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    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • #Frontex wants to disembark refugees in Senegal

    #Hera“ is the only Frontex maritime mission on the territory of a third country. A new agreement might extend this joint border #surveillance.

    The EU border agency Frontex wants to bring back refugees picked up in the Atlantic Ocean to Senegal. The EU Commission should therefore negotiate a so-called #Status_Agreement with the government in Dakar. The proposal can be found in the annual report (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6294-2020-INIT/en/pdf) on the implementation of the Regulation for the surveillance of external sea borders (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0656). It regulates the maritime „operational cooperation“ of Frontex with third countries.

    It would be the first agreement of this kind with an African government. So far, Frontex has only concluded Status Agreements with a number of Western Balkan countries for the joint surveillance of land borders. The only operation to date in a third country (https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/25/frontex-expands-operations-in-eu-neighbouring-countries) was launched by the Border Agency in Albania a year ago.

    Frontex has been coordinating the joint operation „Hera“ in the Atlantic since 2006 (https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-hera-the-canary-islands-WpQlsc). The reason for the first and thus oldest EU border surveillance mission (http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-307-frontex-operation-hera.pdf) was the arrival of many thousands of refugees in boats on the Canary Islands via Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Senegal. For a short period of time, the German Federal Police had also participated in „Hera“ (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/16/098/1609888.pdf), in addition to Portugal, France, Italy, Finland and Luxembourg. Already in 2007 the arrivals decreased drastically. For the past year, Frontex’s „Migratory Map“ (https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map) records only 711 irregular arrivals (by December) on Gran Canaria, Tenerife and the other Spanish islands. According to media reports (https://www.laprovincia.es/canarias/2020/03/03/canarias-supera-1200-personas-llegadas/1260792.html), this number has been nearly doubled in the first two months of 2020 alone.

    „Hera“ is the only maritime mission in which Frontex coordinates an operation which, with Senegal, also takes place in the 12-mile zone, the exclusive economic zone and the airspace of a third country. In „Themis“, „Indalo“ and „Poseidon“, the operational plan only covers waters under the jurisdiction and monitoring of EU Member States.

    Currently, „Hera“ is operated by Spain as the „host state“ with support from Portugal. The two countries patrol with frigates and smaller ships and carry out aerial surveillance with a helicopter. They first transmit their information to a control centre in Las Palmas, to which Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal have sent liaison officers. Processed intelligence is then forwarded to the International Coordination Centre (ICC) in Madrid, which manages all operations of the Spanish border authorities and is also responsible for cooperation with Frontex.

    If suspicious boats are detected in the area of operations in „Hera“, a report is made to the competent Maritime Rescue Operations Centre (MRCC). All those picked up in the Spanish Search and Rescue zone have been able to disembark in the Canary Islands in recent years.

    If the refugees are still in the Senegalese #SAR zone, the national coast guard brings them back to the West African country. With a Status Agreement, Frontex assets could do the same. According to SAR Info, a Canadian information platform, the Senegalese national #MRCC (https://sarcontacts.info/countries/senegal) is also responsible for the rescue coordination off the coast of Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania.

    Before each operation, Frontex is required to assess the possible disembarkation of intercepted refugees in the third countries concerned. In the report for 2018, Leggeri writes that his agency, with the „host states“ of the missions „Themis“ (Italy) and „Indalo“ (Spain), considered such disembarkations to Libya and Tunisia as well as to Morocco to be incompatible with regulations to which Frontex is bound.

    From Frontex’s point of view, however, disembarkations would be possible for Turkey and Senegal, as the governments there do not violate basic fundamental and human rights and also adhere to the principle of non-refoulement, according to which refugees may not be returned to countries from which they have fled. So far, says Leggeri, Frontex and the EU Member States involved in „Poseidon“ and „Hera“ have not forced any persons to Turkey or Senegal.

    The report signed by Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri is as usual one year late, the paper published last week refers to 2018. That was the same year in which the European Union once again wanted to set up „regional disembarkation centres“ in North Africa (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4629). There, asylum applications of persons seeking protection would be examined even before they reach Europe. All the governments in question rejected the proposal, and the African Union also opposed it a year ago. Led by Egypt, the 55 member states criticise the planned EU facilities as „de facto detention centres“ (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/african-union-seeks-to-kill-eu-plan-to-process-migrants-in-africa).

    In the report, Leggeri complains that Frontex has too little competence in its four maritime missions. Bilateral agreements, such as those Italy has concluded with Libya (https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/italy-halt-abusive-migration-cooperation-libya) or Spain with Morocco (https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/21/inenglish/1550736538_089908.html), allow for much closer cooperation with North African coastguards.

    https://digit.site36.net/2020/03/01/frontex-wants-to-disembark-refugees-in-senegal
    #Sénégal #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #désembarquement #surveillance_frontalière #accord #accords #frontières

    Et pas mal de matériel sur seenthis autour de...
    #plateformes_de_désembarquement #disembarkation_paltforms #plateformes_de_débarquement #regional_disembarkation_platforms #Albanie #Océane_atlantique #Atlantique #Allemagne

    –-> voir notamment ici, dans la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765334

    ping @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

  • Turkey to open #Idlib border and allow Syrian refugees free passage to Europe

    Route out of northwestern Syria to be opened for 72 hours, officials tell MEE, after 33 Turkish troops killed in attack by pro-Assad forces.

    Turkey will open its southwestern border with Syria for 72 hours to allow Syrians fleeing the pro-government forces’ assault free passage to Europe, Turkish official sources have told Middle East Eye.

    The decision came after a security meeting chaired by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara late on Thursday after 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in Syria’s Idlib province.

    A senior Turkish official said on Thursday that Syrian refugees headed towards Europe would not be stopped either on land or by sea.

    The official said that Ankara would order police and border and sea patrols to stand down if they detected any Syrian refugees trying to cross into Europe.

    Groups of Syrian refugees and migrants from other countries began heading to Turkey’s borders with Greece and Bulgaria after the announcement was made.

    Various Turkish refugee groups have also organised buses for Syrian refugees intending to head to Turkey’s border with Europe.

    The governor of Hatay province said that Turkish soldiers were killed in a Syrian government attack in Idlib, a province where forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad have been staging an offensive against rebels since December.

    Since then, about a million civilians have been displaced towards the Turkish border - more than half of them children - and hundreds have been killed in the onslaught.
    Nato meeting

    Turkey blamed Thursday’s air strike on Syrian government forces, who are backed by Russia.

    However, Russia’s defence ministry was cited by the RIA news agency on Friday as saying that the Turkish troops had been hit by artillery fire from Syrian government forces who were trying to repel an offensive by Turkish-backed rebel forces.

    Russia is sending two warships equipped with cruise missiles to the Mediterranean Sea towards the Syrian coast, the Interfax news agency cited Russia’s Black Sea fleet as saying on Friday.

    North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ambassadors were meeting in Brussels on Friday at Turkey’s request to hold consultations about developments in Syria, the alliance said.

    Under article four of Nato’s founding Washington Treaty, any ally can request consultations whenever, in their opinion, their territorial integrity, political independence or security are threatened.
    Migrants not allowed through

    Turkey’s Demiroren news agency said around 300 migrants, including women and children, had begun heading towards the borders between European Union countries Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey’s Edirne province at around midnight on Thursday.

    Syrians, Iranians, Iraqis, Pakistanis and Moroccans were among those in the group, it said.

    It said migrants had also gathered in the western Turkish coastal district of Ayvacik in Canakkale province with the aim of travelling by boat to the Greek island of Lesbos.

    Video footage of the migrants broadcast by pro-government Turkish television channels could also not immediately be verified.

    Turkish broadcaster NTV showed scores of people walking through fields wearing backpacks and said the refugees had tried to cross the Kapikule border into Bulgaria, but were not allowed through.

    It said the same group of migrants had then walked through fields to reach the Pazarkule border crossing into Greece, but it was unclear what happened to them thereafter.

    Greece has tightened sea and land borders with Turkey after the overnight developments in Idlib, government sources told Reuters on Friday.

    The sources, who declined to be identified, said Athens was also in contact with the European Union and Nato on the matter.
    ’Turkey is currently hitting all known regime targets’

    The Turkish soldiers’ deaths are the biggest number of fatalities suffered by Ankara’s forces in a single day since it began deploying thousands of troops into Idlib in recent weeks in a bid to halt the military push by Assad’s forces and their allies.

    The latest incident means a total of 46 Turkish security personnel have been killed this month in Idlib.

    Fahrettin Altun, Erdogan’s communications director, said in a written statement that the Turkish government had decided in the meeting to retaliate against Assad’s forces by land and by air.

    “Turkey is currently hitting all known regime targets. What happened in Rwanda and Bosnia cannot be allowed to be repeated in Idlib,” he said.

    Attacks on Turkish forces have caused severe tensions between the Syrian government’s key ally, Russia, and Turkey, which backs certain opposition groups in Idlib.

    Erdogan had vowed to launch a military operation to push back Syrian government forces if they did not retreat from a line of Turkish observations posts by the end of February.

    The nine-year war in Syria has devastated much of the country. An estimated half a million people have been killed and millions have been forced to live as refugees.

    Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, having taken in some 3.7 million Syrians.

    Erdogan has repeatedly threatened to open the gates for migrants to travel to Europe.

    If it did so, it would reverse a pledge Turkey made to the EU in 2016 and could draw western powers into the standoff over Idlib.

    https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-syrian-refugees-free-passage-europe-soldiers-killed-Idlib

    #turquie #frontières #ouverture_des_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Erdogan #bras_de_fer #Europe

    –-

    ajouté à la métaliste sur les refoulements dans l’Evros :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/914147

    • La #Grèce bloque des centaines de migrants à sa frontière avec la Turquie

      A la suite de la montée des tensions en Syrie, Ankara avait plus tôt affirmé que le pays « ne retiendrait pas » les migrants qui cherchent à rejoindre l’Europe. La Grèce a annoncé avoir renforcé ses patrouilles à la frontière.


      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/02/28/la-turquie-menace-d-ouvrir-la-porte-de-l-europe-aux-migrants_6031137_3210.ht

    • Greek police fire teargas on migrants at border with Turkey

      Greek police fired teargas toward migrants who were gathered on its border with Turkey and demanding entry on Saturday, as a crisis over Syria abruptly moved onto the European Union’s doorstep.

      The Greek government reiterated its promise to keep migrants out.

      “The government will do whatever it takes to protect its borders,” government spokesman Stelios Petsas told reporters, adding that in the past 24 hours Greek authorities had averted attempts by 4,000 people to cross.

      Live images from Greece’s Skai TV on the Turkish side of the northern land border at Kastanies showed Greek riot police firing teargas rounds at groups of migrants who were hurling stones and shouting obscenities.

      Media were not permitted to approach the Greek side of the border in the early morning, but the area smelled heavily of teargas, a Reuters witness said.

      A Turkish government official said late Thursday that Turkey will no longer contain the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers after an air strike on war-ravaged Idlib in Syria killed 33 Turkish soldiers earlier that day.

      Almost immediately, convoys of people appeared heading to the Greek land and sea borders on Friday.

      An estimated 3,000 people had gathered on the Turkish side of the border at Kastanies, according to a Greek government official. Kastanies lies just over 900 km (550 miles)north-east of Athens.

      Greece, which was a primary gateway for hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, has promised it will keep the migrants out.

      However, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Saturday that some 18,000 migrants had crossed borders from Turkey into Europe. Speaking in Istanbul, he did not immediately provide evidence for the number, but said it would rise.

      Greek police were keeping media about a kilometre away from the Kastanies border crossing, but the broader area, where the two countries are divided by a river, was more permeable.

      A group of Afghans with young children waded across fast-moving waters of the Evros river and took refuge in a small chapel. They crossed into Greece on Friday morning.

      “Today is good” said Shir Agha, 30 in broken English. “Before, Erdogan people, police problem,” he said. Their shoes were caked in mud. It had rained heavily the night before, and by early morning, temperatures were close to freezing.

      Greece had already said on Thursday it would tighten border controls to prevent coronavirus reaching its Aegean islands, where thousands of migrants are living in poor conditions.

      Nearly a million refugees and migrants crossed from Turkey to Greece’s islands in 2015, setting off a crisis over immigration in Europe, but that route all but closed after the European Union and Ankara agreed to stop the flow in March 2016.

      https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN20N0F6
      #Evros #région_de_l'Evros

    • ’Following last night’s announcement of Turkish plans to open the borders with Greece for 72 hours, a large number of people attempted to cross the Evros/Meriç border near the 11km-long fence in Kastanies.
      They were stopped and are now trapped in the buffer zone between the two countries, surrounded by Greek and Turkish armed forces. Tear gas and stun grenade were reportedly used to dispersed the crowds.
      Human Rights 360 and @ForensicArchi have obtained material from the ground, including proof of people being pushed back across the border from Greece to Turkey and are monitoring the situation.
      As night has fallen, these people fear their human rights will be violated further. We urge the European, Greek, and Turkish authorities to safeguard their rights and safety.


      https://twitter.com/rights360/status/1233468982788841479

    • ’Number of migrants leaving Turkey reaches 36,776’

      Migrants departing from Turkey via northwestern border province of #Edirne, says country’s interior minister.

      The number of migrants leaving Turkey via its northwestern border province of Edirne reached 36,776, the country’s interior minister said on Saturday.

      In a statement on Twitter, Suleyman Soylu said that the number was registered as of 9.02 p.m. local time (1802 GMT).

      Turkish officials announced Friday that they would no longer try to stop irregular migrants from reaching Europe.

      The decision was made as 34 Turkish soldiers were martyred at the hands of regime forces in Idlib, Syria. The Turkish soldiers are working to protect local civilians under a 2018 deal with Russia under which acts of aggression are prohibited in the region.

      Since then, thousands of irregular migrants have flocked to Edirne to make their way into Europe.

      Turkey already hosts some 3.7 million migrants from Syria alone, more than any other country in the world.

      It has repeatedly complained that Europe has failed to keep its promises to help migrants and stem further migrant waves.

      https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/number-of-migrants-leaving-turkey-reaches-36-776/1750216

    • Erdoğan says border will stay open as Greece tries to repel influx

      Turkish leader claims 18,000 people have crossed into EU but some are met with teargas.

      Thousands of migrants may be in no man’s land between Turkey and Greece after Ankara opened its western borders, sparking chaotic scenes as Greek troops attempted to prevent refugees from entering Europe en masse.

      Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, claimed 18,000 migrants had crossed the border, without immediately providing supporting evidence, but many appear to have been repelled by Greek border patrols firing teargas and stun grenades.

      Erdoğan has long threatened to allow refugees and migrants transit into the EU, with which Turkey signed an accord in 2016 to stem westward migration in return for financial aid.

      He stressed the frontier would remain open. “We will not close these doors in the coming period and this will continue,” he said in Istanbul on Saturday. “Why? The European Union needs to keep its promises. We are not obliged to look after and feed so many refugees. If you’re honest, if you’re sincere, then you need to share.”

      Erdoğan complained that funds transferred to Turkey from the EU to support refugees were arriving too slowly, saying he had asked Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, to send them directly to his government.

      But the policy shift appears to be intended to force the EU and Nato to support Ankara’s new military campaign in the north-western province of Idlib, Syria’s last rebel stronghold, where thousands of Turkish soldiers are supporting opposition forces facing an onslaught from regime forces backed by Russian air power.

      Erdoğan said Turkey could not handle a new wave of migration, in an apparent reference to the growing humanitarian crisis in Idlib.

      The Idlib offensive has pushed almost a million displaced civilians toward the Syrian-Turkish border, and hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians remain between advancing Syrian government forces backed by Russia and rebel fighters supported by Turkey.

      In the largest single loss of life to Turkish forces since their country became involved in the Syria conflict, at least 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an airstrike on Thursday night.

      After officials briefed on Friday that police, coastguard and border guards had been ordered to stand down, meaning passage to Europe would be no longer prevented, thousands of refugees and migrants made haste to Turkey’s borders with Greece and Bulgaria. Many travelled on buses provided by the Turkish state.

      They were met by Greek border patrols reportedly firing teargas and stun grenades. Some young migrants and refugees appeared to hurl rocks at the guards.

      “A titanic battle [is being waged] to keep our frontiers closed,” said Panayiotis Harelas, who heads the federation of border guards during an impromptu press conference at the scene.

      A 17-year-old Iranian who had made it into Greece overnight along with a group of friends told the Associated Press he had spent two months in Turkey and could not sustain himself there. “We learned the border was open and we headed there,” he said. “But we saw it was closed and we found a hole in the fence and went through it.”

      Greek authorities said 52 ships were patrolling the seas around Lesbos, along with other Aegean isles, in an apparent show of force to deter clandestine voyages. Greece has also bolstered its eastern land border, while Bulgaria has sent an extra 1,000 troops to its border with Turkey.

      A Greek government spokesperson, Stelios Petsas, said after an emergency meeting of ministers that security forces had repelled “more than 4,000 illegal entries”. Sixty-six people had been arrested after making their way through forest land into the country, none of whom were believed to hail from Idlib, according to Petsas.

      On Saturday morning high winds on Lesbos were mostly preventing arrivals there, with just one boat containing 27 people from various African countries reported to have reached the island. Another 180 reached other Greek islands from Turkey between Friday morning and Saturday morning, according to the coastguard.

      There are more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, along with many others fleeing war and poverty in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Turkey’s borders to Europe were closed to migrants following a £5.2bn deal with the EU in 2016 after more than a million people crossed into Europe by foot.

      As that policy was effectively reversed, Erdoğan claimed that the number of people entering Europe from Turkey could rise to up to 30,000 on Saturday.

      He also said he had told Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, to end his support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria so that Turkey could more easily battle Assad’s forces.

      “We did not go [to Syria] because we were invited by [Assad],” he said. “We went there because we were invited by the people of Syria. We don’t intend to leave before the people of Syria [say] OK, this is done.”

      Syrian and Russian warplanes kept up airstrikes on the strategically important Idlib city of Saraqib on Saturday, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. There were reports that nine Assad-supporting Hezbollah forces were killed by Turkish smart missiles and drones.

      Russia’s foreign ministry said on Saturday that the two sides had agreed this week to reduce tensions on the ground in Idlib, though military action will continue, after Nato envoys held emergency talks at the request of Turkey, a member of the alliance.

      While urging de-escalation in Idlib, Nato offered no immediate assistance but said it would consider strengthening Ankara’s air defences.

      The UN secretary general, António Guterres, called for an immediate ceasefire and said the risk of ever greater escalation was growing by the hour, with civilians paying the gravest price.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/828209

    • Austria says it will stop any migrants trying to rush its border

      Austria will stop any migrants attempting to rush its border if measures to halt them in Greece and through the Balkans fail, conservative Interior Minister Karl Nehammer said on Sunday.

      Greek police fired tear gas to repel hundreds of stone-throwing migrants who tried to force their way across the border from Turkey on Sunday, with thousands more behind them after Ankara relaxed curbs on their movement. It was the second straight day of clashes.

      The rush echoes Europe’s migration crisis in 2015-2016, when Austria served as a corridor into Germany for hundreds of thousands of migrants who traveled through Greece and the Balkans. Austria also took in more than 1% of its population in asylum seekers in the process.

      “Hungary has assured us that it will protect its borders as best it can, like Croatia’s,” Nehammer told broadcaster ORF, referring to two of Austria’s neighbors. Migrants coming up through the Balkans would almost certainly have to pass through either of those countries before reaching Austria.

      “Should, despite that, people reach us then they must be stopped,” he said when asked what Austria would do.

      Nehammer’s boss, Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, built his career on a hard line on immigration, pledging to prevent a repeat of 2015’s influx. He governed in coalition with the far right from 2017 until last year, and is back in power with the Greens as a junior partner.

      When Kurz was foreign minister in 2016, Austria coordinated border restrictions in neighboring Balkan countries to stop migrants reaching it from Greece.

      Austria is prepared to do the same again if necessary, Kurz and Nehammer have indicated. Kurz is an outspoken critic of Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s government, a popular stance in his conservative Alpine country.

      Turkey said on Thursday it would let migrants cross its borders into Europe, despite a commitment to hold them in its territory under a 2016 deal with the European Union.

      Turkey’s turnabout came after an air strike killed 33 Turkish soldiers in Syria, and appeared to be an effort to press for more EU aid in tackling the refugee crisis from Syria’s civil war.

      “The second safety net, and here the Austrian security services have a lot of previous experience, is close cooperation and also support, whether that be financial, material or in terms of personnel, with countries along the (migrants’) escape route,” Nehammer said, referring to Balkan countries.

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-austria-idUSKBN20O2CS
      #route_des_Balkans #Autriche

    • Evros: Greek Army announces exercise with live ammunition on March 2

      Real ammunition will be used on Monday, March 2, 2020, across the Evros river, an announcement by the Greek Army said late on Sunday.

      The 4th Army Corps has announced military exercises with live ammunition at all border outposts at Kipoi and Kastanies where thousands of migrants and refugees have amassed. The broader area of the 24-hour exercise is where also all migrants crossings are in general.

      According to the announcement, guns, machine guns, rifles and pistols will be used during the military exercise with live ammunition.

      Listing the specific areas where the exercise will take place, the Army warns that “movement or stay of persons, trucks and animals during shooting hours is prohibited to avoid accidents.”

      “Non-exploded bullets that may be found, shod not me removed,” and the nearest police authorities should be immediately notified.”

      The timing of the military exercise and thus on a Greek holiday – Clean Monday – is peculiar, but it may serve rather the “internal consumption” and to scare off the migrants, comments news website tvxs.gr

      On Sunday, Greek special police forces and army fired warning shots during patrol in the Evros area in order to deter migrants trying to cross into the country.

      https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/03/02/greece-army-exercise-live-ammunition-mar2

      #armée #militarisation_des_frontières #armes #armes_à_feu

    • Greece Suspends Asylum as Turkey Opens Gates for Migrants

      Greece took a raft of tough measures Sunday as it tried to repel thousands of migrants amassed at its border with Turkey.

      It deployed major military forces to the border, seeking to fortify the area after Turkey allowed migrants to pass through to the European Union over the weekend. The Greek government also said it would suspend asylum applications for a month and summarily deport migrants entering illegally.

      The developments were increasing tensions between the two countries, leaving thousands of people exposed to winter weather and caught in an increasingly volatile situation.

      Neither move announced by Greece is permitted by European Union law, but the Greek government said it would request special dispensation from the bloc. International protocols on the protection of refugees, of which Greece is a signatory, also prohibit such policies.

      “Turkey, instead of curbing migrant and refugee smuggling networks, has become a smuggler itself,” the Greek government said in a statement.

      Military officials would not say how many additional troops were being deployed, but they confirmed that they were stepping up joint military and police operations along the border. Dozens of military vehicles were seen moving toward various outposts along Greece’s 120-mile boundary with Turkey.

      The fortification of the area came after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey confirmed on Saturday that he was opening Turkey’s border for migrants to enter Europe, saying that his country could no longer handle the huge numbers of people fleeing the war in Syria.

      Mr. Erdogan accused European leaders of failing to keep their promise to help Turkey bear the load of hosting 3.6 million Syrian refugees. And he demanded European support for his military operation against a Russian and Syrian offensive in northern Syria that has displaced at least a million Syrians, many of whom are now heading toward the Turkish border. The Turkish Army also suffered significant casualties last week in an airstrike in northwest Syria.

      The president of the European Council said he would visit the Greek-Turkish line on Tuesday with the Greek prime minister, and the European Union announced an urgent foreign ministers’ meeting sometime this week to deliberate on the crisis.

      Thousands of migrants languishing in Turkey were on the move this weekend after Mr. Erdogan said he would not stand in their way. Many dropped everything the moment they heard the border was opening and rushed by bus or taxi, fearing they might miss the chance to get across.

      The Greek government, alarmed at the unfolding migrant wave, said it had sent a warning through mass text messages to all international phone numbers in the area. “From the Hellenic Republic: Greece is increasing border security to level maximum,” the message said in English. “Do not attempt illegally to cross the border.”

      Many migrants went ahead anyway, and some succeeded. Many ended up clashing with the authorities in Greece as riot police officers with batons, shields and masks tried to block their path, sometimes firing tear gas.

      Turkey’s interior minister, Suleyman Soylu, wrote Sunday on Twitter that more than 76,000 people had left Turkey for Greece — a drastically inflated number, according to ground reports from both sides of the border.

      The United Nations estimated that about 15,000 people from several countries, including families with children, were on their way in Turkey to the northern land border with Greece.

      Hundreds of people crossed the Turkish border, either over farmland or the Evros River. Nearly 500 others arrived by boat on the islands near Turkey in the northeastern Aegean, creating small-scale scenes reminiscent of the 2015 crisis that paralyzed parts of Europe.

      The Greek government said it had thwarted nearly 10,000 crossing attempts in 24 hours and arrested 150 people over the weekend.

      But dozens of migrants in small groups could be seen scattered in the region’s villages. The Greek government claimed that those attempting to cross into Greece were all single men and that none were Syrians, but families and Syrians did manage to reach Greece.
      Image

      One man with his wife and small children took shelter in a church, trying to warm up and regroup after the arduous crossing.

      Another migrant, Kaniwar Ibrahim, a 26-year-old tailor from Kobane, Syria, said he had heard from friends that Mr. Erdogan was opening the borders to Europe, so he rushed north.

      Mr. Ibrahim, his face ashen and his lips blue from the cold, was planning his next move at the train station in Orestiada with three West Africans and a few Palestinian migrants who had crossed the border with him overnight.

      He had spent two terrible years in Turkey, he said, so he grabbed the chance to join relatives legally settled in Germany.

      On the Turkish side, where thousands were gathering and smugglers were flocking to offer rides, boats and other services, others were less fortunate, and the hazards of attempting the crossing were becoming clear.

      One migrant died from the cold overnight, according to other migrants, and others said they were badly beaten by Greek border guards or vigilantes — an assertion that the Greek government denied.

      Abdul Kareem al Mir, 23, from the city of Al Salamiyah in central Syria, reached Edirne, Turkey, near Greece, but he was already having second thoughts.

      “I’ve been stuck here for three days in the rain and cold,” he said in a series of messages. “I guess the promises and statements were just a lie.”

      https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/europe/greece-migrants-border-turkey.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimesworld

    • Greece freezes asylum applications from illegally entering migrants

      Greece will not accept for a month, beginning Sunday, any asylum applications from migrants entering the country illegally and, where possible, will immediately return them to the country they entered from, Greece’s government spokesman Stelios Petsas announced Sunday.

      The announcement was made at the conclusion of a cabinet meeting on national security.

      Greece will also ask the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, also known as Frontex, to engage in a rapid border intervention to protect Greece’s borders, which are also EU’s borders, Petsas said.

      The above decisions will be communicated to the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council so that Greece can benefit from temporary measures to face an emergency.

      Petsas said Turkey is violating its commitments from the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement and of becoming itself a trafficker instead of cracking down on them. He called the migrant movement “a sudden, massive, organized and coordinated pressure from population movements in its eastern, land and sea, borders.”

      Charles Michel, President of the European Council, tweeted a few minutes ago:

      “Support for Greek efforts to protect the European borders. Closely monitoring the situation on the ground. I will be visiting the Greek-Turkish border on Tuesday with @PrimeministerGR Mitsotakis.”


      http://www.ekathimerini.com/250097/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-freezes-asylum-applications-from-illegally-entering-migrants

      #procédure_d'asile

    • Griechenland setzt Asylrecht für einen Monat aus

      Der Lage an der griechisch-türkischen Grenze spitzt sich weiter zu: Nun kündigte der griechische Ministerpräsident an, dass sein Land für einen Monat keine neuen Anträge auf Asyl annehmen werde.

      https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlinge-griechenland-setzt-asylrecht-fuer-einen-monat-aus-a-14421c7e-80

    • Clashes as thousands gather at Turkish border to enter Greece

      EU border agency Frontex on high alert as Turkish president keeps crossings open.

      Migrants trying to reach Europe have clashed violently with Greek riot police as Turkey claimed more than 76,000 people were now heading for the EU as a result of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s decision to open the Turkish side of the border.

      Officers fired teargas at the migrants, some of whom threw stones and wielded metal bars as they sought to force their way into Greece at the normally quiet crossing in the north-eastern town of Kastanies.

      As the situation escalated, Turkey’s interior minister, Süleyman Soylu, fuelled the anxiety in Greece and Bulgaria, which also shares a border with Turkey, by tweeting on Sunday morning that 76,385 refugees had left his country through Edirne, a province bordering the two EU member states. He provided no evidence pto support the claim.

      The UN’s International Organization for Migration had said earlier in the day that at least 13,000 people had gathered by Saturday evening at the formal border crossing points at Pazarkule and İpsala, among others, in groups of between several dozen and more than 3,000. The majority were said to have been from Afghanistan.

      Greek police confirmed that at least 500 people had arrived by sea on the islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos near the Turkish coast within a few hours.

      The Greek government said on Sunday evening that it would suspend EU asylum law to implement summary deportations over the next month, a fix allowed within the treaties.

      Earlier in the day the government in Athens had sent a mass text message to all international numbers in the border region appealing for people to stay away. “From the Hellenic Republic: Greece is increasing border security to level maximum,” read the message in English. “Do not attempt illegally to cross the border.”

      The EU’s border protection agency, Frontex, said it was on high alert and had deployed extra support to Greece, as the country’s prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, held a meeting of his national security council.

      “We … have raised the alert level for all borders with Turkey to high,” a Frontex spokeswoman said. “We have received a request from Greece for additional support. We have already taken steps to redeploy to Greece technical equipment and additional officers.”

      The Greek government accused Turkey of orchestrating a “coordinated and mass” attempt to breach the country’s borders by encouraging thousands of asylum seekers to illegally cross them.

      Mitsotakis said he would visit the land border Greece shares with Turkey along the Evros river alongside Charles Michel, the European Council president, on Tuesday. “Once more, do not attempt to enter Greece illegally – you will be turned back,” Mitsotakis said after the national security council meeting.

      Along the north-eastern mainland border, some people waded across a shallow section of the Evros river to the Greek side. Witnesses said there were groups of up to 30, including an Afghan woman with a five-day-old infant.

      Erdoğan opened his western border after an airstrike on Thursday night in Syria’s Idlib province killed at least 33 Turkish soldiers recently deployed to support the Syrian opposition.

      The deaths came as fighting in north-west Syria between Turkish-backed rebels and Russian-backed Syrian government forces escalated, raising the risk of the two regional powers being brought into direct confrontation.

      The Turkish president had repeatedly said he would break his country’s deal with Brussels to prevent migrants entering the EU unless he received greater support from the 27 member states for his intervention in Syria.

      Erdoğan said in a speech on Saturday that he had no intention of rethinking his decision. “What did we say? If this continues, we will be forced to open the doors,” he told a meeting of the ruling Justice and Development party.

      “They did not believe what we said. What did we do yesterday? We opened our border. The number of people crossing the doors to Europe reached around 18,000 by Saturday morning, but today the number could reach 25 or even 30,000, and we will not close the passages during the period to come.”

      The EU has insisted it expects Ankara to abide by a €6bn (£5.2bn) deal signed in 2016, under which Turkey agreed to halt the flow of people to the EU in return for funds. Turkey hosts about 3.6 million refugees from Syria.

      The European council president, Charles Michel, spoke to Erdoğan on Saturday. “The EU is actively engaged to uphold the EU-Turkey statement and to support Greece and Bulgaria to protect the EU’s external borders,” he said in a statement.

      The Kremlin said on Sunday that it hoped Vladimir Putin and Erdoğan would hold talks in Moscow on Thursday or Friday. Istanbul police released Mahir Boztepe, the editor-in-chief of the Turkish edition of Sputnik, the Russian news website, on Sunday.

      Boztepe had been held for two hours as part of what the Ankara public prosecutor’s office said was an investigation into whether Sputnik had been involved in “degrading the Turkish people, the Turkish state, state institutions” and “disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the state”.

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/01/thousands-gather-at-turkish-border-to-cross-into-greece#maincontent

    • Migrants : Erdogan ouvre sa frontière, la Grèce la ferme

      Mécontent du manque de soutien de l’UE, le président turc a mis à exécution vendredi sa menace de laisser passer des réfugiés.

      « Yunanistan ! » C’est avec ce cri de ralliement, qui désigne la Grèce en turc, que plusieurs centaines de réfugiés se sont amassés dès vendredi matin le long du fleuve Evros qui marque la frontière terrestre entre la Grèce et la Turquie. Très vite, les autorités grecques ont fermé le principal point de passage situé à Kastanies, alors que le chef d’état-major des armées se précipitait sur place pour annoncer l’arrivée d’hélicoptères et de renforts militaires pour empêcher toute incursion massive. Les menaces d’Erdogan d’ouvrir les vannes des flux migratoires, qui lui permettent depuis cinq ans de souffler le chaud et le froid vis-à-vis de l’Europe, ont donc été mises à exécution. Furieux du peu de soutien de l’Occident après la perte de 33 soldats jeudi en Syrie, Erdogan a joué la pression sur le point faible de l’UE. Et un simple effet d’annonce a suffi pour ressusciter le spectre d’un remake de 2015, lorsque la Grèce, et l’Europe, avaient dû faire face à un afflux massif de réfugiés, considéré comme le plus important mouvement de population depuis 1945.
      Promesse

      Et pour Athènes, cette menace réactualisée ne pouvait tomber à un plus mauvais moment. Alors que la surpopulation des camps de réfugiés sur les îles grecques faisant face à la Turquie a déjà conduit à une situation explosive, cette semaine des affrontements d’une violence inédite ont eu lieu sur les îles de Lesbos et Chios. De véritables batailles rangées entre les forces de l’ordre et les populations locales, qui refusent la construction de nouveaux centres. Longtemps les habitants avaient pourtant fait preuve d’une générosité et d’une patience à toute épreuve. Mais l’inaction des autorités, qui ont laissé les camps se dégrader jusqu’à l’intolérable, et l’indifférence de l’Europe, qui a renié sa promesse de partager le fardeau migratoire, ont fini par provoquer la colère populaire sur les îles. Et c’est dans ce climat toxique que la Turquie fait soudain basculer le fragile dispositif censé contenir les réfugiés aux portes de l’Europe.

      En réalité, le deal conclu en 2016 entre Ankara et l’Union européenne avait dès le départ tout d’un marché de dupes, sacrifiant de facto la Grèce, chargée de jouer les zones tampons en confinant les nouveaux arrivants sur les îles. Or les flux n’ont jamais totalement cessé. Ils sont même repartis à la hausse en 2019, avec plus de 70 000 arrivées depuis les côtes turques, faisant à nouveau de la Grèce la principale porte d’entrée en Europe.

      En comparaison, les mouvements observés dans la journée de vendredi n’avaient rien d’impressionnant dans l’immédiat : quelques centaines de réfugiés regroupés le long de l’Evros, certes, mais seulement deux canots pneumatiques ont accosté dans la journée de vendredi dans le petit port de Skala Sikaminia, dans le nord de Lesbos. Le premier transportait une quinzaine de personnes, le second une cinquantaine. Alors que pour le seul mois de janvier, 3 136 réfugiés avaient débarqué à Lesbos.

      Mais le vrai sujet d’inquiétude est ailleurs. « Le problème, ce n’est pas seulement que la Turquie annonce qu’elle ne surveille plus ses frontières. Ce qui est plus grave, et totalement nouveau, c’est que les autorités turques semblent organiser et encadrer ces départs vers la Grèce », souligne un humanitaire joint à Athènes. Toute la journée de vendredi, les médias turcs ont ainsi relayé les images de réfugiés invités à monter dans des bus, mis spécialement à disposition pour eux, et qui les ont conduits de la périphérie d’Istanbul jusqu’à la frontière grecque. Au même moment, plusieurs chaînes de télévision, dont la version turque de CNN, filmaient d’autres réfugiés se rassemblant sur des plages pour grimper tranquillement dans un canot pneumatique en partance vers la Grèce, comme pour une banale balade en mer. « Du jamais-vu. En 2015, au moins, la Turquie prétendait ne pas voir et ne pas pouvoir contenir les flux en partance vers la Grèce », soulignait vendredi un internaute grec.
      Horizon

      Par ailleurs, la crise syrienne, qui sert de prétexte à la Turquie pour rompre le statu quo migratoire, a pour l’instant motivé non pas les innombrables réfugiés du pays qu’elle accueille à quitter son sol, mais en priorité des Afghans, à l’image de ceux arrivés en canots vendredi à Lesbos. Sur cette île, où se trouvent près de 20 000 réfugiés, nombreux sont ceux qui dans les prochains jours guetteront l’horizon avec inquiétude. Et d’ores et déjà, les habitants ont noté un fait révélateur : vendredi, Athènes comme Bruxelles sont restés très discrets. Comme si les deux principaux interlocuteurs d’Ankara étaient totalement tétanisés. Sans aucune stratégie face à un voisin pourtant notoirement imprévisible.

      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/02/28/migrants-erdogan-ouvre-sa-frontiere-la-grece-la-ferme_1780087

    • Schreie der Verzweiflung am Grenzzaun

      Rund 15.000 Migranten stehen am türkisch-griechischen Grenzübergang inzwischen den Polizisten gegenüber. Die griechischen Beamten treiben die Geflüchteten mit Tränengas zurück. Premier Mitsotakis bittet um Hilfe von Frontex.

      Die Migranten, die am Samstag durch die Straßen auf der griechischen Seite der Grenze zur Türkei laufen, haben es eilig. „Wir wollen nach Deutschland“, sagt eine Frau aus Algerien. Sie ist mit drei Männern unterwegs, in der Nacht haben sie den Evros überquert, der Fluss markiert die Grenze zwischen Türkei und EU. Ihre Kleidung ist noch nass. Jetzt haben sie Angst, von der griechischen Polizei oder dem Militär festgenommen zu werden. So wie 66 andere Geflüchtete, die es auf griechischen Boden geschafft hatten.

      Der Grenzposten Kastanies ist zum Mittelpunkt eines Kräfteringens zwischen Türkei und Griechenland geworden. Nach SPIEGEL-Informationen schätzen Behörden, dass inzwischen 15.000 Migranten in der Nähe ausharren. Am Samstag versuchten immer wieder Gruppen von Migranten den Grenzzaun zu überwinden, auf Videos sind ihre Schreie der Verzweiflung zu hören. Die griechische Polizei setzte Tränengas ein, um sie daran zu hindern. 4000 Grenzübertritte verhinderte sie nach eigenen Angaben.

      Einige Hundert Migranten wateten durch den Evros, um die griechische Seite zu erreichen. Andere waren in der Pufferzone zwischen dem türkischen und dem griechischen Grenzposten gefangen. Vor ihnen: Stacheldraht und griechische Grenzschützer.

      Der türkische Präsident Recep Tayyip Erdogan bekräftigte am Samstag in Istanbul noch einmal, was schon am Freitag offensichtlich war: „Wir haben die Tore geöffnet“, sagte er. Es ist das faktische Ende des Flüchtlingsdeals zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Türkei.

      Sein Land könne so viele Flüchtlinge nicht versorgen, sagte Erdogan. Außerdem habe Europa seine Versprechen gebrochen. Die Türkei spricht von 35.000 Migranten, die es bereits nach Europa geschafft hätten. Das ist wohl übertrieben, wahrscheinlich waren es bisher nur ein paar Hundert.

      Erdogan hatte die Anweisung am Donnerstagabend erteilt, nachdem bei Kämpfen in Idlib mindestens 36 türkische Soldaten gestorben waren. Im Syrienkrieg hat er sich in eine Sackgasse manövriert. Wenn er noch eine Chance haben will, die türkische Einflusszone im Norden Syriens zu sichern, braucht er nun amerikanische oder europäische Unterstützung.

      Dass die Europäer sich noch in den schon neun Jahre andauernden Bürgerkrieg einmischen wollen, ist unwahrscheinlich. Mit der Grenzöffnung versucht Erdogan nun, die EU zu Konzessionen zu zwingen.

      https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/tuerkei-schickt-fluechtlinge-nach-europa-schreie-der-verzweiflung-am-grenzza

    • Réfugiés : « La Turquie se sert des Syriens pour faire pression sur l’UE »

      La Turquie a annoncé vendredi qu’elle n’assurait plus le contrôle de ses frontières européennes, ajoutant qu’elle ne souhaitait pas accueillir davantage de réfugiés sur son territoire. Les télévisions turques ont filmé desmilliers de Syriens se mettant en route vers la Grèce. Face au chantage d’Ankara, l’UE craint une nouvelle crise migratoire, comme avant 2016.

      « La Turquie n’est plus en mesure de retenir les réfugiés souhaitant se rendre en Europe », a affirmé vendredi 28 février le porte-parole du Parti de la Justice et du Développement (AKP). Cette déclaration intervient dans un contexte particulier : la nuit précédente, 33 soldats turcs ont été tué dans le bombardement d’un bâtiment dans la région d’Idlib.

      Militairement présente dans cette région, la Turquie soutient les rebelles syriens, alors que Bachar Al-Assad tente de récupérer cet ultime bastion rebelle avec l’aide de la Russie. Ces dernières semaines, il a ainsi reconquis près de la moitié de la province, entraînant des mouvements de population qui tentaient de fuir les bombardements. Au total, depuis décembre 2019, l’offensive du régime de Damas a engendré le déplacement de plus de 900 000 Syriens.

      De son côté, la Turquie, qui accueille sur son territoire 3,6 millions de réfugiés syriens, maintient fermée sa frontière avec la Syrie. Ses frontières européennes, en revanche, ne sont désormais plus contrôlées. « Le pays ne souhaite pas accueillir davantage de réfugiés sur son territoire et, aucune sortie de conflit n’étant en vue à Idlib, elle ouvre ses frontières aux réfugiés et facilite leur passage vers l’UE, ce qui s’appelle du chantage », estime une chercheuse indépendante basée en Turquie, sous couvert d’anonymat.

      « La Turquie se sert de nouveau des Syriens pour faire pression sur l’UE », poursuit-elle. « Certains Syriens sont choqués d’être ainsi utilisés et disent qu’ils ne vont pas être manipulés par les Turcs, alors que d’autres saisissent cette opportunité pour fuir la Turquie où les conditions de vie sont de plus en plus précaires. » Depuis l’annonce d’Ankara, des centaines de réfugiés ont pris la direction de la Bulgarie et de la Grèce. « Beaucoup sont sur le départ, tout le monde veut tenter sa chance. Les gens se rendent à Edirne et dans les ports maritimes. Des bus gratuits sont mis à leur disposition et de plus en plus de bateaux partent. »

      “Ce ne sont pas tant les intérêts des réfugiés qui sont au cœur de la question, mais ceux de la Turquie, ou plutôt ceux de sa classe dirigeante.”

      Cette instrumentalisation de la question migratoire de la part de l’AKP n’est pas nouvelle. « Ce ne sont pas tant les intérêts des réfugiés qui sont au cœur de la question, mais ceux de la Turquie, ou plutôt ceux de sa classe dirigeante », explique Juliette Tolay, professeure de Sciences politiques à l’Université de Penn State Harrisburg. Elle ajoute que le Président turc Recep Tayyip Erdoğan menace régulièrement de rouvrir la frontières turque à des fins diverses : accélérer la libéralisation des visas pour les citoyens turcs, éviter toute critique sur le référendum constitutionnel de 2017 ou obtenir un soutien pour la création d’une zone de sécurité en Syrie.

      Dans un article du New York Times, Matina Stevis-Gridneff et Patrick Kingsley observent que les autorités locales ont acheté plusieurs milliers de billets, qu’elles ont aidé les réfugiés syriens à monter dans des autocars Mercedes et les ont conduits à la frontière. 

Tout cela a été filmé par les médias pro-gouvernement, précisent-ils, tandis que les chaînes de télévision ont retransmis en direct des scènes où l’on voit de familles se dirigeant vers les îles grecques, rappelant la crise de 2015.

      La situation évoque désormais celle précédant l’accord de 2016 entre l’UE et la Turquie, venant ainsi mettre unilatéralement fin à ce traité devenu moribond. Signé avec les 28 États membres de l’UE de l’époque, l’objectif de cet accord était de faire cesser l’arrivée quotidienne des migrants sur les îles grecques. Il prévoyait également, en échange d’un considérable soutien financier, le renvoi systématique de tous les migrants vers la Turquie. 

Le traité n’a pourtant pas empêché l’arrivée de migrants sur les îles de la mer Égée et, depuis cet été, le nombre de réfugiés est en hausse. Alors que les patrouilles turques étaient toujours présentes, certains chercheurs affirmaient que la Turquie laissait délibérément passer les réfugiés.

      Quelques heures après l’annonce de l’AKP, ce vendredi, des réfugiés tentant de se rendre en Grèce par voie terrestre se sont retrouvés coincés dans le no man’s land séparant les deux pays. Renforçant sa sécurité à la frontière de Kastanies, la police grecque a réprimé à coups de gaz lacrymogènes toute tentative de traversée. Le porte-parole du gouvernement Stelios Petsas a indiqué que la Grèce avait empêché 4000 migrants venant de Turquie d’entrer « illégalement » sur le territoire.

      Selon Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, depuis vendredi, 18 000 migrants auraient franchi les frontières de la Turquie pour se rendre en Europe.

      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Turquie-syriens-pression-UE

    • Réfugiés : catastrophe humanitaire en vue sur les frontières de la Grèce

      Depuis vendredi, des milliers de réfugiés tentent de passer la frontière terrestre entre la Turquie et la Grèce, avec le soutien d’Ankara qui joue cette carte pour faire pression sur l’Union européenne. Des réfugiés débarquent aussi sur les îles de la mer Égée, où la tension ne cesse de monter avec la population locale.

      Depuis que la Turquie a annoncé qu’elle n’était « plus en mesure de retenir les réfugiés souhaitant se rendre en Europe », vendredi 28 février, la Grèce est débordée à ses frontières. Au poste de Kastanies, dans la région de l’Evros (nord-est de la Grèce, sur la route d’Edirne), plus de 13 000 migrants sont arrivés durant le week-end depuis Istanbul pour tenter de passer. Un chiffre toutefois « gonflé » par la Turquie, qui utilise les réfugiés pour faire pression sur l’Union européenne. Des chaînes de télévision turques ont même diffusé des cartes du chemin à suivre pour se rendre en Europe...

      Vendredi, la Grèce a doublé ses patrouilles à la frontière terrestre et sur les îles de la mer Egée, face à la Turquie. Des drones ont été déployés à la frontière terrestre pour localiser les réfugiés et les avertir par haut-parleur que la frontière était fermée. Des SMS en anglais ont été envoyés sur tous les téléphones portables étrangers à la frontière : « Personne ne peut traverser les frontières grecques. Tous ceux qui tentent d’entrer illégalement sont dans les faits empêchés d’entrer ». L’agence européenne de contrôle des frontières Frontex a également annoncé avoir « redéployé de l’équipement technique et des agents supplémentaires en Grèce ».

