Middle East News- Haaretz.com

/middle-east-news

  • Palestinians paint murals in Jerusalem, looking Israeli occupation in the eye - Palestinians - Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium.MAGAZINE-palestinians-paint-murals-in-jerusalem-looking-israeli-oc

    Palestinians Paint Murals in Jerusalem, Looking Israeli Occupation in the Eye

    A total of 150 colorful murals are planned for Silwan, and when completed, will drastically alter the neighborhood’s appearance: ’The staring eyes say to people we see them and they should see us too’

    #palestine #jérusalem #silwan #occupation #colonisation #démolition

  • Despite Israel, U.S. pressure, and ongoing probe, UN renews #UNRWA mandate - Palestinians - Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/despite-israel-u-s-pressure-and-ongoing-probe-un-renews-unrwa-mandate-1.813

    UNRWA mandate renewed for three years, ending US pressure - The National
    https://www.thenational.ae/world/unrwa-mandate-renewed-for-three-years-ending-us-pressure-1.938128
    https://www.thenational.ae/image/policy:1.938127:1573844786/image.jpg?f=16x9&q=0.6&w=1200&$p$f$q$w=70c86c9

    Countries voted overwhelmingly on Friday to renew the mandate of the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, ending a concerted campaign by the United States to abolish it.

    Having endured a funding crisis largely caused by the US withdrawing support, the finances of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency remain volatile.

    But members of the United Nations Fourth Committee adopted a resolution approving the agency’s operations until June 2023.

    Among those who voted, 170 states supported renewal of the mandate and seven abstained. Only the US and Israel voted against.

    “Despite bullying, blackmail and pressure they stood by UNRWA,” said Riyad Al Mansour, Ambassador for Palestine to the UN, thanking countries for resisting US lobbying against the agency and its donors.

    #Palestine #sionisme #etats-unis

  • Israeli army admits to killing eight Gaza family members: We thought the house was empty
    Israeli military’s spokesperson in Arabic said that the target was an Islamic Jihad commander, but defense establishment sources say it was an ‘infrastructure’■ Palestinians say casualties are a family of herders
    Yaniv Kubovich and Jack Khoury Nov 15, 2019 8:23 AM
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-israeli-army-admits-strike-that-killed-palestinian-family-intended

    Palestinians attend the funeral of the Asoarka family killed in the Israeli strike, Deir al-Balah, Gaza Strip, November 14, 2019.AFP

    The Israeli military admitted on Thursday that it made a mistake in targeting a Gaza building Wednesday night which housed a family of eight, all of whom died in the strike.

    The Israeli army said it assessed that the building in the Deir al-Balah neighborhood was empty, not realizing it was populated by a family. The Israel Defense Forces are investigating the strike, which took place a few hours before a cease-fire came into effect, and its consequences.

    “We are aware of the claim that non-combatants were injured in the central Gaza Strip, and we are investigating it,” the IDF said in a statement, adding that that “we undertake great intelligence and operational efforts not to harm non-combatants over the course of thwarting terror activities.”

    The Palestinian Health Ministry identified the dead as Rasmi Abu Malhous of the Asouarka tribe, 45; his son Mohand, 12; Miriam Asoarka, 45; Moad Mohamed Asoarka, 7; Sim Mohamed Asoarka, 13; Yoseri Asoarka, 39; and two toddlers whose bodies were dug up from the debris on Thursday morning and whose names have not been released.

    Following the strike, the Israeli military’s Arabic-language spokesperson announced that the target had been Rasmi Abu Malhous, the Islamic Jihad commander of a rocket squadron in the center of the Strip. He published a picture of Abu Malhous, but residents of Deir al-Balah say the man in the picture isn’t the one who was killed on Wednesday night.

    Sources in the defense establishment said, however, that the target of the strike was “infrastructure,” and that they were not at all aware that Palestinians were in it.

    Associates and neighbors of the family claim that they had no connection to the Islamic Jihad commander, and that the case was probably one of mistaken identity.

    “This was a very simple, poor family, who lives from hand to mouth in a tin shack, with no water or electricity,” said a neighbor who knew the family. “They lived off herding sheep and were known as simple, poor people. Is this the way the head of a rocket unit or a senior Islamic Jihadist lives?

    “Every child in Gaza knows the unit members and senior activists live in different conditions, they have houses, and even when they go underground their children and families don’t live in such squalor,” he said. “The story that they attacked a senior jihadist seems disconnected from reality.”

    #GAZA

    • Frappes sur Gaza : Israël reconnaît une erreur dans un bombardement
      Par RFI Publié le 15-11-2019 | Avec notre correspondant à Jérusalem, Michel Paul
      http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20191115-israel-gaza-territoires-palestiniens-jihad-islamique-frappes-erreur

      Il règne un calme précaire à la frontière entre Israël et Gaza. Les Israéliens reconnaissent désormais avoir bombardé un bâtiment qui abritait une famille de huit personnes dans le centre de l’enclave palestinienne. Parmi les victimes, trois enfants, âgés de 7 à 13 ans.

      Un porte-parole de l’armée israélienne a reconnu qu’il s’agissait d’une erreur. Les militaires israéliens visaient une infrastructure appartenant à un haut responsable du Jihad islamique du nom de Rasmis Abou Malhous, soupçonné par les Israéliens d’être le responsable de l’unité chargée des roquettes au sein de l’organisation. Un bâtiment qui était situé à Dir el Balah, dans le centre de la bande de Gaza.

      Et toujours selon cette même source militaire, l’armée israélienne ignorait que la bâtisse abritait une famille de huit membres qui ont tous trouvé la mort dans la frappe. Les faits se sont déroulés quelques heures avant l’entrée en vigueur d’un fragile cessez-le-feu entre Israël et le Jihad islamique et ont été révélés par le quotidien Haaretz.

    • Outdated intelligence, social media rumors: Behind Israel’s killing of Gaza family
      Yaniv Kubovich and Jack Khoury Nov 15, 2019 - 5:39 PM |Haaretz.com
      https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-outdated-intelligence-social-media-rumors-behind-israel-s-killing-

      Military officials acknowledge the eight family members died in a building that hadn’t been examined by Israeli intel for months, and no one checked whether any civilians were in the vicinity before the overnight strike, which the IDF is now looking into

      An Israeli strike Wednesday overnight that killed eight Palestinian family members targeted a Gaza building that appeared in an outdated target database, and it was carried out without prior inspection of of civilian presence at the site.

      Following the attack, one of the last incidents in a two-day surge in violence between Israel and Palestinian group Islamic Jihad, the Israeli army’s Arabic-language spokesman claimed that the building was a command post for an Islamic Jihad rocket launching unit in the central Strip. However, this claim was backed by unreliable information based on rumors on social media, which hadn’t been verified.

      The building where the family lived was on a list of potential targets, but Israeli defense officials confirmed to Haaretz that it had not been looked at over the past year or checked prior to the attack.

      The officials also confirmed that they had no idea who the Palestinian whose name and picture were released by the army’s Arabic-language spokesman was, stressing he wasn’t known to be somehow linked to Islamic Jihad, refuting the spokesman’s initial claim.

      Residents of the central Gaza town of Dir al-Balah described the building that was targeted as a tin shack, but it was added months ago to the “target bank” used by the Israel Defense Forces’ Southern Command as an “infrastructure target,” meaning it was of interest as a site, although not because of any individual linked to it.

      The army classified the site, found in a complex of dilapidated shacks and greenhouses, as a military training complex. But in the period since it was approved as a target, the changes at the complex were not looked into to determine if it still served as an Islamic Jihad site.

      At 1:30 A.M., the green light was given to attack the structure and other targets using a JDAM bomb, which is used by the Israeli Air Force’s fighter aircraft. This weapons system fitted on aerial bombs enables a direct hit using a GPS-based guidance system.

      Defense sources confirmed that at no stage was the area checked for the presence of civilians.

      According to an initial investigation the army conducted, the strike was never intended to target a given individual, despite the statement released by its spokesman, but rather to hit infrastructure used by Islamic Jihad.

      Contrary to statements given to the media, defense sources confirmed that the site was a complex of shacks – a target that even if used by the Palestinian group would not have much significance or harm its capabilities. Senior defense officials told Haaretz the target was approved in the past according to protocol, but had not been reexamined since.

      The IDF is still trying to understand what the family was doing at the site, a defense source told Haaretz. The military doesn’t rule out a Palestinian claim that the family had been living there for quite some time prior to the attack.

      A neighbor, who said he personally knew the family, told Haaretz that they had lived there for “over 20 years.” He added they were “known as simple people, living in shacks and making their living off herding and some agriculture, nothing beyond that. They … didn’t come here recently or were moved here by anyone.”

      He also said the targeted complex isn’t known to be used for any sort of military activity.

      “This was a very simple, poor family, who lived from hand to mouth in a tin shack, with no water or electricity,” another neighbor who knew the family told Haaretz on Thursday. “They lived of herding sheep and were known as simple, poor people. Is this the way the head of a rocket unit or a senior Islamic Jihad officer lives?”

      Thousands attended the family’s funeral on Thursday.The Palestinian Health Ministry identified them as Rasmi al-Sawarkah, 45; his son Muhannad, 12; Maryam, 45; Muath Mohammed, 7; Wasim Mohammed, 13; Yousra, 39; and two toddlers whose bodies were dug up from the debris on Thursday morning and whose names haven’t been released.

      Dir al-Balah residents said all of them were related and lived in the same complex.

      The IDF spokesman in Hebrew said in a statement that the strike targeted “terrorist infrastructure,” adding: “According to the information the IDF had at the time of the strike, it was not expected that any uninvolved civilians would be harmed.”

      A jihadist known to no one

      Following the strike, the Israeli military’s Arabic-language spokesperson Avichay Adraee posted on his official social media accounts that a senior Islamic Jihad commander was killed in the strike. A man identified by Adraee as Abu Malhous was said to be in charge of the group’s rocket squadrons in central Gaza.

      Defense officials now admit it was a false statement, and defense sources told Haaretz they are unfamiliar with anyone of that name. The IDF’s Intelligence Corps has no such information that correlates with Adraee’s statement, and the army is examining whether the mistake stemmed from the death of a man with the same name – although he doesn’t look like the person whose photo was distributed by Adraee.

      Haaretz found that the false statement, which defense sources confirmed wasn’t based on any intelligence gathered by Israeli security agencies, was inspired by unreliable information shared on social media, including an Israeli Telegram group.

      However, senior officials gave a green light to publish the unverified information in an attempt by the IDF to display its achievements in targeting high-ranking Islamic Jihad operatives in this round of fighting, which began on Tuesday in the early morning with the assassination of Baha Abu al-Ata.

      This family’s killing has been heavily criticized by Palestinian officials and citizens, also leading the United Nations envoy Nickolay Mladenov to tweet: “There is no justification to attacking civilians in Gaza, or elsewhere! Such a tragedy! My heartfelt condolences to the family of Al-Sawarkah & I wish a speedy recovery to the injured. I call on Israel to move swiftly with its investigation.”

      IDF officials expressed great frustration with how events unfolded, and one of them confirmed it is highly unlikely that such a key figure to the Islamic Jihad’s rocket operation would be found in a shack during a round of violence. The individual who appeared in Adraee’s statement is unknown to the Israeli military, the official stressed, and the information was published without consultation with officials in the field, who could have easily refuted it.

