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  • Comment interpréter les protestations nées de la crise des ordures à Beyrouth ?
    Dans ce texte, le journaliste Moe Ali Nayel tente de concilier une analyse en termes transclassistes avec les discours de haine de classe et de haine confessionnelle tenus par différents groupes de l’élite, y compris les organisateurs du mouvement Vous puez.
    La question est de savoir si jeunesse turbulente qui semble tenir le haut du pavé ces derniers jours est téléguidée par une élite réactionnaire qui tente de reprendre le contrôle des événements et de défendre un régime corrompu en décrédibilisant le mouvement social par la violence et le confessionnalisme ; s’il exprime une tentative de prise du pouvoir par l’alliance aounistes-Hezbollah, dans un cadre régional marqué par l’opposition en Syrie entre Arabis Saoudite et Iran (vision du 14 mars) ; ou bien si cette jeunesse exprime une revendication authentique et représente dès lors la pointe avancée et active d’un mouvement social transclassiste - ce qui pose alors la question de l’encadrement politique de ce mouvement. La comparaison avec les premières manifestations tunsiennes ou égyptiennes étant alors tentante, avec tous les scénarios noirs qui en ont résulté.
    On notera que l’interprétation de Moe Ali Nayel est proche de celle défendue tous ces jours derniers par la journaliste Scarlett Haddad dans l’Orient Le Jour ou Angry Arab.

    Quick Thoughts : Moe Ali Nayel on Lebanon’s Garbage Crisis and Protest Movement
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22501/quick-thoughts_moe-ali-nayel-on-lebanon%E2%80%99s-garbage-

    The “You Stink” campaign’s calls for protests, which began in late July 2015, created space for those from a different social class than those who created the campaign. Since the first protest, youths from marginalized and poverty-stricken areas continued what they had previously been doing alone, without any social media campaigns. These youths do not generally function in the orbit of so-called civil society organizations but have been protesting on their own initiative since last summer’s severe water and power cuts. This summer, their protests escalated in reaction to the garbage crisis, and their proximity to the downtown area made it possible for them to join the demonstration called for by the “You Stink” campaign. While burning trash and blocking the streets leading to downtown Beirut during the first protest, these youths exclaimed, “We are with you, but this is our way of protesting.” It was then and there that they simultaneously expressed their anger toward the government’s security measures, power cuts, and water shortages.

    [...]

    To put it simply, the protest that sparked violence against state violence was not an act of “thuggery” by “saboteurs” who were told to do so by Amal movement leader and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri. People who allege such dynamics do not recognize the daily economic abuse the majority of Lebanese have been enduring for years. It was a whole bouquet of angry Lebanese who found unity and struck back against a state that has been failing them in all aspects, and a state security apparatus that has been particularly brutal in the year since Mashnuq became interior minister. The most marginalized youth, those from Dawra, Burj Hammoud, Khandaqal-Ghami’, Sabra, Tariq Jdideh, and Shiyyah, were those who struck back with all the vengeance accumulated in their bitter souls against state authority. These are the victims of the same social order that has their brothers languishing in jails without trial for simply smoking a joint, or being at the wrong place at the wrong time.

    Two young men I spoke with told me, “We are on the street, jobless, and with no place to go. We pop pills to forget the shit we live in.” The scooter they had purchased on credit was confiscated by the government because they could not afford to register it, yet they needed it to work and earn money. These disenfranchised young men see the law being used to punish them for being poor. All this while a small ruling class cruises around town in its fifty-thousand-dollar SUVs, drives in convoys with tinted windows, running over, beating up, and sometimes killing anyone who stands in its way. This latter group is given state security protection and legal immunity. One group of angry teenage boys were rounded up two weeks ago and brutally beaten up by the Internal Security Forces (ISF), only to be told the next day that it was a case of mistaken identity. They weren’t even given an apology.

    Thus, on the night of 22 August, and as a response to this violence and neglect, an unusual sense of solidarity exploded and a revolutionary spirit reached a climax that manifested itself in the large numbers on the street the next day. The trajectory of the protest thus far is one of inclusion. It is bringing together different strata of Lebanese society in an unusual way to confront an exploitative economic and political system.
    [...]

    Since we are affected by the region, we must realize that this movement could fail and could even open a path to military rule. However, there seems to be a consensus building among grassroots protesters that the street will be occupied until this corrupt ruling class falls. All that seems to matter on the street right now is to shatter the status quo that has long held Lebanon and its people prisoner.

