Council of Europe

/en

  • L’Europe doit mettre fin à la répression des défenseurs des droits humains qui aident les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile et les migrants

    « Dans toute l’Europe, il est de plus en plus fréquent que des organisations et des individus soient harcelés, intimidés, victimes de violences ou considérés comme des délinquants simplement parce qu’ils contribuent à protéger les droits humains des réfugiés, des demandeurs d’asile et des migrants. Les États européens doivent mettre fin à cette répression », a déclaré aujourd’hui la Commissaire aux droits de l’homme du Conseil de l’Europe, Dunja Mijatović, à l’occasion de la publication d’une Recommandation sur la situation des défenseurs des droits humains qui aident les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile et les migrants en Europe.

    Cette Recommandation, intitulée Protéger les défenseurs : mettre fin à la répression des défenseurs des droits humains qui aident les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile et les migrants en Europe, donne un aperçu des défis auxquels sont confrontés les défenseurs des droits humains et présente les mesures que les États membres du Conseil de l’Europe devraient prendre pour les protéger.

    Dans le contexte de politiques d’asile et de migration répressives, sécuritaires et militarisées, les États négligent de plus en plus leur obligation de veiller à ce que les défenseurs des droits humains puissent travailler dans un environnement sûr et favorable. En conséquence, de multiples formes de répression s’exercent sur les défenseurs qui participent à des opérations de sauvetage en mer, fournissent une aide humanitaire ou une assistance juridique, mènent des opérations de surveillance des frontières, assurent une couverture médiatique, mènent des activités de plaidoyer, engagent des procédures contentieuses, ou soutiennent par d’autres moyens encore les réfugiés, les demandeurs d’asile et les migrants en Europe.

    La Recommandation examine les problèmes auxquels sont confrontés les défenseurs des droits humains, notamment :

    - des propos hostiles et stigmatisants tenus par des représentants gouvernementaux, des parlementaires et certains médias ;
    – des violences et des menaces, et le manque de réaction des autorités pour y répondre ;
    – la criminalisation du travail humanitaire ou de défense des droits humains mené auprès des réfugiés, des demandeurs d’asile et des migrants, due à une application trop large des lois sur le trafic illicite de migrants ;
    – le refus d’accès à des lieux où il est essentiel d’assurer un suivi de la situation des droits humains ou de fournir une aide, tels que des centres de détention ou d’accueil ou des zones frontalières.

    « Les gouvernements européens devraient voir les défenseurs des droits humains comme des partenaires qui peuvent contribuer de manière déterminante à rendre les politiques d’asile et de migration plus efficaces et respectueuses des droits humains. Au lieu de cela, ils les traitent avec hostilité. Cette politique délibérée porte atteinte aux droits humains des acteurs de la société civile et des personnes auxquelles ils viennent en aide. Par extension, elle ronge le tissu démocratique des sociétés », a déclaré la Commissaire.

    Afin d’inverser cette tendance répressive, la Commissaire appelle à prendre d’urgence une série de mesures, dont les suivantes :

    - réformer les lois, politiques et pratiques qui entravent indûment les activités des défenseurs des droits humains ;
    – veiller à ce que les lois sur le trafic illicite de migrants ne confèrent le caractère d’infraction pénale à aucune activité de défense des droits humains ou d’aide humanitaire menée auprès des réfugiés, des demandeurs d’asile et des migrants ;
    - lever les restrictions d’accès aux lieux et aux informations ;
    - mettre fin au discours stigmatisant et dénigrant ;
    - établir des procédures de sécurité efficaces pour les défenseurs confrontés à des violences ou à des menaces et veiller à ce que ces cas fassent l’objet d’enquêtes effectives.

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/view/-/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/id/264775174?_com_liferay_asset_publisher_web_portlet_AssetPublisherPortlet_INSTAN
    #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité #asile #migrations #réfugiés #solidarité #recommandation #conseil_de_l'Europe #répression #assistance_juridique #sauvetage #aide_humanitaire #violence #menaces #hostilité #droits_humains #rapport

  • Il Consiglio d’Europa chiede all’Italia di garantire più protezione alle vittime di tratta

    Nel rapporto del Gruppo di esperti sulla lotta alla tratta di esseri umani (Greta) si chiede alle autorità di aumentare le indagini e le condanne, assicurare strumenti efficaci di risarcimento per le vittime e concentrarsi maggiormente sullo sfruttamento lavorativo. Oltre allo stop del memorandum Italia-Libia. Su cui il governo tira dritto.

    Più attenzione alla tratta per sfruttamento lavorativo, maggiori risarcimenti e indennizzi per le vittime e la necessità di aumentare il numero di trafficanti di esseri umani assicurati alla giustizia. Ma anche lo stop del memorandum Italia-Libia e la fine della criminalizzazione dei cosiddetti “scafisti”.

    Sono queste le principali criticità su cui il Gruppo di esperti del Consiglio d’Europa sulla lotta alla tratta di esseri umani (Greta) a fine febbraio ha chiesto al governo italiano di intervenire per assicurare l’applicazione delle normative europee e una tutela efficace per le vittime di tratta degli esseri umani. “Ogni anno in Italia ne vengono individuate tra le 2.100 e le 3.800 -si legge nel report finale pubblicato il 23 febbraio-. Queste cifre non riflettono la reale portata del fenomeno a causa dei persistenti limiti nelle procedure per identificare le vittime, nonché di un basso tasso di autodenuncia da parte delle stesse che temono di essere punite o deportate verso i Paesi di origine”. Una scarsa individuazione dei casi di tratta che riguarderebbe soprattutto alcuni settori “ad alto rischio” come “l’agricoltura, il tessile, i servizi domestici, l’edilizia, il settore alberghiero e la ristorazione”.

    L’oggetto del terzo monitoraggio di attuazione obblighi degli Stati stabiliti dalla Convenzione del Consiglio d’Europa sulla lotta contro la tratta degli esseri umani era proprio l’accesso alla giustizia per le vittime. Dal 13 al 17 febbraio 2023, il gruppo di esperti si è recato in Italia incontrando decine di rappresentanti istituzionali e di organizzazioni della società civile. La prima bozza del report adottata nel giugno 2023 è stata poi condivisa con il governo italiano che a ottobre ha inviato le sue risposte prima della pubblicazione finale del rapporto. Quello in cui il Greta, pur sottolineando “alcuni sviluppi positivi” dall’ultima valutazione svolta in Italia nel 2019, esprime “preoccupazione su diverse questioni”.

    Il risarcimento per le vittime della tratta è una di queste. Spesso “reso impossibile dalla mancanza di beni o proprietà degli autori del reato in Italia” ma anche perché “i meccanismi di cooperazione internazionale sono raramente utilizzati per identificare e sequestrare i beni degli stessi all’estero”. Non solo. Il sistema di indennizzo per le vittime -nel caso in cui, appunto, chi ha commesso il reato non abbia disponibilità economica- non funziona. “Serve renderlo effettivamente accessibile e aumentare il suo importo massimo di 1.500 euro”. Come ricostruito anche da Altreconomia, da quando è stato istituito questo strumento solo in un caso la vittima ha avuto accesso al fondo.

    Il Greta rileva poi una “diminuzione del numero di indagini, azioni penali e di condanne” osservando in generale una applicazione ristretta di tratta di esseri umani collegandola “all’esistenza di un elemento transnazionale, al coinvolgimento di un’organizzazione criminale e all’assenza del consenso della vittima”. Tutti elementi non previsti dalla normativa europea e italiana. Così come “desta preoccupazione l’eccessiva durata dei procedimenti giudiziari, in particolare della fase investigativa”.

    Il gruppo di esperti sottolinea poi la persistenza di segnalazioni di presunte vittime di tratta “perseguite e condannate per attività illecite commesse durante la tratta, come il traffico di droga, il possesso di un documento d’identità falso o l’ingresso irregolare”. Un problema che spesso porta la persona in carcere e non nei progetti di accoglienza specializzati. Che in Italia aumentano. Il Greta accoglie infatti con favore “l’aumento dei fondi messi a disposizione per l’assistenza alle vittime e la disponibilità di un maggior numero di posti per le vittime di tratta, anche per uomini e transgender” sottolineando però la necessità di prevedere un “finanziamento più sostenibile”. In questo momento i bandi per i progetti pubblicati dal Dipartimento per le pari opportunità, hanno una durata tra i 17 e i 18 mesi.

    C’è poi la difficoltà nell’accesso all’assistenza legale gratuita che dovrebbe essere garantita alle vittime che invece, spesso, si trovano obbligate a dimostrare di non avere beni di proprietà non solo in Italia ma anche nei loro Paesi d’origine per poter accedere alle forme di consulenza legale gratuita. Problematico è anche l’accesso all’assistenza sanitaria. “I professionisti del Sistema sanitario nazionale -scrive il Greta- non sono formati per assistere le vittime di tratta con gravi traumi e mancano mediatori culturali formati per partecipare alla fornitura di assistenza psicologica”.

    Come detto, il focus degli esperti riguarda la tratta per sfruttamento lavorativo. Su cui l’Italia ha adottato diverse misure di protezione per le vittime ma che però restano insufficienti. “Lo sfruttamento del lavoro continua a essere profondamente radicato in alcuni settori che dipendono fortemente dalla manodopera migrante” ed è necessario “garantire risorse che risorse sufficienti siano messe a disposizione degli ispettori del lavoro, rafforzando il monitoraggio dei settori a rischio e garantendo che le condizioni di vita e di lavoro dei lavoratori migranti soddisfare i requisiti previsti dalla normativa al fine di prevenire abusi”.

    Infine il Greta bacchetta il governo italiano su diversi aspetti relativi alla nuova normativa sui richiedenti asilo. “Temiamo che le misure restrittive adottate dall’Italia favoriscano un clima di criminalizzazione dei migranti, con il risultato che molte potenziali vittime della tratta non denunciano i loro casi per paura di detenzione e deportazione”, scrivono gli esperti. Sottolineando la preoccupazione rispetto al “rischio di aumento del numero di richiedenti asilo nei centri di detenzione amministrativa” previsto dagli ultimi provvedimenti normativi che aumenterebbe la possibilità anche per le vittime di tratta non ancora identificate di essere recluse. Un rischio riscontrato anche per il Protocollo sottoscritto con l’Albania per gli impatti che avrà “sull’individuazione e la protezione delle persone vulnerabili salvate in mare”.

    Sul punto, nelle risposte inviate al Greta l’8 febbraio 2024, il governo italiano sottolinea che il protocollo siglato con la controparte albanese “non si applicherà alle persone vulnerabili, incluse le vittime di tratta”. Resta il punto della difficoltà di identificazione fatta subito dopo il soccorso, spesso in condizioni precarie dopo una lunga e faticosa traversata.

    Ma nelle dieci pagine di osservazioni inviate da parte dell’Italia, salta all’occhio la puntualizzazione rispetto alla richiesta del Greta di sospendere il memorandum d’intesa tra Italia e Libia che fa sì che “un numero crescente di migranti salvati o intercettati nel Mediterraneo vengano rimpatriati in Libia dove rischiano -scrivono gli esperti- di subire gravi violazioni dei diritti umani, tra cui la schiavitù, il lavoro forzato e lo sfruttamento sessuale”. Nella risposta, infatti, il governo sottolinea che ha scelto di cooperare con le autorità libiche “con l’obiettivo di ridurre i morti in mare, nel pieno rispetto dei diritti umani” e che la collaborazione “permette di combattere più efficacemente le reti di trafficanti di esseri umani e di coloro che contrabbandano i migranti”. Con il rispetto dei diritti umani, del diritti umanitario e internazionale che è “sempre stata una priorità”. Evidentemente non rispettata. Ma c’è un dettaglio in più.

    Quel contrasto al traffico di migranti alla base anche del memorandum con la Libia, sbandierato a più riprese dall’esecutivo italiano (“Andremo a cercare gli ‘scafisti’ lungo tutto il globo terracqueo”, disse la premier Giorgia Meloni a inizio marzo 2023) viene messo in discussione nel rapporto. Dopo aver sottolineato la diminuzione delle indagini sui trafficanti di esseri umani, il Greta scrive che i “capitani” delle navi che arrivano in Italia “potrebbero essere stati costretti tramite minacce, violenza fisica e abuso di una posizione di vulnerabilità nel partecipare all’attività criminali”. Indicatori che li farebbero ricadere nella “categoria” delle vittime di tratta. “Nessuno, però, è stato considerato come tale”, osservano gli esperti. Si scioglie come neve al sole la retorica sulla “guerra” ai trafficanti. I pezzi grossi restano, nel frattempo, impuniti.

    https://altreconomia.it/il-consiglio-deuropa-chiede-allitalia-di-garantire-piu-protezione-alle-

    #traite_d'êtres_humains #Italie #protection #Conseil_de_l'Europe #exploitation #Greta #rapport #agriculture #industrie_textile #hôtelerie #bâtiment #BTS #services_domestiques #restauration #indemnisation #accès_à_la_santé #criminalisation_de_la_migration #Albanie

  • Finland: Concern over right to seek asylum and need for human rights safeguards after full closure of Eastern land border

    In a letter addressed to the Minister of Interior of Finland, #Mari_Rantanen, published today, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, raises concerns about the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants following the temporary closure of Finland’s Eastern land border.

    While acknowledging concerns about the potential instrumentalisation by the Russian Federation of the movement of asylum seekers and migrants, “it is crucial that Council of Europe member states, even when dealing with challenging situations at their borders, react in a manner that fully aligns with their human rights obligations”, writes the Commissioner.

    The Commissioner expresses her concern that decisions to restrict and subsequently close access to the border may impact notably on the right to seek asylum, as well as the principle of non-refoulement and prohibition of collective expulsion. She asks for several clarifications on safeguards implemented and measures taken to ensure human rights protection, and to prevent a humanitarian crisis from unfolding in the context of worsening weather conditions at the border.

    The letter follows up on previous dialogue regarding legislative amendments allowing the Finnish government to restrict access to the border and concentrate applications for international protection at one or more crossing points.

    Read the Commissioner’s letter addressed to the Minister of Interior of Finland: https://rm.coe.int/letter-to-the-minister-of-interior-of-finland-concerning-the-human-rig/1680adab75

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/finland-concern-over-right-to-seek-asylum-and-need-for-human-rights-safeguards-

    #Finlande #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #fermeture_des_frontières #lettre #Russie

    • Il confine tra Russia e Finlandia è «un inferno fatto di ghiaccio».

      Il governo finlandese chiude i valichi di frontiera fino al 14 gennaio.

      Il 14 dicembre 2023, in una sessione straordinaria, il governo finlandese ha deciso la chiusura dell’intero confine orientale della Finlandia con la Russia. I valichi di frontiera di #Imatra, #Kuusamo, #Niirala, #Nuijamaa, #Raja-Jooseppi, #Salla, #Vaalimaa e #Vartius sono stati chiusi e lo saranno fino al 14 gennaio 2024. «Di conseguenza, le domande di protezione internazionale alle frontiere esterne della Finlandia saranno ricevute solo dai valichi di frontiera degli aeroporti e dei porti marittimi» ha comunicato il governo guidato da Petteri Orpo, entrato in carica il 20 giugno scorso.

      La decisione, motivata dalla difesa della sicurezza nazionale e l’ordine pubblico in Finlandia, è avvenuta nello stesso giorno in cui si erano riaperti due valichi di frontiera, dopo una prima chiusura di tutto il confine iniziata il 18 novembre 2023.

      Il governo di Helsinki accusa il governo russo di aver orchestrato l’arrivo dei richiedenti asilo ai valichi di frontiera come ritorsione per l’adesione del Paese nordico all’alleanza militare della NATO, formalizzata il 4 aprile scorso.

      «Questo è un segno che le autorità russe stanno continuando la loro operazione ibrida contro la Finlandia. È una cosa che non tollereremo», ha dichiarato la ministra dell’Interno Mari Rantanen.

      Intanto anche la Lettonia e la Lituania 2 stanno prendendo in considerazione l’idea di chiudere le loro frontiere.

      Per far fronte alla situazione sul confine orientale la guardia di frontiera ha chiesto supporto a Frontex (Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera e costiera), che aveva già inviato personale alla fine di novembre in Carelia settentrionale (una regione storica, la parte più orientale della Finlandia).

      Oltre alla sorveglianza del territorio, l’adesione della Finlandia alla Nato porterà alla costruzione di una recinzione sul confine con la Russia che è lungo 1.340 chilometri. L’opera richiede circa 380 milioni di euro e dai tre ai quattro anni di tempo per essere completata. Rappresenterà la struttura fisica di “protezione” più lunga tra il blocco dell’alleanza atlantica e la Federazione russa.

      I lavori di costruzione della barriera, che sarà situata sul confine sud-orientale per una lunghezza complessiva di circa 200 km, sono partiti con una prima recinzione pilota di circa 3 chilometri che è stata costruita a Pelkola.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8d_qVqN3yUo&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.meltingpot.org%

      Ora è iniziata l’implementazione della fase successiva, che prevede la costruzione di circa 70 chilometri di barriera ai valichi di frontiera e nell’area circostante nel periodo 2024-2025. La barriera, secondo quanto riporta la guardia di frontiera, è una combinazione di una recinzione, una strada adiacente, un’apertura libera da alberi e un sistema di sorveglianza tecnica. Quest’ultimo è definito come uno strumento importante per il controllo delle frontiere.

      In occasione della prima chiusura dei valichi di frontiera, avvenuta nel mese di novembre, diverse istituzioni e ONG hanno criticato questa scelta che compromette il diritto a chiedere asilo. Da Amnesty international all’UNHCR fino al Commissario per l’uguaglianza finlandese.

      Fra le prese di posizione anche quella della Commissaria per i diritti umani del Consiglio d’Europa, Dunja Mijatović, che in una lettera alla Ministra degli Interni finlandese, Mari Rantanen, ha ricordato che «è fondamentale che gli Stati membri del Consiglio d’Europa, anche in situazioni difficili alle loro frontiere, reagiscono in modo pienamente conforme ai loro obblighi in materia di diritti umani». Ha, inoltre, chiesto chiarimenti sulle salvaguardie attuate e sulle misure adottate per garantire la tutela dei diritti umani e per evitare che si verifichi una crisi umanitaria a causa del peggioramento delle condizioni meteorologiche.

      In un comunicato del mese di dicembre, Amnesty International 3 ha affermato che «chiedere asilo è un diritto umano. Il Ministro degli Interni Rantanen sta ignorando i richiedenti asilo e la loro situazione in modo disumano. Nel mondo ci sono più persone che sono state costrette a lasciare le loro case che mai, e limitare il diritto di chiedere asilo non è la risposta».

      L’organizzazione per i diritti umani ha sottolineato che dalle loro precedenti ricerche si è dimostrato che la chiusura delle frontiere ha aumentato la violenza e spinto le persone in cerca di asilo su rotte ancora più pericolose.

      «Nel profondo sono davvero disperato e spero solo che arrivino giorni migliori, il prima possibile. Mi sento come se vivessi in un inferno fatto di ghiaccio, dove la mia vita è arrivata a un punto in cui non c’è via d’uscita, la fine del mio lungo cammino da quando ho lasciato il mio Paese, la Siria». E’ la testimonianza di Nasser, siriano di 43 anni, raccolta da InfoMigrants 4.

      Secondo le informazioni diffuse dal governo finlandese la chiusura dei valichi di frontiera è prevista fino al 14 gennaio. Sarà da capire se questa decisione verrà prorogata e cosa ne è del diritto di asilo in Finlandia.

      1. Studentessa di lettere moderne a Padova. Proseguirò i miei studi con una magistrale in relazioni internazionali in quanto sono molto interessata alla politica, internazionale e al sociale
      2. Border Closure Raises Fears Among Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Ecre (15 dicembre 2023)
      3. Il comunicato stampa (finlandese)
      4. Stuck at the Russian-Finnish border: ‘I feel that I will die here, in the cold’, Michaël Da Costa – InfoMigrants (4 dicembre 2023)

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2024/01/il-confine-tra-russia-e-finlandia-e-un-inferno-fatto-di-ghiaccio

      #sécurité_nationale #ordre_public #Frontex #murs #barrières_frontalières #Pelkola #technologie #asile #droit_d'asile

    • Entre 2 000 et 3 000 migrants massés à la frontière russo-finlandaise, toujours fermée

      Entre 2 000 et 3 000 exilés sont actuellement bloqués à la frontière russo-finlandaise, fermée totalement depuis décembre 2023 et jusqu’en février prochain. Helsinki accuse Moscou d’avoir orchestré cet afflux de migrants pour déstabiliser la Finlande, après son adhésion à l’OTAN en avril dernier. Les relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays n’ont cessé de se dégrader depuis l’offensive russe en Ukraine en 2022.

      La pression migratoire s’accroît à la frontière russo-finlandaise. Entre 2 000 et 3 000 migrants sont actuellement bloqués dans la zone frontalière, depuis la fermeture totale de la frontière finlandaise orientale en décembre 2023.

      Le pays scandinave reproche à la Russie de laisser passer délibérément un flux de migrants sur le sol finlandais, à des fins politiques, pour ébranler l’Union européenne (UE). De son côté, le Kremlin nie et rejette ces accusations.

      Selon Le Monde, la plupart des migrants sont entrés légalement en Russie avant de bénéficier de la complicité d’agents de police russes pour les déposer à la frontière finlandaise qu’ils franchissent en vélo, le franchissement à pied étant interdit.

      D’après Euronews, les exilés payent jusqu’à 6 000 euros les passeurs pour atteindre la frontière finlandaise. Dans un témoignage aux Observateurs de France 24, un passeur a également expliqué soudoyer des garde-frontières finlandais pour laisser passer les migrants : « On donne 500 dollars [457 euros, ndlr] aux garde-frontières par migrant ». Depuis la fermeture de la frontière, les passages réussis sont cependant plus rares - voire impossibles. La semaine dernière, quatre migrants ont été interpellés par les garde-frontières finlandais à Parikkala, en Carélie du Sud, alors qu’ils tentaient de franchir la frontière.
      Volume inhabituel de demandeurs d’asile

      Depuis début août 2023, les autorités finlandaises assure que près de 1 000 demandeurs d’asile sans-papiers, originaires de Somalie, du Yémen ou encore d’Irak, se sont présentés aux postes-frontières séparant les deux pays, pour entrer en Finlande. Un volume inhabituel pour le petit pays nordique de 5,5 millions d’habitants, qui comptabilise d’ordinaire plutôt une dizaine de demandeurs d’asile chaque mois à cette frontière.

      En réponse à ces mouvements de population, la Finlande a renforcé ses patrouilles le long de sa frontière. Elle a fait état sur X (ex-Twitter) de « plus de patrouilles que d’habitude, un contrôle technique plus étendu et un équipement plus polyvalent que d’habitude pour les patrouilles ». L’agence des garde-côtes européenne Frontex a également déployé 55 agents à la frontière finlandaise début décembre.

      https://twitter.com/rajavartijat/status/1747196574554349673

      La Finlande a, par ailleurs, entamé en février 2023 la construction d’une clôture de trois mètres de hauteur sur 200 km à sa frontière avec la Russie, longue de 1 340 km, pour anticiper les futurs mouvements de populations.
      Détérioration des relations entre la Finlande et la Russie

      Helsinki accuse aussi le Kremlin de lui faire payer le prix de sa coopération militaire avec les États-Unis. Le 18 décembre dernier, Washington a signé un accord lui permettant d’accéder à 15 bases militaires en Finlande, et d’y prépositionner du matériel.

      Pendant des années, la Finlande a refusé de rejoindre l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN) pour éviter de contrarier son voisin russe. Mais les relations entre les deux pays se sont progressivement dégradées depuis l’invasion russe en l’Ukraine, en février 2022. En avril 2023, la Finlande a finalement rejoint l’OTAN, craignant que l’offensive russe ne s’étende à d’autres pays limitrophes. De son côté, Vladimir Poutine a accusé les Occidentaux d’avoir « entraîné la Finlande dans l’Otan » et affirmé que cette adhésion allait créer des « problèmes » là où il n’y « en avait pas ».


      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54531/entre-2-000-et-3-000-migrants-masses-a-la-frontiere-russofinlandaise-t

    • Finland extended the closure of crossing points at the border with Russia until at least mid-April yesterday.

      This also means that no asylum applications can be submitted there.

      🇫🇮 first started closing the border in November, after the arrival of hundreds of asylum seekers.

      https://twitter.com/InfoMigrants/status/1755974773224378457

    • Face à la menace russe, le virage vers l’ouest de la Finlande

      Helsinki accuse Moscou d’envoyer des migrants à la frontière entre les deux pays, une « #attaque_hybride » en réponse à son adhésion à l’Otan. La fin des échanges, amorcée dès l’épidémie de Covid, transforme la vie locale, mais le pays reste décidé à regarder vers l’Ouest.

      Le capitaine Jyrki Karhunen marche seul au milieu d’une nationale enneigée du sud-est de la Finlande. Celle-ci mène au poste-frontière d’Imatra, désert, dans la région de Carélie du Sud. La Russie n’est qu’à quelques kilomètres, cachée derrière les vastes forêts de pins, de sapins et de bouleaux.

      « Aujourd’hui, il ne se passe plus rien ici, c’est paisible », explique Jyrki Karhunen. Ce matin de février, seul un SUV de touristes s’introduit dans le paysage figé. « Il est impossible de passer côté russe », indique le capitaine à ces Finlandais en doudoune et lunettes de soleil miroirs. Pour cela, il faut maintenant transiter par l’Estonie ou la Turquie, à plus de 2 000 kilomètres.

      En novembre, le gouvernement d’Helsinki a en effet fermé la totalité de sa frontière orientale avec la Russie, longue de 1 340 kilomètres. Ses points de passage resteront fermés au moins jusqu’au 14 avril, à l’exception d’une entrée ouverte au fret. La Finlande, voisine de la Norvège et de la Suède au nord, ouverte sur la mer Baltique à l’ouest et au sud, se coupe ainsi totalement de la Russie, son unique voisine à l’est.

      Avant la pandémie de Covid et l’invasion de l’Ukraine par Moscou en 2022, 9 millions de personnes franchissaient chaque année cette longue frontière peu habitée où règne la taïga. Les commerciaux y transportaient le bois des riches forêts et ses produits dérivés. Les 90 000 Russes de Finlande retournaient voir leurs proches. Les touristes russes affluaient sur les rives du grand lac Saimaa, dépensant chaque jour 1 million d’euros dans la région de Carélie du Sud.

      Mais l’attaque russe en Ukraine a progressivement affecté ces passages. La Finlande a cessé d’octroyer des visas touristiques aux Russes. Les entreprises locales et russes ont cessé leurs collaborations.
      Un pays neutre jusqu’en 2022

      La fermeture totale de la frontière est finalement tombée fin 2023, en raison d’une « attaque hybride » de Moscou, selon les termes du gouvernement finlandais. La Russie envoie volontairement des migrants à la frontière, accuse Helsinki. L’opération « hybride » serait une réponse de Moscou à l’entrée de la Finlande dans l’Otan, en avril 2023.

      La Finlande, officiellement neutre militairement jusqu’en 2022, était une zone stratégique manquante sur le flanc oriental de l’Alliance atlantique. L’adhésion du pays le plus septentrional de l’UE bouscule la donne militaire de la Baltique à l’Arctique. Le Kremlin avait vite annoncé qu’il prendrait des « contre-mesures ».

      Marko Saareks, adjoint à la direction opérationnelle des gardes-frontières, ne « croi[t] pas à une intervention armée russe à la frontière dans l’immédiat ». Mais « la déstabilisation migratoire » est la principale pression, dit-il.

      Entre août et novembre 2023, environ 1 300 exilés irakiens, syriens, afghans, yéménites ou d’autres pays d’Asie ou d’Afrique sont arrivés via la Russie, des hommes pour la plupart et quelques familles. Ils ont été « aidés et escortés ou transportés jusqu’à la frontière par les gardes-frontières russes », affirme le premier ministre, Petteri Orpo.

      Les arrivées « restent faibles », concèdent les autorités finlandaises, proportionnellement à celles d’autres pays aux frontières externes de l’UE, comme la Grèce. Mais elles sont « inhabituelles » dans ce pays nordique de 5,5 millions d’habitant·es, loin d’être situé sur une route migratoire fréquentée.
      La crainte de l’espionnage

      « Des migrants attendent de l’autre côté. Ils viendront très probablement dès que nous ouvrirons la frontière. Notre crainte est qu’il y ait des espions parmi eux, précise Marko Saareks. Des migrants sont surveillés par Moscou. Les services de renseignement des consulats russes ont quitté la Finlande. Nous soupçonnons Moscou de vouloir renvoyer des agents. »

      Pour être sûre de « contrôler les flux migratoires », poursuit-il, la Finlande construit également une barrière antimigrants de 200 kilomètres de long. Dissimulés derrière les hauts arbres près du poste-frontière d’Imatra, des poteaux d’acier hauts de 3 mètres sortent de la terre gelée. Le chantier, à l’arrêt pendant l’hiver, où le mercure descend jusqu’à − 25 °C, ne doit s’achever qu’en 2026.

      Aujourd’hui, rares sont les exilés qui franchissent la frontière fermée. Un seul y est parvenu, frigorifié, mi-février. Il a été envoyé dans l’un des centres de rétention ou d’accueil du pays. Celui de Joutseno, une ancienne prison rénovée perdue entre les bouleaux, à une quinzaine de kilomètres de la frontière, héberge une centaine de réfugié·es.

      « Nous ne sommes pas utilisés comme armes par Moscou, personne ne m’a poussé vers la Finlande, c’est mon choix, se défend Moayad Salami, un Syrien venu en novembre, qui parle ouvertement à la presse. C’était pour moi le chemin le plus accessible pour rejoindre l’UE. » Pour cet avocat, « depuis que cette frontière est fermée, les réfugiés tentent leur chance ailleurs ». Mais lui raconte une traversée « facile ».

      Il a d’abord acheté un visa russe 2 700 euros à des passeurs pour rejoindre la Russie. Il envisageait de tenter un passage en Pologne via le Bélarus, « mais c’était trop dangereux » au Bélarus, dit-il. Moayad a alors payé des passeurs pour rejoindre la frontière finlandaise en taxi depuis Saint-Pétersbourg, à 160 kilomètres d’ici.

      Avant 2022, un filtrage aux postes-frontières était censé être opéré selon un accord tacite entre la Russie et la Finlande. « Les gardes-frontières russes m’ont laissé partir sans problème, relate Moayad. Mais ils m’ont forcé à leur acheter un vélo à 270 euros pour traverser. » Il ajoute : « Des gardes-frontières russes m’ont ensuite suivi en voiture à distance, pour être sûrs, j’imagine, que je partais bien du pays. »

      Comme lui, plusieurs exilés interrogés assurent avoir été contraints d’acheter à un prix trop élevé des vélos « de mauvaise qualité, qui ne valaient même pas 15-20 euros », à des gardes-frontières ou à leurs « complices ».

      D’autres réfugiés expliquent être restés quelque temps en Russie avant de rejoindre la Finlande. Viku*, un ressortissant pakistanais qui ne souhaite pas donner son nom, a ainsi vécu deux ans à Saint-Pétersbourg. « J’ai étudié les technologies de l’information, je ne trouvais pas d’emploi dans mon secteur et je me sentais harcelé par les autorités. Alors je suis venu en Finlande pour travailler. On dit que c’est le pays où l’on est le plus heureux au monde ! », sourit-il.

      Samir*, un Afghan de 23 ans, en doute, tant le temps s’écoule lentement dans le centre isolé. Étudiant en Russie, il a fui après l’expiration de son visa, « de peur d’être renvoyé en Afghanistan sous la coupe des talibans ». Comme la majorité des réfugiés ici, il attend un entretien qui ne vient pas pour sa demande d’asile.

      « Ces personnes viennent de pays en tension, ou en guerre, comme le Yémen et la Syrie, et sont pour la plupart éligibles à l’asile. Il est absurde de les considérer soudain comme les armes d’une opération hybride, déplore Pia Lindfors, directrice du Centre finlandais de conseil pour les réfugiés, à Helsinki. S’ils étaient des espions, comme l’ont suggéré certaines autorités et hommes politiques, ils ne seraient pas arrivés en tant que demandeurs d’asile. Ils ne seraient pas isolés dans des camps comme ils le sont actuellement. »

      Pia Lindfors déplore la fermeture de cette frontière, contraire au droit d’asile. Tout comme le discours radicalement antimigrants, porté par le Parti des Finlandais, qui gagne du terrain. Cette force politique d’extrême droite a placé ses membres à des postes clés du gouvernement de Petteri Orpo, formé en juin 2023. Celui-ci comprend des membres de quatre partis : la Coalition nationale, présidée par Petteri Orpo, le Parti populaire suédois de Finlande, les chrétiens-démocrates et le Parti des Finlandais. Ce dernier parti extrémiste affiche de longue date son hostilité à l’immigration, qu’il juge « préjudiciable aux finances et à la sécurité ».

      La politique de défense se mélange aujourd’hui à la politique migratoire, au nom de la « sécurité nationale ». La tendance se retrouve dans d’autres pays de l’UE. La Pologne, à titre d’exemple, est accusée de bafouer les droits des demandeurs et demandeuses d’asile à sa frontière avec le Bélarus, qu’elle accuse aussi de « guerre hybride ». Mais ces dérogations d’accès à l’asile pourraient devenir légales à l’échelle européenne, alertent des ONG : la Commission européenne discute de mesures exceptionnelles à mettre en place en cas de « situations d’instrumentalisation de l’immigration ».
      Une logique de « dissuasion »

      La pression migratoire est-elle la seule « menace russe » qui pousse à la fermeture totale de la frontière ? La Baltique, qui borde la Finlande, est un point de tension. Le sabotage des gazoducs Nord Stream, en 2022, n’a toujours pas été élucidé. La Russie a lancé en août des manœuvres navales et aériennes dans cette vaste mer, baptisées « Bouclier océanique 2023 ». Enfin, en décembre, Vladimir Poutine a déclaré : « Il n’y avait aucun problème [à la frontière finlandaise], mais il y en aura maintenant, car nous allons créer le district militaire de Léningrad et y concentrer un certain nombre d’unités. »

      « En Finlande, nous n’avons pas peur de Poutine, mais nous surveillons de près ses actions, déclare avec assurance Pekka Toveri, un député du parti de la Coalition nationale. Comme lui, six anciens militaires siègent aujourd’hui dans l’hémicycle de 200 député·es, un nombre inédit.

      Pekka Toveri étale les atouts militaires d’une Finlande « qui est prête » en cas d’attaque. « Nous avons une bonne armée, 12 000 soldats et quelque 870 000 réservistes, nos entreprises sont prêtes à contribuer à l’effort de guerre », expose l’ancien officier qui veut maintenant « participer au défi d’adhésion à l’Otan ». Environ 60 à 65 % de la population y était réticente avant le conflit ukrainien, « mais la grande majorité y est favorable depuis la guerre en Ukraine », plaide-t-il.

      Partisan d’un engagement sans limite dans l’Alliance atlantique, le président élu en février et investi le 1er mars, Alexander Stubb, est maintenant prêt à autoriser le stockage et le transport d’armes nucléaires sur le territoire. Parallèlement, Helsinki a renforcé sa coopération militaire avec les États-Unis, autorisant l’armée américaine à accéder à quinze installations et zones finlandaises.

      Le virage vers l’ouest est indispensable, considère Pekka Toveri. « Nous connaissons bien les Russes, nous savons que la technique du bâton est celle qui fonctionne le mieux. Il faut rester ferme, la plainte ne fonctionne pas », détaille-t-il, basant son analyse sur un siècle de relations avec le voisin russe.

      La Finlande a fait partie de l’empire russe jusqu’en 1917, avant d’être indépendante. Elle n’a jamais appartenu à l’Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques (URSS). Mais l’attaque de la Finlande par les Soviétiques en 1939, dite guerre d’hiver, a marqué les esprits. « Nous savions que Moscou était capable de nous menacer. Notre principe de neutralité [revendiqué depuis la fin des années 1940 – ndlr] était comme une politique du Yin et du Yang, estime Pekka Toveri. Nous avions une politique de bon voisinage mais nous étions prudents et avions une bonne défense. Nous avons par exemple construit des bunkers capables d’abriter 900 000 personnes depuis le début de la guerre froide. »

      Pour Heikki Patomaki, professeur de relations internationales à l’université d’Helsinki, une mentalité basée sur une « croyance presque exclusive dans la dissuasion et à travers la militarisation rapide de la société » s’intensifie depuis 2022.

      À la chute de l’URSS, surtout, les liens des deux pays s’étaient réchauffés : « Le non-alignement militaire persistant et les nombreuses formes de commerce et de coopération avec la Russie ont facilité de bonnes relations, au moins jusqu’à l’invasion de la Crimée en 2014 et, d’une certaine manière, jusqu’en 2021-2022, note-t-il. Rompre tout dialogue et continuer dans cette logique pourrait être dangereux. Nous avons une longue histoire avec la Russie et ne pouvons pas appliquer cette solution simple à une relation complexe. La Russie ne va pas disparaître et nous avons également un futur avec elle. »

      Signe que la situation est incertaine, les officiels l’accordent : la fermeture de la frontière ne peut être définitive. « Ce n’est pas notre but. Nous avons des échanges commerciaux et une diaspora russe, souligne l’adjoint à la direction opérationnelle des gardes-frontières, Marko Saareks. Mais nous cherchons encore les solutions pour l’ouvrir sans risques. »

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/010324/face-la-menace-russe-le-virage-vers-l-ouest-de-la-finlande

      #Joutseno #Imatra

    • Finland decides to close border with Russia indefinitely

      The Finnish government has decided to keep the border with Russia closed “until further notice,” Finland’s Interior Ministry reported on April 4.

      Finland closed its border with Russia in late November 2023 after Russia orchestrated an influx of migrants as a way to pressure Helsinki.

      In November alone, around 900 asylum seekers from countries like Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen entered Finland from Russia.

      Finland decided in February to keep the border closed until April 14, but the latest decision means that the border crossing will remain shut until the risk of “instrumentalized migration” falls, the Interior Ministry said.

      “The threat assessment is the same and also the assessment that if the border stations were to be opened, it would probably have led to the same situation as before, when they were opened,” Prime Minister Petteri Orpo said in parliament, according to Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat.

      Finland’s government also decided to close several crossing points for maritime traffic to leisure boating due to concerns that Russia may encourage migrants to reach Finland by sea or over lakes.

      “This would be dangerous for people trying to land and would put a burden on sea rescue,” the Interior Ministry said.

      Russia’s strategy of sending asylum seekers to Finland’s eastern border was similar to the situation at the border between Belarus and Poland in 2021, when Minsk encouraged thousands of asylum seekers from the Middle East and Africa to try to reach the EU via the Polish border.

      Most of the migrants were violently pushed back by Polish border guards who set up a no-access zone at the border for nine months.

      https://kyivindependent.com/finland-decides-to-close-border-with-russia-indefinitely

    • Finland closes border crossings with Russia indefinitely

      The Finnish government has announced the country’s border with Russia will remain closed indefinitely. The decision comes on the heels of several closures and reopenings over the past five months.

      On Thursday (April 4), the Finnish Ministry of the Interior said the country’s border crossings with neighboring Russia will remain closed.

      The move comes after the government in February ordered the closure of the border until April 14. As of April 4, this measure has now been extended until further notice.

      In addition, the sea crossings on the island of Haapasaari, in the port of Nuijamaa and on the island of Santio will be closed to “leisure boating” from April 15. Finland wants to prevent the threat of targeted migration from Russia in the spring by closing the harbors to maritime traffic.