      Les autorités grecques ont déclaré le lendemain avoir empêché « 9972 entrées illégales » dans la région de l’Evros, le long des 212 km de frontière terrestre avec la Turquie. « Personne ne venait d’Idlib, mais la plupart venaient d’Afghanistan, du Pakistan et de Somalie », ont précisé les autorités grecques, dénonçant le « chantage d’Ankara ».

      Dimanche, les autorités grecques ont annoncé avoir arrêté, dans la journée, 5500 migrants tentant de traverser illégalement la frontière. Depuis vendredi, des échauffourées ont lieu entre les forces de l’ordre et les migrants au poste-frontière de Kastanies, où des gaz lacrymogènes ont été tirés. Selon une source gouvernementale grecque, des gaz lacrymogènes auraient aussi été distribués par les autorités turques aux migrants pour les utiliser contre la police grecque. Le Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés de l’Onu (HCR) a appelé « au calme et au relâchement des tensions à la frontière ». Mais dimanche, la situation restait tendue : un policier grec a été blessé et transporté à l’hôpital.

      Sur les îles, la tension monte

      Sur les îles grecques, alors que la situation semblait calme vendredi et samedi, au moins 500 migrants ont débarqué dimanche, en raison d’une météo favorable, sur l’île de Lesbos et près de 200 à Chios et Samos, selon l’Agence de presse grecque ANA. Dimanche, les gardes-côtes turcs ne répondaient plus à l’appel de leurs homologues grecs et laissaient passer les embarcations. Alors que le camp de Moria accueille déjà 19 000 personnes dans des conditions sordides et que les habitants de Lesbos s’opposent à la construction de nouveaux camps fermés, la tension a augmenté. Un groupe de personnes a notamment empêché un canot chargé d’environ 50 migrants de descendre à terre en leur criant de rentrer chez eux. Certains insulaires en colère s’en sont également pris aux journalistes, à un représentant du HCR et à des membres d’ONG. D’autres habitants ont bloqué l’accès d’autocars transportant des demandeurs d’asile vers le camp de Moria.

      En rompant de facto l’accord signé avec l’UE en mars 2016 pour lequel elle a perçu six milliards d’euros, et en laissant passer les réfugiés en Europe, la Turquie cherche à obtenir de l’UE et des membres de l’Otan leur soutien dans ses opérations militaires en Syrie. Dimanche, Joseph Borrell, haut-représentant pour les Affaires étrangères européennes, a annoncé la tenue extraordinaire d’un conseil des ministres des Affaires étrangères pour répondre à l’urgence de la situation et soutenir la Grèce et la Bulgarie. Selon son communiqué, « l’accord UE-Turquie doit être maintenu ».

      La procédure d’asile provisoirement suspendue

      En attendant, le Conseil grec de sécurité nationale, convoqué dimanche soir par le Premier ministre, a décidé le renforcement maximal de la garde des frontières orientales, tant terrestres que maritimes. Les forces de l’ordre et l’armée se chargent de refouler les migrants « illégaux » qui essaient d’entrer sur le territoire.

      La procédure d’asile a par ailleurs été suspendue pour une durée d’un mois. Ce qui signifie que ceux qui entrent « illégalement » en Grèce ne pourront pas y déposer une demande d’asile. Ils seront immédiatement expulsés, si possible dans leur pays d’origine, sans procédure préalable d’identification.

      Athènes a également demandé à Frontex de déployer ses unités RABIT pour protéger les frontières du pays, qui sont aussi de frontières de l’UE. Cette décision sera communiqué au Conseil des ministres des Affaires étrangères de l’UE, où la Grèce demandera la mise en application de l’article 78 paragraphe 3 de la Convention européenne, afin que, dans le cadre de la solidarité entre les États membres, des mesures provisoires de protection du territoire soient prises pour faire face à l’urgence.

      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/La-Grece-debordee-par-l-arrivee-de-milliers-de-migrants

    • Réfugiés : la #Bulgarie envoie la gendarmerie à la frontière turque

      La Bulgarie a dépêché vendredi la gendarmerie à sa frontière terrestre et maritime avec la Turquie, le Premier ministre Boïko Borissov évoquant le « danger réel » d’une pression migratoire, suite à la menace d’Ankara de ne plus retenir les candidats au départ.

      La Bulgarie a dépêché vendredi la gendarmerie à sa frontière terrestre et maritime avec la Turquie, le Premier ministre Boïko Borissov évoquant le « danger réel » d’une pression migratoire, suite à la menace d’Ankara de ne plus retenir les candidats au départ.

      M. Borissov s’est notamment inquiété devant des journalistes « du retrait des garde-frontières turcs » et dit attendre un entretien téléphonique avec le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan. « Avec ce qui se passe, le danger est réel en ce moment : les gens fuient face aux missiles », a-t-il déclaré à Sofia, annonçant avoir déployé « tôt ce matin » des renforts.

      La Turquie accueille sur son territoire quelque 3,6 millions de Syriens ayant fui la guerre et craint l’arrivée de nouveaux réfugiés. Un haut responsable turc a assuré vendredi à l’AFP qu’Ankara n’empêchera plus ceux qui essaient de se rendre en Europe de franchir sa frontière, après la mort d’au moins 33 militaires turcs dans la région d’Idleb (nord-ouest de la Syrie) dans des frappes aériennes attribuées par Ankara au régime syrien.

      La Bulgarie partage 259 km de frontière terrestre clôturée avec la Turquie. Elle est membre de l’Union européenne (UE), mais pas de l’espace de libre circulation Schengen.

      En mars 2016, la Turquie et l’UE ont conclu un pacte migratoire qui a fait chuter drastiquement le nombre de passages vers l’Europe. Dans le passé, la Turquie a plusieurs fois menacé d’« ouvrir les portes » de l’Europe aux candidats à l’asile, les observateurs y voyant une manière de faire pression sur Bruxelles.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/280220/refugies-la-bulgarie-envoie-la-gendarmerie-la-frontiere-turque

    • Violations des droits humains à la frontière gréco-turque : l’Union européenne complice !

      Les expulsions d’exilé·e·s décidées par la Grèce, qui annonce vouloir les renvoyer non seulement vers la Turquie d’Erdogan mais même dans leur pays d’origine, sans aucun examen de leur situation et de leur besoin de protection, sont insupportables.

      La situation à la frontière gréco-turque est la conséquence de la politique de l’Union européenne fondée sur la fermeture des frontières, l’externalisation de l’asile et le marchandage avec des États sans scrupules.

      La xénophobie, le racisme et leur normalisation doivent être combattus partout où ils apparaissent, que ce soit en Turquie, en Grèce ou ailleurs. L’instrumentalisation de la vie des migrants, des demandeurs d’asile et des réfugiés réduite à une menace et à une monnaie d’échange doit cesser, tant dans les campagnes électorales nationales que dans les relations entre le gouvernement turc et l’UE.

      Les politiques de rejet qui poussent des milliers de personnes déjà déplacées dans les limbes et les régimes frontaliers qui provoquent le cycle sans fin de la violence à leur encontre doivent être abandonnées.

      Dans l’immédiat, les États membres doivent assurer la libre entrée des exilé·e·s nassé·e·s à la frontière grecque en attente de protection et de soins et l’UE doit cesser de mobiliser Frontex pour les refouler.

      Ce que nous exigeons, c’est la paix, les droits et libertés fondamentaux de chaque personne en déplacement.

      Les frontières tuent, ouvrez les frontières !
      Arrêtez la guerre contre les réfugié·e·s et les migrant·e·s !
      La solidarité transnationale contre le racisme et la guerre !
      Liberté de circulation et d’installation pour tou·te·s !

      Nous appelons à des rassemblements de protestation partout où ce sera possible, et à Paris ce lundi 2 mars à 18 heures devant la représentation de la Commission européenne, 288, boulevard Saint-Germain, métro Assemblée nationale.

      http://www.migreurop.org/article2957

    • Entre crispation et la solidarité, l’UE en ordre dispersé sur la situation des migrants à la frontière greco-turque

      Tandis que certains pays européens prennent leurs dispositions à la perspective d’un nouvel afflux de migrants, d’autres appellent à la solidarité européenne. L’agence européenne de garde-frontières, Frontex, a déployé des dizaines d’agents en Grèce et réfléchit à muscler davantage ses opérations, à la demande d’Athènes.

      « Après que nous avons ouvert les portes, les coups de téléphone se sont multipliés, ils nous disent ’fermez les portes’. Je leur ai dit : ’C’est fait, c’est fini. Les portes sont désormais ouvertes. Maintenant, vous allez prendre votre part du fardeau’. » Dans un discours prononcé lundi 2 mars à Ankara, le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan a sommé l’Europe de prendre ses responsabilités quant aux milliers de migrants massés à la frontière greco-turque depuis vendredi.

      En face, les réactions sont nombreuses, à commencer par la Grèce, première concernée, qui a envoyé l’armée à la frontière et a annoncé la suspension de toute demande d’asile, en vertu de l’article 78.3 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne. En invoquant ce texte, le Premier ministre grec Kyriakos Mitsotakis veut s’assurer d’avoir « le soutien total » des Vingt-sept.

      Celui-ci n’a pas tardé. Dès samedi, la commissaire européenne Ursula von der Leyen avait indiqué que l’Union européenne (UE) observait avec « préoccupation » l’afflux de migrants depuis la Turquie vers ses frontières orientales, en Grèce et en Bulgarie. « Notre première priorité à ce stade est de veiller à ce que la Grèce et la Bulgarie reçoivent notre plein soutien. Nous sommes prêts à fournir un appui supplémentaire, notamment par l’intermédiaire de Frontex (l’agence européenne de garde-frontières) aux frontières terrestres », avait-elle affirmé dans un tweet.

      https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1233828575029186567?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E12

      Dimanche, Frontex a répondu présent en déployant des renforts. « Nous (...) avons remonté le niveau d’alerte pour toutes les frontières avec la Turquie à ’élevé’ », a déclaré une porte-parole de l’agence européenne dans un communiqué. « Nous examinons d’autres moyens de soutenir les pays de l’UE frontaliers avec la Turquie », ajoute la porte-parole qui précise que l’agence suivait également de très près la situation à Chypre, un membre de l’UE dont la partie nord est contrôlée par la Turquie mais qui n’est pas reconnue par quiconque sauf Ankara.

      https://twitter.com/Frontex/status/1234075394619400193?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E12

      Actuellement, la plus grosse opération de Frontex se trouve dans les îles grecques avec 400 personnes sur le terrain, tandis qu’un petit groupe d’agents se trouve dans la région grecque d’Evros, à la frontière turque. Soixante agents sont également déployés en Bulgarie, selon Frontex.

      « Une menace à la stabilité de la région », selon la Bulgarie

      Bien que la frontière bulgare n’a connu aucun mouvement comparable à ceux en cours en Grèce, Sofia a pris les devant. Ainsi, le Premier ministre bulgare Boïko Borissov, dont le pays est voisin de la Turquie, doit rencontrer lundi à Ankara le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan pour discuter de l’aggravation de la situation à Idleb et de l’afflux de migrants aux portes de l’UE.

      Boïko Borissov a déjà prévenu qu’un nouvel afflux de migrants clandestin constituait, selon lui « une menace à la stabilité de la région » alors même que l’Europe « peine à gérer l’épidémie de coronavirus ». La Bulgarie entretient des relations diplomatiques et économiques privilégiées avec son voisin turc. Les deux pays partagent plus de 250 kilomètres de frontière le long de laquelle Sofia a fait installer depuis 2016 une clôture pour bloquer les migrants.

      https://twitter.com/BoykoBorissov/status/1232666456283844608?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E12

      La Bulgarie n’est pas la seule à avoir a fait un pas vers Ankara. Recep Tayyip Erdogan a indiqué, lundi, que des responsables européens - sans préciser lesquels - lui avaient proposé de se réunir avec lui pour un sommet « à quatre ou cinq » pays. Il a aussi déclaré avoir eu un entretien téléphonique avec la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel. L’Allemagne, de son côté, affirme que sa chancelière s’est entretenue avec son homologue bulgare et qu’ils ont convenu ensemble qu’il était nécessaire d’ouvrir le dialogue avec Ankara.

      Fidèle à ses positions conservatrices, l’Autriche a prévenu dès dimanche, par la voix de son ministre de l’Intérieur Karl Nehammer, qu’elle empêcherait tous les migrants clandestins d’entrer sur son territoire. Des déclarations qui font écho à celles prononcées en 2015 et 2016 au pic de la crise migratoire, lorsque l’Autriche servait principalement de pays de transit pour des milliers de migrants en provenance des Balkans qui souhaitaient atteindre l’Allemagne. « La Hongrie nous a assuré qu’elle ferait tout pour protéger ses frontières, tout comme la Croatie. Mais si des migrants arrivent quand même à passer, nous les stopperons », a expliqué Karl Nehammer qui se dit prêt à réinstaurer d’importants contrôles aux frontières comme ce fut le cas en 2015-2016.

      « La Hongrie n’ouvrira ou ne laissera passer personne », a déclaré pour sa part Gyorgy Bakondi, conseiller du Premier ministre nationaliste Viktor Orban. Des renforts policiers et militaires ont été envoyés aux frontières du pays qui avait vu, lui aussi, transiter des dizaines de milliers d’exilés en 2015-2016.

      Autre pays de transit, la Macédoine du nord qui voit le nombre de migrants à sa frontière en augmentation ces derniers mois, se dit prête à faire face à un nouvel afflux. Sa position est de demeurer « un pays de transit » en n’autorisant les migrants à rester sur le sol macédonien que 72 heures, a rappelé lundi le Premier ministre Oliver Spasovski. Se voulant rassurant, celui-ci affirme que la situation est sous contrôle et que la communication avec la Grèce à cet égard était fluide.

      https://denesen.mk/spasovski-nema-da-ima-nov-migrantski-bran-kje-prodolzi-dogovorot-pomegju-eu-

      « Nous devons agir ensemble pour éviter une crise humanitaire et migratoire », dit Paris

      Le président français Emmanuel Macron assure, de son côté, que « la France est prête à contribuer aux efforts européens pour prêter [à la Grèce et à la Bulgarie] une assistance rapide et protéger les frontières. » Et le dirigeant français d’appeler à la solidarité de tous : « Nous devons agir ensemble pour éviter une crise humanitaire et migratoire », a-t-il lancé dans un tweet.

      https://twitter.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1234233225700048900?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E12

      Même discours d’appel à la solidarité pour la Croatie, située sur la route migratoire des Balkans et qui a récemment pris pour six mois la présidence tournante de l’UE : « La Croatie se tient aux côtés de la Grèce et la Bulgarie pour protéger les frontières de l’Europe. Nous exprimons notre pleine solidarité et nous tenons prêts à intervenir si besoin », a déclaré le gouvernement croate sur Twitter.

      https://twitter.com/MVEP_hr/status/1234134767328747529?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E12

      Reste que l’UE n’a jamais réussi à parler d’une seule voix depuis le début de la crise migratoire en 2015. Bruxelles appelle à une réunion d’urgence des ministres européens des Affaires étrangères afin de décider des prochaines étapes dans cette affaire. Le président du Conseil européen Charles Michel se rendra dans la région d’Evros à la frontière turque mardi aux côtés du Premier ministre grec Kyriakos Mitsotakis.

      https://twitter.com/eucopresident/status/1234188948735430656?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E12
      Les Nations unies ont appelé dimanche au calme et à la retenue : « Les États ont certes le droit légitime de contrôler leurs frontières et de gérer les mouvements irréguliers, mais ils devraient se retenir d’user d’une force excessive et disproportionnée et mettre en place un système permettant de faire une demande d’asile de manière ordonnée », a écrit un porte-parole du Haut commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR), Babar Baloch, dans un email à l’AFP. Le HCR appelle également les demandeurs d’asile à « respecter la loi et se retenir de créer des situations perturbant l’ordre public et la sécurité aux frontières et ailleurs ».

      La Turquie accueille sur son sol plus de quatre millions de réfugiés et migrants, en majorité des Syriens, et affirme qu’elle ne pourra pas faire face seule à un nouvel afflux, alors que près d’un million de personnes fuyant les violences à Idleb sont massées à sa frontière. L’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM) a annoncé samedi soir que quelque 13 000 migrants s’étaient amassés à la frontière gréco-turque, dont des familles avec de jeunes enfants qui ont passé la nuit dans le froid. Environ 2 000 personnes supplémentaires sont arrivées au poste-frontière de Pazarkule (Turquie) dimanche, dont des Afghans, des Syriens et des Irakiens, a constaté un journaliste de l’AFP.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/23128/entre-crispation-et-la-solidarite-l-ue-en-ordre-disperse-sur-la-situat

    • Le quotidien grec Efimerida tôn Syntaktôn a publié le communiqué de l’armée qui dit en somme que le 4ième corps de l’Armée fera un exercice avec des tirs à balles réelles à diverses région frontalières dont la forêt de Kastanies et l’endroit dit Gefyra Koipôn (Pont des Jardins) :
      Βολές με πραγματικά πυρά στον Έβρο την Καθαρά Δευτέρα

      Ξεκάθαρο μήνυμα με συγκεκριμένους αποδέκτες έστειλαν οι ελληνικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις, το βράδυ της Κυριακής, ανακοινώνοντας πως το Δ’ Σώμα Στρατού θα προχωρήσει σε βολές με πραγματικά πυρά, την Καθαρά Δευτέρα, 2 Μαρτίου καθ΄ όλη τη διάρκεια του 24ώρου στην περιοχή του Έβρου.

      Η ανακοίνωση γίνεται τη στιγμή που χιλιάδες πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες βρίσκονται στα ελληνοτουρκικά σύνορα και επιδιώκουν να εισέλθουν σε ελληνικό έδαφος, και ενώ το ΚΥΣΕΑ αποφάσισε (μεταξύ άλλων) την « αναβάθμιση σε μέγιστο επίπεδο των μέτρων φύλαξης των ανατολικών, χερσαίων και θαλάσσιων, συνόρων της χώρας από τα σώματα ασφαλείας και τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις για την αποτροπή παράνομων εισόδων στη χώρα ».

      Επίσης, στην ανακοίνωση γίνεται σαφής αναφορά για βολές « ευθυτενούς τροχιάς με πολυβόλα, τυφέκια και πιστόλια με πραγματικά πυρά », ενώ υπάρχει ξεκάθαρη προειδοποίηση πως « απαγορεύεται κάθε κίνηση ή παραμονή ατόμων... για αποφυγή ατυχημάτων ».

      Η ανακοίνωση

      Το Δ΄ ΣΩΜΑ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΥ ανακοινώνει ότι, από την 02 Μαρτίου 2020 και καθόλη τη διάρκεια του 24ώρου, θα εκτελούνται βολές ευθυτενούς τροχιάς με πολυβόλα, τυφέκια και πιστόλια με πραγματικά πυρά, σε όλη την παρέβρια περιοχή όπως παρακάτω :

      Επικίνδυνες περιοχές είναι αυτές , που περικλείονται από τα σημεία : α. ΕΦ Διλόφου – Λυκόνησος – Μουσμουλιές – ΕΦ Μαρασίων .β. ΕΦ Μαρασίων -Δάσος Καστανιών – ΕΦ 1- Περιοχή αποτρεπτικού εμποδίου- ΕΦ 5 – Πράσινη Πόρτα.γ. Πράσινη Πόρτα- ΕΦ 10- ΕΦ Γέφυρας Πυθίου.δ. ΕΦ Γέφυρας Πυθίου -ΕΦ Μαύρου Όγκου- ΕΦ 126- ΕΦ Σουφλίου-ΕΦΜανίτσας.ε. ΕΦ Μανίτσας -ΕΦ. Πλαγιές- Περιοχή Τυχερού- ΕΦ Γεμιστής- ΕΦ ΓέφυραΚήπων- ΕΦ Πετάλου- Αινήσιο Δέλτα.

      Στις παραπάνω περιοχές απαγορεύεται κάθε κίνηση ή παραμονή ατόμων, τροχοφόρων και ζώων κατά τις ώρες των βολών, για αποφυγή ατυχημάτων.

      Βλήματα μη εκραγέντα, που τυχόν θα βρεθούν, να μη μετακινηθούν και να ειδοποιείται άμεσα η πλησιέστερη Αστυνομική Αρχή.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/node/233421

    • Βολές με πραγματικά πυρά σε Έβρο και νησιά

      Βολές με πραγματικά πυρά, την Καθαρά Δευτέρα, καθ΄ όλη τη διάρκεια του 24ώρου στην περιοχή του Έβρου και σε περιοχές των νησιών του ανατολικού Αιγαίου ανακοίνωσε το Δ’ Σώμα Στρατού και η Ανώτατη Στρατιωτική Διοίκηση Εσωτερικού και Νήσων (ΑΣΔΕΝ).

      Οι ανακοινώσεις γίνονται τη στιγμή που πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες βρίσκονται στα ελληνοτουρκικά σύνορα (χερσαία και θαλάσσια) και επιδιώκουν να εισέλθουν σε ελληνικό έδαφος.

      Σύμφωνα με πηγές του στρατού, καθ’ όλη τη διάρκεια του 24ώρου, θα εκτελούνται βολές (Έβρος) « ευθυτενούς τροχιάς με πολυβόλα, τυφέκια και πιστόλια με πραγματικά πυρά », ενώ υπάρχει ξεκάθαρη προειδοποίηση πως « απαγορεύεται κάθε κίνηση ή παραμονή ατόμων... για αποφυγή ατυχημάτων ».

      Στα νησιά, η ΑΣΔΕΝ ανακοίνωσε βολές « ευθυτενούς τροχιάς » στις θαλάσσιες περιοχές ανατολικά των νησιών του ανατολικού Αιγαίου από τη νήσο Σαμοθράκη μέχρι Μεγίστη.

      Στο μεταξύ, στη Λέσβο βρίσκεται εκτάκτως ο υφυπουργός Εθνικής Άμυνας, Αλκιβιάδης Στεφανής, προκειμένου να δει από κοντά την κατάσταση που έχει δημιουργηθεί.


      https://www.efsyn.gr/node/233432

    • Πρωτοφανής ποινικοποίηση της αίτησης ασύλου

      Σε ευθεία και κατάφωρη παραβίαση των διεθνών και ελληνικών νόμων περί ασύλου έχει προβεί η κυβέρνηση της Νέας Δημοκρατίας, με αφορμή τα γεγονότα που εξελίσσονται τις τελευταίες ημέρες στα ελληνοτουρκικά σύνορα.

      Εκτός, λοιπόν, από την αναστολή που αποφάσισε χθες (Κυριακή) το ΚΥΣΕΑ για την υποβολή των αιτήσεων ασύλου —ενέργεια για την οποία ήδη έχει εκφράσει την αντίθεσή της η Ύπατη Αρμοστεία του ΟΗΕ— η κυβέρνηση προχώρησε σε δίκη και καταδίκη των ανθρώπων που εισέρχονται παράνομα σε ελληνικό έδαφος.

      Όπως ανακοινώθηκε από την κυβέρνηση, σήμερα (Καθαρά Δευτέρα) πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες δικάστηκαν και καταδικάστηκαν σε τέσσερα έτη φυλάκισης, χωρίς αναστολή και 10.000 ευρώ χρηματική ποινή έκαστος. Μάλιστα, οι καταδικασθέντες μεταφέρθηκαν σε καταστήματα κράτησης.

      Μέχρι στιγμής δεν έχει γίνει γνωστός ο αριθμός των ανθρώπων που έχουν οδηγηθεί στις φυλακές. Πάντως, από τις 6 το πρωί του Σαββάτου ως τις 6 το απόγευμα της Καθαράς Δευτέρας, έχουν συλληφθεί 183 άτομα.

      Σημειώνεται πως ο ελληνικός νόμος 4636/2019 για τη διεθνή προστασία (άρθρο 46) που εφαρμόζει τις ευρωπαϊκές οδηγίες (άρθρα 8 και 9 Οδηγίας 2013/33/ΕΕ) είναι σαφής, όπως καταγράφεται παρακάτω :

      Σε κάθε περίπτωση, οι δίκες και οι καταδίκες προσφύγων και μεταναστών διαφοροποιούν εντελώς τη μέχρι στιγμής πολιτική των ελληνικών κυβερνήσεων, που ήταν να μην προχωρούν σε διώξεις ανθρώπων που θεωρείται ότι ανήκουν σε ευάλωτες ομάδες. Υπενθυμίζεται πως μέχρι σήμερα, οι διώξεις αφορούσαν μόνο τους διακινητές προσφύγων και μεταναστών.

      Σημειώνεται ότι σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες από τα νησιά, ο υπουργός Μετανάστευσης και Ασύλου ενημέρωσε σήμερα τη δημοτική αρχή Χίου ότι έχουν παραχωρηθεί δημοτικό κτήριο στην οδό Λάδης και χώρος στα Καρδάμυλα, όπου θα κρατούνται οι νεοεισερχόμενοι και θα μεταφέρονται μέσα σε τρεις μέρες σε κλειστές δομές της ενδοχώρας.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/233470_protofanis-poinikopoiisi-tis-aitisis-asyloy

      –-> Commentaire de Vicky Skoumbi :

      Criminalisation sans précédent de la demande d’asile

      D’après le quotidien grec Efimerida tôn Syntatktôn, le gouvernement grec ne s’est pas contenté de suspendre la procédure d’asile pour les nouveaux arrivants- suspension contre laquelle l’HCR a exprimé son opposition- mais il franchit un nouveau seuil dans la repression en procédant à des jugements et des condamnations de ceux qui entrent ‘illégalement’ dans le territoire grec. Le gouvernement a annoncé qu’aujourd’hui des réfugiés et des migrants ont été jugés dans un procès sans doute plus qu’expéditif, et condamnés à quatre ans de détention sans sursis et à 10.000 euros d’amende chacun. Les personnes ayant écopés ces peines ahurissantes ont été déjà transférées à des prisons. Pour l’instant on ignore combien furent condamnés. Toutefois on sait du samedi matin jusqu’à cet après-midi, 183 personnes ont été arrêtées à la frontière.

      Ces faits et gestes constituent une flagrante violation de la législation grecque, car selon la loi grecque 4636/2019 / article 46, pour la protection international, et conformément aux directives européennes (articles 8 et 9 de la directive 2013/33/UE, un ressortissant d’un pays tiers, demandeur d’asile, ne peut pas être détenu du fait qu’il est entré d’une façon irrégulière au pays, ou bien du fait qu’il y séjourne sans autorisation des autorités.

      Le Ministre de l’Immigration et de l’asile, aurait informé les autorités municipales de Chios qu’un immeuble municipal sera transformé en lieu de détention et les arrivants y seront détenus pour trois jours après lesquels ils seront transférés à des centres fermés de la Grèce continentale.

    • Commission pledges border guards, aid to Greece to tackle migrant surge

      The European Commission presented on Wednesday a six-point action plan to support Greece for border policing, that includes financial aid and beefing up #Frontex patrols in the Aegean and Evros, the northeastern border with Turkey.

      More than 10,000 migrants have been trying to breach the Greek border with Turkey after Ankara said last Thursday it would no longer try to halt illegal migration flows to Europe.

      “Greece faces an incredibly challenging situation, one that is completely unprecedented and this difficult task cannot fall on Greece alone. It is the responsibility of the whole of Europe,” Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas said in a joint press conference with EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson in Brussels.

      Presenting the plan, Schinas said Frontex would launch two rapid border operations both on the land and sea border, that will include an additional 100 border guards and equipment.

      Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, is also preparing the deployment of one offshore patrol vessel, six coastal patrol vessels, two helicopters, one aircraft and three thermo-vision vehicles.

      Schinas said the Commission has also asked Frontex to coordinate a new return program for the quick return of “persons without the right to stay” to their countries of origin from Greece, making use of Frontex’s new mandate on returns.

      The EU will provide immediate financial assistance of 350 million euros to support increased reception capacity on the five Greek islands receiving the bulk of migrants, voluntary returns of migrants, and all the infrastructure needed to carry out screening procedures for health and security on the islands.

      The Commission will in addition propose an amended budget to make available a further 350 million euros, if needed.

      On Greece’s request the Commission also launched the civil protection mechanism through which Greece can receive additional medical staff and equipment, blankets and tents, Schinas added.

      At the same time, the EU agency for refugees, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), will accelerate the deployment of an additional number of around 160 case workers in Greece to support the process of asylum applications.

      The Commissioner also said the EU aims to strengthen regional cooperation by developing a coordinating mechanism with countries in the Western Balkan countries on migration.

      The plan will be introduced before the extraordinary meeting of the Justice and Home Office Ministers who will meet later on Wednesday.

      http://www.ekathimerini.com/250222/article/ekathimerini/news/commission-pledges-border-guards-aid-to-greece-to-tackle-migrant-surge

    • Ankara déploie un millier de policiers à la frontière avec la Grèce

      La Turquie a annoncé jeudi que 1 000 policiers « pleinement équipés » allaient être déployés à la frontière avec la Grèce. Ankara espère ainsi « empêcher » Athènes de « repousser » les migrants qui tentent d’entrer sur son territoire depuis près d’une semaine.

      Le bras de fer entre la Grèce et la Turquie continue à la frontière entre ces deux pays. Ankara a annoncé, jeudi 5 mars, le déploiement d’un millier de policiers, « pleinement équipés », le long du fleuve frontalier Evros (Meriç en turc) afin « d’empêcher » Athènes de « repousser » les migrants qui essayent de pénétrer sur son sol.

      La semaine dernière, la Turquie a ouvert ses frontières avec la Grèce pour laisser passer les migrants déjà présents sur son territoire. Depuis cette annonce, des dizaines de milliers de personnes se sont massées le long de la frontière terrestre entre la Turquie et la Grèce, essayant de passer par des postes frontaliers ou en traversant le fleuve. Certains ont fini par renoncer, comme l’a confié à InfoMigrants Khaled, un Palestinien reparti à Istanbul après avoir tenté en vain de rentrer sur le territoire grec.
      35 000 migrants empêchés d’entrer en Grèce

      Une guerre de communication fait rage entre les deux pays voisins. Athènes a annoncé avoir empêché ces derniers jours près de 35 000 migrants d’entrer « illégalement » sur son territoire. La Turquie accuse de son côté la Grèce d’avoir tué plusieurs migrants, ce qu’Athènes a démenti, rejetant des « fausses informations ». De plus, selon le ministre turc de l’Intérieur, Süleyman Soylu, les forces de sécurité grecques ont « blessé 164 personnes et tenté d’en repousser 4 900 sur le territoire turc ».

      Des migrants présents à la frontière et rencontrés par une équipe d’InfoMigrants sur place ont en effet expliqué avoir été repoussés par les Grecs « violemment ». Ils « utilisent du gaz lacrymogène et des grenades assourdissantes. L’un de mes camarades a même dû aller se faire soigner à l’hôpital pour une blessure reçue au bras », a déclaré Mounir, un migrant marocain.

      L’Union européenne a qualifié de « chantage » la décision prise par Ankara d’ouvrir ses frontières, au moment où la Turquie est en quête d’un appui occidental en Syrie.

      L’afflux de migrants vers la Grèce a réveillé en Europe la crainte d’une nouvelle crise migratoire semblable à celle qui a secoué le continent en 2015.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/23219/ankara-deploie-un-millier-de-policiers-a-la-frontiere-avec-la-grece
      #militarisation_des_frontières #police

      Localisation de #Pazarkule :


      –-> ce #poste-frontière se trouve dans le #triangle_de_Karaagac, un territoire attribué à la Grèce en 1923 par le traité de Lausanne et permettant au fleuve Evros de faire une incursion dans le territoire turc (https://visionscarto.net/evros-mur-inutile), soit là où la Grèce a construit un #mur en 2012...

    • La Grèce veut « renvoyer dans leurs pays » les migrants arrivés après le 1er mars

      Le ministre grec chargé des migrations a annoncé mercredi que les migrants arrivés sur les îles grecques depuis le 1er mars seraient transférés vers la ville de Serres, dans le nord du pays, au cours des prochains jours. « Notre objectif est de les ramener dans leurs pays », a-t-il affirmé.

      Les migrants qui sont arrivés illégalement en Grèce après le 1er mars 2020 seront transférés vers la ville de Serres, située dans le nord du pays, a annoncé le ministre chargé des migrations, Notis Mitarachi dans la soirée du 4 mars. Les autorités grecques prévoient, dans un second temps, de renvoyer ces nouveaux arrivants vers leurs différents pays d’origine.

      « Notre objectif est de les ramener dans leurs pays », a affirmé Notis Mitarachi à l’agence de presse Athens News. Il a par ailleurs ajouté que les personnes entrées dans le pays avant le 1er janvier 2019 et vivant sur les îles grecques seraient transférées sur le continent dans les prochains jours.

      Le 1er mars, la Grèce avait déjà annoncé qu’elle n’accepterait plus de nouvelles demandes d’asile pendant un mois.

      Suite à l’ouverture des frontières turques la semaine dernière, plusieurs centaines de migrants ont réussi à entrer illégalement en Grèce, la plupart en rejoignant les îles via la mer. Selon le gouvernement grec, près de 7 000 tentatives d’entrées illégales ont été empêchées en 24 heures dans la région et une vingtaine de migrants y ont été arrêtés, surtout originaires d’Afghanistan et du Pakistan, entre mercredi matin et jeudi matin.

      La Turquie, qui accueille déjà 3,7 millions de réfugiés syriens, a annoncé le 28 février qu’elle se désengageait d’un accord conclu en 2016 avec l’Union européenne et qu’elle n’empêcherait plus les migrants de quitter son territoire. Une manière de faire pression sur Bruxelles et d’obtenir soit davantage de moyens financiers pour prendre en charge les migrants, soit un soutien diplomatique à ses visées géopolitiques dans le conflit syrien, accusent la Grèce et l’Union européenne.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/23230/la-grece-veut-renvoyer-dans-leurs-pays-les-migrants-arrives-apres-le-1
      #01_mars_2020

    • Migrants : la Grèce accusée de recourir à la manière forte

      Refoulement en Turquie, utilisation de gaz lacrymogènes, confiscation de biens : la Grèce est accusée de recourir à la manière forte avec les migrants qui tentent d’entrer en Europe, et Ankara lui attribue même la mort de trois personnes.

      « Des soldats grecs (...) nous ont pris notre argent, nos téléphones. Il est arrivé la même chose à nos amis », raconte Resul,un jeune Afghan, rencontré par l’AFP le long de la longue frontière terrestre qui sépare la Turquie et la Grèce sur plus de 200 km.

      D’autres candidats malheureux à l’exil rencontrés sur les routes affirment qu’ils ont été rossés par les forces de l’ordre grecques, déjà montrées du doigt pour avoir utilisé des gaz lacrymogènes aux ogives potentiellement mortelles en cas de tir tendu sur une personne.

      Depuis que le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan a ordonné l’ouverture des frontières pour laisser passer les migrants désireux de se rendre dans l’Union européenne, Athènes a complètement fermé sa frontière terrestre tout en déployant des forces le long du fleuve Evros.

      Les pratiques présumées de « push-back », qui consistent à repousser les personnes qui voudraient entrer sur un territoire sont dénoncées par plusieurs organisations internationales et des ONG, qui reprochent également au gouvernement grec de contrevenir au droit international et européen en décidant de suspendre les demandes d’asile pendant un mois.
      Etat de siège

      De source gouvernementale grecque, on assure qu’"il n’y a pas de refoulements". Le gouvernement « empêche l’entrée (sur son territoire ndlr), c’est tout à fait différent », a déclaré cette source à l’AFP.

      Parmi les mesures décidées par le conseil gouvernemental de sécurité nationale détaillées dans un acte législatif, figurent « l’arrestation, le transfert dans des centres de détention et le retour immédiat, si c’est possible dans leur pays d’origine, de tous ceux qui entrent illégalement dans le territoire grec ».

      « Le principe fondamental de non-refoulement » stipule que « personne ne peut être renvoyé dans un pays où sa vie ou sa liberté seraient en péril », a souligné mardi Stella Nanou, la responsable de l’Agence des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) en Grèce, lors d’une visite au poste-frontière de Kastanies (Pazarkule côté turc).

      L’ONG allemande de défense des droits des réfugiés Pro Asyl a elle aussi tancé les autorités grecques, jugeant « illégaux » les renvois vers la Turquie « sans que les procédures d’asile n’aient été enclenchées ».

      A la frontière, la région reculée de terres agricoles et de villages assoupis offre le spectacle d’une zone en état de siège : camions militaires et véhicules de police quadrillent la zone du nord au sud et d’est en ouest.

      La Turquie accuse aussi les gardes-frontières grecs d’avoir tué trois migrants lors de heurts à la frontière, ce qu’Athènes a fermement démenti, rejetant des « fausses informations ».
      Chaussures et téléphones portables

      Des journalistes de l’AFP ont vu le long de la frontière des soldats grecs cagoulés embarquant des migrants dans des véhicules militaires. Certains réfugiés se trouvaient aussi à bord de fourgonnettes sans plaques d’immatriculation.

      Les policiers et les militaires ont systématiquement refusé d’indiquer la destination de ces personnes interpellées.

      « On les livre à la justice pour entrée illégale sur le territoire », se contente d’indiquer à l’AFP un policier qui refuse de décliner son identité, à Tychero, un bourg collé à la frontière.

      Des forces de l’ordre grecques sont également soupçonnées d’avoir dépouillé des réfugiés de leurs effets personnels.

      A Tychero, des paires de chaussures souillées de boue sont entassées à côté de l’entrée du poste de police, ainsi que des téléphones portables. De l’autre côté de la frontière, des migrants marchent pieds nus et affirment que les policiers grecs leur ont pris leurs chaussures.

      Quand ils parviennent à entrer en Grèce, les migrants sont livrés à eux-mêmes. A la différence des îles de la mer Egée, aucune organisation humanitaire n’est déployée dans cette vaste région.

      https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/migrants-la-grece-accusee-de-recourir-a-la-maniere-forte-05-03-2020-2365952_

    • La Grèce veut dissuader les exilés de franchir ses frontières

      Depuis l’annonce d’Ankara concernant l’ouverture de la frontière, la Grèce et la Turquie mènent une véritable bataille de la communication : bataille de chiffres, accusations d’exactions, dénonciations de propagande. Côté grec, le ton redouble de fermeté.

      Lesbos (Grèce), de notre envoyée spéciale.– Les rafales de vent fouettent les visages sur le port bétonné de Mytilène, à Lesbos. Les côtes turques, à une dizaine de kilomètres, sont noyées dans la brume ce mercredi.

      Derrière des barrières gardées par des policiers, ils sont près de 560 migrants, majoritairement venus d’Afghanistan et de pays d’Afrique. Depuis des heures, ils guettent l’arrivée d’un bateau qui viendrait les extirper de l’île grecque.

      Peu d’informations circulent sur ces passagers, ce matin-là. Les quelques journalistes autorisés à observer cette scène sous haute surveillance n’ont pas le droit de leur parler. « Pour éviter tout mouvement de foule », explique d’un ton ferme un policier.

      On sait seulement que ces migrants en quête d’Europe sont les derniers à avoir accosté à Lesbos. Ils ont pris la mer à bord d’une dizaine de bateaux pneumatiques depuis la Turquie les 1er, 2 et 3 mars, encouragés par l’annonce de l’ouverture de la frontière par Ankara.

      Isolés dès leur arrivée, les réfugiés n’ont pas fait escale dans le camp surchargé de l’île, Moria, où s’entassent déjà 20 000 migrants dans l’attente de leur traitement d’asile.

      L’imposante frégate militaire s’approche du port en fin de matinée. Elle amarre. Elle devrait embarquer les réfugiés puis prendre le chemin de Serres dans le nord de la Grèce. Mais là-bas, la colère des habitants gronde déjà contre leur venue. Les réfugiés ne le savent pas encore, mais Serres ne sera peut-être qu’une escale.

      « Notre but est de les renvoyer dans leur pays », a révélé le ministre de l’immigration, Notis Mitarachi à l’agence Reuters mercredi, en évoquant l’ensemble des quelque 1 500 exilés arrivés sur les îles depuis le 1er mars.

      Le sort de ces passagers illustre la politique de dissuasion voulue par la Grèce, qui qualifie d’« invasion » et de « menace asymétrique » le déplacement de migrants à ses portes depuis l’annonce par Ankara de l’ouverture de cette frontière, jeudi 27 février. Le message se veut clair. Il n’y aura pas d’accueil pour les nouveaux exilés dans ce pays redevenu en 2019 la première porte d’entrée de l’Europe pour les demandeurs d’asile, qui peine à traiter les quelque 60 000 requêtes déjà en cours.

      La campagne de communication du gouvernement grec a commencé dès vendredi par l’envoi de renforts de police et de l’armée à sa frontière terrestre, dans le nord-est, dans le nome de l’Évros. Il faut dissuader les 12 000 migrants massés du côté turc de la frontière.

      Les images de l’afflux de soldats, puis du chef d’état-major grec et du ministre de la protection du citoyen, Michalis Chryssochoidis, en visite ce jour-là dans la ville-frontière de Kastanies, ont fait le tour des télévisions grecques. La tournée de ces hauts responsables a pour objectif d’envoyer un message fort. « La Grèce est un pays sûr. La Grèce protège les frontières », martèle le ministre.

      La frontière grecque est bien fermée : ce refrain est aussi repris par le premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotákis. Le 1er mars, il annonçait également la suspension, à compter de cette date, du dépôt des demandes d’asile pour toutes les personnes arrivées illégalement en Grèce. Une décision illégale, dénoncent de nombreuses ONG, et contraire au droit international selon le Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR).

      Les autorités grecques, qui dénoncent un « chantage » d’Ankara, ont également annoncé le renvoi systématique des migrants vers leurs pays, la demande de déploiement de la force de réaction rapide (Rabit) de la force européenne Frontex à sa frontière puis le soutien de l’UE « par tous les moyens possibles ».

      Kostas Moutzouris, gouverneur local des îles du nord de l’Égée, assume ce qu’il qualifie de politique de « dissuasion » du gouvernement grec. Droit dans son bureau qui surplombe le port de Mytilène, l’homme populaire à Lesbos précise lui aussi « qu’il faut décourager ces gens de venir ».

      « Les habitants ici étaient solidaires, mais ils n’en peuvent plus, il y a trop de monde », insiste le politicien de droite. « [Le président turc] Erdogan fait de la propagande de l’autre côté, il incite les migrants à venir jusqu’aux frontières depuis Constantinople [Istanbul – ndlr] et d’autres villes du pays. Ils sont pour l’instant dans le nord de la Grèce, à l’Évros, mais comme ils ne peuvent pas passer, ils commenceront à descendre vers la frontière maritime face aux îles », croit-il.

      Les deux pays se livrent une guerre de communication. Les autorités grecques accusent Ankara d’inciter les migrants à venir et de les escorter jusqu’aux eaux grecques. « Le transport [de migrants] est organisé gratuitement jusqu’à la frontière, accompagnés par l’armée turque », a expliqué mercredi 4 mars le porte-parole du gouvernement grec, Stelios Petsas, au cours d’un point presse.

      Il affirme que « des SMS [sont] reçus par les migrants sur leurs téléphones portables au sujet des frontières prétendument ouvertes… [que] la télévision d’État turque […] a diffusé une carte avec des itinéraires vers la région d’Évros et la côte ». De son côté, Ankara nie et affirme qu’Athènes tire à balles réelles sur les réfugiés aux frontières terrestre et maritime. La Grèce dément.

      Une vidéo datant de début mars a fait le tour des réseaux sociaux, relayée par les autorités turques. On y voit un bateau pneumatique de migrants en mer Égée, et une vedette qui fonce à toute vitesse faisant tanguer le zodiac. On y entend les cris des passagers apeurés, puis des tirs de sommation, visant à repousser l’embarcation, au large de Lesbos, d’après Ankara.

      « J’ignore si ce contenu est authentique, avoue Kostas Moutzouris. Mais si c’est avéré, cela ne me paraît pas étrange : il faut dissuader les gens de venir, ces hommes [garde-côtes – ndlr] ne tirent pas sur les réfugiés, mais en l’air pour les dissuader. Les migrants ne doivent pas passer et les militaires grecs feront tout pour qu’ils ne viennent pas. »

      Mercredi 4 mars, des heurts entre migrants et forces de l’ordre grecques à la frontière terrestre ont aussi fait six blessés en raison de « tirs à balles réelles », affirme le gouvernement local turc, qui précisait qu’un migrant était mort de ses blessures.

      Mohamed Al Arab avait 22 ans et était originaire d’Alep, rapporte Le Parisien. Le gouvernement grec, lui, « dément catégoriquement » ces tirs. « La police grecque n’a pas tiré, maintient M. Moutzouris, mais malheureusement cela ne serait pas surprenant que la situation dérape. »

      Une enquête vidéo (visible ci-dessous en anglais) de Forensic Architecture – laboratoire d’investigation pluridisciplinaire avec qui Mediapart a déjà travaillé – sur le meurtre de #Mohamed_Al_Arab contredit la version des autorités grecques.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/050320/la-grece-veut-dissuader-les-exiles-de-franchir-ses-frontieres

    • #Forensic_Architecture releases video confirming murder of Syrian refugee on Greek border

      London-based research group Forensic Architecture has released an investigative video yesterday debunking Greek government’s claims of fake news over the killing of Syrian refugee #Muhammad_al-Arab by Greek fire on the country’s land border with Turkey.

      Twenty-two-year-old al-Arab’s murder was first reported by journalist Jenan Moussa on 02 March on Twitter. Moussa shared videos of the incident and managed to track down al-Arab’s family in Istanbul, who confirmed his death. Greek government spokesperson Stelios Petsas immediately tweeted that the reports were fake news and “Turkish propaganda”, to which Moussa responded with a photo of al-Arab’s coffin.

      Reuters and other international media picked up the story of al-Arab’s death by Greek fire on the border, but local media’s silence on the issue has been deafening. For two days it was unclear whether a killing had actually taken place, with the government repeatedly denouncing reports as inaccurate.

      Last night, Forensic Architecture released a video of their research on al-Arab’s killing. The video confirms the time, date and location of videos shot by witnesses during the incident, using video metadata and comparing video footage with satellite images of the area. The video therefore proves that al-Arab was indeed killed by live ammunition on the Greek-Turkish border as he was trying to cross into Greece. You can watch the Forensic Architecture video here (warning: graphic content).

      This is not the first case Forensic Architecture investigates in Greece. The Turner-nominated group conducted research on the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, the lynching of Zak Kostopoulos, a shipwreck off the coast of Lesvos that resulted in the death of at least 43 people, and the extradiction of Turkish political asylum seekers by Greece. In September 2019, Forensic Architecture had its first solo exhibition in Greece at State of Concept in Athens.

      The killing of al-Arab is the result of escalating violence on the Greek side of the border and rampant racism among Greek citizens, fuelled by politicians and the media. On 02 March, the Greek armed forces announced that they would be using live ammunition on the land border with Turkey and the coast of Lesvos. Meanwhile, armed vigilante groups have emerged patrolling the border, in order to deter refugees from crossing. According to Die Linke and Twitter reports, these groups are joined by neonazi groups from Germany and Austria.