    If we can call this an uprising, then it is important to look at the dynamics on the ground: the street and the forces that reclaimed it. Many Lebanese at this particular moment are breaking away from the confines of their social-sectarian boxes. To understand the core of this protest movement, one ought to be where the leading sentiment of this rebellion exists. It is a mix of anger and vengeance by jobless, impoverished, socially alienated youth from different sects; LGBT individuals and activists who have been subject to violence and harassment by a patriarchal state; a variety of grassroots leftist movements; feminist activists and networks that have become increasingly active and visible in recent years; young mothers and fathers who struggle to provide an adequate life for their children.

    Lebanon’s youth has followed one uprising after another in other Arab countries, recognized its possibilities, and yearned for real change. So far, this campaign appears to be the one and only opportunity that has—thus far—managed to unite us outside the political straightjacket of the March 14 versus March 8 political blocks, demanding the downfall of their politics. It is precisely this sentiment, this sort of anger, that we need to focus so as to further develop, and thus deliver a blow to the status quo.

  • Redrawing Syrian and Iraqi borders is no easy task | The National
    http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/redrawing-syrian-and-iraqi-borders-is-no-easy-task

    Variations sur l’idée de #Sunnistan(s) par Taylor Luck

    Behind closed doors, one scenario is gaining popularity: a Sunni partitioning of Iraq and Syria. Under various proposals, the southern Syrian province of Daraa, Suwayda and Quneitrah would form a separate state, while mainly Sunni Anbar in west Iraq would be combined with Mosul to become an autonomous region. Iraqi Sunni tribesmen have been lobbying Washington for months.

    Meanwhile, the Free Syrian Army’s southern forces have been acting independently for more than a year – answering only to the US and Saudi-run Military Operations Centre in Amman.

    [...]

    But when faced with the facts, autonomous Sunni regions in Syria and Iraq are more fantasy than feasible, even if the idea of sovereign states in southern Syria and west Iraq do have their roots in history.

    Sur un thème proche, le même avec Nicholas Blanford :
    Syrian war : As neighbors seek border enclaves, a de facto partition ?
    http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0803/Syrian-war-As-neighbors-seek-border-enclaves-a-de-facto-partition-video

    Voir la déconstruction du discours sur l’Irak comme pays artificiel, voir le remarquable essai de Sarah Pursley sur Jadaliyya
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21759/lines-drawn-on-an-empty-map_iraq%E2%80%99s-borders-and-the
    Une version arabe est maintenant publiée : http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21946/%D8%AE%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%8
    #irak #Syrie #jordanie

  • Islamic State sex slave price list authentic, $165 for a child - UN — RT News
    http://www.rt.com/news/311612-un-isis-sex-slave

    After circulating for almost a year, the UN has finally confirmed the authenticity of the Islamic State Sex Price list being offered to their fighters and other men trying to purchase sex slaves as young as one for $165.

    Originally published online in November, the UN got hold of the actual hard copy in April, but was reluctant to confirm its authenticity. Now Zainab Bangura, the UN’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict, said the sex menu choices are real.

    “The girls get peddled like barrels of petrol,” Bangura told Bloomberg. “One girl can be sold and bought by five or six different men. Sometimes these fighters sell the girls back to their families for thousands of dollars of ransom.”

    #ei #esclavage

  • Un portrait de la jeunesse des banlieues populaires de Tunis aujourd’hui
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21816/un-portrait-de-la-jeunesse-des-banlieues-populaire

    Un portrait de la jeunesse des banlieues populaires de Tunis aujourd’hui

    Comme le titre l’indique, ce dernier porte la focale sur deux grandes agglomérations de la banlieue ouest de Tunis—Douar Hicher et Ettadhamen—qui ont la particularité d’être souvent qualifiés de « foyers » ou de « fiefs » salafistes par les médias. L’analyse conduite par les auteurs—trois sociologues en plus des directeurs de l’ouvrage—s’appuie sur une grande enquête réalisée au cours de l’année 2014, avec trente-neuf entretiens semi-directifs, six focus groups et 714 enquêtes par questionnaire. C’est par conséquent un portrait très actuel de la jeunesse des banlieues populaires de Tunis que livre cet ouvrage.

    #tunisie #jeunesse

  • Has Amnesty International Lost Its Way ? A Forensic Analysis of Amnesty’s Reports on Operation Protective Edge (Part 1)
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22236/has-amnesty-international-lost-its-way-a-forensic-

    Has Amnesty International Lost Its Way? A Forensic Analysis of Amnesty’s Reports on Operation Protective Edge (Part 1)

    #Norman_Finkelstein sur les biais d’Amnesty International lorsqu’il s’agit [notamment] de la #Palestine (pour ceux qui en douteraient encore).