      In the press release, the government said that irregular migration into Finland from Russia “could expand to maritime traffic” during spring. “This would be dangerous to people seeking to enter Finland and would burden maritime search and rescue,” the government claims.

      The indefinite closure means that migrants will still not be able to apply for asylum at the border crossings — with the exception of “other border crossing points for maritime traffic and at border crossing points for air traffic,” a corresponding press release (https://intermin.fi/en/-/finland-s-eastern-border-to-remain-closed-until-further-notice) reads.

      ’Instrumentalized migration’ expected to increase

      According to the press release, the Finnish government expects the “instrumentalized migration” from Russia to continue and increase. This would pose a “serious threat to Finland’s national security and public order,” the press release reads.

      “Finnish authorities see this as a long-term situation. We have not seen anything this spring that would lead us to conclude that the situation has changed meaningfully,” Finland’s Minister of the Interior Mari Rantanen is quoted in the press release. “In addition, spring will provide opportunities to put more pressure on Finland. There are hundreds and possibly thousands of people close to Finland’s border on the Russian side that could be instrumentalized against Finland.”

      Finland, which shares a more than 1,300-kilometer-long border with Russia, began gradually closing (https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/53925/finland-to-close-entire-border-with-russia-again) the frontier crossings in November.

      Despite both being external borders for the EU and NATO following Finland’s inclusion in the military alliance a year ago, the Finnish-Russian border runs mostly through taiga forests and does not follow any rivers.

      Rights groups including the Council of Europe have been raising concerns over the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants amid the border closures with Russia.

      The Finnish authorities, meanwhile, accuse Moscow of deliberately bringing undocumented asylum seekers to the posts in order to cause problems for the EU and NATO country. The Kremlin denies this.

      There were no immediate reactions to Finland’s move by the Kremlin in Moscow.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/56264/finland-closes-border-crossings-with-russia-indefinitely

  • Meloni, accordo con Rama prevede 2 centri migranti in Albania

    “L’accordo prevede di allestire centri per migranti in Albania che possano contenere fino a 3mila persone”. Lo ha detto la premier Giorgia Meloni dopo l’incontro a Palazzo Chigi con il primo ministro dell’Albania Edi Rama. “L’accordo che sigliamo oggi – ha aggiunto - arricchisce di un ulteriore tassello la collaborazione” tra i due Paesi e “quando ne abbiamo iniziato a discutere siamo partiti dall’idea che l’immigrazione illegale di massa è un fenomeno che nessuno Stato Ue può affrontare da solo e la collaborazione tra Stati Ue e Stati per ora extra Ue – per ora - è fondamentale”. “In questi due centri” i migranti resteranno “il tempo necessario per le procedure e una volta a regime nei centri ci potrà essere un flusso annuale complessivo di 36 mila persone”. “L’accordo non riguarda i minori e donne in gravidanza ed i soggetti vulnerabili – precisa – la giurisdizione sarà italiana. L’Albania collabora sulla sorveglianza esterna delle strutture. All’accordo che disegna la cornice, seguiranno una serie di protocolli. Contiamo di rendere operativi i centri in primavera”. (ANSA).

    https://it.euronews.com/2023/11/06/meloni-accordo-con-rama-prevede-2-centri-migranti-in-albania

    #Italie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Albanie #accord #externalisation #centres

    ajouté à la Métaliste sur l’#accord entre #Italie et #Albanie pour la construction de #centres d’accueil (sic) et identification des migrants/#réfugiés sur le territoire albanais...
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1043873

    –-

    Et ajouté à la métaliste sur les différentes tentatives de différentes pays européens d’#externalisation non seulement des contrôles frontaliers, mais aussi de la #procédure_d'asile dans des #pays_tiers
    https://seenthis.net/messages/900122

    • Migranti, accordo Italia-Albania. Meloni: “Centri italiani nel loro Paese”. Il Pd: “Un pericoloso pasticcio”. Ue: “L’Italia rispetti il diritto comunitario”

      Il premier Edi Rama ricevuto a Palazzo Chigi dove è stato siglato un protocollo d’intesa in materia di gestione dei flussi. Accoglieranno fino a 3mila persone, solo coloro che saranno salvati in mare. Protestano + Europa e Avs

      La presidente del Consiglio Giorgia Meloni ha ricevuto a Palazzo Chigi il primo ministro dell’Albania Edi Rama. «Sono contenta di annunciare con lui un protocollo d’intesa tra Italia e Albania in materia di gestione dei flussi migranti. L’Italia è il primo partner commerciale dell’Albania. C’è una strettissima collaborazione che già esiste nella lotta all’illegalità – dice Meloni durante le dichiarazioni congiunte con il collega albanese – L’accordo prevede di allestire due centri migranti in Albania che possano contenere fino 3mila persone. E arricchisce di un ulteriore tassello la collaborazione» tra i due Paesi e «quando ne abbiamo iniziato a discutere siamo partiti dall’idea che l’immigrazione illegale di massa è un fenomeno che nessuno Stato Ue può affrontare da solo e la collaborazione tra stati Ue e stati - per ora - è fondamentale».

      Un accordo contro cui si scagliano le opposizioni e che il Pd definisce “un pericoloso pasticcio”. Mentre da Bruxelles un portavoce della Commissione europea all’Adnkronos dice: «Siamo stati informati di questo accordo, ma non abbiamo ancora ricevuto informazioni dettagliate: l’accordo operativo deve ancora essere tradotto in legge dall’Italia e ulteriormente implementato. È importante che qualsiasi accordo di questo tipo rispetti pienamente il diritto comunitario e internazionale».

      L’incontro tra i due primi ministri è stata anche l’occasione per ribadire il sostegno dell’Italia all’ingresso di Tirana in Ue. "L’Albania si conferma una nazione amica e nonostante non sia ancora parte dell’Unione si comporta come se fosse un paese membro e questa è una delle ragioni per cui sono fiera che l’Italia sia da sempre uno dei paesi sostenitori dell’allargamento ai Balcani occidentali”. E ancora. «L’Ue non è un club. Quindi, io non parlo di ingressi ma di riunificazione dei Balcani occidentali che sono Paesi Ue a tutti gli effetti», osserva Meloni. Che ricorda anche come l’Italia sia «il primo partner commerciale dell’Albania. Il nostro interscambio vale circa il 20% del Pil albanese. Ci sono intensi rapporti culturali e sociali. È una strettissima collaborazione che già esiste nella lotta all’illegalità. L’accordo di oggi arricchisce questa collaborazione con un ulteriore tassello», conclude la premier.
      Le reazioni

      Se la destra plaude all’intesa tra l’Italia e l’Albania, le opposizioni insorgono. «L’accordo che il governo Meloni ha raggiunto con il governo albanese sembra configurarsi come un pericoloso pasticcio, parecchio ambiguo. Se infatti si è, come sembra, di fronte a richiedenti asilo, appare assolutamente inimmaginabile compiere con personale italiano e senza esborso di risorse, come annunciato, le procedure di verifica delle domande d’asilo», attacca Pierfrancesco Majorino, responsabile Politiche migratorie della segreteria nazionale del Pd. “Praticamente si crea una sorta di Guantanamo italiana, al di fuori di ogni standard internazionale, al di fuori dell’Ue senza che possa esserci la possibilita’ di controllare lo stato di detenzione delle persone rinchiuse in questi centri"., protesta Riccardo Magi, segretario di Più Europa. E Angelo Bonelli di Alleanza Verdi e Sinisra aggiunge: Quello che il governo ha definito come un ’importantissimo protocollo di intesa’ non è altro che una politica di respingimento mascherata da cooperazione internazionale. Il governo italiano –prosegue - sta delegando la gestione dei migranti irregolari, di fatto esternalizzando le proprie responsabilità, con il rischio di creare campi di permanenza che potrebbero non assicurare standard adeguati di accoglienza e rispetto per la dignità umana".

      Ma il ministro degli Esteri Antonio Tajani replica: «L’accordo rafforza il nostro ruolo da protagonista in Europa ed apre nuove strade di collaborazione nell’Adriatico. Contrasto all’immigrazione irregolare e bloccare la tratta di esseri umani. Queste le priorita’ della nostra politica estera».
      Il protocollo d’intesa

      Il protocollo d’intesa tra Italia e Albania in materia di gestione dei flussi migratori siglato oggi, secondo quanto si apprende da fonti di palazzo Chigi, non si applica agli immigrati che giungono sulle coste e sul territorio italiani ma a quelli salvati in mare, fatta eccezione per minori, donne in gravidanza e soggetti vulnerabili. Le strutture realizzate, viene spiegato, potranno accogliere complessivamente fino a 3mila immigrati, per una previsione di 39mila persone accolte in un anno. L’accordo si pone un obiettivo di dissuasione rispetto alle partenze e di deterrenza rispetto al traffico di esseri umani.

      La giurisdizione dei due centri per migranti in Albania sarà italiana, spiega ancora Palazzo Chigi. I migranti, viene precisato, sbarcheranno a Shengjin e l’Italia si occuperà delle procedure di sbarco e identificazione e realizzerà un centro di prima accoglienza e screening; a Gjader realizzerà una struttura modello Cpr per le successive procedure. L’Albania collaborerà con le sue forze di polizia per la sicurezza e sorveglianza. L’Albania, sottolinea ancora Palazzo Chigi, già vede un’importante presenza di forze dell’Ordine e magistrati italiani.
      Rama: “Se l’Italia chiama l’Albania c’è”

      “Se l’Italia chiama l’Albania c’è – risponde Rama – Non sta a noi giudicare il merito politico di decisioni prese in questo luogo e altre istituzioni, a noi sta rispondere ’Presente’ quando si tratta di dare una mano. Questa volta significa aiutare a gestire con un pizzico di respiro in più una situazione e difficile per l’Italia". «La geografia è diventata una maledizione per l’Italia, quando si entra in Italia si entra in Ue – spiega il premier Albanese – Noi non abbiamo la forza e la capacità di essere la soluzione ma abbiamo un dovere verso l’Italia e la capacità di dare una mano. L’Albania non fa parte dell’Unione ma è uno Stato europeo, ci manca la U davanti ma ciò non ci impedisce di essere e vedere il mondo come europei».

      https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2023/11/06/news/migranti_meloni_accordo_albania_edi_rama-419723671

      #Gjader #Shengjin #débarquement #identification #screening #premier_accueil #CPR

    • Migrants, accord Italie-Albanie. Meloni : « Des centres italiens dans leur pays ». Adhésion de Tirana à l’UE : « Nous l’avons toujours soutenue »

      Le Premier ministre Giorgia Meloni a reçu le Premier ministre de l’Albanie au Palazzo Chigi Edi Rama. “Je suis heureux d’annoncer avec lui un mémorandum d’accord entre l’Italie et l’Albanie sur la gestion des flux migratoires. L’Italie est le premier partenaire commercial de l’Albanie. Il existe déjà une collaboration très étroite dans la lutte contre l’illégalité – a déclaré Meloni lors de la réunion conjointe déclarations avec son collègue albanais – L’accord prévoit la création de centres de migrants en Albanie pouvant accueillir jusqu’à 3 mille personnes. Et il enrichit la collaboration « entre les deux pays avec une étape supplémentaire » et « lorsque nous avons commencé à en discuter, nous sommes partis du l’idée que l’immigration clandestine de masse est un phénomène auquel aucun État de l’UE ne peut lutter seul et que la collaboration entre les États de l’UE est – pour l’instant – fondamentale”.

      La rencontre entre les deux premiers ministres a également été l’occasion de réitérer le soutien de l’Italie à l’entrée de Tirana dans l’UE. “L’Albanie se confirme comme une nation amie et même si elle ne fait pas encore partie de l’Union, elle se comporte comme si elle en était un pays membre et c’est une des raisons pour laquelle je suis fier que l’Italie ait toujours été l’un des pays qui soutiennent l’élargissement. aux Balkans occidentaux”. Et encore. “L’UE n’est pas un club. Je ne parle donc pas d’entrées, mais de la réunification des Balkans occidentaux, qui sont à tous égards des pays de l’UE”, observe encore Meloni. Il rappelle également que l’Italie est “le premier partenaire commercial de l’Albanie. Nos échanges commerciaux représentent environ 20 % du PIB albanais. Il existe des relations culturelles et sociales intenses. C’est une collaboration très étroite qui existe déjà dans la lutte contre l’illégalité. L’accord d’aujourd’hui enrichit cette collaboration d’une étape supplémentaire”, conclut le Premier ministre.

      Le protocole d’accord entre l’Italie et l’Albanie sur la gestion des flux migratoires signé aujourd’hui, selon ce que l’on apprend de sources au Palazzo Chigi, ne s’applique pas aux immigrants arrivant sur les côtes et le territoire italiens mais à ceux secourus en mer, à l’exception de les mineurs, les femmes enceintes et les sujets vulnérables. Les structures créées, explique-t-on, pourront accueillir au total jusqu’à 3 mille immigrants, pour une prévision de 39 mille personnes accueillies par an. L’accord vise à dissuader les départs et à décourager la traite des êtres humains.

      « Si l’Italie appelle l’Albanie, elle est là – répond Rama – Ce n’est pas à nous de juger du mérite politique des décisions prises dans ce lieu et dans d’autres institutions, c’est à nous de répondre ‘Présent’ lorsqu’il s’agit de prêter un main. Cette fois, il s’agit d’aider à gérer une situation difficile pour l’Italie avec un peu plus de répit.” “La géographie est devenue une malédiction pour l’Italie, quand vous entrez en Italie, vous entrez dans l’UE – explique le Premier ministre Albanese – Nous n’avons pas la force et Nous avons la capacité d’être la solution, mais nous avons un devoir envers l’Italie et la capacité de lui donner un coup de main. L’Albanie ne fait pas partie de l’Union mais c’est un Etat européen, il nous manque le U devant mais cela ne nous empêche pas d’être et de voir le monde en Européens”.

      https://fr.italy24.press/local/1061085.html

    • Migrants: two structures to manage illegal flows, this is what the Italy-Albania #memorandum_of_understanding provides

      Two structures in Albanian territory under Italian jurisdiction which will serve to manage illegal migratory flows. This is the fulcrum of the memorandum of understanding signed today by Italy and Albania and announced by the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and the counterpart Edi Rama. Rama’s “surprise” visit was not officially announced until this morning when a brief note from Palazzo Chigi announced that the two heads of government would meet in the afternoon and that they would subsequently make statements to the press. The discretion of the two governments prevailed and, consequently, also the surprise effect at the time of the announcement. “It is an agreement that enriches the friendship between the two nations,” said Meloni at the time of the announcement, subsequently explaining the details of the agreement which focuses on three primary objectives: combating human trafficking, preventing it and welcoming who has the right to protection. “Albania will grant some areas of the territory”, where Italy will be able to create “two structures” for the management of illegal migrants: “they will initially be able to accommodate up to three thousand people who will remain here for the time necessary to process asylum applications and , possibly, for the purposes of repatriation", said Meloni, specifying that the agreement does not concern minors, pregnant women and vulnerable subjects.

      The prime minister also provided details on the areas which will host the two structures which, hopefully, will be ready by spring 2024. “In the port of Shengjin (the seaport located north of Albania) disembarkation and identification procedures will be taken care of, while in another more internal area another structure based on the Repatriation Retention Centers model will be created (Cpr)”, explained Meloni, adding that the Albanian police forces will cooperate to guarantee “the security and external surveillance of the structures”. According to Meloni, the agreement signed today is a further step in the close bilateral cooperation. “Mass illegal immigration is a phenomenon that EU member states cannot face alone and cooperation between EU states and, for now, non-EU states can be decisive,” said the Prime Minister, according to whom Albania confirms itself as a friend not only of Italy but also of the European Union. “Despite not yet being formally part of the EU, Albania is a candidate country but behaves as if it were already a de facto member country of the Union and this is one of the reasons why I am proud of the fact that Italy is has always been one of the greatest supporters of the entry of Albania and the Western Balkans into the Union", added Meloni, who defined the memorandum of understanding “an innovative solution” in the hope that “it can become the model for other agreements of this type”.

      Speaking at the end of Meloni’s statements, Prime Minister Rama – underlining that the idea for the agreement was born during the Prime Minister’s summer holiday in Vlore – he immediately wanted to point out that “when Italy calls, Albania is there”. “Albania is not an EU state, but it is in Europe. It is a European state, and this does not prevent us from seeing the world as Europeans,” said Rama. “We would not have made this agreement with any other EU state. There is an important relationship of a historical, cultural, but also emotional nature, which links Albania with Italy", continued the prime minister. “We can lend a hand and help manage a situation which, as everyone sees, is difficult for Italy. When you enter Italy, you enter Europe, the EU, but when it comes to managing this entry as an EU we know well how things go,” said Rama. “We don’t have the strength to be a solution, but I believe we have a duty towards Italy and a certain ability to lend a hand”, added Rama who then recalled how his country can boast a tradition of hospitality, which began by the thousands of Italians protected after the Second World War. “We have a history of hospitality”, Rama underlined, recalling that Albania welcomed more than half a million war refugees and those fleeing to survive the ethnic cleansing from Kosovo. “We also gave refuge to thousands of Afghan women when NATO abandoned Afghanistan, and to a few thousand Iranians,” added the Albanian prime minister.

      https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/migrants-two-structures-to-manage-illegal-flows%2C-this-is-what-the-Ita
      #MoU

    • Migranti: Un #Protocollo_d’intesa con l’Albania, opaco, disumano e privo di basi legali

      Con l’ennesimo annuncio propagandistico del govern si apprende che Giorgia Meloni avrebbe concluso con il premier albanese Edi Rama un Memorandum d’intesa , che prevede – la realizzazione in Albania di due centri per il rimpatrio, che dovrebbero ospitare ogni mese fino a 3000 persone definite “irregolari”, ma solo se soccorse nel Mediterraneo da navi militari italiane, come quelle della Marina Militare e della Guardia di Finanza. Più precisamente, “l’Albania darà possibilità all’Italia di utilizzare alcune aree del territorio albanese dove l’Italia potrà realizzare, a proprie spese, due strutture dove allestire centri per la gestione di migranti illegali. Inizialmente potrà accogliere fino a 3mila persone che rimarranno il tempo necessario per espletare le procedure delle domande di asilo ed eventualmente rimpatrio”. I naufraghi saranno sbarcati a Shengjin e l’Italia si occuperà delle procedure di sbarco e identificazione e realizzerà un “centro di prima accoglienza e screening” a Gjader, che di fatto sarà una “struttura modello Cpr” per le successive procedure. I due centri dovrebbero servire per processare in 28-30 giorni le richieste di asilo e per detenere coloro che si vedranno respinta la richiesta di protezione, in vista del rimpatrio nei paesi di origine. Come ha annunciato Giorgia Meloni “Dei due centri, quello al porto si occuperà delle procedure di sbarco e di identificazione con una prima attività di screening mentre il centro che verrà realizzato nell’area più interna sarà una struttura modello Cpr”.

      Secondo quanto annunciato dalle stesse fonti governative in un anno si penserebbe addirittura di fare transitare in queste nuove strutture detentive, che dovrebbero essere sotto giurisdizione italiana, ma con “sorveglianza esterna” affidata alle autorità albanesi, circa 36.000 persone. Nulla è stato comunicato sulle modalità di rimpatrio e sulle autorità che saranno incaricate di eseguire gli accompagnamenti forzati, nè su quali autorità efettueranno i trasferimenti sotto scorta dai punti di sbarco in Albania ai centri di detenzione “sotto giurisdizione italiana”. Di certo, fin dal momento dello sbarco in Albania i migranti, già ritenuti comunque “illegali”, saranno totalmente privati della libertà personale. Come impone la sentenza n.105/2001 della Corte Costituzionale qualunque procedura di allontanamento forzato attuata da autorità italiane attraverso il trattenimento in un centro di detenzione deve essere convalidata dalla decisione di un giudice. Come sarà possibile realizzare queste garanzie in territorio albanese?

      La consegna delle persone soccorse in mare alle autorità albanesi, al momento dello sbarco, fino, presumibilmente, all’ingresso nei centri di detenzione, che si asserisce sarebbero “sotto giurisdizione italiana” potrebbe costituire una ipotesi di respingimento collettivo analoga a quella riscontrata e condannata dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo nel caso Hirsi, quando nel 2009 una motovedetta della Guardia di finanza riconsegno alle autorità libiche, entrando nel porto di Tripoli, decine di naufraghi socorsi in acque internazionali (pratica illegale che comunque si protrasse fino al 2010, con trasbordi più discreti in alto mare, piuttosto che con l’ingresso delle unità militari italiane nei porti libici). In quell’occasione la Corte di Strasburgo affermò che sebbene il soccorso fosse avvenuto in acque internazionali, il codice della navigazione italiano, oltre che il diritto internazionale, riconoscono che sulla nave militare in alto mare si applica la giurisdizione dello stato della bandiera. Dunque, in quella occasione, tra il momento in cui i profughi venivano accolti a bordo delle navi italiane e quello in cui gli stessi erano consegnati alle autorità libiche a Tripoli, le autorità italiane avevano esercitato su di essi un controllo de facto che impegnava la responsabilità dello stato italiano per qualunque violazione dei diritti sanciti dalla Convenzione europea. La stessa considerazione potrà valere in futuro quando le autorità italiane consegneranno alle forze di polizia albanese i cittadini stranieri soccorsi in mare da unità militari italiane, ai fini del loro trasferimento forzato e dell’eventuale rimpatrio. Secondo il premier albanese, “Chi non ha diritto viene rimpatriato. Ma se l’Italia non riesce a fare i rimpatri dovrà riprenderseli”. La prova più evidente della riduzione delle persone a rifiuti da smaltire, la cifra morale e politica condivisa da Giorgia Meloni e da Edi Rama.

      Un progetto impraticabile e privo di basi legali, quanto previsto dal Memorandum sottoscritto dalla Meloni con il premier albanese, alla luce dei tempi previsti per le procedure nei centri di detenzione, e soprattutto a causa delle difficoltà di esecuzione delle misure di allontanamento forzato da tutti i paesi europei, anche per la mancanza di accordi di riammissione tra l’Albania e molti paesi di origine dei naufraghi che, dopo essere soccorsi in mare, dovranno affrontare in stato di detenzione procedure”accelerate” per il riconoscimento di uno status di protezione, ed una possibile deportazione. Senza potere fare valere i diritti di difesa e le garanzie della libertà personale previsti dalla Costituzione italiana (a partire dal’art.13 che impone la tempestiva convalida da parte di un giudice di ogni misura di trattenimento amministrativo attuata sotto la giurisdizione italiana) e dalle norme sovranazionali dettate dalle Nazioni Unite a protezione dei richiedenti asilo, e dall’Unione Europea in materia di rimpatri e procedure per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale. E poi, se pensiamo ai migranti soccorsi intercettati nel mare Ionio, ma anche a quelli provenienti dalla Libia o dalla Tunisia, quanti di loro provengono da paesi terzi veramente “sicuri” ? Il governo italiano non può creare una evidente disparità di trattamento tra persone soccorse nel Mediterraneo da navi civili e altre soccorse da navi militari, che per questa sola ragione verrebbero esposte a procedure accelerate in territorio extra-UE, a differenza di quelle sbarcate in Italia,soprattutto se si tratta di persone che non provengono da paesi terzi sicuri, per cui in Italia si prevedono procedure ordinarie e sistemi di prima e seconda accoglienza.

      Non si comprende neppure quali saranno i criteri per “selezionare” i naufraghi soccorsi nel Mediterraneo dalle navi militari italiane, e se queste attività di “trasporto” verso l’Albania riguarderanno anche le navi italiane impegnate nell’operazione europea Eunavfor Med- IRINI, ammesso che svolgano qualche volta attività di salvatagio. Soprattutto non si comprende come le navi militari italiane possano fare fronte, dopo soccorsi di massa in axque internazionali, al trasporto di centinaia di persone verso l’Albania, che rimane alquanto decentrata rispetto alle rotte migratorie che attraversano il Mediterraneo centrale dal nord-africa. Forse si vorranno imporre giorni e giorni di navigazione su imbarcazioni poco adatte al trasporto di naufraghi, o si risoverà tutto nel’ennesimo effetto annuncio ?

      Come è avvenuto anche in passato, il contenuto del Memorandum, e degli accordi che seguiranno, resta avvolto nell’opacità più totale, e tutto sembra rimesso a successive intese operative segrete, che matureranno tra le autorità italiane e quelle albanesi. Ma colpisce immediatamente la portata disumanizzante dell’accordo, se solo si mette in evidenza l’uso pregiudiziale del termine “irregolari”, quando non addirittura “illegali”, per indicare tutte le persone soccorse in mare da navi militari italiane e condotte in Albania, ad eccezione di donne in gravidanza, persone vulnerabili e minori. In palese violazione delle norme interne ed europee che impongono per tutti lo sbarco in un porto sicuro indicato dall’autorità che coordina le attività di ricerca e salvataggio, e comunque riconoscono a tutte le persone, senza differenze a seconda della natura e della nazionalità della nave soccorriitrice, il diritto di chiedere protezione internazionale secondo regole fissate da Direttive e Regolamenti europei, oltre che dalla Convenzione di Ginevra del 1951 in materia di asilo, Regole che non possono essere derogate da un Memorandum d’intesa che, come altri che lo hanno preceduto, nel 2016 con il Sudan (governo Renzi), e nel 2017 (governo Gentiloni) con la Libia, neppure sarà portato all’approvazione del Parlamento, come imporebbe l’art. 80 della Costituzione. Approvazione che del resto, anche quando fosse richiesta, sarebbe probabilmente un ennesimo atto di forza della maggioranza, su una opposizione divisa, come in passato, sul tema, oggi ancora più scottante, degli accordi con i paesi terzi per realizzare le politiche di esternalizzazione dei controlli di frontiera. Ma per Giorgia Meloni, dopo il fallimento del Memorandum d’intesa tra Unione europea e la Tunisia, le difficoltà nei rapporti con i governi libici ancora in conflitto, e la caduta di qualsiasi ipotesi di collaborazione con i paesi africani, il Piano Mattei per l’Africa, rimasto congelato dopo la crisi in Niger, paese che si pensava di utilizzare come partner per operazioni di deportazione, e infine, per la ventata anti-occidentale che si respira in tutti i paesi del Sahel dopo l’esplosione del conflitto in Palestina, occorreva una dimostrazione di forza. Magari l’ennesimo annuncio, di un piano che dovrebbe andare a regime, secondo le intenzioni dei governi non prima della primavera del 2024, giusto in tempo prima delle elezioni europee.

      Per il ministro per gli affari europei Raffaele Fitto, il Memorandum sarebbe “in linea con la priorità accordata alla dimensione esterna della migrazione e con i dieci punti del piano della presidente della Commissione von der Leyen”. Da Bruxelles, un portavoce della Commissione europea all’Adnkronos ha invece affermato: “Siamo stati informati di questo accordo, ma non abbiamo ancora ricevuto informazioni dettagliate: l’accordo operativo deve essere tradotto in legge dall’Italia e ulteriormente implementato. È importante che qualsiasi accordo di questo tipo rispetti pienamente il diritto comunitario e internazionale“. Non si vede come la Commissione europea possa dare sostegno a questo Memorandum d’intesa, anche se l’approssimarsi della scadenza delle elezioni europee potrebbe fare schierare opportunisticamente alcuni leader nazionali(sti) o pezzi della Commisione UE a fianco di Giorgia Meloni. Il riconoscimento dell’Albania come “paese terzo sicuro” non potrà certo legittimare respingimenti collettivi, vietati dall’art. 19 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali del’Unione Europea, pratiche illegali di privazione dela libertà personale o procedure di rimpatrio vietate dalla Direttiva 2008/115/CE, e dalle Direttive n. 32 e 33 del 2013, in materia di procedure e di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo.

      Appare ben strano che un paese aderente all’Unione Europea possa deportare persone soccorse in acque internazionali da proprie navi militari verso un paese che non appartiene all’Unione Europea e che dunque non è soggetto al rispetto degli obblighi e delle garanzie stabilite dalla normativa eurounitaria. Se poi si considerasse il diritto internazionale del mare, le persone soccorse in alto mare dovrebbero essere sbarcate in un porto sicuro nel paese che ha coordinato le attività di ricerca e salvataggio. In ogni caso le attività degli assetti militari in mare, con riferimento al soccorso dei naufraghi ed al contrasto dell’immigrazione irregolare, non possono prescindere dagli obblighi imposti dal Regolamento europeo n.656 del 2014. O, forse, le operazioni di ricerca e soccorso si trasformeranno in attività di intercettazione ed “manovre cinematiche di interposizione”, come quelle condotte poste in essere nel 1997 dal comandante di Nave Sibilla, dopo gli accordi di Prodi con il governo albanese di allora, quando la nave militare italiana, nel tentativo di attuare un maldestro blocco navale, speronava un barcone carico di migranti provenienti dall’Albania, mandandolo a fondo? Ci saranno altri casi simili sotto esame da parte dei Tribunali penali italiani?

      La Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo ha già sanzionato l’Italia nel 2014 sul caso Sharifi per i respjgimenti collettivi effettuati verso un paese terzo “sicuro”, come poteva esserlo nel 2009 la Grecia, e sentenze più recenti hanno condannato su diversi casi il nostro paese per trattenimenti informali o “de facto“, senza la tempestiva convalida giurisdizionale imposta in precisi termini temporali, oltre che dall’art. 13 della Costituzione italiana, dagli articoli 5, 6 e 13 della Convenzione europea a salvaguardia dei diritti dell’Uomo. Qualunque forma di detenzione praticata da un paese aderente alla suddetta Convenzione deve avere una espressa previsione legale (riserva di legge), e deve essere convalidata da un giudice davanti al quale ogni persona migrante possa fare valere i suoi diritti di difesa (riserva di giurisdizione). Si prevede la presenza di giudici italiani nei nuovi centri di detenzione che si vorrebbero aprire in Albania “sotto giurisdizione italiana” ?

      Non sembra che il Memorandum d’intesa firmato dalla Meloni e da Edi Rama, alla caccia di appoggi per l’ingresso dell’Albania nell’Unione Europea, abbia tenuto conto di queste regole che, semmai si riuscisse davvero ad applicare quanto annunciato, potrebbero essere lese dalle autorità italiane sotto la cui giurisdizione resterebbero le persone deportate in Albania. E saranno tutte da verificare quali saranno le conseguenze per il traballante governo albanese di un Memorandum d’intesa che rischia di produrre migliaia di persone costrette alla clandestinità in territorio albanese, quando al termine dei trenta giorni di detenzione previsti non potranno essere rimpatriati. Un ennesimo esempio di come gli accordi tra governi possano agevolare le bande criminali che in Albania sono sempre più attive e che potrebbero lucrare sulla clandestinità, che sarebbero meglio contrastate se si garantisse alle persone migranti canali legali di ingresso e il diritto di chiedere asilo in un paese sicuro per davvero, secondo le regole fissate dalle Convenzioni internazionali e dalla normativa dell’Unione europea.

      https://www.osservatoriorepressione.info/migranti-un-protocollo-dintesa-lalbania-opaco-disumano-pri

    • Naufraghi e richiedenti protezione. In collisione con i diritti

      È sbagliato evocare Guantanamo e la detenzione extraterritoriale dei sospetti terroristi negli Usa, ma di certo l’accordo a sorpresa tra Italia e Albania per l’accoglienza di una parte delle persone tratte in salvo dal mare è destinato a far discutere. Il governo Meloni aveva bisogno di riprendere l’iniziativa su un dossier identitario come quello della politica dell’asilo, i cui risultati sono finora rimasti lontani dalle promesse elettorali, e ha servito all’opinione pubblica una soluzione che può presentare come “innovativa”. Ma l’innovazione può entrare in collisione con i diritti sanciti dalla Costituzione italiana e dai trattati europei e internazionali.

      Anzitutto, il patto Meloni-Rama ha un sottofondo post-coloniale, come l’accordo britannico con il Ruanda a cui sembra ispirarsi: un Paese del “Primo mondo”, forte delle sue risorse politiche ed economiche, dirotta su un Paese meno fortunato e più bisognoso di appoggi l’onere di accogliere sul suo territorio i migranti sgraditi. Si immagina paradossalmente che Paesi con meno risorse e istituzioni più fragili possano ricevere degnamente i profughi che da noi sono visti come un problema. Infatti, quasi tradendo il sottotesto punitivo dell’accordo, si prevede che vengano esentati dal trasferimento in Albania donne in gravidanza, minori, soggetti vulnerabili. E il governo non ha esitato a parlare di una misura finalizzata alla deterrenza nei confronti di quelli che si ostina a definire come immigrati illegali, al pari del modello britannico.

      In realtà nel 2022 il 48% dei richiedenti l’asilo ha ottenuto uno status legale in prima istanza, e ad essi si aggiunge il 72% di coloro che hanno presentato un ricorso giurisdizionale. Dunque, rischiamo di mandare in Albania delle persone che hanno diritto all’asilo. Proprio l’esempio britannico mostra che le corti di giustizia, nazionali ed europee, l’hanno finora bloccato, e la capacità di reggere al vaglio della magistratura sarà un arduo banco di prova dell’accordo.

      Qualcosa non quadra poi riguardo ai numeri: si prevede di realizzare due strutture sul territorio albanese, una per l’identificazione allo sbarco, l’altra per l’accoglienza temporanea, con una capacità di 3.000 posti complessivi, e si prevede di trattare complessivamente 36-39.000 profughi all’anno. Si lascia intendere che basteranno quattro settimane per decidere della loro domanda di asilo, mentre oggi il tempo medio è di circa 18 mesi, senza contare la possibilità di ricorso. È probabile che i profughi languiranno a lungo in Albania e che i numeri dei casi trattati rimarranno assai più bassi di quelli annunciati.

      Ma i problemi più spinosi riguardano l’integrazione dei “deportati”. Se otterranno la protezione internazionale, averli lasciati in un Paese terzo non avrà di certo preparato la strada per la loro futura integrazione in Italia, sotto il profilo della possibilità di apprendere e praticare la lingua italiana, di conoscere la società in cui dovranno inserirsi, di orientarsi nel mercato del lavoro e nel sistema dei servizi. Se invece riceveranno un diniego, occorre chiedersi che ne sarà di loro. La bassissima capacità di rimpatrio forzato da parte delle nostre istituzioni (4.304 persone nel 2022), peraltro simili in questo agli altri Paesi europei, è un dato ormai noto. Se ne occuperanno le autorità albanesi? Con quale protezione dei loro diritti umani inalienabili, per esempio il diritto alle cure mediche necessarie e urgenti, o a non morire di fame?

      La politica dell’immigrazione ci ha abituato da tempo a dichiarazioni enfatiche – basti ricordare i più volte annunciati accordi con la Tunisia – e presunte soluzioni che si rivelano inattuabili. Anche l’accordo Italia-Albania rischia ora di entrare nella serie. O meglio: se non sarà attuato, sarà l’ennesima pseudo-ricetta venduta all’opinione pubblica; se dovesse essere attuato, anche solo parzialmente, tratterà soltanto una minoranza dei casi e sferrerà comunque una picconata alla già traballante architettura giuridica dei diritti umani fondamentali.

      https://www.avvenire.it/opinioni/pagine/in-collisione-con-i-diritti

    • Accord migratoire Italie-Albanie : l’#ONU appelle au respect du #droit_international

      L’agence de l’ONU pour les réfugiés (HCR) a appelé mardi au « respect du droit international relatif aux réfugiés » après l’accord signé lundi entre l’Italie et l’Albanie visant à délocaliser dans ce pays l’accueil de migrants sauvés en mer et l’examen de leur demande d’asile.

      « Les modalités de transfert des demandeurs d’asile et des réfugiés doivent respecter le droit international relatif aux réfugiés », a exhorté le HCR dans un communiqué publié à Genève.

      L’accord signé lundi à Rome par la cheffe du gouvernement italien Giorgia Meloni et son homologue albanais Edi Rama prévoit que l’Italie va ouvrir dans ce pays, candidat à l’adhésion à l’UE, deux centres pour accueillir des migrants sauvés en mer afin de « mener rapidement les procédures de traitement des demandes d’asile ou les éventuels rapatriements ».

      Ces deux centres gérés par l’Italie, opérationnels au printemps 2024, pourront accueillir jusqu’à 3.000 migrants, soit environ 39.000 par an selon les prévisions. Les mineurs, les femmes enceintes et les personnes vulnérables ne seraient pas concernés.

      Le HCR, qui dit n’avoir « pas été informé ni consulté sur le contenu de l’accord », estime que « les retours ou les transferts vers des pays tiers sûrs ne peuvent être considérés comme appropriés que si certaines normes sont respectées - en particulier, que ces pays respectent pleinement les droits découlant de la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés et les obligations en matière de droits de l’Homme, et si l’accord contribue à répartir équitablement la responsabilité des réfugiés entre les nations, plutôt que de la déplacer ».

      Un membre du gouvernement italien a précisé mardi que les migrants seraient emmenés directement vers ces centres, sans passer par l’Italie, et que ces structures seraient placées sous l’autorité de Rome en vertu d’« un statut d’extraterritorialité ». Mais de nombreuses questions sur le fonctionnement d’un tel projet restent en suspens.

      L’Italie est confrontée à un afflux de migrants depuis janvier (145.000 contre 88.000 en 2022 sur la même période). Les règles européennes prévoient que d’une manière générale, le premier pays d’entrée d’un migrant dans l’UE est responsable du traitement de sa demande d’asile, et les pays méditerranéens se plaignent de devoir assumer une charge disproportionnée.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/071123/accord-migratoire-italie-albanie-l-onu-appelle-au-respect-du-droit-interna

    • Accordo Italia-Albania: un altro patto illegale, un altro tassello della propaganda del governo

      #Fulvio_Vassallo_Paleologo: «Un protocollo opaco, disumano e privo di basi legali»

      “Un’intesa storica”, “È un accordo che arricchisce un’amicizia storica”, “I nostri immigrati in Albania”, “Svolta sugli sbarchi”. E’ un tripudio di frasi altisonanti e di affermazioni risolutive quelle che hanno accompagnato in questi giorni la diffusione del protocollo d’intesa firmato da Meloni e dal primo ministro albanese, Edi Rama, per l’apertura in Albania di due centri italiani per la gestione dei richiedenti asilo. Strutture in cui dovranno essere trattenute persone migranti, ad esclusione di donne e minori, soccorse nel Mediterraneo centrale da navi militari italiane, come quelle della Marina Militare e della Guardia di Finanza.

      Alcuni dettagli dell’operazione sono emersi da un testo (scarica qui) di nove pagine scarse e 14 articoli che indicano come funzioneranno e verranno gestiti i centri. L’accordo ha una durata di cinque anni e sarà rinnovato automaticamente a meno che una delle due parti non comunichi il proprio dissenso entro sei mesi dalla scadenza. In un anno dovrebbero essere accolte-trattenute circa 36.000 persone. I costi, dalle spese di detenzione alla sicurezza interna, saranno tutti in capo all’Italia, mentre l’Albania fornirà gratuitamente gli spazi in cui verranno costruiti i centri: uno al porto di Shengjin, circa 70 chilometri a nord di Tirana, e un altro a Gjader, nell’entroterra. I due centri dovrebbero servire per processare entro 30 giorni le richieste di asilo e per trattenere coloro a cui verrà negata la richiesta di protezione, in vista del rimpatrio nei paesi di origine oppure del probabile invio in Italia. Come ha annunciato Giorgia Meloni “dei due centri, quello al porto si occuperà delle procedure di sbarco e di identificazione con una prima attività di screening mentre il centro che verrà realizzato nell’area più interna sarà una struttura modello Cpr”.
      L’Italia dovrà farsi carico anche di tutte le spese legate alla costruzione dei centri che dovranno essere aperti per la primavera del 2024. Il Post riporta che il sito albanese Gogo.al ha indicato sommariamente dei costi iniziali (vedi il documento diffuso): “l’Italia verserà all’Albania entro 3 mesi un primo fondo pari a 16,5 milioni. Si prevede che oltre 100 milioni di euro saranno congelati in un conto bancario di secondo livello come garanzia”.