      Other military officials said there was no intention to cover up the killing of a Palestinian family, and that it was an innocent mistake, while admitting the way the incident was handled and made public was unprofessional.

      The IDF’s spokesman in Hebrew said that “initial information” pointed to the death of an Islamic Jihad operative, but “an examination found that the information concerning his identity was uncertain. The issue is being investigated.”

      Noa Landau contributed to this report.

  • Human Rights Group Condemns Israel’s Shelling Of Its Headquarters In Gaza
    November 12, 2019 3:57 PM – IMEMC News
    https://imemc.org/article/human-rights-group-condemns-israels-shelling-of-its-headquarters-in-gaza

    After being targeted by Israeli missiles, the Independent Commission for Human Rights in Palestine (IHCR), issued a statement denouncing the military escalation, and calling for an international investigation at the highest level.

    At approximately 09:50 AM on Tuesday, 12 November 2019, the headquarters of the Independent Commission in the Gaza Strip, which occupies the fifth, sixth and seventh floors of a multi-story building near the Palestinian Legislative Council in the center of Gaza City, was targeted by Israeli missiles.

    Mr. Bahjat Al-Helu, ICHR’s Coordinator of the Awareness and Training Unit in the Gaza Strip, was slightly injured.

    It was a fortunate coincidence that the colleagues on the targeted floor just left the place a few minutes prior the shelling to participate in a meeting on the seventh floor, otherwise, they would have been directly hit.

    The Independent Commission for Human Rights condemns the attacks on its offices in Gaza City and calls upon the international community to take urgent action to stop the aggression carried out by the occupying power since the early morning of today, Tuesday.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=42&v=cDjUVR4i58k&feature=emb_logo

    • Missile hits human rights office in Gaza. Here’s why you never heard about it
      Amira Hass Nov 13, 2019 - Haaretz.com
      https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-boundless-fear-in-gaza-1.8121625

      Israeli sources confirmed a local missile hit an office building in Gaza, but one could conclude that was the case just from the silence of Palestinian media outlets regarding the hit

      At about 10 A.M. on Tuesday, a missile hit the fifth floor of the Al-Harara office building in Gaza City, which is across from the Palestinian Legislative Council building. It s a missile that went astray on its launchers, almost certainly members of Islamic Jihad.

      Ironically, it scored a direct hit on the office of Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights, which scrutinizes the Palestinian authorities and reports on their violations of human rights, civil rights and the rule of law in the enclaves of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

      Israeli sources told Haaretz that the missile wasn’t Israeli. But one could have concluded that it was a local missile just from the silence that Palestinian media outlets imposed on themselves regarding the hit and the destruction it caused to the lowest of the three floors that the commission occupies in this elegant building.

      In Gaza, one cannot keep it a secret when a local rocket or missile falls inside the territory and even causes casualties among Palestinian civilians. But what is shared by word of mouth isn’t reported by the Palestinian media, and certainly not in real time. Even without orders from above, self-censorship is at work.

      Some websites, however, did publish the commission’s press statement, which asked the international community to investigate and condemned the escalation Israel sparked by its assassination of Baha Abu al-Ata (which also killed his wife, Asma, and wounded eight other people).

      By great good fortune, two commission employees who were working on the fifth floor had gone up to the seventh floor for a smoke a few minutes earlier. Eight other employees who had come to work that morning were in their offices on the sixth floor.

      They didn’t understand what had happened when the explosion went off beneath them, with its terrible noise. In the following seconds, they found themselves in a cloud of dust and fragments of the ceiling. At first, they were astonished to find themselves alive; then, each of them checked to see that his colleagues were okay. One had been lightly wounded and suffered from shock.

      Members of Hamas’ internal security service and the civil defense unit (the firefighters) arrived and collected the missile fragments. It’s hard to know if and when information about what happened after that will eventually leak. Will there be an investigation into why the errant missile fell where it did? Will anyone be reprimanded or punished?

      When the missile hit the commission’s office, Gazans already knew that half of Israel was shut down due to Islamic Jihad’s rockets. They could listen to Israeli interviewees talking openly about their fears.

      These Israeli fears, like reports that residents of communities near Gaza had left their homes, were in the past considered achievements of Palestinian militant organizations, especially Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Their ability to “repay” Israel for all its terrifying, lethal and humiliating military assaults – to make Israelis, too, feel fear, while temporarily paralyzing their normal lives – raised the prestige of both organizations, especially in the eyes of Palestinians outside Gaza.

      But countless similar rounds of mutual but asymmetric intimidation have already proven that the number of casualties on the Palestinian side, as well as the damage done to Gaza’s economy, property and infrastructure, is many times greater.

      When Hamas, as the ruling party that even won an election once, uses the tactic of counter intimidation, one can ascribe some sort of political purpose and logic to it and assume that the organization will know how to limit the scope of the escalation, since it bears governmental responsibility and must therefore pay attention to the public’s feelings. But for Islamic Jihad, which has no aspirations to lead the Palestinians, or even participate in elections, intimidation and revenge (“the right to respond”) have become an end in themselves. It’s hard to set limits on them when there are no defined political goals (aside from liberating all of Palestine).

      Tuesday afternoon, Islamic Jihad’s spokesmen announced that the group hadn’t yet responded to the assassination itself. Whether this was braggadocio or a promise, Gazans aren’t censoring themselves in private conversations: This frightens them, a lot.

      The commission employees who came to work at the organization’s headquarters on Tuesday were among the few Gazans who left their homes that morning. Just like in Israel between the Gazan border and Tel Aviv, in Gaza, too, schools and universities were closed. Some teachers and principals were already on their way to school when this was announced, so they had to retrace their footsteps.

      The streets were empty. People stayed home. Markets didn’t open. The only businesses that did open were neighborhood grocery stores, for the sake of people who emerged for a few minutes to buy something.

      A mother of five said she didn’t know whether Gazans were happy over the Israeli panic, “because we’re all shut in our homes.” A young woman said, “We’re afraid of all three types of explosions: when an Israeli missile lands, when a local missile is launched and when Iron Dome intercepts a missile.”

      Nevertheless, the Palestinian public, including representatives of the PLO and its dominant Fatah faction, are united in viewing the assassination of Abu al-Ata as an Israeli crime. Consequently, all the combative reports on Islamic Jihad’s news site, Filistin Al Youm (Palestine Today), also included a personal touch.

      On the night before Abu al-Ata died, he promised his daughter Layan that he’d buy a cake for her birthday, which fell on Tuesday. According to his brother Ihab, he also promised to avenge Omar Haitham al-Badawi, the young man killed by Israeli soldiers in the West Bank’s Al-Aroub refugee camp on Monday.

      Like all Gazans, employees of the Independent Commission for Human Rights have all experienced three major Israeli military assaults and dozens of other military strikes. All have often experienced the fear of death, and all have relatives or friends, including children, women and the elderly, who were killed or wounded in those attacks. But the missile that struck the bottom floor of their office proved that no one ever gets used to fear.

      The rules of self-censorship, however, apply not only to Palestinian journalists, but also to senior Palestinian Authority officials. They oppose Islamic Jihad’s tactics. Yet they can’t say openly and directly that an organization which represents only a tiny fraction of Palestinian society has no right to decide – together with Israeli Defense Minister Naftali Bennett and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – that Gaza will once again descend into the hell of war.

  • A wall, arrests and close surveillance: How Israel fences in a Palestinian family
    Amira Hass | Nov. 2, 2019 | Haaretz.com

    Their every move is filmed, every exit from their house depends on the army and they may access their land three times a year at most. The Gharib family has been living this way since Israel surrounded them with settlers

    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-a-wall-arrests-and-close-surveillance-how-israel-fences-in-a-pales

    Nothing unusual happened this week to Sa adat Gharib and his family from the village of Beit Ijza northwest of Jerusalem. That is, if you don t take the olive harvest into account. This routine is what makes the family a microcosm of the Palestinian situation.

    Life in the enclaves. The enclave the Gharib family lives in is especially small; maybe it should be called a fenced-in pocket. On three sides, a 6-meter-high fence surrounds the one-story house and the short path leading to it from Sa’adat’s brothers’ house to the south. An unpaved, sunken road, blocked by concrete walls and fences, closes in on the house from the south and cuts it off from the family’s olive grove and the village’s lands.

    Above it is a concrete bridge. Under the bridge on the east, behind a locked door made of iron bars, steps lead to the sunken road, which is intended only for Israeli military vehicles. The soldiers have the key to the door and at any moment they can open it and enter the path leading to the family’s house.

    The house. It was built in 1979 on land the family says has belonged to them from as far back as the Ottoman era. The village’s ancient stone houses attest wordlessly to the continuity of life there.

    The permanent threat of being cut off. A large iron gate leans on the concrete wall on the sunken road. The soldiers can move it at will and block the entrance to the fenced-in house, cutting it off at any moment from the village’s other houses.

    In the first three months after the fence was built at the end of 2006, the entrance was blocked all the time, Gharib says. To leave, the family had to negotiate by phone with the police at the nearby Atarot industrial zone, or get the Red Cross to help out. “Sometimes we waited for several hours for them to come and open it,” he said.

    Close surveillance. This is achieved by cameras on the bars of the fence and at the entrance to the path. In Israeli military language this is called an “indicative fence” – which is also equipped with sensors. The son Sabri climbs a tree, the daughter Haya runs to her father, the daughter Ruba returns from school, the nephew Mohammed comes to see who the visitors are. All filmed. Cameras aimed at the Gharib house are also placed at the neighbors’ house beyond the fence.

    The neighbors are settlers. The settlement is Givon Hahadasha. “I don’t talk to them, they don’t talk to me,” Gharib says. About 3 meters separate the house from the fence. At a similar distance on the other side stand the neighbors’ villas. Their cars drive along the fence and park in its shade.

    Gharib hung a green sheet along the bottom part of the fence to obtain a semblance of privacy. Or the illusion of privacy. The setters’ villas are two or three stories high and are abundant with greenery. This past Wednesday a woman was watering plants on her balcony and explaining something to her son. “Tomer,” she called out to him. Three women came down the stairs outside another house and discussed something in Hebrew.

    “Sometimes I lift the green sheet,” says 10-year-old Sabri, “and look at the settlers’ children playing. I say ’Shalom’ to them.”

    The poverty of words. It’s hard to describe the labyrinths of fences, concrete and sunken roads cutting the area’s villages off from their groves and vineyards. It’s hard to describe the way from Ramallah to Beit Ijza – bypass routes and a kind of tunnel, built by Israel, as part of the network of roadblocks and restrictions on movement.

    All the land of the Palestinian region between Beitunia in the north via Nebi Samuel to Beit Iksa in the south have de facto been annexed to Israel. Now Palestinians are forbidden from entering it, aside from laborers who work in the Givat Ze’ev settlement bloc and the dwindling number of residents of two cut-off Palestinian communities, Nebi Samuel and al-Khalaila.Territorial contiguity is for Israelis only.

    Only a tour here and in all the other fenced-off enclaves and sub-enclaves of the West Bank – only actually seeing it – could make clear the reality of living in cages.

    Jerusalem. It’s 11 kilometers (7 miles) from Beit Ijza to the city to the southeast. Since the direct roads are blocked and due to the restrictions on movement, the few village residents who obtain entry permits to Israel must travel to the capital via the Qalandiyah checkpoint for about two hours. In each direction.

