/what-we-do

EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

#technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

State-of-play report

At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

The new standing corps

Recruitment

A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

Training

The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

Use of force

The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

“On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

Privileges and immunities

The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

“Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

Law enforcement

To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

Fundamental rights and data protection

The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

Returns

The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

“The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

EUROSUR

The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

Summary

Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

Jane Kilpatrick

Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

“the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
“The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
“if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

Endnotes

[1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

[2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[3] Section 1.1, state of play report

[4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

[5] Section 7.1, state of play report

[6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, ▻https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

[7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

[9] Chapter III, state of play report

[10] Section 2.5, state of play report

[11] Protocol (No 7), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

[12] Chapter III, state of play report

[13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

[14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, ▻https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

[15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

[16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

[18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[19] Section 8, state of play report

[20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

[21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, ▻https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

[22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

[23] Section 9, state of play report

[24] ERRIN, ▻https://returnnetwork.eu

[25] Section 3.2, state of play report

[26] Chapter III, state of play report

[27] Section 3.2, state of play report

[28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[29] State of play report, p. 19

[30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, ►http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

[31] Section 4, state of play report

[32] Section 7.2, state of play report
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Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

#EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

What is the standing corps?

The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
Long-term staff seconded from member states;
Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

The size of the standing corps

The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

–-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

What are the profiles?

The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

border checks and surveillance;
interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
verifying travel documents;
escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
operating data systems and platforms; and
offering cultural mediation

*Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

Recruitment for the profiles

Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

“Never touch yourself with gloves”

Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

Fit for service?

The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

Jane Kilpatrick

Endnotes

[1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

[5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

[8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

[9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

[11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

[12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

[13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

[14] Ibid.

[15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

[16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

[19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, ▻https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
#gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

Frontex seeks company for drone flights

The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

Aircraft from arms companies

Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

New interested parties for drone flights

At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

Information to non-EU countries

The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

Matthias Monroy

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

Endnotes

[1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, ►https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

[2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

[3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, ▻https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

[4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, ▻https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

[5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, ▻http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

[6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

[7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, ▻http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

[8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

[9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, ▻https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

[10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, ▻https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

[11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, ▻https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

[12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, ▻https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

[13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, ▻https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

[14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, ▻https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

[15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, ▻http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

[16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

[17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

[18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

[19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, ▻https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

[20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

[21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

[22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

#drones

Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

From external to internal surveillance

Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

Legal provisions

A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

“EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

“…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

“The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

“The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

Sources of data

The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

national border surveillance systems;
stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
local, regional and other coordination centres;
other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
border checks;
Frontex;
other member states’ national coordination centres;
third countries’ authorities;
ship reporting systems;
other relevant European and international organisations; and
other sources.[10]

For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

national coordination centres;
national situational pictures;
immigration liaison officers;
Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
third countries’ authorities.[11]

The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

“The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

Operational activities at the internal borders

Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

“When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

“there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

Chris Jones

Endnotes

[1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

[3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, ▻http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

[4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

[5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

[6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, ▻https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

[7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

[8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

[9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

[10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

[11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

[12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

[13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

[14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: ▻https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

[16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, ▻https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

[17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, ▻https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

[18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

[19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

#mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

voir aussi cette enquête de #ZDF : The #Frontex_files :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900554

Je sais pas si ça peut aider (les chiffres semblent bizarre par rapport aux tiens), Frontex, dans son rapport d’activité 2019 affirme avoir secouru 54800 personnes. Le pictogramme est une bouée, mais il n’est pas vraiment précisé « en mer ». Moi je m’interroge sur le cas Libyien : si le centre de coordination des secours en mer dit à Frontex de débarquer les migrants à Tripoli, difficile d’appeler cela un secours.
Régis

Et un commentaire au message, toujours reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop :
En complément, un PDF très complet est disponible ici :
« Analyse juridique Le Régime d’Asile
Européen Commun - introduction à l’attention des juridictions »
▻https://www.easo.europa.eu/file/25988/ent.jsf

New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

Quotes

Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

“The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

“The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

Quotes

Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

“The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

“The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

En 2016, on expliquait ainsi la « facilité »...
GESTION DE LA CRISE DES RÉFUGIÉS. LA FACILITÉ EN FAVEUR DES RÉFUGIÉS EN TURQUIE

En raison de sa situation géographique, la Turquie est un pays de premier accueil et de transit pour de nombreux réfugiés
et migrants. Confrontée à un afflux sans précédent de personnes en quête de refuge, elle accueille actuellement plus
de 2,7 millions de réfugiés syriens enregistrés et déploie des efforts méritoires pour leur apporter une aide humanitaire
et un soutien – la Turquie a déjà consacré plus de 7 milliards d’euros à cette crise. L’UE est déterminée à ne pas laisser
la Turquie seule face à cette situation. La Commission européenne fournit une aide humanitaire destinée aux réfugiés
vulnérables qui ont fui la violence dans leur pays, et en particulier à ceux qui vivent hors des camps et ont besoin d’une
aide immédiate, ainsi qu’à ceux qui ont besoin d’une aide médicale et d’un accès à l’éducation.

https://i.imgur.com/vmhZVnU.png

v. aussi ici :
Erdogan accuse les Européens de ne pas tenir leurs promesses
►https://seenthis.net/messages/512196

1.5 million refugees in Turkey supported by EU’s biggest ever humanitarian programme

The #Emergency_Social_Safety_Net, the largest ever EU humanitarian programme, has now assisted 1.5 million of the most vulnerable refugees in Turkey.

The EU funded programme, launched in September 2016, is the largest single humanitarian project in the history of the European Union.

Christos Stylianides, Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, visiting Turkey on the occasion said: “1.5 million refugees in Turkey are now able to meet their basic needs and live in dignity. The European Union, in cooperation with Turkey, is bringing a real change in the lives of the most vulnerable refugees. I am very proud of what we have achieved together. Jointly with Turkey we will continue this support, focusing on making our assistance sustainable.”

EU humanitarian assistance in Turkey continues to deliver tangible results for the most vulnerable refugees in Turkey. The Emergency Social Safety Net provides monthly cash transfers via a debit card to help refugees buy what they need the most, such as food, medicines, or paying the rent. Another flagship programme, the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education, has surpassed its initial goals and now supports the families of more than 410,000 children who attend school regularly.

The EU programmes will continue in 2019, with a focus on further supporting the most vulnerable and ensuring a sustainable transition from humanitarian aid to a long-term response. The EU humanitarian funding foreseen for 2019 is €640 million, out of which €80 million will be dedicated to support education in emergencies. This funding is part of the second tranche of €3 billion of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey for both humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance.

Background

The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey was set up in 2015 in response to the European Council’s call for significant additional funding to support refugees in Turkey. The EU Facility has a total budget of €6 billion for humanitarian and non-humanitarian projects, of which €3 billion for 2016-2017 and €3 billion for 2018-2019.

The Emergency Social Safety Net programme is implemented by the World Food Programme and the Turkish Red Crescent in close collaboration with the Turkish authorities. With financing from the EU of almost €1 billion to date, the refugees receive around €20 per person per month, plus quarterly top-ups to meet their basic needs.

Another flagship initiative, the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) project, helps refugee children register for and attend school. The programme builds on the Emergency Social Safety Net. It provides cash assistance to vulnerable refugee families with children who attend school regularly.

In addition to humanitarian assistance, the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey focuses on education, migration management, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support.

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1_en.htm
#programme_humanitaire

SECURITY UNION. Closing the information gap

The current EU information systems for security, border and migration management do not work together – they are fragmented, complex and difficult to operate. This risks pieces of information slipping through the net and terrorists and criminals escaping detection by using multiple or fraudulent identities, endangering the EU’s internal security and the safety of European citizens. Over the past year, the EU has been working to make the various information systems at EU level interoperable — that is, able to exchange data and share information so that authorities and responsible officials have the information they need, when and where they need it. Today, the Commission is completing this work by proposing new tools to make EU information systems stronger and smarter, and to ensure that they work better together. The tools will make it easier for border guards and police officers to have complete, reliable and accurate information needed for their duties, and to detect people who are possibly hiding criminal or terrorist activities behind false identities.

▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20171212_security_union_closing_the_information_gap_en.pdf
#interopérabilité #biométrie #ETIAS #Entry/Exit_System #EES #ECRIS-TCN_system

Depuis février 2018, on est passé à Thémis, opération de secours !…

Migrants en Méditerranée. Frontex lance l’opération de secours Themis
▻https://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/migrants/migrants-en-mediterranee-frontex-lance-l-operation-de-secours-themis-55

https://www.ouest-france.fr/sites/default/files/styles/image-900x500/public/2018/02/02/migrants-en-mediterranee-frontex-lance-l-operation-de-secours-themis.jpg

En naviguant un peu, quelques ressources (que tu connais sans doute, voire certainement pour Eurosur)

(mon) point d’entrée

Triton, Poséidon, Hermes : les opérations de Frontex en carte
(avril 2015)
►https://www.latribune.fr/economie/union-europeenne/triton-poseidon-hermes-les-operations-de-frontex-en-carte-471625.html

avec ces cartes

https://static.latribune.fr/article_body/471624/frontex.jpg

https://static.latribune.fr/article_body/471627/eurosur.jpg

la deuxième (lien cassé sur le site de La Tribune) me conduit au centre de ressources de la Commission européenne
▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/multimedia_en

dont
▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/infographics/eurosur/eurosur_en.pdf
(d’où provient semble-t-il la carte précédente)

ou encore
▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/infographics/infographic_shengen_print_en.pdf

(données un peu anciennes, mais cartes intéressantes)

Pour le choix des noms, pas de réponse, si ce n’est que « nos » décideurs sont cultivés. Et que malgré l’emplacement du siège de l’agence en zone barbare, il faut réaffirmer constamment la tradition de haute culture des sources de l’Europe (quasi exclusivement grecques apparemment).

La succession des opérations Frontex, oui, je connais, et on les trouvent aussi sur seenthis, notamment ici :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/419413

Mais c’est cette tricky question des choix des noms qui reste non-résolue
 :-)

Migration : Commission steps up emergency assistance to Spain and Greece

The European Commission has awarded an additional €45.6 million in emergency assistance to support Spain and Greece respond to the migratory challenges they face.

In view of increased arrivals, Spain will receive €25.6 million to improve the reception capacity for arrivals at its southern coast and in Ceuta and Melilla as well as to help increase returns. Another €20 million has been awarded to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to improve reception conditions in Greece, notably on the island of Lesvos.

Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship said: “The Commission continues to deliver on its commitment to support Member States under pressure. Spain has seen arrival figures increase during the past year and we need to step up our support to help manage the numbers and return those who have no right to stay. And while the EU-Turkey Statement has greatly contributed to lowering the number of arrivals in Greece, the country is still facing significant migratory pressure, in particular on the islands. Over €1 billion has now been awarded in emergency assistance to help Member States manage migration.”

With the new funding decisions an important milestone has been reached: In total, the Commission has now mobilised over €1 billion in emergency assistance to help manage migration under the current financial framework (2014-2020) – support that has gone to the Member States most affected such as Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Sweden and now also Spain.

Spain

€24.8 million has been awarded to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security and the Spanish Red Cross for a project aimed at providing healthcare, food, and shelter to migrants arriving on the southern coast of Spain and in Ceuta and Melilla.
A further €720,000 has been awarded to the Ministry of Interior to help improve the quality of return facilities and infrastructure for return transfers.

The emergency funding awarded to Spain comes on top of €692 million allocated to Spain for migration, border and security management under national programmes for the period 2014-2020.

Greece

The additional €20 million awarded to the UNHCR will be used to help manage the reception facilities in the island of Lesvos, support local community projects and provide further emergency accommodation on the islands.
It will also go towards stepping up measures for the protection of children, non-formal education and to prevent sexual and gender-based violence.

This funding decision comes on top of more than €1.6 billion of funding support awarded by the Commission since 2015 to address migration challenges in Greece.

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4342_en.htm
#Espagne

Migration: Commission increases emergency assistance for Spain to €30 million [Updated on 3/8/2018 at 13:01]

Yesterday, the Commission awarded an additional €3 million in emergency assistance under the #Internal_Security_Fund (#ISF) to support Spain in responding to the recent migratory pressure. The assistance will mainly support the costs linked to the deployment of extra staff from the Guardia Civil to the southern borders of Spain. This support brings to €30 million the emergency funding awarded to Spain since July to help the country address migratory challenges. This financial assistance comes on top of €691.7 million allocated to Spain under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) national programme 2014-2020. (For more information: Natasha Bertaud – Tel.: +32 229 67456; Katarzyna Kolanko – Tel.: +32 299 63444)

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-18-4834_en.htm

Avramopoulos in Spain to announce further EU support to tackle migration

As Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos headed to Madrid, the European Commission announced Friday (3 August) a further €3 million in emergency aid to support Spanish border guards in curbing irregular migration.

The new cash comes from the Internal Security Fund and aims to help cover the costs linked to the deployment of extra staff in the southern borders of Spain.

In July this year, the EU executive awarded €24.8 million to the Ministry of Employment and Social Security and the Spanish Red Cross to enhance reception capabilities, health assistance, food and shelter for migrants arriving through the Western Mediterranean route.

A further €720,000 went to the Ministry of Interior to help improve the quality of return and transfer facilities in the south of Spain, Ceuta and Melilla.

This financial assistance comes on top of €691.7 million allocated to Spain under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Security Fund since 2014.

▻https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/avramopoulos-in-spain-to-announce-further-eu-support-to-tackle-migration/?_ga=2.232982942.1049233813.1533558974-1514184901.1489527159

Migration : Commission provides €24.1 million to the International Organisation for Migration to provide support, help and education for migrant children in Greece

The European Commission has awarded €24.1 million in emergency assistance under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) to support Greece in responding to migratory challenges. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) will receive the funding to help ensure that migrant children can be immediately placed in a protective environment and receive education. It will notably support child-adequate accommodation, medical and psychological support, interpretation and cultural mediation as well as food provision for up to 1,200 unaccompanied minors in the Greek islands and in the mainland and facilitate formal education by providing transport and school kits. In addition, the funding will help assist migrants registered for assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes. Today’s funding decision comes on top of more than €1.6 billion of funding support awarded by the Commission since 2015 to address migration challenges in Greece. Under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF), Greece has now been awarded €482.2 million in emergency funding, in addition to €561 million already awarded under these funds for the Greek national programme 2014-2020.

v. aussi :

https://i.imgur.com/3Mcr6mA.png https://i.imgur.com/mIvWV5T.png https://i.imgur.com/PrGqr8n.png

EC provides 43.7 million euros to increase migrant reception capacity in mainland Greece

The European Commission has awarded an additional 43.7 million euros in emergency assistance to the International Organization for Migration (#IOM) to support Greece in responding to migratory challenges, the EU’s executive body said Wednesday.

The grant, which comes from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, is designed to support the provision of emergency shelter for up to 6,000 asylum seekers and refugees by rapidly establishing places in temporary accommodation facilities, the Commission said.

“The funding aims to provide dignified accommodation as well as basic assistance and protection services to the most vulnerable migrants in Greece, especially in view of the upcoming winter months and the need to decongest reception facilities on the Greek islands,” it said.

The Commission has awarded more than 1.6 billion euros in funding since 2015 to address migratory challenges in Greece.

▻http://www.ekathimerini.com/234665/article/ekathimerini/news/ec-provides-437-million-euros-to-increase-migrant-reception-capacity-i
#OIM

Migration et #frontières : la Commission octroie 305 millions d’euros supplémentaires aux États membres sous pression

Cette semaine, la Commission européenne a débloqué une enveloppe supplémentaire de 305 millions d’euros d’aide d’urgence afin de soutenir la #Grèce, l’#Italie, #Chypre et la #Croatie dans le domaine de la gestion des migrations et des frontières.

Ces moyens financiers soutiendront les efforts déployés pour accroître les capacités d’#accueil, protéger les victimes de la traite des êtres humains et renforcer les capacités de surveillance et de #gestion_des_frontières.

M. Dimitris Avramopoulos, commissaire pour la migration, les affaires intérieures et la citoyenneté, a déclaré à cette occasion : « La Commission est résolue à continuer de soutenir les États membres soumis à une #pression_migratoire. Les 305 millions d’euros supplémentaires attribués cette semaine à plusieurs pays permettront de répondre à des besoins urgents, en faisant en sorte que les nouveaux migrants arrivés dans ces pays soient hébergés convenablement et reçoivent de la #nourriture et de l’#eau, que la #sûreté et la #sécurité des personnes les plus vulnérables soient garanties et que les #contrôles_aux_frontières soient renforcés, si nécessaire. »

Ce #financement_d'urgence, qui sera accordé au titre du Fonds « Asile, migration et intégration » (#AMIF) et du #Fonds_pour_la_sécurité_intérieure (#FSI) de la Commission, constitue une partie des 10,8 milliards d’euros déjà mobilisés par la Commission en faveur de la gestion des migrations et des frontières et de la sécurité intérieure pour la période 2014-2020.

