• Après la bataille d’Alep, j’ai vu fleurir (à nouveau) de très belles analyses de classe sur la crise syrienne. Et vu les gens que je fréquente habituellement, ces analyses à l’apparence marxiste ont eu un certain succès. Angry Arab a constaté la même chose hier : The argument du jour for Syrian rebel supporters in the Arab media
    http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2016/12/the-argument-du-jour-for-syrian-rebel.html

    Writers in Saudi/Qatari media never run out of arguments against critics and foes of the Jihadi Syrian rebels. Every week, almost, there is a new argument. The most dominant argument has been that if you oppose Syrian Jihadi rebels then it means you are an Islamophobe. But that argument did not stick. So they have a new one: those right-wing anti-leftists hacks stumbled lo and behold on class analysis (in Saudi media, mind you): they now say that if you oppose the Syrian Jihadi rebels it means that you are against the poor. I kid you not. Yes, class analysis and love of the poor is a feature of the political behavior of oil and gas princes.

  • The Five Mistakes of Syrian opposition
    http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2016/12/the-five-mistakes-of-syrian-opposition.html

    According to Sami Kulayb of Al-Mayadin (and he supports the Syrian regime but has good sources on that side and also with Gulf regimes during his years at Aljazeera), there were five mistakes of the Syrian opposition which harmed its cause:

    1) the fragmentation of the opposition and its disunity and that each member of the leadership wanted to be the sole undisputed leader (I am paraphrasing and not translating).

    2) That it quickly departed from the resistance and anti-Israel camp to appease the West, and that its declared war on Hizbullah and Hamas made it easy for Hizbullah to intervene in Syria.

    3) that it relied on democratic Gulf regimes to help it in its declared agenda of democratizing Syria.

    4) that the liberals accepted to take a back seat to the Islamists in the leadership (of the exile opposition).

    5) that it believed that it can overthrow the regime by force for arms.

    I don’t necessarily agree with this analysis but it is an interesting take. I think that the biggest mistake was to turn the opposition movement into a shop for GCC regimes from the outset. All mistakes followed from that. Don’t forget the flood of money and corruption: Michel Kilu (the Syrian dissident) recently alluded to that in the leaked tape and talked about those who enriched themselves from Qatari money. I would also add: their blatant sectarian language and rhetoric which scared other Syrians and also rallied Shi‘ites in the region. I would also add: the way they governed areas under their control which led some people to choose the Syrian regime as the lesser of two evil. I would also add: the fact they never had a credible consistent message and would engage in double talk. I would also add that they never offered a concrete vision of the future of Syria.

    • @biggrizzly C’est parce que l’outil d’Angry Arab pour présenter ses extraits et citations est une catastrophe, qui ne facilite pas (comme le fait Seenthis) la différenciation entre l’extrait cité et le commentaire.

      C’est d’ailleurs pour cela que j’ai redécoupé en paragraphes son texte. Les points 1 à 5 sont repris de Sami Kleib (et, précise Angry Arab, ce ne sont pas des traductions littérales). Le dernier paragraphe, qui commence par « I don’t necessarily agree with this analysis », est le commentaire de A.A. qui, comme il vient de le dire, propose ses propres arguments.

      Sinon, pour le second degré, c’est possible, sinon il y a aussi les nombreuses fautes de frappe de Angry Arab. Sinon, on est d’accord, il est évident qu’il pense le contraire de cette phrase. :-))

    • T’inquiètes, j’avais bien fait la différence entre les points des uns et des autres et ta mise en forme est très explicite.

      Utiliser « democratic » et « gulf regime » dans la même phrase, ça confirme qu’on est un certain nombre à adopter le même cynisme, et à avoir envie de hurler quand nos journalistes utilisent « l’opposition démocratique » pour évoquer les rebelles financés par les monarchies du Golfe...

      Hier soir, sur France 2, les commentaires étaient bien moins vindicatifs d’ailleurs, quand il s’agissait d’évoquer les rebelles ; il y a une sorte de retournement de leur part, où ceux ci se sentent obligés d’admettre que ces rebelles ne sont pas totalement modérés ni totalement gentils. La propagande russe qui les atteint de plein fouet ? La force des faits ? Ou les sondages qui montrent que les candidats « pro-russes » en France ont de bonnes chances de gagner à la prochaine élection ?