  • New Texts Out Now: Hamza Hamouchene and Mika Minio-Paluello, The Coming Revolution in North Africa: The Struggle for Climate Justice
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21803/new-texts-out-now_hamza-hamouchene-and-mika-minio-n
    Très intéressante démarche

    Climate change will devastate North Africa. Many will die, and millions will be forced to migrate. The desert is spreading. Crops are failing and fisherfolk are losing their livelihoods. Rain will become more erratic, water supplies dwindle and storms more intense. Summers will be hotter and winters colder. Drought is forcing villagers to abandon their homes and rising sea levels are ruining fertile land. Falling food production and shrinking water will threaten even the megacities like Cairo, Casablanca and Algiers. The next twenty years will fundamentally transform the region.

    This is not an act of nature. Climate change is class war—a war by the rich against the working classes, the small farmers, the poor. They carry the burden on behalf of the privileged. The violence of climate change is driven by the choice to keep burning fossil fuels—a choice made by corporations and Western governments, together with domestic elites and militaries. It is the outcome of a century of capitalism and colonialism. But these decisions are constantly being remade in Brussels, DC, and Dubai, and by more locally in Heliopolis, Lazoghly and Qattameya, Ben Aknoun, Hydra and El Marsa.

    Survival relies on both leaving fossil fuels in the ground, and adapting to the already changing climate. Billions will be spent on trying to adapt—finding new water sources, restructuring agriculture and shifting the crops that are grown, building sea walls to keep the saltwater out, changing the shape and style of cities. But whose interest will this adaptation be in? The same authoritarian power structures that caused climate change are shaping the response to it—to protect themselves, and make greater profits. Neoliberal institutions are articulating a climate transition, while leftist and democratic movements are largely silent. Who will be locked out of the climate-proofed gated communities of the future?

    • Hélas excellente prévision
      Et les auteurs sont des gens intéressants :

      Hamza Hamouchene est un militant algérien, écrivain, chercheur, et un membre fondateur de l’Algérie Solidarity Campaign, basée à Londres (ASC), qui fait campagne pour un changement démocratique pacifique en Algérie, et la justice environnementale en Afrique du Nord (Ejna). Il a auparavant travaillé pour Global Justice Maintenant sur les questions du climat, de la nourriture, et de la justice commerciale. Ses écrits ont paru dans le Guardian, Counterpunch, New Internationalist, poivron rouge, Jadaliyya, openDemocracy, Pambazuka, El Watan, Maghreb Emergent, et le Huffington Post.

      Mika Minio-Paluello travaille pour la plate-forme de Londres, l’appui aux communautés de première ligne qui résistent BP et Shell. Pendant deux ans et demi, Mika a été fondée avec l’Initiative égyptienne pour les droits personnels, climatique et soutenir la campagne pour la justice environnementale et l’analyse des contrats de pétrole et de gaz. Elle a co-écrit The Road Oil : Journeys de la mer Caspienne à la City de Londres (Verso, 2013), les voiles, et aimerait garder nouveau abeilles.

  • (Lire absolument – et recoupements souhaités.) 2012 Defense Intelligence Agency document : West will facilitate rise of Islamic State “in order to isolate the Syrian regime” – “This is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want
    http://levantreport.com/2015/05/19/2012-defense-intelligence-agency-document-west-will-facilitate-rise-of

    On Monday, May 18, the conservative government watchdog group Judicial Watch published a selection of formerly classified documents obtained from the U.S. Department of Defense and State Department through a federal lawsuit.

    While initial mainstream media reporting is focused on the White House’s handling of the Benghazi consulate attack, a much “bigger picture” admission and confirmation is contained in one of the Defense Intelligence Agency documents circulated in 2012: that an ‘Islamic State’ is desired in Eastern Syria to effect the West’s policies in the region.

    http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10

    Astoundingly, the newly declassified report states that for “THE WEST, GULF COUNTRIES, AND TURKEY [WHO] SUPPORT THE [SYRIAN] OPPOSITION… THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A DECLARED OR UNDECLARED SALAFIST PRINCIPALITY IN EASTERN SYRIA (HASAKA AND DER ZOR), AND THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THE SUPPORTING POWERS TO THE OPPOSITION WANT, IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE SYRIAN REGIME…”.