    Expulsion attempts. In a 2006 petition to the High Court of Justice on the route of the separation barrier being planned there, a Givon Hahadasha “communal settlement committee” demanded that the army expropriate the house, evict the family and pay them compensation – to ensure the settlers’ safety. The family refused.

    “Ever since Israel occupied the West Bank, Jews have been offering my father to sell the house,” Gharib says. “They even brought him a suitcase of money. He refused.”

    During some years, people hurled stones at the house, also a firebomb, he recalls. It’s the kind of testimony you hear in every West Bank village and neighborhood on whose land settlers built homes just beyond existing Palestinian homes. Envoys offer money and then raise their bid, and when the answer is no, the violent harassments begin – and with them bans on any additional construction.

    Arrests. Gharib, born in 1981, is the youngest of eight siblings; his father died in 2012. He remembers how, when he was a child, his father and older brothers would be in and out of prison because they challenged the settlers and the bans on entering the family’s land. Gharib himself spent three months in prison once for objecting to the construction of the separation barrier. His elderly father was sentenced to a month behind bars for the same offense, he said.

    Prehistory. The separation barrier in the West Bank was planned and built because of the second intifada. The fence at Beit Ijza turned the Gharib family home into a monitored fenced-in pocket after Israel confiscated two of the family’s plots of land.

    But before that there were confiscations for various excuses; the main one was that 167 dunams [41 acres] are registered as Jewish-owned. Jews stayed their briefly in the 1920s and left. After 1948 the land became Jordanian property.

    “We grew wheat and barley on it,” Gharib says. After 1967 the land was declared Israeli government property. A group of Gush Emunim settlers settled there and cleared the way for a secular villa community with some religious residents. The villas near the Gharib house were built after the Oslo Accords, he recalls.

    On the basis of that registration of Jewish ownership, the appeals committees of Israel’s Civil Administration and the High Court of Justice denied appeals and petitions by the head of the family, Sabri Gharib, but recognized his ownership of 24 dunams. Eventually, 10 more dunams were confiscated for the separation barrier. Four dunams had been allocated years earlier for a water tower for the settlement.

    Water. When the fence and security road were built, the pipe that led water to the family’s house was severed. Now a narrow black rubber hose stretches along the fence from the imprisoned house to the brothers’ house.

    In the summer, when the demand for water increases, the pressure in the hose is low and the water doesn’t arrive. This is worsened by the house’s position on relatively high ground. Gharib has been forced to buy water from containers. Instead of 5 shekels ($1.41) per cubic meter he pays 20 shekels. The settlers’ full water tower overlooks the house 6 meters away.

    Proportionality. This is how Supreme Court President Aharon Barak justified the go-ahead he gave the army to surround the family’s house with a fence, destroy part of its groves for the separation barrier and block the family’s direct access to the groves. Access to the groves, he ruled, would be permitted through gates in the separation barrier.

    Twice a year. If this is what Barak meant it’s impossible to say. But the residents of Biddu, Beit Ijza and Beit Duqqu may go to their lands only for a few days twice a year, three at the most: at plowing, grape harvesting and olive picking. The two locked gates are set in a barbed-wire fence beside the security road winding through their land.

    “This year they wouldn’t let us harvest the grapes,” a Biddu resident said Tuesday, waiting for the Border Police to open the gate. This season the gates are opened for eight days over two weeks. At the end of week, on Friday, Saturday and Sunday, they are closed. People like Sa’adat Gharib are forced to miss work in order to pick their olives.

    Sumud – steadfastness. “My son Sabri didn’t know his grandfather Sabri,” Gharib says. “But he knows we’ll never leave the house and never give it and our land up.”

  • Saudi Arabia recognizes its weakness and is ready to talk to the Iranian foe - Iran - Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/.premium-saudi-arabia-recognizes-its-weakness-and-is-ready-to-talk-to-the-i

    Avec les dirigeants irakiens comme intermédiaires

    Saudi Arabia has no illusions that Iraq can or would agree to disengage from Iran and force Tehran to withdraw its forces. Iraq and Iran do $12 billion in trade annually; Iraq is dependent on Iranian gas and electricity and there is the Shi’ite religious connection between the two countries.

    But it looks that Saudi Arabia realizes that in the struggle for regional hegemony it doesn’t have the upper hand, so it’s adopting a new strategy of trying to win influence and access to balance the Iranians. As part of this strategy, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in an interview with CBS, said for the first time that the problems with Iran and the question of safe passage in the Persian Gulf can’t be resolved militarily.

    These remarks, which were applauded in Iran, aren’t the result of some celestial enlightenment that descended on the crown prince. The attack on the oil installations embarrassingly proved Saudi Arabia’s military weakness and vulnerability.

    #Iran #Arabie_saoudite #moyen-orient

  • Liberal Zionists, face the facts: There’s already only one state from the river to the sea - Middle East News - Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-face-the-facts-there-s-already-only-one-state-from-the-river-to-th

    It [Liberal Zionism] [...] opposes the #occupation, at least rhetorically, but also opposes offering Palestinians in the West Bank Israeli citizenship or offering refugees any right of return today, both of which it equates with Israel’s “#destruction.”

    There is a lot of slippery language used when discussing alleged “destruction.” What does it really mean?

    Sometimes the word is used to refer to those who genuinely seek to incite or inflict violence on Israeli Jews. Other times “destruction” refers to the alleged threat posed by the “right of return,” the claim of Palestinian refugees – expelled by Israel or those who fled the war – to return to their homes, or the homes of their parents or grandparents. And yet other times the word “destruction” refers to any demand for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, or for equal rights now for Palestinians living in the West Bank.

    All of this is conflated into a vague notion of “destroying Israel,” with implications of mass slaughter or the full-scale expulsion of Israeli Jews.

    Much of this discourse of “destruction” obscures key problematic assumptions, of which the most critical is this: There is today one state from the river to the sea.

    #sionisme #Palestine

    • Those who argue that Palestinians in the West Bank must not be enfranchised because Israel would then fail to have a Jewish majority – or that granting the disenfranchised Arabs equality would threaten the currently empowered Jews either politically or physically – are essentially making the argument for #apartheid. (In fact, defenders of South African apartheid literally made this case, that they feared violence should the black majority be enfranchised.)

      Indeed, when Israel’s Education Minister recently backed “extend[ing] Israeli sovereignty to all of Judea and Samaria,” but Palestinians there “won’t have a right to vote,” he was asked if that didn’t constitute apartheid. Rafi Peretz didn’t rule out the option that yes, it is.

      Those comments received minimal pushback by liberal Zionists. That’s astonishing.

      Israel’s education minister: [...] Palestinians ’shouldn’t vote’ - Israel News - Haaretz.com
      https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-gay-conversion-therapy-is-possible-and-i-did-it-israel-s-education

      Asked whether this does not constitute apartheid, Peretz didn’t rule out the option that it is.

  • ’Palestinian Authority is tyrannical’: Joint Gaza, West Bank conference amps criticism of Abbas and Hamas

    At a recent confab, panel members and everyday Palestinians discuss democracy, with their openness only highlighting the obedience enforced on Fatah and PLO
    Amira Hass
    Jul 06, 2019

    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-joint-gaza-west-bank-conference-amps-criticism-of-abbas-and-hamas-

    A man with flowing white hair appeared on the large screen in the Red Crescent Society building in El Bireh in the West Bank. It was hard to catch the name of the man, who was speaking in the Red Crescent building in the Gaza Strip. The technique of video conferencing between Gaza and the West Bank, as the sole alternative to the forbidden hour-and-a-half trip, has improved greatly over the past 20 years – as the blockade has tightened on the coastal enclave and amid a drastic drop in the number of people authorized to leave it.

    >> Subscribe for just $1 now

    This is how the conference of the Masarat center for policy research and strategic studies was carried out without any technical disruptions. Each panel had speakers in El Bireh and Gaza, and at the end of every discussion, people in the audience could make comments, from both places. Two moderators ran the panels, one on each screen. But sometimes you could hear voices from the other hall, or the other microphone was left on and a few words that you were meant to hear got swallowed up – like the name of the man with the mane of white hair.

    >> Read more: The stories Haaretz prints that its readers won’t read | Opinion ■ Palestinian Authority to ’take practical steps’ to reduce dependency on Israeli economy, minister says ■ We don’t need a Palestinian personality cult | Opinion

    He voiced his comments after the discussion entitled “The Palestinian Authority: Between survival and collapse.” From the podium he said with great emotion: “We analyze and analyze the situation, but on the ground there is no change. The Palestinian people want democracy. I advise Masarat to organize a conference on building democracy in the Palestinian homeland. If there is no democracy, there is no point in anything. We must concentrate on building democracy, to stand against those who don’t want democracy, who control everything.”

    The pain could be heard in his voice. It was clear he didn’t distinguish between Hamas rule and Fatah rule when he said “those who don’t want democracy.” A few people in the hall on the screen applauded, but regrettably his time ran out.
    An anti-U.S. protest in Ramallah, June 2019.
    An anti-U.S. protest in Ramallah, June 2019.AFP

    The regular opinion polls by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, headed by Khalil Shikaki, include a question on the degree of fear to speak out against the two regimes. In a poll released this week, 40 percent of respondents in the West Bank answered that they could criticize the PA without fear, while 57 percent said they couldn’t. The latest figures for Gaza are 44 percent and 52 percent, respectively.

  • Oman attack: Iran is the immediate, but unlikely, suspect - Iran - Haaretz.com

    Oman attack: Iran is the immediate, but unlikely, suspect
    U.S. officials rushed to point to Tehran, but somehow the world’s leading intelligence services failed to discover who is actually behind the strike. And even if they knew, what could be done without risking all-out war?
    Zvi Bar’el | Jun. 14, 2019 | 8:36 AM | 3
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/.premium-oman-attack-iran-is-the-immediate-but-unlikely-suspect-1.7368134


    A unnamed senior U.S. Defense Department official was quick to tell CBS that Iran was “apparently” behind the Thursday attack on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, followed by State Secretary Mike Pompeo who later told reported that it was his government’s assessment. There’s nothing new about that, but neither is it a decisive proof.

    Who, then, struck the tankers? Whom does this strike serve and what can be done against such attacks?

    In all previous attacks in the Gulf in recent weeks Iran was naturally taken to be the immediate suspect. After all, Iran had threatened that if it could now sell its oil in the Gulf, other countries would not be able to ship oil through it; Tehran threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, and in any case it’s in the sights of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel. But this explanation is too easy.

    The Iranian regime is in the thrones of a major diplomatic struggle to persuade Europe and its allies, Russia and China, not to take the path of pulling out of the 2015 nuclear agreement. At the same time, Iran is sure that the United States is only looking for an excuse to attack it. Any violent initiative on Tehran’s part could only make things worse and bring it close to a military conflict, which it must avoid.

    Iran has announced it would scale back its commitments under the nuclear deal by expanding its low-level uranium enrichment and not transferring the remainder of its enriched uranium and heavy water to another country, as the agreement requires. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s reports reveal that it has indeed stepped up enrichment, but not in a way that could support a military nuclear program.

    It seems that alongside its diplomatic efforts, Iran prefers to threaten to harm the nuclear deal itself, responding to Washington with the same token, rather than escalate the situation to a military clash.