      La presidente del Consiglio doveva battere un colpo, dare un messaggio al suo elettorato e alla maggioranza: il “problema immigrazione”, con gli sbarchi che non accennano a diminuire 1 e il flop dell’accordo con la Tunisia, è sempre una priorità della sua agenda politica, a tal punto che è lei stessa, senza coinvolgere nessun altro ministro, a intestarsi l’operazione e dichiarare il nuovo “punto di svolta”. E’ perciò evidente che questo protocollo si inserisce dentro il solco della narrazione mediatica e normativa, dal decreto Piantedosi sulle Ong, al cosiddetto decreto Cutro, fino alla proclamazione dello stato di emergenza dell’11 aprile e alle altre modifiche ai danni di minori e richiedenti asilo, dove vale tutto per raggiungere l’obiettivo dichiarato di ostacolare gli arrivi delle persone migranti.

      Tuttavia, tutti questi tentativi, dall’esternalizzare le frontiere e le procedure di asilo fino a portare fisicamente le persone in Paesi extra Ue, non sono una prerogativa solo del governo Meloni, ma hanno avuto in questi anni diversi promotori e, pur con delle differenze tra loro, una stessa matrice ideologica anti-migranti: per esempio, i respingimenti a catena dall’Italia alla Bosnia-Erzegovina, non hanno poi uno scopo così diverso dagli accordi tra Inghilterra e Ruanda.

      Secondo l’avvocato Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo si tratta dell’ennesimo annuncio propagandistico del governo in quanto il protocollo d’intesa è «opaco, disumano e privo di basi legali».

      «Nulla infatti – fa notare l’esperto di diritto di asilo e immigrazione – è stato comunicato sulle modalità di rimpatrio e sulle autorità che saranno incaricate di eseguire gli accompagnamenti forzati, né su quali autorità effettuano i trasferimenti sotto scorta dai punti di sbarco in Albania ai centri di detenzione “sotto giurisdizione italiana”. Di certo, fin dal momento dello sbarco in Albania i migranti, già ritenuti comunque “illegali”, saranno totalmente privati della libertà personale. Come impone la sentenza n.105/2001 della Corte Costituzionale qualunque procedura di allontanamento forzato attuata da autorità italiane attraverso il trattenimento in un centro di detenzione deve essere convalidata dalla decisione di un giudice. Come sarà possibile realizzare queste garanzie in territorio albanese?», si domanda.

      Nel protocollo – si legge nel testo – le autorità italiane avranno piena responsabilità all’interno dei centri, mentre le autorità albanesi dovranno garantire la sicurezza all’esterno dei centri e durante il trasferimento dei migranti: potranno entrare nei centri solo «in caso di incendio o di altro grave e imminente pericolo che richiede un immediato intervento».

      «La consegna delle persone soccorse in mare alle autorità albanesi – spiega l’esperto – al momento dello sbarco, fino, presumibilmente, all’ingresso nei centri di detenzione, potrebbe costituire una ipotesi di respingimento collettivo analoga a quella riscontrata e condannata dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo nel caso Hirsi, quando nel 2009 una motovedetta della Guardia di finanza riconsegnò alle autorità libiche, entrando nel porto di Tripoli, decine di naufraghi soccorsi in acque internazionali (pratica illegale che comunque si protrasse fino al 2010, con trasbordi più discreti in alto mare, piuttosto che con l’ingresso delle unità militari italiane nei porti libici)».

      «In quell’occasione – prosegue Paleologo – la Corte di Strasburgo affermò che sebbene il soccorso fosse avvenuto in acque internazionali, il codice della navigazione italiano, oltre che il diritto internazionale, riconoscono che sulla nave militare in alto mare si applica la giurisdizione dello stato della bandiera. Dunque, in quella occasione, tra il momento in cui i profughi venivano accolti a bordo delle navi italiane e quello in cui gli stessi erano consegnati alle autorità libiche a Tripoli, le autorità italiane avevano esercitato su di essi un controllo de facto che impegnava la responsabilità dello stato italiano per qualunque violazione dei diritti sanciti dalla Convenzione europea. La stessa considerazione potrà valere in futuro quando le autorità italiane consegneranno alle forze di polizia albanese i cittadini stranieri soccorsi in mare da unità militari italiane, ai fini del loro trasferimento forzato e dell’eventuale rimpatrio. Secondo il premier albanese, “chi non ha diritto viene rimpatriato. Ma se l’Italia non riesce a fare i rimpatri dovrà riprenderseli”. La prova più evidente della riduzione delle persone a rifiuti da smaltire, la cifra morale e politica condivisa da Giorgia Meloni e da Edi Rama».

      Anche rispetto la procedura di cosiddetto “sbarco selettivo” tra donne, minori e uomini ci sono diversi problemi di legittimità giuridica in quanto si tratta di una palese violazione delle norme interne ed europee che impongono per tutti lo sbarco in un porto sicuro indicato dall’autorità che coordina le attività di ricerca e salvataggio. Anche su questo punto Paleologo è chiaro: «Il diritto di chiedere protezione internazionale è regolato secondo regole fissate da Direttive e Regolamenti europei, oltre che dalla Convenzione di Ginevra del 1951 in materia di asilo. Regole che non possono essere derogate da un Memorandum d’intesa che, come altri che lo hanno preceduto, nel 2016 con il Sudan (governo Renzi), e nel 2017 (governo Gentiloni) con la Libia, neppure se sarà portato all’approvazione del Parlamento, come imporrebbe l’art. 80 della Costituzione. Approvazione che del resto, anche quando fosse richiesta, sarebbe probabilmente un ennesimo atto di forza della maggioranza, su una opposizione divisa, come in passato, sul tema, oggi ancora più scottante, degli accordi con i paesi terzi per realizzare le politiche di esternalizzazione dei controlli di frontiera».

      Da Bruxelles, la Commissione UE non esclude del tutto la validità dell’accordo, affermando che il caso è diverso dall’accordo Regno Unito-Ruanda, in quanto si applicherebbe alle persone che non hanno ancora raggiunto le coste italiane. Sempre secondo l’avvocato Paleologo «il riconoscimento dell’Albania come “paese terzo sicuro” non potrà certo legittimare respingimenti collettivi, vietati dall’art. 19 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea, pratiche illegali di privazione della libertà personale o procedure di rimpatrio vietate dalla Direttiva 2008/115/CE, e dalle Direttive n. 32 e 33 del 2013, in materia di procedure e di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo.

      Appare ben strano che un paese aderente all’Unione Europea possa deportare persone soccorse in acque internazionali da proprie navi militari verso un paese che non appartiene all’Unione Europea e che dunque non è soggetto al rispetto degli obblighi e delle garanzie stabilite dalla normativa eurounitaria. Se poi si considerasse il diritto internazionale del mare, le persone soccorse in alto mare dovrebbero essere sbarcate in un porto sicuro nel paese che ha coordinato le attività di ricerca e salvataggio».

      «La Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo ha già sanzionato l’Italia nel 2014 sul caso Sharifi per i respingimenti collettivi effettuati verso un paese terzo “sicuro”, come poteva esserlo nel 2009 la Grecia, e sentenze più recenti hanno condannato su diversi casi il nostro paese per trattenimenti informali o “de facto“, senza la tempestiva convalida giurisdizionale imposta in precisi termini temporali, oltre che dall’art. 13 della Costituzione italiana, dagli articoli 5, 6 e 13 della Convenzione europea a salvaguardia dei diritti dell’Uomo. Qualunque forma di detenzione praticata da un paese aderente alla suddetta Convenzione deve avere una espressa previsione legale (riserva di legge), e deve essere convalidata da un giudice davanti al quale ogni persona migrante possa fare valere i suoi diritti di difesa (riserva di giurisdizione). Si prevede la presenza di giudici italiani nei nuovi centri di detenzione che si vorrebbero aprire in Albania “sotto giurisdizione italiana”? Non sembra che il Memorandum d’intesa firmato dalla Meloni e da Edi Rama, alla caccia di appoggi per l’ingresso dell’Albania nell’Unione Europea, abbia tenuto conto di queste regole che, semmai si riuscisse davvero ad applicare quanto annunciato, potrebbero essere lese dalle autorità italiane sotto la cui giurisdizione resterebbero le persone deportate in Albania. E saranno tutte da verificare quali saranno le conseguenze per il traballante governo albanese di un Memorandum d’intesa che rischia di produrre migliaia di persone costrette alla clandestinità in territorio albanese, quando al termine dei trenta giorni di detenzione previsti non potranno essere rimpatriati.
      Un ennesimo esempio di come gli accordi tra governi possano agevolare le bande criminali che in Albania sono sempre più attive e che potrebbero lucrare sulla clandestinità, che sarebbero meglio contrastate se si garantisse alle persone migranti canali legali di ingresso e il diritto di chiedere asilo in un paese sicuro per davvero, secondo le regole fissate dalle Convenzioni internazionali e dalla normativa dell’Unione europea», conclude Paleologo.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/11/accordo-italia-albania-un-altro-patto-illegale-un-altro-tassello-della-p

    • L’accordo Italia-Albania sui migranti? Solo propaganda!

      Il nuovo memorandum d’intesa tra Italia e Albania sulla gestione dei migranti? Probabilmente solo un « ennesimo annuncio propagandistico » secondo Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo che firma su ADIF [1] un dettagliato articolo che analizza l’annuncio di Giogia Meloni ( non il provvedimento perché questo non esiste ).

      In altre parole, « per Giorgia Meloni, dopo il fallimento del Memorandum d’intesa tra Unione europea e la Tunisia, le difficoltà nei rapporti con i governi libici ancora in conflitto, il “Piano Mattei per l’Africa”, rimasto congelato dopo la crisi in Niger, paese che si pensava di utilizzare come partner per operazioni di deportazione, e infine, per la ventata anti-occidentale che si respira in tutti i paesi del Sahel dopo l’esplosione del conflitto in Palestina, occorreva una dimostrazione di forza. Magari l’ennesimo annuncio, di un piano che dovrebbe andare a regime, secondo le intenzioni dei governi non prima della primavera del 2024, giusto in tempo prima delle elezioni europee ».

      Possibile che il giurista abbia ragione, ma è anche possibile che il fine sia creare terrore in chi in Italia è già; I CPR, ancor di più se in Albani, sono strumentali a schiavizzare i migranti.

      L’avvocato e attivista pro migranti Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo, nell’articolo solleva pure una serie di perplessità giuridiche del progetto della presidente del consiglio italiano di realizzare un CPR in Albania.

      Una tra queste: « qualunque forma di detenzione praticata da un paese aderente alla Convenzione europea a salvaguardia dei diritti dell’Uomo [e quindi l’Italia, NdR] deve avere una espressa previsione di legge, e deve essere convalidata da un giudice davanti al quale ogni persona migrante possa fare valere i suoi diritti di difesa » [1].

      Come possa assicurarsi, in Albania, la difesa legale del migrante e un procedimento di convalida firmato da un magistrato italiano rappresenta un grande punto interrogativo. « Come sarà possibile realizzare queste garanzie in territorio albanese? », scrive infatti il giurista nell’articolo.

      Precisa poi Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo come « il contenuto del Memorandum, e degli accordi che seguiranno, resta avvolto nell’opacità più totale, e tutto sembra rimesso a successive intese operative segrete, che matureranno tra le autorità italiane e quelle albanesi ».

      Il giudizio finale dell’autore rispetto all’annuncio della Meloni non può, quindi, che essere negativo e drastico: « appare ben strano che un paese aderente all’Unione Europea possa deportare persone soccorse in acque internazionali da proprie navi militari verso un paese che non appartiene all’Unione Europea e che dunque non è soggetto al rispetto degli obblighi e delle garanzie stabilite dalla normativa eurounitaria. Se poi si considerasse il diritto internazionale del mare, le persone soccorse in alto mare dovrebbero essere sbarcate in un porto sicuro nel paese che ha coordinato le attività di ricerca e salvataggio ».

      Tagliente anche il giudizio rispetto alla firma del leader albanese, Edi Rama: « il Memorandum d’intesa rischia di produrre migliaia di persone costrette alla clandestinità in territorio albanese, quando al termine dei trenta giorni di detenzione previsti non potranno essere rimpatriati. Un ennesimo esempio di come gli accordi tra governi possano agevolare le bande criminali che in Albania sono sempre più attive e che potrebbero lucrare sulla clandestinità ».

      La differenza tra la verità di Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo e la propaganda della Meloni, tuttavia, la fanno le “visualizzazioni” del sito ADIF rispetto a quelli di Repubblica, La Stampa, Libero, Il Giornale, La Verità, Il Gazzettino, etc dove l’effetto “annuncio” è passato senza commenti critici.

      Fonti e Note:

      [1] ADIF, 7 novembre 2023, Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo, “Un Protocollo d’intesa con l’Albania, opaco, disumano e privo di basi legali”.

      https://www.pressenza.com/it/2023/11/laccordo-italia-albania-sui-migranti-solo-propaganda

    • Un Protocollo d’intesa con l’Albania, opaco, disumano e privo di basi legali

      Con l’ennesimo annuncio propagandistico del govern si apprende che Giorgia Meloni avrebbe concluso con il premier albanese Edi Rama un Memorandum d’intesa , che prevede – la realizzazione in Albania di due centri per il rimpatrio, che dovrebbero ospitare ogni mese fino a 3000 persone definite “irregolari”, ma solo se soccorse nel Mediterraneo da navi militari italiane, come quelle della Marina Militare e della Guardia di Finanza. Più precisamente, “l’Albania darà possibilità all’Italia di utilizzare alcune aree del territorio albanese dove l’Italia potrà realizzare, a proprie spese, due strutture dove allestire centri per la gestione di migranti illegali. Inizialmente potrà accogliere fino a 3mila persone che rimarranno il tempo necessario per espletare le procedure delle domande di asilo ed eventualmente rimpatrio”. I naufraghi saranno sbarcati a Shengjin e l’Italia si occuperà delle procedure di sbarco e identificazione e realizzerà un “centro di prima accoglienza e screening” a Gjader, che di fatto sarà una “struttura modello Cpr” per le successive procedure. I due centri dovrebbero servire per processare in 28-30 giorni le richieste di asilo e per detenere coloro che si vedranno respinta la richiesta di protezione, in vista del rimpatrio nei paesi di origine. Come ha annunciato Giorgia Meloni “Dei due centri, quello al porto si occuperà delle procedure di sbarco e di identificazione con una prima attività di screening mentre il centro che verrà realizzato nell’area più interna sarà una struttura modello Cpr”.

      Secondo quanto annunciato dalle stesse fonti governative in un anno si penserebbe addirittura di fare transitare in queste nuove strutture detentive, che dovrebbero essere sotto giurisdizione italiana, ma con “sorveglianza esterna” affidata alle autorità albanesi, circa 36.000 persone. Nulla è stato comunicato sulle modalità di rimpatrio e sulle autorità che saranno incaricate di eseguire gli accompagnamenti forzati, nè su quali autorità efettueranno i trasferimenti sotto scorta dai punti di sbarco in Albania ai centri di detenzione “sotto giurisdizione italiana”. Di certo, fin dal momento dello sbarco in Albania i migranti, già ritenuti comunque “illegali”, saranno totalmente privati della libertà personale. Come impone la sentenza n.105/2001 della Corte Costituzionale qualunque procedura di allontanamento forzato attuata da autorità italiane attraverso il trattenimento in un centro di detenzione deve essere convalidata dalla decisione di un giudice. Come sarà possibile realizzare queste garanzie in territorio albanese?

      La consegna delle persone soccorse in mare alle autorità albanesi, al momento dello sbarco, fino, presumibilmente, all’ingresso nei centri di detenzione, che si asserisce sarebbero “sotto giurisdizione italiana” potrebbe costituire una ipotesi di respingimento collettivo analoga a quella riscontrata e condannata dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo nel caso Hirsi, quando nel 2009 una motovedetta della Guardia di finanza riconsegno alle autorità libiche, entrando nel porto di Tripoli, decine di naufraghi socorsi in acque internazionali (pratica illegale che comunque si protrasse fino al 2010, con trasbordi più discreti in alto mare, piuttosto che con l’ingresso delle unità militari italiane nei porti libici). In quell’occasione la Corte di Strasburgo affermò che sebbene il soccorso fosse avvenuto in acque internazionali, il codice della navigazione italiano, oltre che il diritto internazionale, riconoscono che sulla nave militare in alto mare si applica la giurisdizione dello stato della bandiera. Dunque, in quella occasione, tra il momento in cui i profughi venivano accolti a bordo delle navi italiane e quello in cui gli stessi erano consegnati alle autorità libiche a Tripoli, le autorità italiane avevano esercitato su di essi un controllo de facto che impegnava la responsabilità dello stato italiano per qualunque violazione dei diritti sanciti dalla Convenzione europea. La stessa considerazione potrà valere in futuro quando le autorità italiane consegneranno alle forze di polizia albanese i cittadini stranieri soccorsi in mare da unità militari italiane, ai fini del loro trasferimento forzato e dell’eventuale rimpatrio. Secondo il premier albanese, “Chi non ha diritto viene rimpatriato. Ma se l’Italia non riesce a fare i rimpatri dovrà riprenderseli”. La prova più evidente della riduzione delle persone a rifiuti da smaltire, la cifra morale e politica condivisa da Giorgia Meloni e da Edi Rama.

      Un progetto impraticabile e privo di basi legali, quanto previsto dal Memorandum sottoscritto dalla Meloni con il premier albanese, alla luce dei tempi previsti per le procedure nei centri di detenzione, e soprattutto a causa delle difficoltà di esecuzione delle misure di allontanamento forzato da tutti i paesi europei, anche per la mancanza di accordi di riammissione tra l’Albania e molti paesi di origine dei naufraghi che, dopo essere soccorsi in mare, dovranno affrontare in stato di detenzione procedure”accelerate” per il riconoscimento di uno status di protezione, ed una possibile deportazione. Senza potere fare valere i diritti di difesa e le garanzie della libertà personale previsti dalla Costituzione italiana (a partire dal’art.13 che impone la tempestiva convalida da parte di un giudice di ogni misura di trattenimento amministrativo attuata sotto la giurisdizione italiana) e dalle norme sovranazionali dettate dalle Nazioni Unite a protezione dei richiedenti asilo, e dall’Unione Europea in materia di rimpatri e procedure per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale. E poi, se pensiamo ai migranti soccorsi intercettati nel mare Ionio, ma anche a quelli provenienti dalla Libia o dalla Tunisia, quanti di loro provengono da paesi terzi veramente “sicuri” ? Il governo italiano non può creare una evidente disparità di trattamento tra persone soccorse nel Mediterraneo da navi civili e altre soccorse da navi militari, che per questa sola ragione verrebbero esposte a procedure accelerate in territorio extra-UE, a differenza di quelle sbarcate in Italia,soprattutto se si tratta di persone che non provengono da paesi terzi sicuri, per cui in Italia si prevedono procedure ordinarie e sistemi di prima e seconda accoglienza.

      Non si comprende neppure quali saranno i criteri per “selezionare” i naufraghi soccorsi nel Mediterraneo dalle navi militari italiane, e se queste attività di “trasporto” verso l’Albania riguarderanno anche le navi italiane impegnate nell’operazione europea Eunavfor Med- IRINI, ammesso che svolgano qualche volta attività di salvatagio. Soprattutto non si comprende come le navi militari italiane possano fare fronte, dopo soccorsi di massa in axque internazionali, al trasporto di centinaia di persone verso l’Albania, che rimane alquanto decentrata rispetto alle rotte migratorie che attraversano il Mediterraneo centrale dal nord-africa. Forse si vorranno imporre giorni e giorni di navigazione su imbarcazioni poco adatte al trasporto di naufraghi, o si risoverà tutto nel’ennesimo effetto annuncio ?

      Come è avvenuto anche in passato, il contenuto del Memorandum, e degli accordi che seguiranno, resta avvolto nell’opacità più totale, e tutto sembra rimesso a successive intese operative segrete, che matureranno tra le autorità italiane e quelle albanesi. Ma colpisce immediatamente la portata disumanizzante dell’accordo, se solo si mette in evidenza l’uso pregiudiziale del termine “irregolari”, quando non addirittura “illegali”, per indicare tutte le persone soccorse in mare da navi militari italiane e condotte in Albania, ad eccezione di donne in gravidanza, persone vulnerabili e minori. In palese violazione delle norme interne ed europee che impongono per tutti lo sbarco in un porto sicuro indicato dall’autorità che coordina le attività di ricerca e salvataggio, e comunque riconoscono a tutte le persone, senza differenze a seconda della natura e della nazionalità della nave soccorriitrice, il diritto di chiedere protezione internazionale secondo regole fissate da Direttive e Regolamenti europei, oltre che dalla Convenzione di Ginevra del 1951 in materia di asilo, Regole che non possono essere derogate da un Memorandum d’intesa che, come altri che lo hanno preceduto, nel 2016 con il Sudan (governo Renzi), e nel 2017 (governo Gentiloni) con la Libia, neppure sarà portato all’approvazione del Parlamento, come imporebbe l’art. 80 della Costituzione. Approvazione che del resto, anche quando fosse richiesta, sarebbe probabilmente un ennesimo atto di forza della maggioranza, su una opposizione divisa, come in passato, sul tema, oggi ancora più scottante, degli accordi con i paesi terzi per realizzare le politiche di esternalizzazione dei controlli di frontiera. Ma per Giorgia Meloni, dopo il fallimento del Memorandum d’intesa tra Unione europea e la Tunisia, le difficoltà nei rapporti con i governi libici ancora in conflitto, e la caduta di qualsiasi ipotesi di collaborazione con i paesi africani, il Piano Mattei per l’Africa, rimasto congelato dopo la crisi in Niger, paese che si pensava di utilizzare come partner per operazioni di deportazione, e infine, per la ventata anti-occidentale che si respira in tutti i paesi del Sahel dopo l’esplosione del conflitto in Palestina, occorreva una dimostrazione di forza. Magari l’ennesimo annuncio, di un piano che dovrebbe andare a regime, secondo le intenzioni dei governi non prima della primavera del 2024, giusto in tempo prima delle elezioni europee.

      Per il ministro per gli affari europei Raffaele Fitto, il Memorandum sarebbe “in linea con la priorità accordata alla dimensione esterna della migrazione e con i dieci punti del piano della presidente della Commissione von der Leyen”. Da Bruxelles, un portavoce della Commissione europea all’Adnkronos ha invece affermato: “Siamo stati informati di questo accordo, ma non abbiamo ancora ricevuto informazioni dettagliate: l’accordo operativo deve essere tradotto in legge dall’Italia e ulteriormente implementato. È importante che qualsiasi accordo di questo tipo rispetti pienamente il diritto comunitario e internazionale“. Non si vede come la Commissione europea possa dare sostegno a questo Memorandum d’intesa, anche se l’approssimarsi della scadenza delle elezioni europee potrebbe fare schierare opportunisticamente alcuni leader nazionali(sti) o pezzi della Commisione UE a fianco di Giorgia Meloni. Il riconoscimento dell’Albania come “paese terzo sicuro” non potrà certo legittimare respingimenti collettivi, vietati dall’art. 19 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali del’Unione Europea, pratiche illegali di privazione dela libertà personale o procedure di rimpatrio vietate dalla Direttiva 2008/115/CE, e dalle Direttive n. 32 e 33 del 2013, in materia di procedure e di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo.

      Appare ben strano che un paese aderente all’Unione Europea possa deportare persone soccorse in acque internazionali da proprie navi militari verso un paese che non appartiene all’Unione Europea e che dunque non è soggetto al rispetto degli obblighi e delle garanzie stabilite dalla normativa eurounitaria. Se poi si considerasse il diritto internazionale del mare, le persone soccorse in alto mare dovrebbero essere sbarcate in un porto sicuro nel paese che ha coordinato le attività di ricerca e salvataggio. In ogni caso le attività degli assetti militari in mare, con riferimento al soccorso dei naufraghi ed al contrasto dell’immigrazione irregolare, non possono prescindere dagli obblighi imposti dal Regolamento europeo n.656 del 2014. O, forse, le operazioni di ricerca e soccorso si trasformeranno in attività di intercettazione ed “manovre cinematiche di interposizione”, come quelle condotte poste in essere nel 1997 dal comandante di Nave Sibilla, dopo gli accordi di Prodi con il governo albanese di allora, quando la nave militare italiana, nel tentativo di attuare un maldestro blocco navale, speronava un barcone carico di migranti provenienti dall’Albania, mandandolo a fondo? Ci saranno altri casi simili sotto esame da parte dei Tribunali penali italiani?

      La Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo ha già sanzionato l’Italia nel 2014 sul caso Sharifi per i respjgimenti collettivi effettuati verso un paese terzo “sicuro”, come poteva esserlo nel 2009 la Grecia, e sentenze più recenti hanno condannato su diversi casi il nostro paese per trattenimenti informali o “de facto“, senza la tempestiva convalida giurisdizionale imposta in precisi termini temporali, oltre che dall’art. 13 della Costituzione italiana, dagli articoli 5, 6 e 13 della Convenzione europea a salvaguardia dei diritti dell’Uomo. Qualunque forma di detenzione praticata da un paese aderente alla suddetta Convenzione deve avere una espressa previsione legale (riserva di legge), e deve essere convalidata da un giudice davanti al quale ogni persona migrante possa fare valere i suoi diritti di difesa (riserva di giurisdizione). Si prevede la presenza di giudici italiani nei nuovi centri di detenzione che si vorrebbero aprire in Albania “sotto giurisdizione italiana” ?

      Non sembra che il Memorandum d’intesa firmato dalla Meloni e da Edi Rama, alla caccia di appoggi per l’ingresso dell’Albania nell’Unione Europea, abbia tenuto conto di queste regole che, semmai si riuscisse davvero ad applicare quanto annunciato, potrebbero essere lese dalle autorità italiane sotto la cui giurisdizione resterebbero le persone deportate in Albania. E saranno tutte da verificare quali saranno le conseguenze per il traballante governo albanese di un Memorandum d’intesa che rischia di produrre migliaia di persone costrette alla clandestinità in territorio albanese, quando al termine dei trenta giorni di detenzione previsti non potranno essere rimpatriati. Un ennesimo esempio di come gli accordi tra governi possano agevolare le bande criminali che in Albania sono sempre più attive e che potrebbero lucrare sulla clandestinità, che sarebbero meglio contrastate se si garantisse alle persone migranti canali legali di ingresso e il diritto di chiedere asilo in un paese sicuro per davvero, secondo le regole fissate dalle Convenzioni internazionali e dalla normativa dell’Unione europea.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2023/11/07/un-protocollo-dintesa-con-lalbania-opaco-disumano-e-privo-di-basi-legali

    • Accordo Italia-Albania sui migranti, la UE chiede i dettagli

      L’Italia realizzerà in Albania due centri per la gestione dei migranti che potranno gestire un flusso annuale di 36mila persone. Lo ha dichiarato oggi la premier Giorgia Meloni in conferenza stampa con il primo ministro albanese Edi Rama. Ne parliamo con Genthiola Madhi, ricercatrice di Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, e con Andrea Spagnolo, professore di Diritto internazionale e umanitario all’Università di Torino.

      https://www.radio24.ilsole24ore.com/programmi/luogo-lontano/puntata/trasmissione-7-novembre-2023-160500-2404283315532563

    • Ecco perché l’accordo tra Italia e Albania è illegale: tutte le procedure che violano il diritto europeo

      Rappresenta il punto più estremo dell’esternalizzazione delle frontiere e del diritto di asilo. Le tutele per le persone bisognose di protezione, invece che garantite, vengono ridotte al minimo.

      Il Protocollo stipulato tra Italia ed Albania “per il rafforzamento della cooperazione in materia migratoria” è il punto finora più estremo (ma, come si vedrà, anche incoerente) a cui l’Italia è giunta nel processo di esternalizzazione delle frontiere e del diritto di asilo.

      Trattandosi di un’intesa avente una chiara natura politica, che richiede oneri finanziari, e che altresì riguarda la condizione giuridica degli stranieri, quindi una materia coperta dalla riserva di legge di cui all’art. 10 co.2 della Costituzione, il Protocollo e i suoi atti attuativi devono essere ratificati dal Parlamento ai sensi dell’art. 80 della Costituzione. Prive di alcun pregio mi sembrano le argomentazioni di chi ritiene che non occorre alcuna ratifica trattandosi di una sorta rinforzo ad accordi pre-esistenti.

      Scopo del Protocollo è quello di trasportare coattivamente in Albania cittadini di paesi terzi per “i quali deve essere accertata la sussistenza o è stata accertata l’insussistenza dei requisiti per l’ingresso, il soggiorno o la residenza” (art.1) in Italia. In Albania, in “aree di proprietà demaniale” (art.1) albanesi, quindi in territorio albanese a tutti gli effetti, nel quale i migranti rimarrebbero confinati “al solo fine di effettuare le procedure di frontiera o di rimpatrio previste dalla normativa italiana ed europea e per il tempo strettamente necessario alle stesse” (art.4.3).

      Il testo non esclude che l’ingresso in Albania avvenga anche in via diversa da quella marittima, quindi riguardi anche persone straniere bloccate sulle vie terrestri, magari nei Balcani, purché tale trasporto avvenga “esclusivamente con i mezzi delle competenti autorità italiane” (art. 4.4). Le autorità italiane assicurano “la permanenza dei migranti all’interno delle aree impedendo la loro uscita non autorizzata” (art. 6.5) e il periodo di permanenza in Albania “non può essere superiore al periodo massimo di trattenimento consentito dalla normativa italiana” (art. 9.1).

      Al termine delle procedure le autorità italiane “provvedono all’allontanamento dei migranti dal territorio albanese” (art. 9) ovvero al rientro in Italia. Molta enfasi è stata posta sul fatto che l’accordo sia finalizzato al trasferimento forzato in Albania dei soccorsi in mare al fine di esaminare le domande di asilo dei naufraghi; tuttavia nel protocollo non c’è alcun riferimento alla procedura di asilo né alla protezione internazionale e le uniche parole che richiamano l’asilo riguardano il rinvio a non meglio definite procedure di frontiera.

      Obiettivo non secondario del protocollo, risulterebbe dunque essere l’utilizzo del territorio albanese per farvi dei centri di detenzione amministrativa per stranieri espulsi dall’Italia, ma che verrebbero trattenuti in Albania al fine di eseguire coattivamente il rimpatrio nel paese di origine. Nonostante il ministro Piantedosi si affanni a dichiarare che non si tratterà di CPR (Centri per il Rimpatrio) il testo del Protocollo dice diversamente.

      Emerge dunque evidente il rischio che l’operazione intenda nascondere una strategia per realizzare CPR inaccessibili, lontani da sguardi indiscreti e da inchieste giornalistiche, liberandosi dell’incubo di dover trovare un luogo dove aprirli in Italia, dove nessun amministratore, di qualsiasi colore politico li vuole. Esaminiamo ora l’ipotesi che il Protocollo venga applicato principalmente a persone soccorse in mare che verrebbero portate in Albania al solo scopo di detenerle e di esaminare le loro domande di asilo.

      Nel testo del protocollo si fa riferimento esplicito all’espletamento delle procedure di frontiera previste dal diritto italiano ed europeo. Prima ancora di verificare se gli standard e le garanzie previste dal diritto dell’Unione possano essere rispettate, ciò che bisogna chiedersi è se sia possibile esaminare le domande di asilo presentate da coloro che vengono deportati dal territorio italiano in cui si trovano (le navi ed altri mezzi delle autorità italiane) nel territorio albanese.

      La risposta non può che essere negativa, dal momento che il diritto dell’Unione sull’asilo (o protezione internazionale) si applica nel territorio degli Stati membri, alle frontiere, nelle zone di transito e nelle acque territoriali. Non si applica al di fuori dell’Unione. Un’applicazione extra-territoriale del diritto dell’UE non pare possibile, come del tutto correttamente messo in luce anche dal documento “Preliminary Comments on the Italy-Albania Deal” pubblicato il 9.11.23 dall’autorevole E.C.R.E. (European Council on Refugees and Exiles).

      Analogo ragionamento vale anche per ciò che attiene l’ipotesi di usare i centri per l’esecuzione del trattenimento degli stranieri espulsi regolato dal diritto dell’Unione con la Direttiva 115/2008/CE. Anche in tal caso non ne risulta possibile alcuna applicazione extra territoriale al di fuori del territorio degli stati membri dell’Unione.

      Va sempre considerato che non ci troviamo di fronte alla questione di come consentire l’accesso alla procedura di asilo da parte di uno straniero che si trova all’estero, e di come si possa esaminare, almeno in fase preliminare, la sua domanda di asilo al fine di consentire un suo successivo ingresso nel territorio di uno stato membro: in altri termini, di come creare delle procedure di ingresso protette a persone con un chiaro bisogno di protezione.

      All’esatto opposto, il protocollo tra Italia e Albania configura una situazione nella quale persone che sono già sotto la giurisdizione italiana, per essere stati soccorsi e trasportati da navi dello Stato, vengono subito dopo tradotte in un paese terzo al solo scopo di impedirne l’ingresso nel territorio nazionale e predeterminare delle condizioni di esame delle domande di asilo con garanzie procedurali ridotte al minimo.

      Ammettiamo ora, come mero esercizio, che si possa sostenere che il diritto dell’Unione sia applicabile all’esame delle domande di asilo in Albania ed esaminiamo le principali questioni che si aprono: la consegna dei migranti dalle mani delle autorità italiane a quelle albanesi, allo sbarco e fino all’ingresso nei centri di detenzione, che, nonostante l’asserita giurisdizione italiana, si trovano in territorio albanese, potrebbe configurare un respingimento collettivo vietato dal diritto dell’Unione Europea. Per i respingimenti collettivi attuati con la Libia nel 2009 l’Italia è stata condannata dalla Corte Europea dei diritti umani il 23.02.2013 nella causa Hirsi Jamaa.

      Nessuna valutazione sulla condizione delle persone salvate in mare può essere condotta a bordo delle navi italiane, e dunque ogni procedura giuridica dovrebbe iniziare in territorio albanese all’interno di centri sotto la giurisdizione italiana (ma anche albanese). La restrizione della libertà personale di coloro che vi verrebbero rinchiusi, per essere conforme all’art. 13 Costituzione, va convalidato dall’autorità giudiziaria con un esame caso per caso a seguito del quale il provvedimento di trattenimento viene convalidato o meno.

      Come garantire dentro il microcosmo del campo a gestione italiana il corretto funzionamento della procedura, tra cui ovviamente il diritto del richiedente che si intende trattenere di essere assistito da un legale italiano di fiducia? In ogni caso deve essere esclusa la possibilità di un trattenimento generalizzato di tutti i richiedenti asilo perché tassativamente vietato dal diritto dell’Unione che vieta agli Stati di applicare misure di limitazione della libertà personale nei confronti dei richiedenti asilo “per il solo fatto di essere un richiedente” (Direttiva 2013/33/UE articolo 7 paragrafo 1).

      Come noto, il diritto dell’Unione prevede che il trattenimento venga disposto solo in casi molto limitati e “salvo se non siano applicabili efficacemente misure alternative meno coercitive” (articolo 8, paragrafo 2), misure che comunque in Albania non sarebbero mai praticabili.

      La larga maggioranza dei richiedenti asilo, sicuramente tutte le situazioni vulnerabili e i minori, ma anche tutti coloro cui non sarebbe applicabile la procedura accelerata di frontiera, non potrebbero dunque in nessun caso essere trattenuti, ma poiché non possono neppure rimanere in Albania al di fuori dal centro, dovrebbero essere trasportati in Italia immediatamente per continuare l’accoglienza e l’esame ordinario della loro domanda di asilo sul territorio nazionale.

      Nei confronti di coloro che rimarrebbero rinchiusi nei centri in Albania va garantito senza eccezioni l’esercizio dei diritti fondamentali, tra cui il diritto di ricevere “le informazioni sulla procedura con riguardo alla situazione particolare del richiedente” nonché di comunicare con “organizzazioni che prestino assistenza legale o altra consulenza ai richiedenti” (Direttiva 2013/32/UE art. 19).

      In caso di diniego il richiedente deve poter pienamente esercitare il suo diritto alla difesa, costituzionalmente garantito (Cost. articolo 24) e ha diritto ad un “ricorso effettivo” (Direttiva 2013/32/UE art. 46 par.1) che per essere tale deve garantire alla persona la libertà di consultare un legale e di sceglierlo.

      Nell’ambito delle procedure accelerate di frontiera il giudice mantiene la possibilità di concedere la sospensiva nelle more della decisione di merito ovvero “autorizzare o meno la permanenza del richiedente nel territorio dello Stato membro” (art.46 par.6 lettera d). Ma, in caso di autorizzazione il richiedente non si trova affatto sul territorio dello Stato membro (!) bensì in Albania, il che comporta l’immediato trasferimento in Italia del richiedente da parte delle autorità italiane e la prosecuzione dell’iter della domanda in Italia.

      Il Protocollo appare dunque un incredibile coacervo di procedure radicalmente illegittime rispetto al diritto dell’Unione vigente e che comunque non potrebbero essere applicate in modo razionale e rispettoso di garanzie procedurali e di tutela dei diritti fondamentali degli stranieri coinvolti, sia che si tratti di naufraghi prima e richiedenti asilo poi, che di stranieri espulsi e poi trattenuti in Albania.

      https://www.unita.it/2023/11/10/ecco-perche-laccordo-tra-italia-e-albania-e-illegale-tutte-le-procedure-che-vi

    • Ancora lui, ancora Edi

      Periodicamente il primo ministro albanese si occupa dei flussi migratori italiani. Ripassare quali siano le sue motivazioni è utile, anche perché questa volta, forse, ha esagerato. Un commento

      Edi Rama governa l’Albania da più di dieci anni. Le prime elezioni le vinse nel 2013, pochi mesi dopo il “siamo arrivati primi ma non abbiamo vinto” di Pierluigi Bersani. Da noi la sinistra pareggiava con un Berlusconi terminale; sull’altra sponda dell’Adriatico, invece, Edi l’artista, Edi il socialista, l’ex sindaco di Tirana che aveva colorato i palazzi, archiviava per sempre la stagione di Sali Berisha. Voltava pagina. “Come sono avanti questi albanesi”, è il qualunquismo mezzo di sinistra e mezzo di disprezzo che da allora dedichiamo ai nostri vicini. E su questa carenza di conoscenza, da più di un decennio, periodicamente, Edi Rama lucra politica. Non lo vediamo perché per vederlo bisogna considerare l’Albania uno stato. E invece per noi l’Albania è un luogo dell’immaginario, e i sogni non sono portatori di interessi. Non lo vediamo, perché la fiction italo-albanese è utile a mascherare la povertà della nostra politica estera.