    The DIA report, formerly classified “SECRET//NOFORN” and dated August 12, 2012, was circulated widely among various government agencies, including CENTCOM, the CIA, FBI, DHS, NGA, State Dept., and many others.

    The document shows that as early as 2012, U.S. intelligence predicted the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), but instead of clearly delineating the group as an enemy, the report envisions the terror group as a U.S. strategic asset.

    À la une du Akhbar aujourd’hui :
    http://al-akhbar.com/taxonomy/term/5298

    Ça me semble suffisamment énorme pour que les gens de bon goût t’expliquent que c’est rien qu’une théorie du complot et que tu ne devrais pas trop en parler.

    • traduction de l’article en français

      L’Occident facilite la montée de l’État Islamique « afin d’isoler le régime syrien »
      samedi 23 mai 2015 - Brad Hoff - Traduction : Info-Palestine.eu - Dominique Muselet
      http://www.info-palestine.net/spip.php?article15388

      Le lundi 18 mai, Judicial Watch, le groupe de vigilance du gouvernement conservateur, a publié une sélection de documents autrefois classifiés obtenus du Département américain de la Défense et du Département d’État grâce à un procès fédéral.

      Alors que les grands médias se concentraient sur le traitement par la Maison Blanche de l’attaque du consulat de Benghazi, un bien plus « grand tableau » se dégage de la lecture d’un document de la Defense Intelligence Agency rédigé en 2012 : à savoir que l’avènement d’un « État islamique » dans l’est de la Syrie est souhaitable pour que l’Occident puisse arriver à ses fins dans la région.

      De manière surprenante, le rapport récemment déclassifié stipule que pour « l’Occident, les pays du Golfe et la Turquie [qui] soutiennent l’opposition [syrienne]... il y a la possibilité d’établir une principauté salafiste officielle ou pas, dans l’est de la Syrie (Hasaka et der Zor), et c’est exactement ce que veulent les puissances qui soutiennent l’opposition, afin d’isoler le régime syrien ... ».

    • Les gros médias n’arrivent plus à bouger.

      Le Renseignement US avait prédit que le soutien US aux rebelles en Syrie entraînerait la chute de Ramadi
      Moon of Alabama - May 21, 2015 | Traduction : Dominique Muselet - 24 mai 2015
      http://www.legrandsoir.info/le-renseignement-us-avait-predit-que-le-soutien-us-aux-rebelles-en-syr

      Je pense moi aussi qu’il y a de toute évidence un plan derrière les progrès apparemment coordonnés d’Al-Qaïda-Syrie, sous le nom de Jabhat al-Nusra ou maintenant également d’Armée de Conquête, et l’avance de l’État islamique en Syrie et en Irak. Non seulement les faits, mais aussi le rapport DIA attestent d’un tel plan.

      Le troisième élément d’intérêt est fourni par un rapport de Reuters qui relaie des informations qui n’avaient jusqu’à présent circulé qu’en Turquie : Exclusif : les renseignements turcs ont participé à l’envoi d’armes vers les zones tenues par les rebelles islamistes syriens :

      Des témoignages d’officiers de gendarmerie notés dans des documents judiciaires examinés par Reuters laissent penser que des pièces détachées de roquettes, des munitions et des obus de mortier semi-finis ont été envoyés dans des camions escortés par des fonctionnaires de l’Agence de renseignement de l’État (MIT), il y a plus d’un an, vers des zones de la Syrie sous contrôle islamiste.

      Du fait de la publication des rapports de la DIA, des rapports sur le soutien militaire turc actif aux Islamistes d’Al-Qaïda et d’articles qui reconnaissent le soutien américain à l’offensive actuelle d’Al-Qaïda en Syrie, l’administration Obama va probablement subir des pressions pour changer de cap. La prise de Syrte en Libye par l’État Islamique s’ajoute sans doute à la pile. L’administration Obama pourrait au moins être pressée de ne pas soutenir plus longtemps Al-Qaïda en Syrie et en Irak.

      Mais, c’est bien connu, l’administration Obama ne connait pas la honte et, dans le doute, elle choisit toujours la pire solution. Le mieux que nous puissions espérer est que des informations comme celle-ci se répandent et qu’avec le temps elles imprègnent assez l’opinion publique pour que l’Administration soit obligée de changer de politique.