    • D’après l’original : des états régionaux qui considèrent pas la democratie comme une priorité

      سامي كليب | خمسة أخطاء قتلت المعارضة السورية : : لبنان | جريدة السفير
      http://assafir.com/Article/1/520194

      الخطأ الثالث، اذاً، تمثّل في الاعتماد على دول اقليمية ليست الديموقراطية في سلّم أولوياتها،

  • Un long et très intéressant article sur le blog de Joshua Landis pour démonter la thèse «Assad a fabriqué ISIS»: Is Assad the Author of ISIS? Did Iran Blow Up Assef Shawkat? And Other Tall Tales
    http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/assad-author-isis-iran-blow-assef-sawkat-tall-tales-ehsani2

    As the events in Daraa unfolded, the President invited key figures from the town to see what can be done to calm the demonstrations. One such figure was cleric Sayasneh. One of the consistent demands of such meetings was the release of prisoners. It was no different when Douma joined the uprising. Foreign Embassies were also pushing the Syrian State to release what it called political prisoners. People like Zahran Alloush were sentenced to seven years in prison when he was arrested with a group of 40 people on the charge of promoting Wahhabi ideology and gun possession. They had not killed anyone or even fired a shot. Yet, they were sent to prisons like Sednaya and kept there beyond the end of their sentence on the whim of one of the security agencies. It was in this context when the residents of Douma demanded the release of prisoners from their districts. The Syrian leadership was under intense pressure to calm the crisis. The people of Douma promised to do their job at calming their own streets if some of those prisoners were released. Zahran and many others like him were released under this rationale. This is not too dissimilar to the way the American prisons in Iraq worked. Zarqawi, Baghdadi and Golani were all released from those prisons either when their terms ended or when the local populations demanded their release. Just like in Syrian prisons, the prisoners in American jails were also indoctrinated with jihadist ideology. Syria erred by releasing Alloush and Abboud who would go on to form Jeish al Islam and Ahrar just like the U.S. erred when it released Baghdadi who would go on to form ISIS.

    • Angry Arab revient lui aussi sur cette théorie, mais en réponse à un billet de Qifa Nabki : Elias Muhanna ("Qifanabki") on ISIS and the Syrian regime
      http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2016/12/elias-muhanna-qifanabki-on-isis-and.html

      So Elias commented on the lousy (really trashy, journalistically speaking) series about ISIS and the Syrian regime in Daily Beast.
      https://qifanabki.com/2016/12/07/assad-and-isis
      This is not about politics but about methodology, journalistic standards and about the dominant political paradigm about Syria and beyond. Basically, in this piece, Eias reveals himself as fully March 14, while he used to be more careful in his analysis before. This piece reads like the talking points of March 14 really. But away from generalizations let us talk specifics (my responses to his words are in red):

      1) His opening sentence set the stage: "Gutman’s articles have been championed by opposition supporters and critiqued by regime loyalists." So here he tells readers that anyone who is critical of the piece is a regime supporters. Look at this demagogic method. So end of story. Let us go home. If you dare disagree with the non-expert Gutman (who research basically constituted spending long hours in cafes in Istanbul). There is really no need to continue when he says that, but I will continue.

      2) He then informs the readers this: "The most astute observers of the conflict have long recognized the alignment of certain interests between the regime and the most radical elements in the Islamist opposition." Here, you are to believe that if you are astute you have to agree with the premise of Gutman and Western media and government, otherwise you are not astute. No evidence is necessary.

      3) Look at this line (and notice that Elias, like all other cheerleaders of the armed Jihadi groups in Syria) still insist that there was this really secular/feminist/democratic spectrum of secular armed groups, and then the regime came and produced those Islamists and then, voila, the secular armed groups suddenly disappeared in order for Bashshar to claim that his enemies are not the real Voltaire Battalions but the various Islamist Jihadi battalions: "The rise of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra has been disastrous for the secular political opposition".

      4) Elias then proceeds to yet again complains that the fact that Gutman piece is short on data and research (unless sitting in cafes in Istanbul counts as solid research) is bad not from a journalistic standpoint but because it helps the opponents of his beloved Syrian rebels (former Voltaire battalions who were transformed by trickery by the regime to Jihadi battalions): "That’s unfortunate, because they have given regime apologists more ammunition for the claim that the Syrian uprising is nothing but a foreign conspiracy fueled by fake news and Gulf-funded think tanks." But I am not sure what he means by the side reference to Gulf-funded think tanks? Does he mean that those are valuable academic assets who should not be criticized or does he mean that their punditry should be respected and not maligned and ridiculed. Not sure here but he seems defensive about them.