      L’ultimo gioco di prestigio Rama lo ha regalato lunedì scorso a Palazzo Chigi, questa volta il complice non è stato l’«amico Renzi» (2014), né l’«amico Di Maio» (2021), siccome siamo nel 2023 è stata «l’amica Giorgia Meloni». Non sono certo che commentare il memorandum (https://www.ilpost.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/08/1699429572-Protocollo-Italia-Albania-.pdf?x19465) firmato dai due governi sia utile, non solo perché è evidentemente poco praticabile sul piano pratico e giuridico, ma perché seguo da diversi anni le relazioni tra Italia e Albania e non credo più alle parole che si dicono le due diplomazie. A chi non avesse seguito, basti sapere che nel corso della conferenza stampa (https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/il-presidente-meloni-incontra-il-primo-ministro-della-repubblica-d-albania/24178), la Presidente del Consiglio ha dichiarato che l’Albania “concederà all’Italia alcune zone del suo territorio” (sic!), sulle quali l’Italia potrà realizzare “a proprie spese e sotto la propria giurisdizione” due strutture “per la gestione dei migranti illegali”. Per l’esattezza il governo ipotizza di portare in Albania tremila persone al mese, che dovrebbero rimanere in questi centri durante la domanda di asilo, negata la quale il richiedente verrebbe allontanato dal territorio albanese (non si capisce per andare dove, se si rimpatria dall’Italia o dall’Albania). Flusso complessivo annuale stimato: 36.000 persone. Come alla fine delle pubblicità dei farmaci, Meloni in chiusura ha messo le avvertenze – “Il protocollo disegna la cornice politica, all’accordo dovranno seguire i provvedimenti normativi conseguenti” – e ha fornito una vaga data di inizio progetto: primavera 2024. Tradotto: questo accordo non esiste, è pura propaganda.

      Nulla di nuovo sotto il sole italo-albanese. Qualcosa di simile era già avvenuto nel 2018, quando la crisi della nave Diciotti bloccata da Salvini nel porto di Catania venne “risolta” dai media manager del governo albanese, che promise su twitter l’accoglienza di 20 migranti, venendo immediatamente ripreso dall’account della Farnesina, e quindi da tutte le agenzie stampa. Anche allora i ministri Salvini e Di Maio (il governo era gialloverde) enfatizzarono la condotta del piccolo paese balcanico “più europeo e più solidale degli stati membri”: a sinistra ci si cullò nel sogno di un paese povero ma ospitale, a destra ci si vantò dei frutti dell’intransigenza del ministro degli Interni, che con il suo “no” aveva imposto una redistribuzione, peraltro a un paese che con il suo gesto ripagava finalmente l’accoglienza degli italiani (come se la Lega Nord degli anni Novanta fosse stata accogliente verso gli albanesi). Giorni di dichiarazioni allucinanti e vuote, perché nessun asilante della Diciotti arrivò mai in Albania (https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Albania/Nessun-asilante-della-Diciotti-e-mai-arrivato-in-Albania-192453), né alcuna autorità si pose mai il problema che ciò accadesse, essendo illegale il trasferimento di un migrante giunto in Ue in uno stato terzo, fuori dal sistema di asilo europeo.

      Ed è proprio qui che la sparata di Meloni supera quella di Salvini: perché per evitare l’obiezione dell’illegalità di un trasferimento forzato fuori dall’Ue, a questo giro si dice che il porto di Shëngjin e le sue strutture saranno “territorio italiano”, e che da quel territorio i migranti dislocati in Albania potranno chiedere asilo all’Italia. Ammesso e non concesso che sia possibile trasportare i migranti intercettati, poniamo, al largo della Sicilia in un porto a 700 km di mare delle rotte del Mediterraneo centrale (non certo l’approdo più vicino imposto dalle Convenzioni internazionali sul soccorso in mare), davvero non si capisce come sia possibile realizzare una Italia extraterritoriale, capace di organizzare un’accoglienza rispettosa del diritto internazionale fuori dai propri confini. Ma sto contravvenendo al buon proposito di non commentare un memorandum che non diventerà mai operativo. Torniamo alla politica, e in particolare alla politica albanese. Perché, ciclicamente, Edi Rama si occupa delle nostre questioni migratorie?

      Per lo stesso motivo per cui nel 2020 sceneggiò di inviare una squadra di infermieri in Lombardia per aiutare le nostre terapie intensive intasate dal Covid-19 (https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Albania/Dare-un-senso-alla-solidarieta-del-governo-albanese-200768): il video sulla pista dell’aeroporto di Tirana (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYtgeZjtIko

      ), con i poveri medici già inscafandrati è degno della Corea del Nord (per la cronaca, si trattava di ragazzi inesperti, come emerse negli ospedali del bresciano dove vennero dislocati, sostanzialmente per apprendere le tecniche di contrasto al virus, nel momento in cui la pandemia divampava anche in Albania). Nel 2018, come nel 2020 come nel 2023, per Edi Rama l’obiettivo è sempre uno solo: entrare nel flusso narrativo delle vicende europee, accreditarsi tra i partner come leader d’area e dipingere presso le opinioni pubbliche l’Albania come membro di fatto dell’Unione europea. Cose che aiutano a far dimenticare che su ogni singolo dossier dei negoziati di adesione il suo paese arranca.

      La conferenza stampa di Rama e Meloni non ha raccontato l’avvenimento di un fatto diplomatico. È essa stessa il fatto diplomatico. Dinanzi agli italiani, Rama ha offerto a Meloni la possibilità di fingere che l’Italia abbia una politica estera assertiva (una funzione che lo stato albanese ha svolto altre volte nella storia d’Italia), dinanzi agli europei, Meloni ha offerto a Rama ciò che tutti i governi italiani garantiscono a prescindere dal colore politico: il certificato di europeità. “Non solo l’Albania si conferma una nazione amica dell’Italia – ha dichiarato la Presidente – ma anche una nazione amica dell’Unione europea. Nonostante sia solo un paese candidato si comporta già come un paese membro dell’Unione”. Insomma, da dieci anni il copione è lo stesso, ma i nostri governi cambiano ed ereditano il discorso dal precedente, mentre Rama resta e continua ad affinare la sua interpretazione: “Preferisco far riposare il traduttore”, dice prima di sfoderare il suo italiano, con lo sguardo umile di chi vorrebbe fare di più. E poi va dritto al cuore, dritto sul senso di colpa della sinistra, dritto sul complesso di superiorità della destra: “Non avremmo fatto questo accordo con nessuno stato Ue. Il debito che abbiamo con l’Italia non si paga, ma se l’Italia chiama l’Albania c’è. Se ci sono domande bene, se non ci sono firmiamo e andiamo in vita dopo aver fatto il nostro dovere”.

      Da dieci anni, Edi Rama governa il suo paese con i media stranieri e il consenso che miete all’estero, da Bruxelles ad Ankara (perché esiste anche un copione “orientalista” consolidato, ma questa è un’altra storia: https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Albania/Albania-candidata-all-Europa-o-provincia-ottomana-195112). Oggi in Albania manca una opposizione credibile, sia a livello nazionale che municipale, principalmente perché opporsi non conviene. La criminalità organizzata è scesa a patti con questo nuovo, singolo, potere. La corruzione non dilaga, è endemica, l’unico metodo possibile. Le riforme richieste dall’Ue arrancano, gli albanesi emigrano in massa: senza barconi, ma chiedendo asilo in nord Europa, come gli eritrei della Diciotti.

      Per tutti questi motivi Edi (che è cresciuto a Rai e Mediaset e conosce il potere ipnotico che l’estero esercita sulla periferia albanese e che il ricordo della migrazione albanese esercita su di noi) ogni tanto un giretto in Italia se lo fa. E proprio per questi motivi, proprio perché l’Albania reale, nonostante la nostra cooperazione e le nostre politiche, oggi è un paese così, noi abbiamo bisogno di un’Albania che ci racconti quanto siamo stati bravi. Che ci confermi che stiamo raccogliendo i frutti dell’accoglienza seminata trenta anni fa. Che ci rassicuri sul fatto che sappiamo stare nel Mediterraneo, e che sul Mare Nostrum disponiamo di tavoli e relazioni che ci consentono di farci ascoltare in Europa. Questa volta, forse, l’hanno sparata troppo grossa. La ricorrente bugia italo-albanese è un’impostura morale che interessa a poche persone, ma sta oltrepassando le soglie della sostenibilità. Il risveglio rischia di essere molto brusco.

      https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Albania/Ancora-lui-ancora-Edi-228139

    • Albania Agrees to Host Centres Processing Migrants to Italy

      Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has signed an agreement in Rome pledging to host centers that will process the claims of thousands of migrants rescued by Italy at sea.

      Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her Albanian counterpart, Edi Rama, on Monday in Rome signed an important memorandum of understanding under which Albania has agreed to host centres managing thousands of would-be migrants to Italy rescued at sea.

      “Mass illegal immigration is a phenomenon that no EU state can deal with alone, and collaboration between EU states and non-EU states, for now, is fundamental,” Meloni said.

      “The memorandum has three main goals”, she explained; to combat people smuggling and illegal migration, and to welcome only those that have rights to international protection.

      Under the deal, Italy will set up two centres in Albania, which Meloni said in the end might handle “a total annual flow of 36,000 people”.

      Jurisdiction over the centres will be Italian.

      “Albania will grant some areas of territory”, where Italy will create “two structures” for the management of illegal migrants: “they will initially be able to accommodate up to 3,000 people who will remain there for the time needed to process asylum applications and, possibly, for the purposes of repatriation,” said Meloni, Italy’s ANSA news agency reported.

      One centre will be at the northwestern Albanian port of Shëngjin, which will handle disembarkation and identification procedures and where Italy will set up a first reception and screening centre.

      In Gjader, also in north-western Albania, it will set up a second, pre-removal centre, CPR, structure for subsequent procedures, ANSA added.

      The deal does not apply to immigrants arriving on Italian territory but to those rescued in the Mediterranean by Italian official ships – not those rescued by NGOs. It does not apply to minors, pregnant women and vulnerable persons.

      Albania will collaborate on the external surveillance of the centres. A series of protocols will follow that outline the framework. The plan is to make the centres operational in the spring of 2024, Meloni said.

      Since Meloni’s far-right government came into power, one of its priorities has been to reduce the number of people arriving illegally in Italy through the Central Mediterranean or Western Balkan migration routes.

      This goal explains Italy’s renewed political interest in the Balkans. Several top Italian political figures, including Meloni herself and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, have been regularly meeting counterparts in Slovenia, Croatia and Albania in the last months. A central point of these meetings has been migration.

      Data published by the Italian Department of Public Safety show that the number of irregular arrivals in Italy in 2023 until November 1, 2023, was 145,314, a 165-per-cent increase compared to 2021, and 64 per cent higher than 2022.

      Albania’s Rama said Albania could not reach a similar agreement with any other country in the EU, citing the unique connections between Albania and Italy and Italians and Albanians.

      Sa far, Albania has had limited capacities to host migrants, most of whom use it as transit country to reach EU countries.

      Rama added that Albania owes the Italian people a debt for “what they did to us from the first day that we arrived on the shores of [Italy] to find support and to imagine and have a better life”.

      After the fall of communism of Albania in 1991, many Albanians fled to Italy’s southern coasts by boat. According to data published in 2021 by the Italian National Institute of Statistic, 230,000 Albanian citizens have acquired Italian citizenship since 1991.

      https://balkaninsight.com/2023/11/06/albania-agrees-to-host-centres-processing-migrants-to-italy

    • Italy-Albania agreement adds to worrying European trend towards externalising asylum procedures

      “The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Italy and Albania on disembarkation and the processing of asylum applications, concluded last week, raises several human rights concerns and adds to a worrying European trend towards the externalisation of asylum responsibilities,” said today the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović.

      “The MoU raises a range of important questions on the impact that its implementation would have for the human rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. These relate, among others, to timely disembarkation, impact on search and rescue operations, fairness of asylum procedures, identification of vulnerable persons, the possibility of automatic detention without an adequate judicial review, detention conditions, access to legal aid, and effective remedies. The MoU creates an ad hoc extra-territorial asylum regime characterised by many legal ambiguities. In practice, the lack of legal certainty will likely undermine crucial human rights safeguards and accountability for violations, resulting in differential treatment between those whose asylum applications will be examined in Albania and those for whom this will happen in Italy.

      The MoU is indicative of a wider drive by Council of Europe member states to pursue various models of externalising asylum as a potential ‘quick fix’ to the complex challenges posed by the arrival of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. However, externalisation measures significantly increase the risk of exposing refugees, asylum seekers and migrants to human rights violations. The shifting of responsibility across borders by some states also incentivises others to do the same, which risks creating a domino effect that could undermine the European and global system of international protection.

      Ensuring that asylum can be claimed and assessed on member states’ own territories remains a cornerstone of a well-functioning, human rights compliant system that provides protection to those who need it. It is therefore important that member states continue to focus their energy on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of their domestic asylum and reception systems, and that they do not allow the ongoing discussion about externalisation to divert much-needed resources and attention away from this. Similarly, it is crucial that member states ensure that international co-operation efforts prioritise the creation of safe and legal pathways that allow individuals to seek protection in Europe without resorting to dangerous and irregular migration routes.”

      https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/view/-/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/id/261934338

    • German Chancellor Scholz to examine Italy-Albania asylum deal

      The German leader has signalled an openness to study Italy’s recent agreement to hold asylum seekers in centers in Albania. The deal has raised human rights concerns, including from the Council of Europe.

      German Chancellor Scholz has said he will look “closely” at Italy’s plans to establish centers in Albania to hold migrants. Speaking on the sidelines of the congress of European Socialists in the Spanish city of Malaga, he noted that Albania is a candidate for EU membership and that challenges like migration needed to be addressed on a European level, reported Reuters.

      “Bear in mind that Albania will quite soon, in our view, be a member of the EU, implying that we are talking about the question of how can we jointly solve challenges and problems within the European family,” Scholz told reporters on Saturday (November 11).

      The Memorandum of Understanding between the Italian and Albanian governments, announced last week, will see tens of thousands of migrants who were rescued in the Mediterranean housed in closed centers in Albania while authorities assess their asylum requests.

      “Such deals, that have been eyed there, are possible, and we will all look at that very closely,” Scholz stated during the briefing, according to Reuters.

      He emphasized that a clear European course in migration policy was needed “to correct things that have not been right in the past (and) to establish a solidarity mechanism so that not each country on its own has to try and master the challenges alone.”
      ’It becomes less attractive for them to pay big money to smugglers’

      If the Italy-Albania deal is implemented, it would be the first time that such an idea would actually be put in place, Ruud Koopmans, a professor for migration studies and advisor to the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, BAMF, told DW in an interview. He referred to unsuccessful attempts by Denmark and the UK to try something similar in Rwanda.

      From a legal perspective, the Italy-Albania deal could become problematic if people who are rescued on Italian territory instead of in international waters are sent to Albania, Koopmans noted. “When people from the Sahara come to Italy and are then sent to Albania, there is no prior connection to Albania. This could be legally problematic.”

      Koopmans said that it could also become difficult to send people back who are rejected. “…(T)his is not easy in practice, as home countries often do not cooperate and documents are missing. This is a problem that Albania will also face. But if people know that they will have to wait in Albania if they are rejected, it becomes less attractive for them to pay big money to smugglers,” he said.

      Discussions on finding solutions to increasing asylum numbers are gaining momentum, Koopmans said. “More and more countries are looking for solutions. Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands and Germany are having discussions along these lines.” Deals like the Italy-Albania agreement could present an opportunity for countries neighboring the EU, in that they could help their efforts to join the bloc, he added.

      Deal could undermine human rights safeguards, Mijatović

      Italy’s deal has raised concerns among Italy’s opposition as well as rights groups who see it as an attack on the right to asylum. The NGO Emergency said that the deal is “in reality, ...a way to block migrants from arriving on Italian soil – and therefore European soil – to ask for asylum, as required by European and international law. (This is) yet another attack on asylum rights and the provisions of Article 10 of our Constitution.”

      Concerns were also expressed by Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović. She warned that the deal’s legal ambiguities could undermine human rights safeguards and accountability. “The MoU is indicative of a wider drive by Council of Europe member states to pursue various models of externalizing asylum as a potential ’quick fix’ to the complex challenges posed by the arrival of refugees,” she said in a press release on November 13.

      Mijatović urged member states to focus on improving domestic asylum and reception systems and to prioritize safe and legal pathways for protection in Europe.

      Germany announces streamlined asylum process

      The chancellor’s remarks in Malaga came on the heels of an agreement with Germany’s 16 states on a tougher migration policy and increased funding for refugee hosting capacities.

      Faced with an increase in the number of asylum cases filed in Germany, estimated to reach 300,000 this year, the government has announced it will accelerate procedures.

      At all BAMF offices, the procedure for registering asylum seekers now includes photographing and fingerprinting, allowing for immediate data checks to rule out potential multiple identities. The system allows other agencies involved in the asylum process to access biometric data as well, according to BAMF. Arabic names will be transferred into the Latin alphabet to prevent differences in spelling and other mix-ups.

      Furthermore, mobile phone searches will only be conducted on a case-by-case basis, BAMF said, and queries to the Schengen Information System (SIS) will be reduced: if the last SIS search was within 14 days, an additional inquiry is waived.

      A spokesperson from BAMF said that these specific measures would make procedures more efficient, while maintaining high-security standards. The asylum procedure is meant to last 6.7 months on average. However, when considering negative decisions, administrative court proceedings take on average 21.8 months in the first instance, the spokesperson noted.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/53194/german-chancellor-scholz-to-examine-italyalbania-asylum-deal

    • Accordo Italia-Albania, ASGI: è incostituzionale non sottoporlo al Parlamento

      La Costituzione italiana prevede che la ratifica di trattati internazionali spetti al Presidente della Repubblica, previa, quando occorra, l’autorizzazione con legge del Parlamento (art. 87, Cost.).

      Tutti i tipi di trattati internazionali costituiscono una delle fonti del diritto internazionale, la cui efficacia nell’ambito nazionale deriva da un ordine di esecuzione dato per effetto della loro ratifica che fa sorgere l’obbligo internazionale della loro attuazione interna.

      Come ha ricordato il Ministero degli affari esteri nella sua circolare n. 2/2021 del 30 luglio 2021 “quale che sia la loro denominazione formale (trattati, accordi, convenzioni, memorandum, etc.), i trattati internazionali possono essere conclusi tramite documenti a firma congiunta, scambi di note, scambi di lettere o altre modalità, essendo riconosciuto dal diritto internazionale il principio della libertà delle forme.”

      Gli atti per i quali l’art. 80 Cost. prescrive la preventiva legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica sono i «trattati che sono di natura politica, o prevedono arbitrati o regolamenti giudiziari, o importano variazioni del territorio od oneri alle finanze o modificazioni di leggi».

      La dottrina giuridica afferma che si tratti di una forma di controllo democratico della politica estera e di compartecipazione delle Camere al potere estero del Governo. Anche per tale rilevanza politica complessiva l’art. 72, comma 4 Cost. prescrive che i disegni di legge per la ratifica siano esaminati sempre con procedura legislativa ordinaria.

      Inoltre, è bene ricordare che, in generale, qualsiasi norma non costituzionale deve essere interpretata sempre in modo conforme alla Costituzione, sicché anche questo Protocollo deve essere interpretato in modo conforme all’art. 80 Cost.

      Secondo il Governo, tuttavia, il Protocollo italo-albanese in materia di gestione delle migrazioni non deve essere sottoposto a legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica, perché sarebbe l’attuazione del Trattato di amicizia e collaborazione tra la Repubblica italiana e la Repubblica di Albania, con scambio di lettere esplicativo dell’articolo 19, fatto a Roma il 13 ottobre 1995, ratificato e reso esecutivo sulla base della legge 21 maggio 1998, n. 170.

      Tesi giuridicamente infondata, perché l’art. 19 del Trattato del 1995 prevede soltanto che Italia ed Albania “concordano nell’attribuire una importanza, prioritaria ad una stretta ed incisiva collaborazione tra i due Paesi per regolare, nel rispetto della legislazione vigente, i flussi migratori” e che “riconoscono la necessità di controllare i flussi migratori anche attraverso lo sviluppo della cooperazione fra i competenti organi della Repubblica Italiana e della Repubblica di Albania e di concludere a tal fine un accordo organico che regoli anche l’accesso dei cittadini dei due Paesi al mercato del lavoro stagionale, conformemente alla legislazione vigente”.

      Dunque, nel Trattato del 1995 Italia e Albania si sono accordate per concludere successivi protocolli in materia migratoria soltanto per l’ipotesi prevista nell’art. 19 comma 2 e cioè per regolare l’immigrazione albanese in Italia (che infatti è stata poi regolata con due successivi accordi firmati in forma semplificata nel 1997 e nel 2008), mentre le norme che si riferiscono genericamente alla regolazione e al controllo dei flussi migratori alludono a materie del tutto vaghe e suscettibili delle più diverse applicazioni, future e incerte.

      Pertanto, la mera indicazione che si tratti di un Protocollo sulla “cooperazione in materia migratoria” e il richiamo a due precedenti trattati e accordi non possono certo essere lo strumento per eludere l’obbligo derivante dall’art. 80 Cost. per il Governo di presentare alle Camere un apposito disegno di legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica del Protocollo e della futura intesa di attuazione.

      Il Protocollo appena firmato prevede disposizioni molto dettagliate che riguardano proprio i casi in cui l’art. 80 Cost. esige la preventiva legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica, perché:

      – comportano oneri alle finanze, sia perché il Protocollo pone espressamente a carico dell’Italia specifici oneri finanziari, per l’allestimento delle strutture (art. 4, comma 5), per l’erogazione di servizi sanitari (art. 4, comma 9), per la realizzazione delle strutture necessarie al personale albanese addetto alla sicurezza esterna dei centri (art. 5., comma 2), per la riconduzione nei centri da parte delle autorità albanesi di eventuali migranti usciti illegalmente dai centri (art. 6, comma 6) e per l’impiego dei mezzi e delle unità albanesi (art. 8, comma 3) e per eventuali risarcimenti del danno (art. 12, comma 2), cioè per la realizzazione e gestione dei centri, per il relativo personale, per il trasporto da e per l’Albania degli stranieri trattenuti e per la loro assistenza anche sanitaria (a cui dovrà aggiungersi anche la copertura degli oneri connessi al gratuito patrocinio per le spese di difesa degli stranieri, per quelle di interpretariato e per quelle sullo svolgimento dell’attività delle commissioni per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale e dei giudici che convalideranno il trattenimento e che giudicheranno sugli eventuali ricorsi), sia perché il Protocollo prevede specifici contributi, iniziali (16,5 milioni di euro) e una successiva garanzia di 100 milioni di euro, che devono essere erogati dall’Italia all’Albania i cui importi e scadenze sono specificati in un apposito allegato al Protocollo stesso;

      - comportano modificazioni di leggi, perché il Protocolloper essere effettivamente attuato non soltanto prevede espressamente un’intesa successiva (che, dunque, dovrà essere sottoposta alle Camere congiuntamente al Protocollo), ma prevede norme che comportano operazioni amministrative e giudiziarie concernenti stranieri giunti in Italia e che saranno svolte in Albania, cioè norme non previste dalle attuali leggi italiane. Questo significa che il protocollo, per essere attuato, esige implicitamente la modificazione di tante norme legislative vigenti in Italia, che regolano la condizione giuridica degli stranieri che giungono in Italia e che presentano in Italia una domanda per fruire del diritto di asilo nel territorio della Repubblica italiana (e la condizione giuridica dello straniero e le condizioni per il diritto di asilo sono materie coperte da riserva di legge ai sensi dell’art. 10, commi 2 e 3 Cost.). Infatti, in base alle disposizioni del protocollo costoro potranno essere soccorsi da navi italiane, e dunque in territorio italiano, e da qui trasportati poi in Albania per essere sottoposti in territorio albanese a misure restrittive alla libertà personale (e i casi e i modi dei provvedimenti restrittivi della libertà personale sono materie coperte da riserva assoluta di legge e da riserva di giurisdizione previste dall’art. 13 Cost. e dall’art. 5 CEDU); tali restrizioni avverranno mediante provvedimenti disposti e attuati in Albania da autorità italiane in modi che saranno, in tutto o in parte, diversi da quelli già previsti dalle vigenti norme legislative italiane (p. es. occorrerà indicare quale sarà l’autorità di pubblica sicurezza competente dal punto di vista geografico ad adottare i provvedimenti amministrativi di espulsione e i provvedimenti di trattenimento, occorrerà individuare la commissione territoriale competente ad esaminare eventuali domande di protezione internazionale, occorrerà dare una nuova applicazione al concetto di “accompagnamento immediato alla frontiera” di persone che in realtà sono già fuori del territorio italiano, occorrerà stabilire modi e garanzie per interpreti, difensori e stranieri durante lo svolgimento in Albania dei colloqui con le autorità di pubblica sicurezza e con i giudici, occorrerà disciplinare i procedimenti di trasporto degli stranieri da e per i centri albanesi);

      – comportano regolamenti giudiziari che riguardano la giurisdizione italiana, sia relativamente alla sua estensione territoriale e personale (inclusa la regolamentazione di eventuali contenziosi sulla responsabilità civile di ciò che accadrà in Albania che saranno espressamente di competenza dei giudici italiani), sia con riguardo alla effettuazione da parte dei giudici italiani nei centri albanesi dei giudizi di convalida dei trattenimenti e degli eventuali giudizi sui ricorsi contro le eventuali decisioni di diniego e di inammissibilità delle domande di protezione internazionale (occorrerà disciplinare la competenza territoriale del giudice che dovrà giudicare in Albania e le modalità delle notificazioni e dello svolgimento dei giudizi);

      - hanno natura politica, poiché le disposizioni del Protocollo impegnano durevolmente la politica estera italiana, avendo una durata di cinque anni ed essendo state negoziate e stipulate personalmente e pubblicamente dai capi dei Governi dei due Stati e non già da Ministri o da meri funzionari ministeriali, e poiché le premesse del Protocollo espressamente lo motivano con la “comunanza di interessi e di aspirazioni” tra i due Stati e dei due Stati alla prevenzione dei flussi migratori illeciti e della tratta degli esseri umani, e a promuovere la crescente collaborazione bilaterale tra Italia ed Albania “anche nella prospettiva dell’adesione della Repubblica di Albania all’UE”, che è l’evidente interesse principale di tutte le azioni di politica estera del governo albanese. La grande ed evidente politicità dell’accordo è confermata dalle dichiarazioni pubbliche fatte dalla Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri al momento della firma del protocollo davanti al Primo ministro albanese: il Protocollo è stato definito «importantissimo […] che arricchisce un’amicizia storica [e] una cooperazione profonda» tra i due Stati, la «cornice politica e giuridica» della collaborazione tra Italia e Albania e «un accordo di respiro europeo».

      Inoltre, il Protocollo ha per oggetto misure che attengono alle materie della sicurezza e della difesa nazionale. L’attuazione delle disposizioni previste dal Protocollo comporta il trasporto verso l’Albania di stranieri mediante mezzi delle competenti autorità italiane, il che avverrà in modi sostanzialmente forzati, mediante aerei o navi delle Forze armate italiane, le quali hanno già basi in Albania e alle quali il Governo con l’art. 21 del decreto-legge 19 settembre 2023, n. 124 ha affidato la realizzazione dei centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio, dei punti di crisi e dei centri governativi di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo, trattandosi di materie che lo stesso articolo del citato decreto-legge attribuisce espressamente alla materia della difesa e della sicurezza la realizzazione.

      Proprio su queste materie la legge n. 25/1997 (e oggi l’art. 10, comma 1, lett. a) del codice dell’ordinamento militare, emanato con d. lgs. n. 66/2010) ha previsto che tutte le deliberazioni del Governo in materia di sicurezza e di difesa debbano essere sempre approvate dal Parlamento. Ciò comporta che dal 1997 sono sottoposti all’esame delle Camere mediante leggi di autorizzazione alla ratifica anche tutti i tipi di accordi internazionali in materia di sicurezza e di difesa.

      *

      È dunque indispensabile l’esame parlamentare del disegno di legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica di questo protocollo e della sua futura intesa di attuazione e delle norme nazionali che daranno esecuzione nell’ordinamento italiano a questi accordi.

      Va ricordato, infine che:

      – la proposta di legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica non necessariamente deve essere di iniziativa del Governo (la Costituzione non lo prescrive), sicché, come è già accaduto in alcune altre occasioni, in mancanza di una presentazione di un disegno di legge del Governo essa può essere presentata nelle Camere anche da singoli parlamentari;

      – L’Assemblea di ogni Camera ha il potere di presentare alla Corte costituzionale ricorso per conflitto di attribuzioni tra i poteri dello Stato.

      In ogni caso qualora questo Protocollo non sia sottoposto a legge di autorizzazione alla ratifica in conformità con l’art. 80 Cost. non potrà mai essere eseguito, né potrà essere considerato vincolante per l’ordinamento italiano, quale obbligo internazionale ai sensi dell’art. 117, comma 1 Cost.

      https://www.asgi.it/notizie/accordo-italia-albania-asgi-illegittimo-parlamento

    • Nell’intesa Italia-Albania, la continuità deve preoccuparci quanto la novità

      L’accordo spinge la pratica di esternalizzare le frontiere verso direzioni preoccupanti. Dubbi sulla sua effettiva applicabilità

      A più di una settimana dall’annuncio dell’accordo tra Italia e Albania in materia di “gestione dei flussi migratori”, la mossa del governo italiano ha attirato diverse critiche in ambienti giuridici e militanti per le sue implicazioni in termini di diritti umani e di rispetto della legislazione italiana ed europea in materia di asilo.

      Nella consueta propaganda del governo, l’accordo (reso noto soltanto a operazione conclusa) è stato presentato come un successo diplomatico, un accordo “storico” e “innovativo”. Di fronte alle preoccupazioni sollevate da varie voci, la Presidente del Consiglio non è entrata nel merito, limitandosi a dichiararsi “fiera” di questa azione pionieristica, che “può diventare un modello per altre nazioni di collaborazione tra Paesi Ue e extra Ue” 1.

      Il protocollo prevede l’istituzione di due centri (paradossalmente definiti da alcuni media “di accoglienza”) in territorio albanese, ma sottoposti alla giurisdizione italiana: uno per le procedure di identificazione e gestione delle domande di asilo, l’altro per i rimpatri, sul “modello” dei CPR. È previsto un termine di 28 giorni per valutare le domande di ogni richiedente: una velocizzazione dei tempi che sicuramente andrebbe a discapito dell’accuratezza delle raccolte delle prove e delle valutazioni. Per quanto riguarda il “modello” del centro per i rimpatri, è ormai noto quanto gli abusi fisici e psicologici verso i detenuti siano frequenti, e quante morti evitabili sono state causate da questo sistema.

      I dubbi sulla legittimità e le possibili conseguenze dell’accordo sono tanti e fondati. E nonostante alcune affermazioni di approvazione da parte di politici europei per l’esperimento “interessante”, diversi giuristi esperti di migrazioni e diritto d’asilo hanno espresso le loro riserve sull’intesa. Una dichiarazione di ASGI sottolinea le ragioni per cui la mancata approvazione parlamentare di un accordo come questo non può ritenersi legittima. L’intesa prevede infatti disposizioni su alcune materie (finanziarie, scelte di politica estera, modifiche all’ordinamento giuridico) di cui dovrebbe necessariamente rispondere la rappresentanza democratica 2. Nel merito dei contenuti si è ampiamente espresso Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo, avvocato e attivista, descrivendo l’accordo come “privo di basi legali”.

      Un primo elemento di illegittimità è il trasferimento delle persone soccorse dalle navi italiane in territorio extra-europeo. Non si conoscono poi le attribuzioni delle competenze sulle procedure, le modalità dei rimpatri, i criteri per l’attribuzione delle caratteristiche di “vulnerabilità” che impedirebbero il trasferimento di alcune persone tratte in salvo da navi italiane verso l’Albania.

      Critiche sono arrivate anche da alcune organizzazioni non governative. Emergency ha descritto l’accordo come l’ennesimo attacco al diritto di asilo 3. La non appartenenza dell’Albania all’UE significa l’impossibilità di applicare la legge europea all’azione delle autorità albanesi. Inoltre, per i tempi sbrigativi con cui le persone richiedenti asilo sarebbero valutate, potrebbe non esserci spazio per il diritto al ricorso contro la decisione di rifiuto della domanda. In modo analogo, Amnesty International ha condannato l’accordo come “illegale e impraticabile” 4.

      Sia nelle presentazioni istituzionali sia nelle critiche, si è parlato di questo accordo soprattutto in termini di novità, di rottura con il quadro giuridico esistente. Ma è bene anche enfatizzare anche gli aspetti di continuità di questa scelta politica con il passato. Un’opinione autorevole arriva dal Consiglio d’Europa, che nelle parole della Commissaria per i diritti umani Dunja Mijatović esprime la sua preoccupazione per la tendenza crescente in Europa ad esternalizzare le frontiere e le procedure di asilo.

      La dichiarazione mette a punto una serie di fattori ambigui e problematici dell’accordo: “le tempistiche degli sbarchi, l’impatto sulle operazioni di ricerca e salvataggio, l’equità delle procedure di asilo, l’identificazione delle persone vulnerabili, la possibilità automatica di detenzione senza un adeguato controllo giudiziario, le condizioni di detenzione, l’accesso all’assistenza legale e a rimedi effettivi […]. In pratica, la mancanza di certezza giuridica probabilmente comprometterà le garanzie fondamentali per i diritti umani e la responsabilità per le violazioni, determinando un trattamento differenziato tra coloro le cui domande di asilo saranno esaminate in Albania e coloro per i quali ciò avverrà in Italia” 5.

      E sebbene tutte le ambiguità e anomalie implicite nel trattato potrebbero comportarne il fallimento o addirittura l’inapplicabilità, il protocollo d’intesa non fa che aggravare la preoccupante tendenza a esternalizzare le frontiere, ormai consolidata.

      E non è chiaramente una prerogativa esclusiva del governo attuale e delle forze politiche che lo sostengono. Infatti, il memorandum si inserisce perfettamente nel solco di altri accordi, più o meno opachi, che i nostri governi – ma anche altri governi europei e la stessa Unione – sottoscrivono da anni con paesi extra UE. Allora, forse, vale la pena di riflettere su quanto siamo disposti ad accettare, di volta in volta, di sacrificare un pezzo in più dei diritti delle persone in movimento, in una posta al ribasso che ha normalizzato sistemi che producono morte, sfruttamento e torture come inevitabili conseguenze della sacralità dei confini.

      Questa tendenza a esternalizzare tramite accordi con paesi terzi è indice di scarsa democraticità.

      Innanzitutto perché uno strumento come un protocollo d’intesa, o Memorandum of Understanding, è per sua natura “flessibile”. La preferenza sempre più marcata per questo tipo di accordo da parte del governo italiano – si pensi al memorandum con la Libia nel 2017 e con la Tunisia nel 2020 – risponde alle logiche emergenziali con cui sono ormai quasi esclusivamente trattate le questioni legate alle migrazioni.

      Se questo è un vantaggio dal punto di vista del governo, è evidente che la mancanza di controllo sui suoi contenuti e sulla sua eventuale applicazione rappresenta un problema: un memorandum non è legalmente vincolante per le due parti, non è necessariamente sottoposto a ratifiche parlamentare e può essere mantenuto riservato.

      Se si vuole parlare la lingua degli “interessi strategici”, troppo spesso l’unica con cui le istituzioni governative si approcciano alle politiche migratorie, è però una mossa rischiosa e in alcuni casi poco lungimirante. Un paese terzo a cui vengono attribuite determinate prerogative nel controllo dei confini non è un semplice ricettore passivo di politiche neocoloniali. Benché sia evidente che i rapporti di potere sono sbilanciati in favore della controparte europea, è vero anche che accordi di questo tipo hanno dato la possibilità ad alcuni governi di esercitare forme di pressione e influenza. Pressioni che, ovviamente, sono sempre andate a scapito dei diritti delle persone in movimento, usate come merce di scambio per ottenere dei vantaggi. Controlli più serrati si alternano a periodi di “rilascio controllato” dei/delle migranti, a seconda di ciò che il governo appaltante ritiene in quel momento più funzionale ai propri bisogni. È quello che accade ad esempio con Libia, Turchia, Marocco, Tunisia.

      È in questi termini che emerge ancora la continuità con le politiche migratorie degli ultimi decenni. Esternalizzare le frontiere e le procedure permette di sorvolare più di quanto non sia possibile in Italia sulle incombenze giuridiche e burocratiche del sistema di asilo. Ma soprattutto, rende meno visibili le immancabili violazioni associate al sistema di controllo delle migrazioni. Con la creazione di spazi sotto la giurisdizione italiana in un territorio di uno stato terzo, resta da chiarire come sarebbero valutate le responsabilità in caso di carenze gravi nelle strutture, che sono già state riscontrate in moltissime altre strutture europee, e non: sovraffollamento, mancanza di servizi adeguati per i richiedenti, incuria, abusi fisici, somministrazione di psicofarmaci contro la volontà dei soggetti interessati. A chi sarebbe affidata poi la repressione di eventuali rivolte o fughe da parte delle persone detenute?

      Esternalizzare le frontiere ha quindi uno scopo pratico molto preciso: allontanare dal territorio europeo la conoscenza delle sofferenze e degli atti di ribellione delle persone sottoposte al regime delle frontiere, prevenire azioni di monitoraggio e pressioni sul rispetto dei loro diritti da parte della società civile, far svolgere ad altri il lavoro sporco che per cui le istituzioni governative e le forze di polizia europee potrebbero dover essere chiamate a rispondere.

      Sottolineare gli elementi che renderebbero questo accordo illegale e inapplicabile è necessario per prevenire situazioni difficilmente riparabili con gli strumenti a disposizione della legge. Ma potrebbe non bastare: l’esperienza ci ha mostrato come accordi e decreti contrari ad alcuni principi costituzionali e del diritto di asilo abbiano comunque trovato applicazione, soprattutto quando questa è affidata in parte ad autorità di paesi terzi. È fondamentale quindi contestare alle sue radici una gestione emergenziale delle migrazioni, che passa per il solo sistema di asilo senza prevedere canali di ingresso regolari, e che mira a prevenire l’arrivo nel territorio europeo del maggior numero di persone possibile.

      Tweet di Giorgia Meloni: https://twitter.com/GiorgiaMeloni/status/1723027124246708620
      https://www.asgi.it/notizie/accordo-italia-albania-asgi-illegittimo-parlamento
      https://www.emergency.it/comunicati-stampa/laccordo-italia-albania-e-lennesimo-attacco-al-diritto-di-asilo-e-sottende
      https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/11/italy-plan-to-offshore-refugees-and-migrants-in-albania-illegal-and-unworka
      https://www.coe.int/hr/web/commissioner/-/italy-albania-agreement-adds-to-worrying-european-trend-towards-externalising-a

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/11/nellintesa-italia-albania-la-continuita-deve-preoccuparci-quanto-la-novi

    • Tavolo Asilo e Immigrazione: appello al Parlamento perché non ratifichi il Protocollo Italia-Albania

      L’accordo getta le basi per la violazione del principio di non respingimento e per l’attuazione di pratiche di detenzione illegittima: alle persone condotte nei centri sarebbe impedito di uscire, senza una chiara base legale e nessuna garanzia del diritto di difesa e a un ricorso effettivo

      Il Tavolo Asilo e Immigrazione chiede che il Protocollo Italia-Albania venga revocato dal Governo e fa fin da ora un appello al Parlamento perché voti contro il disegno di legge di ratifica preannunciato dal Ministro degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale durante le odierne comunicazioni alla Camera sull’intesa.

      L’accordo firmato con il governo albanese, violando gli obblighi costituzionali e internazionali del nostro Paese, si pone, come quello con la Tunisia, l’obiettivo di esternalizzare le frontiere e il diritto d’asilo.