    • @nidal, j’ai trouvé trois sources mainstream qui évoquent ce document explosif :
      1° - le site de Foxnews : http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/05/18/military-intel-predicted-rise-isis-in-2012-detailed-arms-shipments
      2° - le Sunday Times : http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/focus/article1560083.ece
      3° - le site de Russia Today : http://rt.com/op-edge/261469-isis-suicide-bomb-yemen

      En passant Foxnews dit avoir vérifié la véracité des documents :

      The DIA report, which was reviewed by Fox News, was obtained through a federal lawsuit by conservative watchdog Judicial Watch.

    • Why is the media ignoring Israel’s alliance with al-Qaeda?
      https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/inquiry/18855-why-is-the-media-ignoring-israels-alliance-with-al-qaeda

      The Defense Intelligence Agency report stated that “there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist Principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka and Der Zor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime”. Today, the so-called Islamic State’s power base is in the east and north of Syria, and it controls most of the regions around Deir al-Zor, the regional capital of that eponymous eastern region. The city itself is still contested between regime and ISIS forces.

      The report (revealed by an American conservative group’s freedom of information request) clarifies in a preceding paragraph that “supporting powers” is a reference to “Western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey”. The term “western countries” here is likely supposed to include Israel. In any event, such intelligence is likely to have been shared with Israel.

      So with Israel aware that the West was engaged in such cynicism with al-Qaeda-type groups in Iraq and Syria, it’s no wonder Israel feels itself permitted to engage in an active alliance with al-Qaeda in Syria.

    • Article du Washingon Times (journal conservateur US) qui se
      concentre sur la libye et les mensonges d’Obama et Clinton lors de la mort de l’ambassadeur US à Benghazi mais qui évoque en passant le rapport sur la Syrie : http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/19/obama-hillary-clinton-benghazi-narrative-rebutted-/?page=all

      On another terrorism development that has wide implications today, one DIA report in August 2012 predicted the rise of the Islamic State, which was then emerging in Syria. It now controls wide sections of eastern Syria and northern and western Iraq, and is committing mass slaughter of Christians, Kurds and Muslims of rival sects or clans.
      Mr. Obama downplayed the Islamic State as the “JV” in January 2014 when the terrorist army made its first incursions into western Iraq.

    • Et sur le site Yahoo (rubrique Finance !?) : http://finance.yahoo.com/news/judicial-watch-defense-state-department-203636340.html

      Another DIA report, written in August 2012 (the same time period the U.S. was monitoring weapons flows from Libya to Syria), said that the opposition in Syria was driven by al Qaeda and other extremist Muslim groups: “the Salafist, the Muslim Brotherhood, and AQI are the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria.” The growing sectarian direction of the war was predicted to have dire consequences for Iraq, which included the “grave danger” of the rise of ISIS:

      The deterioration of the situation has dire consequences on the Iraqi situation and are as follows:

      This creates the ideal atmosphere for AQI [al Qaeda Iraq] to return to its old pockets in Mosul and Ramadi, and will provide a renewed momentum under the presumption of unifying the jihad among Sunni Iraq and Syria, and the rest of the Sunnis in the Arab world against what it considers one enemy, the dissenters. ISI could also declare an Islamic state through its union with other terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria, which will create grave danger in regards to unifying Iraq and the protection of its territory.

      Some of the “dire consequences” are blacked out but the DIA presciently warned one such consequence would be the “renewing facilitation of terrorist elements from all over the Arab world entering into Iraqi Arena.”

    • Au tour du Guardian : http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/03/us-isis-syria-iraq

      A revealing light on how we got here has now been shone by a recently declassified secret US intelligence report, written in August 2012, which uncannily predicts – and effectively welcomes – the prospect of a “Salafist principality” in eastern Syria and an al-Qaida-controlled Islamic state in Syria and Iraq. In stark contrast to western claims at the time, the Defense Intelligence Agency document identifies al-Qaida in Iraq (which became Isis) and fellow Salafists as the “major forces driving the insurgency in Syria” – and states that “western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey” were supporting the opposition’s efforts to take control of eastern Syria.

      L’introduction de l’article n’est pas moins savoureuse :

      On Monday the trial in London of a Swedish man, Bherlin Gildo, accused of terrorism in Syria, collapsed after it became clear British intelligence had been arming the same rebel groups the defendant was charged with supporting.

      The prosecution abandoned the case, apparently to avoid embarrassing the intelligence services. The defence argued that going ahead withthe trial would have been an “affront to justice” when there was plenty of evidence the British state was itself providing “extensive support” to the armed Syrian opposition.