      5) Here he produces his theory (same as Gutman theory and same as the various theories about the Jihadi rebels from DAY ONE): "When the Assad regime released many of its Islamist prisoners from Sednaya Prison in 2011 — including individuals like Zahran Alloush, Yahia al-Hamawi, Hassan Abboud, and others who would go on to positions of leadership in Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and ISIS — it did so in full knowledge that the Islamists spelled trouble for the nascent uprising." So the evidence marshaled by Elias is that since the regime released them from jail, it means it controls them and even controls them when they bomb the regime sites and when they kill regime supporters, etc. But here is what curious: if this is the evidence in itself, how come Elias never wrote that US is responsible for the Jihadi in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as the US release scores of Jihadi fighters INCLUDING BAGHDADI HIMSELF? And does this argument not apply to Jordan, Saudi, Pakistani, Afghani, and Moroccan regime? The Jordanian regime is most culpable among them all as it started to manipulate Jihadis long before any of those regimes. So if the evidence is the release from jail, then it can’t be true in the case of Syrian regime and not true in the case of all those other regimes including the US government and its occupation authorities in the region.

      6) Then Elias produces another conspiracy theory more fascinating than the first one: "The intelligence services guessed correctly that the peaceful secular demonstrations would be overrun by violent former inmates". Here, what does overrun mean? I mean, if the rebels were mostly secular, why would the release of Jihadi “overrun” them? What would that happen if the majority are active in the Voltaire Battalions? Why did not the more popular (according to Elias and all other mainstream journalists) secular forces overrun the others?

      7) Then Elias proceeds to make a Lebanon analogy: "That group was widely seen as a tool of Syrian intelligence". Widely seen? It was only “widely seen” by the Hariri family and the rest of the Saudi-run March 14 Movement. There was never any evidence presented about that. The only evidence is that its leader once spent time in Syrian regime jail, just as Baghdadi once spent time in US military jails in Iraq. And many of those Jihadi groups are openly and blatantly opposed to the Syrian regime on sectarian grounds and in fact the regime fought against them in Lebanon during the Syrian political domination of Lebanon. But it gets worse:

      8) Elias then says: "Longtime Syria-watchers will recall that Hizbullah was adamantly opposed to the Lebanese Army’s assault on the camp". I consider myself “a long time Syria-watcher” — and an occasional bird-watcher — and I dont recall that. This is absolutely and totally untrue, and even Elias friends in March 14 would not mischaracterize the stance of Hizbullah as such. Hizbullah was NOT opposed to the assault on the camp: Nasrallah specifically said that entry into the camp “is the red line”. He meant that the civilian population of the camp should be spared and that the assault on Fath Al-Islam should have sparred the lives of civilians But unfortunatley, once the Lebanese Amy began the assault on the camp, Hizbullah never complained AS IT SHOULD HAVE. More than 45 Palestinian civilians were massacred by the Lebanese Army assault. I was and still am of the position that the Lebanese Army should not have assaulted the camp (I call on Elias to visit what is left of the camp to see for himself) in order to get rid of a small armed gang, especially that negotiations were going on. In fact, the lousy Syrian regime Army supported and helped and the lousy Lebanese regime Army in the assault of the camp. And unfortunately Hizbullhah provided intelligence and military support for the Army during the assault. So if my position against Army assault make me an accomplice with Fath Al-Islam, be my guest. But it was really incredible how Elias—desperate to find evidence of any kind—decided to distort the position of Hizbullah.

      9) Finally, Elias concludes with his last evidence, that the Syrian regime had “infiltrated” those groups: "given the regime’s successful infiltration of these groups". Wait. Infiltration of groups means control and creation of those groups? Do you remember after Sep. 11 when George Tenet testified before US Congress that CIA had infiltrated Al-Qa`idah? Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi, and other Arab and Western and Israeli intelligence services had all infiltrated those groups, but why do you go from here to decide that only the Syrian regime is guilty of infiltration? Are you that desperate to validate a lousy piece of journalism by Roy Gutman? Finally, here is what I find interesting: Gutman built up his case on coffee shop chatter by Syrians in Istanbul, but usually Westerners mock unsubstanitated conspiracy theories by Middle Easterners. Yet, only in the case of Syria are those conspiracy theories believed and peddled and only because they serve the propaganda interests of of Western governments.

      PS Do you notice that when people cite the lousy piece by Roy Gutman they always say: the award-winning Roy Gutman. I remember when people cited Judith Miller about WMDs of Iraq before 2003, they also always said: award-winning journalist, Judith Miller.

      PPS Elias Responds here.
      https://qifanabki.com/2016/12/07/assad-and-isis/comment-page-1/#comment-127286

    • Sinon, c’est la même #théorie_du_complot, explicitée cette fois par Michel Touma de l’Orient-Le Jour, reprise de manière extrêmement fainéante par Courrier international :
      http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/lettre-ouverte-du-liban-pourquoi-francois-fillon-tout-faux-su

      (alors qu’il y aurait beaucoup à dire sur le fait de baser une politique étrangère française sur la prétendue et forcément catastrophique « protection des Chrétiens d’Orient »)