      Amnesty International has released a statement calling out Greece for betraying its human rights responsibilities and for putting people’s lives at risk, stating that Greece should do whatever possible to protect the arrival of asylum seekers to the country. The Greek section of Amnesty International has released a separate report, pointing out that the situation along the Greek-Turkish border is “a humanitarian crisis caused by Europe”, and that Greece should protect the right to asylum with support from the EU.

      Demonstrations in solidarity with refugees and against state violence and racism have been announced for today, Thursday 05 March, in various cities in Greece.

      http://und-athens.com/journal/fa-alarab-killing
      #assassinat #meurtre #preuves

    • Pourquoi les migrants bloqués à la frontière grecque évitent-ils la #Bulgarie ?

      Réputé pour faire la vie dure aux réfugiés, le pays est aussi protégé par les bonnes relations que son Premier ministre entretient avec le président turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

      Dans le bras de fer migratoire qui oppose la Turquie à l’Union européenne (UE), un pays pourtant géographiquement en première ligne est resté jusqu’ici bien discret. Alors qu’environ 35 000 migrants ont tenté d’entrer en Grèce depuis la fin février d’après les autorités nationales, la situation à la frontière bulgare reste calme.

      Le 28 février, au lendemain de la décision du président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan de laisser passer les réfugiés cherchant à rejoindre l’Union européenne, le ministre bulgare de l’Intérieur, Mladen Marinov, s’est rendu au poste frontière de Kapitan Andreevo, situé à une vingtaine de kilomètres seulement du village grec de Kastaniès, pour constater « qu’aucune tentative de franchir la frontière [n’avait] été relevée, à l’exception de quelques cas isolés ». Depuis, la situation n’a pas évolué alors que migrants et réfugiés continuent à affluer à la frontière grecque.

      Ce contraste peut en partie s’expliquer par une réticence des réfugiés eux-mêmes à se rendre en Bulgarie, selon Miladina Monova, anthropologue à l’Académie des sciences bulgares et engagée dans l’aide aux migrants. « La situation est particulièrement difficile pour les migrants en Bulgarie, explique-t-elle. Depuis 2015, le message circule dans le milieu des réfugiés qu’il vaut mieux éviter de passer par ce pays car les risques d’être tabassé et dépouillé à la frontière sont particulièrement élevés. »

      Depuis 2016, Sofia a fait installer une clôture métallique équipée de détecteurs de mouvements le long des 250 kilomètres de frontière avec la Turquie. Le gouvernement défend une politique « zéro migration ». Ce mardi, le ministre bulgare de la Défense s’est même opposé à l’installation d’un camp de réfugiés provisoire dans le nord de la Grèce, à 45 km de la Bulgarie, estimant que « l’installation de migrants clandestins du côté grec, près de notre frontière, [créerait] les conditions d’une aggravation de la tension ».
      Violence aux frontières

      Les gardes-frontières bulgares sont effectivement réputés pour leurs pratiques violentes, consistant à repousser physiquement les migrants en dehors du territoire national. « L’usage excessif de la force et les vols par la police des frontières est toujours d’actualité. L’entrée irrégulière sur le territoire reste criminalisée, avec pour conséquence une détention administrative des migrants et réfugiés, y compris des enfants non-accompagnés », rappelle Amnesty international dans son dernier rapport sur la question, publié en 2018. En 2015, un migrant afghan est mort, tué par un coup de feu tiré par un garde-frontière, dans des circonstances qui n’ont toujours pas été éclaircies.

      Malgré sa situation géographique qui en fait une porte de l’UE, la Bulgarie n’a jamais constitué une grosse route migratoire. Ainsi en 2016, seuls 17 187 migrants sont entrés en Bulgarie, dix fois moins qu’en Grèce (176 906). Cette année, entre le premier janvier et la fin du mois de février, ils n’ont été que 141 à passer en Bulgarie, contre 5 854 en Grèce, selon l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM).

      Pour comprendre l’absence actuelle de tension migratoire à frontière turco-bulgare, il faut aussi regarder du côté des relations diplomatiques entre Sofia et Ankara. Le 2 mars, alors que les tensions entre la Turquie et la Grèce étaient à leur comble, le Premier ministre bulgare, Boïko Borissov, a affiché sur les réseaux sociaux sa poignée de main avec Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Et précisé devant les micros : « Nous sommes tombés d’accord pour continuer à entretenir nos relations de bon voisinage, la compréhension réciproque et la paix. » Une relation de bon voisinage qui a probablement évité à la Bulgarie le sort de la Grèce, qui a vu arriver à sa porte des migrants convoyés gratuitement par bus depuis le reste de la Turquie.

      Expulsion des gülenistes

      Au pouvoir depuis 2009, Boïko Borissov entretient depuis longtemps de bonnes relations avec Erdogan. Il a notamment gagné sa confiance en renvoyant vers la Turquie les gülenistes, ces membres d’une confrérie musulmane accusés par le président turc d’avoir organisé la tentative de coup d’Etat de juillet 2016. « On sait dans le milieu des défenseurs des droits de l’homme que le renvoi des gülénistes et des Kurdes est systématique. Mais leur nombre exact est difficile à établir, car il s’agit de renvois immédiats, avant même que ces personnes ne déposent une demande d’asile, note Miladina Monova. La Bulgarie est le seul pays des Balkans à le faire systématiquement, alors même qu’elle est membre de l’UE. » En retour, la Turquie reprend systématiquement les migrants qui tentent de passer en Bulgarie.

      Cette relation entre Borissov et Erdogan a ainsi conduit le Premier ministre conservateur bulgare à servir à plusieurs reprises de médiateur entre l’homme fort d’Ankara et les autres chefs d’Etat européens. En 2018, c’était déjà à son initiative qu’un sommet réunissant dirigeants turcs et européens avait été organisé à Varna, sur la côte bulgare, pour sauver une première fois l’accord migratoire.

      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/03/10/pourquoi-les-migrants-bloques-a-la-frontiere-grecque-evitent-la-bulgarie_

    • Notes From #Pazarkule/ #Evros, Ninth Day

      Pazarkule. Turkey. March 8, 2020. Today we learned that it had become even harder for the refugees to leave the designated area to come to Karaağaç. They are now only allowed to use the main checkpoint. They are also required to give fingerprints and accept bodily checks. The soldiers also take pictures of their eyes. As our friend told us, exists started at 10 o’clock in the morning and went on during the day despite the long queues. Our friends waited two hours in the queue and only after that, they reached to Karaağaç. They were still in a positive mood when we met them there.

      One of our migrant friends told that while they were waiting in the queue a gendarmerie yelled at him saying ‘why are you laughing?’ He answered ‘I am not laughing at anything but why are you yelling?’ Then a higher officer took him to a corner and beat him. In an earlier conversation, this very same friend told us that the soldiers were helping them to cross to Greece. They even gave them hooks and ropes to take down the last remaining fence in front of the border gate. Our friends often tell us about incidents of ill-treatment by the same soldiers who ‘help’ them to cross to the Greek side.

      We also learned that although independent aid organizations were not allowed in the fenced-off area, Yavuz Selim Association was given permission to enter and distribute aid. Our friends from the inside also told us that the Beşir Association had been present on the ground since the first day and they distributed blue clothing items today.

      Our friends went back around 23.00 and reported that their fingerprints were not taken went they re-entered.

      Today we came across a Women’s Day demo in downtown Edirne. Migrants, borders or the war were mentioned neither in the press release nor on the banners and posters; despite the existence of such a large group of migrant women just by the city.

      Today we also had a chance to chat with refugee women. Our female friends who came from the zone told us about their experiences, stories and how they live through this as women. While we were filming, one of the women told us that she studied cinema for one year in Iran and offered to use the camera and make the shooting. We gave her the camera. Thanks to this, the women we were chatting got to know each other and they were relieved because they spoke the same language.

      They told us that in Turkey migrant women were ill approached particularly by men. Their common experience involved being sexually harassed by their bosses. They also mentioned that they had to work for very low wages, could not even get their salaries paid and did not have any access to mechanisms that would guarantee their rights. They also did not have much solidarity from Turkish women. This lack of contact made them feel isolated. Two of these friends told us that although they had Masters degrees and appropriate expertise, they could only find unskilled work. A younger friend said that she wanted to continue with her education and it was not possible in Turkey. They also told us that their future seemed full of uncertainties but they still held the hope that they would be able to cross the border and realize their dreams. Despite all the hardships they had to endure, their only wish is to have an ordinary, quiet and safe life.

      They told us that the conditions in Pazarkule are particularly harsh for women and children; that the sanitary and accommodation conditions were very bad. Women in the area (including themselves) would not go out of their tents often, because they were not feeling safe. There have been incidents of sexual harassment and one woman managed to run away from those who tried to rape her.

      On top of all these problems, the aggression from the Greek side is very tough. Our friends told us with much regret that last night (March 7) the intensity of teargas was really bad, and women with babies lacked protection. Another friend told us that, the same night a mother with a baby in her arms took refuge in our friend’s make-shift nylon tent. The baby had difficulty breathing and the mother was waving a t-shift to air the tent. The baby was now fine, though.

      When we asked about how the women in the area were interacting, they told us that a group of women visited tents to discuss acting in unison. However there was not consensus because everybody had different motivations. Our friends said that they understood these women too because they all were in a struggle for themselves and their children and they would do anything to win this struggle.

      When we chatted about the Women’s Day, they emphasized that their expectation from all women was that women would not discriminate against them. They also expect solidarity between women without any reservations on the basis of language, religion, and nationality. Their wish for all women in the world is to live in equality and freedom. We also learned that some women organized a Women’s day demo in the area. There is a need for more activity directed towards women and other vulnerable groups in the area.

      We also think that sharing our experience in coordination would be useful for new initiatives:

      –Our chat with female migrant friends today reminded us of the importance of maintaining gender equality in our work.

      – All newcomers need orientation about what has been going on here and the material conditions. Short visits only allow getting used to the field, but longer stays are emotionally and physically very tiring.

      –Therefore, we prioritize groups that can stay between 2-5 days. We can manage our activities in groups of 2-5 people. More people are not necessary and larger groups increase the risk of facing interference from officials. If people want to be in the field and commit time and labour, there are plenty of political and practical arenas to contribute. We have at the moment a pool of volunteers that would be enough to do rotations in the coming weeks. If we need further volunteers, we will issue a call again.

      No border pazarkule/edirne, March 8, 2020.

      https://enoughisenough14.org/2020/03/11/notes-from-pazarkule-evros-ninth-day

    • Turkey Steps Back From Confrontation at Greek Border

      The country is winding down an aggressive two-week operation to move tens of thousands of migrants to its frontiers. But relations with Greece and Europe have suffered.

      Turkey has signaled that it is winding down its two-week operation to aid the movement of tens of thousands of people toward Europe, following a tough on-the-ground response from Greek border guards and a tepid diplomatic reaction from European politicians.

      Migrants at the Greek-Turkish land border began to be transported back to Istanbul by bus this week, witnesses at the border said, de-escalating a standoff that initially set off fears of another European migration crisis. Greek officials said the number of attempted border crossings had dwindled from thousands a day to a few hundred, and none were successful on Friday, even as sporadic exchanges of tear-gas with Turkish security forces continued.

      Also Friday, Turkish officials announced that three human smugglers had each been sentenced to 125 years in prison for their roles in the death of a Syrian toddler, Alan Kurdi, whose drowning came to epitomize an earlier migration crisis, in 2015.

      That announcement and the week’s other developments were interpreted by experts and European politicians as signals to Europe that the Turkish authorities were once again willing to police their borders and quell a second wave of migration.

      It follows a tense period in which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey attempted to engineer the reverse: a new migration crisis on Europe’s borders.

      On Feb. 28, the Turkish government announced it would no longer stop migrants trying to reach Europe, and it then drove hundreds to the threshold of Greece, live-streaming the process to encourage more to follow.

      The move was perceived as an attempt to rally European support for Turkey’s military campaign in northern Syria, and more European aid for the four million refugees inside Turkey.

      On at least one occasion, Turkish officials even forced migrants to leave. In a video clip filmed onboard a bus ferrying people to the border, reluctant migrants were shown being forced off the vehicle at gunpoint by officers in plain clothes, and beaten when they resisted.

      https://twitter.com/daphnetoli/status/1236263937706004481?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E12

      Marc Pierini, a former European Union envoy to Turkey, called it “the first-ever refugee exodus, albeit a limited one, fully organized by one government against another.”

      The border clash not only stirred fears of a new migration crisis, but it also saw both countries react with anger and tough tactics. The Greeks have been condemned for suspending asylum applications and detaining and returning some migrants to Turkey.

      To foment a sense of crisis, Turkish security forces fired tear gas over the border at their Greek counterparts and provided journalists with footage of aggressive Greek responses to migrants. Mr. Erdogan accused Greek officials of behaving like officials in Nazi Germany.

      But the Turks used aggressive tactics of their own.

      Footage captured by The New York Times showed Turkish security forces standing aside to allow migrants to tear down part of a fence dividing Turkey and Greece. And other footage emerged of a Turkish vessel pursuing a Greek coast guard vessel in the Aegean, and of a Turkish armored vehicle ramming a border fence between the two countries.

      The Turkish Interior Ministry then sent more guards to the border — not to prevent people from leaving without documents, but to stop Greece from returning them by force, according to the Turkish interior minister, Suleyman Soylu.

      The confrontation marked a low point in relations between two neighbors who have long had a fragile coexistence within NATO, and it threatened to upend a fine balance in the strategically important, energy-rich southeastern Mediterranean.

      It also brought front and center the European Union’s dependence on Turkey to limit the movement of migrants toward its territory, as well as Mr. Erdogan’s willingness to weaponize migrants for his own purposes.

      But experts said Mr. Erdogan’s mobilization of migrants and security forces at the borders with Europe could have backfired, being so provocative that it may have made European politicians less willing to make concessions.

      “The problem is that because of the blackmail used by Turkey, getting an agreement from the European Council is going to be more difficult,” said Mr. Pierini, who is now an analyst for Carnegie Europe, a research organization.

      The European Union in 2016 agreed to funnel 6 billion euros to organizations helping the nearly four million Syrian refugees in Turkey, in exchange for Turkey’s help in securing its borders with Greece.

      That deal came after nearly one million refugees left Turkey for Greece, allowing them to reach the Continent’s prosperous north relatively easily.

      But Turkey has complained that European funding has been slow in coming, and has been paid to aid groups as well as into its own government coffers, making it less efficient. At a meeting in Brussels this week, European Union leaders discussed with Mr. Erdogan whether the agreement would be extended and how to restore it.

      Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, said the meeting with Mr. Erdogan on Monday had been a “good start” in restoring normalcy at the Greek-Turkish borders.

      “Migrants need support, Greece needs support but also Turkey needs support, and this involves finding a path forward with Turkey,” she said. “Clearly we have our disagreements but we have spoken plainly and we have spoken openly to each other about these.”

      https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1237119313447923712?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E12

      The European Union is likely to eventually agree to send more money to Turkey to help with challenges posed by the refugee influx, Mr. Pierini said.

      But European leaders have taken a dim view of Mr. Erdogan’s latest showmanship, and may have become even more reluctant to accede to other Turkish diplomatic priorities, Mr. Pierini added. Those include an expansion of the Turkey’s joint customs union with Europe, and further visa reforms for Turkish nationals.

      The awkward coexistence between Greece and Turkey since the mid-1990s, when the two countries came close to war, could be at even greater risk of lasting damage.

      “Greek-Turkish détente has been one of the cornerstones of geostrategic relations in the southeastern Mediterranean — and the potential of this collapsing is alarming to the region and Western allies,” said Ian Lesser, the vice president of the German Marshall Fund.

      He said that the escalation had unleashed forces that may not be easy to manage.

      “Once someone opens up Pandora’s box, in an environment when you have proxy groups, coast guards, criminal traffickers, many actors who may not be fully under the control of governments, there is always the potential to go wrong,” Mr. Lesser said.

      “That’s true in Syria but it’s also true on the Greek-Turkish border,” he added.

      https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/world/europe/turkey-greece-border-migrants.html

    • Que sait-on de ces photos montrant des migrants quasi nus à la frontière gréco-turque ?

      Des images publiées par la chaîne turque TRT accusent la police grecque de frapper et de dépouiller des migrants. Propagande, répond Athènes. Les témoignages accablant les policiers grecs sont pourtant nombreux.

      CheckNews a retrouvé l’auteur de ces images : il s’agit du photographe Belal Khaled, qui travaille pour la chaîne turque TRT World. Joint par CheckNews, il a accepté de nous transmettre les originaux de plusieurs photos et vidéos, dont nous avons pu extraire les métadonnées. Elles montrent que ces photographies ont été prises le 5 mars 2020, entre 18 h 30 et 20 h, à quelques mètres de la frontière greco-turque, près de la ville d’Uzunköprü, dans la province d’Edirne.

      Belal Khaled raconte y avoir croisé plusieurs groupes de migrants originaires de divers pays (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syrie, Irak, Maroc…) : « Ils revenaient de Grèce vers la Turquie. Cette zone est actuellement sèche, donc les migrants peuvent passer en marchant. Ils ont été arrêtés en Grèce, parfois à la proximité de la frontière, d’autres dans des villages ou même à 100 kilomètres dans le pays, puis ont été ramenés par les policiers grecs à la frontière. » Des vues satellites consultées à l’aide du logiciel Google Earth Pro permettent de se rendre compte que le fleuve Evros (en turc Meriç) peut atteindre un faible niveau à certaines périodes de l’année.

      Le photographe a également filmé des images pour la chaîne de télévision turque TRT, dans laquelle des migrants accusent des soldats grecs de les avoir battus et dépouillés de leur argent, de leurs téléphones et de leurs vêtements.

      Des anti-migrants dénoncent une mise en scène, sans preuve

      Suite à la diffusion de ces images, des internautes hostiles à l’arrivée de nouveaux migrants en Europe ont dénoncé des mises en scène de la part de la chaîne de télévision turque. Selon eux, les hommes se seraient dévêtus peu avant d’être photographiés.

      Ils soulignent également que sur cette photo, un homme torse nu sourit. Une preuve, selon eux, qu’il ne s’agit pas de « vrais migrants », mais de propagandistes voulant nuire à l’image de la Grèce.

      CheckNews a observé de près les photos et vidéos de Belal Khaled. En comparant les visages des hommes présents sur la série prise par Belal Khaled, il apparaît que l’homme au t-shirt blanc n’est pas la même personne que l’homme entouré sur une autre photo. Les métadonnées des photos indiquent que la première image (avec l’homme en tee-shirt) a été prise à 18 h 24, tandis que celle montrant le groupe d’hommes autour du feu a été faite à 19 h 31.

      Nous avons également remarqué que le groupe présent sur les photos avec l’homme en tee-shirt blanc n’est pas le même que celui en sous-vêtements. Belal Khaled explique : « Il y avait deux groupes. Si vous observez la lumière dans la vidéo, elle est plus sombre quand il y a le groupe venu par la rivière, car il est arrivé plus tard, mais les monteurs l’ont mis au début de la vidéo [du reportage de TRT] pour commencer l’histoire. L’autre groupe [avec l’homme en tee-shirt blanc, ndlr] est celui que nous avons vu en arrivant. Nous les avons trouvés assis dans l’herbe, certains d’entre eux étaient quasiment nus, d’autres portaient des vêtements. »

      Quant aux accusations de mise en scène, prouvées selon les internautes anti-migrants par les rires des hommes près de la rivière, le photographe répond : « Si nous avions voulu falsifier nos images, nous n’aurions pas diffusé celles avec des gens qui sourient. C’est pour cela qu’on peut dire que ce sont des vraies photos. C’est normal qu’ils sourient. Je ne sais pas pourquoi ils rient ou de quoi ils parlaient, mais ils peuvent se dire : "Regarde, il prend une photo de toi !" et ça les fait sourire. »

      Contacté par CheckNews, un représentant du gouvernement grec estime que « les documents de propagande turcs ont été réfutés à plusieurs reprises par le porte-parole du gouvernement, Stelios Petsas. Quant à la vidéo présentée par la chaîne d’Etat turque, il suffit de la regarder pour pouvoir la juger. »
      Des témoignages récoltés par des ONG et le New York Times accablent les policiers grecs

      Si le gouvernement grec refuse d’accorder de la valeur aux images capturées par la chaîne turque TRT, les témoignages rapportant des abus des forces grecques à l’égard des migrants sont cependant nombreux.

      CheckNews a ainsi pu retrouver sur Twitter plusieurs photos et vidéos de migrants torse nu et affichant des traces de coups sur leurs dos. Et qui accusent les forces de sécurité grecques de les avoir battus.

      L’auteur de ces tweets est Mohammed Yaşar, un Turc qui travaille pour le groupe de solidarité Tarlabasi, une ONG basée à Uzunköprü qui vient en aide aux migrants en leur fournissant des couvertures et vêtements. Il dit avoir observé le retour de personnes sans vêtements depuis le 3 mars, et publie depuis des vidéos qu’il a lui-même réalisées au contact des migrants maltraités, pour « montrer à tous les peuples du monde comment la Grèce agit et pour que ça cesse ». Il a accepté de nous fournir les fichiers originaux, dont les métadonnées confirment que les images ont bien été prises entre le 4 et le 8 mars 2020, le long de la frontière turque.

      Dans une enquête parue le 10 mars, le New York Times révèle l’existence d’un site secret en Grèce, où les migrants sont « détenus en secret et sans accès à un recours juridique ». Le journal américain note aussi, photo à l’appui, que « plusieurs migrants ont déclaré dans des interviews qu’ils avaient été capturés, dépouillés de leurs biens, battus et expulsés de Grèce sans avoir eu la possibilité de demander l’asile ou de parler à un avocat, dans le cadre d’une procédure illégale connue sous le nom de refoulement ». Le porte-parole du gouvernement, Stelios Petsas, a réagi à l’enquête en réfutant : « Il n’y a pas de centre de détention secret en Grèce. » Avant d’ajouter que si un journal international connaît le site, c’est qu’il n’est pas secret.

      Interrogé sur de tels faits de maltraitance, le directeur adjoint de la division Crises et conflits à Human Rights Watch, Gerry Simpson, déclare à CheckNews, après deux jours d’observation près de la frontière greco-turque : « Nous disposons de preuves importantes provenant de réfugiés et de Turcs vivant dans les villages frontaliers, qui s’occupent des personnes expulsées de Grèce. Ils racontent que depuis la fin du mois de février, du côté grec, des personnes habillées en uniforme et en tenue civile ont battu et volé des réfugiés. » Dans un tweet publié le 8 mars, Gerry Simpson ajoute que « les forces grecques de sécurité aux frontières ont déshabillé et battu des réfugiés avant de les expulser presque nus avec ce genre de blessures », en postant une des photos de Belal Khaled. Dans un rapport publié en juillet 2018, l’ONG de défense des droits humains avait déjà dénoncé les « conditions inhumaines » auxquelles étaient exposés les migrants dans les centres d’accueil et de détention grecs, ainsi que les « abus et mauvais traitements » causés par la police.

      https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/2020/03/13/que-sait-on-de-ces-photos-montrant-des-migrants-quasi-nus-a-la-frontiere-

    • Turkey to Close Land Borders With Greece, Bulgaria Due to #Coronavirus

      Turkey’s state broadcaster TRT Haber said on Wednesday afternoon that the country’s land borders with Greece and Bulgaria will be closed due to the coronavirus pandemic.

      Thus Turkey’s borders with the European Union will remain closed to the entry and exit of people; however the usual trade which goes on between these countries is not expected to be interrupted.

      It is still unknown for how long the borders will remain closed.

      Later on Wednesday, the Interior Ministry of the country issued a statement, confirming the border closure.

      It remains to be seen if this will affect the border tensions in Evros due to the massed thousands of migrants which have been trying to enter Greece since late February.

      https://greece.greekreporter.com/2020/03/18/turkey-to-close-land-borders-with-greece-bulgaria-due-to-coron
      #fermeture_des_frontières

    • Locals on tractors assist Greek Army and Police along the Evros (video)

      With their farming tractors and headlights on, local residents moved to help the Greek army and police along the Evros river, the natural border to Turkey, to prevent illegal crossing from the Turkish border into Greece.
      Others have gathered to the South Evros with their vehicles and see themselves also as assistants to the Greek Army.

      According to a report by ccn-greece, almost the majority of the locals are on the point on Tuesday night, March 3.
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSOsSJ182Tk&feature=emb_logo


      Some of the citizens who patrol in area “have a rifle,” and abuse migrants when they find them, cnn-greece reported the other day.

      Tuesday was a rather quite day at the Greek-Turkish border, although still q,500 people attempted to enter into Greece and 32 from Afghanistan and Pakistan managed it. They were arrested on the spot.

      After it became clear that the border crossing in Kastanies in the north of Evros s will not open, apparently Turkish authorities changes their plans and decided to move migrants to the south at Evros Delta. Buses were made available on Tuesday for this purpose.

      Several migrants told Greek media reports currently on the Turkish side, that they would try to cross the Evros river by boat.

      One migrant told Star TV that they will get the boats by the Turkish forces in the area. “Children and women will go back to Istanbul,” he said. “Mass crossing of the river will take place happen within or in a week,” he added.

      “It is our duty to support the authorities’ efforts, so that it is clear to everybody and especially Turkey, that Greece is a place where everyone comes in. This should have been done from the first moment, when the problem arose in 2015,” a farmer who joined the patrols with his tractor told protothema. “We are farmers, but we also live at the borders region,” the farmer added.

      In facts, the whole Farmers Association has decided to assist the army and police wherever possible.

      A total of 26,000 people were prevented from entering Greek territory via the Evros from Saturday morning to Tuesday afternoon. More than 218 people have been arrested since Saturday. They were immediately arrested, taken to court and sentence in the average to three to four y

      ears, some with an additional fine of 10,000 euros.

      https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/03/04/evros-citizens-tractors-patrols-greece-turkey-migration
      #milices #milices_privées

    • Les migrants évacués de la frontière gréco-turque et placés en #quarantaine

      Le Premier ministre grec a indiqué vendredi que les migrants massés depuis début mars à la frontière terrestre entre la Grèce et la Turquie avaient quitté les lieux, à leur demande et pour se protéger, selon l’agence turque DHA, de la pandémie de coronavirus.

      « Il semble que le campement installé (depuis le 1er mars) a été démantelé et ceux qui étaient (dans la région frontalière du fleuve) Evros sont partis », a indiqué Kyriakos Mitsotakis lors d’une vidéoconférence du conseil des ministres.

      Le ministre turc de l’Intérieur Suleyman Soylu avait indiqué jeudi que 4600 migrants continuaient de camper près du poste frontalier grec de Kastanies, du côté turc.

      Mais jeudi soir, les demandeurs d’asile ont été transférés à bord d’autocars vers des installations adéquates en Turquie pour qu’ils restent en quarantaine pendant deux semaines afin de garantir qu’ils ne soient pas contaminés par le virus Covid-19, a rapporté l’agence turque DHA. Cette évacuation a eu lieu « à la demande des migrants », selon DHA.
      Le campement brûlé

      De son côté, la télévision publique grecque ERT a indiqué que la police turque avait mis le feu dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi au campement désert après l’évacuation des demandeurs d’asile. Une vidéo diffusée vendredi par le gouvernement grec montre de hautes flammes le long des barrières qui marquent la frontière.

      Le Premier ministre grec a souligné que les militaires et les policiers grecs resteraient sur place et que la clôture le long de la frontière serait « renforcée ». « Un chapitre est peut-être clos mais la bataille continue », a encore déclaré Kyriakos Mitsotakis.
      Certains sont détenus en Grèce

      En quête de soutien en Syrie, la Turquie avait annoncé le 29 février qu’elle n’empêcherait plus les migrants de passer en Europe et des milliers de demandeurs d’asile s’étaient aussitôt massés à Pazrakule, du côté turc de la frontière.

      La Grèce avait alors demandé et obtenu l’aide de l’Union européenne pour empêcher les demandeurs d’asile de traverser la frontière.

      Les forces antiémeutes grecques dépêchées à Kastanies avaient fait usage de gaz lacrymogènes pour repousser les migrants. Mais certains qui avaient réussi à passer sur le sol grec sont depuis détenus dans des camps fermés en Grèce ou ont été refoulés en Turquie, selon des ONG, qui ont dénoncé des « pratiques illégales » d’Athènes.

      https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/11201770-les-migrants-evacues-de-la-frontiere-grecoturque-et-places-en-quarantai
      #évacuation

      ping @thomas_lacroix

    • Turkey moves migrants from Greek border amid virus pandemic

      Turkish authorities on Friday evacuated hundreds of migrants who had been waiting at the border with Greece hoping to make their way into Europe, amid the coronavirus pandemic, Turkey’s state-run news agency reported.

      Thousands of migrants had massed at a border crossing with European Union-member Greece after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced last month that his country would no longer prevent refugees and other migrants wanting to travel to EU countries.

      Violent clashes erupted between the migrants and Greek border authorities trying to push them back.

      Anadolu Agency reported Friday that migrants waiting at the border crossing in Edirne province were transported in buses to state guest houses where they would be quarantined. They would be moved to other regions in Turkey at the end of the quarantine, the agency reported.

      Anadolu did not say how many people were transported away from the border area but an estimated 2,000 had been staying in a makeshift camp near the border gate.

      Turkey has so far reported 75 deaths related to the new coronavirus and 3,629 infections. It was not clear if any of the migrants at the border had contracted the virus.

      The Edirne governor’s office did not return calls.

      Greece hailed the development as an “important thing for our country and for Europe,” praising Greek authorities’ ability to guard its land and sea borders.

      Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, speaking during a teleconference with ministers on the situation at the border, said Greek authorities had “ascertained that the makeshift camp which had been created ... appears to have been dismantled and those who were on the Evros border have been moved away.”

      Greek authorities also shared a night-time video of a fire in a wooded area, which they said was Turkish authorities burning the tents left behind by the departing migrants.

      “A chapter might potentially be closing, but this battle, have no doubt, continues,” Mitsotakis told the ministers, according to a statement released by his office. “We managed to secure a very important thing for our country and for Europe. The ability and efficiency of guarding our land and sea borders.”

      A Turkish journalist based in Edirne said several buses were seen leaving the border area and that authorities later disinfected an area where the migrants had been camping.

      Anadolu said some of the migrants asked to be moved, while others had to be convinced.

      Turkey declared its borders open for migrants to cross into Europe following months of threats by Erdogan that he would allow millions of refugees into Europe unless the EU provided more support for the more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey.

      http://www.ekathimerini.com/251075/article/ekathimerini/news/turkey-moves-migrants-from-greek-border-amid-virus-pandemic

    • Crisis not averted: security policies cannot solve a humanitarian problem, now or in the long-term

      At the end of February, the Turkish government announced it would allow refugees to travel onwards to Greece and Bulgaria, in the hope of extracting from the EU further financial support as well as backing for its military operations in Syria. It has now taken up its role as Europe’s border guard again, but the manufactured crisis induced by the Turkish decision and the EU response highlight the long-term failings of the EU’s asylum and migration model.

      http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-359-crisis-not-averted.pdf

    • Tra Turchia e Grecia. Cani, doppiette, trattori e neonazi: la caccia ai profughi

      L’indicibile saldatura è avvenuta sul terreno. “Nacht und nebel”, proprio come nel vecchio slogan nazista, “di notte e nella nebbia” un primo gruppo di estremisti tedeschi ha cominciato a percorrere i campi dove si da la caccia ai migranti. Un richiamo per gli altri che da Austria, Italia, Ungheria si sono messi in macchina per “soccorrere - scrivono nelle loro chat - il popolo greco”. Tra loro Marin Sellner, beneficiario di 1.500 euro donati al suo movimento dallo stragista di Christchurch, in Nuova Zelanda (50 morti a giugno 2019).

      Anche nelle ultime ventiquattr’ore non sono mancati gli scontri lungo la barriera metallica che si è rivelata un muro invalicabile. Dal confine turco, però, i profughi che da giorni danno l’assalto alla frontiera stanno cambiando strategia. Gli attacchi avvengono specialmente di notte, con il fuoco di copertura (fumogeni, lacrimogeni e bombe stordenti) lanciati dalle forze speciali di Ankara. L’opposta propaganda si rinfaccia una serie di colpi, questa volta di piombo vero, esplosi contro un blindato greco. Attacco a sua volta lamentato anche dall’esercito di Ankara.

      Non si sa dove può portare una crisi nella quale due alleati della Nato, per di più confinanti, si sparano addosso. Di certo Erdogan non ha permesso ai profughi di abbandonare la presa, aspettando probabilmente un nuovo incontro con Angela Merkel.

      La contabilità della guerriglia di confine non tiene conto dei feriti. Solo degli arrestati e dei respinti prima che riuscissero a mettere piede su una zolla di Ue. Oggi 3 arresti (2 togolesi e un pachistano) e 741 tentativi d’ingresso bloccati.

      I pochi profughi che riescono a guadagnare un varco devono vedersela con un’armata brancaleone male equipaggiata ma molto determinata. C’è il vecchio Theodoros che non ha avuto il tempo neanche di staccare l’aratro dal trattore con cui si inoltra nella boscaglia. Mentre avanza fa tanto di quel chiasso da mettere in guardia chiunque stia nel raggio di mezzo chilometro. Nei villaggi vicini hanno perfino organizzato una sfilata notturna con le macchine agricole attrezzate con potenti fari alla ricerca dei disgraziati. A sud di Kastanies, dove il fiume già presagisce l’accesso al mare, i paramilitari tollerati da Atene hanno catturato nei giorni scorsi una trentina di profughi, tra cui donne e bambini. Nelle foto che i “cacciatori” si passano di telefono in telefono, si vedono i “prigionieri” a cui sono state tolte le scarpe, ammassate ad alcuni metri da loro, seduti in terra e guardati a vista da uomini armati in attesa che arrivi la polizia. Le donne e i bambini indossano in maggioranza un cappellino rosso. Un accorgimento per renderli ben visibili casomai la corrente dell’Evros li avesse trascinati.

      Dinos Theoharidis, il “colonnello” di Alba Dorata, esprime il suo disappunto con i giornalisti italiani che hanno scoperto e raccontato il suo ruolo da ex membro dei corpi speciali. Adesso fa da ufficiale di collegamento tra i civili in armi e gli ufficiali dell’esercito, mentre le forze armate continuano a riversare uomini sul confine per dare il cambio ai militari che devono vedersela con il gas urticante lanciato dalle forze speciali di Ankara. “A causa vostra ora tutti sanno quello che faccio qui - ci rimprovera Dinos - che bisogna c’era di scriverlo? Non siete dei patrioti come noi?”.

      A dargli manforte sono piombati i tedeschi del Movimento identitario. A Berlino nei mesi scorsi l’Ufficio federale per la Protezione della Costituzione, ha dichiarato che il gruppo è passato da “sospettato di estremismo” a “movimento estremista di destra”. Parte integrante del movimento nazionalista paneruopeo. Una decina di giovani sono arrivati attraverso la frontiera bulgara. Da subito si sono messi a disposizione delle ronde.

      L’internazionale xenofoba è stata accolta con l’applauso di alcuni militari. Soldati che non hanno impedito agli estremisti berlinesi di srotolare uno striscione proprio contro la frontiera turca: “No way”, non si passa. Il governo di Atene sta valutando la loro espulsione. Chiunque voglia perlustrare il confine e dare la caccia ai migranti, qui è il benvenuto. Meglio se con un fucile da caccia in spalla, ma senza farne una bandiera per ottenere visibilità politica a danno di una Grecia Che negli ultimi giorni ha perso molte simpatie.

      Accade in piena Unione Europea. C’è chi mette a disposizione i trattori per superare i muri di fango intorno agli argini. Chi guida mute di cani e, con la doppietta già caricata a pallettoni, batte zolla a zolla i campi di cotone e irrompe nei casali abbandonati. Ogni volta che incrociano un’edicola votiva, si fermano per un triplice segno di croce. Poi procedono lasciandosi strattonare dai segugi, affondando gli scarponi nella direzione decisa dai cani.Sono attesi gruppi neonazisti da ogni dove. Troppo anche per il governo di Atene. “Trovateli a mandateli via”, l’ordine giunto ai commissariati. Alcuni sono però rimasti in zona. Basta che diano una mano ad Alba Dorata e non facciano troppo baccano sui social network.

      https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/cani-doppiette-trattori-e-neonazi-per-dare-la-caccia-ai-migranti-nuovi-scon
      #no_way

  • Monitoring « secondary movements » and « hotspots » : Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “#situational_awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/dec/eu-frontex-int-surv.htm
    #surveillance #mouvements_secondaires #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Frontex #hotspot #hotspots #risques #analyse_de_risques

    –---------

    Dans ce rapport de Statewatch, on peut lire :

    Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”2 New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU.

    Ce qui n’est pas sans rappeler la carte de @reka sur les 3 frontières européennes :
    #pré-frontière
    #frontière
    #post-frontière


    https://visionscarto.net/la-mediterranee-plus-loin

    Pour une version plus récente de cette carte...


    https://asile.ch/2016/12/13/regard-dune-geographe-murs-frontieres-fantasme-controle-migratoire

    ping @etraces @karine4 @reka @isskein

    • Making misery pay : Libya militias take EU funds for migrants

      When the European Union started funneling millions of euros into Libya to slow the tide of migrants crossing the Mediterranean, the money came with EU promises to improve detention centers notorious for abuse and fight human trafficking.

      That hasn’t happened. Instead, the misery of migrants in Libya has spawned a thriving and highly lucrative web of businesses funded in part by the EU and enabled by the United Nations, an Associated Press investigation has found.

      The EU has sent more than 327.9 million euros to Libya (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya), with an additional 41 million approved in early December (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/all-news-and-stories/new-actions-almost-eu150-million-tackle-human-smuggling-protect-vulnerable), largely channeled through U.N. agencies. The AP found that in a country without a functioning government, huge sums of European money have been diverted to intertwined networks of militiamen, traffickers and coast guard members who exploit migrants. In some cases, U.N. officials knew militia networks were getting the money, according to internal emails.

      The militias torture, extort and otherwise abuse migrants for ransoms in detention centers under the nose of the U.N., often in compounds that receive millions in European money, the AP investigation showed. Many migrants also simply disappear from detention centers, sold to traffickers or to other centers.

      The same militias conspire with some members of Libyan coast guard units. The coast guard gets training and equipment from Europe to keep migrants away from its shores. But coast guard members return some migrants to the detention centers under deals with militias, the AP found, and receive bribes to let others pass en route to Europe.

      The militias involved in abuse and trafficking also skim off European funds given through the U.N. to feed and otherwise help migrants, who go hungry. For example, millions of euros in U.N. food contracts were under negotiation with a company controlled by a militia leader, even as other U.N. teams raised alarms about starvation in his detention center, according to emails obtained by the AP and interviews with at least a half-dozen Libyan officials.

      In many cases, the money goes to neighboring Tunisia to be laundered, and then flows back to the militias in Libya.

      The story of Prudence Aimée and her family shows how migrants are exploited at every stage of their journey through Libya.

      Aimée left Cameroon in 2015, and when her family heard nothing from her for a year, they thought she was dead. But she was in detention and incommunicado. In nine months at the Abu Salim detention center, she told the AP, she saw “European Union milk” and diapers delivered by U.N.staff pilfered before they could reach migrant children, including her toddler son. Aimée herself would spend two days at a time without food or drink, she said.

      In 2017, an Arab man came looking for her with a photo of her on his phone.

      “They called my family and told them they had found me,” she said. “That’s when my family sent money.” Weeping, Aimée said her family paid a ransom equivalent of $670 to get her out of the center. She could not say who got the money.

      She was moved to an informal warehouse and eventually sold to yet another detention center, where yet another ransom — $750 this time — had to be raised from her family. Her captors finally released the young mother, who got on a boat that made it past the coast guard patrol, after her husband paid $850 for the passage. A European humanitarian ship rescued Aimée, but her husband remains in Libya.

      Aimée was one of more than 50 migrants interviewed by the AP at sea, in Europe, Tunisia and Rwanda, and in furtive messages from inside detention centers in Libya. Journalists also spoke with Libyan government officials, aid workers and businessmen in Tripoli, obtained internal U.N. emails and analyzed budget documents and contracts.

      The issue of migration has convulsed Europe since the influx of more than a million people in 2015 and 2016, fleeing violence and poverty in the Mideast, Afghanistan and Africa. In 2015, the European Union set up a fund intended to curb migration from Africa, from which money is sent to Libya. The EU gives the money mainly through the U.N.’s International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the High Commissioner for Refugees. (UNHCR).

      But Libya is plagued by corruption and caught in a civil war. The west, including the capital Tripoli, is ruled by a U.N.-brokered government, while the east is ruled by another government supported by army commander Khalifa Hifter. The chaos is ideal for profiteers making money off migrants.

      The EU’s own documents show it was aware of the dangers of effectively outsourcing its migration crisis to Libya. Budget documents from as early as 2017 for a 90 million euro (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-noa-ly-03.pdf) outlay warned of a medium-to-high risk that Europe’s support would lead to more human rights violations against migrants, and that the Libyan government would deny access to detention centers. A recent EU assessment (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/risk_register_eutf_0.pdf) found the world was likely to get the “wrong perception” that European money could be seen as supporting abuse.

      Despite the roles they play in the detention system in Libya, both the EU and the U.N. say they want the centers closed. In a statement to the AP, the EU said that under international law, it is not responsible for what goes on inside the centers.

      “Libyan authorities have to provide the detained refugees and migrants with adequate and quality food while ensuring that conditions in detention centers uphold international agreed standards,” the statement said.

      The EU also says more than half of the money in its fund for Africa is used to help and protect migrants, and that it relies on the U.N. to spend the money wisely.

      The U.N. said the situation in Libya is highly complex, and it has to work with whoever runs the detention centers to preserve access to vulnerable migrants.

      “UNHCR does not choose its counterparts,” said Charlie Yaxley, a spokesman for the U.N. refugee agency. “Some presumably also have allegiances with local militias.”

      After two weeks of being questioned by the AP, UNHCR said it would change its policy on awarding of food and aid contracts for migrants through intermediaries.

      “Due in part to the escalating conflict in Tripoli and the possible risk to the integrity of UNHCR’s programme, UNHCR decided to contract directly for these services from 1 January 2020,” Yaxley said.

      Julien Raickman, who until recently was the Libya mission chief for the aid group Médecins Sans Frontières, also known as Doctors Without Borders, believes the problem starts with Europe’s unwillingness to deal with the politics of migration.

      “If you were to treat dogs in Europe the way these people are treated, it would be considered a societal problem,” he said.

      EXTORTION INSIDE THE DETENTION CENTERS

      About 5,000 migrants in Libya are crowded into between 16 and 23 detention centers at any given time, depending on who is counting and when. Most are concentrated in the west, where the militias are more powerful than the weak U.N.-backed government.

      Aid intended for migrants helps support the al-Nasr Martyrs detention center, named for the militia that controls it, in the western coastal town of Zawiya. The U.N. migration agency, the IOM, keeps a temporary office there for medical checks of migrants, and its staff and that of the UNHCR visit the compound regularly.

      Yet migrants at the center are tortured for ransoms to be freed and trafficked for more money, only to be intercepted at sea by the coast guard and brought back to the center, according to more than a dozen migrants, Libyan aid workers, Libyan officials and European human rights groups. A UNHCR report in late 2018 noted the allegations as well, and the head of the militia, Mohammed Kachlaf, is under U.N. sanctions (https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/materials/summaries/individual/mohammed-kachlaf) for human trafficking. Kachlaf, other militia leaders named by the AP and the Libyan coast guard all did not respond to requests for comment.

      Many migrants recalled being cut, shot and whipped with electrified hoses and wooden boards. They also heard the screams of others emerging from the cell blocks off-limits to U.N. aid workers.

      Families back home are made to listen during the torture to get them to pay, or are sent videos afterward.

      Eric Boakye, a Ghanaian, was locked in the al-Nasr Martyrs center twice, both times after he was intercepted at sea, most recently around three years ago. The first time, his jailers simply took the money on him and set him free. He tried again to cross and was again picked up by the coast guard and returned to his jailers.

      “They cut me with a knife on my back and beat me with sticks,” he said, lifting his shirt to show the scars lining his back. “Each and every day they beat us to call our family and send money.” The new price for freedom: Around $2,000.

      That was more than his family could scrape together. Boakye finally managed to escape. He worked small jobs for some time to save money, then tried to cross again. On his fourth try, he was picked up by the Ocean Viking humanitarian ship to be taken to Italy. In all, Boakye had paid $4,300 to get out of Libya.

      Fathi al-Far, the head of the al-Nasr International Relief and Development agency, which operates at the center and has ties to the militia, denied that migrants are mistreated. He blamed “misinformation” on migrants who blew things out of proportion in an attempt to get asylum.

      “I am not saying it’s paradise — we have people who have never worked before with the migrants, they are not trained,” he said. But he called the al-Nasr Martyrs detention center “the most beautiful in the country.”

      At least five former detainees showed an AP journalist scars from their injuries at the center, which they said were inflicted by guards or ransom seekers making demands to their families. One man had bullet wounds to both feet, and another had cuts on his back from a sharp blade. All said they had to pay to get out.

      Five to seven people are freed every day after they pay anywhere from $1,800 to $8,500 each, the former migrants said. At al-Nasr, they said, the militia gets around $14,000 every day from ransoms; at Tarik al-Sikka, a detention center in Tripoli, it was closer to $17,000 a day, they said. They based their estimates on what they and others detained with them had paid, by scraping together money from family and friends.

      The militias also make money from selling groups of migrants, who then often simply disappear from a center. An analysis commissioned by the EU and released earlier this month by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (https://globalinitiative.net/migrant-detention-libya) noted that the detention centers profit by selling migrants among themselves and to traffickers, as well as into prostitution and forced labor.

      Hundreds of migrants this year who were intercepted at sea and taken to detention centers had vanished by the time international aid groups visited, according to Médecins Sans Frontières. There’s no way to tell where they went, but MSF suspects they were sold to another detention center or to traffickers.

      A former guard at the Khoms center acknowledged to the AP that migrants often were seized in large numbers by men armed with anti-aircraft guns and RPGs. He said he couldn’t keep his colleagues from abusing the migrants or traffickers from taking them out of the center.

      “I don’t want to remember what happened,” he said. The IOM was present at Khoms, he noted, but the center closed last year.

      A man who remains detained at the al-Nasr Martyrs center said Libyans frequently arrive in the middle of the night to take people. Twice this fall, he said, they tried to load a group of mostly women into a small convoy of vehicles but failed because the center’s detainees revolted.

      Fighting engulfed Zawiya last week, but migrants remained locked inside the al-Nasr Martyrs center, which is also being used for weapons storage.

      TRAFFICKING AND INTERCEPTION AT SEA

      Even when migrants pay to be released from the detention centers, they are rarely free. Instead, the militias sell them to traffickers, who promise to take them across the Mediterranean to Europe for a further fee. These traffickers work hand in hand with some coast guard members, the AP found.