Grèce

La Commission débloque 289 millions d’euros pour soutenir la gestion des migrations en Grèce. Cette enveloppe sera répartie comme suit :

Hébergements locatifs et allocations : 190 millions d’euros seront versés au Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (#HCR) pour permettre la poursuite du programme #ESTIA (#aide_d'urgence_à_l'intégration_et_à_l'hébergement). Ce programme fournit des #logements en location permettant d’accueillir jusqu’à 25 000 demandeurs d’asile et réfugiés et distribue des #allocations mensuelles en espèces pour un maximum de 70 000 personnes. Le HCR recevra également un autre montant de 5 millions d’euros afin d’augmenter encore la capacité d’#accueil dans les nouveaux #centres_d'accueil ouverts en Grèce continentale, en mettant à disposition et en distribuant 400 conteneurs préfabriqués.
Conditions d’accueil : 61 millions d’euros iront à l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (#OIM) et au Fonds international de secours à l’enfance des Nations unies (#UNICEF), pour permettre la poursuite des programmes d’appui sur le terrain dans les centres d’accueil en Grèce continentale. Ces programmes englobent l’#accès_aux_soins de santé et à l’#éducation non formelle, la création de zones de sécurité spécifiques pour les #mineurs_non_accompagnés, ainsi que des formations destinées au personnel opérationnel.
Recherche et sauvetage : 33 millions d’euros destinés aux garde-côtes grecs permettront de couvrir une partie des frais de fonctionnement afférents aux activités de connaissance de la situation maritime en mer Égée et contribueront à assurer des débarquements sûrs et une prise en charge efficiente des migrants à la suite d’opérations de recherche et sauvetage.
Adaptation aux conditions hivernales : l’OIM recevra, pour soutenir ses préparatifs, 357 000 euros supplémentaires afin de fournir des couvertures, des vestes d’hiver et des kits d’hivernage dans les infrastructures d’accueil sur les îles grecques et dans la région de l’Évros.

La Commission a mis plus de 2 milliards d’euros à la disposition de la Grèce pour la gestion des migrations, dont près de 1,5 milliard d’euros à titre d’aide financière d’urgence (voir la fiche d’information pour en savoir plus).

Italie

La Commission octroie 5,3 millions d’euros d’aide financière d’urgence aux autorités italiennes pour contribuer à protéger les victimes de la traite des êtres humains dans le contexte migratoire. Dans le cadre d’un projet pilote mené dans des centres d’hébergement de demandeurs d’asile dans la région du Piémont, le financement servira à identifier les victimes de la traite des êtres humains et à les encourager à recourir aux possibilités d’assistance à leur disposition.

Depuis le début de la crise migratoire, la Commission a mis à disposition près de 950 millions d’euros pour soutenir la gestion des migrations et des frontières en Italie. Ce financement comprend un montant de plus de 225 millions d’euros d’aide d’urgence et 724 millions d’euros déjà alloués à l’Italie au titre de ses programmes nationaux relevant du Fonds « Asile, migration et intégration » et du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure 2014-2020 (voir la fiche d’information pour en savoir plus).

Chypre

La Commission accorde 3,1 millions d’euros à Chypre pour que ce pays renforce sa capacité d’accueil et transforme le centre d’urgence temporaire « #Pournaras » en un centre de premier accueil à part entière. Grâce à ce financement, le centre deviendra un centre de formalités universel pouvant fonctionner 24 heures sur 24 et 7 jours sur 7. Les services assurés sur place comprendront l’examen médical, l’#enregistrement, le relevé des #empreintes_digitales, le #filtrage, la fourniture d’informations et la possibilité de présenter une demande d’asile.

L’aide d’urgence s’inscrit dans le cadre des efforts déployés par la Commission pour renforcer l’appui à la gestion des migrations en faveur de Chypre, après l’augmentation considérable du nombre d’arrivées que ce pays a connue au cours de l’année 2018. Ce nouveau financement vient s’ajouter à près de 40 millions d’euros alloués à la gestion des migrations pour la période 2014-2020, et à près de 1 million d’euros d’aide d’urgence alloué en 2014 pour les questions migratoires. Le Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile déploie actuellement 29 agents chargés de dossiers afin d’aider Chypre à résorber l’arriéré de demandes d’asile consécutif à l’augmentation des arrivées au cours des dernières années.

Croatie

La Commission accorde 6,8 millions d’euros à la Croatie pour aider ce pays à renforcer la gestion des frontières extérieures de l’UE, dans le strict respect des règles de l’UE. Cette enveloppe permettra de renforcer la surveillance des frontières et les capacités des services répressifs, en couvrant les coûts opérationnels (indemnités journalières, compensation des heures supplémentaires et équipements) de dix postes de police des frontières. Un mécanisme de suivi sera mis en place afin de faire en sorte que toutes les mesures appliquées aux frontières extérieures de l’UE soient proportionnées et respectent pleinement les droits fondamentaux et la législation de l’Union en matière d’asile.

Le montant octroyé aujourd’hui porte l’aide d’urgence totale en faveur de la gestion des migrations et des frontières allouée à la Croatie par la Commission à près de 23,2 millions d’euros. Cette somme s’ajoute à près de 108 millions d’euros alloués à la Croatie au titre des programmes nationaux relevant du Fonds « Asile, migration et intégration » et du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure 2014-2020.

Contexte

Le soutien opérationnel et financier de l’Union joue un rôle déterminant pour aider les États membres à relever les défis migratoires depuis 2015.

Le soutien de l’UE a également pris la forme d’une aide financière sans précédent accordée au titre du budget de l’UE à des partenaires – non seulement des autorités nationales, mais aussi des organisations internationales et des organisations non gouvernementales. En plus des dotations initiales pour la période 2014-2020 s’élevant à 6,9 milliards d’euros pour le Fonds « Asile, migration et intégration » (AMIF) et le Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure (#FSI_frontières_et_police), un montant supplémentaire de 3,9 milliards d’euros a été mobilisé en faveur de la gestion des migrations et des frontières et de la sécurité intérieure, pour atteindre 10,8 milliards d’euros.

En outre, tirant les leçons de l’expérience, et compte tenu du fait que la gestion des migrations et des frontières demeurera un défi à l’avenir, la Commission a également proposé d’augmenter fortement les financements en la matière au titre du prochain budget de l’UE pour la période 2021-2027.

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6884_fr.htm
#traite_d'êtres_humains #surveillance_des_frontières #santé #MNA #IOM #Evros #Fonds_Asile_migration_et_intégration #tri #catégorisation

Juncker : « les États membres contribuent trop peu au fonds pour l’Afrique »

Après un premier tour de négociations lors du premier jour du Conseil, le président de la Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, a prévenu devant la presse que l’action extérieure de l’UE atteignait ses limites à cause d’un manque de financement.

▻https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/juncker-member-states-committed-too-little-for-africa-fund
#fonds_pour_l'afrique

“EU-Africa migration funds were used on Libya’s coast guard patrol vessels »

Genoa - EU international cooperation funding destined for development projects in Africa was used to refurbish patrol boats for Libya’s coast guard, and handed over to Libyan militia units who practice torture and extrajudicial killings, in violation of Libyan and international standards.

▻http://www.themeditelegraph.com/en/markets/finance-and-politics/2017/11/16/africa-migration-funds-were-used-libya-coast-guard-patrol-vessels-ZxeIfzI2rMZYW6ixGchHKP/index.html

#Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement

–-> je ne sais pas si le fonds dans lequel il est question ici c’est aussi celui qui est mentionné dans le premier article de la liste... @isskein : tu en sais plus ?

Europe’s Plan to Close Its Sea Borders Relies on Libya’s Coast Guard Doing Its Dirty Work, Abusing Migrants

When a Libyan coast guard officer raised his hands and pointed, as if holding a rifle, Thomas Schaible wasn’t too worried. It wasn’t his first violent encounter with the Libyan coast guard, but this time, with a helicopter from the Italian navy overhead and Italian and French warships nearby, Schaible knew it was an empty threat.

►https://theintercept.com/2017/11/25/libya-coast-guard-europe-refugees

Libya human bondage risks overshadowing Africa-EU summit

#Mogherini was questioned about the EU’s strategy of outsourcing the migration crisis to foreign countries such as Libya and Turkey, which received billions to prevent Syrian refugees from crossing to Greece.

She said the situation was different on two counts: first, the migrants stranded in Libya were not legitimate asylum seekers like those fleeing the war in Syria. And second, different international bodies were in charge.

“When it comes to Turkey, it is mainly refugees from Syria; when it comes to Libya, it is mainly migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and the relevant international laws apply in different manners and the relevant UN agencies are different – the UNHCR on one side, especially in Turkey, and the IOM especially in Libya.”

►https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/libya-human-bondage-risks-overshadowing-africa-eu-summit
#IOM #OIM #HCR #Libye #Turquie #migrants_économiques #réfugiés #tri #catégorisation

En lien avec cela, lire:
▻http://seen.li/dn2v
#mixed_migrations

Commission européenne - Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique - Nouveaux programmes

Trois nouveaux programmes d’un montant de 29,6 millions d’euros ont été adoptés dans le cadre du Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique. Ces programmes complètent l’action de l’UE visant à relever les défis de la migration en Méditerranée. Ces nouveaux programmes intensifieront le travail en cours de l’UE pour renforcer la protection des migrants, soutenir leur réintégration durable et permettre une augmentation du nombre de retours volontairement assistés depuis la Libye. Ils contribueront également à la lutte contre les réseaux criminels dans la région.