    Other possible suspects are the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, who continue to pound Saudi targets with medium-range missiles, as was the case last week with strikes on the Abha and Jizan airports, near the Yemeni border, which wounded 26 people. The Houthis have also fired missiles at Riyadh and hit targets in the Gulf. In response, Saudi Arabia launched a massive missile strike on Houthi-controlled areas in northern Yemen.

    The strike on the oil tankers may have been a response to the response, but if this is the case, it goes against Iran’s policy, which seeks to neutralize any pretexts for a military clash in the Gulf. The question, therefore, is whether Iran has full control over all the actions the Houthis take, and whether the aid it gives them commits them fully to its policies, or whether they see assaults on Saudi targets as a separate, local battle, cut off from Iran’s considerations.

    The Houthis have claimed responsibility for some of their actions in Saudi territory in the past, and at times even took the trouble of explaining the reasons behind this assault or the other. But not this time.

    Yemen also hosts large Al-Qaida cells and Islamic State outposts, with both groups having a running account with Saudi Arabia and apparently the capabilities to carry out strikes on vessels moving through the Gulf.

    In the absence of confirmed and reliable information on the source of the fire, we may meanwhile discount the possibility of a Saudi or American provocation at which Iran has hinted, but such things have happened before. However, we may also wonder why some of the most sophisticated intelligence services in the world are having so much trouble discovering who actually carried out these attacks.

    Thwarting such attacks with no precise intelligence is an almost impossible task, but even if the identity of those responsible for it is known, the question of how to respond to the threat would still arise.

    If it turns out that Iran initiated or even carried out these attacks, American and Saudi military forces could attack its Revolutionary Guards’ marine bases along the Gulf coast, block Iranian shipping in the Gulf and persuade European countries to withdraw from the nuclear deal, claiming that continuing relations with Iran would mean supporting terrorism in general, and maritime terrorism in particular.

    The concern is that such a military response would lead Iran to escalate its own and openly strike American and Saudi targets in the name of self-defense and protecting its sovereignty. In that case, a large-scale war would be inevitable. But there’s no certainty that U.S. President Donald Trump, who wants to extricate his forces from military involvement in the Middle East, truly seeks such a conflict, which could suck more and more American forces into this sensitive arena.

    An escape route from this scenario would require intensive mediation efforts between Iran and the United States, but therein lies one major difficulty – finding an authoritative mediator that could pressure both parties. Russia or China are not suitable candidates, and ties between Washington and the European Union are acrimonious.

    It seems that all sides would be satisfied if they could place responsibility for the attacks on the Houthis or other terror groups. That is not to say that the United States or Saudi Arabia have any magic solutions when it comes to the Houthis; far from it. The war in Yemen has been going on for five years now with no military resolution, and increased bombardment of concentrations of Houthi forces could only expand their efforts to show their strength. But the United States would pay none of the diplomatic or military price for assaults on the Houthis it would for a forceful violent response against Iran itself.

    If sporadic, small-scale attacks raise such complex dilemmas, one can perhaps dream of an all-out war with Iran, but it is enough to look at the chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan to grow extremely cautious of the trajectory in which such dreams become a nightmare that lasts for decades.❞
    #Oman #Iran
    https://seenthis.net/messages/786937

    • UPDATE 1-"Flying objects" damaged Japanese tanker during attack in Gulf of Oman
      Junko Fujita – June 14, 2019
      (Adds comments from company president)
      By Junko Fujita
      https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-tanker-japan-damage/update-1-flying-objects-damaged-japanese-tanker-during-attack-in-gulf-of-om

      TOKYO, June 14 (Reuters) - Two “flying objects” damaged a Japanese tanker owned by Kokuka Sangyo Co in an attack on Thursday in the Gulf of Oman, but there was no damage to the cargo of methanol, the company president said on Friday.

      The Kokuka Courageous is now sailing toward the port of Khor Fakkan in the United Arab Emirates, with the crew having returned to the ship after evacuating because of the incident, Kokuka President Yutaka Katada told a press conference. It was being escorted by the U.S. Navy, he said.

      “The crew told us something came flying at the ship, and they found a hole,” Katada said. “Then some crew witnessed the second shot.”

      Katada said there was no possibility that the ship, carrying 25,000 tons of methanol, was hit by a torpedo.

      The United States has blamed Iran for attacking the Kokuka Courageous and another tanker, the Norwegian-owned Front Altair, on Thursday, but Tehran has denied the allegations.

      The ship’s crew saw an Iranian military ship in the vicinity on Thursday night Japan time, Katada said.

      Katada said he did not believe Kokuka Courageous was targetted because it was owned by a Japanese firm. The tanker is registered in Panama and was flying a Panamanian flag, he said.

      “Unless very carefully examined, it would be hard to tell the tanker was operated or owned by Japanese,” he said. (...)

  • Un photojournaliste palestinien risque d’être expulsé loin de sa famille
    Amnesty International, le 23 mai 2019
    https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2019/05/israelopt-palestinian-photojournalist-at-imminent-risk-of-being-ripped-away

    Le photojournaliste palestinien Mustafa al Kharouf, qui risque une expulsion imminente qui serait contraire au droit international et le séparerait de sa femme et de son enfant, doit obtenir le statut de résident permanent à Jérusalem-Est, a déclaré Amnesty International jeudi 23 mai.

    Mustafa al Kharouf est détenu arbitrairement à la prison de Givon, à Ramla, dans le centre d’Israël, depuis le 22 janvier 2019. Son arrestation a eu lieu après que le ministère de l’Intérieur israélien a rejeté sa demande de regroupement familial, en invoquant des raisons de sécurité parmi lesquelles l’« appartenance au Hamas », et ordonné son expulsion immédiate vers la Jordanie, où il n’a aucun droit de résider et restera apatride.

    « La décision des autorités israéliennes de refuser la demande de statut de résident de Mustafa al Kharouf et de l’expulser sur la base d’accusations infondées est cruelle et illégale. Il doit être libéré immédiatement et obtenir le statut de résident permanent à Jérusalem-Est pour pouvoir reprendre une vie normale avec sa femme et son enfant, a déclaré Saleh Hijazi, directeur du Bureau d’Amnesty International à Jérusalem.

    « La détention arbitraire et l’expulsion prévue de Mustafa al Kharouf correspondent à la politique menée depuis longtemps par Israël, qui vise à réduire le nombre de résidents palestiniens à Jérusalem-Est, en faisant fi de leurs droits humains. »

    Alors que deux tribunaux israéliens ont déjà confirmé la décision d’expulsion, l’avocat de Mustafa al Kharouf a récemment déposé un recours devant la Cour suprême d’Israël afin d’annuler cette décision. La Cour suprême doit encore décider si elle examine son recours.

    « Les autorités israéliennes doivent respecter leurs obligations internationales et veiller à ce que Mustafa al Kharouf puisse rester chez lui en lui accordant le statut de résident permanent à Jérusalem-Est. La communauté internationale doit agir de toute urgence en faisant pression sur les autorités israéliennes pour qu’elles renoncent à l’expulser », a déclaré Saleh Hijazi.

    L’expulsion par Israël de Mustafa al Kharouf hors des territoires palestiniens occupés constituerait une grave violation de la Quatrième Convention de Genève et un crime de guerre au regard du Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale.

    Entre 1967 et fin 2018, Israël a révoqué le statut de résident de 14 643 Palestiniens de Jérusalem-Est.

    Complément d’information : Mustafa al Kharouf est un photojournaliste palestinien âgé de 32 ans, né d’une mère algérienne et d’un père palestinien de Jérusalem. Il vit à Jérusalem-Est occupée avec son épouse, Tamam al Kharouf, et sa fille Asia, âgée de 18 mois. Il a quitté l’Algérie à l’âge de 12 ans avec sa famille pour s’établir à Jérusalem-Est.

    #Palestine #Mustafa_al_Kharouf

    Sur ce sujet, une liste d’expulsions aux frontières israéliennes ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/364741

    #Expulsion #Frontière

  • Bahrain stresses commitment to Palestinian state after backlash over U.S.-led peace conference - Palestinians - Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/after-backlash-over-u-s-led-conference-bahrain-says-committed-to-palestinia

    The earlier English statement, however, made no mention of a Palestinian state, but mentioned Bahrain’s support for “the aspirations of the Palestinian people.”

    #dirigeants_arabes #indigents_arabes #sans_vergogne #médiocrité_abyssale

  • Le mouvement Hamas doit prendre garde !
    Abdel Bari Atwan - 9 mars 2019 – Raï al-Yaoum – Traduction : Chronique de Palestine – Lotfallah
    http://www.chroniquepalestine.com/le-mouvement-hamas-doit-prendre-garde

    Il existe effectivement un projet visant à déstabiliser Gaza, mais ce n’est pas une excuse pour frapper les manifestants.

    Il ne fait aucun doute que le mouvement Hamas a commis des erreurs à Gaza. Il a dirigé la bande de Gaza de manière partisane et sectaire, en faisant appel à ses loyalistes et en s’aliénant ses opposants, voire même ceux qui étaient neutres. Il s’est ainsi donné une longue ligne d’adversaires : cela commence à l’intérieur de Gaza avec les opposants locaux qui appartiennent au mouvement Fatah et certains groupes islamistes radicaux opposés au maintien du calme ; puis cela passe par Ramallah où l’Autorité palestinienne (AP) veut reprendre la mains sur la bande de Gaza à ses propres conditions, la principale étant de désarmer la résistance ; et cela se termine à Tel-Aviv, où l’État israélien d’occupation est de plus en plus inquiet de la résistance armée de Gaza, des missiles et des manifestations de masse.

    Malgré tous ces défis, rien ne peut justifier la façon très laide, insultante et brutale avec laquelle la police du Hamas a traité les manifestants alors que ceux-ci cherchaient à exprimer leur colère face à la dégradation des conditions de vie dans le territoire sous blocus. Ces manifestants utilisaient des moyens purement pacifiques pour protester contre les impôts et les taxes qui pèsent sur eux, l’inflation qui rendre la vie impossible et, plus important encore, le taux de chômage des jeunes de 60% ou plus qui les incite à prendre la mer et à risquer leur vie pour tenter de migrer.

    Le Hamas a raison de dire qu’il est confronté à un complot aux multiples facettes visant à remettre en cause son pouvoir à Gaza en déstabilisant le territoire et en le faisant exploser de l’intérieur. Le chef de l’Autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas, et ses assistants ne cachent pas leur intention d’atteindre cet objectif en multipliant les pressions sur les habitants de la bande de Gaza. C’est la raison pour laquelle ils ont largement rogné sur les salaires des fonctionnaires – y compris les partisans du Fatah -, forcé des milliers de personnes à prendre une retraite anticipée et cessé de payer la facture de carburant de la seule centrale électrique de la bande côtière. Israël – confronté à des missiles de plus en plus efficaces, des ballons et des cerfs-volants incendiaires, des Marches du retour et des dommages croissants à sa réputation internationale – est naturellement le principal comploteur.

    Chaque fois que j’appelais des parents ou des amis dans la bande de Gaza, quelle que soit leur conviction politique, ils se plaignaient de moments difficiles et de la difficulté à joindre les deux bouts. Mais tous, même les partisans du Fatah, étaient d’accord sur un point : le Hamas avait instauré la sécurité et mis fin à l’anarchie qui régnait avant sa prise du pouvoir par son célèbre coup de force de 2007. (...)