      The Libyan coast guard is supported by both the U.N. and the EU. The IOM highlights (https://libya.iom.int/rescue-sea-support) its cooperation with the coast guard on its Libya home page. Europe has spent more than 90 million euros since 2017 for training and faster boats for the Libyan coast guard to stop migrants from ending up in Europe.

      This fall, Italy renewed a memorandum of understanding with Libya to support the coast guard with training and vessels, and it delivered 10 new speedboats to Libya in November.

      In internal documents obtained in September by the European watchdog group Statewatch, the European Council described the coast guard as “operating effectively, thus confirming the process achieved over the past three years” (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-council-libya-11538-19.pdf). The Libyan coast guard says it intercepted nearly 9,000 people in 2019 en route to Europe and returned them to Libya this year, after quietly extending its coastal rescue zone 100 miles offshore with European encouragement.

      What’s unclear is how often militias paid the coast guard to intercept these people and bring them back to the detention centers — the business more than a dozen migrants described at the al-Nasr Martyrs facility in Zawiya.

      The coast guard unit at Zawiya is commanded by Abdel-Rahman Milad, who has sanctions against him for human trafficking by the U.N.’s Security Council. Yet when his men intercept boats carrying migrants, they contact U.N. staff at disembarkation points for cursory medical checks.

      Despite the sanctions and an arrest warrant against him, Milad remains free because he has the support of the al-Nasr militia. In 2017, before the sanctions, Milad was even flown to Rome, along with a militia leader, Mohammed al-Khoja, as part of a Libyan delegation for a U.N.-sponsored migration meeting. In response to the sanctions, Milad denied any links to human smuggling and said traffickers wear uniforms similar to those of his men.

      Migrants named at least two other operations along the coast, at Zuwara and Tripoli, that they said operated along the same lines as Milad’s. Neither center responded to requests for comment.

      The U.N.’s International Organization for Migration acknowledged to the AP that it has to work with partners who might have contacts with local militias.

      “Without those contacts it would be impossible to operate in those areas and for IOM to provide support services to migrants and the local population,” said IOM spokeswoman Safa Msehli. “Failure to provide that support would have compounded the misery of hundreds of men, women and children.”

      The story of Abdullah, a Sudanese man who made two attempts to flee Libya, shows just how lucrative the cycle of trafficking and interception really is.

      All told, the group of 47 in his first crossing from Tripoli over a year ago had paid a uniformed Libyan and his cronies $127,000 in a mix of dollars, euros and Libyan dinars for the chance to leave their detention center and cross in two boats. They were intercepted in a coast guard boat by the same uniformed Libyan, shaken down for their cell phones and more money, and tossed back into detention.

      “We talked to him and asked him, why did you let us out and then arrest us?” said Abdullah, who asked that only his first name be used because he was afraid of retaliation. “He beat two of us who brought it up.”

      Abdullah later ended up in the al-Nasr Martyrs detention center, where he learned the new price list for release and an attempted crossing based on nationality: Ethiopians, $5,000; Somalis $6,800; Moroccans and Egyptians, $8,100; and finally Bangladeshis, a minimum $18,500. Across the board, women pay more.

      Abdullah scraped together another ransom payment and another crossing fee. Last July, he and 18 others paid $48,000 in total for a boat with a malfunctioning engine that sputtered to a stop within hours.

      After a few days stuck at sea off the Libyan coast under a sweltering sun, they threw a dead man overboard and waited for their own lives to end. Instead, they were rescued on their ninth day at sea by Tunisian fishermen, who took them back to Tunisia.

      “There are only three ways out of the prison: You escape, you pay ransom, or you die,” Abdullah said, referring to the detention center.

      In all, Abdullah spent a total of $3,300 to leave Libya’s detention centers and take to the sea. He ended up barely 100 miles away.

      Sometimes members of the coast guard make money by doing exactly what the EU wants them to prevent: Letting migrants cross, according to Tarik Lamloum, the head of the Libyan human rights organization Beladi. Traffickers pay the coast guard a bribe of around $10,000 per boat that is allowed to pass, with around five to six boats launching at a time when conditions are favorable, he said.

      The head of Libya’s Department for Combating Irregular Migration or DCIM, the agency responsible for the detention centers under the Ministry of Interior, acknowledged corruption and collusion among the militias and the coast guard and traffickers, and even within the government itself.

      “They are in bed with them, as well as people from my own agency,” said Al Mabrouk Abdel-Hafez.

      SKIMMING PROFITS

      Beyond the direct abuse of migrants, the militia network also profits by siphoning off money from EU funds sent for their food and security — even those earmarked for a U.N.-run migrant center, according to more than a dozen officials and aid workers in Libya and Tunisia, as well as internal U.N. emails and meeting minutes seen by The Associated Press.

      An audit in May of the UNHCR (https://oios.un.org/audit-reports, the U.N. refugee agency responsible for the center, found a lack of oversight and accountability at nearly all levels of spending in the Libya mission. The audit identified inexplicable payments in American dollars to Libyan firms and deliveries of goods that were never verified.

      In December 2018, during the period reviewed in the audit, the U.N. launched its migrant center in Tripoli (https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/12/5c09033a4/first-group-refugees-evacuated-new-departure-facility-libya.html), known as the #Gathering_and_Departure_Facility or #GDF, as an “ alternative to detention” (https://apnews.com/7e72689f44e45dd17aa0a3ee53ed3c03). For the recipients of the services contracts, sent through the Libyan government agency LibAid, it was a windfall.

      Millions of euros in contracts for food (https://apnews.com/e4c68dae65a84c519253f69c817a58ec) and migrant aid went to at least one company linked to al-Khoja, the militia leader flown to Rome for the U.N. migration meeting, according to internal U.N. emails seen by the AP, two senior Libyan officials and an international aid worker. Al-Khoja is also the deputy head of the DCIM, the government agency responsible for the detention centers.

      One of the Libyan officials saw the multimillion-euro catering contract with a company named Ard al-Watan, or The Land of the Nation, which al-Khoja controls.

      “We feel like this is al-Khoja’s fiefdom. He controls everything. He shuts the doors and he opens the doors,” said the official, a former employee at the U.N. center who like other Libyan officials spoke anonymously out of fear for his safety. He said al-Khoja used sections of the U.N. center to train his militia fighters and built a luxury apartment inside.

      Even as the contracts for the U.N. center were negotiated, Libyan officials said, three Libyan government agencies were investigating al-Khoja in connection with the disappearance of $570 million from government spending allocated to feed migrants in detention centers in the west.

      At the time, al-Khoja already ran another center for migrants, Tarik al-Sikka, notorious for abuses including beating, hard labor and a massive ransom scheme. Tekila, an Eritrean refugee, said that for two years at Tarik al-Sikka, he and other migrants lived on macaroni, even after he was among 25 people who came down with tuberculosis, a disease exacerbated by malnutrition. Tekila asked that only his first name be used for his safety.

      “When there is little food, there is no choice but to go to sleep,” he said.

      Despite internal U.N. emails warning of severe malnutrition inside Tarik al-Sikka, U.N. officials in February and March 2018 repeatedly visited the detention center to negotiate the future opening of the GDF. AP saw emails confirming that by July 2018, the UNHCR’s chief of mission was notified that companies controlled by al-Khoja’s militia would receive subcontracts for services.

      Yaxley, the spokesman for UNHCR, emphasized that the officials the agency works with are “all under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.” He said UNHCR monitors expenses to make sure its standard rules are followed, and may withhold payments otherwise.

      A senior official at LibAid, the Libyan government agency that managed the center with the U.N., said the contracts are worth at least $7 million for catering, cleaning and security, and 30 out of the 65 LibAid staff were essentially ghost employees who showed up on the payroll, sight unseen.

      The U.N. center was “a treasure trove,” the senior Libaid official lamented. “There was no way you could operate while being surrounded by Tripoli militias. It was a big gamble.”

      An internal U.N. communication from early 2019 shows it was aware of the problem. The note found a high risk that food for the U.N. center was being diverted to militias, given the amount budgeted compared to the amount migrants were eating.

      In general, around 50 dinars a day, or $35, is budgeted per detainee for food and other essentials for all centers, according to two Libyan officials, two owners of food catering companies and an international aid worker. Of that, only around 2 dinars is actually spent on meals, according to their rough calculations and migrants’ descriptions.

      Despite the investigations into al-Khoja, Tarik al-Sikka and another detention center shared a 996,000-euro grant from the EU and Italy in February.

      At the Zawiya center, emergency goods delivered by U.N. agencies ended up redistributed “half for the prisoners, half for the workers,” said Orobosa Bright, a Nigerian who endured three stints there for a total of 11 months. Many of the goods end up on Libya’s black market as well, Libyan officials and international aid workers say.

      IOM’s spokeswoman said “aid diversion is a reality” in Libya and beyond, and that the agency does its best. Msehli said if it happens regularly, IOM will be forced to re-evaluate its supports to detention centers “despite our awareness that any reduction in this lifesaving assistance will add to the misery of migrants.”

      Despite the corruption, the detention system in Libya is still expanding in places, with money from Europe. At a detention center in Sabaa where migrants are already going hungry, they were forced to build yet another wing funded by the Italian government, said Lamloum, the Libyan aid worker. The Italian government did not respond to a request for comment.

      Lamloum sent a photo of the new prison. It has no windows.

      TUNISIA LAUNDERING

      The money earned off the suffering of migrants is whitewashed in money laundering operations in Tunisia, Libya’s neighbor.

      In the town of Ben Gardane, dozens of money-changing stalls transform Libyan dinars, dollars and euros into Tunisian currency before the money continues on its way to the capital, Tunis. Even Libyans without residency can open a bank account.

      Tunisia also offers another opportunity for militia networks to make money off European funds earmarked for migrants. Because of Libya’s dysfunctional banking system, where cash is scarce and militias control accounts, international organizations give contracts, usually in dollars, to Libyan organizations with bank accounts in Tunisia. The vendors compound the money on Libya’s black-market exchange, which ranges between 4 and 9 times greater than the official rate.

      Libya’s government handed over more than 100 files to Tunisia earlier this year listing companies under investigation for fraud and money laundering.

      The companies largely involve militia warlords and politicians, according to Nadia Saadi, a manager at the Tunisian anti-corruption authority. The laundering involves cash payments for real estate, falsified customs documents and faked bills for fictitious companies.

      “All in all, Libya is run by militias,” said a senior Libyan judicial official, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of risking his life. “Whatever governments say, and whatever uniform they wear, or stickers they put....this is the bottom line.”

      Husni Bey, a prominent businessman in Libya, said the idea of Europe sending aid money to Libya, a once-wealthy country suffering from corruption, was ill-conceived from the beginning.

      “Europe wants to buy those who can stop smuggling with all of these programs,” Bey said. “They would be much better off blacklisting the names of those involved in human trafficking, fuel and drug smuggling and charging them with crimes, instead of giving them money.”

      https://apnews.com/9d9e8d668ae4b73a336a636a86bdf27f

  • EU aid and development funding has provided €215 million for border security in Morocco since 2001

    Since 2001, almost €215 million has been provided to Morocco by the EU to finance border security projects. Human rights abuses against migrants and refugees committed by Moroccan authorities call into question whether financial support from the EU to Moroccan border security should continue.

    http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-347-eu-morocco-aid-border-security.pdf

    Initial EU funding efforts worth some €68 million took place between 2001 and 2010 and, despite an interlude in which financial support was concerned with reform of the country’s migration policy, in 2018 funding for border security returned with a vengeance, with €140 million promised to Morocco - half of which comes from the EU Trust Fund for Africa.

    The strengthening of the EU-Morocco relationship on migration control has coincided with a crackdown on migrant presence in the north of Morocco, during which at least 8,000 people have been arrested and internally displaced to the south by the Moroccan police.

    People on the move have often faced violence at the hands of the Moroccan authorities in the name of enforcing the country’s migration policy. Nevertheless, the European Commission is reticent to acknowledge that it may have contributed in some way to operations by the Moroccan security forces in which human rights have been violated - an official told Statewatch that Morocco “advocates for a humanistic approach that considers human rights and integration as its first priority.”

    There is little publicly-available information on the results of these funding programmes and the evaluation report for just one project is publicly available. However, the activities foreseen for each project - contained in documents released to Statewatch - indicate that development aid has been used to increase the capacity of Moroccan state institutions to control the country’s land and sea borders, to exchange and coordinate information with both African and European partners. It seems like that the projects currently being implemented will continue in this vein.

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-morocco-borders.htm
    #Maroc #externalisation #externalisation_des_frontières #asile #migrations #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières

    ping @isskein @karine4

    Ajouté à cette métaliste sur développement et migrations :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768702

  • Germany wants asylum seekers assessed before reaching Europe

    The German interior minister #Horst_Seehofer has called for a new European migration system which would see asylum applications decided outside Europe’s borders.

    Germany has called on the European Union to change its approach to asylum applications. The interior minister, Horst #Seehofer, said on Tuesday that applicants should undergo initial assessment at Europe’s external borders and be sent home from there as well.

    “We have to realize that the Dublin system has failed,” Seehofer told the interior ministers of France, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom at a meeting of the so-called #G6 group in the southern German city of Munich on Tuesday.

    The Dublin regulation refers to European Union rules which state that the EU country in which a person seeking asylum first sets foot should handle the asylum application.

    External processing

    “(This) system cannot be the basis for the EU’s future asylum policy,” Seehofer said. “We need a new philosophy that starts at the external borders.”


    https://twitter.com/BMI_Bund/status/1189152116176248832?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

    “Our proposition: Effective protection of Europe’s external borders, where we check whether someone has a need for protection or has to be returned immediately. This means we need a unified set of rules.”

    Under Seehofer’s proposal, only asylum seekers with prospects for receiving protection in Europe should be distributed among a group of willing EU countries. Their asylum issues would then be addressed there.

    If the initial assessment at the European external borders is negative, the EU border agency Frontex should return the asylum seeker to his or her home country.

    Most support Seehofer

    The EU migration commissioner, Dimitris Avrampoulos, who also attended the G6 meeting, welcomed the proposal and called the discussions “constructive”. He said most of the G6 ministers supported Seehofer.


    https://twitter.com/Avramopoulos/status/1188870575877492736?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

    Seehofer also wants to bring forward a planned strengthening of the European border agency, Frontex. Officials in Brussels on Wednesday approved plans to deploy 10,000 uniformed border guards and officers across the EU by 2027, the AFP news agency reports.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/20480/germany-wants-asylum-seekers-assessed-before-reaching-europe
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #procédure_d'asile

    Je répète ici les mots de Seehofer, car on va probablement encore et encore les réutiliser...

    “We have to realize that the Dublin system has failed, (...) (This) system cannot be the basis for the EU’s future asylum policy,” Seehofer said. “We need a new philosophy that starts at the external borders. (...) Our proposition: Effective protection of Europe’s external borders, where we check whether someone has a need for protection or has to be returned immediately. This means we need a unified set of rules.”

    –-----------

    Ceci est à mettre en lien aussi avec le même genre de proposition (celle d’une externalisation non seulement des #contrôles_frontaliers, mais aussi de la #procédure_d'asile, et du #tri et de la #catégorisation) de #Macron en 2017 :
    Macron veut « identifier » les demandeurs d’asile au #Tchad et au Niger
    https://seenthis.net/messages/704970
    #France #hub

    –-------

    Mais Macron lui-même n’avait rien inventé... C’était une proposition qui arrivait de l’#Angleterre de #Tony_Blair :

    The idea of establishing reception centres in third countries, however, is not new. It was first suggested, unsuccessfully, by Tony Blair in 2003 [https://www.theguardian.com/society/2003/feb/05/asylum.immigrationasylumandrefugees] It was then taken over by the former German Interior Minister Otto Schily in 2005,[ “German Interior Ministry, Effektiver Schutz für Flüchtlinge, wirkungsvolle Bekämpfung illegaler Migration – Überlegungen des Bundesministers des Innern zur Einrichtung einer EU-Aufnahmeeinrichtung in Nordafrika 9 September 2005.”] who proposed to establish asylum centres in North Africa, and more recently Italy. The original 2003 Blair proposal was that any third-country national who sought asylum in the EU would be returned immediately to a centre in a third country where his or her application would be considered.

    https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/offshore-processing-asylum-applications-out-sight-out-mind
    #UK

    v. aussi :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/704970#message704974
    #Transit_Processing_Centres (#TPCs) #UK

    ping @_kg_ @isskein @karine4 @visionscarto

    –----

    voir la métaliste sur les tentatives d’externalisation de la procédure d’asile de différents pays européens dans l’histoire :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/900122

    • Austrian Presidency document: “a new, better protection system under which no applications for asylum are filed on EU territory”

      A crude paper authored by the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the EU and circulated to other Member States’s security officials refers disparagingly to “regions that are characterised by patriarchal, anti-freedom and/or backward-looking religious attitudes” and calls for “a halt to illegal migration to Europe” and the “development of a new, better protection system under which no applications for asylum are filed on EU territory,” with some minor exceptions.

      See: Austrian Presidency: Informal Meeting of COSI, Vienna, Austria, 2-3 July 2018: Strengthening EU External Border Protection and a Crisis-Resistant EU Asylum System (https://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/EU-austria-Informal-Meeting-%20COSI.pdf)

      The document was produced for an ’Informal Meeting of COSI’ (the Council of the EU’s Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security) which took place on 2 and 3 July in Vienna, and the proposals it contains were the subject of numerous subsequent press articles - with the Austrian President one of the many who criticised the government’s ultra-hardline approach.

      See: Austrian president criticises government’s asylum proposals (The Local, https://www.thelocal.at/20180715/austrian-president-criticises-governments-asylum-proposals); Austrian proposal requires asylum seekers to apply outside EU: Profil (Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-austria/austrian-proposal-requires-asylum-seekers-to-apply-outside-eu-profil-idUSKB); Right of asylum: Austria’s unsettling proposals to member states (EurActiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/right-of-asylum-austrias-unsettling-proposals-to-member-states)

      Some of the proposals were also discussed at an informal meeting of the EU’s interior ministers on Friday 13 July, where the topic of “return centres” (http://statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/eu-ciuncil-returns.htm) was also raised. The Luxembourg interior minister Jean Asselborn reportedly said that such an idea “shouldn’t be discussed by civilized Europeans.” See: No firm EU agreement on Austrian proposals for reducing migration (The Local, https://www.thelocal.at/20180713/no-firm-eu-agreement-on-austrian-proposals-for-reducing-migration)

      The Austrian Presidency paper proposes:

      "2.1. By 2020

      By 2020 the following goals could be defined:

      Saving as many human lives as possible;
      Clear strengthening of the legal framework and the operational capabilities of FRONTEX with respect to its two main tasks: support in protecting the Union’s external border and in the field of return;
      Increasing countering and destruction of people smugglers’ and human traffickers‘ business models;
      Significant reduction in illegal migration;
      More sustainable and more effective return measures as well as establishment of instruments that foster third countries’ willingness to cooperate on all relevant aspects, including the fight against people smuggling, providing protection and readmission;
      Development of a holistic concept for a forward-looking migration policy (in the spirit of a “whole of government approach“) and a future European protection system in cooperation with third countries that is supported by all and does not overburden all those involved – neither in terms of resources nor with regard to the fundamental rights and freedoms they uphold.

      2.2. By 2025

      By 2025 the following goals could be realised:

      Full control of the EU’s external borders and their comprehensive protection have been ensured.
      The new, better European protection system has been implemented across the EU in cooperation with third countries; important goals could include:
      no incentives anymore to get into boats, thus putting an end to smuggled persons dying in the Mediterranean;
      smart help and assistance for those in real need of protection, i.e. provided primarily in the respective region;
      asylum in Europe is granted only to those who respect European values and the fundamental rights and freedoms upheld in the EU;
      no overburdening of the EU Member States’ capabilities;
      lower long-term costs;
      prevention of secondary migration.
      Based on these principles, the EU Member States have returned to a consensual European border protection and asylum policy.”

      And includes the following statements, amongst others:

      “...more and more Member States are open to exploring a new approach. Under the working title “Future European Protection System” (FEPS) and based on an Austrian initiative, a complete paradigm shift in EU asylum policy has been under consideration at senior officials’ level for some time now. The findings are considered in the “Vienna Process” in the context of which the topic of external border protection is also dealt with. A number of EU Member States, the EU Commission and external experts contribute towards further reflections and deliberations on these two important topics.”

      “...ultimately, there is no effective EU external border protection in place against illegal migration and the existing EU asylum system does not enable an early distinction between those who are in need of protection and those who are not.”

      “Disembarkment following rescue at sea as a rule only takes place in EU Member States. This means that apprehensions at sea not only remain ineffective (non-refoulement, examination of applications for asylum), but are exploited in people smugglers’ business models.”

      “Due to factors related to their background as well as their poor perspectives, they [smuggled migrants] repeatedly have considerable problems with living in free societies or even reject them. Among them are a large number of barely or poorly educated young men who have travelled to Europe alone. Many of these are particularly susceptible to ideologies that are hostile to freedom and/or are prone to turning to crime.

      As a result of the prevailing weaknesses in the fields of external border protection and asylum, it is to be expected that the negative consequences of past and current policies will continue to be felt for many years to come. As experience with immigration from regions that are characterised by patriarchal, anti-freedom and/or backward-looking religious attitudes has shown, problems related to integration, safety and security may even increase significantly over several generations.”

      See: Austrian Presidency: Informal Meeting of COSI, Vienna, Austria, 2-3 July 2018: Strengthening EU External Border Protection and a Crisis-Resistant EU Asylum System (pdf)

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/eu-austrian-pres-asylum-paper.htm

      #Autriche

    • Germany proposed a new automatic relocation scheme for asylum seekers (https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-sets-out-plan-for-automatic-relocation-of-asylum-seekers), according to which requests for international protection would be evaluated at the external borders of the European Union. The proposal was presented last week to EU member states, with the aim of making progress in the reforming of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), ahead of the German Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second part of next year. The document proposes the initial evaluation of cases at EU’s external borders, a new regime for determining which member state is responsible for the further processing of the application, and measures to prevent asylum seekers’ migration from one member state to another. The proposal that initial assessments of all cases should be made at the external borders is very problematic, since it determines that “clearly false and unfounded” requests would be denied immediately at the external border, as well as the fact that measures including restricting freedom of movement could be used in such proceedings. Moreover, the question of what would be the exact procedure of determining which states are responsible for processing applications for asylum also arises. According to the German plan, the key role in this would be reserved for European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which the Commission already proposes to transform into the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), that would then decide which member state is responsible for the further processing of applications. This decision would be based on factors such as the size of the population of the member state, their GDP and so on.

      Reçu via Inicijativa dobrodosli, mail du 04.11.2019.

  • New Frontex Regulation : corrected version of the text

    The European Parliament is due to approve a corrected version of the new Frontex Regulation, which was originally agreed between the Council and Parliament in April but has been undergoing revision by legal and linguistic specialists.

    See: REGULATION (EU) 2019/... OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of ... on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/oct/eu-frontex-regulation-ep-approved-corrected-version-2-10-19.pdf)

    And: the version initially agreed between the Parliament and Council in April (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/apr/eu-frontex-final-tAnnex%20to%20LIBE%20letter-EBCG-text.pdf)

    The Regulation was proposed in September 2018 and agreement was reached between the Parliament and Council in April 2019. The speed of the legislative process may explain why the text has to be corrected and approved in accordance with Rule 241 of the Parliament’s rules of procedure (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RULES-9-2019-07-02-RULE-241_EN.html).

    The headline change introduced by the new Regulation is a “standing corps” of 10,000 border guards. The official intention is to introduce the standing corps by 2027, but incoming Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has committed to doing so by 2024 - although an article in DW commented (https://www.dw.com/en/can-the-eus-ursula-von-der-leyen-fulfill-her-promises/a-49625188) that this “looks extremely unlikely, as the member states have repeatedly rejected the move.”

    The new Regulation will also give the agency expanded surveillance powers, an extended mandate in the field of deportations and new possibilities for cooperation with non-EU states. Under its current mandate, Frontex has already begun to operate outside the EU, with an operation launched in Albania in May.

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/oct/eu-new-frontex-reg.htm
    #frontex #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #gardes-frontières_européens #gardes-frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Albanie #surveillance #renvois #expulsions

    –---

    Sur la coopération avec l’Albanie, voir :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/782260

  • Paris et Rome adoptent « une position commune » sur la répartition des migrants en Europe

    Les pays de l’UE devront participer au « #mécanisme_automatique » de répartition, voulu par MM. Macron et Conte, sous peine de pénalités financières.

    Après des mois de brouille franco-italienne, le président français, Emmanuel Macron, et le chef du gouvernement italien, Giuseppe Conte, se sont déclarés d’accord, mercredi 18 septembre, pour mettre en place un « mécanisme automatique » de répartition des migrants.

    Après deux ans de dissensions sur cet épineux dossier, ils défendront désormais au sein de l’Union européenne (UE) « une position commune pour que tous les pays participent d’une façon ou d’une autre » à l’accueil « ou bien soient pénalisés financièrement », a expliqué M. Macron.
    Lors d’une conférence de presse commune, ils ont aussi réclamé une gestion « plus efficace » du renvoi dans leur pays d’origine des migrants qui n’ont pas droit à l’asile. Le dirigeant italien a souligné que l’Italie ne « laisserait pas les trafiquants décider des entrées sur le territoire », mais aussi jugé qu’il fallait « gérer ce phénomène », quand l’ancien ministre de l’intérieur Matteo Salvini, patron de la Ligue, refusait tout débarquement de migrants.
    La France solidaire

    Regrettant de son côté « l’injustice » vécue par les Italiens, Emmanuel Macron a répété que l’UE n’avait pas été suffisamment solidaire envers l’Italie. « La France est prête à évoluer sur ce point dans le cadre de la remise à plat des accords de Dublin », qui confient actuellement aux pays d’arrivée la charge du traitement des demandes d’asile, a-t-il dit. « Je ne mésestime pas ce que le peuple italien a vécu », a expliqué M. Macron, mais « la réponse au sujet migratoire n’est pas dans le repli mais dans une solution de coopération européenne efficace. »

    Plusieurs ministres de l’intérieur de l’UE (dont les ministres français, allemand et italien) doivent se réunir lundi à Malte pour discuter de ce dossier.

    Les deux dirigeants n’ont toutefois pas évoqué devant la presse certaines des demandes de l’Italie venant en complément de la future répartition automatique des migrants en Europe. Parmi ces points qui restent à éclaircir figurent la répartition non seulement des demandeurs d’asile mais aussi des migrants économiques ainsi que la rotation des ports de débarquement, qui devrait intégrer des ports français. Fermés aux ONG secourant les migrants, les ports italiens se sont entrouverts ces derniers jours en laissant notamment débarquer sur l’île de Lampedusa 82 rescapés.
    Un sommet bilatéral programmé

    La visite du président français, la première d’un dirigeant européen depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir d’une nouvelle coalition en Italie, visait d’abord à rétablir de bonnes relations entre les deux pays, après une année de tensions avec les leaders de la précédente coalition populiste au pouvoir, notamment sur la question migratoire.

    Le chef de l’Etat français n’a passé qu’une soirée dans la capitale italienne, enchaînant un court entretien avec son homologue, Sergio Mattarella, et un dîner de travail avec le premier ministre, Giuseppe Conte, récemment reconduit à la tête d’un nouvel exécutif où le Mouvement cinq étoiles (M5S) est cette fois associé au Parti démocrate (centre gauche) et non à la Ligue (extrême droite).

    Entre l’Italie et la France existe « une amitié indestructible », a assuré le président français dont le déplacement à Rome a permis de programmer, pour 2020 en Italie, un sommet bilatéral, rendez-vous annuel lancé en 1983 mais qui n’avait pas été mis à l’agenda l’an passé pour cause de tensions entre les deux pays.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/09/19/paris-et-rome-vont-defendre-une-position-commune-sur-la-repartition-des-migr
    #répartition #asile #migrations #réfugiés #France #Italie #solidarité #UE #EU #Europe #Dublin #règlement_dublin #coopération #ports

    L’accent est mis aussi sur les #renvois... évidemment :

    ils ont aussi réclamé une gestion « plus efficace » du renvoi dans leur pays d’origine des migrants qui n’ont pas droit à l’asile.

    #machine_à_expulsion

    Et évidemment... zéro prise en compte des compétences, envies, liens, attachements que les migrants/réfugiés pourraient exprimer et qui pourraient être prises en compte dans le choix du pays de leur installation...
    #paquets_postaux

    ping @isskein @karine4

    • Société.L’Italie obtient un accord pour la “redistribution” des migrants

      Lundi 23 septembre, à Malte, les ministres de l’Intérieur de plusieurs pays européens ont trouvé un accord pour mettre en place un mécanisme de répartition des migrants qui arrivent dans les ports méditerranéens. Un succès politique pour le nouveau gouvernement italien.

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/revue-de-presse/societe-litalie-obtient-un-accord-pour-la-redistribution-des-

    • Société.L’Italie obtient un accord pour la “redistribution” des migrants

      Lundi 23 septembre, à Malte, les ministres de l’Intérieur de plusieurs pays européens ont trouvé un accord pour mettre en place un mécanisme de répartition des migrants qui arrivent dans les ports méditerranéens. Un succès politique pour le nouveau gouvernement italien.

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/revue-de-presse/societe-litalie-obtient-un-accord-pour-la-redistribution-des-

    • Déplacement à Rome après la mise en place du nouveau gouvernement italien

      Deux semaines seulement après la mise en place du nouveau gouvernement italien, le Président Emmanuel Macron est le premier Chef d’État à se rendre à Rome pour un dîner de travail avec Giuseppe Conte, Président du Conseil des ministres italien. Cette rencontre était précédée d’un entretien avec Sergio Mattarella, Président de la République italienne.
      La visite en Italie du Président de la République était importante, tant sur le fond, dans le contexte d’un agenda européen chargé après les élections européennes, que sur le plan symbolique.

      (Re)voir la déclaration conjointe à la presse du Président de la République et du Président du Conseil des ministres italien, à l’issue de leur rencontre :

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fUXMEP3Kifg

      Déclaration conjointe à la presse du Président de la République et du Président du Conseil des ministres italien

      Merci beaucoup Monsieur le Président du Conseil, cher Giuseppe.

      Je n’ai que très peu de choses à rajouter et rien à retrancher de ce qui vient d’être dit à l’instant par le Président du Conseil. Je suis très heureux d’être ici parmi vous, très heureux d’être aujourd’hui à Rome quelques jours après la formation de votre nouveau gouvernement.

      Je viens de m’entretenir à l’instant avec le Président de la République, Sergio MATTARELLA, après les entretiens que nous avons eu au printemps dernier, lors des commémorations des 500 ans de la mort de Léonard DE VINCI en France, et je suis heureux de vous retrouver ici, cher Giuseppe, à Rome dans ces responsabilités.

      Ma présence aujourd’hui, c’est d’abord la volonté marquée de travailler ensemble pour la relation bilatérale et pour le projet européen, vous l’avez parfaitement rappelé. C’est aussi un message fort et clair envoyé au peuple italien d’amitié de la part du peuple français. Votre Président l’a dit il y a quelques mois, cette amitié est indestructible. Parfois nous ne sommes pas d’accord, il se peut qu’on se dispute, il se peut qu’on ne se comprenne pas mais toujours on se retrouve. Et je crois que nous en sommes là et que la volonté du peuple français est véritablement de travailler avec le peuple italien et de réussir pleinement. Vous l’avez dit Monsieur le Président à l’instant, notre souhait est de renforcer, et nous venons de l’évoquer ensemble, la coopération bilatérale et européenne et je veux revenir simplement sur quelques sujets.

      Le premier évidemment c’est le sujet des migrations. Sur ce sujet je ne mésestime pas ce que depuis 2015 le peuple italien vit, ce que l’Italie a subi, et là aussi avec beaucoup parfois de malentendus, d’incompréhensions, d’injustices qui ont été vues, perçues, et qui ont suscité de la colère. Je crois très profondément, comme vous l’avez dit, que la réponse au sujet migratoire n’est pas dans le repli, la provocation nationaliste mais la construction de solutions et de coopérations européennes réelles et efficaces.

      D’abord, nous vivons une situation, aujourd’hui, qui n’est plus celle de 2015 parce qu’il y a eu un très gros travail qui a été mené pour prévenir avec les États d’origine, pour mieux travailler avec beaucoup de partenaires africains, la situation que nous avons pu connaître alors. Mais ce que nous voulons faire ensemble, c’est poursuivre ce travail. Nos ministres de l’Intérieur se retrouveront dans quelques jours pour travailler sur la base de notre échange. Ils élargiront leur discussion à d’autres collègues européens, je pense en particulier à leur collègue maltais et à l’ensemble des pays de la rive Sud, et ils se retrouveront précisément à Malte, et ils poursuivront ainsi le travail que nous avons pu lancer à Paris au mois de juillet dernier, incluant aussi plusieurs organisations internationales.

      Notre approche doit répondre à trois exigences auxquelles je crois pouvoir dire que nous sommes l’un et l’autre attachés. La première, c’est une exigence d’humanité. On ne peut résoudre, ce conflit, en le faisant aux dépens des vies humaines ou en acceptant des personnes bloquées en mer ou des scènes de noyade que nous avons trop souvent vécues. La deuxième, c’est la solidarité, et c’est ce qui a manqué bien trop souvent en Europe. Je l’ai dit, l’Union européenne n’a pas fait suffisamment preuve de solidarité avec les pays de première arrivée, notamment l’Italie, et la France est prête à évoluer sur ce point dans le cadre de la remise à plat des accords de Dublin. Je souhaite que nous puissions ensemble travailler à une solution nouvelle, plus forte et plus solidaire. Et puis le troisième principe, c’est celui de l’efficacité. Les désaccords politiques ont conduit à une approche qui est, au fond, très inefficace, inefficace pour prévenir les arrivées, inefficace aussi pour gérer ce qu’on appelle les mouvements secondaires, parce qu’avec notre organisation actuelle, nous avons au fond trop de non-coopération entre les États membres, et du coup une situation où beaucoup de femmes et d’hommes qui ont pris tous les risques pour quitter leur pays se retrouvent sur la rive de l’Europe, errent de pays en pays, où les responsabilités sont renvoyées des uns aux autres et où nous sommes collectivement inefficaces à bien protéger ceux qui ont le droit à l’asile et à pouvoir renvoyer au plus vite ceux qui n’y ont pas droit.

      S’agissant des sauvetages en mer et des débarquements, vous l’avez évoqué, Monsieur le Président du Conseil, je suis convaincu que nous pouvons nous mettre d’accord sur un mécanisme européen automatique de répartition de l’accueil des migrants coordonné par la Commission européenne, qui permette de garantir à l’Italie ou à Malte, avant une arrivée, que ses partenaires puissent prendre en charge rapidement toutes les personnes débarquées, et avoir une organisation beaucoup plus solidaire et efficace, comme je viens de le dire, plus largement.

      Pour être justes et efficaces, il nous faut donc partout pouvoir défendre le droit d’asile, qui fait partie, bien souvent, de nos Constitutions, c’est le cas de la France, qui fait partie de nos textes les plus fondamentaux, je pense justement au texte de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.Et donc protéger le droit d’asile, c’est aussi nous assurer que celles et ceux qui n’y ont pas droit sont reconduits le plus rapidement possible vers leur pays d’origine. C’est notre volonté commune d’avoir, au niveau européen, une plus grande harmonisation du droit d’asile, plus de coopération et une politique plus efficace de réadmission vers les pays d’origine lorsque les cas ne relèvent pas de l’asile. Au total, je crois que nous avons aujourd’hui une fenêtre d’opportunité pour parachever, relancer sur certains points, plus fondamentalement, le travail de remise à plat sur le plan des migrations et de l’asile en Europe aujourd’hui.

      La discussion que nous avons eue ces derniers jours et que nous venons d’avoir avec le Président du Conseil, comme la discussion que nous avons eue avec plusieurs de nos partenaires, en tout cas, me rend déterminé et volontariste sur ce sujet à vos côtés. Je crois, là aussi, que nous pourrons défendre une position commune avec la nouvelle Commission européenne pour que tous les pays participent, sous une forme ou une autre, à la solidarité européenne en la matière, ou bien soient pénalisés financièrement.

      Le deuxième sujet extrêmement important que nous avons discuté et qui est au cœur non seulement de l’agenda bilatéral mais de l’agenda européen, c’est celui de la croissance, de la création d’emplois, du contexte macroéconomique. Le Président du Conseil l’a évoqué. Nous voyons tous les chiffres en Europe, et si aujourd’hui, la croissance se tient à peu près, elle est en deçà de ce que nous avons pu connaître parce qu’il y a les incertitudes géopolitiques, parce qu’il y a la conflictualité commerciale mondiale, parce qu’il y a un ralentissement en Chine qui pèse sur plusieurs économies de la zone euro, parce qu’il y a aussi sans doute une coordination de nos politiques économiques qui n’est plus adaptée.

      Je veux, en la matière, ce soir, et le faire ici a un sens tout particulier, rendre hommage au travail de Mario DRAGHI, et tout particulièrement à ses dernières décisions. Une fois encore avec beaucoup de courage et de clairvoyance, le Président de la Banque centrale européenne a pris les décisions qui convenaient, mais il a aussi fait des déclarations qui convenaient, même si certains ne veulent pas entendre. Je le dis avec force, il a, à mes yeux, raison. La politique monétaire, depuis 2012, a fait le maximum de ce qu’elle pouvait faire pour préserver la situation européenne, éviter la déflation et nous éviter le pire. Il appartient aujourd’hui aux chefs d’État et de gouvernement de prendre leurs responsabilités en ce qui concerne leur budget propre comme en ce qui concerne les décisions que nous aurons à prendre au niveau européen, pour avoir une véritable politique de relance et de demande intérieure. Certains États membres ont des marges de manœuvre, et je salue d’ailleurs les annonces récentes à cet égard des Pays-Bas, qui ont décidé d’un plan d’investissements d’avenir dans lequel, je dois dire, je me retrouve, 50 milliards d’investissements sur les années qui viennent.

      J’attends avec impatience les décisions des autres États membres, et je pense que les décisions budgétaires que nous aurons collectivement à prendre doivent tenir compte de ce contexte macroéconomique et être au rendez-vous de l’investissement, de la relance. Nous en avons besoin parce que nous avons des défis éducatifs en matière de recherche, en matière stratégique, qui sont fondamentaux. Et je crois que nous pouvons garder le sérieux qui relève de nos traités, nous pouvons garder la politique de réformes qui relève de chaque pays, mais que nous devons conduire, et nous pouvons garder la lucidité sur le contexte macroéconomique qui est le nôtre, et refuser, en quelque sorte, que notre continent rentre dans la stagnation et plutôt s’arme pour préparer son avenir.

      Nous avons évoqué, avec le Président du Conseil, plusieurs autres sujets, évidemment la politique culturelle et les coopérations culturelles entre nos pays. Nous avons des échéances à venir extrêmement importantes : l’exposition Léonard DE VINCI, les expositions RAPHAËL qui vont être l’objet d’échanges, de partenariats entre nos deux pays et qui sont au cœur, je crois, de ce regard réciproque, de cette fierté que nous portons ensemble.

      Nous avons évoqué et nous allons travailler ce soir sur les sujets climatiques. Là aussi, nous croyons l’un et l’autre dans un agenda ambitieux sur le plan européen d’investissement, d’une banque climatique qui doit être au cœur du projet de la prochaine Commission, d’un prix du CO2 qui doit aussi prendre en compte ce défi et d’une stratégie neutralité carbone à l’horizon 2050, pour laquelle nous espérons finir de convaincre les derniers partenaires réticents. C’est cette même stratégie que nous allons défendre ensemble à New York lors du sommet climat, puis au moment où nous aurons à prendre nos engagements pour le Fonds vert dans les prochaines semaines.

      Enfin, le Président du Conseil l’a évoqué, sur plusieurs sujets internationaux, là aussi, nous avons conjugués nos efforts et nos vues. Et je crois que le sujet de la crise libyenne, qui nous a beaucoup occupé ces dernières années, fait l’objet aujourd’hui d’une vraie convergence franco-italienne, vraie convergence parce que nous avons su travailler ensemble pour passer des messages à nos partenaires. Je veux saluer la rencontre que vous avez eue avec le Président AL-SARAJ cet après-midi, et avec une conviction pleinement partagée : l’issue ne peut être trouvée que par le compromis politique et les discussions. C’est ce que nous avons d’ailleurs porté ensemble lors du G7 de Biarritz en défendant l’idée d’une conférence internationale pour la Libye incluant toutes les parties prenantes et une conférence inter-libyenne permettant cette réconciliation de toutes les parties au sein de la Libye. Vous avez rappelé ce point à l’instant. Et à ce titre, l’initiative portée par nos deux ministres des Affaires étrangères dans quelques jours à New York, rassemblant l’ensemble de leurs homologues concernés, est, à mes yeux, la mise en œuvre très concrète de cette volonté et sera, comme vous l’avez dit, une étape importante.

      Voilà sur quelques-uns des sujets importants de coopération économique, culturelle, industrielle, sur les sujets de défense dont nous allons continuer à parler dans quelques instants, sur les sujets européens, la volonté qui est la nôtre d’œuvrer ensemble. Dans quelques semaines, nous nous retrouverons autour de la table du Conseil pour parler de ces sujets et de quelques autres, et je me réjouis, Monsieur le Président du Conseil, de la perspective que vous avez ouverte d’un prochain sommet entre nos deux pays au début de l’année prochaine, qui se tiendra donc en Italie, qui nous permettra de poursuivre ce travail commun et de poursuivre aussi les travaux que nous avions lancé pour un traité du Quirinal, et donc pour parachever aussi toutes les coopérations communes entre nos deux pays. Je vous remercie.

      https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/09/18/deplacement-a-rome-apres-la-mise-en-place-du-nouveau-gouvernement-italien

    • The “#temporary_solidarity_mechanism” on relocation of people rescued at sea - what does it say?

      Germany, France, Italy and Malta have drafted a declaration (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-temporary-voluntary-relocation-mechanism-declaration.pdf) establishing a “predictable and efficient temporary solidarity mechanism” aimed at ensuring the “dignified disembarkation” of people rescued at sea in the Mediterranean. If those rescued are eligible for international protection they will be relocated to a participating EU member state within four weeks, while ineligible persons will be subject to “effective and quick return.”

      See: Joint declaration of intent on a controlled emergency procedure - voluntary commitments by member states for a predictable temporary solidarity mechanism (23 September 2019: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-temporary-voluntary-relocation-mechanism-declaration.pdf)

      The mechanism set out in the declaration is designed to address “the need to protect human life and provide assistance to any person in distress,” whilst preventing the emergence of any new irregular maritime routes into the EU. All signatories will be obliged to call on other EU and Schengen Member States to participate. Offers - or refusals - to do so are expected (https://www.dw.com/en/five-eu-interior-ministers-want-quotas-for-shipwrecked-refugees/a-50539788) to come at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 8 October.

      The mechanism

      Signatories to the declaration will have to ensure that persons rescued on the high seas are disembarked “in a place of safety”. Member states may also “offer an alternative place of safety on a voluntary basis”. Where rescue is carried out by a state-owned vessel, disembarkation will take place in the territory of the flag State.

      Following disembarkation, participating states should provide “swift relocation, which should not take longer than 4 weeks”, a process which will be coordinated by the European Commission - as has been the case with recent voluntary relocations (https://www.thejournal.ie/ireland-migrants-ocean-viking-4779483-Aug2019) following rescue at sea.

      The declaration requires participating states to declare pledges for relocation prior to disembarkation and “as a minimum, security and medical screening of all migrants and other relevant measures.” This should be based on “standard operating procedures, building on and improving existing practices by streamlining procedures and the full use of EURODAC,” the EU database of asylum-seekers’ fingerprints, with “support of EU Agencies, e.g. on EURODAC registration and initial interviewing.”

      It is unknown to which standard operating procedures the text refers (Statewatch has previously published those applicable in the Italian ’hotspots’ (http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/it-hotspots-standard-operating-procedures-en.pdf)), nor what precisely “streamlining procedures” may entail for individuals seeking international protection.

      EU agencies Europol, Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) are present in the Greek hotspots, where detainees are not provided (https://flygtning.dk/system/siden-blev-ikke-fundet?aspxerrorpath=/media/5251031/rights-at-risk_drc-policy-brief2019.pdf) with either interpreters or adequate information on removal procedures; and those in Italy, where the EU’s own Fundamental Rights Agency has identified (https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-opinion-hotspots-update-03-2019_en.pdf) a number of serious problems.

      States may cease participation in the mechanism in cases of “disproportionate migratory pressure,” to be calculated using two rather vague criteria: “limitations in reception capacities or a high number of applications for international protection.” There is no further detail on how these will be determined.

      The mechanism will be valid for no less than six months and may be renewed, although it could be terminated “in the case of misuse by third parties”, a term with no further explanation. Furthermore, if within six months the number of relocated people rises “substantially”, consultations between participating member states will begin - during which “the entire mechanism might be suspended.”

      At the same time, the text calls for “advance on the reform of the Common European Asylum System,” which should provide a binding and permanent mechanism - if the member states can ever agree on such rules.

      The announcement on the signing of the declaration by the four member states was welcomed by Amnesty International. Eva Geddie, Director of the European Institutions Office, said (https://www.amnesty.eu/news/malta-asylum-seeker-disembarkation-deal-shows-a-more-humane-approach-is-poss): “We hope this mechanism will put an end to the obscene spectacle of people left stranded on boats for weeks waiting to know where, or even if, they can disembark.” The President of the European Parliament also welcomed the news (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190923IPR61761/sassoli-migration-agreement-respects-fundamental-principles-of-ep-pr). The devil, however, may be in the detail.

      Return as a priority

      Return “immediately after disembarkation,” where applicable, is one of the commitments set out in paragraph 4. This seems to imply that some form of asylum assessment will take place at sea, an idea that has previously been dismissed (https://www.ecre.org/italys-proposed-idea-of-hotspots-at-sea-is-unlawful-says-asgi) as illegal and unworkable.

      Return is emphasised as a priority again in paragraph 7, which recalls the operational support role of both Frontex and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in “the effective and quick return of those not eligible to international protection in the EU”.

      The use of “appropriate leverages, to ensure full cooperation of countries of origin,” is encouraged. Using aid and trade policy as ’incentives’ for non-EU states to readmit their own nationals has for some years now been high on the policy agenda.

      Doublethink ahoy

      The declaration also sets out certain requirements for “all vessels engaged in rescue operations”, including “not to send light signals or any other form of communication to facilitate the departure and embarkation of vessels carrying migrants from African shores” and:

      “not to obstruct the Search and Rescue operations by official Coast Guard vessels, including the Libyan Coast Guard, and to provide for specific measures to safeguard the security of migrants and operators.”