      L’accordo Italia-Albania, così come delineato, comporta infatti il rischio di gravi violazioni dei diritti umani. Il testo dell’intesa non chiarisce se i centri da realizzarsi in Albania saranno destinati alle procedure di esame delle domande di protezione internazionale e in particolare alle procedure di frontiera o al rimpatrio, ma alle persone condotte nei centri sarebbe impedito di uscire, subendo di fatto un regime di detenzione automatica e prolungata, senza una chiara base legale. Anche la possibilità di controllo giurisdizionale sembra compromessa, così come il diritto di difesa e a un ricorso effettivo. L’Accordo non chiarisce infatti la competenza a convalidare il trattenimento delle persone, né che cosa accadrà alle persone che hanno chiesto protezione internazionale che non ottengano risposta entro i 28 giorni previsti dalla procedura accelerata.

      Infine, desta preoccupazione la mancanza nel Protocollo di qualsiasi riferimento alle persone maggiormente vulnerabili, minori, donne, famiglie, vittime di tortura, e di come queste sarebbero salvaguardate dall’applicazione dell’accordo, così come era stato invece annunciato nei giorni scorsi.

      Per questi motivi le Organizzazioni del Tavolo Asilo e Immigrazione ne hanno chiesto oggi la revoca da parte del Governo durante una conferenza stampa alla quale hanno partecipato anche la Segretaria del Partito Democratico Elly Schlein e il Segretario di +Europa Riccardo Magi, il senatore Graziano Delrio, Presidente del Comitato Parlamentare di controllo sull’attuazione dell’Accordo di Schengen, di vigilanza sull’attività di Europol, di controllo e vigilanza in materia di immigrazione, oltre ai deputati Matteo Mauri, Giuseppe Provenzano e Alfonso Colucci.

      Le associazioni hanno inoltre lanciato un appello al Parlamento perché voti contro il disegno di legge di ratifica preannunciato dal Ministro degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale durante le odierne comunicazioni alla Camera.

      Per il Tavolo Asilo e Immigrazione

      A Buon Diritto, ACAT, ACLI, ActionAid, Amnesty International Italia, ARCI, ASGI, Casa dei Diritti Sociali, Centro Astalli, CGIL, CIES, CNCA, Commissione Migranti e GPIC Missionari Comboniani Italia, DRC Italia, Emergency, Europasilo, Fondazione Migrantes, Forum per Cambiare l’Ordine delle Cose, Intersos, Medici del Mondo, Medici per i Diritti Umani, Medici Senza Frontiere, Movimento Italiani Senza Cittadinanza, Oxfam Italia, Refugees Welcome Italia, Save the Children Italia, Senza Confine, Società Italiana Medicina delle Migrazioni, UIL, UNIRE

      Aderiscono inoltre

      AOI, Mediterranea Saving Humans, Open Arms, Rivolti ai Balcani, Sea Watch e Sos Mediterranée Italia

      https://www.asgi.it/primo-piano/tavolo-asilo-e-immigrazione-appello-al-parlamento-perche-non-ratifichi-il-proto

    • Italy: Parliament to ratify Albania deal to process asylum seekers

      Both of Italy’s houses of parliament will be given the chance to ratify the country’s new deal to process asylum seekers in Albania. The motion was approved after a debate in the lower house on Tuesday.

      Italy’s Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani spoke to Italy’s lower house on Tuesday (November 21), explaining the Italy-Albania deal to process asylum seekers in more detail, and promising that the deal would be presented as a DDL (proposal of a law) and that both houses would have the chance to ratify it before it proceeds.

      In his long speech to the lower house, Tajani reminded parliamentarians that other similar deals with countries like Libya had not been subject to the same ratification process. Originally the Italian government said that the Italy-Albania deal didn’t need to be either, since it was not a treaty and only treaties needed to be ratified by parliament.

      However, in what the opposition has dubbed a “complete U-turn,” two weeks after the Italy-Albania deal was signed, Tajani has announced that it would be presented as a subject for debate by parliamentarians. The government hopes that the debates and ratification process will be “as quick as possible,” since the deal is meant to begin in just a few months, by spring 2024.
      Deal ’is just one additional instrument’ to manage migration

      Fighting the traffickers is “an absolute priority” for the Italian government, said Tajani during his speech to parliament. Referring to the death of a two-year-old girl during a rescue operation on Monday (November 20), Tajani said “we won’t and shouldn’t get used to these kinds of tragedies that are unfolding along our coasts.”

      He proposes that the Italy-Albania deal is just “one additional instrument” to help Italy manage migration. Tajani said that Italy has worked hard to make migration a central tenet of EU debate, and says that Italy and other members of the bloc are all working hard to “stop irregular migration, fight traffickers and strengthen the external borders of the EU.”

      Although Tajani admitted that the deal was “no panacea”, he said that Italy had “deep and historic ties with Albania” and already had joint teams to stop the trade in drugs and migrants. For the benefit of the parliament, Tajani outlined once again that the deal would be entirely paid for by Italy and was expected to cost €16.5 million initially. This would cover the two centers, one at the port and one about 30 kilometers away.

      The initial center at the port will be where people are registered and fingerprinted. They will then be moved to the reception center, where they will have their asylum requests examined. Anyone whose request is refused would be repatriated from there.
      Not comparable to UK-Rwanda deal, says Tajani

      This is no offshoring deal, said Tajani, disputing the accusations that it was “Italy’s Guantanamo” or anything like the UK-Rwanda deal. The centers will be entirely staffed by Italian personnel, be managed under Italian law, and they will come under the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, said Tajani.

      Italy’s foreign minister underlined that “no vulnerable people, women or children” would be sent to these centers. It will be exclusively to process the asylum requests of non-vulnerable migrants from safe countries, explained Tajani, or those who have already had one claim refused, or people waiting for repatriation.

      There will never be more than 3,000 people in the centers at any one time, promised Tajani. Italy will pay Albania for police patrols outside the centers and for any hospital visits that are required. Tajani also assured parliamentarians that all rights to healthcare and safety would be respected and that the only asylum seekers brought to Albania would be by Italian official boats. NGO rescue ships would not be disembarking people in Albania.
      Keeping it within the ’European family’

      Tajani said that the European Commission had already confirmed that the agreement did not violate EU law, since, as Tajani explained quoting EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson, the processing will follow Italian law which is fully in line with European law.

      Several MPs in the debate, including Minister Tajani referenced the fact that the German chancellor had said they would be following the agreement closely and thinking about similar models for their country. According to Tajani, the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that since Albania will soon be part of the European family, referring to Albania’s European accession process, processing asylum seekers in Albania was about “solving challenges within Europe” and not offshoring.

      Scholz, speaking in Malaga recently, said that the whole bloc was looking to “reduce irregular migration” and said he thought there should be more deals struck like the EU-Turkey 2016 deal, to help Europe manage migration.

      Increasing the legal pathways to Italy

      Nearing the conclusion of his speech, Tajani underlined that any exceptions to adhering to the rule of international law would be straight out “impossible”. Using the Albania agreement as a model, Tajani said the Italian government was seeking to conclude or extend similar deals with other friendly countries, transit countries and countries of origin.

      Tajani promised that the Italian government would also increase the number of legal pathways into Italy. He said in parliament that the new work permits for migrant workers had already been increased to about 150,000 per year from this year to 2025, compared to 82,000 in 2022.

      At the end of the debate in parliament, a majority of 189 to 126 voted to allow the proposal to continue its passage and be put forward as an official proposal of law (DDL), to be examined and ratified by both houses.
      Critics call deal ’illegitimate’ and ask for it to be revoked

      However, the law was not without its critics. During the debate, Riccardo Magi from the Più Europa (More Europe) party said that the deal “did nothing but increase uncertainty and would take away the fundamental right to personal liberty” of people who may be detained under the deal. He added that he didn’t believe that even the ministers proposing the deal believed it would really be doable.”

      On November 20, Amnesty International and 35 other NGOs, which together form the TAI (Tavalo Asilo e Immigrazione – a forum for the discussion of asylum and immigration) have also criticized the deal, calling it “illegitimate” and saying it should be “revoked.”

      The TAI held a press conference on Tuesday (November 21) where they reiterated that in their opinions, the deal violated international obligations and laws. They said that just like the deal with Tunisia, it was an attempt to “externalize the borders and the right to asylum.”

      According to a press release from the TAI, the Italian migration system is “in chaos and continuously violates the law and the rights of welcome and asylum” that under international law they are forced to offer. TAI accuses the Italian government of “making sure it implements practices in the field which just produce emergencies and discomfort.”

      The TAI says that the Italy-Albania deal “risks seriously violating human rights.” They say that once those people are on an Italian boat, they come under Italian jurisdiction, so they can’t then be transferred to another state to have their asylum requests examined.

      The deal, says TAI, goes against the principle of non-refoulement, whereby a person cannot be sent back to a land where they could knowingly be put in danger. The deal also allows for people to be detained illegitimately, claims TAI.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/53392/italy-parliament-to-ratify-albania-deal-to-process-asylum-seekers

    • In Pictures: Sites Where Refugees Will be Hosted In Albania

      BIRN has taken a look at the sites in Albania where a reception centre and a refugee camp will be built in accordance with the controversial agreement reached between the Albanian and Italian governments.

      The agreement was opposed both in Italy and Albania and one of the biggest critics that it received is related to Albania’s capacities to receive 3000 migrants in a month.

      According to the protocol that has been published, a reception centre for migrants will be built inside the Port of Shengjin, in the Lezha area of northern Albania, which will process and register migrants rescued at sea by Italy.

      A second site, which will serve as a refugee camp, will be built in Gjader, a village where a former military air base was built in the 1970s during the communist era.

      Italy’s plan to build migrant centres in Albania has been criticised in both countries, where activists and human rights lawyers have questioned Albania’s capacities to handle the arrangements.

      While the deal has been criticised by human rights experts, lawyers and civil society groups in Italy, in Albania many see it as Prime Minister Edi Rama’s personal initiative, since it was not discussed previously in public.

      The deal allows Italy to set up facilities on Albanian territory for migrants it has rescued at sea, which will accommodate up to 3,000 people at any one time.

      The agreement, which BIRN has seen, although without its annexes, states: “In the event that, for any reason, the [migrant’s] right to stay in the facilities cease to exist”, Italy must immediately transfer these persons out of Albanian territory.

      “Italy will use the port of Shengjin and the Gjader area to establish, at its own expense, two entry and temporary reception facilities for immigrants rescued at sea, capable of accommodating up to 3,000 people, or 39,000 a year, to expedite the processing of asylum applications or potential repatriation”, the text of the protocol notes, adding that jurisdiction over the centres will be Italian.

      “In Shengjin, Italy will handle disembarkation and identification procedures and establish a first reception and screening centre; in Gjader, it will create a model Cpr facility for subsequent procedures. Albania will collaborate with its police forces, for security and surveillance,” it adds.

      https://balkaninsight.com/2023/11/22/in-pictures-sites-where-refugees-will-be-hosted-in-albania
      #photographie #localisation

    • L’intesa con Tirana costerà oltre mezzo miliardo. 142 milioni di euro solo nel 2024

      «Oltre 142 milioni di euro nel 2024, quasi 645 nei cinque anni di validità (prorogabili). È quanto costerà ai contribuenti italiani l’intesa tra la presidente del Consiglio Giorgia Meloni e l’omologo Edi Rama per rinchiudere nei centri di trattenimento in Albania i migranti soccorsi in alto mare dalle navi italiane. Soldi che l’esecutivo è andato a cercare raschiando il fondo del barile degli accantonamenti di quattordici ministeri.»

      https://ilmanifesto.it/tagli-a-universita-e-agricoltura-per-fare-i-centri-in-albania
      #coût

    • The 2023 Italy-Albania protocol on extraterritorial migration management

      In November 2023, the Italian government concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), or Protocol, with the Albanian authorities envisaging extraterritorial migration and asylum management, including detention and asylum processing, in Albania. This Report examines the Protocol in light of EU, regional and international legal standards, and the main responses that it has attracted so far. It concludes that the MoU can be understood as a nationalistic and unilateral arrangement that, while not involving the EU, covers policy areas falling within the scope of European law. The MoU runs contrary to EU constitutive principles enshrined in the Treaties, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as international law. It should be regarded as a non-model in migration and asylum policies as it is affected by far-reaching illegality and unfeasibility grounds undermining both its rationale and implementation.

      https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-2023-italy-albania-protocol-on-extraterritorial-migration-management
      #extra-territorialité #droit_international #droits_fondamentaux

    • Nouvel avatar de l’externalisation : l’accord Italie-Albanie

      Il y a 20 ans, Plein Droit s’inquiétait des projets européens d’installation, dans des pays non membres de l’Union européenne (UE), de « centres de transit » où seraient enfermées, le temps d’instruire leur demande d’asile, les personnes étrangères ayant franchi illégalement les frontières de l’Union. Évoquant un « cauchemar », l’édito dénonçait l’intention des États membres « de se dégager des responsabilités que la Convention de Genève sur les réfugiés fait peser sur eux », ajoutant : « On devine au prix de quelles pressions, économiques ou non, ces pays accepteront ou se feront imposer ces camps de transit, […] on imagine sans mal l’insécurité à laquelle les demandeurs d’asile seront confrontés, les chantages auxquels ils pourront être soumis de la part des pays condamnés par l’Europe à les accueillir à sa place [1] ».

      Si, depuis, l’externalisation de l’asile a été déclinée de multiples façons [2], le projet de #camps_de_détention situés hors de l’UE, mais juridiquement contrôlés par un État membre, ne s’est jamais concrétisé. Sans doute à cause des #obstacles_juridiques que poserait un tel montage, notamment au regard du respect des droits fondamentaux. Mais aussi parce qu’il suppose de trouver où les implanter : jusqu’ici, les tentatives pour convaincre des pays voisins de se prêter au jeu ont échoué. Lorsqu’en 2018 le Conseil européen a exploré la possibilité de créer, hors du territoire européen, des « #centres_régionaux_de_débarquement » pour y placer des boat people interceptés en Méditerranée, il s’est heurté au refus catégorique des États nord-africains et de l’Union africaine [3].

      Aujourd’hui, le #cauchemar est à nos portes. À la veille de l’adoption du Pacte européen qui entend accélérer la procédure frontalière d’examen des demandes d’asile et renforcer la « dimension externe » de la politique migratoire de l’UE, l’Italie a conclu le 6 novembre, avec l’Albanie, un accord visant à y délocaliser l’accueil de migrants secourus en mer et l’examen des demandes d’asile. Il paraît que c’est au cours de ses vacances en Albanie, l’été dernier, que la cheffe du gouvernement italien Giorgia Meloni a posé les bases de cette « pièce importante » de sa stratégie de lutte contre les flux migratoires. Elle y a trouvé l’oreille attentive de son homologue albanais, Edi Rama, prêt à mettre « gratuitement » à la disposition de l’Italie deux zones au nord du pays pour qu’elle y construise les centres sous administration italienne où seront détenus des migrants interceptés en mer par des navires italiens. Le premier, dans une ville côtière, pour y procéder aux premiers soins, aux opérations d’identification, et instruire les demandes d’asile ; le second, sur une base militaire, pour organiser le #rapatriement des personnes qui ne demandent pas l’asile ou ne seront pas reconnues éligibles à une protection. Aux demandeurs d’asile placés dans ces centres qualifiés d’« extraterritoriaux » serait appliquée la procédure accélérée que la loi italienne prévoit pour les requêtes formées à la frontière. Seuls ceux qui obtiendraient une protection seraient admis au séjour en Italie, les autres devant être expulsés.

      L’accord ne pourra cependant entrer en vigueur avant que la Haute Cour albanaise ne se soit prononcée sur sa #constitutionnalité : les membres de l’opposition qui l’ont saisie contestent cette forme de « vente d’un morceau du territoire albanais » qui conduirait, selon un député du parti Più Europa, à la création d’« une sorte de #Guantanamo italien, en dehors de toute norme internationale, en dehors de l’UE [4] ».

      Là n’est pas le seul problème que soulève l’accord, même si Georgia Meloni aimerait que celui-ci devienne « un modèle à suivre ». Un « modèle » qui suscite les réserves du Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR), à aucun moment « informé ni consulté », et que dénonce la Commissaire aux droits de l’Homme du Conseil de l’Europe. Relevant ses « #ambiguïtés_juridiques », celle-ci liste les multiples questions que l’accord soulève en matière d’équité des procédures d’asile, d’identification des personnes vulnérables et des mineurs, de risque de détention automatique sans contrôle juridictionnel, de conditions de détention, d’accès à l’assistance juridique et de recours effectif... Et met en garde contre le recours croissant à l’externalisation, qui pourrait « créer un effet domino susceptible de saper le système européen et mondial de protection internationale [5] ». De leur côté, plusieurs ONG ont déjà mis en évidence l’incompatibilité de l’accord avec la législation européenne – à laquelle l’Italie est tenue de se conformer – en matière d’asile et d’éloignement [6].

      Les institutions de l’UE semblent moins inquiètes. Pas de réaction du côté des gouvernements, sans doute soulagés de voir l’Italie traiter seule le problème des arrivées d’exilé·es sur ses côtes plutôt que d’être rappelés à une « solidarité européenne » à laquelle ils préfèrent se dérober. Quant à la Commission européenne, elle s’est empressée de préciser que « le droit européen n’est pas applicable en dehors du territoire de l’UE » mais que, « étant donné l’appartenance de l’Italie à l’Union et l’adoption obligatoire d’une législation commune, les règles qui s’appliqueront dans les centres albanais seront effectivement de nature européenne et imiteront le cadre qui s’applique sur le sol italien [7] ». Nous voilà rassurés.

      https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article7170

    • Protocole d’accord Italie/Albanie sur les migrations : une coopération transfrontière contraire au droit international

      La chambre des députés italienne et la Cour suprême albanaise ont approuvé le protocole d’accord sur les migrations conclu en novembre 2023, respectivement les 24 et 29 janvier 2024. Le réseau Migreurop dénonce des manœuvres qui s’inscrivent dans la continuité des politiques de l’Union européenne (UE) et de ses États membres pour externaliser le traitement de la demande de protection internationale.

      Le 6 novembre 2023, l’Italie a conclu un « accord » avec l’Albanie en vue de délocaliser le traitement de la demande d’asile de certain·e·s ressortissant·e·s étranger·ère·s de l’autre côté de ses frontières [1]. Ce protocole, rendu public le 7 novembre, s’appliquerait aux personnes interceptées ou secourues en mer par les autorités italiennes, qui pourraient être débarquées dans les villes côtières albanaises de Shëngjin et de Gjader. Les personnes reconnues « vulnérables » ne seraient pas concernées par cet accord.

      Celui-ci prévoit, d’ici le printemps 2024, la construction de deux camps [2] financés par l’Italie : l’un destiné à l’évaluation de la demande d’asile, l’autre aux « éventuels rapatriements » [3] (autrement dit, aux expulsions). Alors que le Parlement italien n’a pas été sollicité au moment de la conclusion de l’accord [4], ces structures relèveraient pourtant exclusivement de la juridiction italienne. Contre une compensation financière et une avancée dans le processus d’adhésion à l’UE, l’Albanie aurait donné son accord pour « accueillir » 3 000 personnes par mois sur son territoire et assurer une part active dans les activités de sécurité et de surveillance via ses forces de police [5]. Fortement inspiré par le concept australien de « Pacific solution » [6], ce mécanisme placerait les deux camps sous autorité italienne, avec du personnel italien, en vertu d’un statut d’extraterritorialité.

      Certaines institutions européennes se sont dans un premier temps contentées d’appeler au respect du droit national et international. La Commissaire européenne en charge des affaires intérieures a déclaré, une semaine après que l’accord a été rendu public : « L’évaluation préliminaire de notre service juridique est qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une violation de la législation de l’UE, mais que cela est hors de la législation de l’UE » [7]. Une formulation particulièrement ambiguë, qui n’a pas été éclaircie quand elle a ajouté : « l’Italie se conforme à la législation européenne, ce qui signifie que les règles sont les mêmes. Mais d’un point de vue juridique, il ne s’agit pas de la législation européenne, mais de la législation italienne (qui) suit la législation européenne ».

      La Commissaire aux droits de l’Homme du Conseil de l’Europe, a quant à elle rappelé que « la possibilité de déposer une demande d’asile et de la faire examiner sur le territoire des États membres reste une composante indispensable d’un système fiable et respectueux des droits humains », ajoutant que « Le protocole d’accord crée un régime d’asile extraterritorial ad hoc, caractérisé par de nombreuses ambiguïtés juridiques » [8].

      S’il a l’allure d’un accord bilatéral, cet accord s’inscrit dans la continuité de l’externalisation des politiques d’asile menée par les États européens depuis le début des années 2000, se projetant plus ou moins loin des frontières européennes (du Maroc au Rwanda en passant par la Turquie, notamment). De nombreux pays sont en effet tenus de coopérer avec l’UE et ses États membres dans le domaine de l’immigration et de l’asile en échange d’avantages en matière commerciale, de politique étrangère ou d’aide au développement.

      Dans le cas présent, l’Italie, au nom d’un prétendu « partage des responsabilités », pioche dans la mallette à outils à disposition des États pour externaliser le traitement de la demande d’asile. L’Albanie ayant obtenu en 2014 le statut de pays candidat à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne, cette coopération transfrontière représenterait un gage de sa bonne volonté, se donnant ainsi l’image d’être le partenaire-clé des pays européens dans la mise en œuvre de leurs politiques de sélection et de filtrage des personnes étrangères aux frontières extérieures [9]. Cette stratégie utilitariste, mobilisant les personnes en migration comme levier de négociation politique, a déjà été mise en œuvre par le passé à de maintes reprises, et le réseau Migreurop a solidement étayé les effets délétères de tels accords sur les droits des personnes migrantes [10].

      Au-delà de l’opacité et du secret qui a entouré sa conclusion, ce protocole d’accord pose de nombreuses questions :

      Alors même que l’accord ne s’appliquerait pas aux personnes considérées vulnérables, ne peut-on estimer que les personnes rescapées sont de facto vulnérables ? Que le déplacement dans ces centres albanais de personnes rescapées en mer constitue de facto une action qui vulnérabilise ces personnes ?

      Quid du principe de non-refoulement ? En envoyant des personnes en dehors de son territoire, le temps du traitement de la demande d’asile, l’Italie risque de contrevenir au principe de non-refoulement, pourtant énoncé à l’article 33 de la Convention de 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés, qui interdit le retour des réfugiés et des demandeurs d’asile vers des pays où ils risquent d’être persécutés [11].

      En pratique, sa mise en œuvre impactera les droits des personnes selon les conditions du débarquement (qui ne sera donc pas le lieu sûr le plus proche comme le prévoit la réglementation internationale) : qu’en sera-t-il du respect de la procédure de demande d’asile, de l’identification de la vulnérabilité, de l’accès à une assistance juridique ? Elle impactera aussi, ensuite, les conditions dans lesquelles les personnes seront détenues, à l’image de ce qui s’est passé dans les hotspots en Grèce, dans lesquels les personnes étaient prisonnières de camps à ciel ouvert [12].

      Qui sera responsable en cas de violations des droits au sein de ces camps ? Quel droit s’appliquera, le droit italien ou le droit albanais ? Comment pourra être garantie l’effectivité des droits dans un territoire localisé à distance de la juridiction responsable, loin des regards ?

      Selon les termes de cet accord, ni les personnes débarquées par les bateaux d’ONG, ni les personnes arrivées de manière autonome ne devraient être concernées. Comment savoir si les autorités italiennes n’élargiront pas cette procédure à tou·te·s les demandeur·euse·s d’asile ? L’accord ne risque-t-il pas, en outre, de mettre en difficulté les conditions dans lesquelles s’effectueront les opérations de recherche et sauvetage des personnes en détresse en mer ? Le tri entre les personnes reconnues vulnérables et les autres se fera-t-il sur le bateau ou en Albanie ?

      Pour les personnes expulsées, le seront-elles depuis l’Italie ou depuis l’Albanie ? De sérieux doutes se posent au regard des déclarations du Premier ministre albanais affirmant qu’elles incomberaient aux autorités italiennes (alors qu’initialement cette tâche devait être effectuée par l’Albanie).

      La détention aurait lieu durant la procédure frontalière et en vue du retour, mais quid des personnes libérées en Albanie : seront-elles renvoyées vers l’Italie ou un autre État ?

      Cet accord tombe-t-il sous le coup du droit européen ou non ? La Commissaire aux affaires intérieures a laissé planer un doute sur la nature européenne des règles qui s’y appliqueraient. La Commissaire aux droits de l’Homme du Conseil de l’Europe a quant à elle pointé du doigt le risque d’un effet domino « susceptible de saper le système européen » si d’autres États décident eux-aussi de transférer leur responsabilité au-delà des frontières européennes [13].

      Les règles édictées dans l’accord politique sur le pacte européen adoptées le 20 décembre 2023 devront-elles s’appliquer sur le territoire albanais car sous juridiction italienne et donc européenne ?

      Et pour finir, se pose la question du coût exorbitant de ces déplacements de populations, mais aussi celui de l’accord négocié avec l’Albanie pour disposer d’une partie de son territoire national, et du fonctionnement-même de ces camps.

      Pour toutes ces raisons, le réseau Migreurop dénonce un protocole d’accord qui n’aurait jamais dû voir le jour. Et à supposer que le gouvernement italien s’obstine dans cette direction, cela ne peut se faire sans que le droit européen et la protection des droits des personnes soient mis en œuvre et respectés. À commencer par celui de demander l’asile dans de bonnes conditions.

      Les mécanismes d’externalisation à l’œuvre – qui se généralisent – violent le droit international avec la complicité des autorités nationales et la complaisance de certaines institutions européennes. Il est urgent de refuser ce contournement incessant du droit qui, loin des regards, s’inscrit dans la stratégie mortifère de mise à distance des personnes étrangères.

      https://migreurop.org/article3230

  • Drowning in Lies. Greece tries to cover up its own role in the #Pylos shipwreck by tampering with evidence

    On the night of 13 June, a vessel carrying around 750 men, women and children mainly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria capsized in the Central Mediterranean, in Greek waters. The Greek authorities had been aware of the overloaded vessel the day before because Europe’s border agency Frontex and activists had warned them.

    Instead of rescuing the people, the Greek coast guard stayed close to the boat and observed it from the sky with a helicopter, ignoring Frontex’s offer for help. They sent commercial vessels to the area and later a coast guard boat.

    Shortly after the coast guard vessel arrived on the scene, the overloaded boat capsized. Only 104 men survived. All the others, including all the women and children on board, drowned.

    Survivors alleged that their vessel was towed by the Greek coast guard boat, causing the fatal wreck. The Greek coast guard and the government strongly denied these allegations and claimed the boat was never towed.

    We decided to collect as many survivor testimonies as possible and try to establish what really happened, and whether there had been efforts to cover up the truth.
    METHODS

    Finding visual evidence to determine the cause of the shipwreck was nearly impossible since it happened on the high seas and commercial vessels and surveillance planes were sent away by the Greek authorities. Videos survivors might have had on their phones were no longer accessible due to water damage or because they lost their phones.

    We decided to put a team together, including journalists from the same regions as the passengers, and carried out 17 interviews with survivors – the largest number collected in a single investigation into the wreck so far – to compare their accounts. We also spoke to sources inside the European border agency Frontex.

    We obtained crucial court documents containing two sets of testimonies given by the same nine survivors. They spoke first to the Greek coast guard and later to a local Greek court.
    STORYLINES

    Documents and witness testimony obtained by Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, Monitor, SIRAJ, El País, Reporters United and The Times show the Greek coast guard tampered with official statements to conceal their role in the wreck and pressured survivors into naming certain people as the smugglers.

    Nine survivors were asked by the coast guard to give witness statements just hours after the wreck. On analysing the documents, we discovered that critical parts of several testimonies contain identical phrases.

    The documents reveal that the translator used during one of the survivor’s interviews with the coast guard is a member of the coast guard himself. Other translators were local residents who spoke Arabic and other languages, who were sworn in on the day.

    In the documents, eight survivors are stated to have blamed the capsizing on factors unrelated to towing. Four of them are stated to have testified – in nearly identical wording – that the boat capsized because it was “old” and “there were no life jackets”. Their interviews were translated by three different interpreters.

    None of the survivors interrogated by the coast guard blamed the coast guard at all, according to the transcriptions. But in a later round of questioning by a Greek court of the same nine survivors, six of them are stated to have said the coast guard towed the boat shortly before it capsized.

    We spoke to two of the nine survivors who testified; they told us that the coast guard had omitted the parts of their testimony mentioning towing.

    “They asked me what happened to the boat and how it sank. I told them the Greek coast guard came and tied the rope to our boat and towed us and caused the capsizing of the boat,” said one survivor. “They didn’t type that in my testimony. When they presented it at the end I couldn’t find this part.”

    He added that the coast guard pressured him to single out certain people as the smugglers in charge of the operation. This claim is supported by our analysis of the documents: two answers to the coast guard’s questions about smugglers contain identical sentences.

    Another survivor who testified said he also blamed the shipwreck on towing when asked by the coast guard, but still signed the deposition at the end despite knowing it did not reflect what he said, because he felt “terrified”.

    Sixteen out of the seventeen survivors we spoke to said the coast guard attached a rope to the vessel and tried to tow it shortly before it capsized. Four also claimed that the coast guard was attempting to tow the boat to Italian waters, while four reported that the coast guard caused more deaths by circling around the boat after it capsized, making waves that caused the boat’s carcass to sink.

    While Europe and its border agency Frontex have largely backed Greece on its border practices and said following the shipwreck that they believed the coast guard did everything it could to save the people who drowned, Frontex is now doubting the official version

    The border agency has circulated an internal report on the incident based on survivor testimony, in which survivors state that the Greek coast guard was to blame for the drownings, according to sources.

    https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/drowning-in-lies
    #Grèce #naufrage #asile #migrations #décès #morts #tragédie #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #14_juin_2023 #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #13_juin_2023
    #Lighthouse_reports #enquête #contre-enquête

    Sur ce naufrage voir ce fil de discussion:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1006608

    • Survivors: ‘Greek coastguard was next to us when boat capsized’

      Two Syrian refugees recall their harrowing journey and pin blame on the coastguard for the devastating shipwreck.

      “The boat was too heavy,” he told Al Jazeera.

      “We were sitting next to each other, and there was a constant fear of sinking.”

      On the derelict blue ship that was soon to hit international headlines, he saw about 750 people crammed together, shoulder-to-shoulder, unable to move. They had all hoped to eventually reach Europe.

      In a few days, he would see hundreds of these people drown as a Greek coastguard ship floated nearby.

      Ahmed fled Syria with his friend Mohammed*, 23. They both asked to use pseudonyms because they fear the Greek government would punish them for speaking out about what they saw that night.

      They are two of the 104 survivors of the shipwreck off the coast of Pylos, Greece. Seventy-eight people have been confirmed dead.

      Like hundreds of other people on board, their third companion, Mohammed’s cousin, was never found.

      Their path to the central Mediterranean was taken in many steps. Ahmed and Mohammed said they left home hoping for a future without violence.

      Their journey took them to Lebanon, then Egypt and Libya.

      They spent about a month in Libya, where smugglers kept them closed up in an apartment with Egyptians, Pakistanis and other Syrians also making the journey.

      Mohammed said the smugglers beat the Egyptians and Pakistanis, constantly cursing and insulting them.

      Finally, in the first days of June, they were told, “You are leaving today.”

      They were put on the back of trucks that drove to the shore, were loaded onto small boats and were taken to a trawler, the Adriana, out in deeper waters.

      “They were beating people there,” Ahmed said.

      “They were beating them while taking them to the lower deck of the boat. … It was very bad down there. It smelled of diesel and fish. You couldn’t breathe.”

      Ahmed and his companions managed to pay a bribe of $200 to get themselves a spot on the upper deck.

      But wherever the passengers sat on the ship, they were wedged together.

      Women and children were kept below in the hold. From their cramped spot on the top deck, the young men could see the sea.
      ‘People were starting to lose consciousness’

      From the second day of the voyage, the boat’s engine started breaking down.

      “They would repair it, and after a while, it would break down again,” Mohammed said. “Every time they repaired it, it would stop again after two to three hours.”

      After the second day at sea, food and water ran out. Panic began to percolate across the ship.

      “At that time, people were starting to lose consciousness,” Ahmed said.

      “They were falling on the ground. They were fainting. Some were shaking. We were seeing tens, hundreds of people in this state.”

      They heard fights were breaking out all across the boat due to hunger, thirst and fear.

      “Me, Ahmed and my relative who is now missing were always trying to keep our spirits up,” Mohammed said. “When someone cried, we made jokes. ‘We will make it,’ we were saying to ourselves. But everyone was going crazy.”

      By the fourth day, they heard disturbing news from the hold.

      “Some people coming up from below said, ‘There are dead people down there,’” Ahmed said.

      “They said there were six dead bodies on the boat. Five bodies were down below, and we didn’t see them. One was on the upper deck. We saw him.”

      Ahmed and Mohammed said the passengers started telephoning the Italian authorities and the Greek coastguard to ask for help.

      “From the fourth day onwards, the Greek coastguard had been aware of us,” Mohammed said.

      By the fifth day, June 13, they said it looked like the Adriana had stopped moving completely.

      In the afternoon, a helicopter flew overhead.

      The passengers could not understand from the deck, but it was the Greek coastguard. In the afternoon, one and then another commercial ship passed by and tossed those on board water over the waves.

      “People were saying: ‘Take us with you.’ They were saying, ‘No.’” Mohammed said. “We asked for help, but they refused to help us.”

      A Greek coastguard vessel finally approached the fishing trawler around midnight in the first minutes of June 14, the friends said. “‘Follow us,’ they told us. We followed them,” Mohammed said.

      “Half an hour later, our boat stopped completely. It could not move. They came back and tied us to their boat.”

      Ahmed and Mohammed said the coastguard started to tow their stalled-out trawler, but it took a sharp turn, and the Adriana heaved precariously left, then right, then capsized.

      “They were right next to us when it capsized. In the moment it sank, they moved away from us. They deliberately made us sink,” Mohammed said. “We were standing on top of the boat, and we were able to see everything clearly.”

      Tossed into the dark Mediterranean Sea, hundreds of people tried to find something to cling onto, some way to survive. “People were holding onto me,” Ahmed said.

      “I was going under the water and getting away from people. Every time I got away, I would come across someone else, and they would hold onto me to save themselves. When someone grabbed onto me, we both went underwater together.”

      After an hour and a half, Ahmed said he spotted an inflatable coastguard boat and swam towards it.

      “They were 200 or 300 metres [220 to 330 yards] away from us,” he said. “I swam to them and got into the boat. They did not come close to us to save us. They were standing far away, and those who could swim were going towards them, like me.”

      As he made his way towards the inflatable boat, Ahmed had to push aside bodies floating in the water.

      Once taken to the larger coastguard boat, Ahmed was reunited with Mohammed. The two hugged each other, overwhelmed and elated to have found each other.

      They started asking about their third companion. He had not made it, and they realised how incomplete their relief was.

      The survivors of the shipwreck were taken ashore. Mohammed said that when they were first held in the Greek city of Kalamata, the authorities came to take his testimony of the tragedy three or four times.

      “When we told them that we had been towed with a rope, they stopped,” he said. “They were saying that the problem was our boat. They wrote our statements with their own words. They did not write down what we said. They made us say it and write it down.”

      Ahmed said no officials have ever taken his testimony.
      ‘Accountability vacuum’

      Both men are now in the Malakasa refugee camp, 40km (25 miles) north of Athens. They are awaiting their asylum claims to be processed. Mohammed is desperate for news of his cousin, even if that news is confirmation he is dead.

      Ahmed’s and Mohammed’s accounts contradict the account of the Greek coastguard, which has said the passengers of the Adriana refused aid, it was only immobile for about 20 minutes before it capsized and the coastguard had not towed the boat prior to it capsizing.

      Survivors’ accounts line up with other evidence.

      The Greek investigative website Solomon has published emails showing that the Greek authorities had been notified that the ship was in distress by 6pm (15:00 GMT) on June 13. And tracking data published and verified by the BBC and The New York Times show that the trawler was not moving for at least seven hours before it capsized.

      When asked to comment on allegations that the coastguard towed the boat and was involved in the shipwreck, the Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy told Al Jazeera: “The required information is part of the investigation procedure that is being conducted under strict confidentiality based on the instructions given by the prosecutor of the Supreme Court. Regarding the details of the operation plan of the Hellenic coastguard, no further comments can be made by our service.”

      Fingers have been pointed at the Greek coastguard for both the shipwreck and its large death toll.

      “It has been evidenced that the Hellenic coastguard uses a range of tactics to move boats they have intercepted at sea into different territorial areas to avoid responsibility for search and rescue and the lodging of their applications for international protection,” said Hope Barker, a policy analyst at the Border Violence Monitoring Network.

      “Whilst this usually includes towing boats back to Turkish territorial waters, it is equally likely that if the boat was closer to Italian territorial waters, they would try to transfer it there instead.”

      The organisation is calling for an independent investigation and for Frontex, the European Union’s border agency, to withdraw from Greece.

      “Violations of fundamental rights by the Hellenic coastguard are routine and systematised operations that have proven to be under-investigated by the Greek state. There is an accountability vacuum that allows these actions to continue unabated,” Barker said.

      In Malakasa, Mohammed said he cannot stop thinking about the moment the boat capsized and the screams of the people around him. He does not know how he survived in the water.

      “I shouted Ahmed’s and my cousin’s names for a while,” he said. “In that moment, I heard a voice screaming, ‘Mother! Mother!’ I asked that person for his name, and he said, ‘Fuat’.

      “He and I told each other our names, so that whichever of us survived would be able to bring the news to the other’s family.”

      https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/7/5/survivors-greek-coastguard-was-next-to-us-when-boat-capsized

    • Under the unwatchful eye of the authorities’ deactivated cameras: dying in the darkest depths of the Mediterranean

      A collaborative investigation by Solomon, Forensis, The Guardian and ARD presents the most complete tracing, to date, of the course that the fishing vessel Adriana took until it ultimately sank, causing over 600 people to drown − while under the supervision of Greek and European authorities. A document reveals that according to Frontex recommendations, the Coast Guard vessel was obligated to record the operation on video.

      In the early hours of June 14, the state-of-the-art cameras of the Coast Guard vessel ΠΠΛΣ-920 were off.

      The deadliest shipwreck within the Greek Search and Rescue Zone, one of the largest the Mediterranean has ever seen, was reportedly not visually detected.

      Only hours before, aerial photos of the overloaded fishing vessel were taken. Nearby tankers recorded videos before they were ordered to leave the scene. There were satellite images that captured its movement.

      But the exact circumstances in which the Adriana capsized off Pylos, killing more than 600 people, remain unclear three weeks on.

      In affidavits and interviews, some of the 104 survivors attributed the sinking of the fishing vessel to an attempt by the Hellenic Coast Guard to tow it to Italian waters.

      The Coast Guard emphasizes that it saved human lives, and maintains that the fishing vessel overturned due to a disturbance by the passengers.

      Solomon, in a joint investigation with the research group Forensis, The Guardian and German public broadcaster ARD reveals: the Coast Guard vessel ΠΠΛΣ-920, the only vessel present at the time the Adriana capsized, was obligated to “document its operation by video-recording” in accordance with a 2021 Frontex document which recommends that the Greek authorities record their operations continually.

      If this had been done, today there would be answers to the questions that the victims’ families are still asking.

      The ΠΠΛΣ-920 cameras were supposed to record

      By midday on June 13, the Greek and Italian authorities and Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), were aware of the overloaded fishing vessel, which had been sailing aimlessly for four days in the central Mediterranean – its only means of navigation was a compass and the position of the sun.

      The activist network Alarm Phone had also relayed to the authorities the desperate SOS of some 750 men, women, and children — mostly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria — who, lacking potable water, were using their shoelaces to lower containers into the sea: “They are urgently asking for help”.