Three new programmes worth €29.6 million have been adopted in the framework of the EU Trust Fund for Africa as part of EU work in addressing migration challenges in the Mediterranean. A set of priorities for 2018 have also been agreed.

These new programmes will step up the EU’s ongoing work to strengthening protection of migrants, support sustainable reintegration and provide assisted voluntary returns. The programmes will also contribute to fight criminal networks across the region.

High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini said: “Last week we established a joint EU/AU/UN Task Force to accelerate our work to protect migrants and refugees and fight the criminal networks. With these new programmes, we will step up our commitments, save lives, guarantee the respect of human rights and of international standards, provide alternatives to those wishing to return to their homes and support to host communities. We already assisted over 14,000 people stranded in Libya to return and will support an additional 15,000 returns by February 2018. And we will support our partners to counter traffickers and smugglers, assisting them in bringing peace and security to the region.”

Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn said: “The current challenges in the Mediterranean Sea remain a top priority for the European Union. The EU Trust Fund for Africa continues to take action to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and to defend the rights of people who risk falling into the hands of traffickers and smugglers. With our new programmes, we will help dismantle criminal networks in North of Africa, support migrants who wish to return to their home countries and facilitate access for migrants to legal advice. We will also promote socio-economic integration in Morocco and will foster socio-economic development of the Libyan Municipalities”.

Regional programme - Facility for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in North Africa, €10 million

This programme will be implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and will further contribute to the ongoing efforts under the assistance voluntary return scheme. It will strengthen protection of migrants, support sustainable reintegration systems in North Africa and provide assisted voluntary return to migrants wishing to return to their home from Northern Africa. This Facility is conceived as a regional flexible mechanism able to adapt to the specific needs of the countries. This is yet another action towards enhancing support to stranded migrants as well as reinforcing national return and reintegration systems across the North of Africa region.

Regional programme - Dismantling the criminal networks operating in North Africa and involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, €15 million

This project will focus on regional dimension of fight against smugglers and traffickers. It will target the public sector of the countries in the region (in particular the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, and Health). Under this programme, implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), capacity-building as well as light equipment, such as IT and forensic tools, will be provided to actors dealing with law enforcement and criminal justice. The final beneficiaries will be the general public, victims of trafficking, smuggled migrants, and families of the latter two categories.

Morocco - Legal Empowerment for migrants, €4.58 million

This programme implemented by the Belgian Technical Cooperation will reinforce the protection and resilience of migrants and refugees, displaced persons and host communities in Morocco. Whilst strengthening awareness on their rights and access to legal counselling, the project will also contribute to promote the socio-economic integration of migrants and facilitate migrants’ integration in the Moroccan society. This is a new very specific action complementing the EU support to the implementation of the Moroccan National Strategy on Migration (SNIA). The programme will support actors who help migrants and refugees access to their rights, such as lawyers, students, civil society associations and justice staff. It will develop and create legal clinics in Rabat, Casablanca, Tanger and Oujda.

Objectives for 2018

The Commission also outlined the priorities of the EUTF/North of Africa window for 2018. The situation in Libya will remain a top priority, with on the one hand increased efforts for the protection of migrants and refugees, including through the support for additional assisted voluntary returns and support for evacuation of the most vulnerable ones (in line with the recent decision of the EU-African Union summit); and on the other hand support to host communities. More specifically, funding will be provided to the UNHCR’s evacuation mechanism through the EUTF and discussions with the IOM on additional measures under the assisted voluntary return scheme are being finalised. The Commission is also working together with Italy on a new initiative to be presented to the Operational Committee early in 2018, which is aimed at fostering the socio-economic development of the Libyan Municipalities, on the basis of needs of local authorities and in close coordination with the PC/Government of National Accord (GNA).

▻http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/commission-europeenne-fond-fiduciaire-d-urgence-pour-l-afrique-

Come viene usato il Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa?

“Vertice UE-Africa: l’Europa non paga”. Così titolava il settimanale tedesco Der Spiegel alla vigilia del Summit di Abidjan di fine novembre, evidenziando un problema crescente nell’approccio europeo al contenimento dei flussi migratori: come reperire le risorse con cui finanziare il Fondo fiduciario per l’Africa. Perché se da un lato aumentano obiettivi e programmi da finanziare, dall’altro non cresce il coinvolgimento economico dei governi europei.

▻http://openmigration.org/analisi/come-viene-usato-il-fondo-fiduciario-per-lafrica

2.12.2017 – Commission européenne - Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique - Nouvelles actions pour renforcer la stabilité dans la corne de l’Afrique

Le Comité opérationnel du Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique a adopté une nouvelle série de 13 programmes d’un montant de 174,4 millions d’euros pour la région de la #Corne_de_l'Afrique

▻http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/commission-europeenne-fond-fiduciaire-d-urgence-pour-l-afrique-

EU ACTION IN LIBYA ON MIGRATION
▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20171207_eu_action_in_libya_on_migration_en.pdf

Fondo Africa, quelle risorse destinate a progetti lontani dall’aiuto allo sviluppo

Il dossier realizzato sugli atti di delibera e ottenuto grazie alla richiesta dell’Associazione per gli Studi giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI) e sulla risposta del sottosegretario agli Esteri Della Vedova all’interrogazione del PD sull’utilizzo delle risorse stanziate. Risorse spese in Tunisia, Niger e Libia che pongono, secondo ActionAid, problemi di costituzionalità e trasparenza

▻http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/cooperazione/2017/12/18/news/fondo_africa-184514509

Libyan coast guard attacks rescuers after training by EU military operation

▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/dec/eu-libyan-coast-guard-eu-training-abuses-hunko-pr-18-12-17.pdf

A ‘blind spot’ in the migration debate? International responsibility of the EU and its Member States for cooperating with the Libyan coastguard and militias

The discussion on the restrictive migration management policies of the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) has so far focused on the potential violation of the primary rules of international law that determine the conduct of subjects of international law. The question of applicability of the secondary rules of international responsibility that provide for the consequences of the commitment of a wrongful act has attracted less attention. The main question in the current context is whether the cooperation of the EU and its MS with the Libyan coastguard and militias with the view of stemming irregular migration flows to Europe generates international responsibility for the above actors. More specifically, it is asked whether there is an autonomous basis in the law of international responsibility for holding the EU and its the MS responsible for the violations of human rights occurring in Libya, even if they do not exercise directly jurisdiction over migrants. Three aspects of this theme will be developed here: first, the nature and scope of the cooperation of the EU and its MS, in particular Italy, with the Libyan authorities, coastguard and militias in view of restricting the access of migrants to the EU; second, the extent of human rights violations of migrants in Libya; and third, the alleged complicity and responsibility of the EU and MS for the violations of these rights.

▻http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-blind-spot-in-the-migration-debate-international-responsibility

L’Europe affirme que la formation des gardes-côtes libyens avance

La formation des gardes-côtes libyens, notamment pour le sauvetage de migrants, avance, a déclaré jeudi à Tunis le commandant de l’opération navale européenne Sophia, chargée de lutter contre les passeurs.

« La formation se passe bien », a affirmé Enrico Credendino, commandant de la force navale européenne en Méditerranée (Sophia).

« Les gardes-côtes libyens ont été très actifs, en particulier au cours du second semestre 2017. Ils ont secouru beaucoup de migrants, presque 18.000 alors qu’en 2015 par exemple, ils en avaient secouru seulement 800 », a-t-il précisé.

Lancée en 2015 par l’UE, l’opération navale Sophia est chargée de lutter contre les passeurs et de former les gardes-côtes libyens.

Sa mission a été reconduite en juillet par le Conseil européen jusqu’en décembre 2018.

Déchirée par les rivalités entre groupes armés et les autorités qui se disputent le pouvoir, la Libye a sombré dans le chaos depuis la chute du régime de Mouammar Kadhafi en 2011.

Des centaines de milliers de migrants, certains fuyant des conflits, d’autres la pauvreté tentent de traverser la Méditerranée depuis la Libye pour rejoindre l’Europe. Depuis le début de l’année, au moins 337 d’entre eux sont morts ou disparus au large de la Libye, selon l’Organisation internationale des migrations.

▻https://www.voaafrique.com/a/migrations-formations-de-garde-cotes-libyens-avance/4300524.html
#Opération_sophia

A mettre en lien avec cet article :
La guardia costiera libica minaccia l’ong Proactiva Open Arms
►https://www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2018/03/16/guardia-costiera-libica-open-arms

Un film de #Andrea_Segre, à voir absolument. Il montre les manoeuvres italiennes en Libye :
L’ordine delle cose (L’ordre des choses) :

Rinaldi, policier italien de grande expérience, est envoyé par son gouvernement en Libye afin de négocier le maintien des migrants sur le sol africain. Sur place, il se heurte à la complexité des rapports tribaux libyens et à la puissance des trafiquants exploitant la détresse des réfugiés.
Au cours de son enquête, il rencontre dans un centre de rétention, Swada, une jeune somalienne qui le supplie de l’aider. Habituellement froid et méthodique, Rinaldi va devoir faire un choix douloureux entre sa conscience et la raison d’Etat : est-il possible de renverser l’ordre des choses ?

http://www.jolefilm.com/wp-content/uploads/70x100-OrdineDelleCose-Manifesto-WEB.jpg

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_b8mp4N4Blw

Il est actuellement en salle à Grenoble...