    • Article d’Alaistair Crooke dans le Huffington Post :
      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/syria-iraq-fractured_b_7471540.html

      Coincidentally, a highly redacted U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessment from August 2012 has been released through a federal lawsuit. It states that “If the situation unravels [in Syria], there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka and Der Zor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime.” The assessment says that the creation of such a Salafist principality would have “dire consequences” for Iraq and would possibly lead to the creation of an Islamic State and would “create the ideal atmosphere for AQI to return to its old pockets in Mosul and Ramadi.”

      A few days after the release of the DIA assessment report, John Bolton lent weight to its claims: “I think the Sunni Arabs are never going to agree to be in a state [Iraq] where the Shia outnumber them 3-1. That’s what ISIS has been able to take advantage of. I think our objective should be a new Sunni state out of the western part of Iraq, the eastern part of Syria run by moderates or at least authoritarians who are not radical Islamists.”

  • Passionnant entretien avec Ziad Abu Rish sur l’histoire du Liban post-indépendance
    http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/agendaArticle.php?id=49
    Juste un extrait, mais son regard d’historien permet de relativiser bcp de discours sur la "nature" de l’Etat libanais, que nous ne cessons de juger d’après la situation post-guerre civile.

    What about sectarianism? How does sectarianism play a role in the early independence period?

    The early independence period has important insights regarding these dynamics. Particularly important, as mentioned above, is to recognize that the meaning of sectarianism in this period is really different than what we think of today. While there certainly was the memory of sectarian violence from the nineteenth century, very few people seem to have had in mind an idea of sectarianism parallel to what manifested during the 1975-1990 civil war or thereafter. This is important for several reasons. First of all, we should note that the principle of confessional representation was openly discussed by politicians, lawyers, and several other interest groups as a temporary (rather than permanent) measure. However one views the honesty of such claims, it is important to realize that, at least in so far as the level of formal speech is concerned, sectarian allotment was not necessarily viewed as the raison d’etre of the state. More so, there were frequent calls for ending sectarian practices, either at the level of the state bureaucracy or that of personal status courts. Newspaper coverage from the period highlights important strikes and protest campaigns seeking to directly challenge sect-based hiring practices and sectarian differences in the management of personal status issues such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and so forth.

    Also important is the fact that sectarian-based political parties were not necessarily as dominant during this time, to say nothing of being sectarian in the same way. For example, it was the Constitutional Bloc and the National Party that represented the dominant elite-based political groupings, into which we saw the entrance of several reformist coalitions and parties that periodically disrupted this binarization of politics. Even the Kataib Party, which was out of power prior to 1958, was both more populist in its demands and frequently sought temporary strategic alliances with Sunni-identified groups such as al-Najada and al-Nida’ al-Watani. This is of course to say nothing of the Communist Party or the Progressive Socialist Party, before the defection from the latter group to the ranks of the Ba‘th Party and others.

    My purpose in highlighting these dynamics is not to create a utopic vision of the past. Rather, it is to point to historical developments that do not fit the received wisdom about the early independence period and thus are not even subject to inquiry. The early independence period was very much one in which primary political mobilizations featured cross-sectarian coalitions that fundamentally challenge our assumptions of how Lebanese citizens identified themselves, their interests, and their allies and adversaries—irrespective of whether these experiments ultimately failed, were derailed, or carried through to their alleged logical conclusions. This is not to say that sectarianism was non-existent. It is simply to argue that its manifestations were different. In fact, I believe that one of the more lacking areas of inquiries in the history of Lebanon is the workings of sectarianism during the early independence period. Similar to the question relating to the nature and functioning of state institutions, much of what we allegedly know about this period vis-à-vis sectarianism is either assumed or projected backward from the post 1958 or 1975 periods

    Pour mémoire, il avait écrit un très intéressant papier sur l’histoire de l’électricité au Liban :
    Abu-Rish, Ziad. 2014. « On Power Cuts, Protests, and Institutions : A Brief History of Electricity in Beirut (Part One) ». Jadaliyya. avril 22. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/17416/on-power-cuts-protests-and-institutions_a-brief-hi
    #Liban #Etat #histoire #indépendance

  • ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Abnudi (1938-2015)
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21483`abd-al-rahman-al-abnudi-(1938-2015)

    With the death of ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Abnudi (1938-2015), Egypt and the Arab world lost the last of the pioneers of colloquial poetry who have significantly enriched poetry written in the spoken Egyptian dialect and expanded its horizons. Together with Fuad Haddad (1927-85) and Salah Jahin (1930-86), Al-Abnudi was instrumental in moving Egyptian colloquial poetry beyond the poetics of mass mobilization and explicit political expression to more complex and diverse realms. Over the last two decades, al-Abnudi had become a familiar household face, voice and name (also nick-named al-Khal, or the uncle) through his frequent recitations of new as well as old poems of his and numerous interviews on satellite television shows.