      ΠΠΛΣ-920, the Coast Guard vessel which received the order to depart from the port of Souda, Crete to assist, has been the pride of the Coast Guard since 2021. European funding covered 90% of its cost, and it is one of the best-equipped vessels available in Greece.

      And it could not be in better hands: earlier this year, in March, its captain was awarded for “his valuable contribution to the protection of maritime borders and human life at sea.”

      According to the Coast Guard, ΠΠΛΣ-920, like its three sister ships (ΠΠΛΣ-900, ΠΠΛΣ-910 and ΠΠΛΣ-930), has two state-of-the-art thermal camera systems. According to the Coast Guard, however, when the fishing vessel capsized, the cameras were not in operation because the crew’s attention was focused on the rescue efforts.

      “When we have an incident, we try to have the ability to operate seamlessly. Making some crew members ‘inactive’ so that they can record a video, you understand, is unethical,” Coast Guard spokesman Nikos Alexiou stated on June 15, justifying why the incident was not recorded on video.

      However, one of the three former and current Coast Guard officers who spoke to us during our investigation, said that these cameras do not require constant manual operation and they exist exactly for this reason – to record such incidents.

      But there is still a critical issue: a document reveals that, according to Frontex recommendations in March 2021, the Coast Guard vessel was obligated to record the operation.

      The document states that “if feasible, all actions taken by Frontex assets or Frontex co-financed assets… should be documented by video consistently.”

      The cost of the ΠΠΛΣ-290, one of four state-of-the-art vessels purchased for €55.5 million, has been 90% financed through Frontex. It is designated to be “available for four months a year, for Frontex missions outside of Greek waters.”

      Frontex had recommended the visual recording of operations, during a meeting where representatives from Greece were present as well as from other European countries, following complaints of human rights violations by the Coast Guard.

      The complaints that were assessed during the meeting referred to the exact same practice, attributed to ΠΠΛΣ-920: towing vessels of asylum seekers outside of Greek waters.
      We created a 3D model of the Adriana

      Solomon, Forensis, The Guardian and ARD worked together and after analyzing a wealth of evidence, we present the most complete picture to date, of the Adriana’s course up to the time of its sinking.

      We collected more than 20 survivor accounts and analyzed material derived from, among others, witness statements, official reports from the Coast Guard and Frontex, deck logs of the Coast Guard vessel and tankers in transit, aerial photographs and data on the position and movement of ships and aircraft. We also secured exclusive footage from the commercial vessels that were in the area and spoke to sources at Frontex, the Coast Guard, and rescuers.

      The analysis of this information resulted in a detailed chronology of the events that occurred on June 13 and 14, an interactive map showing Adriana‘s movement, as well as a 3D model of the fishing vessel.

      With the help of the 3D model, we were able to do what no official authority or journalistic investigation has done so far: to conduct in-person interviews with survivors of the wreck, using the visual impression of this body of data.

      Using the method of situated testimony, the survivors placed themselves in the 3D model of the ship, indicated their location on the deck, and recalled the events that unfolded before the sinking of the Adriana: from the alleged towing to its capsize.

      In this way, we were able to cross-reference accounts of what happened in the presence of the Coast Guard vessel, based on each person’s eyewitness account.
      Main conclusions

      Eleven critical findings emerge from the joint investigation:

      – Frontex offered to help three times. A Frontex source stated that the Coast Guard did not respond to any of the three requests for assistance.

      - The records of ΠΠΛΣ-920 are incoherent and raise questions. For example, while it is reported that immediately before the sinking, the fishing vessel was moving west, it actually appears to be moving for about an hour (00:44 – 01:40) in a southerly direction at a speed of only 0.6 knots. In addition: since, according to the Coast Guard, the fishing vessel’s engine had stopped working at 00:44, why was the preparation of life-saving equipment carried out an hour later, at 01:40?

      - While the fishing vessel’s engine was running but there was no navigation capability, according to testimonies, ΠΠΛΣ-920 approached the vessel and gave directions to Italy. A survivor stated: “[a crew member] told us that the Greek ship would go ahead of us and lead us to Italian waters. He told us that in two hours we would be in Italy.” ΠΠΛΣ-920 directed the fishing vessel from a distance, which followed until its engine broke down again.

      – According to Syrian survivors on deck, when the engine broke down, masked men from ΠΠΛΣ-920 boarded the fishing vessel and tied a blue rope to the stern. The above-mentioned testimonies are also consistent with an entry in the ΠΠΛΣ-920 deck logbook, which mentions the participation of a four-member team from the Special Missions Unit in the operation.

      - According to the same survivors, there were two brief attempts to tow the fishing vessel. The first time the rope broke. The second time the ΠΠΛΣ-920 increased its speed and the fishing vessel rocked to the right, then to the left, then to the right again and flipped onto its right side.

      – The Pakistani survivors were located in the interior of the ship, and could not see what was happening. They stated, however, that while the fishing vessel’s engine was not working, they felt a sharp forward thrust “like a rocket” — a sensation that corroborates the use of a rope for towing.

      – Testimonies in this investigation support testaments presented by other journalistic investigations, as well as survivor statements included in the official case file: this action appears to have led to the capsize and eventual sinking of the ship.

      - The fishing vessel capsized and survivors climbed on top of it. ΠΠΛΣ-920 left the scene, creating waves that made it more difficult for the survivors to stay afloat.

      – After withdrawing, ΠΠΛΣ-920 directed its floodlights on the shipwreck site. Survivors tried to swim to the Coast Guard vessel, but the distance was too great.

      – ΠΠΛΣ-920 began the rescue operation 30 minutes after the sinking, and only after the fishing vessel had completely disappeared from the water’s surface.

      - Survivors claim that their phones (which were protected in plastic cases) contain visual material from the incident. Immediately after the rescue, according to the same testimonies, Coast Guard officers confiscated their phones, which have not been returned to them.

      https://vimeo.com/843117800

      Survivor accounts of the towing

      In the deck log of ΠΠΛΣ-920, which we have seen, there is no mention of any towing attempt. The Coast Guard captain reports that they approached the fishing vessel to offer assistance, received no response, and followed it “from a discreet distance”.

      This is disputed by the accounts of the survivors, some of whom not only tell of a rope that was tied to the fishing vessel, but they all mention its color: blue.

      This investigation documents, for the first time, the blue cable that was used by ΠΠΛΣ-920, which can also be seen in earlier photos of the vessel.

      The estimation that the attempt to tow the fishing vessel by the ΠΠΛΣ-920 led to its sinking is underlined by the statements of survivors, that form part of the case file which is available to the journalists that participated in this investigation.

      “Then the Greek ship came and threw the rope which was tied to the front of our ship,” says a survivor who was on the deck.

      The Coast Guard started towing the fishing vessel, he adds, and “when it was going slowly the fishing vessel was fine, but instead of approaching the Greek ship we were moving away. When they hit the gas, I’m sorry to say, that’s when our ship sank.”

      The same survivor estimates that the fishing boat capsized due to the “pulling from the Greek ship, because then our ship began to lean to one side. And I, who was standing in a corner, slipped into the water with a relative of mine, who died.”

      Another survivor who was also on the deck, but at the stern and without full visibility, says in his testimony that “it was night, the guys in front told me that they tied the rope, but I could feel the motion too, because then we moved, but not for more than two minutes.”

      “Then we said stop-stop because our ship is leaning,” he says, adding, “I think we sank due to the fact that our boat was in bad condition and overloaded and that it shouldn’t have been towed.”

      In another testimony, the description of the towing attempt is concise: “On the last day the Greek ship threw us a rope and tied us to their ship. The Greek one turned right, then ours overturned and we fell into the water.”

      We contacted the Coast Guard, asking questions about the timeline of the shipwreck and asking them to comment on the findings of our investigation. At the time of publication, we have not received a response.
      Why didn’t Greece respond to Frontex?

      The picture of what actually happened would be more complete if the ΠΠΛΣ-920 was not the only vessel present during the incident.

      According to the captain of the merchant ship Faithful Warrior, at 00:18 the Coast Guard’s Search & Rescue Coordination Center gave him permission to depart the scene, thus removing the last witness present. The Faithful Warrior left at 00:30, about 15 minutes before the fishing vessel’s engine stopped working, according to Coast Guard records.

      Frontex, which operates in the central Mediterranean, had informed the Greek authorities about the fishing vessel early in the afternoon, and had offered to help.

      Specifically, at 19:35 (local Greek time) Frontex offered to assist with the Eagle I aircraft. Afterwards, the Greek side asked Frontex to assist in a search and rescue incident south of Crete, where 80 people were in danger. The vessel in question was spotted by the Frontex Heron drone at 22:50.

      At 00:34, Frontex again offered to provide assistance with the Eagle I and a few minutes later, at 00:52, it also offered the Heron. According to a Frontex source who spoke to our joint investigation, the Greek authorities did not respond to any request to send aerial assets to the overloaded fishing vessel.
      Fabricated testimonies?

      Concerns have also been raised about the possible alteration of survivors’ testimonies.

      Survivors gave two rounds of statements: first to the Coast Guard and then to an investigator. Both versions are available to Solomon and the international colleagues who participated in this investigation.

      While there are no references to the attempted towing of the fishing vessel in the survivor testimonies recorded by the Coast Guard, the same survivors spoke about it in the second interview with the investigator.

      Also, when describing the shipwreck, the testimonies that appear to have been given to the Coast Guard by two survivors of different nationalities, are the same, word for word: “There were too many people in the boat, which was old and rusty … that’s why it capsized and sank in the end.”
      Inside the hold

      The TikTok video shows his older brother hugging him tightly and kissing him, before he enters the airport, dragging along his suitcase.

      He had flown from Karachi to Dubai, and from Dubai to Alexandria, Egypt. From there he boarded another plane that took him to Benghazi, Libya, where he spent over ten days locked in a trafficker’s hideout, before he was taken to board the Adriana.

      When he saw the old fishing boat he couldn’t believe it — he thought the trip to Italy would also be by plane. He wanted to go back to Pakistan, but the traffickers wouldn’t let him.

      Inside the Adriana, Abdul traveled on the lowest of three levels, in suffocating conditions where he had to sit with his knees bent. “To get from one place to another, you had to step on people.”

      Conditions were similar on the middle level, where about 300 people were reportedly crammed in, with more than 200 people still on deck. The testimonies speak of another, separate space inside the fishing vessel, where women and children were located. No women were among the 104 people that were rescued.

      The Pakistani travelers had paid a total of €8,000-€10,000 each for the long journey to Europe – Abdul’s family of rice farmers had sold their land to finance his trip.

      Abdul had learned to swim in the canals around his family’s crops – when the Adriana sank, it was his ability to swim that allowed Abdul to reach the Coast Guard vessel and save himself.

      As he walks along in Athens, Abdul’s relatives call him, asking what’s the name of the city he’s in. He tells us about his family, but he also shows us photos of loved ones who perished: he was onboard the Adriana with 14 of his friends and his uncle. Only he survived.

      And of his 350 fellow Pakistanis who were also in the hold with him, only 12 were rescued. “Beautiful people were lost,” says Abdul.

      People who participated in the investigation: Christina Varvia, Lydia Emmanouilidou, Katy Fallon, Ebrahem Farooqui, Armin Ghassim, Sebastian Heidelberger, Stefanos Levidis, Andreas Makas, Stavros Malichudis, Iliana Papangeli, Corina Petridi, Timo Robben, Georgia Skartadou, Sulaiman Tadmory, George Christides.

      https://wearesolomon.com/mag/format/investigation/under-the-unwatchful-eye-of-the-authorities-deactivated-cameras-dying-

    • Greek shipwreck: hi-tech investigation suggests coastguard responsible for sinking

      Research into loss of trawler with hundreds of deaths strongly contradicts official accounts – while finding a failure to mobilise help and evidence that survivor statements were tampered with

      Attempts by the Greek coastguard to tow a fishing trawler carrying hundreds of migrants may have caused the vessel to sink, according to a new investigation by the Guardian and media partners that has raised further questions about the incident, which left an estimated 500 people missing

      The trawler carrying migrants from Libya to Italy sank off the coast of Greece on 14 June. There were 104 survivors.

      Reporters and researchers conducted more than 20 interviews with survivors and drew on court documents and coastguard sources to build a picture of missed rescue opportunities and offers of assistance that were ignored. Multiple survivors said that attempts by the Greek coastguard to tow the vessel had ultimately caused the sinking. The coastguard has strenuously denied that it attempted to tow the trawler.

      The night that the trawler capsized, 47 nautical miles off Pylos, in south-western Greece, was reconstructed using an interactive 3D model of the boat created by Forensis, a Berlin-based research agency founded by Forensic Architecture, which investigates human rights violations.

      The joint investigation by the Guardian, German public broadcaster ARD/NDR/Funk and Greek investigative outlet Solomon, in collaboration with Forensis, has given one of the fullest accounts to date of the trawler’s course up to its sinking. It unearthed new evidence such as a coastguard vessel moored at a closer port but never dispatched to the incident and how Greek authorities failed to respond not twice, as previously reported, but three times to offers of assistance by Frontex, the EU border and coastguard agency.

      Forensis mapped the final hours before the sinking, using data from the coastguard’s log and the testimony of the coast guard vessel’s captain, as well as flight paths, maritime traffic data, satellite imagery and information from videos taken by nearby commercial vessels and other sources. The ship’s last movements contradict the coastguard and reveal inconsistencies within the official account of events, including the trawler’s direction and speed.

      Crucially, the investigation showed the overcrowded trawler started moving westward on meeting the single Greek coastguard vessel sent to the scene. According to multiple survivor testimonies given to the Guardian and Greek prosecutors, the coastguard had told the migrants it would lead them to Italy – clashing with the official version that the trawler started moving west of its own accord. The investigation also showed the trawler had turned to the south and was almost stationary for at least an hour until, survivors said, a second and fatal towing attempt took place.
      Survivors use the 3D model of the boat to describe what happened on the night of the 14 June.

      Two survivors used the 3D model to describe the towing itself, while three others, who were sitting inside or on the vessel’s lower deck, described being propelled forward “like a rocket”, but with the engine not operating. That suggests a towing attempt.

      Another survivor separately said he heard people shouting about a rope being attached by the “Greek army” and described being towed for 10 minutes shortly before the trawler sank. “I feel that they have tried to push us out of Greek water so that their responsibility ends,” a survivor said after considering the map of events and reflecting on his memories of the night.

      Maria Papamina, a lawyer from the Greek Council for Refugees, one of two legal organisations representing between 40 and 50 survivors, said that there had been two towing attempts recounted to her team. Court documents also show that seven out of eight survivors gave accounts to the civil prosecutor of the presence of a rope, towing and a strong pull, in depositions conducted on 17 and 18 June.

      The exact circumstances of the sinking cannot be conclusively proved in the absence of visual evidence. Several survivors testified to having had their phones confiscated by the authorities and some mentioned having filmed videos moments before the sinking. Questions remain over why the newly acquired Greek coastguard vessel at the scene did not record the operation on its thermal cameras. The vessel, called the 920, was 90% financed by the EU to bolster the capabilities of Frontex in Greece and is part of the EU border agency’s joint operations in the country. Frontex recommends that “if feasible, all actions taken by … Frontex co-financed assets should be documented by video consistently”.

      In official statements the Greek coastguard said the operation was not recorded because the crew’s focus was on the rescue operation. But a source within the coastguard said cameras do not need constant manual operation and are there precisely to capture such incidents.

      The presence of masked men, described by two survivors as attaching a rope to the trawler, is also documented in the ship’s log, which includes an entry about a special ops team known as KEA joining the 920 that night.

      According to coastguard sources, it would not be unusual to deploy KEA – typically used in risky situations such as suspected arms or drug smuggling at sea – given the vessel’s unknown status, but one source said that their presence suggested the vessel should have been intercepted on security and maritime safety grounds alone.

      One source described the failure to mobilise help closer to the incident as “incomprehensible”. The 920 was deployed from Chania, in Crete, about 150 nautical miles from the site of the sinking. The source said the coastguard had somewhat smaller but still capable vessels, based in Patras, Kalamata, Neapoli Voion and even Pylos itself. The 920 was ordered by coastguard HQ to “locate” the trawler at about 3pm local time on 13 June. It finally made contact close to midnight. An eyewitness official confirmed another vessel was stationed in Kalamata on 14 June and could have reached the trawler within a couple of hours. “It should have been a ‘send everything you’ve got’ situation. The trawler was in clear need of assistance,” the source said.

      The Greek coastguard and Frontex were alerted to the trawler on the morning of 13 June. Both agencies had photographed it from the air but no search and rescue operation was conducted – according to the Greek side, because the boat had refused assistance. Authorities received an urgent SOS said to have been relayed to them at 5.53pm local time by the small boats emergency hotline Alarmphone, which was in contact with people on board.

      Two of the coastguard sources told the Guardian they believed towing was a likely reason for the boat capsizing. This would not be without precedent. In 2014, an attempt to tow a refugee boat off the coast of Farmakonisi cost 11 lives. Greek courts cleared the coastguard, but the European court of human rights passed a damning judgment in 2022.

      Allegations have also been made that survivors’ statements were tampered with. Two rounds of testimonies were given – first to the coastguard and then to a civil prosecutor – both seen by the Guardian. Testimonies to the coastguard by two separate survivors of different nationalities are word for word the same when describing the sinking: “We were too many people on the boat, which was old and rusty … this is why it capsized and sank in the end.”

      Under oath to the civil prosecutor, days later, the same survivors describe towing incidents and blame the Greek coastguard for the sinking. The same Syrian survivor who stated in his coastguard testimony that the trawler capsized due to its age and overcrowding would later testify: “When they stepped on it, and I am sorry to mention this, our boat sank. I believe the reason was the towing by the Greek boat.”

      Brussels has asked for a “transparent” investigation into the wreck, while there is frustration within Frontex, which repeatedly offered assets to Greek authorities – a plane twice and later a drone – but received no reply. Although Frontex is facing mounting calls to pull out of Greece, the Guardian understands it is considering less drastic measures such as discontinuing co-financing of Greek coastguard vessels.

      The Coast Guard said it “would not comment on operational issues or the ongoing investigation which is confidential according to a Supreme Court Order.”

      Nine Egyptians on the trawler have been arrested on charges including involuntary manslaughter, causing a shipwreck and migrant smuggling; they deny wrongdoing. According to Guardian information, the accused testified there were two towing attempts, the second resulting in the sinking of the boat. A brother of one of the accused said his sibling paid about £3,000 to be on the boat, amounting to proof, he said, that he was not a smuggler.

      In Greece and beyond, survivors and victims’ families are trying to understand what happened. Three Pakistani survivors said they flew from Pakistan through Dubai or Egypt to Libya. Two believed they would fly from Libya to Italy and were shocked on seeing the trawler. “I can’t sleep properly. When I sleep I feel as if I am sinking into the water and will die,” one said.

      Nearly half of the estimated 750 people on board are thought to have been Pakistani citizens taking an emerging people-smuggling route to Italy. Pakistani authorities estimate that 115 came from Gujranwala in the east of the country, a region known for its rice plantations and cotton fields but deeply mired in Pakistan’s economic crisis.

      Ahmed Farouq, who lives on the outskirts of the city of Gujranwala, lost his son in the Pylos shipwreck. Talking of the alleged towing, he saids: “They wanted it to sink. Why didn’t they save the people first? If they don’t want illegal migrants, let them deport us, but don’t let us drown.”

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jul/10/greek-shipwreck-hi-tech-investigation-suggests-coastguard-responsible-f

    • Greek coastguard ’pressured’ disaster survivors to blame Egyptian men

      New evidence found by BBC News casts further doubt on the Greek coastguard’s version of events surrounding last month’s deadly migrant boat sinking, in which up to 600 people died.

      Two survivors have described how the coastguard pressed them to identify nine Egyptians on board as traffickers.

      A new video of the overcrowded boat foundering at sea also challenges the Greek coastguard’s account.

      It was taken when the boat was said to be on a “steady course”.

      BBC Verify has confirmed the footage was filmed when the coastguard claimed the boat was not in need of rescue - and was in fact filmed by the coastguard itself.

      We have also confirmed that the larger vessel in the background is the oil tanker Faithful Warrior, which had been asked to give supplies to the migrant boat.

      The official Greek coastguard account had already been challenged in a BBC Verify report - but now we have seen court documents which show serious discrepancies between survivors’ witness statements taken by the coastguards, and the in-person evidence later presented to a judge.

      A translator has also come forward with his account of a people-smuggling investigation last year, after another group of migrants were rescued by the coastguard. He describes how witnesses from that incident were intimidated by the coastguard. The legal case collapsed before it could reach trial.

      The revelations raise fresh questions about how the Greek authorities handle such disasters.

      Both the Greek coastguard and Greek government did not comment and declined our requests for interview.
      A map of a section of the Mediterranean Sea showing the possible route taken by the migrant boat off the coast of Libya, near the city of Tobruk. The possible route shows the last approximate location of the boat before it sunk and the path taken by the Faithful Warrior, which had made contact with the boat. Also shown is the Greek port city of Pylos.

      Survivors ’silenced and intimidated’

      Soon after the 14 June sinking, nine Egyptian men were detained and charged with manslaughter and people-smuggling.

      But two survivors of the disaster say migrants were silenced and intimidated by Greek authorities, after suggesting the coastguards may have been to blame for the tragedy.

      For the past month, allegations have been made that the coastguard used a rope to tow the fishing vessel, causing it to sink.

      The two survivors we spoke to in Athens - who we are calling Ahmad and Musaab to protect their identities - say that is what happened.

      “They attached a rope from the left. Everyone moved to the right side of our boat to balance it,” says Musaab. “The Greek vessel moved off quickly causing our boat to flip. They kept dragging it for quite a distance.”

      The men described how they spent two hours in the water before being picked up by the coastguard.

      When I ask how they knew it was that amount of time, Musaab says his watch was still working so he could tell.

      Once on land, in Kalamata, they claim the coastguard told survivors to “shut up” when they started to talk about how the Greek authorities had caused the disaster.

      “When people replied by saying the Greek coastguard was the cause, the official in charge of the questioning asked the interpreter to tell the interviewee to stop talking,” says Ahmad.

      Ahmad says those rescued were told to be grateful they hadn’t died.

      He says there were shouts of: “You have survived death! Stop talking about the incident! Don’t ask more questions about it!”

      he men say they are scared to speak out publicly because they fear they too will be accused like the Egyptians.

      “If there was a fair system in place, we would contribute to this case,” says Ahmad.

      The men told us they had both paid $4,500 (£3,480) for a spot on the boat. Ahmad’s younger brother was also on board. He is still missing.
      Collapsing court cases

      As well as this testimony given to us by survivors, we have seen court documents which raise questions about the way evidence is being gathered to be presented in court.

      In initial statements from five survivors, none mentioned the coastguard trying to tow the migrant vessel with a rope. But days later, in front of a judge, all explained that there had been a failed attempt to tow it.

      One initial statement reads:

      But the same witness later told a judge:

      BBC Verify has not spoken to these witnesses and so we can’t say why their accounts changed.

      The Greek coastguard initially denied using a rope - but later backtracked, admitting one had been used. But it said it was only to try to board the vessel and assess the situation. It said this was at least two hours before the fishing vessel capsized.

      Eighty-two people are confirmed dead in the sinking, but the United Nations estimates as many as 500 more lost their lives.

      The Greek authorities say the charged Egyptian men are part of a smuggling ring and were identified by fellow passengers. They face up to life imprisonment if found guilty.

      Some survivors allege some of the nine suspects mistreated those on board - while other testimony says some were actually trying to help.

      But Ahmad and Musaab told us the coastguard had instructed all of the survivors to say that the nine Egyptian men were to blame for trafficking them.

      “They were imprisoned and were wrongly accused by the Greek authorities as an attempt to cover their crime,” says Musaab.

      A Greek Supreme Criminal Court deputy prosecutor is carrying out an investigation, but calls - including from the UN - for an international, independent inquiry have so far been ignored. The European Commission has indicated it has faith in the Greek investigation.

      But Ahmad and Musaab are not alone in their concerns about the Greek coastguard.
      Interpreter comes forward to BBC

      When the nine Egyptian men were arrested in the hours after the shipwreck, it was widely reported as an example of efficient detective work by the Greek authorities.

      But for Farzin Khavand it rang alarm bells. He feared history was repeating itself.

      He says he witnessed Greek coastguards put two innocent Iranian men in the frame for people-smuggling last year, following the rescue of 32 migrants whose boat had got into trouble crossing from Turkey.

      Mr Khavand, a UK citizen who speaks Farsi and has lived in the Kalamata area for 20 years, acted as a translator during the coastguard’s investigation into what happened then.

      He says the migrants - 28 from Afghanistan and four from Iran - explained that they had set off from Turkey and been at sea for eight days before being rescued.

      During this time, the Greek coastguard had approached the boat, before leaving, he was told.

      Two Arabic-speaking men had abandoned the boat after the engine blew up, Mr Khavand was told by the Afghan migrants. They said that most people on board had taken turns to try to steer the stricken boat to safety - including the two accused Iranians, who had paid to be on board like everyone else.

      “They [the Iranian men] were highly traumatised,” Mr Khavand said.

      “They were repeating to me that they’d never even seen an ocean before they set off in Turkey. And they kept being told they were the captain and they said: ’We know nothing about the boat. We can’t even swim.’”

      One of the two accused - a man called Sayeed who was facing a long prison sentence - had been rescued with his young son, explained Mr Khavand.

      “I asked him ’Why did you take a six-year-old child on a boat?’ And he said the smugglers told us it’s only two hours’ journey.”

      Mr Khavand relayed their accounts to the coastguard, exactly as it had been told to him - but he says when he saw the transcripts, the Afghans’ testimony had changed. He fears they altered their stories after pressure from the Greek authorities.

      He says the Iranians told him that some of their fellow Afghan passengers had been leaned on by the coastguard to name them as the people-smugglers - to avoid being “treated unpleasantly”, threatened with prison, and being “returned to the Taliban”.

      The case eventually collapsed. Mr Khavand says he was not willing to assist the Greek coastguard again. He says when Sayeed and his son were released from custody the €1,500 (£1,278) that had been confiscated from them was not returned.

      “The scene ended with me thinking I don’t want to do this again because they were not trying to get to the bottom of the truth. They were trying to pick a couple of guys and accuse them of being people smugglers.”

      All of these accusations were put to the Greek authorities by the BBC - but we have received no response. Our request for an interview with Greece’s minister of maritime affairs - who oversees the coastguard - was also rejected.
      Greece previously accused of human rights violations

      Kalamata lawyer Chrysanthi Kaouni says she has seen other criminal cases brought against alleged people smugglers which have troubled her.

      She has been involved in more than 10 such cases, she tells us.

      “My concerns are around the translations, the way evidence is gathered and - later on - the ability of the defendants to challenge this evidence,” she said.

      “Because of these three points, I don’t think there are enough safeguards according to the international law, and in the end I don’t believe justice is done.”

      A new study has found that the average trial in Greece for migrants accused of people smuggling lasted just 37 minutes and the average prison sentence given was 46 years.

      The study, commissioned by The Greens/European Free Alliance group in the European Parliament, looked at 81 trials involving 95 people - all of whom were tried for smuggling in eight different areas of Greece between February 2020 and March 2023.

      The study claims verdicts were reached often on the testimony of a single police or coastguard officer and, in more than three-quarters of the cases, they didn’t appear in court for their evidence to be cross-examined.

      Ahmad says he and the other survivors now want authorities to recover the shipwreck and the people that went down with it, but they have been told it’s too difficult and the water is too deep.

      He compares this to the vast amounts of money and resources spent on searching for five people on the Titan submersible in the North Atlantic in June.

      “But we were hundreds,” he says. “It’s not just a ship. It’s our friends and family.”

      https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66154654

    • Italy warned of dead children on migrant ship hours before it capsized

      The findings of an investigation by Welt am Sonntag and

      POLITICO raise questions about whether the authorities knew the boat was in distress earlier than they admitted.

      Early on the morning of the Adriana’s final day at sea, the Italian authorities sent a troubling warning to their EU and Greek colleagues: Two children had died aboard the overloaded migrant boat.

      The alert was sent at 8:01 a.m. UTC, just over an hour after the Italians initially spotted the vessel at 6:51 a.m., an investigation by Welt am Sonntag and POLITICO found. The ship would later stall out in the ocean and capsize that night, killing hundreds of migrants on board.

      The new details are revealed in an internal document at the EU border agency Frontex and seen by Welt, part of a “serious incident report” Frontex is compiling on the tragedy.

      The findings raise questions about whether the authorities knew of serious distress on the boat much earlier than they have admitted. The document further complicates the timeline European authorities have given about the boat — Frontex has said its own plane was the first to discover the Adriana at 9:47 a.m., while the Greek government has said it was alerted around 8 a.m.

      According to the internal document, Rome’s warning went to both Frontex and the Greek coast guard’s central office for rescue operations in Piraeus, which sits on the coast near Athens. Yet despite the alert, the Greek authorities did not send a coast guard vessel to the boat until 7:40 p.m., nearly 12 hours later. The boat then capsized around 11 p.m., roughly 15 hours after Rome’s notice first came through, leaving approximately 600 people dead.

      Survivors have said the Greek coast guard’s attempts to attach ropes to the ship caused it to capsize — accounts Greek officials say are not definitive. Only 104 people were brought to shore alive.

      Frontex declined to comment on the internal document showing the Italian warning, citing the “ongoing investigations” and referring to a June 16 statement. That statement lists a chronology of events starting at 9:47 a.m. with the Frontex plane spotting the boat.

      Dimitris Kairidis, Greece’s newly appointed migration minister, told POLITICO in Brussels that he had not seen the Frontex note, and he neither confirmed nor denied that Athens had received the Rome alert mentioning dead children.

      There is, he said, an “independent judicial investigation,” and if anyone is found responsible, “there will definitely be consequences.”

      “But until then,” he added, “we should not rush to conclusions and bow to political pressure.”

      Asked for comment, the Greek government referred to a statement on its coast guard website from June 14, which mentions information coming from Rome around 8 a.m. It doesn’t say whether that information included a warning about dead children on board.

      The Italian government did not respond to a request for comment.

      Greece has faced mounting political pressure over the tragedy.

      German lawmaker Clara Bünger, a member of The Left, is pushing for a review of the drama that unfolded off the shore of Pylos.

      She told Welt that “upon sighting such an overcrowded boat, Frontex should have immediately issued a mayday distress signal; even more so if Frontex knew that there were already Tuesday morning about two dead children on board.”

      That this didn’t happen, she added, is “outrageous and unforgivable.”

      Frontex has been trying to rehab its reputation under new Director Hans Leijtens, but Bünger argued he is on a doomed mission. Frontex, she argued, should just be dissolved.

      “This project has failed miserably,” she said.

      Erik Marquardt, a German European Parliament member from the Greens, pointed out that Germany chairs the Frontex Management Board.

      “I expect the German government to enforce full transparency here,” he said.

      The European Commission, the EU’s executive, said it does not comment on “ongoing investigations” or “leaks.”

      But the Commission stressed: “The facts about the tragic incident off the coast of Pylos must be clarified. That is the priority now.”

      https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-warned-greece-of-dead-children-on-migrant-ship-hour-before-it-capsize

    • Frontex und Athen wussten 15 Stunden vor Bootsdrama von toten Kindern an Bord

      Mitte Juni starben vor der griechischen Küste 600 Migranten, als ihr Boot kenterte. Über die Verantwortung für die schlimmste Katastrophe seit Jahren im Mittelmeer wird seitdem gestritten. Nun kommt heraus: Eine wichtige Information zu den wahren Abläufen wird nach Informationen von WELT AM SONNTAG bewusst zurückgehalten.

      Die EU-Grenzschutzagentur Frontex sowie die griechische Regierung verschweigen die wahren Abläufe eines Bootsdramas im Juni mit rund 600 Toten. Wie WELT AM SONNTAG und das ebenfalls zum Axel-Springer-Verlag gehörende Nachrichtenunternehmen „Politico“ erfuhren, muss die hochdramatische Situation vor der griechischen Küste Athen und den Grenzschützern viel früher bewusst gewesen sein als bislang bekannt.

      Frontex hatte in einer Stellungnahme mitgeteilt, als Erstes habe ein agentureigenes Flugzeug das völlig überladene Boot um 9.47 Uhr (UTC) entdeckt. Allerdings soll das Boot – so geht es aus einem internen Frontex-Dokument hervor – bereits um 6.51 Uhr erstmals gesichtet worden sein – und zwar durch italienische Behörden.

      Um 8.01 Uhr alarmierte die Seenotrettungstelle Rom demnach sowohl Frontex als auch die Leitstelle in Piräus, von wo aus Rettungseinsätze der griechischen Küstenwache gesteuert werden. Noch brisanter: Bestandteil dieses Alarms war die Information, dass an Bord des Bootes bereits zwei Kinder verstorben seien. Wie Italien an seine Informationen zu der Existenz des Bootes und den toten Kindern gelangte, ist unklar.

      Der Alarm ist nach Informationen von WELT AM SONNTAG Teil der Notizen des noch in Arbeit befindlichen „Serious Incident Report“, der das Aktenzeichen 12595/2023 trägt. Trotz des Alarms aus Roms unternahmen die griechischen Behörden lange nichts. Erst gegen 19.40 Uhr traf ein Schiff der Küstenwache in der Nähe der Migranten ein.

      Das Boot kenterte schließlich gegen 23 Uhr, 15 Stunden nach dem Alarm aus Rom. Unmittelbar davor hatten griechische Küstenwächter Seile an das Boot angebracht, was – so berichteten Überlebende – zum Kentern geführt habe. Nur 104 Menschen wurden lebend an Land gebracht.

      WELT AM SONNTAG konfrontierte Frontex mit den Informationen zu dem Alarm aus Rom. Wann ging dieser ein? Was war die Reaktion der Agentur? In einer schriftlichen Antwort hieß es, man könne „aufgrund von laufenden Ermittlungen“ kein Statement abgeben, das über jenes vom 16. Juni hinausgeht. Darin wird die Chronologie der Ereignisse geschildert – mit 9.47 Uhr als Startpunkt, der Sichtung des Bootes durch ein Frontex-Flugzeug.

      Der neu ernannte griechische Migrationsminister Dimitris Kairidis sagte in Brüssel, er habe die Frontex-Notiz nicht gesehen; weder bestätigte noch dementierte er, dass Athen diese Information aus Rom erhalten hat. Er erklärte, dass „eine unabhängige gerichtliche Untersuchung“ stattfinde. Sofern jemand für schuldig befunden werde, „wird es definitiv Konsequenzen geben.

      Bis dahin solle man „keine voreiligen Schlüsse ziehen und sich dem politischen Druck beugen“. Am Freitag verwies Athen auf ein Statement auf der Küstenwache-Webseite vom 14. Juni, in dem eine Info zu dem Boot aus Rom gegen acht Uhr erwähnt wird. Von toten Kindern kein Wort. Die italienische Regierung beantwortete eine Anfrage zu dem Sachverhalt nicht.

      Der Druck aus der Politik auf die Behörde und Athen wächst derweil. Die Linken-Bundestagsabgeordnete Clara Bünger, die auf eine Aufarbeitung des Pylos-Dramas drängt, sagte WELT AM SONNTAG: „Beim Sichten eines derart überfüllten Bootes hätte Frontex sofort einen Mayday-Notruf machen müssen. Das gilt umso mehr, wenn Frontex wusste, dass es am Dienstagmorgen bereits zwei tote Kinder an Bord gab.“ Dass das nicht geschehen ist, sei „ungeheuerlich und unverzeihbar“. Frontex-Direktor Hans Leijtens hätte angekündigt, er wolle Vertrauen wiederherstellen und Menschenrechte achten: „Dieses Vorhaben ist krachend gescheitert.“ Bünger sagte, Frontex sei nicht reformierbar – und forderte die Auflösung.

      Der EU-Parlamentarier Erik Marquardt (Grüne) verwies darauf, dass Deutschland den Vorsitz im Frontex-Verwaltungsrat hat: „Ich erwarte von der Bundesregierung, dass sie hier vollständige Transparenz durchsetzt.“ Derartige Versprechen seitens Leijtens würden bislang nicht eingehalten.

      Die EU-Kommission ließ verlauten, man äußere sich „weder zu laufenden Untersuchungen noch zu Leaks“, machte aber klar: „Die Fakten über den tragischen Vorfall vor der Küste von Pylos müssen geklärt werden. Das ist jetzt die Priorität.“

      https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article246382076/Migration-Frontex-und-Athen-wussten-15-Stunden-vor-Bootsdrama-von-toten-Kindern

    • Pylos shipwreck: the Greek authorities must ensure that effective investigations are conducted

      In a letter to the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, published today, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, stresses that Greece has the legal obligation to conduct effective investigations into the Pylos shipwreck, which resulted in the death of more than 80 persons with many hundreds still missing, to establish the facts and, where appropriate, to lead to the punishment of those responsible.

      The Commissioner expresses concern about reports of pressure having been exercised on survivors and about allegations of irregularities in the collection of evidence and testimonies, which may have led to a minimisation of the focus on certain actors in this tragedy, including the Greek Coast Guard. In the case of Safi and Others v. Greece, the European Court of Human Rights spelled out the parameters of an effective investigation into a similar event. Among those parameters, the Commissioner notes that independence is critical to securing the trust of the victims’ relatives, the survivors, the public and Greece’s international partners. While stressing that investigations cannot be limited to the role of alleged smugglers, she requests clarifications on the scope of the investigations initiated after the shipwreck.

      Referring to the right of missing persons’ families to know the truth, the Commissioner seeks information on the efforts made to ensure that the remains of deceased migrants are located, respected, identified, and buried.

      Expressing concerns at restrictions on survivors’ freedom of movement and the way asylum interviews have been conducted, she requests information on the concrete measures that Greece has taken to abide by its human rights obligations regarding reception conditions and access to the asylum procedure.

      "In my view, the shipwreck of 14 June is unfortunately not an isolated incident”, writes the Commissioner. This should prompt a reconsideration of the approach to refugees and migrants arriving by sea at the political, policy and practical level. In this context, the Commissioner urges the Prime Minister to ensure that Greece abides by its international obligations regarding search and rescue, both under maritime law and human rights law.

      Finally, the Commissioner reiterates her call for the Greek government to actively create and maintain an enabling legal framework and a political and public environment which is conducive to the existence and functioning of civil society organisations and to the work of human rights defenders and investigative journalists, and to stop their criminalisation and other forms of harassment.

      https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/pylos-shipwreck-the-greek-authorities-must-ensure-that-effective-investigations

      Pour télécharger la lettre:
      https://rm.coe.int/letter-addressed-to-the-prime-minister-of-greece-by-dunja-mijatovic-co/1680ac03ce

      #conseil_de_l'Europe

    • Après le naufrage d’un bateau avec 750 personnes à bord au large de la Grèce, une enquête de la médiatrice européenne sur le rôle de Frontex

      #Emily_O’Reilly, dont le rôle est de demander des comptes aux institutions et aux agences de l’Union européenne, a annoncé avoir ouvert cette procédure à la suite du naufrage survenu en juin, le pire en Méditerranée depuis 2016.

      Un peu plus d’un mois après le pire naufrage d’un bateau de migrants depuis 2016 en Méditerrannée, survenu mi-juin au large de la Grèce et qui a fait des centaines de morts, la médiatrice européenne a annoncé, mercredi 26 juillet, avoir ouvert une enquête afin de « clarifier le rôle » de Frontex, l’agence de l’Union européenne (UE) chargée des frontières, dans les opérations de sauvetage.

      « Alors que le rôle des autorités grecques fait l’objet d’une enquête au niveau national, celui de Frontex dans les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage doit également être clarifié », a souligné dans un communiqué Emily O’Reilly. Le rôle de la médiatrice est de demander des comptes aux institutions et aux agences de l’UE.