#film

Migranti, gli occhi della Libia sui radar europei nel Mediterraneo

A dicembre 2016 un ufficiale di collegamento della guardia costiera libica è entrato nel cuore del #Sea_Horse_Mediterranean_Network, il sistema di monitoraggio dell’Unione per il controllo delle frontiere Sud del Mediterraneo e che vede in prima linea l’Italia. Ma il governo libico era ritenuto inaffidabile dalla Commissione Ue nel 2015 ed escluso dal progetto. Ora perché è coinvolto? E a quale titolo?

Occhi elettronici. Radar potenti e sofisticati. Satelliti militari in grado di scansionare ogni centimetro quadrato del Mediterraneo centrale, quel pezzo di mare tra la Libia e l’Italia divenuto tomba per migliaia di migranti, morti mentre cercavano di fuggire alle guerre dei loro paesi e alle torture dei carcerieri libici. Mezzi straordinariamente potenti, soprattutto se messi in rete, formando un flusso di dati in grado di salvare vite – avvistando ogni piccolo gommone che tenta la traversata – e di bloccare i traffici. Non solo di esseri umani, ma anche di petrolio, droga, armi. Si chiama Sea Horse Mediterranean Network ed è l’asset più prezioso della rete di controllo della frontiera sud dell’Europa.

Un progetto costato milioni di euro, promosso direttamente dall’Unione europea e che vede un ruolo da protagonista dell’Italia. Una rete che – stando a documenti consultati da Famiglia Cristiana – potrebbe però cadere in pessime mani. Quelle delle milizie libiche, ovvero le forze di Tripoli che compongono quella stessa Guardia costiera pronta ad usare le armi contro le Ong, accusata un anno fa dalle Nazioni Unite di essere stata complice in alcuni casi degli stessi trafficanti. Il progetto in origine riguardava l’area dell’Atlantico. La responsabilità, in quel caso, era stata affidata alla Guardia Civil spagnola e l’area interessata era sostanzialmente il tratto di mare a sud delle Canarie, una delle rotte delle migrazioni via mare attive fino a una decina di anni fa. Il sistema permette di «scambiare informazioni via satellite per combattere l’immigrazione irregolare via mare», si legge in un documento delle autorità spagnole che abbiamo consultato, creando dei punti di contatto in ogni paese coinvolto «per accedere a questa rete sicura».

Le informazioni raccolte sono estremamente sensibili e costituiscono una base di conoscenza e di intelligence sicuramente strategica. Dopo l’avvio di una prima fase sulla zona atlantica, il progetto Sea Horse punta, dal 2015, al Mediterraneo. Tre i paesi del nord Africa coinvolti: l’Egitto, la Tunisia e la Libia. Nel novembre del 2015 il commissario europeo Dimitris Avramopoulos aveva risposto ad una interrogazione delle deputate europee Sabine Lösing e Cornelia Ernst (GUE/NGL), spiegando che il progetto era in una fase di stallo. Il problema principale riguardava proprio la Libia: «A causa della situazione d’insicurezza e alla mancanza di stabilità del governo nazionale libico – si legge nella risposta all’interrogazione pubblicata sul sito del Parlamento europeo – tutte le attività per installare il #National_Contact_Point in Libia sono sospese. Di conseguenza le autorità libiche interessate non sono collegate al #Mebocc, che sarà ospitato dal centro di coordinamento italiano per la sorveglianza delle frontiere».

La sigla Mebocc sta per #Mediterranean_Border_Cooperation_Center, ed è il cuore della rete di controllo del mare tra Italia e Libia. La collocazione di questo centro, come ha spiegato il commissario europeo, è prevista nel nostro paese, con un backup a Malta. Tutto, però, sembrava fermo fino al novembre del 2015.

Un ufficiale di collegamento libico era presente nel cuore della rete europea di sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime

Alla fine del 2016, dopo il cambio ai vertici del ministero dell’Interno e l’arrivo di Marco Minniti, il progetto ha subito un’accelerazione. Nella “Relazione sulla performance per il 2016” del Viminale c’è un paragrafo dove si annuncia l’operatività del progetto: «L’infrastruttura satellitare», si legge nel documento, «è stata installata nel #Centro_Interforze_di_Gestione_e_Controllo (#CIGC) #SICRAL di Vigna di Valle, teleporto principale del Ministero della Difesa, mentre presso il Centro Nazionale di Coordinamento per l’immigrazione “Roberto Iavarone” – #EUROSUR, sede del MEBOCC, sono stati installati gli altri apparati funzionali alla rete di comunicazione. Al 31 dicembre 2016, quello dell’Italia risultava essere l’unico nodo realmente attivo e pronto per le comunicazioni».

Tutto pronto, dunque, per operare. Pronto e operativo, a quanto sembra, era anche il governo libico, che solo un anno prima veniva definito instabile dalla Commissione europea. Si legge nel rapporto del Ministero dell’Interno, documento che Famiglia Cristiana ha consultato: «Si segnala inoltre che nel 2016, nell’ambito del progetto Sea Horse Mediterranean Network, quattro ufficiali della Guardia Costiera – Marina Militare Libica sono stati ospitati in Italia, in qualità di osservatori, uno presso l’#ICC - #International_Coordination_Center, altri due imbarcati sull’assetto spagnolo “#Rio_Segura” durante il mese di settembre e uno presso il Centro nazionale di coordinamento – EUROSUR della Direzione Centrale per l’Immigrazione dal 5 al 9 dicembre, con funzioni di collegamento con le autorità libiche e per migliorare/stimolare la cooperazione nella gestione degli eventi di immigrazione irregolare provenienti dalla Libia».

Dunque un ufficiale di collegamento libico era presente nel cuore della rete europea di sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime del Mediterraneo poco più di un anno fa. Fatto che potrebbe avere come conseguenza la possibilità di accesso al sistema Sea Horse da parte del governo di Tripoli, impegnato, come abbiamo visto, nel respingimento in mare dei migranti che fuggono dal Nord Africa verso l’Europa. La sensibilità delle informazioni che il network raccoglie e gestisce è evidente. Un mese fa è stata presentata una seconda interrogazione al Parlamento europeo per capire se i libici già sono in grado di accedere ai dati dei satelliti che monitorano il Mediterraneo: «Dove, in Libia o in Italia, sono stati realizzati i Centri Operativi (ad esempio il Mebocc) e quali autorità o milizie sono coinvolte?», hanno chiesto i deputati Sabine Lösing e Cornelia Ernst. Al momento non hanno ottenuto nessuna risposta. La Libia è sempre più vicina.

▻http://www.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/migranti-gli-occhi-della-libia-sui-radar-europei-nel-mediterraneo.
#Egypte #Tunisie #Libye #images_satellitaires

Migranti, affidarne i soccorsi alla Libia significa respingerli

Un verbale della riunione dell’ Organizzazione mondiale del mare del 30 ottobre scorso svela la contrarietà di creare un coordinamento libico dei salvataggi nel Mediterraneo. Ma giovedì scorso la nave della Ong spagnola Open Arms è stata affidata proprio alle motovedette di Tripoli come ha spiegato anche la Guardia Costiera italiana. Ora cominciano i respingimenti collettivi per conto terzi?

▻http://m.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/migranti-affidarne-i-soccorsi-in-mare-alla-libia-significa-respi

EU Trust Fund for Africa: five new programmes adopted for the Sahel and Lake Chad region

The European Commission has adopted five new programmes worth over €141 million under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development Neven Mimica said: "Our new EU programmes, worth €141 million, are particularly focusing on important opportunities for young people. They will furthermore support our #G5-Sahel partners to strengthen development and stability in border areas, as well as help us to save more lives and fight human traffickers, who take advantage of vulnerable people’s despair. We also continue our actions to support partner countries to better manage migration and to develop civil registries. Those needs do not decrease, and the resources from the EU Trust Fund are quickly depleting”

At the regional level, two programmes totalling €75 million will seek to shore up stability and youth participation in the G5 #Sahel countries (#Burkina_Faso, Chad, #Mali, Mauritania and #Niger). A new €70 million Emergency programme will increase people’s access to social services in border areas. The programme was designed under the Sahel Alliance and responds directly to the needs voiced by the G5 Sahel countries under the #Priority_Investment_Programme. Another €5 million will ensure the implementation of the second phase of “#The_Voices_of_young_people_in_the_Sahel” programme, which was launched in 2017 and contributes to integrating youth organisations into the processes of designing and implementing development and social policies.

A new €7.6 million programme in Niger will further boost migrant protection on migratory routes and support host communities. Also in Niger, the ongoing AJUSEN budget support programme in the justice, security and border management sectors will receive an additional €10 million to continue this work.