      Whether ’rescue’ by the Libyan Coast Guard is compatible with “the security of migrants” is doubtful - return to Libya means a return to inhumane and degrading conditions and there is clear evidence (https://www.glanlaw.org/single-post/2018/05/08/Legal-action-against-Italy-over-its-coordination-of-Libyan-Coast-Guard-pull) of the Libyan Coast Guard knowingly endangering the lives of migrants in distress at sea.

      EU governments are well aware of these issues. A recent document (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-libya.htm) sent to national delegations by the Finnish Presidency of the Council highlighted that:

      Another major issue is that of migrants and refugees rescued or intercepted at sea being transferred to detention centres and the lack of traceability, transparency and accountability… The Libyan government has not taken steps to improve the situation in the centres. The government’s reluctance to address the problems raises the question of its own involvement."

      Beefing up the Libyan Coast Guard and aerial surveillance

      The increasing role of the Libyan Coast Guard - and the maritime agencies of other states such as Morocco - is being deliberately enhanced by the EU. Finance and training is being provided whilst national governments are placing increasing pressure on private rescue operations (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/es-mo-sar.htm).

      Any member state that signs up to the declaration will be making a commitment to continue “enhancing the capacities of coast guards of southern Mediterranean third countries,” at the same time as encouraging “full respect of human rights in those countries.”

      One key means for assisting with the activities of non-EU coast guard agencies is “EU-led aerial surveillance”:

      “in order to ensure that migrant boats are detected early with a view to fight migrant smuggling networks, human trafficking and related criminal activity and minimizing the risk of loss of life at sea.”

      The EU’s Operation Sophia now has no boats and is largely relying on aerial surveillance to carry out its work. A recent internal Operation Sophia document seen by Statewatch says that:

      “Aerial assets will be used to enhance maritime situational awareness and the information collected will only be shared with the responsible regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC).”

      That is likely to be the Libyan MRCC. According to a March 2019 letter (http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-344-Commission-and-Italy-tie-themselves-up-in-knots-over-libya.pdf) from the European Commission to Frontex’s Executive Director, the Italian MRCC also acts as a “communication relay” for its Libyan counterpart.

      Member states are urged to contribute assets to these surveillance operations. It is noteworthy that the declaration contains no call for states to provide vessels or other equipment for search and rescue operations.

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-relocation-deal.htm

  • Militarisation des frontières en #Mer_Egée

    En Mer Egée c’est exactement la même stratégie qui se met en place, et notamment à #Samos, où une #zeppelin (#zeppelin_de_surveillance) de #Frontex surveillera le détroit entre l’île et la côte turque, afin de signaler tout départ de bateaux. L’objectif est d’arrêter « à temps » les embarcations des réfugiés en les signalant aux garde-corps turques. Comme l’a dit le vice-ministre de l’immigration Koumoutsakos « on saura l’heure de départ de l’embarcation, on va en informer les turques, on s’approcher du bateau... »
    S’approcher pourquoi faire, sinon, pour le repousser vers la côte turque ?
    Le fonctionnement de la montgolfière sera confié aux garde-cotes et à la police grecque, l’opération restant sous le contrôle de Frontex.

    –-> reçu via la mailing-list de Migreurop, le 30.07.2017

    #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Turquie #Grèce #migrations #réfugiés #asile #police #gardes-côtes #surveillance

    –-----------

    Commentaire de Martin Clavey sur twitter :

    Cynisme absolu : Frontex utilise des drones pour surveiller les migrants en méditerranée ce qui permet à l’Union européenne de ne pas utiliser de bateau de surveillance et donc ne pas être soumis au #droit_maritime et à avoir à les sauver

    https://twitter.com/mart1oeil/status/1158396604648493058

    • Σε δοκιμαστική λειτουργία το αερόσταστο της FRONTEX

      Σε δοκιμαστική λειτουργία τίθεται από σήμερα για 28 ημέρες το αερόστατο της FRONTEX στη Σάμο, μήκους 35 μέτρων, προσδεμένο στο έδαφος, εξοπλισμένο με ραντάρ, θερμική κάμερα και σύστημα αυτόματης αναγνώρισης, το οποίο θα επιτηρεί αδιάλειπτα και σε πραγματικό χρόνο το θαλάσσιο πεδίο.

      Σύμφωνα με ανακοίνωση του Λιμενικού, στόχος είναι η αστυνόμευση του θαλάσσιου πεδίου και η καταπολέμηση του διασυνοριακού εγκλήματος. Δημιουργείται ωστόσο το ερώτημα αν οι πληροφορίες που θα συλλέγει το αερόστατο θα χρησιμοποιούνται για την αναχαίτιση ή την αποτροπή των πλεούμενων των προσφύγων που ξεκινούν από τα τουρκικά παράλια για να ζητήσουν διεθνή προστασία στην Ευρώπη.

      « Πρώτα απ’ όλα ξέρεις τι ώρα φεύγει από τους διακινητές το σκάφος, ενημερώνεις την τουρκική πλευρά, πηγαίνεις εσύ κοντά, δηλαδή είναι ένα σύνολο ενεργειών » σημείωνε την περασμένη εβδομάδα σε συνέντευξή του στον ΑΝΤ1 ο αναπληρωτής υπουργός Μεταναστευτικής Πολιτικής Γιώργος Κουμουτσάκος, μιλώντας για τα αποτελέσματα που αναμένεται να έχει το αερόστατο στην ενίσχυση της επιτήρησης των συνόρων.

      Το Λιμενικό είναι η πρώτη ακτοφυλακή κράτους-μέλους της Ε.Ε. που χρησιμοποιεί αερόστατο για την επιτήρηση της θάλασσας, δέκα μήνες μετά την πρώτη παρόμοια πανευρωπαϊκή χρήση μη επανδρωμένου αεροσκάφους μεσαίου ύψους μακράς εμβέλειας.

      « Αυτό καταδεικνύει την ισχυρή και ξεκάθαρη βούληση του Λ.Σ.-ΕΛ.ΑΚΤ. να καταβάλει κάθε δυνατή προσπάθεια, χρησιμοποιώντας τη διαθέσιμη τεχνολογία αιχμής, για την αποτελεσματική φύλαξη των εξωτερικών θαλάσσιων συνόρων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης, την πάταξη κάθε μορφής εγκληματικότητας καθώς και την προστασία της ανθρώπινης ζωής στη θάλασσα », σημειώνει το Λιμενικό.

      Η λειτουργία του αερόστατου εντάσσεται στην επιχείρηση « Ποσειδών » που συντονίζουν το Λιμενικό και η ΕΛ.ΑΣ. υπό την επιτήρηση της FRONTEX.

      Παράλληλα, στο νησί θα τεθεί σε λειτουργία φορτηγό εξοπλισμένο με παρόμοια συστήματα, προκειμένου να μπορούν να συγκριθούν τα αποτελέσματα και η λειτουργία του επίγειου και του εναέριου συστήματος.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/205553_se-dokimastiki-leitoyrgia-aerostasto-tis-frontex

    • Zeppelin over the island of Samos to monitor migrants trafficking

      Greek authorities and the Frontex will release a huge surveillance Zeppelin above the island of Samos to monitor migrants who illegally try to reach Greece and Europe. The installation of the ominous balloon will be certainly a grotesque attraction for the tourists who visit the island in the East Aegean Sea.

      Deputy Minister of Migration Policy Giorgos Koumoutsakos told private ANT1 TV that the Zeppelin will go in operation next week.

      “In Samos, at some point, I think it’s a matter of days or a week, a Zeppelin balloon will be installed in cooperation with FRONTEX, which will take a picture of a huge area. What does that mean? First of all, you know what time the ship moves away from the traffickers, inform the Turkish side, you go near, that is a set of actions,” Koumoutsakos said.

      The Zeppelin will be monitored by the GNR radar unit of the Frontext located at the port of Karlovasi, samiakienimerosi notes adding “It will give a picture of movements between the Turkish coast to Samos for the more effective guarding of our maritime borders.”

      The Deputy Minister did not elaborate on what exactly can the Greek Port Authority do when it comes “near” to the refugee and migrants boats.

      According to daily efimerida ton syntakton, the Norwegian NGO, Aegean Boat Report, revealed a video shot on July 17. The video shows how a Greek Coast Guard vessel approaches a boat with 34 people on board and leaves them at the open sea to be “collected” by Turkish authorities, while the passengers, among them 14 children, desperately are shouting “Not to Turkey!”

      It is not clear, whether the Greek Coast Guard vessel is in international waters as such vessels do not enter Turkish territorial waters. According to international law, the passengers ought to be rescued. The Greek Coast Guard has so far not taken position on the issue, saying it will need to evaluate the video first, efsyn notes.

      “There is no push backs. Everything will be done in accordance with the international law. Greece will do nothing beyond the international law,” Koumoutsakos stressed.

      PS I suppose, tourists will be cheered to have their vacation activities monitored by a plastic Big Brother. Not?

      https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2019/07/26/zeppelin-samos-migrants-refugees

    • Once migrants on Mediterranean were saved by naval patrols. Now they have to watch as #drones fly over
      https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/8a92adecf247b04c801a67a612766ee753738437/0_109_4332_2599/master/4332.jpg?width=605&quality=85&auto=format&fit=max&s=c0051d5e4fff6aff063c70

      Amid the panicked shouting from the water and the smell of petrol from the sinking dinghy, the noise of an approaching engine briefly raises hope. Dozens of people fighting for their lives in the Mediterranean use their remaining energy to wave frantically for help. Nearly 2,000 miles away in the Polish capital, Warsaw, a drone operator watches their final moments via a live transmission. There is no ship to answer the SOS, just an unmanned aerial vehicle operated by the European border and coast guard agency, Frontex.

      This is not a scene from some nightmarish future on Europe’s maritime borders but a present-day probability. Frontex, which is based in Warsaw, is part of a £95m investment by the EU in unmanned aerial vehicles, the Observer has learned.

      This spending has come as the EU pulls back its naval missions in the Mediterranean and harasses almost all search-and-rescue charity boats out of the water. Frontex’s surveillance drones are flying over waters off Libya where not a single rescue has been carried out by the main EU naval mission since last August, in what is the deadliest stretch of water in the world.

      The replacement of naval vessels, which can conduct rescues, with drones, which cannot, is being condemned as a cynical abrogation of any European role in saving lives.

      “There is no obligation for drones to be equipped with life-saving appliances and to conduct rescue operations,” said a German Green party MEP, Erik Marquardt. “You need ships for that, and ships are exactly what there is a lack of at the moment.” This year the death rate for people attempting the Mediterranean crossing has risen from a historical average of 2% to as high as 14% last month. In total, 567 of the estimated 8,362 people who have attempted it so far this year have died.

      Gabriele Iacovino, director of one of Italy’s leading thinktanks, the Centre for International Studies, said the move into drones was “a way to spend money without having the responsibility to save lives”. Aerial surveillance without ships in the water amounted to a “naval mission without a naval force”, and was about avoiding embarrassing political rows in Europe over what to do with rescued migrants.

      Since March the EU’s main naval mission in the area, Operation Sophia, has withdrawn its ships from waters where the majority of migrant boats have sunk. While Sophia was not primarily a search-and-rescue mission, it was obliged under international and EU law to assist vessels in distress. The switch to drones is part of an apparent effort to monitor the Mediterranean without being pulled into rescue missions that deliver migrants to European shores.

      Marta Foresti, director of the Human Mobility Initiative at the Overseas Development Institute, an influential UK thinktank, said Europe had replaced migration policy with panic, with potentially lethal consequences. “We panicked in 2015 and that panic has turned into security budgets,” she said. “Frontex’s budget has doubled with very little oversight or design. It’s a knee-jerk reaction.”

      The strategy has seen Frontex, based in Warsaw, and its sister agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, based in Lisbon, invest in pilotless aerial vehicles. The Observer has found three contracts – two under EMSA and one under Frontex – totalling £95m for drones that can supply intelligence to Frontex.

      The models include the Hermes, made by Elbit Systems, Israel’s biggest privately owned arms manufacturer, and the Heron, produced by Israel Aerospace Industries, a state-owned company. Both models were developed for use in combat missions in the occupied Palestinian territory of Gaza. Frontex said its drone suppliers met all “EU procurement rules and guidelines”.

      There is mounting concern both over how Frontex is spending EU taxpayers’ money and how it can be held accountable. The migration panic roiling Europe’s politics has been a boon for a once unfashionable EU outpost that coordinated national coastal and border guards. Ten years ago Frontex’s budget was £79m. In the latest budget cycle it has been awarded £10.4bn.

      Demand from member states for its services have largely been driven by its role in coordinating and carrying out deportations. The expansion of the deportation machine has caused concern among institutions tasked with monitoring the forced returns missions: a group of national ombudsmen, independent watchdogs appointed in all EU member states to safeguard human rights, has announced plans to begin its own independent monitoring group. The move follows frustration with the way their reports on past missions have been handled by Frontex.

      Andreas Pottakis, Greece’s ombudsman, is among those calling for an end to the agency policing itself: “Internal monitoring of Frontex by Frontex cannot substitute for the need for external monitoring by independent bodies. This is the only way the demand for transparency can be met and that the EU administration can effectively be held into account.”
      Acting to extradite helpless civilians to the hands of Libyan militias may amount to criminal liability

      The Frontex Consultative Forum, a body offering strategic advice to Frontex’s management board on how the agency can improve respect for fundamental rights, has also severely criticised it for a sloppy approach to accountability. An online archive of all Frontex operations, which was used by independent researchers, was recently removed.

      The switch to drones in the Mediterranean has also led to Frontex being accused of feeding intelligence on the position of migrant boats to Libya’s coast guards so they can intercept and return them to Libya. Although it receives EU funds, the Libyan coast guard remains a loosely defined outfit that often overlaps with smuggling gangs and detention centre owners.

      “The Libyan coast guard never patrols the sea,” said Tamino Böhm of the German rescue charity Sea-Watch. “They never leave port unless there is a boat to head to for a pullback. This means the information they have comes from the surveillance flights of Italy, Frontex and the EU.”

      A Frontex spokesperson said that incidents related to boats in distress were passed to the “responsible rescue coordination centre and to the neighbouring ones for situational awareness and potential coordination”. Thus the maritime rescue coordination centre in Rome has begun to share information with its Libyan counterpart in Tripoli, under the instructions of Italy’s far-right interior minister, Matteo Salvini.

      The EU is already accused of crimes against humanity in a submission before the International Criminal Court for “orchestrating a policy of forced transfer to concentration camp-like detention facilities [in Libya] where atrocious crimes are committed”.

      The case, brought by lawyers based in Paris, seeks to demonstrate that many of the people intercepted have faced human rights abuses ranging from slavery to torture and murder after being returned to Libya.

      Omer Shatz, an Israeli who teaches at Sciences Po university in Paris, and one of the two lawyers who brought the ICC case, said Frontex drone operators could be criminally liable for aiding pullbacks. “A drone operator that is aware of a migrant boat in distress is obliged to secure fundamental rights to life, body integrity, liberty and dignity. This means she has to take actions intended to search, rescue and disembark those rescued at safe port. Acting to extradite helpless vulnerable civilians to the hands of Libyan militias may amount to criminal liability.”

      Under international law, migrants rescued at sea by European vessels cannot be returned to Libya, where conflict and human rights abuses mean the UN has stated there is no safe port. Under the UN convention on the law of the sea (Unclos) all ships are obliged to report an encounter with a vessel in distress and offer assistance. This is partly why EU naval missions that were not mandated to conduct rescue missions found themselves pitched into them regardless.

      Drones, however, operate in a legal grey zone not covered by Unclos. The situation for private contractors to EU agencies, as in some of the current drone operations, is even less clear.

      Frontex told the Observer that all drone operators, staff or private contractors are subject to EU laws that mandate the protection of human life. The agency said it was unable to share a copy of the mission instructions given to drone operators that would tell them what to do in the event of encountering a boat in distress, asking the Observer to submit a freedom of information request. The agency said drones had encountered boats in distress on only four occasions – all in June this year – in the central Mediterranean, and that none had led to a “serious incident report” – Frontex jargon for a red flag. When EU naval vessels were deployed in similar areas in previous years, multiple serious incidents were reported every month, according to documents seen by the Observer.

      https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/04/drones-replace-patrol-ships-mediterranean-fears-more-migrant-deaths

      #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Libye

    • L’uso dei droni per guardare i migranti che affogano mette a nudo tutta la disumanità delle pratiche di controllo sui confini

      In troppi crediamo al mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la realtà macchiata di sangue.

      “Se avessi ignorato quelle grida di aiuto, non avrei mai più trovato il coraggio di affrontare il mare”.

      Con queste parole il pescatore siciliano Carlo Giarratano ha commentato la sua decisione di sfidare il “decreto sicurezza” del Governo italiano, che prevede sanzioni o l’arresto nei confronti di chiunque trasporti in Italia migranti soccorsi in mare.

      La sua storia è un esempio della preoccupante tensione che si è creata ai confini della “Fortezza Europa” in materia di leggi e regolamenti. Secondo il diritto internazionale, il capitano di un’imbarcazione in mare è tenuto a fornire assistenza alle persone in difficoltà, “a prescindere dalla nazionalità o dalla cittadinanza delle persone stesse”. Al contempo, molti paesi europei, e la stessa UE, stanno cercando di limitare questo principio e queste attività, malgrado il tragico bilancio di morti nel Mediterraneo, in continua crescita.

      L’Agenzia di Confine e Guardia Costiera Europea, Frontex, sembra aver escogitato una soluzione ingegnosa: i droni. L’obbligo legale di aiutare un’imbarcazione in difficoltà non si applica a un veicolo aereo senza pilota (UAV, unmanned aerial vehicle). Si può aggirare la questione, politicamente calda, su chi sia responsabile di accogliere i migranti soccorsi, se questi semplicemente non vengono proprio soccorsi. Questo principio fa parte di una consolidata tendenza a mettere in atto politiche finalizzate a impedire che i migranti attraversino il Mediterraneo. Visto l’obbligo di soccorrere le persone che ci chiedono aiuto, la soluzione sembra essere questa: fare in modo di non sentire le loro richieste.

      Jean-Claude Juncker sostiene che le politiche europee di presidio ai confini sono concepite per “stroncare il business dei trafficanti”, perché nella moralità egocentrica che ispira la politica di frontiera europea, se non ci fossero trafficanti non ci sarebbero migranti.

      Ma non ci sono trafficanti che si fabbricano migranti in officina. Se le rotte ufficiali sono bloccate, le persone vanno a cercare quelle non ufficiali. Rendere la migrazione più difficile, ha fatto aumentare la richiesta di trafficanti e scafisti, certamente non l’ha fermata. Invece che stroncare il loro business, queste politiche lo hanno creato.

      Secondo la logica della foglia di fico, l’UE sostiene di non limitarsi a lasciare affogare i migranti, ma di fornire supporto alla guardia costiera libica perché intercetti le imbarcazioni che tentano la traversata e riporti le persone nei campi di detenzione in Libia.

      Ma il rapporto del Global Detention Project, a proposito delle condizioni in questi campi, riferisce: “I detenuti sono spesso sottoposti a gravi abusi e violenze, compresi stupri e torture, estorsioni, lavori forzati, schiavitù, condizioni di vita insopportabili, esecuzioni sommarie.” Human Rights Watch, in un rapporto intitolato Senza via di fuga dall’Inferno, descrive situazioni di sovraffollamento e malnutrizione e riporta testimonianze di bambini picchiati dalle guardie.

      L’Irish Times ha riportato accuse secondo cui le milizie associate con il GNA (Governo Libico di Alleanza Nazionale, riconosciuto dall’ONU), starebbero immagazzinando munizioni in questi campi e userebbero i rifugiati come “scudi umani”. Sembra quasi inevitabile, quindi, la notizia che il 3 luglio almeno 53 rifugiati sono stati uccisi durante un attacco dei ribelli appartenenti all’Esercito Nazionale Libico, nel campo di detenzione di Tajura, vicino a Tripoli.

      Secondo una testimonianza riportata dall’Associated Press, a Tajura i migranti erano costretti a pulire le armi delle milizie fedeli al GNA, armi che erano immagazzinate nel campo. Secondo i racconti di testimoni oculari dell’attacco, riportati dalle forze ONU, le guardie del campo avrebbero aperto il fuoco su chi tentava di scappare.

      Nel mondo occidentale, quando parliamo di immigrazione, tendiamo a focalizzarci sul cosiddetto “impatto sulle comunità” causato dai flussi di nuovi arrivati che si muovono da un posto all’altro.

      Nelle nostre discussioni, ci chiediamo se i migranti portino un guadagno per l’economia oppure intacchino risorse già scarse. Raramente ci fermiamo a guardare nella sua cruda e tecnica realtà la concreta applicazione del controllo alle frontiere, quando si traduce davvero in fucili e filo spinato.

      Ci ripetiamo che i costi vanno tutti in un’unica direzione: secondo la nostra narrazione preferita, i controlli di confine sono tutti gratis, è lasciare entrare i migranti la cosa che costa. Ma i costi da pagare ci sono sempre: non solo il tributo di morti che continua a crescere o i budget multimilionari e sempre in aumento delle nostre agenzie di frontiera, ma anche i costi morali e sociali che finiamo con l’estorcere a noi stessi.

      L’ossessione per la sicurezza dei confini deve fare i conti con alcune delle più antiche e radicate convinzioni etiche proprie delle società occidentali. Prendersi cura del più debole, fare agli altri quello che vogliamo sia fatto a noi, aiutare chi possiamo. Molti uomini e donne che lavorano in mare, quando soccorrono dei naufraghi non sono spinti solo da una legge che li obbliga a prestare aiuto, ma anche da un imperativo morale più essenziale. “Lo facciamo perché siamo gente di mare”, ha detto Giarratano al Guardian, “in mare, se ci sono persone in pericolo, le salviamo”.

      Ma i nostri governi hanno deciso che questo non vale per gli europei. Come se fosse una perversa sfida lanciata a istinti morali vecchi di migliaia di anni, nell’Europa moderna un marinaio che salva un migrante mentre sta per affogare, deve essere punito.

      Infrangere queste reti di reciproche responsabilità fra gli esseri umani, ha dei costi: divisioni e tensioni sociali. Ed è un amaro paradosso, perché proprio argomenti di questo genere sono in testa alle nostre preoccupazioni percepite quando si parla di migrazioni. E mentre l’UE fa di tutto per respingere un fronte del confine verso i deserti del Nord Africa, cercando di tenere i corpi dei rifugiati abbastanza lontani da non farceli vedere da vicino, intanto l’altro fronte continua a spingere verso di noi. L’Europa diventa un “ambiente ostile” e quindi noi diventiamo un popolo ostile.

      Ci auto-ingaggiamo come guardie di confine al nostro interno. Padroni di casa, infermiere, insegnanti, manager – ogni relazione sociale deve essere controllata. Il nostro regime di “frontiera quotidiana” crea “comunità sospette” all’interno della nostra società: sono persone sospette per il solo fatto di esistere e, nei loro confronti, si possono chiamare le forze dell’ordine in ogni momento, “giusto per dare un’occhiata”.

      Il confine non è solo un sistema per tenere gli estranei fuori dalla nostra società, ma per marchiare per sempre le persone come estranee, anche all’interno e per legittimare ufficialmente il pregiudizio, per garantire che “l’integrazione” – il Sacro Graal della narrazione progressista sull’immigrazione – resti illusoria e irrealizzabile, uno scherzo crudele giocato sulla pelle di persone destinate a rimanere etichettate come straniere e sospette. La nostra società nel suo insieme si mette al servizio di questo insaziabile confine, fino a definire la sua vera e propria identità nella capacità di respingere le persone.

      Malgrado arrivino continuamente immagini e notizie di tragedie e di morti, i media evitano di collegarle con le campagne di opinione che amplificano le cosiddette “legittime preoccupazioni” della gente e le trasformano in un inattaccabile “comune buon senso”.

      I compromessi che reggono le politiche di controllo dei confini non vengono messi in luce. Questo ci permette di guardare da un’altra parte, non perché siamo crudeli ma perché non possiamo sopportare di vedere quello che stiamo facendo. Ci sono persone e gruppi che, come denuncia Adam Serwer in un articolo su The Atlantic, sono proprio “Focalizzati sulla Crudeltà”. E anche se noi non siamo così, viviamo comunque nel loro stesso mondo, un mondo in cui degli esseri umani annegano e noi li guardiamo dall’alto dei nostri droni senza pilota, mentre lo stato punisce chi cerca di salvarli.

      In troppi crediamo nel mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la tragica e insanguinata realtà del concreto controllo quotidiano sui confini. E comunque, se fosse possibile, non avremmo ormai risolto questa contraddizione? Il fatto che non lo abbiamo fatto dovrebbe portarci a pensare che non ne siamo capaci e che ci si prospetta una cruda e desolante scelta morale per il futuro.

      D’ora in poi, il numero dei migranti non può che aumentare. I cambiamenti climatici saranno determinanti. La scelta di non respingerli non sarà certamente gratis: non c’è modo di condividere le nostre risorse con altri senza sostenere dei costi. Ma se non lo facciamo, scegliamo consapevolmente i naufragi, gli annegamenti, i campi di detenzione, scegliamo di destinare queste persone ad una vita da schiavi in zone di guerra. Scegliamo l’ambiente ostile. Scegliamo di “difendere il nostro stile di vita” semplicemente accettando di vivere a fianco di una popolazione sempre in aumento fatta di rifugiati senza patria, ammassati in baracche di lamiera e depositi soffocanti, sfiniti fino alla disperazione.

      Ma c’è un costo che, alla fine, giudicheremo troppo alto da pagare? Per il momento, sembra di no: ma, … cosa siamo diventati?

      https://dossierlibia.lasciatecientrare.it/luso-dei-droni-per-guardare-i-migranti-che-affogano-m

    • Et aussi... l’utilisation de moins en moins de #bateaux et de plus en plus de #avions a le même effet...

      Sophia : The EU naval mission without any ships

      Launched in 2015 to combat human smuggling in the Mediterranean, the operation has been all but dismantled, symbolizing European division on immigration policy.


      The Italian air base of Sigonella extends its wire fencing across the green and yellow fields of Sicily, 25 kilometers inland from the island’s coastline. Only the enormous cone of Mount Etna, visible in the distance, stands out over this flat land. Posters depicting a sniper taking aim indicate that this is a restricted-access military zone with armed surveillance.

      Inside, there is an enormous city with deserted avenues, runways and hangars. This is the departure point for aircraft patrolling the Central Mediterranean as part of EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Sophia, Europe’s military response to the human smuggling rings, launched in 2015. But since March of this year, the planes have been a reflection of a mutilated mission: Sophia is now a naval operation without any ships.

      The Spanish detachment in #Sigonella has just rotated some of its personnel. A group of newly arrived soldiers are being trained in a small room inside one of the makeshift containers where the group of 39 military members work. The aircraft that they use is standing just a few meters away, on a sun-drenched esplanade that smells of fuel. The plane has been designed for round-the-clock maritime surveillance, and it has a spherical infrared camera fitted on its nose that allows it to locate and identify seagoing vessels, as well as to detect illegal trafficking of people, arms and oil.

      If the EU had systematically shown more solidarity with Italy [...] Italian voters would not have made a dramatic swing to the far right

      Juan Fernando López Aguilar, EU Civil Liberties Committee

      This aircraft was also made to assist in sea rescues. But this activity is no longer taking place, now that there are no ships in the mission. Six aircraft are all that remain of Operation Sophia, which has been all but dismantled. Nobody would venture to say whether its mandate will be extended beyond the current deadline of September 30.

      The planes at Sigonella continue to patrol the Central Mediterranean and collect information to meet the ambitious if vague goal that triggered the mission back at the height of the refugee crisis: “To disrupt the business of human and weapons smuggling.” The operation’s most controversial task is still being carried out as well: training Libya’s Coast Guard so they will do the job of intercepting vessels filled with people fleeing Libyan war and chaos, and return them to the point of departure. Even official sources of Europe’s diplomatic service admitted, in a written reply, that the temporary suspension of naval assets “is not optimal,” and that the mission’s ability to fulfill its mandate “is more limited.”

      In these four years, the mission has had some tangible achievements: the arrest of 151 individuals suspected of human trafficking and smuggling, and the destruction of 551 boats used by criminal networks. Operation Sophia has also inspected three ships and seized banned goods; it has made radio contact with 2,462 vessels to check their identity, and made 161 friendly approaches. For European diplomats, the mission has been mainly useful in “significantly reducing smugglers’ ability to operate in high seas” and has generally contributed to “improving maritime safety and stability in the Central Mediterranean.”

      Sophia’s main mission was never to rescue people at sea, yet in these last years it has saved 45,000 lives, following the maritime obligation to aid people in distress. The reason why it has been stripped of its ships – a move that has been strongly criticized by non-profit groups – can be found 800 kilometers north of Sicily, in Rome, and also in the offices of European politicians. Last summer, Italy’s far-right Interior Minister Matteo Salvini began to apply a closed-port policy for ships carrying rescued migrants unless a previous relocation agreement existed with other countries. Salvini first targeted the non-profit groups performing sea rescues, and then he warned his European colleagues that Italy, which is leading the EU mission, would refuse to take in all the rescued migrants without first seeing a change in EU policy. A year later, no European deal has emerged, and every time a rescue is made, the issue of who takes in the migrants is negotiated on an ad hoc basis.

      Operation Sophia has saved 45,000 lives

      Although arrivals through this route have plummeted, Salvini insists that “Italy is not willing to accept all the migrants who arrive in Europe.” Political division among member states has had an effect on the European military mission. “Sophia has not been conducting rescues since August 2018,” says Matteo Villa, a migration expert at Italy’s Institute for International Policy Studies (ISPI). “Nobody in the EU wanted to see a mission ship with migrants on board being refused port entry, so the ‘solution’ was to suspend Sophia’s naval tasks.”

      The decision to maintain the operation without any ships was made at the last minute in March, in a move that prevented the dismantling of the mission just ahead of the European elections. “Operation Sophia has helped save lives, although that was not its main objective. It was a mistake for [the EU] to leave it with nothing but airplanes, without the ships that were able to save lives,” says Matteo de Bellis, a migration and refugee expert at Amnesty International. “What they are doing now, training the Libyans, only serves to empower the forces that intercept refugees and migrants and return them to Libya, where they face arbitrary detention in centers where there is torture, exploitation and rape.”

      Ever since the great maritime rescue operation developed by Italy in 2013, the Mare Nostrum, which saved 150,000 people, its European successors have been less ambitious in scope and their goals more focused on security and border patrolling. This is the case with Sophia, which by training the Libyan Coast Guard is contributing to the increasingly clear strategy of outsourcing EU migratory control, even to a country mired in chaos and war. “If Europe reduces search-and-rescue operations and encourages Libya to conduct them in its place, then it is being an accomplice to the violations taking place in Libya,” says Catherine Wollard, secretary general of the non-profit network integrated in the European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE).

      Training the Libyans only serves to empower the forces that intercept refugees and migrants and return them to Libya, where they face torture, exploitation and rape

      Matteo de Bellis, Amnesty International

      The vision offered by official European sources regarding the training of the Libyan Coast Guard, and about Operation Sophia in general, is very different when it comes to reducing mortality on the Mediterranean’s most deadly migration route. “Operation Sophia was launched to fight criminal human smuggling networks that put lives at risk in the Central Mediterranean,” they say in a written response. European officials are aware of what is going on in Libya, but their response to the accusations of abuse perpetrated by the Libyan Coast Guard and the situation of migrants confined in detention centers in terrible conditions, is the following: “Everything that happens in Libyan territorial waters is Libya’s responsibility, not Europe’s, yet we are not looking the other way. […] Through Operation Sophia we have saved lives, fought traffickers and trained the Libyan Coast Guard […]. We are performing this last task because substantial loss of life at sea is taking place within Libyan territorial waters. That is why it is very important for Libya’s Coast Guard and Navy to know how to assist distressed migrants in line with international law and humanitarian standards. Also, because the contribution of Libya’s Coast Guard in the fight against traffickers operating in their waters is indispensable.”

      Criticism of Operation Sophia is also coming from the European Parliament, which funded the trip that made this feature story possible. Juan Fernando López Aguilar, president of the parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, attacks the decision to strip Sophia of its naval resources. The Socialist Party (PSOE) politician says that this decision was made “in the absolute absence of a global approach to the migration phenomenon that would include cooperative coordination of all the resources at member states’ disposal, such as development aid in Africa, cooperation with origin and transit countries, hirings in countries of origin and the creation of legal ways to access the EU. Now that would dismantle [the mafias’] business model,” he says.

      López Aguilar says that the EU is aware of Italy’s weariness of the situation, considering that “for years it dealt with a migratory pressure that exceeded its response capacity.” Between 2014 and 2017, around 624,000 people landed on Italy’s coasts. “If they EU had systematically shown more solidarity with Italy, if relocation programs for people in hotspots had been observed, very likely Italian voters would not have made a dramatic swing giving victory to the far right, nor would we have reached a point where a xenophobic closed-port narrative is claimed to represent the salvation of Italian interests.”

      Miguel Urbán, a European Member of Parliament for the Spanish leftist party Unidas Podemos, is highly critical of the way the EU has been managing immigration. He talks about a “militarization of the Mediterranean” and describes European policy as bowing to “the far right’s strategy.” He blames Italy’s attitude for turning Sophia into “an operation in the Mediterranean without a naval fleet. What the Italian government gets out of this is to rid itself of its humanitarian responsibility to disembark migrants on its coasts.”

      For now, no progress has been made on the underlying political problem of disembarkation and, by extension, on the long-delayed reform of the Dublin Regulation to balance out frontline states’ responsibility in taking in refugees with solidarity from other countries. Sophia will continue to hobble along until September after being all but given up for dead in March. After that, everything is still up in the air.

      https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/08/29/inenglish/1567088519_215547.html
      #Sophie #Opération_Sophia #Sicile

    • L’uso dei droni per guardare i migranti che affogano mette a nudo tutta la disumanità delle pratiche di controllo sui confini

      In troppi crediamo al mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la realtà macchiata di sangue.

      “Se avessi ignorato quelle grida di aiuto, non avrei mai più trovato il coraggio di affrontare il mare”.

      Con queste parole il pescatore siciliano Carlo Giarratano ha commentato la sua decisione di sfidare il “decreto sicurezza” del Governo italiano, che prevede sanzioni o l’arresto nei confronti di chiunque trasporti in Italia migranti soccorsi in mare.

      La sua storia è un esempio della preoccupante tensione che si è creata ai confini della “Fortezza Europa” in materia di leggi e regolamenti. Secondo il diritto internazionale, il capitano di un’imbarcazione in mare è tenuto a fornire assistenza alle persone in difficoltà, “a prescindere dalla nazionalità o dalla cittadinanza delle persone stesse”. Al contempo, molti paesi europei, e la stessa UE, stanno cercando di limitare questo principio e queste attività, malgrado il tragico bilancio di morti nel Mediterraneo, in continua crescita.

      L’Agenzia di Confine e Guardia Costiera Europea, Frontex, sembra aver escogitato una soluzione ingegnosa: i droni. L’obbligo legale di aiutare un’imbarcazione in difficoltà non si applica a un veicolo aereo senza pilota (UAV, unmanned aerial vehicle). Si può aggirare la questione, politicamente calda, su chi sia responsabile di accogliere i migranti soccorsi, se questi semplicemente non vengono proprio soccorsi. Questo principio fa parte di una consolidata tendenza a mettere in atto politiche finalizzate a impedire che i migranti attraversino il Mediterraneo. Visto l’obbligo di soccorrere le persone che ci chiedono aiuto, la soluzione sembra essere questa: fare in modo di non sentire le loro richieste.

      Jean-Claude Juncker sostiene che le politiche europee di presidio ai confini sono concepite per “stroncare il business dei trafficanti”, perché nella moralità egocentrica che ispira la politica di frontiera europea, se non ci fossero trafficanti non ci sarebbero migranti.

      Ma non ci sono trafficanti che si fabbricano migranti in officina. Se le rotte ufficiali sono bloccate, le persone vanno a cercare quelle non ufficiali. Rendere la migrazione più difficile, ha fatto aumentare la richiesta di trafficanti e scafisti, certamente non l’ha fermata. Invece che stroncare il loro business, queste politiche lo hanno creato.

      Secondo la logica della foglia di fico, l’UE sostiene di non limitarsi a lasciare affogare i migranti, ma di fornire supporto alla guardia costiera libica perché intercetti le imbarcazioni che tentano la traversata e riporti le persone nei campi di detenzione in Libia.

      Ma il rapporto del Global Detention Project, a proposito delle condizioni in questi campi, riferisce: “I detenuti sono spesso sottoposti a gravi abusi e violenze, compresi stupri e torture, estorsioni, lavori forzati, schiavitù, condizioni di vita insopportabili, esecuzioni sommarie.” Human Rights Watch, in un rapporto intitolato Senza via di fuga dall’Inferno, descrive situazioni di sovraffollamento e malnutrizione e riporta testimonianze di bambini picchiati dalle guardie.

      L’Irish Times ha riportato accuse secondo cui le milizie associate con il GNA (Governo Libico di Alleanza Nazionale, riconosciuto dall’ONU), starebbero immagazzinando munizioni in questi campi e userebbero i rifugiati come “scudi umani”. Sembra quasi inevitabile, quindi, la notizia che il 3 luglio almeno 53 rifugiati sono stati uccisi durante un attacco dei ribelli appartenenti all’Esercito Nazionale Libico, nel campo di detenzione di Tajura, vicino a Tripoli.

      Secondo una testimonianza riportata dall’Associated Press, a Tajura i migranti erano costretti a pulire le armi delle milizie fedeli al GNA, armi che erano immagazzinate nel campo. Secondo i racconti di testimoni oculari dell’attacco, riportati dalle forze ONU, le guardie del campo avrebbero aperto il fuoco su chi tentava di scappare.

      Nel mondo occidentale, quando parliamo di immigrazione, tendiamo a focalizzarci sul cosiddetto “impatto sulle comunità” causato dai flussi di nuovi arrivati che si muovono da un posto all’altro.

      Nelle nostre discussioni, ci chiediamo se i migranti portino un guadagno per l’economia oppure intacchino risorse già scarse. Raramente ci fermiamo a guardare nella sua cruda e tecnica realtà la concreta applicazione del controllo alle frontiere, quando si traduce davvero in fucili e filo spinato.

      Ci ripetiamo che i costi vanno tutti in un’unica direzione: secondo la nostra narrazione preferita, i controlli di confine sono tutti gratis, è lasciare entrare i migranti la cosa che costa. Ma i costi da pagare ci sono sempre: non solo il tributo di morti che continua a crescere o i budget multimilionari e sempre in aumento delle nostre agenzie di frontiera, ma anche i costi morali e sociali che finiamo con l’estorcere a noi stessi.

      L’ossessione per la sicurezza dei confini deve fare i conti con alcune delle più antiche e radicate convinzioni etiche proprie delle società occidentali. Prendersi cura del più debole, fare agli altri quello che vogliamo sia fatto a noi, aiutare chi possiamo. Molti uomini e donne che lavorano in mare, quando soccorrono dei naufraghi non sono spinti solo da una legge che li obbliga a prestare aiuto, ma anche da un imperativo morale più essenziale. “Lo facciamo perché siamo gente di mare”, ha detto Giarratano al Guardian, “in mare, se ci sono persone in pericolo, le salviamo”.

      Ma i nostri governi hanno deciso che questo non vale per gli europei. Come se fosse una perversa sfida lanciata a istinti morali vecchi di migliaia di anni, nell’Europa moderna un marinaio che salva un migrante mentre sta per affogare, deve essere punito.

      Infrangere queste reti di reciproche responsabilità fra gli esseri umani, ha dei costi: divisioni e tensioni sociali. Ed è un amaro paradosso, perché proprio argomenti di questo genere sono in testa alle nostre preoccupazioni percepite quando si parla di migrazioni. E mentre l’UE fa di tutto per respingere un fronte del confine verso i deserti del Nord Africa, cercando di tenere i corpi dei rifugiati abbastanza lontani da non farceli vedere da vicino, intanto l’altro fronte continua a spingere verso di noi. L’Europa diventa un “ambiente ostile” e quindi noi diventiamo un popolo ostile.

      Ci auto-ingaggiamo come guardie di confine al nostro interno. Padroni di casa, infermiere, insegnanti, manager – ogni relazione sociale deve essere controllata. Il nostro regime di “frontiera quotidiana” crea “comunità sospette” all’interno della nostra società: sono persone sospette per il solo fatto di esistere e, nei loro confronti, si possono chiamare le forze dell’ordine in ogni momento, “giusto per dare un’occhiata”.

      Il confine non è solo un sistema per tenere gli estranei fuori dalla nostra società, ma per marchiare per sempre le persone come estranee, anche all’interno e per legittimare ufficialmente il pregiudizio, per garantire che “l’integrazione” – il Sacro Graal della narrazione progressista sull’immigrazione – resti illusoria e irrealizzabile, uno scherzo crudele giocato sulla pelle di persone destinate a rimanere etichettate come straniere e sospette. La nostra società nel suo insieme si mette al servizio di questo insaziabile confine, fino a definire la sua vera e propria identità nella capacità di respingere le persone.

      Malgrado arrivino continuamente immagini e notizie di tragedie e di morti, i media evitano di collegarle con le campagne di opinione che amplificano le cosiddette “legittime preoccupazioni” della gente e le trasformano in un inattaccabile “comune buon senso”.

      I compromessi che reggono le politiche di controllo dei confini non vengono messi in luce. Questo ci permette di guardare da un’altra parte, non perché siamo crudeli ma perché non possiamo sopportare di vedere quello che stiamo facendo. Ci sono persone e gruppi che, come denuncia Adam Serwer in un articolo su The Atlantic, sono proprio “Focalizzati sulla Crudeltà”. E anche se noi non siamo così, viviamo comunque nel loro stesso mondo, un mondo in cui degli esseri umani annegano e noi li guardiamo dall’alto dei nostri droni senza pilota, mentre lo stato punisce chi cerca di salvarli.

      In troppi crediamo nel mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la tragica e insanguinata realtà del concreto controllo quotidiano sui confini. E comunque, se fosse possibile, non avremmo ormai risolto questa contraddizione? Il fatto che non lo abbiamo fatto dovrebbe portarci a pensare che non ne siamo capaci e che ci si prospetta una cruda e desolante scelta morale per il futuro.

      D’ora in poi, il numero dei migranti non può che aumentare. I cambiamenti climatici saranno determinanti. La scelta di non respingerli non sarà certamente gratis: non c’è modo di condividere le nostre risorse con altri senza sostenere dei costi. Ma se non lo facciamo, scegliamo consapevolmente i naufragi, gli annegamenti, i campi di detenzione, scegliamo di destinare queste persone ad una vita da schiavi in zone di guerra. Scegliamo l’ambiente ostile. Scegliamo di “difendere il nostro stile di vita” semplicemente accettando di vivere a fianco di una popolazione sempre in aumento fatta di rifugiati senza patria, ammassati in baracche di lamiera e depositi soffocanti, sfiniti fino alla disperazione.

      Ma c’è un costo che, alla fine, giudicheremo troppo alto da pagare? Per il momento, sembra di no: ma, … cosa siamo diventati?

      https://dossierlibia.lasciatecientrare.it/luso-dei-droni-per-guardare-i-migranti-che-affogano-m

    • Grèce : le gouvernement durcit nettement sa position et implique l’armée à la gestion de flux migratoire en Mer Egée

      Après deux conférences intergouvernementales ce we., le gouvernement Mitsotakis a décidé la participation active de l’Armée et des Forces Navales dans des opérations de dissuasion en Mer Egée. En même temps il a décidé de poursuivre les opérations de ’désengorgement’ des îlses, de renfoncer les forces de garde-côte en effectifs et en navires, et de pousser plus loin la coopération avec Frontex et les forces de l’Otan qui opèrent déjà dans la région.

      Le durcissement net de la politique gouvernementale se traduit aussi par le retour en force d’un discours ouvertement xénophobe. Le vice-président du gouvernement grec, Adonis Géorgiadis, connu pour ses positions à l’’extrême-droite de l’échiquier politique, a déclaré que parmi les nouveaux arrivants, il y aurait très peu de réfugiés, la plupart seraient des ‘clandestins’ et il n’a pas manqué de qualifier les flux d’ ‘invasion’.

      source – en grec - Efimerida tôn Syntaktôn : https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/kybernisi/211786_kybernisi-sklirainei-ti-stasi-tis-sto-prosfygiko

      Il va de soi que cette militarisation de la gestion migratoire laisse craindre le pire dans la mesure où le but évident de l’implication de l’armée ne saurait être que la systématisation des opérations de push-back en pleine mer, ce qui est non seulement illégal mais ouvertement criminel.

      Reçu de Vicky Skoumbi via la mailing-list Migreurop, 23.09.2019

  • Info sur la refonte de la #Directive_Retour et les futurs projets de réforme du #régime_d'asile_européen_commun

    info sur la prochaine étape européenne en matière de politique migratoire. Plus précisément sur la refonte de la Directive Retour qui va passer au vote en #LIBE et aussi des infos sur l’évolution du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (#RAEC), histoire d’informer de ce vers quoi l’on tend probablement pour la prochaine législature (donc le prochain mandat).

    Dans un effort pour réformer le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (RAEC) et tendre vers une #uniformisation du droit d’asile au niveau européen, les directives sont revues une à une depuis quelques années (Directive Accueil, Procédure, Qualification et Retour + le règlement Dublin qui est au point mort depuis 2017 à cause du Conseil Européen).
    Ces #révisions rentrent dans le cadre de l’#agenda_européen_pour_les_migrations qui a été élaboré en 2015 par la Commission sous ordre du Conseil Européen.

    Le package est en état d’avancement prochain et l’étape la plus proche semble concerner la refonte de la Directive Retour.
    Néanmoins, il y a également un nombre assez important de dispositifs prévus dont il est peut-être pas inintéressant d’évoquer dans le sillage de l’analyse sur cette Directive.

    Il y a donc deux parties dans ce mail d’info : la première sur le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (RAEC) et ce qu’il préfigure ; la seconde sur le texte de la Directive Retour plus précisément.

    Le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun :

    Il y a de nombreux discours actuellement autour de la mise en place d’un droit d’asile "harmonisé" au niveau européen.

    C’est une obsession de Macron depuis son élection. Il a réaffirmé, lors de la restitution du Grand Débat, sa volonté d’une Europe au régime d’asile commun : "c’est aussi une Europe qui tient ses frontières, qui les protège. C’est une Europe qui a un droit d’asile refondé et commun et où la #responsabilité va avec la #solidarité."
    https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/04/25/conference-de-presse-grand-debat-national

    La confusion est telle que les journalistes ne semblent pas toujours comprendre si ce régime d’asile commun existe ou non.

    Sur france inter par exemple :
    "Cela fait plusieurs années que l’on parle de la mise en place d’un régime d’asile européen commun. Nous en sommes encore très loin mais plusieurs textes sont actuellement en discussion, sur les procédures, sur l’accueil, les qualifications, les réinstallations, la création d’une agence européenne pour l’asile "
    https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/cafe-europe/cafe-europe-24-fevrier-2018

    Et non... ça ne fait pas plusieurs années qu’on en parle... ça fait plusieurs années qu’il existe !