      « Il a été signalé que Frontex avait bien alerté les autorités grecques de la présence du navire et proposé son assistance ; mais, ce qui n’est pas clair, c’est ce qu’elle aurait pu ou aurait dû faire d’autre », a-t-elle ajouté.

      Le patron de Frontex, Hans Leijtens, a salué l’ouverture de cette enquête, assurant être prêt à coopérer « en toute transparence » pour expliquer le rôle de son agence. « Si nous ne coordonnons pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, sauver des vies en mer est essentiel. Nous apportons une aide aux autorités nationales lorsque cela est nécessaire », a-t-il ajouté dans un message sur X (ex-Twitter).

      Partage d’informations entre Frontex et les autorités nationales

      Le chalutier vétuste et surchargé, qui était parti de Libye, a fait naufrage au large du sud de Grèce dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin. Il transportait environ 750 personnes à son bord, mais seule une centaine de migrants ont survécu.

      Depuis le naufrage, les interrogations sont tournées autour de la lenteur de l’intervention des gardes-côtes grecs et sur les causes du chavirement de l’embarcation.

      Par cette enquête sur le rôle de Frontex, Mme O’Reilly veut en particulier se pencher sur le partage d’informations entre l’agence européenne et les autorités nationales en matière d’opérations de recherche et de sauvetage.

      Elle la coordonnera aux côtés du médiateur grec, Andreas Pottakis, qui a « la compétence d’examiner » la façon dont les autorités grecques se sont occupées du bateau Adriana.

      Mi-juillet, les eurodéputés ont réclamé l’élaboration d’une « stratégie de recherche et de sauvetage fiable et permanente » des migrants en Méditerranée. Dans une résolution transpartisane, dépourvue de caractère contraignant, ils ont appelé Bruxelles à apporter aux Etats membres de l’UE un « soutien matériel, financier et opérationnel » pour renforcer leurs capacités de sauvetage en mer.

      Les élus du Parlement européen citaient les chiffres de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), selon laquelle plus de 27 600 personnes ont disparu en Méditerranée depuis 2014.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/07/26/naufrage-d-un-bateau-de-migrants-au-large-de-la-grece-la-mediatrice-europeen

    • Smuggler, Warlord, EU ally

      The lead smugglers behind the Pylos shipwreck are closely linked to General Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan warlord who EU leaders are partnering with to curb migration

      On the night of 13 June, a vessel carrying around 750 men, women and children mainly from Pakistan, Egypt and Syria capsized in Greek waters. Only 104 men survived. All women and children died.

      In an earlier investigation we revealed Greek coastguard efforts to cover up their role in the fatal shipwreck. The country’s naval court has since launched a preliminary investigation into the coastguard’s response to the sinking, with no arrests or suspensions of officers so far.

      The only arrests made were those of nine Egyptians, accused in a separate inquiry of being part of the smuggling network behind the deadly voyage. They were charged with six counts including illegal trafficking of foreigners, organisation crime and manslaughter by negligence.

      Using the contacts and documents already available to us, we pursued a follow-up investigation to establish the truth about any smugglers behind the fatal sea crossing, with the aim of identifying the key players and establishing the extent to which the nine Egyptians in prison in Greece are actually responsible.
      METHODS

      Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, SIRAJ, El País and Reporters United used the previously established relationships with survivors and their families, as well as a network of sources in Libya, to investigate the smuggling network behind the Pylos wreck.

      We also looked into the ongoing court case against nine alleged smugglers, analysing confidential court documents and speaking to five of the families of those arrested.
      STORYLINES

      While investigating the circumstances that led to the shipwreck and Greece’s responsibility in it, we spoke to 17 survivors.

      Many named the key smugglers involved in organising the trip during our interviews with them – none of them were people on board the ship.

      Some were Eastern Libyan nationals with ties to the region’s powerful ruler, Khalifa Haftar.

      One name stood out: Muhammad Saad Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi. Three sources identified him as a key player in the smuggling operation: a survivor, a lower level smuggler and a Libyan insider all gave his name.

      Al-Kahshi works for a special forces navy unit called the “frogmen”, run by a family member of his, Bahar Al-Tawati Al-Mnfi. Al-Tawati Al-Mnfi works under the direct orders of Khalifa Haftar.

      One survivor explained that Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi used his position to issue the licence that allowed the boat (which came from Egypt) to navigate in Libyan waters and made sure the Libyan coast guards were paid to shut off the marine radar devices that detect ship movements to allow the departure.

      We found that the network goes far beyond Al-Kahshi Al-Mnfi.

      Survivors, insiders and analysts explained that the trip was organised with wide ranging support from powerful people reporting to Haftar.

      Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui said the “migrant business” had been flourishing in Eastern Libya in the last 18 months. “Haftar cannot say that he’s not aware,” he added. “He can’t say that he’s not involved.”

      “All trips are overseen by his son, Saddam Haftar” said one survivor. “Saddam leads the cooperation himself or assigns one of the frogmen battalions [this may have been the case for the Pylos trip] or the 2020 battalion, depending on who has more migrants to pay the fees.”

      Five survivors who flew from Syria to Libya describe how immigration officials facilitated their arrival at Benghazi’s military airport. One said: “At the airport, a person took my passport, went to immigration office, put a stamp and took us outside”.

      There was a curfew in Eastern Libya on the night of departure (حظر التجول ليلاً في طبرق الليبية), yet the survivors we interviewed said that it was at night that they, along with hundreds of passengers, were taken to a small bay near Wadi Arzouka, east of Tobruk, and boarded onto the vessel.

      Militias supported by Khalifa Haftar are not only involved in smuggling, they are also active in illegal “pullbacks” of migrants in EU waters.

      At least two pullbacks (in May and July this year) were carried out by a militia (Tariq Bin Ziyad) controlled by Haftar’s son, including one in Maltese waters.

      At least four of the people who died in the Pylos shipwreck were on the boat that was pulled back by the Tariq Bin Ziyad militia on 25 May, according to family members.

      These findings raise serious questions about EU member states’ migration prevention policies.

      It is known by EU authorities that Eastern Libyan militias answering to Haftar carry out both pullback and smuggling operations. The IOM and the UNHCR briefed EU officials on an increase in departures from eastern Libya , describing them as a “lucrative source of income for the eastern Libyan rulers involved”.

      In spite of this, Italy and Malta are making deals with Haftar to prevent migration.

      In May, Haftar met with Italian PM Meloni to discuss migration related issues and in June Italy’s interior minister said they would ask Haftar to collaborate in stopping departures.

      The same month, for the first time, a Maltese delegation met Haftar in Benghazi to discuss security challenges in the region, with particular emphasis on irregular migration.

      Internal EU documents show the commission is looking for ways to curb arrivals from Benghazi’s airport with the collaboration of local operators.

      Harchaoui described Italian efforts to encourage Khalifa Haftar to stop departures as “bribery” and pointed to “a very clear admission of how Italy intends to work and what it promised to Haftar: if you reduce the human smuggling volumes, we will inject capital”.

      Meanwhile, there’s growing evidence that nine Egyptians imprisoned for trafficking in Greece are being scapegoated.

      We spoke to the families of five of the nine Egyptians under arrest – all of them say that they were passengers, not smugglers.

      Three of them provided evidence that their relatives paid for their trip, indicating that it’s highly unlikely that they were involved in organising the smuggling operation.

      We were able to verify the identity of a smuggler who asked one of the accused men for money ahead of the trip.

      We previously found that witness testimony provided to the coast guard had been tampered with, including survivors’ answers to questions about smugglers.

      In the documents, two answers to questions about smugglers contain identical sentences.

      Those who were interrogated by the coast guard mentioned being pressured to place the blame on the nine Egyptians later indicted.

      https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/smuggler-warlord-eu-ally

    • Naufrage au large de la Grèce : deux ONG pointent les défaillances des autorités grecques

      Dans un rapport publié le 3 août, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch reviennent sur les circonstances troubles du drame survenu aux portes de l’Europe dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin, qui a coûté la vie à au moins six cents personnes. Les associations réclament une enquête « efficace, indépendante et impartiale ».

      C’est un naufrage qui a d’abord marqué les esprits de par son ampleur : pas moins de 750 personnes se trouvaient à bord d’un bateau de pêche en bois, L’Adriana, au moment où il a chaviré, dans la nuit du 13 au 14 juin, au large de Pýlos en Grèce. Partie de Tobrouk en Libye pour rejoindre l’Italie, l’embarcation surchargée transportait des ressortissants syriens, égyptiens, palestiniens ou pakistanais, dont de nombreuses femmes et enfants placés dans la cale pour être « à l’abri » des éventuelles intempéries ou du soleil.

      Mais on retient aussi les circonstances troubles dans lequel il s’est produit. Très vite après le naufrage, des premières voix parmi la centaine de rescapés se sont élevées pour pointer le rôle potentiel des gardes-côtes grecs dans ce drame.

      Mediapart a documenté, dès le 17 juin, cette version différente de celle avancée par les autorités du pays. Une enquête de la BBC est venue l’appuyer, puis le New York Times a suivi : des témoignages de survivant·es attestent que les gardes-côtes ont non seulement tardé à organiser un sauvetage, mais ont aussi tenté de tirer le bateau à l’aide d’une corde, pouvant ainsi avoir contribué à le faire chavirer.

      Après un déplacement de neuf jours en Grèce et une vingtaine d’entretiens réalisés avec des exilé·es sur place, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch ont relevé également les « disparités extrêmement préoccupantes » entre les récits des survivant·es du Pýlos et la version des événements livrée par les autorités.

      Les survivant·es interrogé·es par les deux ONG « ont systématiquement déclaré que le navire des gardes-côtes grecs envoyé sur les lieux avait attaché une corde à L’Adriana et l’avait remorqué, le faisant tanguer, puis chavirer », peut-on lire dans le rapport d’enquête publié conjointement ce jeudi 3 août.

      Aux ONG, les responsables des gardes-côtes ont de leur côté affirmé que leurs équipes s’étaient approchées du bateau, reconnaissant avoir utilisé une corde, mais qu’après de « premières négociations », les passagers avaient repoussé la corde pour poursuivre leur trajet.
      Le rôle des gardes-côtes grecs et de Frontex interrogé

      Une version contredite par le témoignage des survivant·es interrogé·es : « Peu importe leur position sur le bateau, les survivants disent tous avoir ressenti le mouvement du bateau une fois tracté, qui avançait alors très vite alors que le moteur ne fonctionnait plus, précise Alice Autin, chercheuse pour la division Europe et Asie centrale à Human Rights Watch. Tous sont d’accord pour dire que c’est cela qui a fait vaciller le bateau, avant de le faire chavirer. »

      Frontex a par ailleurs déclaré avoir repéré l’embarcation dès la veille du naufrage, ce qui a poussé certains acteurs à s’interroger sur le rôle de l’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières. Pourquoi n’est-elle pas intervenue pour venir en aide aux passagers ? A-t-elle bien alerté les autorités grecques pour qu’une opération de recherche et de sauvetage soit menée en urgence ?

      Dans un communiqué, Frontex a précisé que l’un de ses avions de surveillance « avait immédiatement informé les autorités compétentes », sans toutefois intervenir, au prétexte que les exilé·es avaient refusé « toute aide ». Le lendemain du drame, le patron de l’agence Hans Leijtens était en déplacement en Grèce pour « mieux comprendre ce qu’il s’était passé », et voir comment ses équipes pouvaient aider les autorités grecques, précisant que le fait de « sauver des vies était leur priorité ».

      Une version qui ne semble pas avoir convaincu la médiatrice européenne, qui a décidé, le 24 juillet dernier, d’ouvrir une enquête de sa propre initiative pour interroger le rôle de Frontex dans les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage à la suite du naufrage survenu en Grèce.

      « Il est clair que Frontex a joué un rôle important dans la mission de recherche et de sauvetage du point de vue de la coordination. À ce titre, je pense qu’il est possible de clarifier davantage son rôle dans de telles opérations », a déclaré dans une lettre ouverte Emily O’Reilly, qui occupe le poste de Médiateur européen.

      « Il a été signalé que Frontex avait bien alerté les autorités grecques de la présence du navire et proposé son assistance ; mais ce qui n’est pas clair, c’est ce qu’elle aurait pu ou aurait dû faire d’autre », a-t-elle souligné. Frontex s’est dite prête à coopérer « en toute transparence ».

      « Cela posera des questions importantes sur le rôle, les pratiques et les protocoles de l’agence dans le contexte des opérations [en mer] et sur les mesures qu’elle a prises pour se conformer à ses obligations en matière de droits fondamentaux et aux lois de l’UE », estiment Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch.
      Des appels à l’aide ignorés

      Les deux ONG s’interrogent aussi sur l’aide que les gardes-côtes grecs auraient pu apporter aux migrant·es dans les heures ayant précédé le naufrage. De hauts responsables des gardes-côtes leur auraient affirmé que « les personnes à bord du bateau limitaient leur demande d’aide à de l’eau et de la nourriture » et avaient exprimé leur volonté de poursuivre leur route vers l’Italie.

      Mais les survivant·es interrogé·es par Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch ont « déclaré que les passagers avaient demandé à être secourus » et qu’ils avaient entendu d’autres personnes à bord de l’embarcation appeler à l’aide lors d’un échange avec un téléphone satellite, plusieurs heures avant le naufrage. Certains auraient enlevé leur T-shirt pour le secouer en l’air et appeler à l’aide, d’autres auraient hurlé à l’attention des deux navires marchands croisés avant le drame.

      « Des récits concordent pour dire que des personnes ont perdu la vie à bord du bateau avant le naufrage et que l’un des corps a été placé sur le pont supérieur au-dessus de la cabine pour signifier l’urgence de la situation », poursuit Alice Autin d’Human rights watch. Et d’ajouter : « Les gardes-côtes grecs avaient la responsabilité de venir en aide aux passagers du bateau et il apparaît au vu des résultats de notre enquête qu’il y a des doutes sur la manière dont cela s’est déroulé. »

      Plusieurs survivants ont enfin déclaré que les autorités leur auraient confisqué leur téléphone après le naufrage, poursuivent les ONG. Or, certaines personnes auraient « tout filmé ». Ces téléphones pourraient, s’ils réapparaissaient, servir dans le cadre de l’enquête ouverte par la justice grecque.

      « Il est essentiel d’analyser ce qu’ils contiennent pour faire toute la lumière sur le déroulement des faits », conclut Alice Autin. Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch réclament une enquête « efficace, indépendante et impartiale ».

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/030823/naufrage-au-large-de-la-grece-deux-ong-pointent-les-defaillances-des-autor

    • Greece: Disparities in accounts of Pylos shipwreck underscore the need for human rights compliant inquiry

      Starkly divergent accounts from survivors and Greek authorities around the circumstances of the deadly Pylos shipwreck, underscore the urgent need for an effective, independent, and impartial investigation, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said today. 

      The disparities between survivors’ accounts of the Pylos shipwreck and the authorities’ version of the events are extremely concerning

      The fishing vessel, Adriana, was carrying an estimated 750 people when it sank on 14 June off the coast of Pylos. In the aftermath, accounts from several of the 104 survivors suggest that the vessel was towed by a Greek coast guard boat, causing the fatal wreck.  The Greek authorities have strongly denied these claims.

      “The disparities between survivors’ accounts of the Pylos shipwreck and the authorities’ version of the events are extremely concerning” said Judith Sunderland, Associate Europe and Central Asia Director at Human Rights Watch.

      “The Greek authorities, with support and scrutiny from the international community, should ensure that there is a transparent investigation to provide truth and justice for survivors and families of the victims, and hold those responsible to account.”  

      A delegation from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch visited Greece between 4 and 13 July 2023 as part of ongoing research into the circumstances of the shipwreck and steps toward accountability. They interviewed 19 survivors of the shipwreck, 4 relatives of the missing, and nongovernmental organizations, UN and international agencies and organizations, and representatives of the Hellenic Coast Guard and the Greek Police.

      The organizations’ initial observations confirm the concerns reported by several other reputable sources as to the dynamics of the shipwreck. Survivors interviewed by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch consistently stated that the Hellenic Coast Guard vessel dispatched to the scene attached a rope to the Adriana and started towing, causing it to sway and then capsize. The survivors also consistently said that passengers asked to be rescued, and that they witnessed others on the boat plead for a rescue by satellite phone in the hours before their boat capsized.  

      In a meeting with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, senior officials of the Hellenic Coast Guard said individuals on the boat limited their request for assistance to food and water and expressed their intention to proceed to Italy. They said the crew of the Coast Guard vessel came close to the Adriana and used a rope to approach the boat to assess whether passengers wanted help, but that after the first “negotiations”, passengers threw the rope back and the boat continued its journey.

      This preventable tragedy demonstrates the bankruptcy of EU migration policies predicated on the racialized exclusion of people on the move and deadly deterrence

      Greek authorities have opened two criminal investigations, one targeted at the alleged smugglers, and another into the actions of the coast guard. It is vital for these investigations to comply with international human rights standards of impartiality, independence, and effectiveness. 

      To enhance the credibility of judicial investigations both in practice and perception, they should be under the supervision of the Supreme Court Prosecutor’s Office. Further, Greek authorities should ensure that the Greek Ombudsman’s office is promptly provided with information and resources necessary to carry out its functions as the National Mechanism for Investigating Incidents of Arbitrariness, in relation to any disciplinary investigation.   

      Several survivors said that the authorities confiscated their phones following the shipwreck but did not give them any related documentation or tell them how to retrieve their property. Nabil, a survivor of Syrian origin, told the organisations, “It’s not only the evidence of the wreck that has been taken from me, it is my memories of my friends who were lost, my life has been taken from me”. 

      The Greek authorities’ longstanding failure to ensure accountability for violent and unlawful pushbacks at the country’s borders raises concerns over their ability and willingness to carry out effective and independent investigations.

      Lessons should be learned from the European Court of Human Rights 2022 decision about the 2014 “Farmakonisi” shipwreck, in which survivors argued that their boat had capsized because the Hellenic Coast Guard used dangerous maneuvers to tow them towards Turkish waters. The Court condemned Greece for the authorities’ failures in handling rescue operations and for shortcomings in the subsequent investigation of the incident, including how victims’ testimony was handled.  

      In view of the seriousness and international significance of the Pylos tragedy, Greek authorities should seek out and welcome international and/or European assistance and cooperation in the conduct of national investigations as an additional guarantee of independence, effectiveness and transparency.  

      A full and credible investigation into the shipwreck should seek to clarify any responsibility for both the sinking of the ship and delays or shortcomings in the rescue efforts that may have contributed to the appalling loss of life. The investigation should involve taking the testimonies of all survivors, under conditions that guarantee their trust and safety.

      All forensic evidence, such as traces of communications, videos, and photographs, should be collected, assessed and safeguarded to facilitate accountability processes. Any property, such as cell phones, taken from survivors for investigative purposes should be appropriately logged and returned within a reasonable amount of time.  

      All of those involved in or with knowledge of the incident, including the Hellenic Coast Guard, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the captains and crews of the two merchant vessels, and others who took part in the rescue operation after the shipwreck should be invited or required to testify, as appropriate, and should cooperate fully and promptly with the investigations.

      To ensure this is the last, and not the latest, in an unconscionably long list of tragedies in the Mediterranean, the EU should reorient its border policies towards rescue at sea and safe and legal routes

      In parallel to the national investigation, the EU Ombudsman has announced that it will open an inquiry into the role of Frontex in search and rescue (SAR) activities in the Mediterranean, including in the Adriana shipwreck. This will pose important questions about the agency’s role, practices and protocols in the context of SAR operations and on what actions it has taken to comply with its fundamental rights obligations and EU laws during this and other shipwrecks.

      Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are continuing to investigate the Pylos shipwreck and demand justice for all those harmed.

      “This preventable tragedy demonstrates the bankruptcy of EU migration policies predicated on the racialized exclusion of people on the move and deadly deterrence,” said Esther Major, Amnesty International’s Senior Research Adviser for Europe.

      “To ensure this is the last, and not the latest, in an unconscionably long list of tragedies in the Mediterranean, the EU should reorient its border policies towards rescue at sea and safe and legal routes for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants.”  

      Background 

      As part of their ongoing investigation, the organizations have sent letters requesting information to several key entities, including the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, the Prosecutors of the Supreme Court and of the Piraeus Naval Court and Frontex.

      On 13 June 2023, Frontex said its surveillance plane spotted the Adriana at 09:47 UTC (12:47 EEST/in Athens) and alerted authorities in Greece and Italy. In the following hours, two merchant vessels and later a Hellenic Coast Guard vessel interacted with the Adriana. After the boat capsized at around 2 a.m. EEST on 14 June, only 104 survivors, including several children, were rescued.

      The Prosecutor of Kalamata ordered the arrest of nine Egyptian nationals who survived the shipwreck on charges of smuggling, membership in an organized criminal network, manslaughter, and other serious crimes.

      Following an order by the Head of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Piraeus Naval Court, a prosecutor is currently conducting a preliminary investigation into the conditions of the shipwreck and the potential punishable offences by members of the Hellenic Coast Guard. The organizations have sought information with the Greek Minister of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy about any disciplinary investigation opened into the actions of members of the Hellenic Coast Guard.

      https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/08/greece-disparities-in-accounts-of-pylos-shipwreck-underscore-the-need-for-h

  • La Commissaire aux droits de l’homme du Conseil de l’Europe appelle le Gouvernement britannique à ne pas extrader Julian Assange
    https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/view/-/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/commissioner-calls-on-uk-government-not-to-extradite-julian-assange?_101_INSTAN

    Dans une lettre, rendue publique aujourd’hui, la Commissaire aux droits de l’homme du Conseil de l’Europe, Dunja Mijatović, appelle la ministre de l’Intérieur du Royaume-Uni, Priti Patel, à ne pas extrader Julian Assange.

    La Commissaire a pris cette initiative devant l’imminence d’une décision sur l’extradition de M. Assange. Elle observe que les conséquences plus larges qu’une telle extradition aurait pour les droits de l’homme n’ont pas encore été dûment examinées dans le cadre de la procédure. Dunja Mijatović souligne notamment que l’inculpation de M. Assange par les États-Unis soulève d’importantes questions concernant la protection des personnes qui divulguent, dans l’intérêt public, des renseignements classés secrets et qui peuvent ainsi révéler des violations des droits de l’homme. Elle conclut que, si l’extradition de M. Assange pour ce motif était autorisée, cela limiterait l’exercice de la liberté des médias et pourrait finir par dissuader la presse de remplir sa mission consistant, dans une société démocratique, à fournir des informations et à jouer un rôle de sentinelle.

    La version en anglais :
    https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/commissioner-calls-on-uk-government-not-to-extradite-julian-assange

    In a letter, published today, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, called on UK Home Secretary Priti Patel not to extradite Julian Assange.

    Writing in view of the impending decision on Mr Assange’s extradition, the Commissioner noted that the wider human rights implications of doing so had not yet been adequately considered in the extradition proceedings. She particularly highlighted that the indictment by the United States against Mr Assange raised important questions about the protection of those that publish classified information in the public interest, including information that exposes human rights violations. She concluded that allowing Mr Assange’s extradition on this basis would have a chilling effect on media freedom, and could ultimately hamper the press in performing its task as purveyor of information and public watchdog in democratic societies.

  • #Refoulements_en_chaîne depuis l’#Autriche (2021)

    In a recent finding, the Styria Regional Administrative Court in Graz ruled that pushbacks are “partially methodically applied” in Austria, and that in the process, the 21-year-old complainant was subject to degrading treatment, violating his human dignity. The ruling further shed light on the practices of chain pushbacks happening from Italy and Austria, through Slovenia and Croatia, to BiH. The last chain pushback from Austria all the way to BiH was recorded by PRAB partners in early April 2021, while in 2020, 20 persons reported experiencing chain pushbacks from Austria and an additional 76 from Italy.

    Source: rapport “#Doors_Wide_Shut – Quarterly report on push-backs on the Western Balkan Route” (juin 2021)

    #push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #Slovénie #Croatie #frontière_sud-alpine #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Alpes

    • MEPs slam Slovenian Presidency for their role in chain-pushbacks

      In the first week of September (2. 8. 2021), MEPs in the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs confronted Slovenian Interior Minister Aleš Hojs as he presented the priorities for Slovenian presidency of the Council of the European Union in Brussels. With evidence provided by BVMN and network members InfoKolpa and Are You Syrious, representatives of The Left in the European Parliament took the Presidency to task for its systemic policy of chain-pushbacks and flagrant abuse of the rule of law. Members also shamed the Slovenian Ministry of Interior for continuing to ignore a Supreme Court ruling which established Slovenia had violated the rights of a Cameroonian plaintiff and are obligated to allow him access to the Slovenian asylum system and to stop returning people to Croatia as there is overwhelming evidence of chain-refoulement and degrading treatment often amounting to tortute.

      Presenting the evidence

      Malin Björk, whose fact-finding trip to Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia was facilitated by Are You Syrious and Infokolpa, then handed over the Black Book of Pushbacks to Minister Hojs, a dossier of cases recorded by the Border Violence Monitoring Network which collates pushback violations from across the Balkans since 2017. The book has a concerningly large section on Slovenian chain pushbacks, sharing the voices of 1266 people documented by BVMN who had either been chain pushed back (via Croatia) to Bosnia-Herzegovina or Serbia. The cases speak of systemic gatekeeping of asylum, misuse of translation, the registering of minors as adults, and fast-tracked returns to Croatian police who would then carry out brutal pushbacks. All point to a high level of complicity by the Slovenian authorities in the brutalisation of people-on-the-move, a fact reinforced by the April ruling of the Slovenian Supreme Court.

      Yet this first hand evidence is in reality just the tip of the iceberg, and a recent open letter on the matter revealed how according to officially available data, over 27,000 returns of potential asylum seekers were carried out by Slovenian authorities in the recent years, resulting in chain refoulement via Croatia to non-EU countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina.

      “I expect you as a responsible Minister, not only for your country, but for the EU Presidency to take part of this document and tell us what you will do to stop the illegality, impunity and the brutality.”

      More weak denials

      Interior Minister Hojs doubled down on his stance that Slovenia was managing its borders according to the Rule of Law, even despite his own national court ruling the complete opposite. In an unsurprising move, reminiscent of many Interior Ministers across the EU, Hojs levied accusations of fake news and dismissed the Black Book set before him as a fabrication. Referring to his short attempt to actually look at the evidence presented in the book Hojs stated: “How many lies can be concentrated on one half page, I immediately closed the book and did not touch it again”. With the Minister unwilling to leaf through the 244 pages dedicated to crimes carried out by Slovenia, the network welcome him to view the visual reconstruction of a pushback published last year which vividly captured the experience of those denied asylum access in Slovenia and then brutalised while being collectively expelled from Croatia.

      “I have read the Black Book already in parliament and have seen what they write about me and the Slovenian police. All lies.”

      – Minister Hojs Speaking to Slovenian TV

      The fact is that Minister Hojs is personally not mentioned in the Black Book, though his actions are documented on countless pages, implies that someone is indeed lying. Court judgements, the testimony of thousands of pushback victims, and hard video evidence all highlight the fragility of the Slovenian government’s “fake news” line. While already deeply concerning at a national level, the fact that this administration is also spearheading the EU Presidency shows the extent to which perpetrators of pushbacks have been enabled and empowered at the highest level in Brussels. As a recent webinar event hosted by InfoKolpa and BVMN asked: Can a country responsible for mass violations of Human Rights be an honest broker in the preparations of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum? Until the ruling by the Supreme Court is implemented and people-on-the-move have their mandated right to request asylum in Slovenia, this question will continue to be answered firmly with a “no”.

      Today, our MEPs talked to @aleshojs 🇸🇮 Minister of Home Affairs about the thousands of men, women and children who have been denied over the past years the right to seek asylum in Slovenia, and forcefully handed over to Croatian. @Border_Violence #StopPushbacks pic.twitter.com/XvNLvoCLhY

      — The Left in the European Parliament (@Left_EU) September 2, 2021

      MEP statement

      “I was in Velika Kladusa in Bosnia, I was astonished to meet many migrants and refugees that had been to Slovenia, but they had been told that the right to seek asylum did not exist in you country. One of the persons that I met there was from Cameroon and had escaped political persecution. Once he thought he was in safety in Slovenia he called the police himself to ask to be able to claim asylum. Instead he was as so many others, as thousand of others, handed over to the Croatian police who brutalised him and sent him back to Bosnia.

      This case is a little bit special, compared to the many thousands of others, because on 9th April this year the Slovenian Supreme Court itself ruled that Slovenian police had violated the principle of non-refoulement, the prohibition of collective expulsion and denied the him the right to seek international protection.

      You (Minister Hojs) have had meetings with Commissioner Johansson and you have said you will stand up for the right to seek asylum for asylum seekers. Now your own court has found that you fail in this case. So my questions are: Will you stand by your words and provide a humanitarian visa for this person so that he can come back to Slovenia to apply for asylum as he was supposed to have been granted two years ago? And the second is more structural of course, how will you ensure that people have the right to apply for asylum in Slovenia, that they are not brutally pushed back to Croatian police, who are then illegally pushing them back to Bosnia in a kind of chain pushback situation which is a shame, a shame, at European borders?”

      – Malin Björk MEP

      The case referred to is part of strategic litigation efforts led by network member InfoKolpa, which resulted in a landmark judgement issued on 16 July 2020 by the Slovenian Administrative Court. The findings prove that the Slovenian police force in August 2019 carried out an illegal collective expulsion of a member of a persecuted English-speaking minority from Cameroon who wanted to apply for asylum in the country. The verdict was confirmed on 9th April 2021 by the Slovenian Supreme Court, which ruled the following: the Slovenian police violated the principle of non-refoulement, the prohibition of collective expulsions and denied the asylum seeker access to the right to international protection. The state was ordered to ensure that the plaintiff is allowed to re-enter the country and ask for international protection, but no effort has been made by the authorities to respect the ruling of the court. The case is thus another confirmation of the Slovenian misconduct that persistently undermines the foundations of the rule of law, specifically international refugee law and international human rights law.

      We fear for Slovenia.

      https://www.borderviolence.eu/meps-slam-slovenian-presidency-for-their-role-in-chain-pushbacks

    • Briefly reviewing the topic of pushbacks at European borders, it is important to report on the case of a young refugee from Somalia who was prevented from seeking asylum in Austria and was expulsed, or more precisely, pushed back to Slovenia, contrary to international and European law. His case will soon be reviewed at the Provincial Administrative Court of Styria (https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/migrant-tuzio-austriju-slucaj-bi-mogao-imati-posljedice-i-za-hrvatsku-policiju/2302310.aspx), and if he wins the case, it will be the second verdict that indicates systematic and sometimes chained pushbacks of refugees through Austria, Slovenia, and thus Croatia all the way to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

      Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa Dobrodosli, du 16.09.2021

    • Violenze e respingimenti: la “stretta” della Slovenia sui migranti. Con l’aiuto dell’Italia

      Solo a settembre oltre 100 persone in transito sono state respinte a catena in Bosnia ed Erzegovina. Molte di loro sono state fermate a pochi chilometri dal confine italiano. I pattugliamenti misti della polizia italiana e slovena potrebbero spiegare l’aumento delle persone rintracciate. La denuncia del Border violence monitoring network

      Otto casi di respingimenti a catena dalla Slovenia alla Bosnia ed Erzegovina nel mese di settembre 2021. Più di cento persone coinvolte, in prevalenza cittadini afghani e pakistani, che denunciano violenze da parte della polizia slovena. Molte di loro (almeno 34) sono state fermate a “un passo” dal confine italiano: la “stretta” del governo di Lubiana sul controllo del territorio, in collaborazione con la polizia italiana, sembra dare i primi risultati.

      La denuncia arriva dalla rete Border violence monitoring network (Bvmn) che monitora il rispetto dei diritti delle persone in transito nei Paesi balcanici: “Non si hanno testimonianze dirette di poliziotti italiani coinvolti ma si presume che l’aumento nella sorveglianza del territorio e l’alto numero di persone arrestate nel nord della Slovenia sia una conseguenza dell’accordo tra Roma e Lubiana” spiega Simon Campbell, coordinatore delle attività della rete. Il ruolo dell’Italia resta così di primo piano nonostante le riammissioni al confine siano formalmente interrotte dal gennaio 2021.

      Nel report di Bvmn di settembre 2021 vengono ricostruite dettagliatamente numerose operazioni di respingimento che “partono” dal territorio sloveno. Intorno alle sette e trenta di sera del 7 settembre 2021 un gruppo di quattro cittadini afghani, tra cui un minore, viene fermato vicino alla città di Rodik, nel Nord-Ovest della Slovenia a circa cinque chilometri dal confine con l’Italia. Il gruppo di persone in transito viene bloccato da due agenti della polizia di frontiera slovena e trasferito in un centro per richiedenti asilo. Ma è solo un’illusione. Quarantotto ore dopo, il 9 settembre verso le 17, i quattro si ritroveranno a Gradina, nel Nord della Bosnia ed Erzegovina: nonostante abbiano espresso più volte la volontà di richiedere asilo le forze di polizia slovena le hanno consegnate a quelle croate che hanno provveduto a portarle nuovamente al di fuori dell’Ue. Una decina di giorni dopo, il 19 settembre, un gruppo di otto persone, di età compresa tra i 16 e i 21 anni, riesce a raggiungere la zona confinaria tra Slovenia e Italia ma durante l’attraversamento dell’autostrada A1, all’uscita di una zona boscosa, interviene la polizia. All’appello “mancano” due persone che camminavano più avanti e sono riuscite a raggiungere Trieste: le guardie di frontiera lo sanno. L’intervistato, un cittadino afghano di 21 anni, sospetta che “una sorta di videocamera con sensori li aveva ha individuati mentre camminavano nella foresta”. O forse uno dei 55 droni acquistati dal ministro dell’Interno sloveno per controllare il territorio di confine. A quel punto le forze speciali slovene chiedono rinforzi per rintracciare i “fuggitivi” e nel frattempo sequestrano scarpe, telefoni cellulari, power bank e soldi ai membri del gruppo identificati che dopo circa mezz’ora sono costretti a entrare nel retro di un furgone. “Non c’era ossigeno perché era sovraffollato e la polizia ha acceso l’aria condizionata a temperature elevate. Due persone sono svenute durante il viaggio” spiega il 21enne. Verso le 12 la polizia croata prende il controllo del furgone: il gruppo resta prigioniero nel veicolo, con le porte chiuse e senza cibo e acqua, per il resto della giornata. Alle due del mattino verranno rilasciati vicino a Bihać, nel cantone bosniaco di Una Sana.

      Sono solo due esempi delle numerose testimonianze raccolte dal Border violence. I numeri dei respingimenti a catena sono in forte aumento: da gennaio a agosto 2021 in totale erano state 143 le persone coinvolte, solo nel mese di settembre 104. Un dato importante che coinvolge anche l’Italia. Le operazioni di riammissione dall’Italia alla Slovenia sono formalmente interrotte -anche se la rete segnala due casi, uno a marzo e uno a maggio, di persone che nonostante avessero già raggiunto il territorio italiano sono state respinte a catena fino in Bosnia- ma il governo italiano fornisce supporto tecnico e operativo al governo sloveno per il controllo del territorio grazie a un’intesa di polizia tra Roma e Lubiana di cui non si conoscono i contenuti.

      Sono ripresi infatti nel mese di luglio 2021 i pattugliamenti misti al confine nelle zone di Gorizia e Trieste. “Al momento dobbiamo approfondire l’effettivo funzionamento dell’accordo: non abbiamo testimonianze dirette di poliziotti italiani coinvolti -continua Campbell-. Presumiamo però che l’alto livello di sorveglianza del territorio e il numero di persone che vengono catturate in quella zona dimostra che l’intesa sui pattugliamenti assume un ruolo importante nei respingimenti a catena verso la Bosnia”. Paese in cui la “malagestione” del fenomeno migratorio da parte del governo di Sarajevo si traduce in una sistematica violazione dei diritti delle persone in transito e in cui le forze di polizia sotto accusa del Consiglio d’Europa per i metodi violenti che utilizza. Elementi che il Viminale non può considerare solo come “collaterali” delle politiche con cui tenta di esternalizzare i confini.

      La particolarità dei respingimenti da parte delle autorità slovene è che sono realizzati alla luce del sole. “La caratteristica di queste operazioni consiste nel fatto che i migranti vengono consegnati ‘ufficialmente’ alle autorità croate dagli ufficiali sloveni ai valichi di frontiera sia stradali che ferroviari -spiegano gli attivisti-. Prendendo come esempio la Croazia la maggior parte dei gruppi vengono allontanati da agenti che eseguono le operazioni con maschere, in zone di confine remote”. In Slovenia, invece, spesso vengono rilasciate tracce di documenti firmati per giustificare l’attività di riammissione. “Nonostante questa procedura sia la Corte amministrativa che la Corte suprema slovena hanno ritenuto che queste pratiche violano la legge sull’asilo perché espongono le persone al rischio di tortura in Croazia”.

      Una violenza denunciata, a inizio ottobre 2021, da un’importate inchiesta giornalistica di cui abbiamo parlato anche su Altreconomia. I pushaback sloveni, a differenza di quelli “diretti” che si verificano in Croazia e in Bosnia ed Erzegovina, sono più elaborati perché “richiedono più passaggi e quindi possono durare più giorni”. “Siamo rimasti tre giorni in prigione. Non abbiamo potuto contattare nessun avvocato, non ci hanno fornito un traduttore. Ci hanno dato solo una bottiglia di acqua al giorno e del pane” racconta uno dei cittadini afghani intervistati. Oltre al cattivo trattamento in detenzione, diverse testimonianze parlano di “violenze e maltrattamenti anche all’interno delle stazioni di polizia slovene” e anche al di fuori, con perquisizioni violente: in una testimonianza raccolta dalla Ong No name kitchen, un cittadino afghano ha denunciato una “perquisizione intensiva dei genitali”. I maggiori controlli sul territorio sloveno, possibili anche grazie alla polizia italiana, rischiano così di far ricadere le persone in transito in una spirale di violenza e negazione dei diritti fondamentali.

      https://altreconomia.it/violenze-e-respingimenti-la-stretta-della-slovenia-sui-migranti-con-lai

    • “They were told by the officers that they would be taken to Serbia.... at 12am they were dropped at the Bosnia-Croatia border, near the town of Velika Kladuša”

      Date and time: September 24, 2021 00:00
      Location: Velika Kladuša, Bosnia and Herzegovina
      Coordinates: 45.1778695699, 16.025619131638
      Pushback from: Croatia, Slovenia
      Pushback to: Bosnia, Croatia
      Demographics: 11 person(s), age: 17-22 , from: Afghanistan, Pakistan
      Minors involved? No
      Violence used: kicking, insulting, theft of personal belongings
      Police involved: 2 Slovenian officers wearing blue uniforms, 2 Croatian officers wearing light blue uniforms, 2 police vans
      Taken to a police station?: yes
      Treatment at police station or other place of detention: detention, personal information taken, papers signed, denial of food/water, forced to pay fee
      Was the intention to ask for asylum expressed?: Yes
      Reported by: No Name Kitchen

      Original Report

      On 20th September 2021, 6 Afghan males between the ages of 17 and 22 attempted to cross the border from Slovenia into Italy near the city of Trieste. They had been traveling for 3 days from Serbia before reaching this point. They walked for 4 hours to the border with another group, but the weather was cold and raining so they decided to try taking a taxi instead. As they were hidden in the taxi they did not have enough space for their bags, and so during this ride they had no water or food.