    • Hamas Crushes Protests at Cost to Its Popularity

      Even if demonstrators don’t dare protest again, the Hamas government has inflicted upon itself a powerful blow

      Amira Hass | Mar 19, 2019 12:08 PM
      https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-hamas-crushes-protests-at-cost-to-its-popularity-1.7039204

      For now it seems that the intimidation has done its job. The Hamas regime in Gaza succeeded in putting down the protests. But the immediate and cruel repression has managed to shock even those people who tend to take Hamas’ side in the conflict between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, or who see the Ramallah leadership as primarily responsible – after Israel, of course – for the Gaza residents’ enormous distress.

      Hamas proved last week the extent to which it fears popular criticism, which at first wasn’t necessarily ideological or political. There is a tendency to believe that the Hamas leadership is more attentive to the public than the Fatah leadership. The former was given a chance to confirm this belief and score some points even among those who are not their ideological supporters. That opportunity was squandered.

      In response to the suppression of the demonstrations and the detention of journalists (23 of whom were arrested, with three still detained as of Monday), journalists received a message this week to boycott the March of Return demonstrations this Friday and not to report on them. “This will be a test of the youth movement,” a Gazan woman told Haaretz. “If they don’t attend the demonstrations and leave them just to the Hamas people, it will be another way to show their strength and the strength of the protest.”

      Despite the high price they’ve exacted in lives and in the health of Gazan residents and the functioning of the Strip’s health system, the March of Return demonstrations were seen as an act that gave meaning to the residents cooped up in the Strip, and as a political achievement for Hamas, which had organized a protest that reached the ears of the entire world. Therefore the readiness – even if it’s only talk – to boycott them as an act of protest indicates that Hamas cannot count forever on its monopoly as the leading force of resistance against the occupation.

      Hamas has proven that it clings to its status as the ruling party in Gaza, just as Fatah is clinging to its status as the ruling party in the West Bank enclaves. Just as the PA organized artificial demonstrations of support for Mahmoud Abbas, so did Hamas fashion rallies for itself over the past few days in Gaza, while blocking the authentic demonstrations. On Sunday it exploited the shooting and knifing attack at the Ariel junction to bring its supporters out into the streets. What it denies its opponents, it permits its supporters.

      The youth movement that initiated the demonstrations promised on Sunday to revive them, but it didn’t happen. Nevertheless, those I spoke with gave the impression that there’s no fear of speaking openly about what’s happening and to share the reports with others. The way Hamas security personnel beat demonstrators could be seen from the few video clips that were distributed, despite the confiscation of journalists’ and others’ cell phones. They are reminiscent of the videos taken at demonstrations in Iran – with telephones that were half hidden under clothing or handbags, or from behind screens.

      The total number of people arrested and those freed is not known and it’s doubtful if anyone will manage to calculate it. Nor is it known how many people are still being detained in police stations now. The talk of torture in detention was very scary. There were reports that some regular participants in the Friday demonstrations were among those detained and tortured. These reports are yet to be verified.

      When journalists are not free and don’t dare investigate events properly, the Palestinian human rights organizations operating in Gaza become even more important, particularly the Independent Palestinian Human Rights Commission, (which acts as the ombudsman of the PA and of the de facto government in Gaza), the Palestinian Center for Human Rights and the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights. These are organizations that criticize the PA regime when necessary, and continuously document the Israeli violations of international law and human rights.

      During the wars and Israeli military attacks, their field investigators took risks to gather testimony and document the harshest of incidents. Shortly after the violent dispersal of the demonstrations in Gaza on Thursday, these organizations issued reports and condemnations – in Arabic and English – provided their counterpart organizations in Ramallah with regular information, and repeatedly sent out their people to take testimony.

      Here too the Hamas security apparatuses revealed their fear of the facts coming out; policemen attacked two senior officials of the Independent Palestinian Commission – Jamil Sarhan, director of the Gaza branch, and attorney Baker Turkmani. On Friday, in the context of their work, both of them were in the home of a journalist in the Dir al-Balah refugee camp, where the boldest demonstrations took place. Hamas policemen confiscated their cell phones and removed them from the house. When they were outside, in police custody, although their identities were known, other policemen beat them until they bled. Sarhan still suffers from a head wound.

      It didn’t stop there. Four researchers from three human rights organizations (the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, Al-Mezan and Al-Dameer) were arrested Saturday while collecting testimony and were taken for questioning. When the lawyer of the Palestinian Center went to the police to find out the reason for the arrests, he was also arrested. But the five were released a few hours later. These organizations and their people have proven in the past that they cannot be intimidated. So from Hamas’ perspective, the attempt to frighten them was foolish.

      It seems that the suppression of the demonstrations restored, if only for a short while, the emotional and ideological barrier that in the 1980s had separated the nationalist PLO groups and the Islamic organizations in the pre-Hamas era. The National and Islamic Forces, an umbrella body, convened Friday and called on Hamas to apologize to the public and release all the detainees.

      Hamas and Fatah have long refused to sit together at these meetings, at least at most of them, so this is an organization without teeth. But its importance as an umbrella body is that during times of crisis it brings together senior officials of various parties and movements, albeit not all of them, and provides some sort of platform for exchanging views and calming the situation when necessary.

      At this meeting, all the national organizations were present except for Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The absence of the latter is interesting; during past periods of tension between Hamas and Fatah, this small organization remained neutral and was a partner to the external efforts to reconcile between them. This time one could interpret their absence from the meeting as expressing support for Hamas’ repression – or as dependence on the large religious organization.

      Those who signed the meeting’s call for Hamas to apologize included the Popular Front, which is very close to Hamas when it comes to their criticism of the Oslo Accords and the PA. Although it has shrunk and no longer has prominent leaders or activists as in the past, it still benefits from its past glory, and its clear stance has symbolic value. Even if the demonstrators fear to return to protest for a lengthy period, the Hamas government has inflicted upon itself a powerful blow.

  • Israel’s release of Palestinian lawmaker lets her forget the larger prison for a moment
    In a festive meeting, Khalida Jarrar gave well-wishers a chance to celebrate her release from a small prison and temporarily shelve fears about an escalation of Israeli violence
    Amira Hass | Mar 09, 2019
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-release-of-palestinian-lawmaker-lets-her-forget-larger-prison-for-

    Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas called Khalida Jarrar at around 1 P.M. Sunday to congratulate her on her release from administrative detention – detention without trial – which had lasted 20 months. At his side was his intelligence chief, Majed Faraj, who was actually the first to congratulate her. She responded by congratulating Faraj for his recovery from an illness; he then gave the phone to Abbas, who said that he had “missed her.”

    This is a routine exchange of pleasantries, almost like the American ‘How are you?” – and Jarrar responded as is customary, saying “I missed you too, Abu Mazen,” using Abbas’ nickname. He told her that he and Faraj were on their way to Baghdad, to what official spokesmen would later define as an important meeting with the Iraqi government.

    According to reports on several websites, the last time Jarrar and Abbas met, at a meeting of Palestinian leaders in June 2017, she sharply criticized Abbas’ punitive policies toward Gaza. She also assailed the security coordination with Israel.

    There were even reports that Abbas was planning to block her participation in leadership meetings, which include the executive committee of the PLO, different factions in the (now formally dispersed) Palestinian Legislative Council and the heads of various organizations. A month later Israel’s Shin Bet security service and the army arrested her at home.

    This week, though, both Abbas and Jarrar sounded at ease during their brief exchange. Their conversation took place between Jarrar’s interview with a local TV station, a conversation with Haaretz, a phone call from a senior Fatah member inquiring about a good time to visit, and a short visit from an emotional and teary acquaintance who came to hug Jarrar not knowing there had already been a mass welcoming event.

    Based on experience, following a previous incarceration of Khalida and her release in June 2016, Khalida’s husband Ghassan knew that their house would be too small for all the well-wishers. Ahead of her release he rented a hall at Ramallah’s Catholic church for three days, six hours a day, beginning on the day of her release a week ago Thursday.

    Several thousand people showed up during those three days. People came in delegations and as individuals, from Hebron and Jerusalem, Jenin and Tul Karm, Haifa and Nazareth, from villages and refugee camps, young and old. There were people with or without political affiliations, people Jarrar knew and many she didn’t. There were celebrities and ordinary folk, former prisoners (“I’m on leave between arrests,” one of them joked), as well as probable future prisoners. Every Palestinian family has experienced a detention or a stint in an Israeli prison by one of its sons or daughters for the crime of opposing the Israeli occupation.

    Jarrar shook hands, hugged people, and talked in a relaxed manner with anyone who sat down beside her, as if that person were the only one in the hall. She had her photo taken with anyone requesting a selfie with her, and gave short interviews. Most of all, she laughed and smiled a lot.

    “For a long time we haven’t smiled so much or been in such a good mood,” wrote on Facebook a feminist activist who was among the people greeting Jarrar. As another woman put it, “How good it was to meet everyone, and for a change not at a mourning tent.”

    Collective depression

    The reception was an invitation to taste the flavor of “national unity,” to experience together a sweet moment inseparable from the constant sense of burden experienced alone and together, brought about by a life under foreign rule, a hostile and violent one. This was an opportunity to overcome, for three days, the collective feeling of depression and helplessness caused by internal political, economic and social fissures, setting aside for a short time fears about an escalation of violence by Israel. This was an opportunity to celebrate together a release from a small prison while ignoring for a moment the big cages.

    “I’m still confused, I think it will take me two or three months to get used to it,” Jarrar said. At home, too, she was all smiles, laughing with her guests. The laughter was contagious, coming from the heart. Ghassan was busy making coffee or tea, coming in with loaded trays, offering baklava and chocolates, insisting that guests eat, trying to make sure that Ajwa, the orange tabby cat, didn’t run out when the door opened for another guest.

    “How is Tamar?” Khalida wanted to know Saturday at the church hall, referring to Israeli lawyer Tamar Peleg.

    On Sunday she contacted the 93-year-old Peleg, who since the first intifada and until not very long ago represented hundreds of administrative detainees, including Ghassan Jarrar, Palestinians who were imprisoned by Israel without trial or indictment and with no assumption of innocence. “I won’t forget what you did for the detainees,” Khalida told her. “I think about you a lot and miss you.” This time the “miss you” wasn’t a pleasantry.

    Jarrar was first arrested in 1989 for participating in a demonstration on International Women’s Day, March 8. In April 2015 Jarrar was arrested at home and convicted, after a plea bargain, of membership in an illegal organization, of providing forbidden services, and of incitement. She received a 15-month sentence and was released in June 2016.

    A year later, in July 2017, soldiers again barged into her home in the middle of the night and arrested her – a member of the suspended Palestinian parliament, an elected representative in a faction named after Abu Ali Mustafa, the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine who was assassinated by Israel in August 2001. He was replaced by Ahmed Sa’adat, who was convicted of involvement in the assassination of far-right Israeli politician Rehavam Ze’evi in October 2001 and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

    When Jarrar was arrested, her interrogator had nothing to ask her; the military prosecution couldn’t even come up with allegations that would allow for a show trial. “I was arrested and don’t know why,” Jarrar said. “Actually, I know that it was for nothing, and that’s scary. Do they expect us to sit at home and say nothing?”

    Her father’s death

    During the two periods his wife was in prison, Ghassan would say that he bore his own detentions much better than he did Khalida’s. But now she was surprised by the question “did you feel the same way? Was it easier to bear your own imprisonment rather than that of Ghassan?” After a long reflection she said: “I now understand better how difficult prison is. It’s true that I worried about Ghassan when I was in prison, about how he manages alone at home.” Then she laughed her rolling laughter.

