarly true: to insist on the use of “Iraqi forces” or “Iraqi state forces” is also to take sides in the struggle over the Iraqi state’s legitimacy— this time defending the legitimacy of the Iraqi state.