    […]

    Following the military ouster of President Morsi in July 2013, al-Abnudi, like the majority of Egypt’s liberal and leftist intellectuals, expressed enthusiastic support for the new regime, a position which was controversial and seen by some of his fans as inconsistent with the opposition to autocracy that reigned in his poetry.

  • Water Management in Jordan in Response to the Syrian Crisis: Between Neoliberal Pressures and Social Tensions
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21440/water-management-in-jordan-in-response-to-the-syri
    par Eliott Ducharme

    Since 1948, the Kingdom of Jordan has taken in a considerable number of refugee populations fleeing conflicts in Palestine, Iraq and now Syria. While this brings the country significant international aid, it also raises the question of the capacity of urban public services to handle this new demographic pressure. These public services, heavily subsidised for reasons of social stability, are in a state of chronic crisis, and are unable to meet user demand. This has led to sharp socio-spatial inequalities, growing popular discontent, worrying tensions between “native” Jordanians and Jordano-Palestinians, and growing stigmatisation of Syrian refugees. This article looks at the impacts of the “Syrian crisis” on water management in North Jordan, which is host to seventy percent of the refugees.

    An understanding of these issues requires an historical perspective on water distribution and the formation of state-controlled, centralized water distribution network. The chronic problems of the water system impact powerfully on the way the authorities handle the “Syrian crisis,” in particular in their relations with western funding agencies, which are heavily involved in the issue of water, providing both funds and technical assistance. In fact, the response to the refugees’ burning issue conjures several “rationalities of government:” a recurrent conflict between neoliberal ideas (privatization, cuts in government subsidies for basic goods, new public management) conveyed by the international aid agencies, and the more ambiguous position of the Jordanian government, increasingly constrained as it is, to meet the requirements of its funders, while trying to spare the population and manage their strong expectations of accessing services cheaply.

    #eau #Jordanie #réfugiés #Syrie #privatisation

  • http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21284/britains-interest-in-bahrain_legal-fictions-and-th

    In 1783, the Al Khalifa family—originally from the Najd region of what is now Saudi Arabia—captured the islands of Bahrain from Shaykh Nasr Al Madhkur, who had ruled them on behalf of the Qajar dynasty of Persia. In 1926, over one hundred and fifty years later, the status of Bahrain’s sovereignty remained a contentious issue. In December of that year, G. R. Warner, a British diplomat in London, wrote to a colleague in India stating that “on political grounds it is of great importance to avoid any action which would result in the re-awakening of the controversy as to the sovereignty of Bahrein.”

  • The Present and Future of Climate Change in Turkey and Beyond: An Interview with Umit Sahin
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21346/the-present-and-future-of-climate-change-in-turkey

    Turkey’s antidemocratic and neoliberal developmentalist policies are in stark contrast with what is needed to fight climate change. Şahin believes that the upcoming UN Climate Change Conference to be held in Paris will be an insufficient, yet crucial step for establishing a legally binding, international agreement to combat climate change. For Şahin, the power of social movements is key to pushing governments to take concrete action.

    @elvan

  • Compte-rendu Istanbul 2023 de Yoann Morvan et Sinan Logie
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21092/istanbul-2023

    Les éditions B2 ont récemment enrichi leur collection Territoires par un « arpentage dans le temps et l’espace » d’Istanbul. Mais pas dans n’importe quel Istanbul. Istanbul 2023, c’est avant toute chose le choix de raconter les métamorphoses de la mégapole turque à partir de l’analyse des recompositions socio-urbaines de ses périphéries. Grands projets d’infrastructures, villes nouvelles, nouveau centre financier sont quelques exemples parmi d’autres choisis par l’anthropologue Yoann Morvan (CNRS) et l’architecte Sinan Logie (Université Bilgi d’Istanbul) pour présenter les projets emblématiques de cette « métropole qui vient », toute dédiée à l’objectif 2023 du gouvernement souhaitant célébrer à grand faste le centenaire de la république turque. De la sorte, les auteurs entendent contrer la sur-médiatisation dont bénéficient les espaces référents situés autour de la péninsule historique et des rivages du Bosphore. Ce décentrement géographique constitue l’intérêt premier de cet ouvrage qui se concentre sur ce que les auteurs nomment les « franges », « marges » ou « interstices » toujours situés dans l’ombre des clichés marketing et touristiques. Renouveler la vision habituelle d’Istanbul à partir d’une analyse des transformations urbaines de ses périphéries correspondait finalement aux critères éditoriaux de B2 qui cherche à rendre accessible à un large public des textes courts, originaux et de qualité sur les thématiques de l’architecture et de l’urbain.