In Senegal, a €9 million initiative will help tackle criminal networks that are linked to irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and enhance regional cooperation in this area.

In #Côte_d'Ivoire, a new programme worth €30 million will support the country’s ongoing efforts to create a coherent and robust civil registry system that will help improve the management of public policies, enable people to exercise their fundamental rights and improve their access to public services, including the facilitation of voluntary return and the sustainable reintegration of migrants.

Last but not least, the #Technical_Cooperation_Facility covering all Trust Fund regions and the Research and Evidence Facility covering the Sahel and Lake Chad and the North of Africa regions have been reinforced with an additional amount of €12 million. In line with the evidence-based approach under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to ensure strategic and efficient interventions, this additional funding will facilitate more studies and research, as well as technical support when necessary.

The five programmes adopted today bring the total number of programmes adopted since December 2015 for the Sahel and Lake Chad region to 91, with a total value of €1.7 billion.

Background

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was established in 2015 to address the root causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement. Resources currently allocated to this Trust Fund are €4.1 billion from EU institutions, European Member States and other donors.

Today’s assistance adds to the 165 programmes already approved across the three regions (North of Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad region and Horn of Africa), worth a total of €3,157 million. These funds were divided up as follows: Sahel/Lake Chad €1,549 million (86 programmes); Horn of Africa €1,141.3 million (58 programmes); North of Africa €467.1 million (17 programmes). This amount includes 4 cross-region programmes (€145.1 million).

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6447_en.htm?locale=EN
#Tchad #Mauritanie #jeunesse #Sénégal #réintégration #retours_volontaires #retour_volontaire

#relocalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #UE #EU #statistiques #chiffres #hotspots #Europe #Grèce #Italie
cc @stesummi

Aujourd’hui, la Commission a adopté son 14 e rapport sur la relocalisation de demandeurs d’asile au sein de l’UE et la réinstallation de réfugiés depuis des pays tiers à l’UE.

Les relocalisations ayant atteint des niveaux record au mois de juin (avec plus de 2 000 personnes relocalisées au départ de la Grèce et près de 1 000 au départ de l’Italie) et presque tous les États membres faisant des offres de places et effectuant des transferts régulièrement, il est tout à fait réalisable de relocaliser l’ensemble des personnes admissibles avant le mois de septembre. Il est cependant nécessaire de fournir des efforts supplémentaires afin d’accélérer les transferts au départ de l’Italie, eu égard notamment à la situation actuelle en Méditerranée centrale. Parallèlement, les réinstallations se poursuivent à un rythme satisfaisant tandis que la Commission a lancé un nouvel exercice d’offres de places en vue de la réinstallation des personnes les plus vulnérables au départ de la Libye, de l’Égypte, du Niger, de l’Éthiopie et du Soudan tout en poursuivant les réinstallations depuis la Turquie.

M. Dimitris Avramopoulos, commissaire chargé de la migration, a déclaré à ce sujet : « Un point ressort très clairement de l’évaluation des résultats obtenus jusqu’à présent : la relocalisation fonctionne pour autant qu’existe une volonté politique. Nous devons à présent consentir un dernier effort pour atteindre notre objectif commun de relocaliser, d’ici septembre, la grande majorité des demandeurs d’asile admissibles présents en Grèce et en Italie. L’Italie, en particulier, subit une énorme pression, aussi appelle-je tous les États membres à intensifier encore leurs efforts en matière de relocalisation au départ de ce pays. L’UE ne laissera pas les pays ayant une frontière extérieure seuls face à cette situation ; la Commission ne cessera de veiller à ce que tous les États membres s’acquittent de leurs obligations juridiques en matière de relocalisation. »

Parallèlement, la Commission passe aujourd’hui à l’étape suivante des procédures d’infraction engagées contre la République tchèque, la Hongrie et la Pologne pour non-respect de leurs obligations juridiques en matière de relocalisation (voir le communiqué de presse).

Relocalisation

Le rythme des relocalisations a continué à progresser au cours des derniers mois, les transferts étant supérieurs à 1 000 chaque mois depuis novembre 2016 et le mois de juin 2017 marquant un nouveau record mensuel avec plus de 3 000 transferts. Au 24 juillet, le nombre total de relocalisations s’établit à 24 676 (16 803 au départ de la Grèce et 7 873 au départ de l’Italie).

Les efforts ne doivent pas faiblir, quelque 4 800 candidats étant actuellement en attente d’une relocalisation au départ de la Grèce – chiffre qui devrait probablement atteindre les 6 800 – et les candidats admissibles continuant d’arriver en Italie. Cette dernière doit encore enregistrer d’urgence dans le programme de relocalisation les personnes admissibles arrivées en 2016 et au premier semestre de 2017. Cela vaut en particulier pour les Érythréens dont 25 000 environ sont arrivés en Italie depuis le début de l’année 2016 mais dont 10 000 seulement ont été enregistrés en vue d’une relocalisation. Ainsi qu’il est exposé dans le Plan d’action visant à soutenir l’Italie, présenté par la Commission, les autorités italiennes devraient rapidement enregistrer tous les Érythréens actuellement présents sur son territoire et centraliser la procédure de relocalisation dans des pôles prévus à cet effet. Le Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile (EASO) soutient actuellement les efforts de l’Italie au moyen d’une campagne d’information en ligne destinée à identifier tous les demandeurs potentiels.

Au cours de cette phase finale, il est primordial que les États membres accélèrent les relocalisations et offrent suffisamment de places pour relocaliser tous les demandeurs admissibles, y compris ceux susceptibles d’arriver jusqu’au 26 septembre. En tout état de cause, l’obligation juridique des États membres de procéder à des relocalisations ne prendra pas fin après le mois de septembre : les décisions du Conseil en matière de relocalisation s’appliquent à toutes les personnes arrivées en Grèce ou en Italie avant le 26 septembre 2017 puis les candidats admissibles doivent être relocalisés dans un délai raisonnable, après cette date.

Plusieurs États membres sont en passe d’avoir satisfait à leurs obligations en matière de relocalisation : Malte, la Lettonie ainsi que la Norvège, pays associé à l’espace Schengen qui participe volontairement au programme, ont tous trois relocalisé le nombre total de personnes qui leur avait été attribué pour la Grèce, tandis que la Suède, qui n’a entamé les relocalisations qu’au mois de juin, aura effectué près de 60 % des relocalisations qui lui incombaient. La Commission se félicite également de l’augmentation récemment annoncée des offres mensuelles de places par l’Espagne et de l’accélération annoncée du rythme des transferts par l’Allemagne.

Réinstallation

Les avancées globales en matière de réinstallation continuent d’être positives, près de trois quarts (17 179) des 22 504 réinstallations décidées en juillet 2015 ayant déjà été menées à bien. Étant donné que plusieurs États auxquels avaient été attribués de gros contingents ont rempli leur engagement en matière de réinstallation conformément aux conclusions de juillet 2015 ou sont en passe de le faire, la plupart des efforts se concentrent à présent sur les réinstallations au titre de la déclaration UE-Turquie. Les efforts déployés en matière de réinstallation au titre de ce programme demeurent toutefois inégaux, plusieurs États membres n’ayant encore procédé à aucune réinstallation.

Les réinstallations effectuées depuis la Turquie augmentent de manière continue. Depuis le 14 juin, 1 552 réfugiés syriens supplémentaires ont été réinstallés au départ de la Turquie vers des États membres de l’UE. Le nombre total de réinstallations effectuées en application de la déclaration s’élève désormais à 7 806. Parallèlement, des progrès sont enregistrés dans les négociations, menées entre les États participants et la Turquie, sur les procédures opérationnelles standard pour le programme d’admission humanitaire volontaire, l’objectif étant de parvenir à un accord dès que possible.

Le 4 juillet, la Commission a invité les États membres à présenter de nouvelles offres de place en matière de réinstallation pour l’année 2018, qui bénéficieront du soutien financier de la Commission. Cet exercice d’offres de places vise à assurer la transition entre les programmes de réinstallation en cours et l’adoption de la proposition de la Commission relative à un nouveau cadre pour la réinstallation, actuellement débattue par les colégislateurs. Conformément au Plan d’action visant à soutenir l’Italie et afin de réduire la pression migratoire qui s’exerce sur la Libye, de sauver des vies et d’offrir des alternatives aux voies de migration irrégulières et périlleuses, les États membres ont été expressément invités à mettre l’accent sur les réinstallations depuis la Libye, l’Égypte, le Niger, l’Éthiopie et le Soudan, tout en poursuivant celles au départ de la Turquie. La Commission a affecté 377,5 millions d’EUR aux fins de la réinstallation en 2018, ce qui permettra de financer la réinstallation d’au moins 37 750 personnes ayant besoin d’une protection internationale (10 000 EUR par personne).