    The hardest experience in prison was her father Canaan’s death a month and a half after her arrest. That experience – the death of a loved one while you’re in prison – is one shared by thousands of Palestinians.

    Jarrar relates how one day she and the prisoners’ representative were called at 5 P.M. to the clinic at Sharon Prison. “I was puzzled. I didn’t have a clue. There was a team of wardens there, one of them Druze, who began by saying the usual words of consolation before telling me about my father, showing me a death certificate sent to the prison by Mahmoud” – attorney Mahmoud Hassan from the Addameer prisoner support rights group that Jarrar headed before being elected to the legislative council.

    She continued: “When I returned to my cell, they allowed a few female inmates from other cells to come and take part in my grief. The next day they let me talk by phone to my family, for 20 minutes.”

    Her father, who owned a toy store in the center of Nablus, was unwell. The day before her last arrest she visited him in the hospital. Her daughter Suha reminded her this week: “You brought him a pea dish you had cooked.”

    Suha asked her what change struck her most when she came out of prison. She immediately replied: the deterioration in the health of her mother, who can now barely walk. Here’s another collective Palestinian experience: Time in prison seems suspended, frozen, only to be rediscovered, once a person is freed, by parents who have aged and children who have grown.

    Despite the difficulties of prison life, Khalida took advantage of her time behind bars. She read and studied, but mainly encouraged other female prisoners and detainees to study, read and discuss human rights, women’s rights, prisoner rights, their status in society and discrimination.

    It is said that the tradition of studying and reading, practiced by Palestinian security prisoners in the past, has dwindled since the end of the 1990s. In recent years some prisoners have tried to revive it, and Jarrar joined the trend. Last year, on the eve of International Women’s Day, the government of Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah revoked several laws discriminating against women; this led her to initiate a celebratory discussion within prison walls. On March 8 they studied the achievements of International Women’s Day.

    The parliament Jarrar was elected to in 2006 was suspended most of its tenure, but some of the legislators, mainly belonging to small left-wing parties, including Jarrar, tried various ways to influence the public discourse about social issues such as the Palestinian Authority budget and women’s rights.

    In prison, Jarrar made good use of her former sociopolitical experiences. But in prison, she says, she became more closely familiar with social issues such as violence against women, a phenomenon that has driven some women to get arrested on purpose or attempt suicide by brandishing a knife in front of soldiers. “Prison isn’t where you belong or a solution for you,” she told those women. Women released from prison say she was always available, supporting and helping them during crises.

    Don’t say you don’t have an opinion,” she would say. She was happy to discover during her last detention term that one of these women, for example, has become more assertive and plans to run in local elections when she gets out of jail. “Living for a long time in close quarters with women from all walks of life and geographic areas, holding conversations with them,” Jarrar told Haaretz, further increased her understanding of “how much these women suffer” under occupation and in Palestinian society.

    #Khalida_Jarrar

  • The director who won’t take money from Israel but wants Israelis to see his films
    Yasmin Zaher - Feb 27, 2019 4:25 PM

    Kamal Aljafari was born in Ramle but works from Berlin. In a conversation with Haaretz, he explains how his work is about the place he left: ‘I use cinema as an act of reclamation’

    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-the-director-who-won-t-take-money-from-israel-but-wants-israelis-t

    When filmmaker Kamal Aljafari talks about Palestinian cinema and where it is going, he begins with an important clarification. “It’s becoming clear that Palestinian art and cinema is now coming from all over the world. We’re not talking about historic Palestine anymore.”

    Why the Palestinian art scene is increasingly being seen as an international movement has obvious political reasons related to the absence of a Palestinian state and the unresolved status of refugees. The majority of Palestinians today – over 6 million – live in the diaspora. But the case of Aljafari, who has Israeli-German citizenship, is different: It touches on the universal relationship between art and exile, and attests to an inability to create from within.

    Aljafari, 47, was born in Ramle, in “what Israelis call the Arab ghetto,” he tells Haaretz by phone. In 1998, after completing his studies at Hebrew University, he went to study film in Germany and has stayed there ever since. He lives and works in Berlin, but continues to visit Israeli regularly – because “my work is about the place that I left.”

    He says he simply couldn’t accept the conditions of his existence in Israel anymore. “I was fed up with being a second-class citizen. We come from there, but it is not our country anymore,” he says.

    Reality as sci-fi

    Two weeks ago, Aljafari premiered his new film, “It’s a Long Way From Amphioxus,” at the Berlin International Film Festival. Continuing his objective of “taking people from the margins” and making them the main focus, his 17-minute short was filmed in a West Berlin center for processing asylum seekers – one of the largest of its kind.

    The film presents dark, crowded scenes from the waiting room, with only the bright red numbers of the queue-management system shining brightly. In the film’s only moment of dialogue, a Syrian woman turns to a young man and asks him “What are they distributing here?” “Numbers,” he responds.
    (...)
    What we imagine for ourselves

    In his bio on the Berlinale website, the filmmaker is described as “Kamal Aljafari, born in Palestine in 1972.” In Germany, he says, he can be a Palestinian and not have to submit to a system that compromises his identity.

    “I couldn’t accept a situation where I was being renamed, to have to use another name that someone gave me,” he says. “It’s not about facts, it’s about what we imagine for ourselves – and I try to do the same in my films.”

    He reiterates that he is not talking about a national identity. “I’m talking about what it means to be a person from the margins – geographic margins, gender margins, whatever they are. It’s more natural for me to be an immigrant here [in Germany], where there are other immigrants. But I couldn’t accept being an immigrant in my own country. I needed to free myself. Saying ‘Born in Palestine in 1972’ is abstract, it’s poetic.”

    His films may be experimental but Aljafari is an extremely down-to-earth artist, able to soberly diagnose the challenges facing Palestinian filmmakers. “We are a fragmented, diasporic nation,” he reflects. “The problem of cinema is that it relies heavily on money. If you look at national cinema – in Europe, Asia or in Israel itself – there’s a state behind it. We are stateless, and this makes it a lot more difficult to gather the means to make films. History is written by the powerful, and as an oppressed people it’s harder for us to tell our stories.”

    The financing dilemma is especially pertinent for Palestinians in Israel. As Aljafari explains, “The Israeli state pours a lot of money into cinema, and it’s becoming more and more difficult to make critical films. They intervene in the content. We see this with the ‘loyalty law,’” he says, referring to the legislation that allows Israel’s Culture Ministry to withhold funding on political grounds.

    “Imagine a film fund asking German or French artists to declare loyalty to the German or French state,” Kamal continues, “It’s crazy. It’s against art.”

    There is also another obstacle, with this one coming from a surprising source. The boycott, divestment and sanctions movement makes no concessions for Palestinian citizens of Israel, and in theory applies the same regulations to them as it does to their Jewish-Israeli counterparts. It appears that disenfranchisement, in some cases, can be just as bad, if not worse, than statelessness.

    Aljafari, though, has a typically original take on the problem. “I want my films to be shown to Israeli audiences, but I’m just not interested in cooperating with Israeli government institutions,” he says. “The system didn’t grant me a place to live and create, so I chose to work outside it. I made the decision to never take money from the Israeli state a long time before BDS existed. It’s related to a personal decision to restore who I am.”

    https://vimeo.com/user8154531

  • Israel just admitted arming anti-Assad Syrian rebels. Big mistake - Middle East News
    Haaretz.com - Daniel J. Levy Jan 30, 2019 5:03 PM
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-israel-just-admitted-arming-anti-assad-syrian-rebels-big-mistake-1

    In his final days as the Israel Defense Forces’ Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot confirmed, on the record, that Israel had directly supported anti-Assad Syrian rebel factions in the Golan Heights by arming them.

    This revelation marks a direct break from Israel’s previous media policy on such matters. Until now, Israel has insisted it has only provided humanitarian aid to civilians (through field hospitals on the Golan Heights and in permanent healthcare facilities in northern Israel), and has consistently denied or refused to comment on any other assistance.

    In short, none other than Israel’s most (until recently) senior serving soldier has admitted that up until his statement, his country’s officially stated position on the Syrian civil war was built on the lie of non-intervention.

    As uncomfortable as this may initially seem, though, it is unsurprising. Israel has a long history of conducting unconventional warfare. That form of combat is defined by the U.S. government’s National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force in a denied area” in the pursuit of various security-related strategic objectives.

    While the United States and Iran are both practitioners of unconventional warfare par excellence, they primarily tend to do so with obvious and longer-term strategic allies, i.e. the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance fighters in Afghanistan, and various Shia militias in post-2003 Iraq.

    In contrast, Israel has always shown a remarkable willingness to form short-term tactical partnerships with forces and entities explicitly hostile to its very existence, as long as that alliance is able to offer some kind of security-related benefits.

    The best example of this is Israel’s decision to arm Tehran during the Iran-Iraq War, despite the Islamic Republic of Iran’s strong anti-Zionist rhetoric and foreign policy. During the 1980s, Iraq remained Jerusalem’s primary conventional (and arguably existential) military threat. Aiding Tehran to continue fighting an attritional war against Baghdad reduced the risk the latter posed against Israel.

    Similarly, throughout the civil war in Yemen in the 1960s, Israel covertly supported the royalist Houthi forces fighting Egyptian-backed republicans. Given Egypt’s very heavy military footprint in Yemen at the time (as many as a third of all Egyptian troops were deployed to the country during this period), Israelis reasoned that this military attrition would undermine their fighting capacity closer to home, which was arguably proven by Egypt’s lacklustre performance in the Six Day War.

    Although technically not unconventional warfare, Israel long and openly backed the South Lebanon Army, giving it years of experience in arming, training, and mentoring a partner indigenous force.

    More recently, though, Israel’s policy of supporting certain anti-Assad rebel groups remains consistent with past precedents of with whom and why it engages in unconventional warfare. Israel’s most pressing strategic concern and potential threat in Syria is an Iranian encroachment onto its northern border, either directly, or through an experienced and dangerous proxy such as Hezbollah, key to the Assad regime’s survival.

    For a number of reasons, Israel committing troops to overt large-scale operations in Syria to prevent this is simply unfeasible. To this end, identifying and subsequently supporting a local partner capable of helping Israel achieve this strategic goal is far more sensible, and realistic.

    Open source details of Israel’s project to support anti-Assad rebel groups are sparse, and have been since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.

    Reports of this first arose towards the end of 2014, and one described how United Nations officials had witnessed Syrian rebels transferring injured patients to Israel, as well as “IDF soldiers on the Israeli side handing over two boxes to armed Syrian opposition members on the Syrian side.” The same report also stated that UN observers said they saw “two IDF soldiers on the eastern side of the border fence opening the gate and letting two people enter Israel.”

    Since then, a steady stream of similar reports continued to detail Israeli contacts with the Syrian rebels, with the best being written and researched by Elizabeth Tsurkov. In February, 2014 she wrote an outstanding feature for War On The Rocks, where she identified Liwaa’ Fursan al-Jolan and Firqat Ahrar Nawa as two groups benefiting from Israeli support, named Iyad Moro as “Israel’s contact person in Beit Jann,” and stated that weaponry, munitions, and cash were Israel’s main form of military aid.