    #Istanbul #Périphéries #transformations_urbaines

  • The Curious Case of Rula Amin in Jordan: Undermining the Rule of Law?
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21099/the-curious-case-of-rula-amin-in-jordan_underminin

    On Monday 16 March 2015, Jordanian police arrested Rula Amin, a veteran international journalist, in Amman, Jordan. Rula had refused to give up physical custody of her five-year-old daughter, Dina, to her ex-husband. However, the exact legal pretext for Rula’s arrest is still unclear.

    The origins of the situation lay in a visitation agreement established between Rula and her ex-husband while meeting in Ramallah. The latter broke that agreement a little over a year ago when he effectively kidnapped Dina, their then-four-year-old daughter, by taking her to Amman after their meeting in Ramallah and preventing Rula from seeing or speaking to her daughter.

    […]

    This past Sunday, Rula was informed that she had seven days to surrender custody of her daughter to her ex-husband. However, on Monday (the following day), Jordanian authorities arrested Rula and are currently detaining her in a women’s prison. As of writing, no specific charges have been publicized, nor have the authorities provided any basis for their detention of Rula. Some Jordanian websites are however publishing unconfirmed reports that she was arrested on the charge of contempt of court.

    À l’instant: Freed! But for how long? Arrested fighting for her daughter: the story of Rula Amin - Martin Jay
    http://en.annahar.com/article/221933-freed-but-for-how-long-arrested-fighting-for-her-daughter-the-sto

    Reports from Amman at 6.0pm Beirut time are that Rula Amin has been temporarily reunited with her daughter after being allowed out from jail.

    But the custody battle for her daughter might be long and bitter.

  • R-Shief and Scholarship on Digital Activism
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21053/r-shief-and-scholarship-on-digital-activism-featur

    Today R-Shief (the site’s name is the Arabic pronunciation of “archive”) contains 18 billion tweets in English and Arabic and years’ worth of Facebook, YouTube, and website data. Every month, it processes about 100,000 million new tweets. Shereen Sakr compares English and Arabic hashtags, as well as different hashtags referring to the same events, looking for interesting patterns. Anyone can log onto the R-Shief site and do a number of searches and comparisons, using tools developed by Shereen Sakr and several collaborators.

    At the moment, Shereen Sakr doesn’t have the resources to make the full archive available to a large public. If she did, she says, she’d turn it into a tool that anyone could use to answer the many shifting questions regarding the relationship between social media and political mobilization in the Arab world.

    @gonzo

  • Destruction de la culture au Proche-Orient : de qui se moque t on ? Un bulldozer peut en cacher un autre
    Editorial Cartoons | THE DAILY STAR
    http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Cartoons.aspx?id=1635


    Le Daily Star peut bien moquer les « incultes » de Daesh : cette caricature pourrait facilement être détournée en écrivant Ministry of culture of the Republic of Lebanon, avec comme site archéologique : le centre ville, le site d’Echmoun à Saida, ou tant d’autres ailleurs au Liban...
    Mieux, voilà deux photos d’archive avec des bulldozers qui portent des autocollants OGER (1983 dans le centre-ville de Beyrouth).
    https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/17206670/Ph2OGERplDebbas.JPG
    https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/17206670/Ph1souknourieh.JPG
    #daesh #IS #EI #Hariri #solidere #Beyrouth #patrimoine

  • The Right to Food Safety : Rights-Based Dialogue as a Springboard towards State-Building
    http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20977/the-right-to-food-safety_rights-based-dialogue-as-

    Whether or not the Minister of Public Health perseveres in his efforts is not the point. Much more significant is whether social forces can take advantage of the momentum to strengthen the citizens’ movement in support of food safety and ensure its survival. Despite the momentum of public discourse, the lack of any social initiative in this regard so far only increases the urgency of the issue.

    The will and the intentions of those in power might be difficult to control, but what about ordinary citizens? How can they take advantage of rights-based momentum to develop their capabilities and their defiance, and thereby improve their chances of imposing their fundamental rights on those in power, whoever they may be?

    A mettre en relation avec http://seenthis.net/messages/318256 de @nidal avec qui il partage quelques conclusions.