Contexte

Le programme temporaire de relocalisation d’urgence a été institué par deux décisions adoptées par le Conseil en septembre 2015, en vertu desquelles les États membres se sont engagés à relocaliser depuis l’Italie et la Grèce des personnes ayant besoin d’une protection internationale.

Le 8 juin 2015, la Commission a proposé un programme européen de réinstallation que les États membres ont adopté le 20 juillet 2015 en vue de la réinstallation de 22 504 personnes ayant manifestement besoin d’une protection internationale.

La déclaration UE-Turquie du 18 mars 2016 prévoit que, pour tout Syrien renvoyé en Turquie au départ de l’une des îles grecques, un autre Syrien sera réinstallé dans l’UE depuis la Turquie. Ce principe s’applique depuis le 4 avril 2016. La priorité est donnée aux migrants qui ne sont pas entrés de manière irrégulière dans l’UE ni n’ont tenté de le faire.

Le 13 juillet 2016, la Commission a proposé à titre permanent un cadre de l’UE pour la réinstallation afin d’établir un ensemble commun de procédures de sélection types et un statut de protection commun afin de rationaliser les efforts européens en matière de réinstallation.

▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170726_fourteenth_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf

cc @i_s_

Migrations : mois record pour le nombre des relocalisations depuis l’Italie et la Grèce

Les relocalisations ayant atteint des niveaux record au mois de juin (avec plus de 2 000 personnes relocalisées au départ de la Grèce et près de 1 000 au départ de l’Italie) et presque tous les États membres faisant des offres de places et effectuant des transferts régulièrement, il est tout à fait réalisable de relocaliser l’ensemble des personnes admissibles avant le mois de septembre. Il est cependant nécessaire de fournir des efforts supplémentaires afin d’accélérer les transferts au départ de l’Italie, eu égard notamment à la situation actuelle en Méditerranée centrale. Parallèlement, les réinstallations se poursuivent à un rythme satisfaisant tandis que la Commission a lancé un nouvel exercice d’offres de places en vue de la réinstallation des personnes les plus vulnérables au départ de la Libye, de l’Égypte, du Niger, de l’Éthiopie et du Soudan tout en poursuivant les réinstallations depuis la Turquie.

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2104_fr.htm

Commentaire reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 28.07.2017 :

c’est risible... donc, il y a eu 7.873 depuis le debout de la relocalisation et en peu plus du dernier mois ont arrivé peu moins de 30.000 en italie... beaucoup plus de 2 millions d’arrivés (évitant de parler de retours dublin vers l’italie) en deux années, du point de vue de la commission veut dire que 40.000 relocalisations seraient un succés (après avoir exclus touts les arrivés en grece après le 20 mars 2016 et toutes les nationalités qui arrivent en italie à part les erythréens)...

E.U. Countries Must Accept Their Share of Migrants, Court Rules

A summary of the judgment said the Court of Justice had dismissed “in their entirety the actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary.” The quota program was “necessary to respond effectively and swiftly to an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of displaced persons,” the court said.

https://static01.nyt.com/images/2017/09/07/world/07Eumigrants1/07Eumigrants1-master768.jpg

#Slovaquie #Hongrie

La relocalisation des migrants depuis l’Italie suspendue

En Italie, 181 000 migrants sont arrivés via la Libye en 2016 et 101 000 entre le 1er janvier et le 18 septembre 2017. Outre les réticences des pays à respecter leurs obligations en termes d’accueil, la lenteur des procédures a également freiné les relocalisations. A ce jour, moins d’un tiers des demandeurs d’asile éligibles au programme de répartition ont pu rejoindre un autre pays de l’UE.

Bruxelles a bien assuré que « toutes les personnes arrivées en Grèce ou en Italie, avant la date limite du 26 septembre, peuvent être éligibles du programme de relocalisation ». Mais d’après les données du ministère l’Intérieur, Rome aura du mal à faire partager le fardeau selon les accords de 2015.

▻http://www.rfi.fr/europe/20170925-relocalisation-migrants-depuis-italie-suspendue?ref=tw
#suspension #fin

RELOCATION NOT PROCRASTINATION
▻https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Policy-Note-07.pdf

Relocalisations | Éloge de la médiocrité et de l’hypocrisie

Ainsi donc, « la Suisse rempli[rait] son engagement d’accueil de migrants envers l’UE »… Le titre de l’article publié sur le site de RTS info, reprenant à son compte une dépêche ATS, pourrait faire sourire. D’abord parce que jusqu’à preuve du contraire, 1175 relocalisations sur 1500 [1] ne représente pas 100% des promesses faites, mais moins de 80% ou une note de 4,7 sur 6. Pas vraiment l’excellence, non ?

▻https://asile.ch/2017/09/28/relocalisations-eloge-de-mediocrite-de-lhypocrisie

Peter Szijjarto: Why we fight the EU on refugees

Hungary’s foreign minister discusses tough immigration policies and the fight against EU migrant quotas.

▻http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2017/09/peter-szijjarto-fight-eu-refugees-170930102418739.html

Fin des relocalisations : pour quel #bilan ?

Les derniers chiffres font état d’un total de 29 144 personnes relocalisées entre septembre 2015 et septembre 2017. Ce n’est que 18,2% du projet initial, 29,7% du quota finalement retenu et, en réalité, à peine plus que les trois-quarts du chiffre de 37 000 que la Commission visait réellement, une fois « exclus » les migrants arrivés sur le sol grec après l’accord avec la Turquie et les nationalités ne parvenant pas à passer le seuil d’un taux de reconnaissance de 75 %(1).

Que s’est-il passé ? Deux États, la Hongrie et la Pologne, ont refusé d’accueillir ne serait-ce qu’un seul demandeur d’asile. La République tchèque n’a plus procédé à aucune relocalisation depuis août 2016. Le fait que, en juillet, des procédures d’infraction aient été lancées contre ces trois États pour avoir refusé d’appliquer le programme de relocalisation ne les a cependant pas fait changer de stratégie.

Quant aux autres Etats membres, l’Espagne n’a atteint que 13,7 % de son quota, la Belgique, 25,6 % et la France 21,7 %. Les Pays-Bas et le Portugal ont rempli 39,6 % et 49,1 % de leur objectif, respectivement. Et pour ces Etats qui n’ont pas accueilli le nombre de demandeurs d’asile pour lequel ils s’étaient pourtant engagés, aucune sanction n’est à l’ordre du jour…

Malte et la Lettonie sont les deux seuls pays de l’UE à être parvenus au chiffre fixé. Il est important de souligner aussi les efforts de certains États membres comme la Finlande, qui a accueilli 1 951 demandeurs d’asile, soit 94 % du chiffre prévu, ou encore l’Irlande qui a ouvert ses portes à 459 demandeurs d’asile, représentant 76,5 % de son quota. La Norvège et le Lichtenstein, qui ont participé volontairement au programme, ont tous les deux respecté leurs engagements, respectivement fixés à 1 500 et 10.

Cela étant, en dépit de la bonne volonté de certains États membres ou d’États associés, nul n’oserait qualifier cette initiative – sensée, reconnaissons-le – de succès. Ce qui ne peut que poser question sur l’esprit qui va guider les États membres dans les discussions concernant la réforme du droit d’asile en cours.

▻http://www.aedh.eu/Fin-des-relocalisations-pour-quel.html
#relocalisations #asile #migrations #réfugiés

Le 16 novembre 2017, RTS info publie cette nouvelle :

L’UE promet 34’400 places pour les réfugiés d’Afrique et du Moyen-Orient

▻https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/9089989-l-ue-promet-34-400-places-pour-les-refugies-d-afrique-et-du-moyen-orient

L’article fini ainsi :

Réinstallation

« Nous sortons petit à petit du mode crise et nous gérons maintenant la migration dans un esprit de partenariat et de responsabilité partagée », s’est félicité le commissaire à la Migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos.

Il a souligné l’importance du programme de réinstallation, visant à répartir les réfugiés arrivés en Grèce et en Italie. Plus de 31’500 personnes en ont bénéficié depuis 2015, selon la Commission.

–-> RTS Info reprend les statistiques de l’UE ("31’500 en ont bénéficié depuis 2015"), qui se vante presque des 31’500 places, en oubliant que ces 31’500 places devaient en réalité être 160’000 au début... et que du coup le programme de réinstallation est un échec !

Relocalisation des demandeurs d’asile depuis la Grèce et l’Italie

Le 26 mars 2018, la Commission européenne indiquait que 34 323 demandeurs d’asile ont été relocalisés depuis l’Italie et la Grèce sur le territoire des Etats participants à l’effort de relocalisation

http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/images/large/relocation-trends-march2018.jpg http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/images/large/relocation-graph-per-states-march2018.jpg http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/images/large/relocation-table-march2018.jpg

►http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/donnees/relocalisation-des-demandeurs-dasile-depuis-la-grece-et-litalie

2 questions surgissent à partir de la lecture de ce texte :

1. Pourquoi on parle de 98’255 demandeurs d’asile à réinstaller, quand au début on en prévoyait 160’000 (puis 106’00) ?

https://i.imgur.com/u2HpJyQ.png

2. Le programme de relocalisation ne devait pas se terminer en septembre 2017 ?

https://i.imgur.com/3OMSrRh.png

Relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece

On 31 May 2018, the European Commission reported that 34 689 asylum seekers have been relocated from Italy and Greece to other States participating in the relocation process

Among the 34 689 asylum seekers relocated:

12 690 have been relocated from Italy
21 999 have been relocated from Greece

According to the Commission’s document, commitments legally foressen in the Council Decisions amount to 98 255 asylum seekers to be relocated (34 953 from Italy and 63 302 from Greece) over 2 years.