    Historique :

    En vérité, cette tentative d’harmonisation des législations est ancienne et date à peu près du Conseil Européen de #Tampere en 1999 qui donna les premières impulsions pour la mise en place du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun avec tout ce que l’on connait maintenant à savoir par exemple, le #règlement_Dublin.
    Ici le résumé des orientations du Conseil sont claires :
    "il faut, pour les domaines distincts, mais étroitement liés, de l’#asile et des #migrations, élaborer une politique européenne commune (...) Il est convenu de travailler à la mise en place d’un régime d’asile européen commun, fondé sur l’application intégrale et globale de la Convention de Genève. (...) Ce régime devrait comporter, à court terme, une méthode claire et opérationnelle pour déterminer l’Etat responsable de l’examen d’une demande d’asile, des normes communes pour une procédure d’asile équitable et efficace, des conditions communes minimales d’#accueil des demandeurs d’asile, et le rapprochement des règles sur la reconnaissance et le contenu du statut de réfugié."
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_fr.htm#a

    Vous avez ici les bases du RAEC et notamment du règlement Dublin qui vise justement à la détermination de l’#Etat_responsable de l’asile afin de lutter contre le "#shopping_de_l'asile", un """"fléau""""" qui avait déjà touché l’Europe durant les années 90 avec la crise des Balkans (en 1992, 700 000 personnes environ ont demandé l’asile en Europe, ce qui signifie par ailleurs que non... 2015 n’est pas une situation si inédite. La situation s’est stabilisée après 1993 où 500 000 personnes ont demandé l’asile, puis 300 000 dans les années qui ont suivi, mais pas au point de ne pas "forcer" les pays à réagir au niveau européen).
    https://www.persee.fr/doc/homig_1142-852x_1996_num_1198_1_2686

    Cet acte fondateur du #Conseil_de_Tampere est corroboré par plusieurs documents et on peut en trouver aussi confirmation par exemple dans le rapport sur la #politique_européenne_de_Retour (rédigé tous les trois ans) qui commence par :
    "L’Union européenne s’efforce depuis 1999 de mettre au point une approche globale sur la question des migrations, qui couvre l’#harmonisation des conditions d’admission, les droits des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour régulier ainsi que l’élaboration de mesures juridiques et le renforcement d’une coopération pratique en matière de prévention des flux migratoires irréguliers."
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=celex:52014DC0199

    Bref, à partir de 1999 et donc du Conseil de Tampere, la direction est prise de mener une politique migratoire à l’échelle européenne pour renforcer le contrôle des frontières extérieures.

    Les Textes du RAEC, l’échec de l’harmonisation et les règlements qui nous attendent en conséquence :

    Le Conseil (donc les États) ordonné à Tampere et donc la Commission exécute en proposant plusieurs textes qui vont dessiner le paysage actuel du droit d’asile européen commun.

    Un ensemble de textes est donc créé et adopté :

    Le règlement Dublin succède donc à la convention de Dublin en 2003
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A8glement_Dublin_II
    Avec son frère le règlement #Eurodac qui permet la mise en oeuvre de #Dublin aussi en 2003 (logique) :
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurodac

    #Frontex est lancé en 2004 :
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agence_europ%C3%A9enne_pour_la_gestion_de_la_coop%C3%A9ration_op%C3%A9

    Et les directives qui constituent le coeur du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun avec le règlement Dublin sont lancées dans la foulée :

    La #Directive_Accueil en 2003 (puis réformée en 2013)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033

    La #Directive_Procédure en 2005 (réformée aussi en 2013)
    https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/Procedures-FR.pdf

    La #Directive_Qualification en 2004 (réformée en 2011)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011L0095

    La Directive Retour en 2008 (qui va être réformée maintenant)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ajl0014

    L’ensemble de ces textes avait pour but d’harmoniser les législations nationales européennes (pour le meilleur et pour le pire d’ailleurs).
    Le problème concerne donc, non pas l’absence de législations européennes communes, mais plutôt les marges de manoeuvres des Etats dans l’interprétation des Directives et leur transposition dans les législations nationales. Cette marge de manoeuvre est telle qu’elle permet aux Etats de retenir ce qui les arrange dans tel ou tel texte, de sorte que toute tentative d’harmonisation est impossible.

    Dès lors, la diversité des procédures est toujours la norme d’un pays à l’autre ; un pays comme les Pays-Bas donne 4 ans de protection subsidiaire, tandis que la France avant la loi Asile n’en donnait qu’une ; la liste des pays sûrs n’est pas la même selon les Etats .... etc etc etc

    Les Etats ont tellement la main que finalement, on peut assez facilement conclure à l’#échec total des tentatives d’harmonisation et donc du RAEC, tant les Etats ont, du début à la fin, fait un peu près ce qu’ils voulaient avec les textes.
    (voir également Sarah Lamort : https://www.amazon.fr/Europe-terre-dasile-Sarah-Lamort/dp/2130734669)

    La Commission a elle-même très bien compris ces faiblesses.

    Exaspérée elle déclare en 2016 que malgré ses efforts pour la mise en place effective du RAEC : " il existe encore des différences notables entre les États membres dans les types de procédures utilisés, les conditions d’accueil offertes aux demandeurs, les #taux_de_reconnaissance et le type de protection octroyé aux bénéficiaires d’une protection internationale. Ces #divergences contribuent à des #mouvements_secondaires et à une course à l’asile (« #asylum_shopping »), créent des facteurs d’attraction et conduisent en définitive à une répartition inégale entre les États membres de la responsabilité d’offrir une protection à ceux qui en ont besoin.(...) Ces #disparités résultent en partie des dispositions souvent discrétionnaires qui figurent dans la version actuelle de la directive relative aux procédures d’asile et de celle relative aux conditions d’accueil." et de toutes les autres en vérité pouvons-nous ajouter...
    L’objectif est donc de "renforcer et harmoniser davantage les règles du régime d’asile européen commun, de façon à assurer une plus grande égalité de traitement dans l’ensemble de l’Union et à réduire les facteurs d’attraction injustifiés qui encouragent les départs vers l’UE" (les facteurs d’attraction étant le "shopping de l’asile")

    Et pour cela la Commission propose de transformer quasiment toutes les Directives citées plus haut en Règlement... :
    " la Commission proposera un nouveau règlement instituant une procédure d’asile commune unique dans l’Union et remplaçant la directive relative aux procédures d’asile ; un nouveau règlement relatif aux conditions que doivent remplir les demandeurs d’asile remplaçant l’actuelle directive du même nom, et des modifications ciblées de la directive relative aux conditions d’accueil."
    https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/FR/1-2016-197-FR-F1-1.PDF

    La différence entre la Directive et le Règlement étant que justement la Directive est soumise à une interprétation des Etats dans la transposition au sein des législations nationales de la dite Directive (dont on voit qu’elle est large), tandis qu’un Règlement est contraignant et s’applique sans interprétation, ni marge de manoeuvre whatsoever à tous les Etats (comme le règlement Dublin).
    Ici par exemple, la Commission propose de changer la Directive Procédure en un Règlement, histoire par exemple, que tous les pays aient la même liste de pays d’origine sûrs une bonne fois pour toute : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0467

    Ce processus d’abrogation des #directives pour en faire des #règlements est en cours et il est très important puisque cela signifie qu’il va falloir surveiller de très près les dispositions qui vont apparaitre dans ces nouveaux textes qui vont TOUS s’appliquer stricto sensu.
    Ce n’est pas forcément une bonne nouvelle.

    Reste que les Etats pourraient s’opposer à l’imposition de textes aussi coercitifs et d’ailleurs, ils ont eux-mêmes bloqué la révision du règlement Dublin. Cela pose la question de l’Etat d’avancement.

    Etat d’avancement :
    Depuis l’annonce de la transformation des Directives en Règlements en 2016, les dossiers ne semblent pas avoir tant avancés que cela pour autant que je sache sauf concernant quelques dossiers majeurs, notamment la Directive Retour.

    Concernant la mise en place des règlements, la Commission est très vague dans sa dernière communication sur l’état d’avancement de l’agenda européen matière de migrations de mars 2019 : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2019:0126:FIN:FR:PDF
    En décembre 2017, elle disait :
    "Présentées il y a un an et demi, ces propositions en sont à des stades d’avancement différents dans le processus législatif. Certaines, comme la proposition concernant l’Agence de l’Union européenne pour l’asile et la réforme d’Eurodac, sont sur le point d’être adoptées. D’autres, à savoir le cadre de l’Union pour la réinstallation, le règlement relatif aux conditions que doivent remplir les demandeurs d’asile et la directive relative aux conditions d’accueil, progressent. En revanche, la proposition de règlement sur les procédures d’asile et, comme pierre angulaire, la proposition de révision du règlement de Dublin, nécessitent encore un travail considérable. Dans ce contexte, il convient aussi de progresser dans les travaux sur la notion de pays tiers sûr au sens de l’UE, en tenant compte des conclusions du Conseil européen de juin"
    https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/FR/COM-2017-820-F1-FR-MAIN-PART-1.PDF

    Il y a donc fort à parier qu’en à peine 1 an et demi, les choses n’aient pas beaucoup avancées concernant les règlements.
    Bref, comme il était assez attendu, ce qui ne contraint pas totalement les Etats avancent et le reste piétine pour le moment.

    Par contre, elles avancent concernant la politique des retours et donc la Directive Retour !

    Politique des retours et externalisation de l’asile :

    Après le Conseil de Tampere en 1999, vient la "crise des migrants" en 2015, qui ne fera qu’accélérer les constatations de l’échec du RAEC.

    Le Conseil européen lance donc une réunion spéciale en avril 2015 qui annonce un changement de stratégie vers l’extérieur avec notamment un renforcement de la coopération avec les pays tiers pour le "contrôle de l’immigration". Ordre est donné à la Commission de mobiliser tous les moyens nécessaires pour mettre cette nouvelle stratégie en oeuvre.
    Ce n’est pas le lancement officiel de l’externalisation de l’Asile puisque le processus de Khartoum et de Rabat sont antérieurs et déjà lancés.
    Néanmoins, il me parait assez évident personnellement qu’un coup d’accélérateur à la stratégie d’externalisation sera donné à partir de ce Conseil qui sera entièrement tourné vers la coopération internationale :
    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement

    Dans le prolongement logique des décisions prises lors du Conseil d’avril 2015 et de l’orientation stratégique vers l’extérieur, le Conseil Européen lancera le Sommet de la Valette en novembre où il invitera un nombre conséquent de pays africains.
    Ainsi le Sommet de la Valette, "fut l’occasion de reconnaître que la gestion des migrations relève de la responsabilité commune des pays d’origine, de transit et de destination. L’UE et l’Afrique ont travaillé dans un esprit de partenariat afin de trouver des solutions communes aux défis d’intérêt commun."
    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12

    C’est après ce Sommet que seront initiés le Fond Fiduciaire, les accords avec la Turquie, la Libye, les garde-côtes, la transformation de Frontex etc
    Bien que tout cela ait été préparé en amont.

    Après les ordres du Conseil, la Commission s’exécute avec l’Agenda Européen en Matière de Migrations et la focale sur les retours :
    Devant la stratégie d’orientation du Conseil qui demande des réformes fortes et des actions pour transformer la politique européenne d’asile, la Commission s’exécute en mai 2015 avec l’Agenda Européen des migrations :https://ec.europa.eu/france/node/859_fr

    Cet agenda met l’emphase sur un nombre impressionnant de points, mais une large part est également réservée aux retours page 11 et 12 (puisqu’il faudrait s’assurer que les retours soient efficaces et effectifs d’après la Commission).
    https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_fr.pdf

    Dans la foulée la Commission lance donc une réflexion sur la politique des retours qui culminera la même année en 2015 avec The Action Plan of Return.
    L’action plan partira d’un principe assez simple, si les migrants viennent, c’est parce qu’on ne les renvoie pas...
    "The European Agenda on Migration, adopted by the European Commission on 13 May 2015, highlighted that one of the incentives for irregular migration is the knowledge that the EU’s system to return irregular migrants is not sufficiently effective"
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0453

    Ce plan est censé résoudre ce problème.
    Mais il sera aussi un relatif échec, ce qui n’empêchera pas la Commission d’insister en lançant un nouveau plan en 2017, The Renewed Action Plan on return :
    "Despite this, the overall impact on the return track record across the European Union remained limited, showing that more resolute action is needed to bring measurable results in returning irregular migrants. "
    https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170302_a_more_effective_return_policy_in_the_european_union_-_a_renewed_

    Toujours dans la foulée d’une politique d’expulsion efficace, il sera discuté plus tard (en mars 2019 sur l’évaluation de l’application de l’agenda européen) de la meilleure façon d’exécuter les retours en Europe. C’est là où nous en sommes.
    Pour la mise en place d’une politique de retour efficace, il y a donc deux stratégies :

    1) renforcer les accords de réadmission avec des accords bilatéraux ou par le biais des accords de Cotonou (qui vont être révisés et qui ont beaucoup tourné autour des migrations justement...on en reparlera un jour).
    "Concernant donc "les retours et la réadmission, l’UE continue d’œuvrer à la conclusion d’accords et d’arrangements en matière de réadmission avec les pays partenaires, 23 accords et arrangements ayant été conclus jusqu’à présent. Les États membres doivent maintenant tirer pleinement parti des accords existants."
    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1496_fr.htm

    2) renforcer les procédures de retour depuis l’Europe.
    La Commission espère en conséquence que "le Parlement européen et le Conseil devraient adopter rapidement la proposition de la Commission en matière de retour, qui vise à limiter les abus et la fuite des personnes faisant l’objet d’un retour au sein de l’Union"
    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1496_fr.htm

    C’est pourquoi la Commission propose de revoir la Directive Retour.

    La Directive Retour :
    La directive retour est donc la prochaine directive sur la liste des refontes.
    Ce sera un gros sujet a priori puisque la prochaine étape c’est le vote en Commission LIBE avant donc le vote en plénière.
    L’échéance est donc proche et les discussions bien avancées.

    Un texte problématique :

    Article 6 et 16
    En gros, les problèmes qui se posent avec ce texte ont surtout à voir avec l’article 6 qui décrit une liste de 16 critères de "risque de fuites", les derniers étant particulièrement dangereux puisqu’il semblerait que "résister aux procédures de retour" ou "refuser de donner ses empreintes" peuvent représenter des risques de fuites....
    Cet élargissement des critères est à mettre en lien avec l’article 18 qui permet la détention de toutes les personnes qui représentent un risque de fuite. Avec un élargissement pareil des critères de "fuites", je crains que l’on ne se donne le droit d’enfermer tout le monde.

    Article 7
    L’article 7 oblige les Etats tiers à coopérer dans les procédures de retour.
    L’application de cet article me semblait complexe mais le Brief du Parlement sur la Directive au paragraphe "Council" (donc sur les discussions au Conseil) ajoute que les Etats réfléchissent à la possibilité de sanctions pour les pays tiers en cas de non-respect de cette obligation de coopération.
    Et à ce moment-là j’ai compris.... Ma théorie c’est qu’un chantage quelconque pourra être mis en place pour établir une pression forçant les Etats tiers à coopérer.
    Tout le problème tient sur l’amplitude des sanctions possibles. Je n’en vois pas beaucoup, sauf à menacer de rompre des accords commerciaux ou de développement.

    C’est déjà plus ou moins le cas via le Fond Fiduciaire ou les fonds d’aide au dvp puisque l’on voit parfois que l’aide au dvp dépend de la mise en place d’accords de réadmission.
    Par exemple : l’UE et l’Afghanistan ont signé un accord de réadmission en Octobre 2016 : https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf
    Et dans la foulée d’octobre, 5 milliards d’aide au dvp étaient débloqués pour la période 2016-2020 à la conférence de Bruxelles (https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-afghanistan_march_2019.pdf).

    Avec une opération pareille, des soupçons de chantage à l’aide au dvp me paraissent tout à fait légitime.
    Cependant, ils existaient une séparation dans la forme. C’est-à-dire que même si les liens peuvent sembler évidents, les accords de réadmission n’établissaient pas directement de chantage entre l’un et l’autre. Il n’était pas écrit que des "sanctions" étaient possibles (du moins pas dans l’exemple de l’Afghanistan ni même dans l’accord de Cotonou - exception faite de ce qui concerne l’article 96 et le respect des droits—et dans aucun autre texte à ma connaissance).
    Ici le Conseil veut faire un pas de plus dans la direction d’une politique assumée de pressions via des sanctions et donc, indirectement semble-t-il, de chantage.

    Les Pays Tiers-Sûrs
    Un autre élément dangereux dans ce paragraphe sur le Conseil dans le Brief du Parlement : c’est que les Etats de leur côté réfléchissent aussi à la possibilité de renvoyer une personne dans un pays tiers considéré comme sûr qui ne soit pas le pays d’origine.
    En d’autres termes, renvoyer les soudanais par exemple, en Egypte par exemple légalement.

    Cela rejoint a priori les discussions sur la notion de pays tiers sûrs que la Commission et le Conseil continuent de vouloir développer depuis très longtemps malgré les oppositions franches des ONG (http://www.forumrefugies.org/s-informer/actualites/le-concept-de-pays-tiers-sur-une-remise-en-cause-profonde-de-l-acces-) ou même l’avis défavorable de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme en 2017 (https://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/171219_avis_concept_pays_tiers_sur_5.pdf)
    On ferait ici un pas de plus au sein du creuset initié par la politique des "pays d’origine sûrs" et on s’offrirait le droit de renvoyer des personnes dans des pays qui n’auraient pas les conditions pour les accueillir dignement (tant matériellement que du point de vue du respect des droits...).

    Article 22
    L’article 22 est aussi très problématique puisque les dispositions aux frontières devraient changer :
    Les migrants en zone d’attente devraient recevoir une décision de retour simplifiée plutôt qu’une explication motivée.
    Il ne devrait plus y avoir aucune chance de départ volontaire, sauf si le migrant possède un document de voyage en cours de validité (remis aux autorités) et coopère pleinement (car s’il ne coopère pas, on l’a vu, il peut être déclaré en "tentative de fuite" ou en "fuite").
    Concernant les recours, les migrants ne disposeront que de 48 heures pour faire appel d’une décision de retour fondée sur un rejet de l’asile à la frontière, et l’effet suspensif ne s’appliquera qu’à la présentation de nouvelles conclusions importantes (type CNDA) ou qu’il n’y a pas déjà eu de contrôle juridictionnel effectif.

    Article 16
    D’ailleurs, les recours peuvent subir un changement relativement dramatique à cause de l’article 16. Selon le brief de la Commission :
    " Proposed Article 16(4) imposes a general obligation on Member States to establish ‘reasonable’ time limits. In relation to appeals lodged against return decisions adopted as a consequence of a decision rejecting an application for international protection, Member States would have to establish a time limit for lodging an appeal of a maximum of five days, but would be free to fix a shorter period."
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637901/EPRS_BRI(2019)637901_EN.pdf
    Une manière de réduire encore plus les possibilités de recours.

    Article 13
    L’article 13 apporte aussi des changements aux refus d’entrée : " the proposal would allow Member States to impose an isolated entry ban, not accompanied by a corresponding return decision, if the irregularity of a stay is detected when the third-country national is exiting the territory of a Member State"
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637901/EPRS_BRI(2019)637901_EN.pdf

    Néanmoins, j’ai pour le moment du mal à évaluer l’étendue de cette proposition à l’article 13 et il faudrait peut-être en discuter avec l’anafé par exemple.

    #procédure_d'asile #réforme

    Reçu par email via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 06.06.2019

    • New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

      A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

      The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

      The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

      For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

      However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

      The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

      The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

      Quotes

      Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

      “The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

      Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

      “The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

    • New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

      A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

      The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

      The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

      For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

      However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

      The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

      The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

      Quotes

      Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

      “The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

      Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

      “The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

    • European Border and Coast Guard: Launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU

      Today, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, in cooperation with the Albanian authorities, is launching the first ever joint operation on the territory of a neighbouring non-EU country. As of 22 May, teams from the Agency will be deployed together with Albanian border guards at the Greek-Albanian border to strengthen border management and enhance security at the EU’s external borders, in full agreement with all concerned countries. This operation marks a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and its Western Balkan partners, and is yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.

      The launch event is taking place in Tirana, Albania, in the presence of Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Edi Rama, Albanian Prime Minister and Sandër Lleshaj, Albanian Interior Minister.

      Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, said: "With the first ever deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams outside of the EU, we are opening an entirely new chapter in our cooperation on migration and border management with Albania and with the whole Western Balkan region. This is a real game changer and a truly historical step, bringing this region closer to the EU by working together in a coordinated and mutually supportive way on shared challenges such as better managing migration and protecting our common borders.”

      Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, said: “Today we mark a milestone for our agency and the wider cooperation between the European Union and Albania. We are launching the first fully fledged joint operation outside the European Union to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.”

      While Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders, the European Border and Coast Guard is able to lend both technical and operational support and assistance. The European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to support the Albanian border guards in performing border checks at crossing points, for example, and preventing unauthorised entries. All operations and deployments at the Albanian border with Greece will be conducted in full agreement with both the Albanian and Greek authorities.

      At the start of the operation, the Agency will be deploying 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and 1 thermo-vision van from 12 EU Member States (Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.

      Strengthened cooperation between priority third countries and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will contribute to the better management of irregular migration, further enhance security at the EU’s external borders and strengthen the Agency’s ability to act in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, while bringing that neighbourhood closer to the EU.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2591_en.htm
      #externalisation

    • Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos in Albania at the official launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU

      Ladies and Gentlemen,

      We are here today to celebrate an important achievement and a milestone, both for Albania and for the EU.

      Only six months ago, here in Tirana, the EU signed the status agreement with Albania on cooperation on border management between Albania and the European Border and Coast Guard. This agreement, that entered into force three weeks ago, was the first agreement ever of its kind with a neighbouring country.

      Today, we will send off the joint European Border and Coast Guard Teams to be deployed as of tomorrow for the first time in a non-EU Member State. This does not only mark a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and Western Balkan partners, it is also yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.

      The only way to effectively address migration and security challenges we are facing today and those we may be confronted with in the years to come is by working closer together, as neighbours and as partners. What happens in Albania and the Western Balkans affects the European Union, and the other way around.

      Joint approach to border management is a key part of our overall approach to managing migration. It allows us to show to our citizens that their security is at the top of our concerns. But effective partnership in ensuring orderly migration also enables us, as Europe, to remain a place where those in need of protection can find shelter.

      Albania is the first country in the Western Balkans with whom the EU is moving forward with this new important chapter in our joint co-operation on border management.

      This can be a source of pride for both Albania and the EU and an important step that brings us closer together.

      While the overall situation along the Western Balkans route remains stable with continuously low levels of arrivals - it is in fact like night and day when compared to three years ago - we need to remain vigilant.

      The Status Agreement will help us in this effort. It expands the scale of practical, operational cooperation between the EU and Albania and hopefully soon with the rest of the Western Balkan region.

      These are important elements of our co-operation, also in view of the continued implementation of the requirements under the visa liberalisation agreement. Visa-free travel is a great achievement, which brings benefits to all sides and should be safeguarded.

      Together with Albanian border guards, European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to perform border checks at crossing points and perform border surveillance to prevent unauthorized border crossings and counter cross-border criminality.

      But, let me be clear, Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders. European Border and Coast Guard Teams may only perform tasks and exercise powers in the Albanian territory under instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards of the Republic of Albania.

      Dear Friends,

      When it comes to protecting our borders, ensuring our security and managing migration, the challenges we face are common, and so must be our response.

      The European Border and Coast Guard Status Agreement and its implementation will allow us to better work together in all these areas. I hope that these agreements can be finalised also with other Western Balkans partners as soon as possible.

      I wish to thank Prime Minister Edi Rama, the Albanian authorities, and the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Fabrice Leggeri and his team for their close cooperation in bringing this milestone achievement to life. I also want to thank all Member States who have contributed with staff and the personnel who will be part of this first deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams in a neighbouring country.

      With just a few days to go before the European Elections, the need for a more united and stronger European family is more important than ever. We firmly believe that a key priority is to have strong relations with close neighbours, based on a clear balance of rights and obligations – but above all, on genuine partnership. This includes you, fellow Albanians.

      Albania is part of the European family.Our challenges are common. They know no borders. The progress we are witnessing today is another concrete action and proof of our commitment to bring us closer together. To make us stronger.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-2668_en.htm

    • Externalisation: Frontex launches first formal operation outside of the EU and deploys to Albania

      The EU has taken a significant, if geographically small, step in the externalisation of its borders. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, has launched its first Joint Operation on the territory of a non-EU-Member State, as it begins cooperation with Albania on the border with Greece.

      After the launch of the operation in Tirana on 21 May a deployment of 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and a thermo-vision van started yesterday, 22 May (European Commission, link). Twelve Member States (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) have contributed to the operation.

      New agreements

      The move follows the entry into force on 1 May this year of a Status Agreement between the EU and Albania on actions carried out by Frontex in that country (pdf). Those actions are made possible by the conclusion of operational plans, which must be agreed between Frontex and the Albanian authorities.

      The Status Agreement with Albania was the first among several similar agreements to be signed between the Agency and Balkan States, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia.

      The nascent operation in Albania will give Frontex team members certain powers, privileges and immunities on Albanian territory, including the use of force in circumstances authorised by Albanian border police and outlined in the operational plan.

      Frontex does not publish operational plans whilst operations (which can be renewed indefinitely) are ongoing, and documents published after the conclusion of operations (usually in response to requests for access to documents) are often heavily-redacted (Ask the EU, link).

      Relevant articles

      Article 4 of the Status Agreement outlines the tasks and powers of members of Frontex teams operating in Albanian territory. This includes the use of force, if it is authorised by both the Frontex team member’s home Member State and the State of Albania, and takes place in the presence of Albanian border guards. However, Albania can authorise team members to use force in their absence.

      Article 6 of the Status Agreement grants Frontex team members immunity from Albanian criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction “in respect of the acts performed in the exercise of their official functions in the course of the actions carried out in accordance with the operational plan”.

      Although a representative of Albania would be informed in the event of an allegation of criminal activity, it would be up to Frontex’s executive director to certify to the court whether the actions in question were performed as part of an official Agency function and in accordance with the Operational Plan. This certification will be binding on the jurisdiction of Albania. Proceedings may only continue against an individual team member if the executive director confirms that their actions were outside the scope of the exercise of official functions.

      Given the closed nature of the operational plans, this grants the executive director wide discretion and ensures little oversight of the accountability of Agency team members. Notably, Article 6 also states that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses. This immunity does not, however, extend to the jurisdiction of team members’ home Member States, and they may also waive the immunity of the individual under Albanian jurisdiction.

      Right to redress

      These measures of immunity alongside the lack of transparency surrounding documents outlining team members’ official functions and activities (the operational plan) raise concerns regarding access to redress for victims of human rights violations that may occur during operations.

      Human rights organisations have denounced the use of force by Frontex team members, only to have those incidents classified by the Agency as par for the course in their operations. Cases include incidents of firearm use that resulted in serious injury (The Intercept, link), but that was considered to have taken place according to the standard rules of engagement. This opacity has implications for individuals’ right to good administration and to the proper functioning of accountability mechanisms.

      If any damage results from actions that were carried out according to the operational plan, Albania will be held liable. This is the most binding liability outlined by the Status Agreement. Albania may only “request” that compensation be paid by the Member State of the team member responsible, or by the Agency, if acts were committed through gross negligence, wilful misconduct or outside the scope of the official functions of the Agency team or staff member.

      Across the board

      The provisions regarding tasks, powers and immunity in the Status Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia and Serbia are all broadly similar, with the exception of Article 6 of the agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. This states:

      “Members of the team who are witnesses may be obliged by the competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina… to provide evidence in accordance with the procedural law of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

      The Status Agreement with Serbia, an early draft of which did not grant immunity to team members, is now consistent with the Agreement with Albania and includes provisions stating that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses.

      It includes a further provision that:

      “...members of the team may use weapons only when it is absolutely necessary in self-defence to repel an immediate life-threatening attack against themselves or another person, in accordance with the national legislation of the Republic of Serbia”.

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/may/fx-albania-launch.htm

    • La police des frontières extérieures de l’UE s’introduit en Albanie

      Frontex, l’agence chargée des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, a lancé mardi en Albanie sa première opération hors du territoire d’un de ses États membres.

      Cette annonce de la Commission européenne intervient quelques jours avant les élections européennes et au moment où la politique migratoire de l’UE est critiquée par les candidats souverainistes, comme le ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini ou le chef de file de la liste française d’extrême droite, Jordan Bardella, qui a récemment qualifié Frontex d’« hôtesse d’accueil pour migrants ».

      Cette opération conjointe en Albanie est « une véritable étape historique rapprochant » les Balkans de l’UE, et témoigne d’une « meilleure gestion de la migration et de la protection de nos frontières communes », a commenté à Tirana le commissaire chargé des migrations, Dimitris Avramopoulos.

      L’Albanie espère convaincre les États membres d’ouvrir des négociations d’adhésion ce printemps, ce qui lui avait été refusé l’an passé. Son premier ministre Edi Rama a salué « un pas très important dans les relations entre l’Albanie et l’Union européenne » et a estimé qu’il « renforçait également la coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité ».

      À partir de 22 mai, Frontex déploiera des équipes conjointes à la frontière grecque avec des agents albanais.

      La Commission européenne a passé des accords semblables avec la Macédoine du Nord, la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui devraient également entrer en vigueur.

      Tous ces pays sont sur une des « routes des Balkans », qui sont toujours empruntées clandestinement par des milliers de personnes en route vers l’Union européenne, même si le flux n’est en rien comparable avec les centaines de milliers de migrants qui ont transité par la région en quelques mois jusqu’à la fermeture des frontières par les pays de l’UE début 2016.

      Ce type d’accord « contribuera à l’amélioration de la gestion de la migration clandestine, renforcera la sécurité aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et consolidera la capacité de l’agence à agir dans le voisinage immédiat de l’UE, tout en rapprochant de l’UE les pays voisins concernés », selon un communiqué de la Commission.

      Pour éviter de revivre le chaos de 2015, l’Union a acté un renforcement considérable de Frontex. Elle disposera notamment d’ici 2027 d’un contingent de 10 000 garde-frontières et garde-côtes pour aider des pays débordés.


      https://www.lapresse.ca/international/europe/201905/21/01-5226931-la-police-des-frontieres-exterieures-de-lue-sintroduit-en-albani

    • European Border and Coast Guard Agency began to patrol alongside the Albanian-Greek border in late May (https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118). Similar agreements have recently been concluded with Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina but Albania is the first country to start implementing programs aimed at blocking refugees entering the EU. Bilten states that Frontex employees can carry arms and fight “against any kind of crime, from” illegal migration “to theft of a car or drug trafficking”. Frontex’s mission is not time-bound, i.e. it depends on the EU’s need. The Albanian authorities see it as a step forward to their membership in the Union.

      Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa dobrodosli, le 10.06.2019

      L’article original:
      Što Frontex radi u Albaniji?

      Nakon što je Europska unija službeno zatvorila “balkansku migrantsku rutu”, očajni ljudi počeli su tražiti nove puteve. Jedan od njih prolazi kroz Albaniju, a tamošnja se vlada odrekla kontrole nad vlastitom granicom u nadi da će time udobrovoljiti unijske dužnosnike.

      Agencija za europsku graničnu i obalnu stražu, Frontex, počela je krajem prošlog mjeseca patrolirati uz albansko-grčku granicu. Već prvog dana, raspoređeno je pedesetak policajaca iz različitih zemalja članica EU koji bi se u suradnji s albanskim graničarima trebali boriti protiv “ilegalne migracije”. Iako je slične dogovore Unija nedavno sklopila sa zemljama poput Srbije, Sjeverne Makedonije, Crne Gore te Bosne i Hercegovine – a sve s ciljem blokiranja mogućnosti izbjeglica da uđu na područje EU – Albanija je prva zemlja u kojoj je počela provedba tog programa. Zaposlenici Frontexa ne samo da smiju nositi oružje, već imaju i dozvolu da se bore protiv bilo koje vrste kriminala, od “ilegalnih migracija” do krađe automobila ili trgovine drogom. Također, njihova misija nije vremenski ograničena, što znači da će Frontexovi zaposlenici patrolirati s albanske strane granice dok god to Unija smatra potrebnim.

      Unatoč nekim marginalnim glasovima koji su se žalili zbog kršenja nacionalne suverenosti prepuštanjem kontrole nad granicom stranim trupama, javnost je reagirala bilo potpunom nezainteresiranošću ili čak blagom potporom sporazumu koji bi tobože trebao pomoći Albaniji da uđe u Europsku uniju. S puno entuzijazma, lokalni su se mediji hvalili kako su u prva četiri dana Frontexovi zaposlenici već ulovili 92 “ilegalna migranta”. No to nije prvo, a ni najozbiljnije predavanje kontrole nad granicom koje je poduzela albanska vlada. Još od kasnih 1990-ih i ranih 2000-ih jadranskim i jonskim teritorijalnim vodama Republike Albanije patrolira talijanska Guardia di Finanza. Tih se godina albanska obala često koristila kao most prema Italiji preko kojeg je prelazila većina migranata azijskog porijekla, ne samo zbog blizine južne Italije, već i zbog slabosti državnih aparata tijekom goleme krize 1997. i 1998. godine.

      Helikopteri Guardije di Finanza također kontroliraju albansko nebo u potrazi za poljima kanabisa i to sve u suradnji s lokalnom državnom birokracijom koja je sama dijelom suradnica dilera, a dijelom nesposobna da im se suprotstavi. No posljednjih godina, zbog toga što su druge rute zatvorene, sve veći broj ljudi počeo se kretati iz Grčke preko Albanije, Crne Gore i BiH prema zemljama EU. Prema Međunarodnoj organizaciji za migracije, granicu je prešlo oko 18 tisuća ljudi, uglavnom iz Sirije, Pakistana i Iraka. To predstavlja povećanje od sedam puta u odnosu na godinu ranije. Tek manji dio tih ljudi je ulovljen zbog nedostatka kapaciteta granične kontrole ili pak potpune indiferencije prema ljudima kojima siromašna zemlja poput Albanije nikada neće biti destinacija.
      Tranzitna zemlja

      Oni koje ulove smješteni su u prihvatnom centru blizu Tirane, ali odatle im je relativno jednostavno pobjeći i nastaviti put dalje. Dio njih službeno je zatražio azil u Albaniji, ali to ne znači da će se dulje zadržati u zemlji. Ipak, očekuje se da će ubuduće albanske institucije biti znatno agresivnije u politici repatrijacije migranata. U tome će se susretati s brojnim pravnim i administrativnim problemima: kako objašnjavaju lokalni stručnjaci za migracije, Albanija sa zemljama iz kojih dolazi većina migranata – poput Sirije, Pakistana, Iraka i Afganistana – uopće nema diplomatske odnose niti pravne predstavnike u tim zemljama. Zbog toga je koordiniranje procesa repatrijacije gotovo nemoguće. Također, iako sporazum o repatrijaciji postoji s Grčkoj, njime je predviđeno da se u tu zemlju vraćaju samo oni za koje se može dokazati da su iz nje došli, a većina migranata koji dođu iz Grčke nastoji sakriti svaki trag svog boravka u toj zemlji.

      U takvoj situaciji, čini se izvjesnim da će Albanija biti zemlja u kojoj će sve veći broj ljudi zapeti na neodređeno vrijeme. Prije nekih godinu i pol dana, izbila je javna panika s dosta rasističkih tonova. Nakon jednog nespretnog intervjua vladinog dužnosnika njemačkom mediju proširile su se glasine da će se u Albaniju naseliti šesto tisuća Sirijaca. Brojka je već na prvi pogled astronomska s obzirom na to da je stanovništvo zemlje oko tri milijuna ljudi, ali teorije zavjere se obično šire kao požar. Neki od drugorazrednih političara čak su pozvali na oružanu borbu ako dođu Sirijci. No ta je panika zapravo brzo prošla, ali tek nakon što je vlada obećala da neće primiti više izbjeglica od onog broja koji bude određen raspodjelom prema dogovoru u Uniji. Otad zapravo nema nekog osobitog antimigrantskog raspoloženja u javnosti, unatoč tome što tisuće ljudi prolazi kroz zemlju.
      Europski san

      Odnos je uglavnom onaj indiferencije. Tome pridonosi nekoliko stvari: činjenica da je gotovo trećina stanovništva Albanije također odselila u zemlje Unije,1 zatim to što ne postoje neke vjerske i ultranacionalističke stranke, ali najviše to što nitko od migranata nema nikakvu namjeru ostati u zemlji. No zašto je albanska vlada tako nestrpljiva da preda kontrolu granice i suverenitet, odnosno zašto je premijer Edi Rama izgledao tako entuzijastično prilikom ceremonije s Dimitrisom Avramopulosom, europskim povjerenikom za migracije, unutrašnje poslove i državljanstvo? Vlada se nada da će to ubrzati njezin put prema članstvu u Europskoj uniji. Posljednjih pet godina provela je čekajući otvaranje pristupnih pregovora, a predavanje kontrole nad granicom vidi kao još jednu ilustraciju svoje pripadnosti Uniji.

      S druge strane, stalna politička kriza koju su izazvali studentski protesti u prosincu 2018., te kasnije bojkot parlamenta i lokalnih izbora od strane opozicijskih stranaka, stavlja neprestani pritisak na vladu. Očajnički treba pozitivan znak iz EU jer vodi političku i ideološku borbu protiv opozicije oko toga tko je autentičniji kulturni i politički predstavnik europejstva. Vlada naziva opoziciju i njezine nasilne prosvjede antieuropskima, dok opozicija optužuje vladu da svojom korupcijom i povezanošću s organiziranim kriminalom radi protiv europskih želja stanovništva. Prije nekoliko dana, Komisija je predložila početak pristupnih pregovora s Albanijom, no Europsko vijeće je to koje ima zadnju riječ. Očekuje se kako će sve ovisiti o toj odluci. Ideja Europe jedno je od čvorišta vladajuće ideologije koja se desetljećima gradi kao antipod komunizmu i Orijentu te historijska destinacija kojoj Albanci stoljećima teže.

      Neoliberalna rekonstrukcija ekonomije i društva gotovo je uvijek legitimirana tvrdnjama kako su to nužni – iako bolni – koraci prema integraciji u Europsku uniju. Uspješnost ove ideologije ilustrira činjenica da otprilike 90% ispitanih u različitim studijama podržava Albansku integraciju u EU. U toj situaciji ne čudi ni odnos prema Frontexu.

      https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118

    • Frontex expands operations in EU neighbouring countries

      After Albania and Montenegro, the EU Commission has concluded a Frontex status agreement with Serbia, to be followed by Northern Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A first deployment of the EU border troops has meanwhile been increased.

      The European Commission has now also signed an arrangement with Serbia on „cooperation on border management“. The so-called status agreement regulates the implementation of „Joint Operations“ with the EU border agency Frontex at the common borders with the European Union. It was already published by the Commission in January and has now been ratified by the Serbian Parliament. Kosovo’s territory is excluded.

      The objectives of the agreement include the fight against irregular migration and cross-border crime in accordance with the Frontex Regulation. The EU also promises „increased technical and operational assistance“ to the Serbian border police.

      Model status agreement for „priority third countries“

      The negotiations with Serbia followed a model status agreement approved by the Commission under the „European Migration Agenda“ for operational cooperation with „priority third countries“. The Commission first concluded a status agreement with Albania a year ago, followed by a similar agreement with Montenegro on 7 October this year. Further status agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Macedonia have been negotiated but still need to be ratified by the national parliaments. The European Parliament must also give its assent.

      Once all five status agreements have been signed, Frontex could be deployed throughout the whole Western Balkans with the exception of Kosovo. The EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, describes the agreements as „yet one more step towards bringing the Western Balkan region closer to the EU“. All countries concerned are considered candidates for EU membership and the agreement to the Frontex operations is intended to facilitate the negotiations.

      However, this rapprochement is likely to be damaged by the decision of the French government to refuse negotiations on EU membership to Northern Macedonia and Albania despite fulfilling the necessary conditions. The North Macedonian parliament could therefore delay the planned Frontex agreement. The same applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which France’s President Macron described as a „ticking time bomb“ for returning jihadists.

      Police powers and immunity

      The border police officers sent by Frontex from the EU Member States receive a special identity card from the country of deployment and wear their own uniforms with a blue Frontex armband. They will also carry weapons, ammunition and equipment from their sending state and may use force.

      The troops enjoy immunity during Frontex operations. If a criminal offence is found, it will be prosecuted by the jurisdiction of the Member State of origin. Frontex team members also enjoy full protection against civil and administrative prosecution in the State of operation. The latter will also be liable for any damage caused by a member of the team during „all acts performed in the exercise of the official functions“.

      Deployment plan agreed with Greece

      Following the conclusion of the status agreement with Albania, it took six months for Frontex to launch its by now „first-ever joint operation“ on the territory of a neighbouring third country. According to Frontex, the governments in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia have sent personnel to a total of 16 patrol vehicles and one thermovision car.

      According to the operational plan, which Frontex says is agreed with the Greek government, the operation will take place along the entire „green“ border and, in addition to border surveillance in the sections Sopik, Çarçovë, Leskovik, Shtikë, Kapshticë and Livadhja, will include border control at the Albanian-Greek crossing points Kakavija, Tre Urat (Çarçovë), Kapshticë, Rips and Qafe Bote. Frontex has set up support offices in Gjirokaster, Kakavija and Kapshticë to coordinate operations.

      In the meantime, the operation, which started with 50 EU officials, has grown to 66. One sixth comes from the German Federal Police, which also brought along six of the twelve patrol vehicles currently in use. In addition to operational border control, training measures are also planned in Albania. The operation will also facilitate the exchange of operational information and „best practices“.

      No Albanian human rights groups involved

      The new Frontex Regulation will apply from 4 December. The border agency will be then granted more powers and will set up a border troop of 10,000 border guards. The measures taken by Frontex should be observed by a Fundamental Rights Officer, among others. Frontex has also set up a Consultative Forum with non-governmental organisations to advise the Agency on how to prevent infringements.

      For „Joint Operations“ in third countries, the Consultative Forum recommends involving human rights groups active there in the operational plan. However, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, which sends eleven officers to Albania, has „no knowledge“ of the involvement of Albanian non-governmental organisations. The German Government also does not know which Albanian organisations might be asked to participate.

      https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/25/frontex-expands-operations-in-eu-neighbouring-countries

  • JE VAIS COMMENCER ICI UN NOUVEAU FIL DE DISCUSSION, SUR LES SAUVETAGES ET LES NAUFRAGES EN MEDITERRANEE.

    CE FIL DE DISCUSSION COMPLÈTE CELUI COMMENCÉ ICI :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/768421

    Ici la métaliste complète:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/706177

    ping @isskein

    –------------

    Ecco il decreto sicurezza-bis: multe per ogni migrante trasportato e per chi non rispetta le norme Sar

    Salvini si attribuisce la competenza a vietare il transito delle navi ritenute pericolose e prevede che a indagare possano essere solo le Dda. Pene più pesanti per chi aggredisce le forze dell’ordine. Il M5S: «Il ministro dell’Interno copre così il fallimento sui rimpatri».

    È un vero e proprio blitz quello con il quale il ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini vara un #decreto_sicurezza_bis che prevede sanzioni pecuniarie pesantissime contro chi soccorrse i migranti in violazione delle norme #Sar ma soprattutto con cui attribuisce al Viminale e alle Direzione distrettuali antimafia competenze che erano del ministero dei Trasporti e delle Procure ordinarie.

    Il provvedimento consta di dodici articoli, la maggior parte dei quali dedicato ancora al contrasto dell’immigrazione clandestina. Con norme clamorose destinate a spaccare il consiglio dei ministri.
    La prima prevede sanzioni a chi «nello svolgimento di operazioni di soccorso in acque internazionali, non rispetta gli obblighi previste dalle Convenzioni internazionali», dunque i comportamenti che Salvini attribuisce alle navi umanitarie. Le sanzioni previste sono di due tipi: da 3.500 a 5.500 euro per ogni straniero trasportato e, nei casi reiterati, se la nave è battente bandiera italiana la sospensione o la revoca della licenza da 1 a 12 mesi.

    L’articolo numero 2 va a modificare il #Codice_della_navigazione. Salvini attribuisce al Viminale quelle che sono al momento competenze del ministero dei Trasporti, in particolare la limitazione o il divieto di transito nelle acque territoriali di navi qualora sussistano ragioni di sicurezza e di ordine pubblico. E, come già scritto nelle direttive fin qui emanate, Salvini ritiene che tutte le navi che trasportino migranti siano una minaccia per la sicurezza nazionale.

    Il decreto modifica anche il codice di procedura penale estendendo anche alle ipotesi non aggravate di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina la competenza delle Direzioni distrettuali antimafia e la disciplina delle intercettazioni preventive. Di fatto togliendo alle Procure ordinarie la possibilità ad indagare.

    Tre milioni di euro vengono stanziati per l’impiego di poliziotti stranieri in operazioni sotto copertura contro le organizzazioni di trafficanti di uomini.

    Un altro pacchetto di norme inasprisce le sanzioni per chi devasta o danneggia nel corso di riunioni in luoghi pubblici e al contempo trasforma da sanzioni in delitti, con il conseguente inasprimento delle pene, le azioni di chi si oppone a pubblici ufficiali con qualsiasi mezzo di resistenza attiva o passiva, dagli scudi alle mazze e ai bastoni. Modifiche al codice penale aggravano il reato e dunque le sanzioni per violenza, minaccia e resistenza a pubblico ufficiale soprattutto se commessi durante manifestazioni in luogo pubblico. Soppressa la causa di esclusione della punibilità per particolare tenuità del fatto.

    L’articolo 7 è la norma già annunciata come «#spazzaclan» e prevede l’istituzione di un commissario straordinario con il compito di realizzare un programma di interventi finalizzati ad eliminare l’arretrato delle sentenze di condanna da eseguire nei confronti di imputati liberi. Previste le assunzioni a tempo determinato di durata annuale di 800 unità .

    L’ultimo articolo infine prevede l’impiego di altri 500 militari a Napoli in occasione delle #Universiadi.

    Fonti del M5s hanno commentato: «Salvini copre così il fallimento sui rimpatri». Secondo altre fonti «c’è fortissima preoccupazione che il ministro dell’Interno si spinga sempre più su temi estremisti».

    https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2019/05/10/news/ecco_il_decreto_sicurezza-bis_pene_piu_pesanti_per_i_trafficanti_di_uomin
    #decreto_sicurezza #décret #Italie #Salvini #migrations #réfugiés #Méditerranée #amende #sauvetage #mourir_en_mer #ONG #eaux_territoriales #eaux_internationales #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières

    • Message d’@isskein via la mailing-list Migreurop.
      Chronique 9-10 mai 2019 en Méditerranée :

      9 mai Le Mare Jonio (Mediterranea Saving Humains, RescueMed) sauve 29 passagers (1 enfant de 1 an, 3 femmes dont une enceinte) d’un bateau pneumatique endommagé dans les eaux internationales, à 40 miles des côtes libyennes. Ils demandent un port sûr au centre de coordination italien, le ministère de l’Intérieur leur enjoint de contacter les gardes-côtes libyens...