    She also describes how Israel has supported its allied groups in fighting local affiliates of Islamic State with drone strikes and high-precision missile attacks, strongly suggesting, in my view, the presence of embedded Israeli liaison officers of some kind.

    A 2017 report published by the United Nations describes how IDF personnel were observed passing supplies over the Syrian border to unidentified armed individuals approaching them with convoys of mules, and although Israel claims that these engagements were humanitarian in nature, this fails to explain the presence of weaponry amongst the unidentified individuals receiving supplies from them.

    Writing for Foreign Policy in September 2018, Tsurkov again detailed how Israel was supporting the Syrian rebel factions, stating that material support came in the form of “assault rifles, machine guns, mortar launchers and transport vehicles,” which were delivered “through three gates connecting the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to Syria - the same crossings Israel used to deliver humanitarian aid to residents of southern Syria suffering from years of civil war.” She also dates this support to have begun way back in 2013.

    The one part of Israel’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War which has been enthusiastically publicised, though, has been its ongoing humanitarian operations in the Golan. Dubbed “Operation Good Neighbor,” this was established in June 2016, and its stated aim is to “provide humanitarian aid to as many people as possible while maintaining Israel’s policy of non-involvement in the conflict.”

    Quite clearly, this is - at least in parts - a lie, as even since before its official commencement, Israel was seemingly engaging with and supporting various anti-Assad factions.

    Although Operation Good Neighbor patently did undertake significant humanitarian efforts in southern Syria for desperate Syrian civilians (including providing free medical treatment, infrastructure support, and civilian aid such as food and fuel), it has long been my personal belief that it was primarily a smokescreen for Israel’s covert unconventional warfare efforts in the country.

    Although it may be argued that deniability was initially necessary to protect Israel’s Syrian beneficiaries who could not be seen to be working with Jerusalem for any number of reasons (such as the likely detrimental impact this would have on their local reputation if not lives), this does not justify Israel’s outright lying on the subject. Instead, it could have mimicked the altogether more sensible approach of the British government towards United Kingdom Special Forces, which is simply to restate their position of not commenting, confirming, or denying any potentially relevant information or assertions.

    Israel is generous in its provision of humanitarian aid to the less fortunate, but I find it impossible to believe that its efforts in Syria were primarily guided by altruism when a strategic objective as important as preventing Iran and its proxies gaining a toehold on its northern border was at stake.

    Its timing is interesting and telling as well. Operation Good Neighbor was formally put in place just months after the Assad regime began its Russian-backed counter-offensive against the rebel factions, and ceased when the rebels were pushed out of southern Syria in September 2018.

    But it’s not as if that September there were no longer civilians who could benefit from Israeli humanitarian aid, but an absence of partners to whom Israel could feasibly directly dispatch arms and other supplies. Although Israel did participate in the rescue of a number of White Helmets, this was done in a relatively passive manner (allowing their convoy to drive to Jordan through Israeli territory), and also artfully avoided escalating any kind of conflict with the Assad’s forces and associated foreign allies.

    Popular opinion - both in Israel and amongst Diaspora Jews - was loud and clear about the ethical necessity of protecting Syrian civilians (especially from historically-resonant gas attacks). But it’s unlikely this pressure swung Israel to intervene in Syria. Israel already had a strong interest in keeping Iran and its proxies out southern Syria, and that would have remained the case, irrespective of gas attacks against civilians.

    Although Israel has gone to great lengths to conceal its efforts at unconventional warfare within the Syrian civil war, it need not have. Its activities are consistent with its previous efforts at promoting strategic objectives through sometimes unlikely, if not counter-intuitive, regional partners.

    Perhaps the reason why Eisenkot admitted that this support was taking place was because he knew that it could not be concealed forever, not least since the fall of the smokescreen provided by Operation Good Neighbor. But the manner in which Israel operated may have longer-term consequences.

    Israel is unlikely to change how it operates in the future, but may very well find future potential tactical partners less than willing to cooperate with it. In both southern Lebanon and now Syria, Israel’s former partners have found themselves exposed to dangers borne out of collaboration, and seemingly abandoned.

    With that kind of history and record, it is likely that unless they find themselves in desperate straits, future potential partners will think twice before accepting support from, and working with, Israel.

    For years, Israel has religiously adhered to the official party line that the country’s policy was non-intervention, and this has now been exposed as a lie. Such a loss of public credibility may significantly inhibit its abilities to conduct influence operations in the future.

    Daniel J. Levy is a graduate of the Universities of Leeds and Oxford, where his academic research focused on Iranian proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. He lives in the UK and is the Founding Director of The Ortakoy Security Group. Twitter: @danielhalevy

    #IsraelSyrie

  • Blackwater Founder Says US Troops In Syria Could Be Replaced By Private Contractors | Zero Hedge
    https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-01-15/blackwater-founder-says-us-troops-syria-could-be-replaced-private-contrac
    https://zh-prod-1cc738ca-7d3b-4a72-b792-20bd8d8fa069.storage.googleapis.com/s3fs-public/styles/max_650x650/public/2019-01/Erick+Prince%20Syria_0.jpg?itok=Su5mDM6R

    “American history is filled with public and private partnerships, of places that the private sector can fill those gaps, where a very expensive military probably shouldn’t be,” Prince said. “If there is not some kind of robust capability to defend from a ground invasions from the very conventional power that the Iranians and the Syrians have, our allies will be smashed,” he continued.

    Prince — the brother of billionaire Education Secretary Betsy DeVos — has over the past years since selling his mired-in-controversy Blackwater group (now Academi) begun a new mercenary empire in China called Frontier Services Group (FSG), in a market where Western firms of necessity find themselves working closely with Chinese state authorities. He’s reportedly had success in securing security and logistics contracts in Africa and China, and has since at least 2017 lobbied both top US generals and Congressional leaders to consider massive privatization of the now fast approaching two decade long quagmire in Afghanistan, from which Trump has recently vowed to extricate the United States.

    Infamous private paramilitary firm Blackwater planning comeback. First stop: Syria - U.S. News - Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/blackwater-looks-to-trump-for-a-comeback-in-syria-1.6850563

    Prince, however, is eyeing a major comeback by offering Trump a way to both safeguard U.S. allies in Syria while pulling out U.S. troops – a promise from his 2016 presidential campaign made all the more relevant by U.S. soldiers being killed by an ISIS bomb in Syria this week.

    “If there is not some kind of robust capability to defend from a ground invasion from the very conventional power that the Iranians and the Syrians have, our allies there will be smashed,” Prince told Fox Business this week.

  • » Israeli Soldiers Kill A Mentally Disabled Palestinian In Tulkarem– IMEMC News - December 4, 2018 10:25 AM
    http://imemc.org/article/israeli-soldiers-kill-a-palestinian-in-tulkarem

    Dozens of Israeli soldiers invaded, on Tuesday at dawn, Tulkarem refugee camp, and Tulkarem city, in northern West Bank, killed a mentally disabled Palestinian, and injured several others.

    Media sources said the soldiers killed Mohammad Husam Abdul-Latif Habali , 22, from Tulkarem city, and injured another young man, after shooting them with live fire.

    They added that the soldiers shot Mohammad, who was mentally disabled, from a very close range, and that he died almost instantly, from gunshot wounds to his head and limbs.

    The soldiers also injured several Palestinians with rubber-coated steel bullets, and caused many others to suffer the effects of teargas inhalation.

    #Palestine_assassinée

    • Un Palestinien tué lors d’un affrontement en Cisjordanie
      Par Reuters le 04.12.2018 à 11h59 - (Nidal al Moughrabi ; Danielle Rouquié pour le service français)
      https://www.challenges.fr/monde/un-palestinien-tue-lors-d-un-affrontement-en-cisjordanie_629915

      TOULKAREM, Cisjordanie (Reuters) - L’armée israélienne a tué un Palestinien lors d’un affrontement mardi en Cisjordanie occupée, ont annoncé les autorités palestiniennes.

      L’armée israélienne a déclaré que ses troupes avaient ouvert le feu au cours d’une « émeute violente ». Elle n’a pas fait état de victimes.

      Selon l’agence de presse officielle palestinienne Wafa, les forces israéliennes sont entrées dans la ville de Toulkarem et ont fouillé plusieurs habitations. Un attroupement s’est alors produit.

      Une porte-parole de l’armée israélienne a déclaré qu’alors que ses troupes opéraient, « une violente émeute a été déclenchée au cours de laquelle des dizaines de Palestiniens ont lancé des pierres ».

      « Les troupes ont répondu par des moyens de dispersion antiémeute et ensuite par des tirs à balles réelles », a déclaré la porte-parole.

      Un jeune homme de 22 ans a été tué après avoir reçu une balle dans la tête, ont annoncé des responsables des services de santé palestiniens. (...)

    • Israel Said a Palestinian Was Killed in Clashes. A Video Shows He Was Shot in the Back
      https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-video-shows-palestinian-shot-in-the-back-contradicting-israeli-acc

      While the army says Mohammad Khossam Khabali was shot during violent clashes, video shows him walking with friends on a main street

      A video of the fatal shooting of a Palestinian shows that he was shot in the back and contradicts the Israeli military’s claim that the incident occurred during violent clashes. The army has opened an investigation into the shooting, which occurred Tuesday in the West Bank city of Tul Karm.

      A video of the incident aired by a local television station shows Mohammad Khossam Khabali,a 23-year-old who used a cane to help him walk, shot in the back as he walks with a group of other people in the city in the early morning hours.

      The video also shows Khabali standing with a group of friends prior to the shooting at the entrance to a restaurant. Khabali was critically wounded and taken to the Tul Karem hospital, where he was pronounced dead

    • Israël a dit qu’un Palestinien avait été tué au cours d’affrontements. Une vidéo montre qu’on lui a tiré dans le dos
      11 décembre | Jack Khoury et Yaniv Kubovich pour Haaretz
      |Traduction J.Ch. pour l’AURDIP
      https://www.aurdip.org/israel-a-dit-qu-un-palestinien.html
      Alors que l’armée dit que Mohammad Khossam Khabali a été abattu au cours de violents affrontements, une vidéo le montre marchant dans une rue principale avec des amis.
      Une vidéo du tir mortel sur un Palestinien montre qu’on lui a tiré dans le dos et contredit l’armée israélienne qui prétend que l’incident est survenu au cours de violents affrontements. L’armée a ouvert une enquête sur ce tir, qui a eu lieu mardi à Tulkarem en Cisjordanie.
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=HjfzPgVtzwM


      Une vidéo de l’incident, diffusée par une station de télévision locale, montre Mohammad Khossam Khabali, 23 ans, qui utilisait une canne pour l’aider à marcher, frappé d’une balle dans le dos alors qu’il marche dans la ville au petit matin avec un groupe d’autre personnes.(...)

  • Botched Israeli operation in Gaza endangers human rights groups - Palestinians

    If it turns out that the IDF invented a fictitious aid group for the operation, from now on it can be expected that every real new organization will find it difficult to be trusted by the authorities and residents in the Gaza Strip

    Amira Hass
    Nov 25, 2018

    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-botched-israeli-operation-in-gaza-endangers-human-rights-groups-1.