On 31 May 2018, participating states have reached 35,30% of commitments enshrined in the Council Decisions.

http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/images/large/relocation-trends-31052018.jpg http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/images/large/relocation-graph-31052018.jpg http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/images/large/relocation-table-31052018.jpg

v. aussi les promesses de relocalisation de l’Allemagne depuis la Grèce :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/764733

Septembre 2020, graphique publié par Libé :

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L211xH700/ZCKkW18png-7725f-317d7.png

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/876752#message878323

En 2021, on recommence avec les promesses :
EU aims for 30,000 refugee resettlements until 2022
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/922594

Post-Deportation Monitoring

Jill is a post-doctoral researcher at the migration law section, VU Amsterdam, and the CERI at Sciences Po Paris. In the past, she has researched migration brokers, consulate officers, welfare hotels and airports. In Cameroon, she resarched exit controls at airports and the prosecution of failed migrants for the offence of attempting to emigrate illegally. Jill holds a PhD from the University of Amsterdam, an MA in development studies from Sciences Po Paris, and a BA in history and politics from the University of Sheffield. She is an experienced fieldwork researcher and has conducted missions in rural and urban Africa and Asia. Jill teaches on human trafficking, development, and international politics and migration law, and has worked on vulnerabilities and protection mechanisms for migrants, women, and children in collaboration amongst others with UNESCO, Amnesty, the Samu Social, PICUM, Migreurope and Kritnet.

▻http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/post-deportation-monitoring

Deported migrants call for freedom from behind barred windows

They wait to learn of their fate inside a fenced reception and removal centre in the town of #Pehlivankoy. The United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) says it has yet to gain access to the facility.

▻http://www.euronews.com/2016/04/09/deported-migrants-call-for-freedom-from-behind-barred-windows

Syrians returned to Turkey under EU deal ’have had no access to lawyers’

Refugees report being detained indefinitely in poor conditions and not being allowed to rejoin family members in Turkey

▻http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/16/syrians-returned-to-turkey-after-eu-deal-complain-of-treatment

What Merkel, Tusk and Timmermans should have seen during their visit to Turkey.
▻http://www.guengl.eu/uploads/news-documents/GUENGL_report_Situation_of_refugees_since_EU-Turkey_deal_2016.05.10.pdf

10/05, 9.30 - Press conference: Situation of refugees since EU-Turkey deal
▻http://www.guengl.eu/news/article/press-conferences/press-conference-situation-of-refugees-since-eu-turkey-deal

#HarekAct

HarekAct aims at contributing to a critical and analytical knowledge production on the question of migration in general, with a focus on the case of Turkey in particular. The blog will serve as a collective platform to monitor, increase and share various debates and information on migration, asylum and border issues primarily in Turkey as well as on the general European context as far as it is connected to Turkey.

▻http://harekact.bordermonitoring.eu
#monitoring

Esperimento Grecia

In questa sezione è possibile scaricare i rapporti relativi alla ricerca condotta da A.S.G.I. fra il 15 e il 19 giugno 2016 sul diritto d’asilo e la sua applicazione in Grecia dopo l’accordo UE-Turchia del 18 marzo. I rapporti verranno periodicamente aggiornati.

▻https://pushandback.com/esperimento-grecia

Readmissions from Greece to Turkey: what happens after readmission?

On 18th of March 2016 at the EU - Turkey summit, the leaders of member state countries and Turkey, in line with the previously accepted Joint Action Plan, agreed to return migrants, who arrived to Greek islands irregularly after 20th of March and who did not apply for asylum in Greece, to Turkey under the framework of Bilateral Readmission Protocol between Turkey and Greece which was signed in 2001.

▻http://multeci.org.tr/haberdetay.aspx?Id=140

Only ’16 percent of asylum seekers’ in Greece to be sent to Turkey: Report

Turkey agreed with EU in 2016 to take back illegal migrants from Greek islands for incentives including financial aid

▻http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/only-16-percent-asylum-seekers-greece-be-sent-turkey-report-132230521

Grèce : « seulement 16% » des demandeurs d’asile susceptibles d’être renvoyés

Seulement « 16% des demandeurs d’asile » en Grèce sont susceptibles d’être renvoyés en Turquie ou dans leur pays d’origine malgré le pacte UE-Turquie, a affirmé dimanche Maria Stavropoulou, ex-directrice du service d’asile grec.

▻https://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/grece-seulement-16-des-demandeurs-dasile-susceptibles-detre-r

EU-Turkey Deal: Reception Conditions Trigger Voluntary Returns

The number of asylum seekers returned from Greece, voluntarily and involuntarily, and levels of EU support to refugees in Turkey cast shadow on EU Agenda on Migration.

In its response (►https://www.linksfraktion.de/themen/nachrichten/detail/eu-tuerkei-deal-ist-in-vielerlei-hinsicht-kritikwuerdig) to a parliamentary question, the German government stated that 5000 people, who had sought asylum in Greece, left Greece via voluntary return programmes in the context of the EU-Turkey deal. According to the European Commission, 322 people have been returned to Turkey and the EU has accepted 7000 Syrian refugees in return; Turkey hosts 3.9 million registered refugees, 143 000 of which live in refugee camps. The EU is supporting 1.5 million Syrian refugees who live outside of camps, mostly in big cities, through the so-called “Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN)” with 20€ per month, the response note. The EU provided six rescue ships for the Turkish coastguards migration management programme implemented by IOM 2016-18 with an overall funding of €20 million, the German governments notes.

The question by 22 MPs was filed in the context of Turkey maintaining the territorial reservations to the Geneva Convention, which means that Syrian refugees currently only obtain temporary refugee status. The MPs also refer to human rights organisations warning of poor reception conditions and summary returns (►https://www.ecre.org/turkey-responds-to-increasing-arrivals-of-afghans-with-mass-deportation) from Turkey, reports on catastrophic conditions in Greek Island hotspots and the European Court of Auditors criticising lack of transparency and inefficiency of the support for refugees provided for Turkey.

MP Ulla Jelpke comments (►https://www.linksfraktion.de/themen/nachrichten/detail/eu-tuerkei-deal-ist-in-vielerlei-hinsicht-kritikwuerdig), the German government makes the EU-Turkey deal seem a success as long as those seeking protection are prevented from entering the EU. In truth, she points out, the situation of refugees in Turkey is rather dire. The EU subsidies of €20 per months for those not living in camps were insufficient and more than two million registered refugees did not receive any support from the EU. It is no surprise that many of them, including children, have to take jobs for starvation wages, Jelpke notes.

Taking stock (▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1496_en.htm) of the past four years of the European Agenda on Migration this week, the commission called the EU-Turkey deal a “game changer” (▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20190306_managing-migration-factsheet-step-change-migration-management-bor): “Arrivals to Greece quickly drop by 97% and have remained low ever since. Irregular migrants will be returned to Turkey and more than €6 billion will be mobilised to support 3.5 million Syrian in Turkey.” They also note, “key problems in Greece remain unresolved as regards returns, asylum processing and adequate accommodation”.

For further information:

Linksfraktion, Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke et al. , 25 February 2019: ▻https://www.linksfraktion.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF_Dokumente/2019/19-7198_EU_Tu__rkei_Deal.pdf
ECRE, Weekly Editorial: Dirty deals done dirt cheap, 17 March 2017: ▻https://www.ecre.org/weekly-editorial-dirty-deals-done-dirt-cheap
ECRE, Weekly Editorial: EU-Turkey – Deconstructing the deal behind the statement, 16 March 2018: ►https://www.ecre.org/weekly-editorial-deconstructing-the-deal-behind-the-statement
ECRE Turkey responds to increasing arrivals of Afghans with mass deportation, 13 April 2018: ►https://www.ecre.org/turkey-responds-to-increasing-arrivals-of-afghans-with-mass-deportation
ECRE, Greece takes another legal step to lower asylum seeker guarantees to implement the EU-Turkey deal, 24 May 2018: ▻https://www.ecre.org/greece-takes-another-legal-step-to-lower-asylum-seeker-guarantees-to-implement
ECRE, Turkey: Refugees at the Border Faced with Choice Between Detention and Return, Report Finds*, 19 October 2018: ►https://www.ecre.org/turkey-refugees-at-the-border-faced-with-choice-between-detention-and-return-r