      10 mai Le Mare Ionio accoste à Lampedusa, les 29 rescapés débarquent. 20h45, la « saisie préventive » du MareJonio, réclamée depuis le matin par l’Intérieur, a été notifiée. Le capitaine Pietro Marrone et Luca Casarini, chef de mission du #Mare_Jonio, font l’objet d’une enquête pour facilitation de l’immigration clandestine

      10 mai le navire militaire italien #Cigala_Fulgosi débarque dans le port d’Augusta (Sicile) 36 migrants secourus sur une embarcation à la dérive

      10 mai Au moins 70 personnes disparues dans un naufrage au large des côtes tunisiennes

      Il n’y a aujourd’hui plus aucun navire d’ONG en Méditerranée centrale.

      Sur le #naufrage au large de la #Tunisie, v. plus ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/780298

    • Dl sicurezza bis, cosa prevede il decreto che introduce multe da 5.500 euro a chi salva i migranti

      Il Ministero dell’Interno nella serata del 10 maggio 2019 ha messo a punto il “decreto sicurezza bis”, che prevede multe per chi soccorre i migranti, ma non solo.

      Il decreto si compone di 12 articoli.

      Il nucleo centrale prevede l’inasprimento delle misure contro i trafficanti di esseri umani e il potenziamento delle operazioni sotto copertura per contrastare l’immigrazione clandestina.

      Qui abbiamo spiegato cosa prevede il decreto sicurezza bis, punto per punto:
      Multe per chi soccorre i migranti

      L’articolo 1 del decreto sicurezza bis prevede che chi, nello svolgimento di operazioni di soccorso in acque internazionali, non rispetta gli obblighi previsti dalle Convenzioni internazionali – con particolare riferimento alle istruzioni operative delle autorità SAR competenti o di quelle dello Stato di bandiera può incorrere in una “sanzione amministrativa del pagamento di una somma da 3.500 a 5.500 euro per ciascuno degli stranieri trasportati”.

      Nei casi “più gravi o reiterati è disposta la sospensione da 1 a 12 mesi, ovvero la revoca della licenza, autorizzazione o concessione rilasciata dall’autorità amministrativa italiana inerente all’attività svolta e al mezzo di trasporto utilizzato”.
      Modifiche al codice della navigazione

      L’articolo 2 del decreto sicurezza bis prevede alcune modifiche al codice della navigazione, e nello specifico viene attribuito al ministro dell’Interno il potere di “limitare o vietare il transito e la sosta di navi mercantili o unità da diporto o di pesca nel mare territoriale per motivi di ordine e sicurezza pubblica e comunque in caso di violazione” di alcune delle disposizioni della Convenzione di Montego Bay.
      Favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina

      All’articolo 3 il decreto sicurezza bis vuole contrastare a monte l’organizzazione dei trasporti di migranti irregolari. I reati associstende ai
      Finanziamento da 3 milioni per le forze dell’ordine

      Il decreto sicurezza bis all’articolo 4 prevede lo stanziamento di 3 milioni di euro nel triennio 2019-2021 per il finanziamento degli “oneri conseguenti al concorso di operatori di polizia di Stati con i quali siano stati stipulati appositi accordi” per lo svolgimento di operazioni sotto copertura “anche con riferimento alle attività di contrasto del delitto di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina”.
      Universiadi

      Tra le novità del decreto sicurezza bis c’è l’arrivo di 500 militari in più a Napoli in vista delle Universiadi 2019.
      Inasprimento delle sanzioni per i reati di devastazione

      L’articolo 5 del decreto sicurezza bis interviene sul Tulps, il Testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza, inasprendo le sanzioni conseguenti ai reati di devastazione, saccheggio e danneggiamento, commessi nel corso di riunioni effettuate in luogo pubblico o aperto al pubblico.

      Inoltre, prevede espressamente l’obbligo di comunicazione immediata, non oltre le 24 ore, all’autorità di pubblica sicurezza delle generalità delle persone ospitate in alberghi o in altre strutture ricettive.

      Tutela degli operatori delle forze dell’0rdine

      L’articolo 6 del decreto sicurezza bis prevede maggiori tutele per gli operatori delle forze dell’ordine impiegati in servizio di ordine pubblico, attraverso l’introduzione di nuove fattispecie delittuose. Il decreto inoltre trasforma quelle che attualmente sono contravvenzioni in delitti e prevede inoltre l’inasprimento delle sanzioni.

      Ad esempio, “chiunque nel corso di manifestazioni.. per opporsi a pubblico ufficiale o all’incaricato di pubblico servizio.. utilizza scudi o altri oggetti di protezione passiva ovvero materiali imbrattanti o inquinanti è punito con la reclusione da 1 a 3 anni”.

      Ovvero, “chiunque lancia o utilizza illegittimamente, in modo da creare un concreto pericolo per l’incolumità delle persone o l’integrità delle cose, razzi, bengala, fuochi artificiali, petardi, strumenti per l’emissione di fumo o di gas visibile… ovvero bastoni, mazze, oggetti contundenti è punito con la reclusione da 1 a 4 anni”.
      Commissario straordinario e assunzione di 800 persone

      L’articolo 8 del decreto sicurezza bis prevede l’istituzione di un commissario straordinario e l’assunzione di 800 persone con impegno di spesa per oltre 25 milioni di euro: permetterà di notificare sentenze ai condannati attualmente in libertà e garantire così l’effettività della pena. Inasprite anche le misure per chi aggredisce operatori delle forze dell’ordine.

      Il commissario straordinario, nominato dal Consiglio dei ministri su proposta del ministro dell’Interno, ha il compito di realizzare un programma di interventi finalizzati ad eliminare l’arretrato relativo ai procedimenti di esecuzione delle sentenze di condanna divenute definitive da eseguire nei confronti di imputati liberi.

      https://www.tpi.it/2019/05/10/decreto-sicurezza-bis-cosa-prevede

    • Decreto sicurezza bis, ennesima proposta in contrasto con i principi fondamentali

      Nelle stesse ore in cui apprendevamo dell’ennesima strage avvenuta nel Mare Mediterraneo a causa delle politiche di chiusura ed esternalizzazione dell’Italia e dell’Unione europea, i mass media hanno anticipato i contenuti di un possibile nuovo decreto d’urgenza proposto dal Ministero dell’Interno che dovrebbe andare nuovamente a modificare alcune delle norme sulla disciplina dell’immigrazione in Italia.

      Il testo appare essere l’ennesimo stravolgimento dei fondamentali principi di diritto internazionale e un ulteriore contributo alla politica posta in essere da questo Governo, così come da quello precedente, finalizzata a colpire coloro, specialmente organizzazioni non governative di chiara fama, che non vollero ubbidire alla regolamentazione della salvaguardia del diritto alla vita.

      Tra esse la previsione di nuove sanzioni (ed addirittura la sospensione o la revoca della licenza alla navigazione) a carico di chi a certe condizioni ponga in essere “azioni di soccorso di mezzi adibiti alla navigazione ed utilizzati per il trasporto irregolare di migranti, anche mediante il recupero delle persone”. Ovvero sanzioni per chi, nell’adempimento di un dovere etico, giuridico e sociale, salva vite umane altrimenti destinate alla morte.

      Nonostante i gravi dissidi istituzionali determinati dall’ultimo Governo Conte e dalle politiche dell’attuale Ministro dell’Interno, con l’attuale ipotesi di decreto legge (a cui sono evidenti a tutti la mancanza dei requisiti di necessità ed urgenza), si persegue pervicacemente nella strada intrapresa e, addirittura, si decide di portare la guerra agli esseri umani anche in acque internazionali sbeffeggiando le convenzioni internazionali in materia di ricerca e soccorso in mare.

      Riservandoci una compiuta analisi normativa se e quando (malauguratamente) quel testo dovesse prendere formalmente vita, riteniamo doveroso evidenziare che :

      sino ad oggi la magistratura italiana ha ritenuto che le operazioni di salvataggio in mare da parte di navi private sono state svolte per adempiere a precisi obblighi internazionali e per rispondere ad evidenti condizioni di necessità

      La situazione generatasi in Libia nel corso degli ultimi anni è degenerata ulteriormente nelle ultime settimane impone di intervenire per salvare la vita dei civili e dei migranti presenti nel Paese e di interrompere le politiche di sostegno alla Libia relative alle operazioni della Guardia costiera libica

      Salvare vite in mare è un dovere che risponde a precisi obblighi umanitari e non può e non dovrà mai essere considerato un crimine.

      Prendere posizione contro questo ennesimo attacco al rispetto della vita umana, ai diritti e alle libertà fondamentali è un dovere a cui non è più possibile sottrarsi.

      https://www.asgi.it/primo-piano/decreto-sicurezza-bis-ennesima-proposta-in-contrasto-con-i-principi-fondamental

    • Il teorema #Zuccaro sulle ong è fallito

      Il giudice per le indagini preliminari (gip) di Catania, #Nunzio_Sarpietro, ha accolto la richiesta di archiviazione della procura di Catania per l’inchiesta a carico del comandante della nave umanitaria Open Arms Marc Reig e della capomissione Anabel Montes Mier, accusati di associazione a delinquere finalizzata al favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina in seguito al salvataggio di più di duecento persone, il 15 marzo 2018, al largo della Libia. Durante l’operazione la nave umanitaria si era trovata a dover affrontare momenti di tensione con una motovedetta libica, che rivendicava il coordinamento delle operazioni.

      In quell’occasione gli spagnoli si erano rifiutati di consegnare ai guardacoste libici i migranti appena soccorsi e per questo, dopo essere approdati nel porto di Pozzallo, erano stati accusati di diversi reati e la loro nave era stata sequestrata. Con l’archiviazione di questa inchiesta, cade uno degli ultimi pilastri del cosiddetto “teorema Zuccaro”, la tesi sostenuta dal procuratore di Catania Carmelo Zuccaro secondo cui ci sarebbero stati dei contatti tra le navi delle ong e i trafficanti di esseri umani. Resta aperta, invece, l’inchiesta della procura di Ragusa contro Reig e Montes Mier accusati di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina e violenza privata per lo stesso caso. Rimane aperta anche l’inchiesta della procura di Trapani contro la nave Iuventa dell’ong Jugend Rettet, sequestrata nell’agosto del 2017. Il gip dovrebbe decidere l’eventuale rinvio a giudizio nelle prossime settimane.

      “Siamo felici di apprendere che un ulteriore passo verso la verità è stato fatto”, ha commentato l’organizzazione spagnola Proactiva Open Arms in un comunicato. “Ribadiamo di aver sempre operato nel rispetto delle convenzioni internazionali e del diritto del mare e che continueremo a farlo mossi da un unico obiettivo: difendere la vita e i diritti delle persone più vulnerabili”. L’avvocata Rosa Emanuela Lo Faro chiarisce di non aver ancora preso visione delle motivazioni che hanno spinto la stessa procura di Catania a chiedere l’archiviazione. “Dal 3 maggio 2019 sapevamo però che il gip aveva archiviato questa indagine”, conferma Lo Faro.

      Già nel marzo del 2018 lo stesso gip Sarpietro aveva confermato il sequestro della nave, ma aveva escluso il reato di associazione a delinquere contro il capitano Marc Reig e la coordinatrice dei soccorsi Anabel Montes Mier, lasciando in piedi invece l’accusa di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina. Questo elemento aveva fatto decadere la competenza territoriale del tribunale di Catania che ha una specifica autorità per i reati associativi e aveva fatto intervenire il tribunale di Ragusa, che deve ancora esprimersi in merito all’inchiesta per favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina e violenza privata.

      In questo caso giudiziario è stata particolarmente importate la decisione del gip di Ragusa nell’aprile del 2018 di dissequestrare la nave, ferma nel porto di Pozzallo per un mese dopo il salvataggio. Nel decreto di dissequestro infatti il gip di Ragusa Giovanni Giampiccolo aveva riconosciuto lo stato di necessità nel quale era avvenuto il salvataggio e aveva inoltre stabilito che la Libia non è un posto sicuro in cui portare le persone soccorse in mare. Il giudice Giampiccolo ha riconosciuto che la Libia è “un luogo in cui avvengono gravi violazioni dei diritti umani (con persone trattenute in strutture di detenzione in condizioni di sovraffollamento, senza accesso a cure mediche e a un’adeguata alimentazione, e sottoposte a maltrattamenti e stupri e lavori forzati)”.

      “Quella decisione ha fatto scuola”, sottolinea l’avvocata Lo Faro. Da quel momento infatti non sono stati più disposti sequestri preventivi, ma solo sequestri probatori.

      Le indagini della procura di Catania
      Una figura centrale in questa vicenda è stato il procuratore generale di Catania Carmelo Zuccaro, alla guida della procura della città siciliana dal 2016. Dopo aver annunciato l’apertura di un fascicolo d’indagine conoscitivo sull’attività di queste organizzazioni, nella primavera del 2017 aveva rilasciato numerose interviste ai mezzi d’informazione italiani e stranieri. Il 22 marzo 2017 il pm era anche intervenuto in un’audizione al comitato parlamentare di controllo sull’attuazione dell’accordo di Schengen dichiarando di aver aperto delle indagini sui profitti delle ong e affermando di ritenere sospetto il “proliferare così intenso di queste unità navali”.

      “Noi riteniamo ci si debba porre il problema di capire da dove provenga il denaro che alimenta, che finanzia questi costi elevati. Da questo punto di vista, la successiva fase della nostra indagine conoscitiva sarà quella di capire quali siano i canali di finanziamento”. In quell’occasione aggiungeva di trovare “anomalo” che le navi non approdassero nel porto più vicino, bensì nei porti italiani, e sosteneva che ci fosse un rapporto tra la presenza delle navi umanitarie e l’aumento del numero dei morti. L’altra questione che il procuratore sollevava era quella della necessità della presenza a bordo delle navi di poliziotti e autorità giudiziarie impegnate nel contrasto al traffico di esseri umani. Questo è stato un tema caro ai magistrati, perché il materiale raccolto dalla polizia giudiziaria nel periodo della missione umanitaria Mare nostrum aveva aiutato le procure a condurre diverse indagini contro i trafficanti.

      La stessa preoccupazione ha ispirato anche uno dei punti del codice di condotta voluto dal ministro dell’interno Marco Minniti. Dal 2013 la procura di Catania si era trasformata nell’epicentro delle indagini sul traffico di esseri umani nel Mediterraneo, grazie proprio alla missione Mare nostrum. Prima i barconi con i migranti si spingevano sotto costa e arrivavano a Lampedusa, l’isola italiana più vicina alla Tunisia, oppure sulla parte occidentale della Sicilia, nella provincia di Trapani, che in linea d’aria è più raggiungibile dalle spiagge nordafricane. Ma in quello stesso periodo la marina militare e la guardia costiera italiana avevano cominciato a effettuare soccorsi in alto mare, nel canale di Sicilia, e poi nelle acque internazionali davanti alle coste libiche, quindi diversi porti siciliani, soprattutto quelli orientali come Catania, erano stati coinvolti negli sbarchi.

      Anche per questo Zuccaro si diceva preoccupato del grado di collaborazione tra le ong e la polizia giudiziaria: “Vogliamo cercare di capire se da parte di queste ong vi è comunque quella doverosa collaborazione che si deve prestare alle autorità di polizia e alle autorità giudiziarie al momento in cui si pongono in contatto con l’autorità giudiziaria italiana”. In questa prima audizione per il procuratore di Catania risultano sospetti soprattutto i finanziamenti che le ong ricevono, mentre in diverse interviste successive si concentra sui presunti contatti tra i trafficanti e le navi.

      Circa un mese dopo, durante la trasmissione Agorà su Rai 3, il pm si spinge oltre, affermando che l’obiettivo delle navi umanitarie potrebbe essere quello di destabilizzare l’economia: “A mio avviso alcune ong potrebbero essere finanziate dai trafficanti, sono a conoscenza di contatti. Forse la cosa potrebbe essere ancora più inquietante. Si perseguono da parte di alcune ong finalità diverse: destabilizzare l’economia italiana per trarne dei vantaggi”.

      Accuse a cui il governo, tramite i ministri dell’interno Marco Minniti e quello della giustizia Andrea Orlando, reagiva con fermezza, chiedendo le prove. Zuccaro rispondeva di “avere denunciato un fenomeno e non singole persone”, perché se “si aspetta troppo tempo si rischia di produrre elementi deleteri non più controllabili”. Parlava di “deroga” al riserbo, ma anche di “un dovere per chi deve fare rispettare la legalità”. In un’intervista con la Repubblica del 28 aprile 2017, il procuratore afferma però una cosa nuova: finalmente ha “la certezza” dei contatti tra le ong e i trafficanti, ma si tratta di materiale non utilizzabile in sede giudiziaria. Si parla di tabulati telefonici e conversazioni nelle mani dell’intelligence. Zuccaro si dice certo di un rapporto di complicità tra le ong e gli scafisti.

      Per due mesi nella primavera del 2017 il procuratore è molto presente sui mezzi d’informazione nazionali e internazionali con dichiarazioni di questo tenore, in tanti lo accusano di violare il segreto istruttorio e di produrre affermazioni che hanno un valore più politico che giudiziario. Mentre Zuccaro concede le sue interviste è aperta un’indagine conoscitiva sulle ong della Commissione difesa del senato, guidata dal senatore Nicola La Torre. Interpellato dalla commissione parlamentare, il generale Stefano Screpanti, capo del III Reparto operazioni del comando generale della guardia di finanza, smentisce le affermazioni del procuratore capo di Catania: “Allo stato attuale delle nostre conoscenze, non ci sono evidenze investigative tali da far emergere collegamenti tra ong e organizzazioni che gestiscono il traffico di migranti”.

      Dopo due anni d’indagini, il 13 agosto 2018 l’inchiesta “madre” di Zuccaro (che intanto aveva ipotizzato anche il reato di associazione a delinquere) è avviata all’archiviazione, nel caso Open Arms viene archiviata l’accusa di “associazione a delinquere”, ma ormai la campagna di discredito ai danni delle ong ha fatto il suo corso e le dichiarazioni del pm hanno influenzato in maniera irreversibile l’opinione pubblica italiana, che considera “accertati” i contatti tra ong e scafisti, in barba a qualsiasi garantismo.

      https://www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2019/05/15/amp/open-arms-zuccaro-ong?__twitter_impression=true

    • Des migrants débarqués à Lampedusa, Salvini furieux

      Quarante-sept migrants ont été débarqués dimanche soir à Lampedusa, une île au sud de la Sicile, après la saisie sur ordre de justice de leur bateau de sauvetage, provoquant la colère du ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini.

      Le navire affrété par l’ONG allemande Sea-Watch battant pavillon néerlandais, qui stationnait dans les eaux italiennes tout près de l’île de #Lampedusa, a été saisi dans la journée par la police financière italienne sur ordre d’un procureur de Sicile.

      Puis, les migrants à bord ont été transférés par moto-vedettes vers la terre ferme en fin de soirée. Une décision que M. Salvini —également vice-Premier ministre et chef de la Ligue (extrême-droite)— a semblé découvrir en temps réel à la télévision, l’amenant à demander qui au gouvernement avait pu prendre une telle décision contre son avis formel.

      Déjà à couteaux tirés avec lui, son partenaire gouvernemental du Mouvement 5 étoiles, Luigi Di Maio, a rétorqué qu’il n’acceptait pas ses insinuations, rappelant qu’il était obligatoire de faire débarquer les passagers d’un bateau saisi par la justice.

      Parallèlement à ce nouveau couac gouvernemental en pleine campagne pour les élections européennes, des échauffourées ont eu lieu dimanche soir à Florence (centre) entre forces de l’ordre et 2.000 personnes venues protester contre la présence de M. Salvini qui tenait un meeting politique dans la ville.

      Dimanche, le chef de Ligue avait jugé risibles les critiques du Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’Homme (HCDH) de l’ONU contre un projet visant à durcir la législation anti-migratoire en Italie.

      L’ONU, « un organisme international qui coûte des milliards d’euros aux contribuables, qui a comme membres la Corée du Nord et la Turquie, et qui vient faire la morale sur les droits de l’Homme à l’Italie ? (...) Cela prête à rire », a commenté M. Salvini.

      Un projet de décret-loi, qui pourrait être soumis lundi au conseil des ministres, propose de donner au ministre de l’Intérieur le pouvoir d’interdire les eaux territoriales italiennes à un navire pour des raisons d’ordre public.

      Le texte prévoit aussi une amende de 3.500 à 5.500 euros par migrant arrivé en Italie pour tout navire de secours n’ayant pas respecté les consignes des garde-côtes compétents dans la zone où il serait intervenu.

      Dans sa lettre envoyée au ministère italien des Affaires étrangères, le HCDH demande à l’Italie de ne pas approuver ce nouveau décret-loi.

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/des-migrants-debarques-lampedusa-salvini-furieux.afp.com.2019

    • Sea Watch, sbarcati i migranti. Salvini accusa i M5s: «Chi ha dato l’ordine?». Di Maio: «Non dia la colpa a noi»

      Sequestrata la nave Ong. Il ministero dell’Interno: i migranti non scenderanno. Ma il pm ordina che vengano portati sull’isola. E scoppia lo scontro tra i partner di governo. I primi a scendere una donna incinta e suo marito.
      La prima è una donna incinta, sorretta dal marito. A piedi nudi. Poi via via, tutti gli altri. Sorrisi, abbracci e saluti. Sono scesi tutti. Nonostante Salvini. “Fino a quando sono ministro io quella nave in un porto italiano non entra e non sbarca nessuno”, aveva garantito il ministro dell’Interno quando la Sea Watch 3 aveva ignorato la sua diffida e si era presentata davanti al porto di Lampedusa ottenendo l’autorizzazione all’ancoraggio alla fonda.

      Ventiquattro ore dopo, i 47 migranti rimasti a bordo della nave della Ong tedesca sono scesi a terra. Sequestro della nave d’iniziativa della Guardia di finanza, perquisizione e contestuale sbarco di tutti i migranti. Lo stesso “modello” già seguito per due volte per sbloccare i precedenti soccorsi della Mare Jonio, rimasta sequestrata per alcuni giorni e poi sempre liberata dai pm di Agrigento. Che questa volta si sono mossi di concerto con la Guardia di finanza forzando la mano ad un inferocito Salvini, incredulo di essere smentito proprio alla vigilia di quel consiglio dei ministri in cui intende portare all’approvazione il suo contestatissimo decreto sicurezza-bis.

      Un braccio di ferro senza precedenti quello tra la Procura di Agrigento e la Guardia di finanza da una parte e il Viminale dall’altro, conclusosi alle otto di sera quando due motovedette, dopo aver notificato al comandante della Sea Watch i decreti di sequestro e perquisizione firmati dal procuratore aggiunto Salvatore Vella che per tutto il weekend ha seguito personalmente sull’isola l’evolversi della vicenda, hanno scortato in porto la nave umanitaria.

      L’accelerazione nel primo pomeriggio quando il comandante Arturo Centore fa sapere alla Guardia costiera che la situazione a bordo è di assoluta emergenza. Alcuni migranti hanno indossato il giubbotto di salvataggio e minacciano di buttarsi a mare. “Se entro le nove di sera la situazione non si sblocca, levo l’ancora ed entro direttamente in porto”, annuncia il comandante della Sea Watch.

      A quel punto Guardia di finanza, guardia costiera e Procura decidono di notificare i sequestri e far sbarcare tutti. Anche contro il volere del Viminale.

      Salvini, che già poche ore prima, in un comizio a Sassuolo aveva attaccato a testa bassa “una procura e un giudice che invece di indagare gli scafisti indaga me”, incassa malissimo il colpo e ancor prima che la Sea Watch attracchi al molo di Lampedusa mette le mani avanti e sottolinea che lo sbarco avviene contro la sua volontà. “La magistratura faccia come crede ma il Viminale continua e continuerà a negare lo sbarco da quella nave fuorilegge. Il ministro dell’Interno si aspetta provvedimenti nei confronti del comandante della nave dal quale è lecito attendersi indicazioni precise sui presunti scafisti presenti a bordo”.

      Alle otto di sera, quando i 47 migranti toccano terra e vengono portati nell’hotspot di contrada Imbriacola, una nota firmata dal procuratore di Agrigento Luigi Patronaggio (il pm del caso Diciotti che per primo ha contestato a Salvini il sequestro di persona) spiega la “ratio” della scelta degli inquirenti: “Il sequestro probatorio è stato eseguito per violazione dell’articolo 12 del Testo unico sull’immigrazione ponendo la nave a disposizione di questa procura che ne ha disposto, previo sbarco dei migranti, il trasferimento sotto scorta nel porto di Licata. Le indagini proseguiranno sia per l’individuazione degli eventuali trafficanti di esseri umani coinvolti sia per la valutazione della condotta della Ong”. Come sempre. A sbarco avvenuto, quando anche l’ultimo migrante era già sceso a terra, Salvini ricara: «Per me possono stare lì fino a ferragosto. Gli porto da mangiare e da bere ma stanno lì». E al procuratore di Agrigento: «E’ quello che mi ha indagato per sequestro di persona. Se li farà sbarcare, ne prenderò atto e valuteremo nei suoi confronti il favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina».
      Salvini attacca i 5s: «Chi ha dato l’ordine?»
      Matteo Salvini ha assistito in diretta tv allo sbarco dei migranti dalla nave Sea Watch 3, ospite in studio su La7. «Qualcuno l’ordine lo avrà dato. Questo qualcuno ne dovrà rispondere», si irrita il ministro. Il M5s fa sapere a stretto giro che non sono stati i suoi ministri. Ma Salvini insiste: «Chi è che li ha autorizzati a
      sbarcare? Io no, non ho autorizzato niente, deve essere qualcun altro. Io sorrido ma è grave. Perché siamo un Paese sovrano con leggi, regole, una storia e nessuna associazione privata se ne può disinteressare. Qualcuno quell’ordine lo avrà dato. Questo qualcuno ne deve rispondere».

      Il vicepremier Luigi Di Maio prende le distanze parlando A che tempo che fa: «Il sequestro lo esegue la magistratura quindi non credo sia un espediente» per far sbarcare i migranti a bordo «perché la magistratura è indipendente dal governo. Quando arrivano qui contattiamo i Paesi Ue e chiediamo la redistribuzione. Io credo che la politica delle redistribuzioni è l’unica strada che abbiamo per fronteggiare il fenomeno. Poi c’è il tema dei rimpatri che si devono fare. La Chiesa Valdese stamattina ha lanciato una disponibilità, lavoriamo nel senso della redistribuzione» e «non scontriamoci con la magistratura, tutte queste tensioni non fanno bene al Paese».

      E dopo le accusa di Salvini replica: «Non accetto che il ministro dell’Interno dice che se stanno sbarcando dalla Sea Watch è perché i ministri 5 Stelle hanno aperto i porti. La nave è stata sequestrata dalla magistratura e, quando c’è un sequestro, si fanno sbarcare obbligatoriamente le persone a bordo».

      Duro anche il ministro Danilo Toninelli: «Salvini, se ha qualcosa da dirmi, me la dica in faccia. Non parli a sproposito del sottoscritto in tv. È evidente che l’epilogo della vicenda è legato al sequestro della nave da parte della magistratura, non serve un esperto per capirlo. Magari il ministro dell’Interno si informi prima di parlare. E trovi soluzioni vere sui rimpatri, non ancora avviati da quando è il responsabile della sicurezza nazionale».
      Lo sbarco per Salvini è una sconfitta politica
      Comunque la si guardi, la conclusione del braccio di ferro per Salvini è una sonora sconfitta che il ministro dell’Interno cerca di capitalizzare puntando tutte le sue carte su quel decreto sicurezza-bis che l’Onu chiede di ritirare ritenendolo una “violazione dei diritti umani e delle convenzioni internazionali”.

      Dopo aver irriso la lettera dell’alto Commissariato dell’Onu invitandolo ad occuparsi “dell’emergenza umanitaria in Venezuela anziché fare campagna elettorale in Italia”, Salvini ribadisce: "Resta un tema fondamentale: la difesa dei confini nazionali e l’ingresso in Italia di un gruppo di sconosciuti dev’essere una decisione della politica (espressione della volontà popolare) o di magistrati e Ong straniere? La vicenda Sea Watch 3 conferma una volta di più l’urgenza di approvare il decreto sicurezza bis già nel Consiglio dei ministri di domani per rafforzare gli strumenti del governo per combattere i trafficanti di uomini e chi fa affari con loro”.

      I 47 migranti sbarcati aspettano adesso di conoscere il loro destino. Le chiese evangeliche hanno dato la loro piena disponibilità ad accoglierli tutti nelle loro comunità in Italia ma anche all’estero.

      https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2019/05/19/news/via_libera_per_la_sea_watch_puo_attraccare_a_lampedusa-226674239

    • Italy: UN experts condemn bill to fine migrant rescuers

      UN human rights experts* have condemned a proposed draft decree by Italy’s interior minister, Matteo Salvini, to fine those who rescue migrants and refugees at sea, and urged the Government to halt its approval.

      “The right to life and the principle of non-refoulement should always prevail over national legislation or other measures purportedly adopted in the name of national security,” said the independent experts, who conveyed their concerns about the decree in a formal letter to the Italian Government.

      “We urge authorities to stop endangering the lives of migrants, including asylum seekers and victims of trafficking in persons, by invoking the fight against traffickers. This approach is misleading and is not in line with both general international law and international human rights law. Instead, restrictive migration policies contribute to exacerbating migrants’ vulnerabilities and only serve to increase trafficking in persons.”

      Earlier this month, Mr. Salvini announced a proposal to issue a decree that would fine vessels for every person rescued at sea and taken to Italian territory. NGO and other boats that rescued migrants could also have their licences revoked or suspended.

      The UN experts said that, should the decree – yet to be approved by the government – enter into force, it would seriously undermine the human rights of migrants, including asylum seekers, as well as victims of torture, of trafficking in persons and of other serious human rights abuses.

      They also asked for the withdrawal of two previous Directives banning NGO vessels rescuing migrants off Libya’s coasts from accessing Italian ports. In particular, the second Directive singled out the Italian ship Mare Jonio for helping those at sea.

      Declaring that Libyan ports were “able to provide migrants with adequate logistical and medical assistance” was particularly alarming, the experts said, especially given reports that Libyan coastguards had committed multiple human rights violations, including collusion with traffickers’ networks and deliberately sinking boats.

      The experts said any measure against humanitarian actors should be halted. “We are deeply concerned about the accusations brought against the Mare Jonio vessel, which have not been confirmed by any competent judicial authority. We believe that this represents yet another political attempt to criminalise humanitarian actors delivering life-saving services that are indispensable to protect humans’ lives and dignity.”

      The UN experts said Italian authorities had failed to properly consider several international norms, such as article 98 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the duty to help any person in danger at sea. “Article 98 is considered customary law. It applies to all maritime zones and to all persons in distress, without discrimination, as well as to all ships, including private and NGO vessels under a State flag,” they said.

      The Directives stigmatize migrants as “possible terrorists, traffickers and smugglers”, without providing evidence, the experts said. “We are concerned that this type of rhetoric will further increase the climate of hatred and xenophobia, as previously highlighted in another letter to which the Italian Government is also yet to reply.”

      The experts have contacted the Government about their concerns and await a reply. A copy of the letter has also been shared with Libya and the European Union.

      https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24628&LangID=E

    • Des ONG accusent la marine italienne de ne pas avoir porté assistance à des migrants en détresse

      L’ONG allemande Sea-Watch et le collectif Mediterranea accusent un navire de la marine italienne d’être resté à distance d’une embarcation de migrants en détresse au large des côtes libyennes, alors qu’il ne se trouvait qu’à plusieurs dizaines de kilomètres. Les 80 personnes en difficulté ont finalement été interceptées par les garde-côtes libyens et renvoyées en Libye.

      « Le navire P492 Bettica de la marine italienne est à proximité d’un canot pneumatique en détresse avec environ 80 personnes à son bord mais il n’intervient pas ». Ce message a été posté sur Twitter jeudi 23 mai en début d’après-midi par l’ONG Sea-Watch qui alerte sur la présence d’une embarcation dans les eaux internationales, au large de la Libye. C’est son avion de secours, le Moonbird, qui a repéré le canot en difficulté. « Notre avion a envoyé un message de détresse et a confirmé que des personnes sont accrochées à l’embarcation qui est en train de se dégonfler », continue l’ONG allemande.
      https://twitter.com/SeaWatchItaly/status/1131652854006067200?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

      Un peu plus tôt, Alarm Phone, la plateforme téléphonique qui vient en aide aux migrants en mer, avait donné l’alerte sur les réseaux sociaux. « Depuis 12h40, nous sommes en contact avec un bateau en détresse en Méditerranée centrale […]. L’eau entre dans le bateau. Nous avons transmis leur position au MRCC de Rome. Nous demandons une opération de sauvetage rapide ».

      Selon les ONG, la marine italienne n’est pas loin de l’embarcation. Elle ne serait pas intervenue.

      Un tweet de la marine italienne confirme, en effet, sa présence dans la zone, à 80 km du canot en difficulté. « Nous envoyons notre propre hélicoptère pour soutenir le Colibri [également sur zone, ndlr] », écrit la marine italienne sur le réseau social. « Avec un hélicoptère de la région, nous avons vérifié que les migrants ont été récupérés par un bateau de la patrouille libyenne ».

      « Le gouvernement sera responsable de ses actes »

      Seulement voilà, les ONG accusent ainsi les Italiens d’être « restés à distance » sciemment, pour laisser « le champ libre » aux garde-côtes libyens. « Encore un refoulement par procuration en Méditerranée centrale » a réagi Alarm Phone. « L’UE continue de violer le droit international, d’ignorer les bateaux en détresse et de repousser les gens en zone de guerre ».

      https://twitter.com/alarm_phone/status/1131612656341852161?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

      Des accusations qui inquiètent plusieurs personnalités politiques en Italie. « Si c’est vrai, ce serait très grave car il est absolument impensable que des hommes, des femmes et des enfants soient renvoyés dans cet enfer qu’est la Libye », a déclaré le sénateur du mouvement 5 étoiles (M5S) Gregorio De Falco, également officier de la marine.

      Même son de cloche chez Massimiliano Smeriglio, candidat du Parti démocrate aux élections européennes. « Nous ne pouvons pas croire qu’’un navire de notre marine, qui a accompli tant de missions de secours international, peut apporter son aide sans intervenir dans une tragédie. Intervenez sans délai sans quoi le gouvernement sera responsable de ses actes », a-t-il insisté.
      Début mai, un navire militaire italien avait subi les foudres du ministre de l’Intérieur après avoir secouru des migrants en mer sans avoir attendu les garde-côtes. Matteo Salvini refuse systématiquement le débarquement des migrants sur le sol italien.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17114/des-ong-accusent-la-marine-italienne-de-ne-pas-avoir-porte-assistance-

    • Dl sicurezza bis, I pescatori continueranno a salvare i migranti

      Michele e Salvatore Casciaro, padre e figlio, sono pescatori di Novaglie, Salento. Salvatore assiste alla tragedia dei migranti nel canale d’Otranto sin dal grande esodo degli albanesi negli anni Novanta. E da allora partecipa con la propria imbarcazione alle operazioni di soccorso e salvataggio dei naufraghi. Oggi i flussi principali provengono dal nord africa. Nell’ultimo salvataggio ha salvato con il figlio Michele una somala che altrimenti sarebbe annegata. Ma con il decreto sicurezza bis, continueranno a salvare i naufraghi o si volteranno dall’altra parte? (M. Tota)

      http://www.la7.it/tagada/video/dl-sicurezza-bis-i-pescatori-continueranno-a-salvare-i-migranti-21-05-2019-27242
      #pêcheurs

    • Il cambio di rotta di un Paese che perde l’onore
      Finora la Marina militare aveva sempre risposto alle chiamate di

      naufraghi in difficoltà.

      OGGI le cose in Italia non sono facili e quindi è proprio oggi che dobbiamo amare il nostro Paese, rispettarlo, dobbiamo dialogare, confrontarci, litigare sapendo che il suolo che calpestiamo ci restituirà solo ciò che avremo seminato e curato. Ogni parola è un seme, ogni ragionamento è un seme e noi italiani restiamo quello che siamo sempre stati: persone fatte di terra e mare. Conosciamo il mare, gabbia e occasione, limite e infinito, siamo uomini e donne di mare. Ecco perché, quando già l’Europa trattava l’immigrazione come un problema, l’Italia continuava a salvare vite in mare. E le salvava perché un uomo, una donna, un bambino che dall’Africa prendono il mare per venire in Italia, se in pericolo, non sono migranti, ma naufraghi. È la legge eterna del mare: ogni naufrago va tratto in salvo. Sempre.

      Qualcuno mi dira’, non possiamo salvarli tutti noi. Se nessun altro li salva, vi rispondo, allora li salveremo noi! Esistono le Zone Sar (Search and Rescue, ovvero “ricerca e salvataggio”) di competenza dei diversi paesi, perché dovremmo farci carico di recuperare i naufraghi anche laddove non sarebbe di nostra competenza? Perché per prima cosa dobbiamo rispettare la vita umana, è una regola universale alla quale se ci sottraiamo iniziamo a modificarci. Lasciare che una persona anneghi significa perdere qualsiasi cosa abbiamo raggiunto. Empatia, leggi, diritti, morale, convivenza. Perdiamo tutto. Non è sentimentalismo, è misura di ciò che sta accadendo. Non possiamo sottrarci dal salvare le persone in mare perché ogni vita perduta, quando poteva essere salvata, è sofferenza che si moltiplica, è odio. E l’odio diventa rancore, e il rancore vendetta.

      Ma non possiamo accoglierli tutti, mi direte. Manca il lavoro per noi, come possiamo farci carico di centinaia di migliaia di persone in cerca di un futuro migliore? Ma noi non dobbiamo accoglierli tutti: noi dobbiamo salvarli tutti, è nostro dovere farlo. Non facciamoci fregare dalla propaganda: salvare e accogliere sono due cose diverse, due momenti diversi che possono e devono essere gestiti in maniera diversa. Il salvataggio risponde a una necessità immediata, non c’è tempo per la strategia. L’accoglienza viene dopo e su quella si può discutere e cambiare passo, ma senza mettere in dubbio la necessità di salvare. Anzi, direi, senza mettere in discussione il diritto che noi italiani abbiamo, il privilegio che viviamo nel salvare vite umane. Salvare vite è come donare vita, come è accaduto che lo abbiamo dimenticato? Qualcuno oggi pensa di poter girare la faccia davanti a queste storie, pensa che tutto sommato la quotidianità sia già così difficile che non serve complicarsi la vita con questo strazio; non invidio queste persone perché per loro il risveglio sarà ancora più duro. E non le invidio perché non sanno quanto l’Italia abbia fatto la differenza, perché non sanno che l’Italia non ha mai girato le spalle a chi, in pericolo, chiedeva aiuto.

      Mi sono sentito orgoglioso di essere italiano quando ho visto il lavoro titanico che la Marina militare italiana ha sempre fatto, prima da sola, poi con l’Europa ma da capofila, poi insieme alle Ong, poi di nuovo da sola. Sono orgoglioso dei pescatori italiani che, nonostante andassero incontro a sanzioni gravose e al sequestro delle loro imbarcazioni che sono per loro sopravvivenza stessa, hanno sempre obbedito alla legge del mare, quella legge che impone di prestare soccorso a chiunque si trovi in pericolo tra le onde, a qualunque costo e senza pensare alle conseguenze. “Noi gente in mare non l’abbiamo lassata mai!”: questo era il principio dei pescatori lampedusani e a questo principio non si sono sottratti; se l’avessero fatto, avrebbero negato ogni singola parte della loro vita.

      Ma le cose sono cambiate ora, dirà qualcuno tra voi. Oggi la Marina sta agendo diversamente, direte. Sappiamo che il 23 maggio scorso, e lo sappiamo dagli unici testimoni rimasti nel Mediterraneo a darci queste informazioni, ovvero le Ong, un uomo è morto durante un’operazione di salvataggio, anzi, prima ancora che l’operazione iniziasse. Nel video girato da un velivolo della Sea-Watch si vede un gommone in avaria che sta imbarcando velocemente acqua. La Sea-Watch contatta prima la Guardia costiera libica che non risponde e poi la nave della Marina militare italiana Bettica, che si trova a meno di trenta miglia dal gommone.

      Improvvisamente e per quasi un’ora le comunicazioni tra la Marina militare italiana e la Sea-Watch si interrompono, quando riprendono la Bettica avverte che la Guardia costiera libica si sta recando sul posto. È prassi che la Guardia costiera libica non risponda alle richieste di soccorso. È prassi che i salvataggi siano fatti all’unico scopo di riportare i migranti nei campi di prigionia libici dove ricomincia il loro calvario, dove vengono torturati e dove viene estorto loro denaro: ogni migrante preso dalla Guardia costiera libica è guadagno doppio per i trafficanti (che, detto per inciso, non sono le Ong ma la guardia costiera libica finanziata dall’Italia e dall’Europa) che li lasceranno tornare nel loro paese solo in cambio di denaro.

      È ormai appurato che la Libia non è un porto sicuro. E allora perché la nave della Marina militare italiana Bettica non è intervenuta? Perché si infanga l’onore (che bella parola quando porta con sé il rispetto per la vita umana) dei militari della Marina che hanno sempre, secondo coscienza, risposto prima ancora che alle convenzioni internazionali, che pure stabiliscono il dovere di salvare vite, alla superiore e universale legge del mare? Oggi possiamo dividerci su tutto, ma non sulla necessità e sul dovere di salvare vite. Quando un uomo, una donna o un bambino sono in pericolo in mare, noi abbiamo il dovere di salvarli e se l’alternativa è la Libia, dobbiamo essere consapevoli che li stiamo condannando all’inferno. Per sfuggire a questo ragionamento, la propaganda inventa scorciatoie ridicole ma funzionanti: parole da buonista, parli bene dall’attico a Manhattan; si bersaglia chi racconta, non il racconto, perché quello è oggettivo e non può essere messo in discussione. Ma quell’uomo che annega è vita reale, non la finzione spacciata per realtà sui social.

      Facile dire la solita balla buonista parli tu dall’attico a Manhattan… no, parlo da meridionale, nato e cresciuto nelle terre più martoriate d’Italia, più saccheggiate, terre dimenticate da Dio e dagli uomini, ma non dai politici avvoltoi e sciacalli. Quelli, di noi meridionali, non si dimenticano mai. Promettono acqua agli assetati e intanto condannano le nostre anime per l’eternità. Parlo da uomo che non può accettare che il confine tra la vita e la morte sia una linea convenzionale e invisibile tracciata nel mare. Ciò che resta, alla fine di tutto, è l’onore. L’onore riscattato dal significato abusivo che ne danno le mafie per indicare nell’uomo d’onore l’affiliato. Onore inteso come rispetto dei nostri principi umani più profondi al di là delle conseguenze, nonostante le conseguenze.

      Onore è ciò che permette ancora di guardarci l’un l’altro e di sapere che io mi posso fidare di te perché tu ti puoi fidare di me, qualunque sia la tua condizione sociale, qualunque sia il luogo da cui provieni, il tuo quartiere, la tua religione e il colore della tua pelle, la tua condizione sociale, il tuo lavoro, il tuo conto in banca, la scuola che frequenta tuo figlio, il lavoro che fai. È facile: se mentre tu soffri e muori io giro lo sguardo dall’altra parte, se io soffrirò e rischierò di morire mi ripagherai con la stessa moneta. Salvare per essere salvati. Salvare per salvarsi: nel nostro mare, se smettiamo di salvare, finiremo annegati noi.

      https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2019/06/01/news/il_cambio_di_rotta_di_un_paese_che_perde_l_onore-227596448

    • Appel au secours d’un capitaine, coincé en mer avec 75 migrants malades

      Le capitaine d’un bateau égyptien ayant recueilli vendredi 75 migrants dans les eaux internationales, a lancé un appel aux autorités tunisiennes pour qu’elles le laissent accoster, alors que les vivres commencent à manquer et que des migrants sont malades.

      Le remorqueur égyptien #Maridive_601, qui dessert des plateformes pétrolières entre la Tunisie et l’Italie, est arrivé vendredi soir au port de Zarzis, dans le sud de la Tunisie, après avoir récupéré dans la matinée les migrants à la dérive.

      « Je demande aux autorités tunisiennes de nous permettre d’urgence d’entrer dans le port de Zarzis », a déclaré à l’AFP le capitaine #Faouz_Samir, ajoutant que « l’état de santé des migrants est mauvais, beaucoup sont atteints de la gale ».

      Un médecin a pu monter à bord, a indiqué la branche locale du Croissant-Rouge. « Quatre personnes sont dans un état qui nécessite une intervention médicale », et la plupart d’entre eux sont atteints de la gale infectieuse", a déclaré à l’AFP Mongi Slim, responsable du Croissant-Rouge dans le sud de la Tunisie.

      Selon l’organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), les migrants, 64 Bangladais, 9 Egyptiens, un Marocain et un Soudanais, dont au moins 32 enfants et mineurs non accompagnés, « ont besoin d’urgence d’eau, de nourriture, de vêtements, de couvertures et surtout d’assistance médicale ».

      L’agence de l’ONU a indiqué être prête à aider la Tunisie pour accueillir ces candidats à l’exil, partis de Libye dans l’espoir d’atteindre l’Europe.

      « Nous comprenons les difficultés et l’ampleur des défis que les flux migratoires peuvent poser et nous travaillons à appuyer les capacités de secours et d’assistance », a souligné Lorena Lando, chef de mission de l’OIM en Tunisie.

      « Nous restons toutefois préoccupés par les politiques de plus en plus restrictives adoptées par plusieurs pays du nord de la Méditerranée », ajoute Mme Lando.

      Le gouvernement et les autorités locales tunisiennes, sollicitées par l’AFP, n’ont pas souhaité s’exprimer.

      En août dernier, un autre bateau commercial, le Sarost 5, était resté bloqué plus de deux semaines en mer avec les 40 immigrés clandestins qu’il avait secourus. Soucieuses de ne pas créer un précédent, les autorités tunisiennes avaient souligné qu’elles acceptaient ces migrants exceptionnellement et pour raisons « humanitaires ».

      Le 10 mai, 16 migrants originaires en majorité du Bangladesh avaient été sauvés par des pêcheurs tunisiens, après le naufrage de leur embarcation qui avait fait une soixantaine de morts.

