Russia is using Syria to send hints to Erdogan that they can’t step on Moscow’s toes in Ukraine, but Turkey is not the only country getting such warnings
Last Thursday, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov had a “revelation.” Russia suddenly remembered that it is a partner to the diplomatic process in Syria, and in an impressive display of political consideration, Bogdanov declared that Russia sees the participation of the Syrian Kurds in the diplomatic process as an essential element in preventing separatism and building a unified Syria.
The Syrian Kurds, who maintain a de facto autonomy in northern Syria, have been courting Russia for a long time, primarily due to fears that U.S. forces will withdraw from Syria. Senior Russian officials have met with the leaders of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, but so far they have refrained from pressing for them to be included in the diplomatic process.
Moscow’s rationale was understandable. In Russia’s delicate relations with Turkey, any mention of the Syrian Kurds, who are labeled a terrorist organization by Ankara, in the same breath as a diplomatic solution causes Turkey to roil. Russian recognition of a Kurdish movement or organization as a legitimate component in negotiations over a new Syrian constitution, and thus to changes in the structure of the regime, will be seen by Turkey as recognition of a terrorist organization, and could undermine its ability to mount military operations against such a group.
But when Turkey sends military assistance to Ukraine, equips it with advanced combat UAVs, and sends its advisors to Kyiv, that is the time to remind the Turks that “Kyiv is here.” In other words, in Damascus and in Ankara as well. If Turkey proudly treads on Russia’s toes in Ukraine and displays support for Western policy, then the time has come for Russia to brandish a threat that will hit Turkey where it hurts.
A diplomatic solution in Syria is still a far off dream. The sixth rounds of talks held this month between representatives of the Syrian opposition and the Syrian regime, with the mediation of the United Nations envoy Geir Pedersen, ended with a laconic announcement about “optimism,” but with no results worthy of reporting. An ocean stands not only between the regime and the opposition, but between the ranks of the opposition itself.
The reports of an intention to change the composition of the opposition’s negotiating team and the structure of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, which convened in Doha, shows that the opposition still has a long way to go, and that Assad can remain calm. While Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad speaks of “amendments to the constitution passed in 2012,” the opposition demands a new constitution, equality in political status and the removal of Assad, as if nothing has changed in Syria since the beginning of the civil war 11 years ago. As if some Arab countries had not renewed their diplomatic ties with Damascus, as if European countries had not abandoned their opposition to Assad’s continued rule and as if Russia were willing to rid itself of the Syrian leader who will ensure their continued entrenchment in the country for decades.
Turkey is not the only country getting warnings about Syria to hint at involvement in Ukraine. In January, Russian jets posted at the Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia conducted a joint aerial patrol with the Syrian Air Force, in which they flew along the border of the Golan Heights. Israel was quick to touch base with its Russian contacts in Syria and Moscow, but the official Russian announcement was that the patrols would continue and would now become part of routine cooperation between the Syrian and Russian air forces. Two weeks earlier, a Russian general declared that Russia’s Tu-22MS bombers stationed at the base last May could strike any target across the Mediterranean Sea.
Russia is not yet preventing Israel from conducting airstrikes against Iranian targets, but the message was clear: If Israel plans to assist Ukraine with arms, Israel’s freedom of operation in Syria could be restricted, or even ended. Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Maria Zakharova reacted to recent Israeli strikes with strong words: “They are a crude violation of Syria’s sovereignty and may trigger a sharp escalation of tensions… such actions pose serious risks to international passenger flights.”
Israel issued a statement that it banned the transfer of arms it had sold to the Baltic states to Ukraine. The most recent attacks conducted by Israel in Syria may show that Russia has calmed down and that Israel does not intend to renounce the Syrian aerial arena in favor of assistance to Ukraine. To be on the safe side, Russia has announced that it has brought an advanced Lancet-3 kamikaze drone to conduct operations against terrorists in Syria. The use of drones by Russia is nothing new, but the range and weight of explosives that the Lancet-3 can carry will require extreme caution and further coordination with the Russian airbase.
Russia’s military messages to Israel are also directed at Washington, whose planes operate in northern Syria. In the past two years, there have been reports of a series of near-misses between American and Russian jets in the skies of Syria. In one incident, there was a report of a mutual engagement without any casualties. In the past, the saying was that the United States is a power that can fight one war on one front, and that when it finds itself on several fronts – such as in Afghanistan, Iraq and the war on ISIS – it starts to get lost. Russia, it transpires, is capable of managing several fronts in parallel. But this description is not entirely accurate. Russia is currently waging one battle: To restore its historic status. All the other fronts, such as Ukraine, Syria and Libya, are just beads on the same string.