      The two groups set off in two different taxis. The first made it across the border, but as the second one was approaching it after a 40-minute journey, a police car began chasing them. The driver of the taxi stopped on a small bridge and escaped on foot, but the men in the car were arrested by two Slovenian police officers. The officers have been described as one young man and one old man, both wearing blue short-sleeved tops. The men were then taken to a police station near the Italian border. Here they spent 1 night. The respondents remarked that they were treated well, that the police cooperated and did not try to scare them, and that they were given food, water, and blankets. However, it was cold, and a few of the group became ill. The police tried to interview them about their attempt across the border, but after receiving no response told them to rest and take their food.

      On the morning of 21 September, the group was all given a COVID test and taken to a quarantine facility. Here they spent 3 nights. Again, the respondent stated that they were treated well. They were allowed to use their mobile phones for 2 hours per day and were given good quality food and medical care from a nurse/doctor. The group stated that they intended to claim asylum except for one that was going to Germany because he had a brother there. They also filled out a form stating that they faced threat in Afghanistan. Communication was initially made in English, but a Pashtu-speaking interpreter from Pakistan was provided for the interview. One of the group, the 6th member, was allowed to stay in Slovenia as he was 17.

      On the morning of 24 September the group of 5, all Afghan males between the age of 18 and 22, were given all of their belongings and driven to a small checkpoint on the Croatian border. The checkpoint was described as a two-sided road with a container on each side. Here they were handed over to two Croatian officers, which the Slovenian officers spoke with. The Croatian officers have been described as one woman around 40-45 years old and one man around 50, with both wearing light blue short-sleeved shirts consistent with the uniform of the Croatian Granicna Policija (border police), and one wearing a jacket. Here the respondents remarked that the good treatment ended and that the Croatian officers began acting “insane”. They were driven to a police station near the Croatia-Slovenia border. Here their sim cards were all taken, meaning the group could not access their phones or location services anymore. In the station, there was also a group of 7 Pakistani men. Initially, the two groups were held in separate rooms, but when another detainee arrived at the station all 11 men were put in the same room. The respondents described the room as 2x2m, designed for 1 person, and smelling very bad.

      The two groups were kept in these conditions from 10 am-7 pm, with no food or water. They asked for these repeatedly and were eventually given something to eat after paying with their own money. One of the group of 5 was kicked twice for no apparent reason. The group stated their intention to claim asylum, and again filled out a form stating that they faced threat in Afghanistan. In response, the woman officer asked: “why did you leave Afghanistan? If there was war you should fight not leave”. The group remarked that they refused to engage, stating that “she doesn’t know politics, doesn’t know when someone should stay or leave, there is different reasons”.

      At around 8 pm all 11 men were given their belongings back, minus their sim cards. As the belongings were jumbled and all given at once, some things were lost or potentially stolen. They were then ordered to get in a van which was driven by the same two officers. The group of 5 asked to be returned to Serbia as they had contacts there and had spent time there. They also had Serbian refugee camp ID cards. They were told by the officers that they would be taken to Serbia. The officers then began driving slowly, stopping often and parking to pass the time. The groups asked for something to drink and gave money in return for cola and water. At 12am they were dropped at the Bosnia-Croatia border, near the town of Velika Kladuša.

      The group walked into Velika Kladuša. They spent all night outside with no blankets, sleeping bags, or comfortable places to sleep. The weather was freezing. They tried to enter a restaurant at 7am but were not allowed in. After 2 nights in the cold weather, the group of 5 decided to return to Serbia. The return cost between €500-600. They crossed the border into Serbia at a bridge, where the group remarked that there was no police in sight.

      https://www.borderviolence.eu/violence-reports/september-24-2021-0000-velika-kladusa-bosnia-and-herzegovina

    • Voir aussi le "report of the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture on the situation in Croatia"

      The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has published today the report on its ad hoc visit to Croatia from 10 to 14 August 2020. The report is made public pursuant to Rule 39 §3 (1) of the Rules of Procedure (2) of the CPT following written statements made by a senior Croatian official pertaining to the content of the report which were placed into the public domain. The Committee deemed such statements as a misrepresentation of the contents of the report, the professional integrity and modus operandi of the members of the CPT’s delegation. Consequently, the Committee decided to publish the report of the visit in full.

      In a report on Croatia published today, the CPT urges the Croatian authorities to take determined action to stop migrants being ill-treated by police officers and to ensure that cases of alleged ill-treatment are investigated effectively.

      The Committee carried out a rapid reaction visit to Croatia from 10 to 14 August 2020, and in particular along the border area to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), to examine the treatment and safeguards afforded to migrants deprived of their liberty by the Croatian police. The CPT’s delegation also looked into the procedures applied to migrants in the context of their removal from Croatia as well as the effectiveness of oversight and accountability mechanisms in cases of alleged police misconduct during such operations. A visit to the Ježevo Reception Centre for Foreigners was also carried out.

      The report highlights that, for the first time since the CPT started visiting Croatia in 1998, there were manifest difficulties of cooperation. The CPT’s delegation was provided with incomplete information about places where migrants may be deprived of their liberty and it was obstructed by police officers in accessing documentation necessary for the delegation to carry out the Committee’s mandate.

      In addition to visiting police stations in Croatia, the CPT’s delegation also carried out many interviews across the Croatian border in the Una-Sana Canton of BiH, where it received numerous credible and concordant allegations of physical ill-treatment of migrants by Croatian police officers (notably members of the intervention police). The alleged ill-treatment consisted of slaps, kicks, blows with truncheons and other hard objects (e.g. butts/barrels of firearms, wooden sticks or tree branches) to various parts of the body. The alleged ill-treatment had been purportedly inflicted either at the time of the migrants’ “interception” and de facto deprivation of liberty inside Croatian territory (ranging from several to fifty kilometres or more from the border) and/or at the moment of their push-back across the border with BiH.

      In a significant number of cases, the persons interviewed displayed recent injuries on their bodies which were assessed by the delegation’s forensic medical doctors as being compatible with their allegations of having been ill-treated by Croatian police officers (by way of example, reference is made to the characteristic “tram-line” haematomas to the back of the body, highly consistent with infliction of blows from a truncheon or stick).

      The report also documents several accounts of migrants being subjected to other forms of severe ill-treatment by Croatian police officers such as migrants being forced to march through the forest to the border barefoot and being thrown into the Korana river which separates Croatia from BiH with their hands still zip-locked. Some migrants also alleged being pushed back into BiH wearing only their underwear and, in some cases, even naked. A number of persons also stated that when they had been apprehended and were lying face down on the ground certain Croatian police officers had discharged their weapons into the ground close to them.

      In acknowledging the significant challenges faced by the Croatian authorities in dealing with the large numbers of migrants entering the country, the CPT stresses the need for a concerted European approach. Nevertheless, despite these challenges, Croatia must meet its human rights obligations and treat migrants who enter the country through the border in a humane and dignified manner.

      The findings of the CPT’s delegation also show clearly that there are no effective accountability mechanisms in place to identify the perpetrators of alleged acts of ill-treatment. There is an absence of specific guidelines from the Croatian Police Directorate on documenting diversion operations and no independent police complaints body to undertake effective investigations into such alleged acts.

      As regards the establishment of an “independent border monitoring mechanism” by the Croatian authorities, the CPT sets out its minimum criteria for such mechanism to be effective and independent.

      In conclusion, nonetheless the CPT wishes to pursue a constructive dialogue and meaningful cooperation with the Croatian authorities, grounded on a mature acknowledgment, including at the highest political levels, of the gravity of the practice of ill-treatment of migrants by Croatian police officers and a commitment for such ill-treatment to cease.

      https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-publishes-report-on-its-2020-ad-hoc-vi

      Pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://rm.coe.int/1680a4c199

      #CPT #rapport

      –-

      Commentaire de Inicijativa Dobrodosli (mailing-list du 08.12.2021) :

      Jerko Bakotin writes for Novosti (https://www.portalnovosti.com/odbor-vijeca-europe-hrvatska-policija-sustavno-zlostavlja-migrante-i-) that this report is “perhaps the strongest evidence publicly available so far in support of previously hard-to-dispute facts. First, that Croatian police massively and illegally denies refugees and migrants the right to asylum and expels them from the depths of the territory, that is, conducts pushbacks. Second, that these pushbacks are not officially registered. Third, the pushbacks are done with knowledge, and certainly on the orders of superiors.” Civil society organizations point out (https://hr.n1info.com/vijesti/rh-sustavno-krsi-prava-izbjeglica-koristeci-metode-mucenja-a-zrtve-su-i-d) that the Croatian government is systematically working to cover up these practices, and there will be no change until all those who are responsible are removed and responsibility is taken. Unfortunately, it is likely that the Croatian political leadership will instead decide to shift the blame to refugees and declare international conspiracies against Croatia (https://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/jednostavno-pitanje-za-bozinovica-i-milanovica-sudjeluje-li-i-vijece-europe). As a reaction to the published report, Amnesty International points out (https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/12/human-rights-body-has-condemned-croatian-authorities-for-border-violence) that due to the European Commission’s continued disregard for Croatia’s disrespect for European law, and their continued support in resources, it is really important to ask how much the Commission is complicit in human rights violations at the borders.

    • Another important report (https://welcome.cms.hr/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Polugodisnje-izvjesce-nezavisnog-mehanizma-nadzora-postupanja-policijski) came out on Friday - in a working version that was later withdrawn from a slightly surprising address where it was published - on the website of the Croatian Institute of Public Health. It is the report of the Croatian "independent mechanism for monitoring the conduct of police officers of the Ministry of the Interior in the field of illegal migration and international protection”. Despite the tepid analysis of police treatment - which can be understood given the connection of members of the mechanism with the governing structures, as well as a very problematic proposal for further racial profiling and biometric monitoring of refugees using digital technologies, the report confirmed the existence of pushbacks in Croatia: “through surveillance, the mechanism found that the police carried out illegal pushbacks and did not record returns allowed under Article 13 of the Schengen Borders Code.” We look forward to the publication of the final version of the report.

      –-> via Inicijativa Dobrodosli (mailing-list du 08.12.2021)

  • Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro Convention, 2005)

    The Faro Convention emphasizes the important aspects of heritage as they relate to human rights and democracy. It promotes a wider understanding of heritage and its relationship to communities and society. The Convention encourages us to recognize that objects and places are not, in themselves, what is important about cultural heritage. They are important because of the meanings and uses that people attach to them and the values they represent.

    The Faro Convention is a “framework convention” which defines issues at stake, general objectives and possible fields of intervention for member States to progress. Each State Party can decide on the most convenient means to implement the Convention according to its legal or institutional frameworks, practices and specific experience. Compared to other conventions, the “framework convention” does not create specific obligations for action. It suggests rather than imposes.

    The Convention was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 13 October 2005, and opened for signature to member States in Faro (Portugal) on 27 October of the same year. It entered into force on 1 June 2011. To date, 20 member States of the Council of Europe have ratified the Convention and 7 have signed it.

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/faro-convention

    –—

    Faro Convention Action Plan
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=74eMTcLFydM&feature=emb_logo


    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BB0U1MMSTv4

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/faro-action-plan
    #Convention_de_Faro #héritage #patrimoine #droits_humains #démocratie #héritage_culturel

  • European countries should lift the taboo on Afrophobia and start addressing this phenomenon
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKs5N0mq7A4&feature=emb_logo

    “Racism and racial discrimination against people of African descent remain a widespread yet unacknowledged problem in Europe. It is time to recognise it and take measures to combat Afrophobia more effectively”, said today the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, releasing a report on the topic ahead of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

    The report is based on the discussions that the Commissioner held on 24 November 2020 with human rights defenders working on combating Afrophobia. It highlights that people of African descent continue to be exposed to particularly grave forms of racism and racial discrimination, including racial stereotyping, racist violence, racial profiling in policing and criminal justice, and practices which perpetuate social and economic inequalities.

    This situation is compounded by the prevailing denial of the problem and a lack of public debate on Afrophobia in Europe. Cases and patterns of human rights violations affecting people of African descent are not given adequate consideration, even when they are reliably attested.

    The report also points to the limited research and equality data, the insufficient efforts to address the legacy of colonialism and the slave trade, and the lack of educational and awareness-raising efforts that contribute to the invisibility of the problem.

    The Commissioner underlines the important work carried out by human rights defenders of African descent and NGOs working on combating Afrophobia. She regrets the threats to their lives and safety and the various forms of pressure they are subjected to, such as harassment and attacks in the media online and offline, as well as surveillance and censorship.

    Human rights activists of African descent are also regularly sanctioned for occupying the public space, for example in conducting demonstrations. They face a higher risk of being profiled by automated tools and there appears to be inadequate police protection and a lack of prosecution for attacks against human rights defenders, often carried out by right-wing extremist groups.

    “There is a wealth of international standards and guidelines underlying states’ obligations to combat racism and racial discrimination, paying particular attention to persons of African descent. Member states should implement them as a matter of urgency to reverse the situation”, said the Commissioner.

    She recommends making the fight against racism and racial discrimination a top priority and showing a clear commitment to addressing the legacy of colonialism and the slave trade. “There is a need to overcome the resistance to the acknowledgment of responsibility for these violations”, says the Commissioner. She also stresses the need to reflect historical slavery and the colonial past, as well as their present-day ramifications, in school curricula.

    The Commissioner also draws attention to the importance of taking steps to stamp out racial profiling and impunity for racist crimes committed by law enforcement agents; taking action against all forms of incitement to hatred against people of African descent and enhancing protection against hate crimes; strengthening measures to combat discrimination in access to education, employment, housing and health care, and ensuring that artificial intelligence systems do not discriminate.

    Lastly, the Commissioner stresses member states’ obligation to provide protection and support to human rights defenders working to combat Afrophobia, facilitating a safe and free environment for them to carry out their work without unnecessary or disproportionate legal, political or administrative obstacles. They must be given a voice in national policy and should have more opportunities for dialogue at regional level. “It is time that European countries face the roots and present forms of racism and discrimination and start building more inclusive societies”, concluded the Commissioner.

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/european-countries-should-lift-the-taboo-on-afrophobia-and-start-addressing-thi
    #Afrophobie #discriminations #racisme #discriminations_raciales #conseil_de_l'Europe #Europe #rapport #droits_humains #stéréotypes #violence #violence_raciale #profilage_ethnique #inégalités #colonialisme #esclavage #invisibilisation #harcèlement #censure #surveillance #responsabilité #éduction #intelligence_artificielle #IA #AI

    Pour télécharger le rapport:


    https://rm.coe.int/combating-racism-and-racial-discrimination-against-people-of-african-d/1680a1c0b6

    ping @cede @isskein @_kg_ @karine4

  • Council of Europe’s anti-torture Committee calls on Malta to improve the treatment of detained migrants

    In a report published today on a rapid reaction ad hoc visit to Malta in September 2020, the Council of Europe’s anti-torture committee (CPT) urges the Maltese authorities to change their approach towards immigration detention and to ensure that migrants deprived of their liberty are treated with both dignity and humanity.

    The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has published today the report on its ad hoc visit to Malta focussing on immigration detention, which took place from 17 to 22 September 2020, together with the response of the Maltese authorities.

    In the report, the CPT acknowledged the significant challenges posed to the Maltese authorities by the arrival of increasing numbers of migrants, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, this situation cannot absolve Malta from its human rights obligations and the duty of care owed to all migrants deprived of their liberty by the Maltese authorities.

    Overall, the CPT found an immigration system that was struggling to cope: a system that purely “contained” migrants who had essentially been forgotten, within poor conditions of detention and regimes which verged on institutional mass neglect by the authorities. Indeed, the living conditions, regimes, lack of due process safeguards, treatment of vulnerable groups and some specific Covid-19 measures were found to be so problematic that they may well amount to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

    The carceral design of detention centres such as Hermes Block and the Warehouses at Safi Detention Centre remained totally inappropriate: large rooms crammed with beds, no privacy, and communication with staff via locked doors. Migrants were generally locked in their accommodation units with little to no access to daily outdoor exercise and no purposeful activities. Other deficiencies included a lack of maintenance of the buildings (especially the sanitary facilities), insufficient personal hygiene products and cleaning materials and an inability to obtain a change of clothes. Moreover, there was also a systematic lack of information provided to detained persons about their situation, compounded by minimal contact with the outside world or even staff.

    Vulnerable migrants in particular were not getting the care and support they required. Not only were young children and their parents as well as unaccompanied/separated minors being detained, but they were held in very poor conditions, together with unrelated adult men. Clear protection policies and protocols for looking after vulnerable migrants need to be put in place.

    The CPT underlined that there is an urgent need for Malta to revisit its immigration detention policy, towards one better steered by its duty of care to treat all persons deprived of their liberty with dignity.

    The CPT stressed that the problem of migration into Malta was not new and will almost certainly continue given the push factors that exist in those countries from which the vast majority of migrants come. Therefore, Malta together with the support of the European Union and other member states must put in place an immigration detention system which abides by European values and norms.

    In their response, the Maltese authorities provided detailed information on the steps being taken to improve the conditions of detention for detained migrants and outlined the measures taken and currently underway to reduce the pressure on the immigration detention system, including notably the significant reduction in the number of migrants being detained and instead transferred into open centres and the many refurbishment works underway to improve conditions.

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-s-anti-torture-committee-calls-on-malta-to-improve-the-treatm

    #détention_administrative #rétention #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Malte #rapport #Conseil_de_l'Europe

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Crêpe Georgette publie un très bon thread sur les biais sexistes dans la justice en réponse au thread d’un proc.
    Je vous laisse « juges », et on commence par le thread du proc.
    https://twitter.com/SirYesS25095892/status/1343277586928037888

    Je lis qu’il faut CROIRE les femmes victimes de violences conjugales. CROIRE. Je suis procureur, je ne crois pas. Je prouve, ou je ne prouve pas. Je poursuis, ou je classe. Mon avis, ma reprobation, mon jugement de valeur, le tribunal s’en fiche. & il a raison

    Je rappelle que des hommes sont victimes. Des enfants. Parlons de violences intra familiales, de VIF pour aller plus vite. C’est plus neutre, moins marqué idéologiquement. Car je ne fais pas d’idéologie, je fais du droit.

    Il se peut que vous soyez victime. Depuis des mois des années peut être. Jusqu’à présent vous n’avez pas pu pas osé pas voulu en parler. Pour des raisons qui vous appartiennent. Que personne n’a le droit de juger. Et la vous avez franchi le pas.

    Vous avez poussé la porte d’une gendarmerie ou d’1 commissariat. Vous avez tout raconté. Peut être pleuré. On vous a envoyé voir un médecin. Ça a été très dur de déballer tout ca, et la vous avez peur. Pour vous quelque chose a basculé. Pour moi c’est le début du travail.

    Mon travail est de vous protéger. Pour ça je dois PROUVER ce que vous affirmez. Par tous moyens, témoignages, certificats medicaux, enquête d’environnement, constatations, tout ce que les enquêteurs vont pouvoir trouver. Et ils vont chercher !

    Même quand on ne se sent pas prêt(e) a franchir le pas, c’est bien de se confier, a ses amis, a son médecin. De prendre des photos si on est marqué, si la maison porte les traces du dernier petage de plombs... Tous ces petits éléments de preuve, que nous viendrons récolter.

    Pour vous protéger le Procureur doit faire bien plus que vous croire. Aucune parole n’est sacrée et ne peut se suffire a elle-même... Si elle se heurte a des dénégations, sans élément de preuve, elle restera lettre morte.

    La lutte contre les VIF est une noble lutte, que je porte depuis longtemps. Elle ne justifie pas tout. Ne demandez pas aux enquêteurs ou a la justice de croire les victimes, une condamnation basée sur ma seule croyance, celle de l’enquêteur ou celle du juge serait terrifiante.

    Perso, l’invisibilisation du côté patriarcal des violences et le coup de la symétrie avec des hommes violentés, ça te place vite le curseur.

    Réponse de Crêpe Georgette qui a donc mis plein de pièces dans la machine à produire des trolls mascus.
    https://twitter.com/valerieCG/status/1343549022305398788

    Me voilà de retour car « Monsieur je ne fais pas d’idéologie, je fais du droit » le mérite bien. (thread sur les biais judiciaires en matière de sexisme - rions (jaune) un peu).

    Les lois sont le produit d’une histoire ; si aujourd’hui nous différencions le viol (pénétration) des autres agressions sexuelles c’est le produit d’1 histoire où ce qui était considéré comme grave était de mettre enceinte 1 femme qui n’était pas la vôtre (ce n’est qu’un ex).

    Donc les lois sont elles mêmes le produit d’une idéologie et il faut être diantrement présomptueux pour penser qu’on les applique sans aucune idéologie. quelques ex issus du merveilleux livre Une culture du viol à la française de votre adorée moi-même ==>

    On sait que selon l’heure de la journée, les jugements sont différents, si un jury est entièrement blanc et juge un noir, il sera plus sévère que s’il y a un seul noir dans le jury, on sait qu’il existe ce qu’on appelle des stéréotypes judiciaires. je me cite ==>

    On a de beaux exemples de stéréotypes judiciaire sexistes au Canada en 2017, en Espagne avec un viol collectif, en France à Nanterre, ou en Italie (cas détaillés en screenshot)

    les NotAllJurists vont me répondre « ce ne sont que quelques brebis galeuses !! ». Mais on a aussi des enquêtes sur l’ensemble de raisons poussant par ex au classement sans suite (menées par des juristes et pas des abominables idéologues féministes) du viol . que nous disent-elles ?

    1. l’enquête a été insuffisante
    2. s’il y a viol conjugal ds 1 contexte de violences, on va confondre le viol avec les autres violences
    3. ds un contexte de séparation
    4. pour les tentatives de viol
    5. pour les victimes fragiles (maladie mentale, drogue, alcool

    On a aussi des études sur la correctionalisation des viols et que lit on de la bouche même d’un acteur de la chaine judiciaire ?
    Si la société toute entière souffre de préjugés sur les violences faites aux femmes, le système n’en est pas exempt.

    Revenons ensuite au merveilleux screen. la grande force des réactionnaires est de nous faire croire que nous serons biaisés alors qu’eux sont dans le fait le plus pur. (et le pire ca fonctionne). donc fions nous aux statistiques.

    Toutes les enquêtes de victimination (dont celles de l’ONDRP qu’il va être difficile de considérer comme féministe) prouvent que l’écrasante majorité des auteurs de violences sont des hommes, que les victimes soient des femmes, des hommes ou des enfants.

    arrêtons nous ensuite sur ce screen. Personne n’a demandé aux tribunaux de croire les victimes sur parole ; ce sont vos fantasmes. Et guess what vous pouvez croire une victime, même en tant que procureur et ne pas pouvoir condamner le coupable car il y a un manque de preuves.

    Continuons avec ce screen. Notez l’absence, idéologiquement marquée, du mot « pouvoir » qui fait porter à la victime la responsabilité (en ayant l’air de ne pas y toucher) de son sort
    la plupart des victimes ne portent pas plainte à cause de gens qui ne les croient pas et par peur.

    Enfin le pompon sur la Garonne, que dis-je l’Amazonie. Mesdames, entre 2 fouilles intégrales de votre téléphone auquel il a évidemment accès (c’est pour ca que les sites d’aide sont anonymes champion !), pensez a photographier votre pain dans la gueule !!

    vous noterez au passage que Monsieur « je fais du droit et pas de l’idéologie » appelle des violences sur conjoint un « petage de plomb ». (ca ira ensuite nous expliquer que le terme de féminicide n’est pas dans la loi).

    Incroyable l’Europe elle même (foutue idéologie !!) qui produit des rapports expliquant qu’hommes et femmes n’ont pas un accès égal à la justice à cause de biais et stéréotypes de genre.

    https://www.coe.int/en/web/genderequality/equal-access-of-women-to-justice

    Incroyable (bis) le Grevio a pointé les manquements de la France, entre autres au niveau judiciaire pour proteger les femmes victimes de violences. (c’est ou tous ces idéologues)

    https://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/violences-sexistes-et-sexuelles-ce-quil-faut-retenir-du-rapport-qui-pointe-les

    Enfin (et ca s’adresse à mes camarades féministes) certain-e-s arrivent (avec succès) à connoter négativement le terme idéologie et à faire croire qu’il ne serait pas neutre (donc négatif) de défendre les droits des femmes.
    Observons cette inversion de valeurs. Documentons-là.

    Magnifique exemple de stéréotype judiciaire puisqu’il est prouvé depuis longtemps (SI VOUS PRENIEZ LA PEINE DE LIRE SUR LE SUJET) que la part de mensonges en termes de violences conjugales/sexuelles est congrue. (2nd screen une étude US)

    enfin (je vais m’arrêter à un moment promis), les stéréotypes judiciaires sont aussi raciaux. la source : « Demographic differences in sentencing, United States Sentencing Commission, novembre 2017.
    donc travaillez sur vos biais au lieu de les nier

  • Covid-19 Migrants, refugees and asylum
    https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/covid-19-migrants-refugees-and-asylum

    Migrants, asylum seekers and refugees to Europe continue to face uncertain times amidst the COVID crisis. Drahoslav Štefánek, Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees describes some of the challenges and the support that the Council of Europe is offering to member states.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#europe#conseildeleurope#refugie#droitsfondamentaux

  • Intercultural Cities: COVID-19 Special page
    #Covid-19#Europe#ville#migrant#migration
    https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/covid-19-special-page

    Since the spreading of COVID-19 virus and disease, public authorities at all government levels and worldwide are facing a large-scale emergency situation which is new for most of today’s societies. Apart from the immediate threat to health posed by the pandemic, the “future” is already announcing more challenges to our human rights acquis, social, economic and institutional structures, with obvious implications in all areas of our shared daily reality.

  • EU to end ship patrols in scaled down Operation Sophia

    The European Union will cease the maritime patrols that have rescued thousands of migrants making the perilous Mediterranean Sea crossing from North Africa to Europe, but it will extend air missions, two diplomats said on Tuesday (26 March).

    A new agreement on the EU’s Operation Sophia was hammered out after Italy, where anti-migrant sentiment is rising, said it would no longer receive those rescued at sea.

    Operation Sophia’s mandate was due to expire on Sunday but should now continue for another six months with the same aim of deterring people smugglers in the Mediterranean. But it will no longer deploy ships, instead relying on air patrols and closer coordination with Libya, the diplomats said.

    “It is awkward, but this was the only way forward given Italy’s position, because nobody wanted the Sophia mission completely shut down,” one EU diplomat said.

    A second diplomat confirmed a deal had been reached and said it must be endorsed by all EU governments on Wednesday.

    The tentative deal, however, could weaken Operation Sophia’s role in saving lives in the sea where nearly 2,300 people perished last year, according to United Nations figures.

    From the more than one million refugees and migrants who made it to the bloc during a 2015 crisis, sea arrivals dropped to 141,500 people in 2018, according to the United Nations.

    Still, Italy’s deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini, has said his country would no longer be the main point of disembarkation for people trying to cross the Mediterranean by boat and rescued by Sophia’s patrol ships.

    Rome called for other countries to open up their ports instead, but no other EU states came forward. Diplomats said countries including Spain, France and Germany signalled they were not willing to host more rescued people – most of whom are fleeing wars and poverty in Africa and the Middle East.

    However, EU governments did want the mission to continue because they felt it had been effective in dissuading smugglers.

    The compromise discussion in Brussels did not discuss military aspects of the role of air patrols. But the new arrangement will involve more training of the coast guard in Libya, where lawlessness has allowed smugglers to openly operate sending people to Europe by sea.

    But it would be in line with the EU’s policy of turning increasingly restrictive on Mediterranean immigration since the surge in 2015 and discouraging people from risking their lives in the sea in trying to cross to Europe where governments do not want them.

    The bloc has already curbed operations of EU aid groups in the part of the Mediterranean in question and moved its own ships further north where fewer rescues take place.

    https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-to-end-ship-patrols-in-scaled-down-operation-sophia
    #opération_sophia #méditerranée #asile #réfugiés #sauvetage #missions_aériennes #migrations #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #mer_Méditerranée #sauvetages

    • Commissioner calls for more rescue capacity in the Mediterranean

      I take note of the decision taken by the EU’s Political and Security Committee with regards to Operation Sophia. I regret that this will lead to even fewer naval assets in the Mediterranean, which could assist the rescue of persons in distress at sea. Lives are continuing to be lost in the Mediterranean. This should remind states of the urgency to adopt a different approach, one that should ensure a sufficiently resourced and fully operational system for saving human lives at sea and to safeguard rescued migrants’ dignity.

      Whilst coastal states have the responsibility to ensure effective coordination of search and rescue operations, protecting lives in the Mediterranean requires concerted efforts of other states as well, to begin with the provision of naval assets specifically dedicated to search and rescue activities, deployed in those areas where they can make an effective contribution to saving human lives. Furthermore, I reiterate my call to all states to refrain from hindering and criminalising the work of NGOs who are trying to fill the ever-increasing gap in rescue capacity. States should rather support and co-operate with them, including by ensuring that they can use ports for their life-saving activities.

      Finally, the decision to continue only with aerial surveillance and training of the Libyan Coast Guard further increases the risks that EU member states, directly or indirectly, contribute to the return of migrants and asylum seekers to Libya, where it is well-documented, in particular recently by the United Nations, that they face serious human rights violations. So far, calls to ensure more transparency and accountability in this area, including by publishing human rights risk assessments and setting up independent monitoring mechanisms, have not been heeded. The onus is now on EU member states to show urgently that the support to the Libyan Coast Guard is not contributing to human rights violations, and to suspend this support if they cannot do so.

      https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/commissioner-calls-for-more-rescue-capacity-in-the-mediterranean
      #droits_humains #gardes-côtes_libyens #Libye

    • EU to end ship patrols in scaled down migrant rescue operation: diplomats

      The European Union will cease the maritime patrols that have rescued thousands of migrants making the perilous Mediterranean Sea crossing from North Africa to Europe, but it will extend air missions, two diplomats said on Tuesday.
      A new agreement on the EU’s Operation Sophia was hammered out after Italy, where anti-migrant sentiment is rising, said it would no longer receive those rescued at sea.

      Operation Sophia’s mandate was due to expire on Sunday but should now continue for another six months with the same aim of detering people smugglers in the Mediterranean. But it will no longer deploy ships, instead relying on air patrols and closer coordination with Libya, the diplomats said.

      “It is awkward, but this was the only way forward given Italy’s position, because nobody wanted the Sophia mission completely shut down,” one EU diplomat said.

      A second diplomat confirmed a deal had been reached and said it must be endorsed by all EU governments on Wednesday.

      The tentative deal, however, could weaken Operation Sophia’s role in saving lives in the sea where nearly 2,300 people perished last year, according to United Nations figures.

      From the more than one million refugees and migrants who made it to the bloc during a 2015 crisis, sea arrivals dropped to 141,500 people in 2018, according to the United Nations.

      Still, Italy’s deputy prime minister Matteo Salvini, has said his country would no longer be the main point of disembarkation for people trying to cross the Mediterranean by boat and rescued by Sophia’s patrol ships.

      Rome called for other countries to open up their ports instead, but no other EU states came forward. Diplomats said countries including Spain, France and Germany signaled they were not willing to host more rescued people - most of whom are fleeing wars and poverty in Africa and the Middle East.

      However, EU governments did want the mission to continue because they felt it had been effective in dissuading smugglers.

      The compromise discussion in Brussels did not discuss military aspects of the role of air patrols. But the new arrangement will involve more training of the coast guard in Libya, where lawlessness has allowed smugglers to openly operate sending people to Europe by sea.

      But it would be in line with the EU’s policy of turning increasingly restrictive on Mediterranean immigration since the surge in 2015 and discouraging people from risking their lives in the sea in trying to cross to Europe where governments do not want them.

      The bloc has already curbed operations of EU aid groups in the part of the Mediterranean in question and moved its own ships further north where fewer rescues take place.

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-sophia/eu-weighs-up-awkward-migration-compromise-on-mediterranean-mission-idUSKCN1

    • En Méditerranée, l’UE retire ses navires militaires qui ont sauvé 45.000 migrants

      Les États membres de l’Union européenne ont décidé, mercredi 27 mars, de retirer leurs navires militaires engagés en Méditerranée dans le cadre de l’opération militaire dite « Sophia », au moins temporairement. Depuis 2015, ces bateaux ont pourtant permis de sauver 45 000 migrants environ.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/280319/en-mediterranee-l-ue-retire-ses-navires-militaires-qui-ont-sauve-45000-mig

    • #EUNAVFOR_MED Operation Sophia : mandate extended until 30 September 2019

      The Council today extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia until 30 September 2019.

      The Operation Commander has been instructed to suspend temporarily the deployment of the Operation’s naval assets for the duration of this extension for operational reasons. EU member states will continue to work in the appropriate fora on a solution on disembarkation as part of the follow-up to the June 2018 European Council conclusions.

      The Operation will continue to implement its mandate accordingly, strengthening surveillance by air assets as well as reinforcing support to the Libyan Coastguard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea through enhanced monitoring, including ashore, and continuation of training.

      The operation’s core mandate is to contribute to the EU’s work to disrupt the business model of migrant smugglers and human traffickers in the Southern Central Mediterranean. The operation has also supporting tasks. It trains the Libyan Coastguard and Navy and monitors the long-term efficiency of the training and it contributes to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya. In addition, the operation also conducts surveillance activities and gathers information on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. As such, the operation contributes to EU efforts for the return of stability and security in Libya and to maritime security in the Central Mediterranean region.

      EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia was launched on 22 June 2015. It is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration. The Operation Commander is Rear Admiral Credendino, from Italy. The headquarters of the operation are located in Rome.

      Today’s decision was adopted by the Council by written procedure.

      https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/29/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia-mandate-extended-until-30-september-2

  • #Until_when_Europe ?

    CEAR and the Greek Council for Refugees denounce through this video the inaction of European authorities on the situation of thousands of refugees, many of who face a third winter in tents and precarious accommodation in Greece, Until when Europe? This is what the more than 14,000 refugees who continue to be trapped on the islands in inhumane conditions are wondering. “We live in a small tent and the baby is very cold”, “If I was not sick and so tired, I would wait quietly. But I’m sick, very sick, and I can not wait”. These are some of the testimonies of the thousands of refugees who remain trapped in the islands, waiting for a response from Europe.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_PG3EfwzRMY


    #vidéo #film #se_questa_è_Europa #hotspots #asile #migrations #campement #camps #réfugiés #Grèce #droits_humains #piège #îles #attente #honte

    • Greece: Council of Europe anti-torture committee calls for the situation of psychiatric patients to be improved, while criticising once again the poor treatment of immigration detainees

      The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has published today the report on its most recent visit to Greece from 10 to 19 April 2018, together with the response of the Greek authorities.

      The report highlights the systemic overcrowding in three of the five psychiatric establishments visited (Evangelismos, Gennimatas and Sotiria), with patients at Evangelismos being accommodated in the corridors. In all five hospitals visited, the CPT is critical of the lack of staff and over-reliance on pharmacotherapy, and the fact that patients were offered few activities. Another concern is the widespread practice of excessive and/or inappropriate use of mechanical restraint. The CPT also received some isolated allegations of ill-treatment (punches, tight restraints, and verbal abuse) by staff at the private “Athina Vrilissa” Psychiatric Clinic. Further, at Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital, it found that the use of the basement protection cells for the seclusion of patients without supervision and for extended periods could easily be considered inhuman and degrading. Moreover, safeguards surrounding involuntary placement procedures were found to be insufficient in law and practice.

      In their response, the Greek authorities accepted most of CPT’s recommendations aimed at improving the situation in psychiatric establishments. In particular, the new draft law governing involuntary placement will increase the safeguards for psychiatric patients. Swift action was taken to close down the basement protection cells at Korydallos Prison Psychiatric Hospital. Moreover, an external supervisory body will be established and a Committee be set up to monitor and evaluate the use of means of restraint and medication in all psychiatric institutions in Greece.

      As regards immigration detention, the CPT stresses once again the need for a coordinated European approach to address the high number of foreign nationals arriving in Greece. At the same time, the report recalls that foreign nationals deprived of their liberty by the Greek authorities must be treated humanely and with dignity.

      In the course of the visit, the CPT received a number of credible allegations of police ill-treatment (slaps, punches, kicks, baton blows and verbal abuse) from foreign nationals held in detention in the Evros region and at Moria Pre-removal Centre on Lesvos. It also received several credible allegations about the occurrence of “push-back” operations, whereby foreign nationals were returned from Greece to Turkey by boat across the Evros River; some of the persons met alleged that they had been ill-treated (including baton blows to the head) by police and border guard officers or (para-) military commandos during such operations.

      Conditions of detention were found to be grossly sub-standard in some of the police and border guard stations visited, such as at Isaakio, where foreign nationals were detained overnight in two filthy cells with less than 1.5 m² of living space each. The Pre-removal Centre in Fylakio was so severely overcrowded, that single men, families, children and pregnant women were crammed together for several weeks or months with little more than 1 m² of living space per person, a situation that can easily be considered as amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment. The provision of health care services also remained inadequate, with a chronic lack of health care staff and an absence of even the most basic medical equipment and medication.

      Regrettably, the CPT had to reiterate its recommendations that the Greek authorities increase significantly the number of dedicated open (or semi-open) shelter facilities for unaccompanied minors and that they fundamentally revise their policy regarding the detention of unaccompanied minors both for reception and identification purposes and under “protective custody”. The CPT recommends that an end should be put to holding unaccompanied minors in reception and identification centres, pre-removal centres, special holding facilities for irregular migrants or police and border guard stations. The CPT also calls for an end to the routine detention of children with their parents in police establishments upon their arrival in the country.

      In their response, the Greek authorities deny that the practice of “push-backs” exists and point out that investigations into alleged unofficial removals and police ill-treatment found no disciplinary liability by the Hellenic Police. Further, the authorities explain that the poor conditions of detention in the Evros region were due to the increased migratory pressure at the time of the CPT’s visit. On a more positive note, the authorities plan to refurbish police detention facilities used for holding irregular migrants in line with CPT standards and to improve the conditions in the eight pre-removal detention facilities in the country.

      The main findings of the CPT are set out in the executive summary of the report.

      The CPT’s report and the Greek authorities’ response have been made public at the request of the Greek Government.

      https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/greece-council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-calls-for-the-situation-of-psyc

      Pour télécharger le #rapport:
      https://rm.coe.int/1680930c9a

  • Unrelenting rise in xenophobic populism, resentment, hate speech in Europe in 2017.
    https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/unrelenting-rise-in-xenophobic-populism-resentment-hate-speech-in-europe-in-201

    Read full press release: Unrelenting rise in xenophobic populism, resentment, hate speech in Europe in 2017 : https://search.coe.int/directorate_of_communications/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016808b6356

    Xenophobic populism and hate speech have continued to be on the rise in 2017, with high levels of migration and challenges of integration, religious extremism, terrorist attacks and the austerity-driven socio-economic climate observed all over Europe, says the annual report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) published today.

    The populist rhetoric has blended into a hatred of non-nationals or minorities; migration and multiculturalism have continued to be presented as a threat to social cohesion and security; traditional and social media have encouraged self-segregation and further deepened social divides. Existing security concerns have been exploited to justify huge trade-offs in fundamental rights of migrants and other vulnerable groups, the report stresses.

    The Chairperson of ECRI Jean-Paul Lehners said: “While acknowledging the difficulties European states encounter, we still have to encourage them to change their narrative to a more balanced and fact-based discourse that emphasises the positive contribution of well-governed migration, in particular by underlining the opportunities and resources migrants can bring.”

    Managing migration while respecting human rights has remained a major challenge in many member states, according to the report. While ECRI has observed several measures to facilitate the integration of migrants, in particular in the areas of housing, education and employment, the majority of the efforts remain largely limited to migration control. This risks hindering successful integration.