    If members of the Israeli special operations force that Hamas exposed in the Gaza Strip this month indeed impersonated aid workers, as Walla news and the Israel Television News Company reported, it will reinforce and even retroactively justify Hamas’ longtime suspicions.
    Hamas has in the past claimed that, consciously or not, international humanitarian organizations assist Israel’s Shin Bet security service and the Israeli military.
    To really understand Israel and the Palestinians - subscribe to Haaretz
    This is exactly what the employees of foreign aid organizations, as well as Palestinian ones with some foreign staff, fear. A senior employee in one of these organizations told Haaretz that if Israel has abused the network of international or local aid groups, it could undermine the critical activities of organizations large and small: The Hamas government that controls the Gaza Strip might take precautions that will interfere with their entry into the Strip and their work.
    “No one will listen to the protest of a small organization on the exploitation of humanitarian activity,” he said. “Large organizations need to make their voices heard.”

    The bodies of four of the six men killed during an Israeli raid on Khan Younis in a hospital morgue in Gaza, on Sunday, November 11, 2018AFP
    Foreigners who entered the Gaza Strip last week reported more exacting questioning than usual at Hamas’ border control position and strict identity checks of passengers at checkpoints within the Strip.

    A Westerner who visits the Strip frequently told Haaretz they sense some suspicion on the part of ordinary Gazans toward foreigners — and not for the first time.
    What is interesting is that Palestinian media outlets did not publish the suspicions about the Israel special force impersonating aid workers: In other words, Hamas did not raise this claim publicly.
    According to versions heard in the Gaza Strip, the members of the unit carried forged Palestinian ID cards, presumably of Gazans, and said they had food distribution coupons. It also seems they spent a number of days in the Strip before they were exposed.
    Working for an aid organization is a logical and convenient cover story. As part of the strict limits on movement by Israel, foreigners and Palestinians who are not residents of the Strip, who work for international aid organizations (and foreign journalists) are among the few who receive entry permits into the Gaza Strip.

    Palestinian militants of Hamas’ military wing attend the funeral of seven Palestinians, killed during an Israeli special forces operation in the Gaza, in Khan Younis, on November 12, 2018.AFP
    Hamas senior official Moussa Abu Marzouk was quoted as hinting that the entry of the unit was made possible through a checkpoint of the Palestinian Authority, at the Erez border crossing.
    His statement fed the constant suspicions against the PA’s security services of cooperation and help for the Israeli security forces. But knowing how the official entry process into the Gaza Strip from Israel works raises doubts about the feasibility of this scenario.
    In addition to navigating the bureaucracy of Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories to obtain an entry permit from Israel, foreigners seeking to enter the Gaza Strip must also coordinate their travel in advance with the Hamas authorities.
    To enter officially through the Erez crossing, you must submit full identification details, including details on the purpose of the visit and the organization and identity of contact persons inside the Gaza Strip.
    >> How Hamas sold out Gaza for cash from Qatar and collaboration with Israel | Opinion
    The military unit’s entry through Erez would have required Israel to use the name of a well-known aid organization, which would not raise any suspicions. Did the Israel Defense Forces use the name of an organization such as UNRWA or an Italian aid group funded by the European Union, for example?
    And if it turns out that to carry out the mission, the IDF invented a fictitious aid group a long time ago, and in doing so received the help of COGAT, from now on it can be expected that every real new organization will find it difficult to be trusted by the authorities and residents in the Gaza Strip.
    Keep updated: Sign up to our newsletter
    Email* Sign up

    On entry to the Gaza Strip, those who receive permits go through four checkpoints: On the Israel side of the crossing, at the first registration position of the PA on the other side of the crossing, at the checkpoint of the PA police, which was once the Hamas checkpoint and was handed over to the PA about a year ago when it was attempted to establish a reconciliation government, and at the new registration position of Hamas, which has restarted operations these last few months.
    Even those bearing Palestinian identity cards — which according to reports the members of the unit carried — must pass through the posts of the PA and Hamas and answer questions. At the Hamas position, suitcases are not always checked, but a person who often enters the Gaza Strip told Haaretz that the check — even if only to search for alcohol — is always a risk to be taken into account.
    It is hard to believe that the members of the Israeli military unit would have entered Gaza without weapons, on one hand, or would have risked exposure, on the other, he said. 
    One gets the impression from media reports that Hamas and the IDF are both busy competing over who was humiliated more by the exposure of the unit’s operations. What is certain is that making humanitarian aid into a tool in the service of Israeli military intelligence contributes to the feeling of vulnerability and isolation of the Strip.

  • How Hamas sold out Gaza for cash from Qatar and collaboration with Israel

    Israel’s botched military incursion saved Hamas from the nightmare of being branded as ’sell-outs’. Now feted as resistance heroes, it won’t be long before Hamas’ betrayal of the Palestinian national movement is exposed again

    Muhammad Shehada
    Nov 22, 2018 7:04 PM

    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-how-hamas-sold-out-gaza-for-cash-from-qatar-and-collaboration-with

    Earlier this month, Hamas was confronted by one of its worst nightmares. The Palestinian mainstream began to brand Hamas with the same slurs that Hamas itself uses to delegitimize the Palestinian Authority. 
    "They sold us out!” Gazans began to whisper, after Hamas reached a limited set of understandings with Israel in early November. Its conditions required Hamas to distance Gazan protesters hundreds of meters away from the separation fence with Israel and actively prevent the weekly tire-burning and incendiary kite-flying associated with what have become weekly protests.
    In return for this calm, Israel allowed a restoration of the status quo ante – an inherently unstable and destabilizing situation that had led to the outbreak of popular rage in the first place. 

    Other “benefits” of the agreement included a meaningless expansion of the fishing zone for few months, restoring the heavily-restricted entry of relief aid and commercial merchandise to Gaza, instead of the full-on closure of previous months, and a tentative six-month supply of Qatari fuel and money to pay Hamas’ government employees. Basically, a return to square one. 
    skip - Qatari ambassador has stones thrown at him in Gaza
    Qatari ambassador has stones thrown at him in Gaza - דלג

    The disaffected whispers quickly became a popular current, which took overt form when the Qatari ambassador visited Gaza. He was met with angry cries of “collaborator,” as young Gazans threw stones at his vehicle after the ambassador was seen instructing a senior Hamas leader with the words: “We want calm today...we want calm.”
    Keep updated: Sign up to our newsletter

    Hamas leaders didn’t dare show their faces to the people for several days following, and the movement’s popular base had a very hard time arguing that the agreement with Israel - which offered no fundamental improvement of condition – and sweetened by Qatari cash wasn’t a complete sell-out by Hamas. 
    Inside Hamas, there was evident anxiety about public outrage, not least in the form of social media activism, using Arabic hashtags equivalents to #sell-outs. One typical message reads: “[Suddenly] burning tires have became ‘unhealthy’ and [approaching] the electronic fence is suicide! #sell-outs.”

    Social media is clearly less easy to police than street protests. Even so, there was a small protest by young Gazans in Khan Younis where this “sell-out” hashtag became a shouted slogan; the demonstrators accused Hamas of betrayal.
    But relief for Hamas was at hand – and it was Israel who handed the movement an easy victory on a gold plate last week. That was the botched operation by Israel thwarted by Hamas’ military wing, the al-Qassam brigade, which cost the life of a lieutenant colonel from an IDF elite unit.
    The ensuing retaliation for Israel’s incursion, led by the Islamic Jihad (prodded into action by Iran), who launched 400 improvised rockets into Israel, was intended to draw a bold red line of deterrence, signaling that the Israeli army cannot do as it pleases in Gaza. 
    For days after this last escalation, Hamas leaders rejoiced: that exhibition of muscle power proved their moral superiority over the “collaborationist” Palestinian Authority. Boasting about its heroic engagement in the last escalation, Hamas easily managed to silence its critics by showing that the “armed resistance” is still working actively to keep Gaza safe and victorious. Those are of course mostly nominal “victories.”

    But their campaign was effective in terms of changing the political atmosphere. Now that the apparatus of the Muqawama had “restored our dignity,” further criticism of Hamas’ political and administrative conduct in Gaza was delegitimized again. Criticism of Hamas became equivalent to undermining the overall Palestinian national struggle for liberation.

    Unsurprisingly that silenced the popular outrage about Hamas’ initial agreement of trading Gaza’s sacrifices over the last seven months for a meager supply of aid and money. The few who continued to accuse Hamas of selling out were promptly showered by footage of the resistance’s attacks on Israel, or reports about Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s resignation, for which Hamas claimed credit, coming as it did a day after a Hamas leader demanded he resigned. 
    Mission accomplished, a piece of cake. Now it was time for Hamas to return to business, strengthened by a renewed shield of resistance-immunity that branded criticism as betrayal.
    Although Hamas leaders have admitted the reality: no more fundamental cease-fire is being negotiated, and so no fundamental improvements for Gaza can be expected - it continues to sell Gazans the delusion that their decade of endurance is finally bearing fruit and soon, more prosperity, employment and hope will trickle down to the masses.
    What has actually trickled down so far are temporary and symbolic painkillers, not an actual end to Gaza’s pain.

    Hamas agreed to give a small share of the Qatari spoils to 50,000 poor Gazan families; $100 for each household. They agreed to creating temporary employment programs for 5,000 young university graduates with the aspirational title of Tomoh ("Ambition"). They promised to keep up the fight until Gaza is no longer unlivable, and Hamas leaders pledged with their honor to continue the Gaza Great Return March until the protests’ main goal - lifting the blockade - was achieved.
    But does that really mean anything when the protests are kept at hundreds of meters’ distance from the fence, essentially providing the “Gazan silence” Netanyahu wants? When no pressure is applied anymore on the Israeli government to create a sense of urgency for action to end the disastrous situation in Gaza? And when Hamas continues to avoid any compromises about administering the Gaza Strip to the PA in order to conclude a decade of Palestinian division, and consecutive failures?
    That Hamas is desperately avoiding war is indeed both notable and worthy, as well as its keenness to prevent further causalities amongst protesters, having already suffered 200 deaths and more than 20,000 wounded by the IDF. That genuine motivation though is mixed with more cynical ones – the protests are now politically more inconvenient for Hamas, and the casualty rate is becoming too expensive to sustain.
    Yet one must think, at what price is Hamas doing this? And for what purpose? If the price of Gaza’s sacrifices is solely to maintain Hamas’ rule, and the motive of working to alleviate pressure on Gaza is to consolidate its authority, then every Gazan has been sold out, and in broad daylight.

    Only if Hamas resumes the process of Palestinian reconciliation and a democratic process in Gaza would those actions be meaningful. Otherwise, demanding that the world accepts Hamas’ rule over Gaza as a fait accompli – while what a Hamas-controlled Gaza cannot achieve, most critically lifting the blockade, is a blunt betrayal of Palestinian martyrdom.
    It means compromising Palestinian statehood in return for creating an autonomous non-sovereign enclave in which Hamas could freely exercise its autocratic rule indefinitely over an immiserated and starving population.
    Which, according to PA President Mahmoud Abbas, is what Hamas has always wanted since rising to power in 2009: an interim Palestinian state in Gaza under permanent Hamas rule, not solving the wider conflict but rather obliterating in practice the prospect of a two state solution.
    It remains to be seen if the calls of “sell-outs” will return to Gaza’s social networks and streets, not least if Hamas’ obduracy and appetite for power end up selling out any prospect of a formally recognized State of Palestine.
    Muhammad Shehada is a writer and civil society activist from the Gaza Strip and a student of Development Studies at Lund University, Sweden. He was the PR officer for the Gaza office of the Euro-Med Monitor for Human Rights. Twitter: @muhammadshehad2

    Muhammad Shehada