      La majorité des bâtiments de la marine qui ont patrouillé au large de la Libye ces dernières années se sont retirés tandis que les navires humanitaires font face à des blocages judiciaires et administratifs.

      https://www.voaafrique.com/a/appel-au-secours-d-un-capitaine-coinc%C3%A9-en-mer-avec-75-migrants-malades/4943716.html

    • Tugboat carrying 75 migrants stranded off Tunisia for 10 days

      The #Maridive_601, an Egyptian tugboat that rescued 75 migrants in international waters over one week ago, is still stranded off the Tunisian coast as Tunisian authorities refuse to let it dock.

      The Egyptian tugboat Maridive 601 rescued the migrants off the southern Tunisian coast on May 31 after they embarked from Libya.

      Sixty-four of the 75 migrants are Bangladeshi and at least 32 of those on board are minors and unaccompanied children, according to the International Organization for Migration.

      The Maridive 601, which services oil platforms between Tunisia and Italy, picked up the migrants who were drifting in international waters near the Tunisian coast, and headed to the closest port of Zarzis in southern Tunisia.

      “I request that the Tunisian authorities allow us to make an emergency entry to Zarzis port,” appealed Faouz Samir, captain of the Maridive 601 shortly after the rescue.

      Since then, the crew has not received entry permission. An official from the Tunisian interior ministry was quoted as saying Monday that „the migrants want to be taken in by a European country." The official did not want to be quoted by name.

      Cases of infectious scabies

      Earlier last week, a Red Crescent team based in the southern Tunisian city of Zarzis delivered aid and medical care to the migrants, some of whom were ill, according to the Red Crescent.

      They “urgently need water, food, clothes, blankets and above all medical assistance,” the IOM added. According to AFP reports, the IOM added it was ready to help Tunisia provide for the migrants.

      Mongi Slim, a Red Crescent official in southern Tunisia, told InfoMigrant last Thursday that cases of scabies were on the rise and that there were around thirty people affected. The second captain of the Maridive 601 added that the Red Crescent was not allowed to board the ship to provide scabies medication. Instead, the crew had to contact its chartering company, Shell Tunisia, which in turn delivered medication in addition to food, water, mattresses and blankets. “We’re in telephone contact with the Red Crescent and they give us instructions on how to treat the migrants,” the captain informed InfoMigrants.

      Video footage

      Photos published online by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, an NGO, showed migrants lying on the deck of the boat, while sailors attempted to feed them. A video by the same NGO shows migrants shouting: “We don’t need food, we don’t want to stay here, we want to go to Europe.”

      https://www.facebook.com/ftdes/videos/189765251957864

      Tunisia’s central government and local authorities did not wish to comment to media requests.

      “We understand the difficulties and the scale of the challenges that migration flows pose and we are working to support relief and assistance capacities,” said Lorena Lando, the IOM’s head of mission in Tunisia. “But we are worried by the increasingly restrictive policies adopted by several countries,” Lando told AFP.

      Last month, around 60 migrants, most from Bangladesh, drowned off the coast of Tunisia after leaving Libya on a boat bound for Europe.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/17413/tugboat-carrying-75-migrants-stranded-off-tunisia-for-10-days?ref=tw
      #Tunisie
      ping @_kg_

    • Méditerranée : le navire #Sea_Watch_3 de retour dans la zone de détresse

      Après avoir été bloqué par la justice italienne pendant près d’un mois, le navire humanitaire Sea Watch 3 est de retour dans la zone de détresse (SAR zone) au large de la Libye. Il est actuellement le seul bateau de sauvetage en mer.

      Le navire humanitaire de l’ONG allemande Sea Watch, le Sea Watch 3, est de retour dans la zone de sauvetage au large de la Libye, la SAR zone.

      Le Sea Watch 3 était bloqué depuis le 20 mai par la justice italienne dans le cadre de poursuites pour aide à l’immigration illégale. Il a reçu samedi 8 juin l’autorisation de repartir en mer, a annoncé l’association.

      "Le Sea Watch 3 est libre ! Nous avons reçu une notification formelle sur la libération du navire saisi et son retour aux opérations" en mer, s’est félicitée l’organisation humanitaire sur Twitter.

      Malgré la politique de "fermeture des ports" du ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini (extrême droite), le Sea Watch 3 avait pu débarquer les 65 migrants qu’il avait secourus à la mi-mai ; ils ont été autorisés à débarquer sur l’île de Lampedusa.

      Cette opération de secours avait provoqué la fureur de Matteo Salvini, qui a semblé la découvrir en temps réel à la télévision. “Je suis le ministère des règles et des ports fermés. Si un ministre du mouvement 5 étoiles a autorisé le débarquement, il devra répondre de ses actes devant les Italiens”, avait-il notamment lâché.

      Matteo Salvini estime que les migrants qui partent en mer à partir de la Libye doivent être remis aux garde-côtes libyens, conformément à un accord conclu entre l’Union européenne et Tripoli, mais les organisations humanitaires qui portent au secours des migrants refusent de s’y conformer.

      Hormis le Sea Watch 3, à la date du 10 juin, aucun autre navire humanitaire n’est présent au large des côtes libyennes.

      Les navires humanitaires qui sont bloqués dans des ports européens :

      – Depuis un débarquement en juin 2018 à Malte, le Lifeline de l’ONG allemande eponyme est bloqué au port de La Valette, à Malte, où les autorités contestent sa situation administrative.

      – Depuis le mois de janvier 2019, l’Open Arms de l’ONG espagnole Proactiva Open Arms est bloqué à Barcelone par les autorités espagnoles. Au printemps 2018, ce navire avait été placé un mois sous séquestre en Italie avant d’être autorisé à repartir.

      – Début août 2017, la justice italienne a saisi le Juventa de l’ONG allemande Jugend Rettet, accusée de complicité avec les passeurs libyens mais qui clame depuis son innocence.

      –Le Mare Jonio, un navire battant pavillon italien qui entend avant tout témoigner de la situation en mer, est actuellement bloqué en Sicile par les autorités.

      Les ONG qui résistent :

      –Dans les airs, les petits avions Colibri de l’ONG française Pilotes volontaires et Moonbird de Sea-Watch mènent régulièrement des patrouilles pour tenter de repérer les embarcations en difficulté.

      –L’Astral, le voilier de l’ONG Open Arms, est actuellement à Barcelone.

      Les navires humanitaires qui ont renoncé :

      Des ONG engagées au large des côtes libyennes ont suspendu leurs activités, face à la chute des départs de Libye et face à une intensification des menaces des garde-côtes libyens, qui considèrent les ONG comme complices des passeurs.

      – Suite aux pressions politiques, privé de pavillon, l’Aquarius de l’ONG SOS Méditerranée – qui a secouru près de 20 000 personnes en deux ans et demi - a mis fin à ses missions en décembre 2018. L’ONG espère toutefois trouver un nouveau bateau pour repartir rapidement en mer au printemps 2019.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17410/mediterranee-le-navire-sea-watch-3-de-retour-dans-la-zone-de-detresse

    • Italy to fine NGOs who rescue migrants at sea

      The Italian government has decided to impose stiff fines on rescuers who bring migrants into port without authorization. It also gave the interior ministry, led by Matteo Salvini, power to demand the payment.

      A decree adopted by the Italian government on Tuesday would force non-governmental organizations to pay between €10,000 and €50,000 ($11,327 – $56,638) for transporting rescued migrants to Italian ports.

      Rescuers who repeatedly dock without authorization risk having their vessel permanently impounded. The fines would be payable by the captain, the operator and the owner of the rescue ship.

      The Italian government is composed of the anti-establishment 5-Star Movement and right-wing populist League Party. The League leader Matteo Salvini, who also serves as the interior minister, has been spearheading an effort to clamp down on illegal immigration.

      Delayed decree

      The adoption of the decree has been delayed due to criticism from the United Nations and the office of the Italian president. Following the cabinet session on Tuesday, however, Salvini praised it as a “step forward the security of this country.” The populist leader also said he was “absolutely sure about the fact that it is compliant” with all national and international laws.

      The decree allows police to investigate possible migrant trafficking operations by going undercover. It also makes it easier to eavesdrop electronically on suspected people smugglers. Other sections of the decree impose stricter punishments on rioters and violent football fans.

      Read more: Italian court rules Salvini can be charged with kidnapping

      Additionally, the decree gives Salvini’s ministry the power to order the NGOs to pay the fines, this was previously the area of the transport and infrastructure ministries.

      Salvini has pushed through several anti-migrant decrees since becoming interior minister a year ago, including one in December which ended humanitarian protection for migrants who do not qualify for refugee status. Earlier this week, Salvini blasted three judges who opposed his hardline policies.

      Risking life at sea

      Since 2014, more than 600,000 people have made the dangerous journey across the central Mediterranean to reach Italy, fleeing war and poverty in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. More than 14,000 have been recorded killed or missing when attempting the trip.

      Without a legal way to reach Europe, they pay people smugglers for passage in unseaworthy boats. The UNHCR and IOM recently said that 1,940 people have reached Italy from north Africa since the beginning of 2019, and almost 350 have died en route — putting the death rate for those crossing at more than 15%. The number of new arrivals has dropped off in recent years, but Rome is still faced with hundreds of thousands of people who migrated illegally. Pending asylum claims as of May 31 this year were 135,337.

      With official search-and-rescue missions canceled, the burden of assisting the shipwrecked migrants falls on rescue NGOs. The Italian coastguard estimates NGOs have brought in some 30,000 people per year since 2014.

      https://www.dw.com/en/italy-to-fine-ngos-who-rescue-migrants-at-sea/a-49143481

    • L’UNHCR chiede all’Italia di riconsiderare un decreto che penalizzerebbe i salvataggi in mare nel Mediterraneo centrale

      L’UNHCR, l’Agenzia delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati, esprime preoccupazione per l’approvazione da parte del governo italiano di un nuovo decreto contenente anche diverse disposizioni che potrebbero penalizzare i salvataggi in mare di rifugiati e migranti nel Mediterraneo centrale, compresa l’introduzione di sanzioni finanziarie per le navi delle Ong ed altre navi private impegnate nel soccorso in mare.

      Salvare vite umane costituisce un imperativo umanitario consolidato ed è anche un obbligo derivante dal diritto internazionale. Nessuna nave o nessun comandante dovrebbe essere esposto a sanzioni per aver soccorso imbarcazioni in difficoltà e laddove esista il rischio imminente di perdita di vite umane.

      “In una fase in cui gli Stati europei si sono per lo più ritirati dalle operazioni di soccorso nel Mediterraneo centrale, le navi delle Ong sono più cruciali che mai,” ha dichiarato Roland Schilling, Rappresentante regionale a.i. per il Sud Europa. “Senza di loro, altre vite saranno inevitabilmente perse”.

      L’UNHCR è inoltre preoccupata per il fatto che il decreto possa avere l’effetto di penalizzare i comandanti che rifiutano di far sbarcare le persone soccorse in Libia.

      Alla luce della situazione di sicurezza estremamente volatile, delle numerose segnalazioni di violazioni di diritti umani e dell’uso generalizzato della detenzione nei confronti delle persone soccorse o intercettate in mare, nessuno dovrebbe essere riportato in Libia.

      L’UNHCR ha ribadito più volte che il rafforzamento delle capacità di ricerca e soccorso, in particolare nel Mediterraneo centrale, deve essere accompagnato da un meccanismo regionale volto ad assicurare procedure di sbarco rapide, coordinate, ordinate e sicure. La responsabilità per i rifugiati e i migranti soccorsi in mare deve essere condivisa tra tutti gli stati che li accolgono, invece di ricadere su uno o due.

      L’UNHCR chiede al governo italiano di rivedere il decreto e al parlamento di modificarlo, mettendo al centro la protezione dei rifugiati ed il salvataggio di vite umane.

      https://www.unhcr.it/news/lunhcr-chiede-allitalia-riconsiderare-un-decreto-penalizzerebbe-salvataggi-mar

    • Migrants bloqués au large de la Tunisie : les Bangladais refusent le rapatriement

      Quinze jours après avoir été secourus, 75 migrants - dont la moitié de mineurs - sont toujours coincés à bord d’un navire commercial égyptien près des côtes tunisiennes. La Tunisie refuse de les laisser débarquer et souhaite les faire « rentrer chez eux ». Seuls les migrants africains ont accepté d’être rapatriés. La majorité des rescapés, des Bangladais, s’opposent à toute expulsion.

      Les 75 naufragés secourus il y a quinze jours par le bateau commercial égyptien Maridive 601 sont toujours bloqués au large de Zarzis, sur la côte tunisienne. Quelque 32 mineurs se trouvent à bord du navire.

      Les autorités tunisiennes refusent de les laisser débarquer depuis le vendredi 31 mai, jour du sauvetage. « Le gouverneur de Médenine insiste pour qu’ils rentrent chez eux », explique Mongi Slim du Croissant rouge tunisien, joint par InfoMigrants vendredi 14 juin.

      Informés de cette décision par le Croissant rouge, seuls les Égyptiens, les Marocains et les Soudanais présents à bord ont accepté un rapatriement dans leurs pays.

      La Tunisie demande l’aide du Bangladesh

      Les 64 autres naufragés, des Bangladais dont de nombreux mineurs, ont refusé cette offre. « Ils demandent de rejoindre l’Italie ou de pouvoir rester en Tunisie avec une permission de travail », raconte Mongi Slim.

      « Les autorités ont sollicité l’aide de l’ambassade du Bangladesh. Elle va intervenir pour résoudre le problème », ajoute-t-il.

      « Rien pour se mettre à l’abri du soleil »

      En attendant, à bord, la situation psychologique des naufragés se dégrade. « Il fait très chaud en cette période de l’année dans le sud de la Tunisie, et sur le bateau les migrants n’ont rien pour se mettre à l’abri du soleil. Ils risquent la déshydratation. Ils sont emprisonnés en mer », déplore Ben Amor Romdhane, du Forum tunisien pour les droits économiques et sociaux (FTDES) également contacté par InfoMigrants. Le militant s’inquiète aussi des cas de gale signalés à bord.

      Pour la première fois depuis 15 jours, jeudi, une équipe médicale du Croissant rouge tunisien a pu monter sur le Maridive 601 avec des médicaments et des vivres. Jusqu’ici, le navire était ravitaillé en eau, en nourriture et en médicament anti-gale par la compagnie Shell Tunisie qui affrète le bateau. Le Croissant rouge était néanmoins parvenu à faire acheminer un stock de médicaments. Les premiers soins avaient été prodigués par l’équipage, guidé au téléphone par le Croissant rouge.

      Le médecin du Croissant rouge, qui a pu examiner les 75 migrants jeudi, a déclaré qu’il n’y avait pas de maladie grave ou d’urgences, seulement des cas de diabète, selon Mongi Slim.

      D’après le représentant du navire égyptien, joint par InfoMigrant, la situation reste pourtant « très tendue ». « La seule solution est de laisser ces migrants entrer en Tunisie », estime-t-il.

      Cet incident rappelle celui qu’avait connu le Sarost 5 l’an dernier. Le navire commercial, qui avait secouru 40 migrants en mer Méditerranée, avait dû attendre 17 jours l’autorisation de débarquer à Zarzis. Les autorités avaient finalement cédé titre exceptionnel « pour des raisons humanitaires ».

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17533/migrants-bloques-au-large-de-la-tunisie-les-bangladais-refusent-le-rap

    • Migrants stranded at sea for three weeks now risk deportation, aid groups warn

      Group of 75 people survive prolonged ordeal but could now be made to leave Tunisia.

      https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/235b366ca8ef3c06feec045df894e482906510c0/0_0_1280_768/master/1280.jpg?width=620&quality=85&auto=format&fit=max&s=35a960601e803a971255f0

      A group of migrants who spent nearly three weeks trapped onboard a merchant ship in torrid conditions face possible deportation to their home countries after they were finally allowed to disembark in Tunisia, aid groups have warned.

      The 75 migrants, about half of whom are minors or unaccompanied children, were rescued on 31 May by the Maridive 601 only to spend the next 20 days at sea as European authorities refused to let them land.

      “The migrant boat was ignored by Italian and Maltese authorities, though they were in distress in international waters”, said a spokesperson for Alarm Phone, a hotline service for migrants in distress at sea that was alerted to the ship’s plight by crew members. “This is a violation of international law and maritime conventions”.

      Heat and humidity onboard the Maridive 501, an Egyptian tugboat that services offshore oil platforms, were insufferable, said aid groups. Food and water were scarce, scabies broke out and spread, and several people suffered fractures and other injuries during the rescue operation.

      Witnesses said the psychological strain was immense for migrants and crew members alike.

      The brother of one Bangladeshi man said on 3 June: “Today is Eid [the festival marking the end of Ramadan]. But the day is not for me. My brother is on the ship. I can’t take it any more. How is he? How can I explain my feelings to you? When I get good news, this will be my Eid gift and that day will be my Eid day.”

      Six days later, he said: “How many days will they stay there? Who can take care of him? I am depressed, every day my mother is crying.”

      The ship’s captain, Faouz Samir, asked repeatedly to be allowed to land at the nearest port, in Zarzis, but was initially refused permission. Regional authorities said migrant centres in Medenine were too overcrowded.

      On 6 June, the migrants staged an onboard protest, asking to be sent to Europe. Video of the protest was published by the Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux.

      The closure of Italian and Maltese ports to rescue ships has seemingly had a ripple effect, with Tunisia closing its own harbours to rescued people in order to avoid an overwhelming influx of migrants.

      On Tuesday evening, however, the Tunisian authorities relented. The migrants, who are mainly from Bangladeshi but also include Egyptians, Moroccans and Sudanese, will now be transferred to a detention centre.

      Aid groups, however, who had been demanding an immediate disembarkation in view of the medical emergency onboard, are concerned people may be sent back to Libya or even deported to their home countries after landing in the port of Zarzis. The governor of Medenine had previously said the boat would be allowed to dock only if all the migrants were immediately deported.

      “We are happy for the survivors. They are exhausted, some are traumatised, but we will accompany them so that we can finally find respite and reflect on the different alternatives available to them,” said Wajdi Ben Mhamed, head of the International Organisation for Migration’s Zarzis office.

      The IOM said its protection team would assist the survivors with “their protection needs and provide, for those who have requested it, assistance for voluntary return to their country of origin’’.

      Relatives claim some of the Bangladeshi survivors were told that food, water and medical treatment would be withheld if they did not accept deportation.

      One man who spoke to his brother on 18 June said fears of imminent deportation had been exacerbated by the visit of a Bangladeshi envoy to the boat. The envoy’s visit followed a meeting five days earlier with the Tunisian minister of the interior.

      Another relative said of a Bangladeshi migrant aboard the tugboat: “In Bangladesh there are people who want to kill him. He paid all the money and went to Libya to get away from the problems in Bangladesh. Then he escaped from Libya because of the problems there. He wants to go to Europe.”

      Médecins Sans Frontières warned that Tunisia could not be defined a safe haven for migrants and refugees, given that it had no functioning asylum system in place. “The nearest places of safety for rescues in the central Mediterranean are Italy or Malta,” said a spokesperson.

      A dangerous precedent would be set if an agreement was found to deport those rescued to their countries of origin quickly after disembarkation in Tunisia. Aid groups warn that boats like the Maridive would turn into migrant holding facilities until deportations were arranged. Many more boats could thus turn from places of rescue to prison islands, floating along north African shores.
      More than 70 million people now fleeing conflict and oppression worldwide
      Read more

      Giorgia Linardi, of SeaWatch in Italy said: “After this episode we should reflect on whether Tunisia qualifies as a place of safety, as our sources suggested that the migrants could be immediately repatriated or expelled from the country. The situation aboard the Maridive is very much confronted with the situation faced right now by the SeaWatch vessel with 53 migrants on board which is still floating in front of Italian territorial waters. As of now, the attitude of the Italian authorities is no different from the attitude of the Tunisian authorities towards the Maridive despite the two states having a different framework in terms of protection of human rights and in terms of asylum system in place.”

      With sea conditions currently favourable, thousands are preparing to leave Libya, where war and political instability have been aggravated by floods caused by heavy rain.

      Without rescue boats, however, the number of shipwrecks is likely to rise further. Only two of the 10 NGO rescue boats that were active in the Mediterranean are still present.

      According to data from the UN and the IOM, about 3,200 people have reached Italy and Malta from North Africa since the beginning of 2019, and almost 350 have died en route – putting the death rate for those crossing at about 11% along the central Mediterranean route.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jun/19/migrants-stranded-at-sea-for-three-weeks-now-face-deportation-aid-group

    • Italy’s redefinition of sea rescue as a crime draws on EU policy for inspiration

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-341-italy-salvini-boats-directive.pdf

      –-> analyse de #Yasha_Maccanico sur la première directive de Salvini contre la #Mare_Jonio et la façon dans laquelle il essaye (avec part de raison) justifier la criminalisation systématique des secours en mer en base aux instructions issues de la Commission dans le contexte de l’Agenda Européenne, plus des problèmes de base dans les représentations contenues dans la directive.

    • Maridive : les 75 migrants bloqués depuis 18 jours au large de Zarzis ont pu débarquer en Tunisie

      Après 18 jours d’hésitation, les autorités tunisiennes ont finalement laissé les 75 migrants du #Maridive débarquer au port de Zarzis, ce mercredi. Ils ont toutefois imposé leurs conditions : les migrants ont tous accepté préalablement de rentrer dans leur pays.

      « C’est enfin fini, c’est un soulagement ». Mongi Slim, membre du Croissant-rouge tunisien, s’est réjoui, mardi 18 juin, du débarquement des 75 migrants bloqués depuis le 31 mai au large de Zarzis. Les autorités tunisiennes refusaient en effet de laisser débarquer en Tunisie ces personnes secourues par un navire commercial égyptien, le Maridive 601, au large de la Libye.

      Après 18 jours de blocage, ils ont enfin pu toucher la terre ferme. « Nous sommes heureux pour les survivants. Ils sont épuisés, certains sont traumatisés mais nous les accompagnerons pour pouvoir enfin trouver du répit », a déclaré Wajdi Ben Mhamed, chef de bureau de l’agence de l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM), dans un communiqué.

      Un premier vol vers le Bangladesh jeudi

      Cependant, ce débarquement s’est fait sous conditions après de longues négociations entre les ONG, les organisations internationales et les autorités. Tunis a finalement autorisé leur débarquement à condition que les migrants acceptent tous d‘être renvoyés dans leur pays d’origine. Parmi les 75 migrants secourus, 64 sont de nationalité bangladaise, neuf égyptienne, un est originaire du Maroc et un autre du Soudan.


      https://www.facebook.com/iomtunis/posts/354908018559713

      Samedi 15 juin, des représentants de l’ambassade du Bangladesh sont montés à bord du Maridive et ont convaincu les Bangladais de retourner chez eux. Selon Mongi Slim, du Croissant rouge tunisien, un premier groupe de 20 Bangladais devrait être renvoyé dès jeudi 20 juin.

      Aucune demande d’asile déposée

      Une information que ne confirme par l’OIM, qui est chargée d’organiser les retours volontaires de ces naufragés. « Nous avons effectivement dit aux autorités qu’un vol commercial avec une vingtaine de places partaient de Tunisie demain vers le Bangladesh. Mais nous n’organisons pas de retours forcés », précise à InfoMigrants Lorena Lando, chef de mission de l’OIM en Tunisie. « Mais, nous attendons de faire un point avec les migrants et savoir qui veut profiter d’un retour volontaire », insiste-t-elle.

      Malgré l’accord, l’OIM rappelle que les migrants qui veulent demander l’asile seront redirigés vers le Haut-commissariat des Nations unies aux réfugiés (HCR). Mais pour l’heure, selon l’agence onusienne, aucun des migrants du Maridive ne souhaite déposer une demande d’asile en Tunisie.
      Le 10 mai dernier, 16 migrants, majoritairement du Bangladesh, avaient été sauvés par des pêcheurs tunisiens, après le naufrage de leur embarcation ayant fait une soixantaine de morts. Deux d’entre eux avaient décidé de rentrer dans leur pays.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17614/maridive-les-75-migrants-bloques-depuis-18-jours-au-large-de-zarzis-on

    • Working Paper: Guidelines on temporary arrangements for #disembarkation

      Given the voluntary nature of participation in the mechanism, determination of persons to be relocated will be based on the indications by the Member States of relocation of the profiles that these Member States are willing to accept (variable geometry)."

      “Member States that relocate voluntarily (a lump sum of 6000 EUR per applicant).”

      The Council of the European Union has produced a new “Working Paper” on: Guidelines on temporary arrangements for disembarkation (LIMITE doc no: WK 7219-19):

      “The Guidelines are based on best practices used in previous disembarkation cases, and rely on a coordinating role of the Commission and support by relevant agencies. The framework is of a temporary nature and the participation of the Member States is on a voluntary basis. This document has a non-binding nature.” [emphasis added]

      The circumstances for “triggering” Temporary Arrangements (TA) are:

      “type of arrivals covered

      – a search and rescue operation; and/or

      – other sea arrivals where there is a humanitarian ground at stake.”

      On the face of it the idea would appear to refer to just about every rescue. However the idea relies on the state of first disembarkation - for example, in the Med: Spain, France, Italy and Greece - allowing a safe port of arrival. These states then make a “relocation” request to other Member States. This is entirely based on voluntary participation.

      “Workflow in the Member State of disembarkation

      The following procedural steps should be undertaken in the Member State of disembarkation, where appropriate with the assistance from EU agencies, and where relevant with the involvement of the Member State of relocation, in agreement with the benefitting Member State:

      (...) Initial identification, registration, fingerprinting and swift security screening: Registration and fingerprinting of all arriving migrants as category 2 in Eurodac system; check against national and EU information systems (such as Eurodac, SIS, VIS, Europol and Interpol databases) to ensure that none of the persons arriving to the EU is a threat to public policy, internal security or public health.

      Assessment regarding possible use of alternatives to detention or detention, on a case by case basis, pending further processing (in the context of border procedure, where possible, or otherwise)”

      Member states will be allowed to set conditions on acceptable refugees to relocate:

      “Given the voluntary nature of participation in the mechanism, determination of persons to be relocated will be based on the indications by the Member States of relocation of the profiles that these Member States are willing to accept (variable geometry).”

      The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA) will:

      “provide assistance in screening, debriefing, identification and fingerprinting;

      – deploy Return Teams (composed of escort, forced return monitor and/or return specialists);”

      Financial support

      "Under the AMIF Regulation, funds are to be made available for:

      – Member States that relocate voluntarily (a lump sum of 6000 EUR per applicant, applying the amended Article 18 of the AMIF Regulation 516/2014);

      – support to return operations;

      – Member States under pressure, as appropriate, including the possibility of a lump sum per relocation to cover transfer costs.

      – When MS make full use of the lump sums available under the national programmes, additional financial support could be provided.

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/jun/eu-council-disembark.htm

    • La #marine_italienne sur le banc des accusés

      En octobre 2013, un bateau de pêche chargé de réfugiés syriens fait naufrage près de Lampedusa, île italienne proche de la Sicile. Si 212 personnes ont pu être sauvées, 26 corps ont été repêchés et environ 240 sont restées portés disparus dont une soixantaine d’enfants. Ce drame ne restera pas impuni.
      Un procès se tiendra en 2018 avec, sur le banc des accusés pour homicide involontaire et non-assistance à personnes en danger, des officiers de la marine italienne. C’est la première fois qu’un procès de ce type est lancé. Ce jour-là, un médecin syrien qui se trouvait à bord avec ses deux enfants -tous deux morts noyés- a appelé plusieurs fois au secours les garde-côtes italiens. Ceux-ci retransmettaient le relais à leurs confrères maltais et peu après lançaient un message signalant la situation aux navires se trouvant dans la zone. C’était le cas du navire Libra de la marine italienne, à moins d’une heure de navigation mais qui, au lieu de se précipiter, s’est éloigné en laissant intervenir les Maltais, ce qui prenait beaucoup plus de temps. Le bateau des migrants a fini par chavirer à 17h07. Les secours dont, le Libra, sont arrivés vers 18h00. Trop tard.

      https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/080337-000-A/la-marine-italienne-sur-le-banc-des-accuses

    • Bangladeshi migrants in Tunisia forced to return home, aid groups claim

      Relatives say more than 30 people stuck at sea told to go home or lose food and water.

      More than 30 migrants from Bangladesh who were trapped on a merchant ship off Tunisia for three weeks have been sent back to their home country against their will, according to relatives.

      They were among 75 migrants rescued on 31 May by the Maridive 601, an Egyptian tugboat that services offshore oil platforms, only to spend the next 20 days at sea near the Tunisian coast.

      The International Organization for Migration, an intergovernmental organisation linked to the United Nations, said the Bangladeshis “wished to return home”.

      But relatives and aid groups claimed that when a Bangladeshi envoy visited the boat the migrants were forced to accept their repatriation under the threat of having food, water and medical treatment being taken away.

      One relative told the Guardian: “When all the people were on the boat, they were told by the Bangladeshi embassy that if they didn’t agree to sign, they would not get any food or water any more. The people were afraid to die on the boat. The Bangladeshi embassy forced them to sign.”

      On 18 June, the 75 migrants, who included Egyptian, Moroccan and Sudanese people, were taken off the Maridive 601 and transferred to a Tunisian detention centre.

      The IOM confirmed that a few days later the first 17 individuals were returned to Bangladesh, and on 24 June, another 15 migrants were sent back.

      It said “more migrants will be travelling in the coming days, according to their decision”.

      The Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux (FTDES), an independent organisation that aims to defend economic and social rights, said: “We doubt that the decisions to return were made voluntarily by the migrants.

      “We have tried to visit the migrants in the reception centre in order to inquire about their wellbeing but despite making repeated inquiries and requests, the whereabouts of the detained migrants was not revealed.”

      Another relative said: “I spoke with my brother this morning in the centre. He is scared to be returned to Bangladesh, like all the people there. Nobody wants to return to Bangladesh; everyone who is returned is forced.”

      The IOM’s head of mission in Tunisia, Lorena Lando, rejected the accusations. “None of the migrants has been deported; [they] wished to return,” she said. “IOM does not do deportation, nor force anyone to return.”

      Lando said the IOM “did not have access” to the migrants until 19 June, after the Tunisian authorities allowed their disembarkation.

      She added: “Remaining at sea was not a solution either. It is up to the person to also apply for asylum if they fear persecution … or seek help to return home or take time to decide.”

      A spokesperson for Alarm Phone, a hotline service for migrants in distress at sea that was alerted to the ship’s plight by crew members, said: “The IOM refers to such deportations as voluntary returns but what is voluntary about telling survivors that they can leave their prison merely if they agree to be returned?

      “Do we really believe that these Bangladeshi people risked their lives to move to Libya and then to try to cross the Mediterranean, only to then be ‘voluntarily’ returned to Bangladesh?”

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/25/bangladeshi-migrants-in-tunisia-forced-to-return-home-aid-groups-claim

  • Report to the EU Parliament on #Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017

    A recent report by Frontex, the EU’s border agency, highlights the ongoing expansion of its activities with non-EU states.

    The report covers the agency’s cooperation with non-EU states ("third countries") in 2017, although it was only published this month.

    See: Report to the European Parliament on Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-ep-third-countries-coop-2017.pdf (pdf)

    It notes the adoption by Frontex of an #International_Cooperation_Strategy 2018-2020, “an integral part of our multi-annual programme” which:

    “guides the Agency’s interactions with third countries and international organisations… The Strategy identified the following priority regions with which Frontex strives for closer cooperation: the Western Balkans, Turkey, North and West Africa, Sub-Saharan countries and the Horn of Africa.”

    The Strategy can be found in Annex XIII to the 2018-20 Programming Document: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf (pdf).

    The 2017 report on cooperation with third countries further notes that Frontex is in dialogue with Senegal, #Niger and Guinea with the aim of signing Working Agreements at some point in the future.

    The agency deployed three Frontex #Liaison_Officers in 2017 - to Niger, Serbia and Turkey - while there was also a #European_Return_Liaison_Officer deployed to #Ghana in 2018.

    The report boasts of assisting the Commission in implementing informal agreements on return (as opposed to democratically-approved readmission agreements):

    "For instance, we contributed to the development of the Standard Operating Procedures with #Bangladesh and the “Good Practices for the Implementation of Return-Related Activities with the Republic of Guinea”, all forming important elements of the EU return policy that was being developed and consolidated throughout 2017."

    At the same time:

    “The implementation of 341 Frontex coordinated and co-financed return operations by charter flights and returning 14 189 third-country nationals meant an increase in the number of return operations by 47% and increase of third-country nationals returned by 33% compared to 2016.”

    Those return operations included Frontex’s:

    “first joint return operation to #Afghanistan. The operation was organised by Hungary, with Belgium and Slovenia as participating Member States, and returned a total of 22 third country nationals to Afghanistan. In order to make this operation a success, the participating Member States and Frontex needed a coordinated support of the European Commission as well as the EU Delegation and the European Return Liaison Officers Network in Afghanistan.”

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-report-third-countries.htm
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers
    #Balkans #Turquie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Afrique_du_Nord #Afrique_sub-saharienne #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Guinée #Sénégal #Serbie #officiers_de_liaison #renvois #expulsions #accords_de_réadmission #machine_à_expulsion #Hongrie #Belgique #Slovénie #réfugiés_afghans

    • EP civil liberties committee against proposal to give Frontex powers to assist non-EU states with deportations

      The European Parliament’s civil liberties committee (LIBE) has agreed its position for negotiations with the Council on the new Frontex Regulation, and amongst other things it hopes to deny the border agency the possibility of assisting non-EU states with deportations.

      The position agreed by the LIBE committee removes Article 54(2) of the Commission’s proposal, which says:

      “The Agency may also launch return interventions in third countries, based on the directions set out in the multiannual strategic policy cycle, where such third country requires additional technical and operational assistance with regard to its return activities. Such intervention may consist of the deployment of return teams for the purpose of providing technical and operational assistance to return activities of the third country.”

      The report was adopted by the committee with 35 votes in favour, nine against and eight abstentions.

      When the Council reaches its position on the proposal, the two institutions will enter into secret ’trilogue’ negotiations, along with the Commission.

      Although the proposal to reinforce Frontex was only published last September, the intention is to agree a text before the European Parliament elections in May.

      The explanatory statement in the LIBE committee’s report (see below) says:

      “The Rapporteur proposes a number of amendments that should enable the Agency to better achieve its enhanced objectives. It is crucial that the Agency has the necessary border guards and equipment at its disposal whenever this is needed and especially that it is able to deploy them within a short timeframe when necessary.”

      European Parliament: Stronger European Border and Coast Guard to secure EU’s borders: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190211IPR25771/stronger-european-border-and-coast-guard-to-secure-eu-s-borders (Press release, link):

      “- A new standing corps of 10 000 operational staff to be gradually rolled out
      - More efficient return procedures of irregular migrants
      - Strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries

      New measures to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard to better address migratory and security challenges were backed by the Civil Liberties Committee.”

      See: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-libe-report-frontex.pdf (pdf)

      The Commission’s proposal and its annexes can be found here: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-soteu-jha-proposals.htm

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/ep-new-frontex-libe.htm

  • UN experts: concern over EU’s attempts to seal borders, close protection space and disregard human rights and humanitarianism

    In September eight UN working groups, independent experts and special rapporteurs issued a statement highlighting serious concerns over the ongoing attempts to reform the EU’s migration and asylum systems. Their paper was addressed to the informal summit of EU heads of state and government in Salzburg in September, but remains relevant given the ongoing discussions in the EU on the Common European Asylum System and revamping of EU agencies such as Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

    The document was signed by the UN’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity; Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants; Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children.

    See: Joint communication of Special Procedures ahead of the informal summit of EU heads of state or government in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018 (OL OTH 64/2018, 18 September 2018, pdf): http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/oct/un-joint-communication-eu-migration-asylum-proposals-18-9-18.pdf

    Selected quotes:

    "We would like to comment on three particular proposals elaborated by the European Commission based on the European Council’s conclusions, which are of utmost concern from a human rights perspective, namely: the creation of #regional_disembarkation_platforms, the establishment of controlled centres, and the strengthening of the border police and coast guard.

    ...Outsourcing responsibility of disembarkation to third countries, in particular those with weak protection systems, only increases the risk of #refoulement and other human rights violations. As similar models have shown elsewhere, external disembarkation and processing centres do not provide durable solutions and result in numerous grave human rights violations, including breaches of the non-refoulement obligation, torture and ill-treatment, confinement amounting to arbitrary or indefinite detention, and violations of the right to life. Furthermore, processes should be established to ensure that relevant actors be held to account if they fail to meet international standards.”

    -----

    “We are deeply concerned that in truth, the above-mentioned three proposals which are being discussed in the context of the reform of the common migration and asylum system are aimed at sealing borders, closing the protection space in Europe, and disregarding human rights principles and humanitarian concerns as central aspects at stake. Moreover, we are concerned that these measures are being proposed as a means to leverage political gain in response to the worrying rise of anti-migration and xenophobic hate speeches and stances, as reflected by increased acts and discourses of #violence and racism against migrants in various member States. In this respect, we urge the European Commission to lead efforts to counter negative anti-immigration discourses both at the political and social level in order to facilitate and improve the reception and integration of migrants in Europe.”

    -----

    “The EU and its member States should adopt a more thoughtful approach, and seek constructive, long-term, sustainable solutions, instead of adopting counterproductive and ineffective security policies which result in the criminalization and stigmatization of migrants.”

    -----

    “It is high time for the EU to accept the impossibility of sealing borders and the perverse incentives and paradoxes created by the current system, as well as the inevitability and added benefits of mobility. The EU must invest in the overall development of a coherent and robust migration policy that fully integrates the human rights of migrants as enshrined in both international and regional law. Measures intended to prevent migration, accelerate returns, and seal borders are not the solution, and only respond to misguided security concerns over the protection of migrants.”

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/oct/un-sr-eu-migration.htm
    #ONU #fermeture_des_frontières #EU #UE #droits_humains #humanitarisme #Europe #réfugiés #asile #migrations #plateformes_de_désembarquement #contrôles_frontaliers #externalisation #push-back #droit_à_la_vie #hate_speech #xénophobie #racisme #mobilité #politique_migratoire
    ping @reka

  • Autour des #gardes-côtes_libyens... et de #refoulements en #Libye...

    Je copie-colle ici des articles que j’avais mis en bas de cette compilation (qu’il faudrait un peu mettre en ordre, peut-être avec l’aide de @isskein ?) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/705401

    Les articles ci-dessous traitent de :
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Méditerranée #push-back #refoulement #externalisation #frontières

    • Pour la première fois depuis 2009, un navire italien ramène des migrants en Libye

      Une embarcation de migrants secourue par un navire de ravitaillement italien a été renvoyée en Libye lundi 30 juillet. Le HCR a annoncé mardi l’ouverture d’une enquête et s’inquiète d’une violation du droit international.

      Lundi 30 juillet, un navire battant pavillon italien, l’Asso Ventotto, a ramené des migrants en Libye après les avoir secourus dans les eaux internationales – en 2012 déjà l’Italie a été condamnée par la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme pour avoir reconduit en Libye des migrants secourus en pleine mer en 2009.

      L’information a été donnée lundi soir sur Twitter par Oscar Camps, le fondateur de l’ONG espagnole Proactiva Open Arms, avant d’être reprise par Nicola Fratoianni, un député de la gauche italienne qui est actuellement à bord du bateau humanitaire espagnol qui sillonne en ce moment les côtes libyennes.

      Selon le quotidien italien La Repubblica, 108 migrants à bord d’une embarcation de fortune ont été pris en charge en mer Méditerranée par l’Asso Ventotto lundi 30 juillet. L’équipage du navire de ravitaillement italien a alors contacté le MRCC à Rome - centre de coordination des secours maritimes – qui les a orienté vers le centre de commandement maritime libyen. La Libye leur a ensuite donné l’instruction de ramener les migrants au port de Tripoli.

      En effet depuis le 28 juin, sur décision européenne, la gestion des secours des migrants en mer Méditerranée dépend des autorités libyennes et non plus de l’Italie. Concrètement, cela signifie que les opérations de sauvetage menées dans la « SAR zone » - zone de recherche et de sauvetage au large de la Libye - sont désormais coordonnées par les Libyens, depuis Tripoli. Mais le porte-parole du Conseil de l’Europe a réaffirmé ces dernières semaines qu’"aucun navire européen ne peut ramener des migrants en Libye car cela serait contraire à nos principes".

      Violation du droit international

      La Libye ne peut être considérée comme un « port sûr » pour le débarquement des migrants. « C’est une violation du droit international qui stipule que les personnes sauvées en mer doivent être amenées dans un ‘port sûr’. Malgré ce que dit le gouvernement italien, les ports libyens ne peuvent être considérés comme tels », a déclaré sur Twitter le député Nicola Fratoianni. « Les migrants se sont vus refuser la possibilité de demander l’asile, ce qui constitue une violation des accords de Genève sur les sauvetages en mer », dit-il encore dans le quotidien italien La Stampa.

      Sur Facebook, le ministre italien de l’Intérieur, Matteo Salvini, nie toutes entraves au droit international. « La garde-côtière italienne n’a ni coordonné, ni participé à cette opération, comme l’a faussement déclarée une ONG et un député de gauche mal informé ».

      Le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) a de son côté annoncé mardi 31 juillet l’ouverture d’une enquête. « Nous recueillons toutes les informations nécessaires sur le cas du remorqueur italien Asso Ventotto qui aurait ramené en Libye 108 personnes sauvées en Méditerranée. La Libye n’est pas un ‘port sûr’ et cet acte pourrait constituer une violation du droit international », dit l’agence onusienne sur Twitter.

      http://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/10995/pour-la-premiere-fois-depuis-2009-un-navire-italien-ramene-des-migrant

    • Nave italiana soccorre e riporta in Libia 108 migranti. Salvini: «Nostra Guardia costiera non coinvolta»

      L’atto in violazione della legislazione internazionale che garantisce il diritto d’asilo e che non riconosce la Libia come un porto sicuro. Il vicepremier: «Nostre navi non sono intervenute nelle operazioni». Fratoianni (LeU): «Ci sono le prove della violazione»

      http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/07/31/news/migranti_nave_italiana_libia-203026448/?ref=RHPPLF-BH-I0-C8-P1-S1.8-T1
      #vos_thalassa #asso_28

      Commentaire de Sara Prestianni, via la mailing-list de Migreurop:

      Le navire commerciale qui opere autour des plateformes de pétrole, battant pavillon italien - ASSO 28 - a ramené 108 migrants vers le port de Tripoli suite à une opération de sauvetage- Les premiers reconstructions faites par Open Arms et le parlementaire Fratoianni qui se trouve à bord de Open Arms parlent d’une interception en eaux internationales à la quelle a suivi le refoulement. Le journal La Repubblica dit que les Gardes Cotes Italiennes auraient invité Asso28 à se coordonner avec les Gardes Cotes Libyennes (comme font habituellement dans les derniers mois. Invitation déclinés justement par les ong qui opèrent en mer afin de éviter de proceder à un refoulement interdit par loi). Le Ministre de l’Interieur nie une implication des Gardes Cotes Italiens et cyniquement twitte “Le Garde cotes libyenne dans les derniers heures ont sauvé et ramené à terre 611 migrants. Les Ong protestent les passeurs font des affaires ? C’est bien. Nous continuons ainsi”

    • Départs de migrants depuis la Libye :

      Libya : outcomes of the sea journey

      Migrants intercepted /rescued by the Libyan coast guard

      Lieux de désembarquement :


      #Italie #Espagne #Malte

      –-> Graphiques de #Matteo_Villa, posté sur twitter :
      source : https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1036892919964286976

      #statistiques #chiffres #2016 #2017 #2018

      cc @simplicissimus

    • Libyan Coast Guard Takes 611 Migrants Back to Africa

      Between Monday and Tuesday, the Libyan Coast Guard reportedly rescued 611 migrants aboard several dinghies off the coast and took them back to the African mainland.

      Along with the Libyan search and rescue operation, an Italian vessel, following indications from the Libyan Coast Guard, rescued 108 migrants aboard a rubber dinghy and delivered them back to the port of Tripoli. The vessel, called La Asso 28, was a support boat for an oil platform.

      Italian mainstream media have echoed complaints of NGOs claiming that in taking migrants back to Libya the Italian vessel would have violated international law that guarantees the right to asylum and does not recognize Libya as a safe haven.

      In recent weeks, a spokesman for the Council of Europe had stated that “no European ship can bring migrants back to Libya because it is contrary to our principles.”

      Twenty days ago, another ship supporting an oil rig, the Vos Thalassa, after rescuing a group of migrants, was preparing to deliver them to a Libyan patrol boat when an attempt to revolt among the migrants convinced the commander to reverse the route and ask the help of the Italian Coast Guard. The migrants were loaded aboard the ship Diciotti and taken to Trapani, Sicily, after the intervention of the President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella.

      On the contrary, Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini has declared Tuesday’s operation to be a victory for efforts to curb illegal immigration. The decision to take migrants back to Africa rather than transporting them to Europe reflects an accord between Italy and Libya that has greatly reduced the numbers of African migrants reaching Italian shores.

      Commenting on the news, Mr. Salvini tweeted: “The Libyan Coast Guard has rescued and taken back to land 611 immigrants in recent hours. The NGOs protest and the traffickers lose their business? Great, this is how we make progress,” followed by hashtags announcing “closed ports” and “open hearts.”

      Parliamentarian Nicola Fratoianni of the left-wing Liberi and Uguali (Free and Equal) party and secretary of the Italian Left, presently aboard the Spanish NGO ship Open Arms, denounced the move.

      “We do not yet know whether this operation was carried out on the instructions of the Italian Coast Guard, but if so it would be a very serious precedent, a real collective rejection for which Italy and the ship’s captain will answer before a court,” he said.

      “International law requires that people rescued at sea must be taken to a safe haven and the Libyan ports, despite the mystification of reality by the Italian government, cannot be considered as such,” he added.

      The United Nations immigration office (UNHCR) has threatened Italy for the incident involving the 108 migrants taken to Tripoli, insisting that Libya is not a safe port and that the episode could represent a breach of international law.

      “We are collecting all the necessary information,” UNHCR tweeted.

      https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/santiago-anti-abortion-women-stabbed-chile-protest-a8469786.html
      #refoulements #push-back

    • Libya rescued 10,000 migrants this year, says Germany

      Libyan coast guards have saved some 10,000 migrants at sea since the start of this year, according to German authorities. The figure was provided by the foreign ministry during a debate in parliament over what the Left party said were “inhumane conditions” of returns of migrants to Libya. Libyan coast guards are trained by the EU to stop migrants crossing to Europe.

      https://euobserver.com/tickers/142821

    • UNHCR Flash Update Libya (9 - 15 November 2018) [EN/AR]

      As of 14 November, the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) has rescued/intercepted 14,595 refugees and migrants (10,184 men, 2,147 women and 1,408 children) at sea. On 10 November, a commercial vessel reached the port of Misrata (187 km east of Tripoli) carrying 95 refugees and migrants who refused to disembark the boat. The individuals on board comprise of Ethiopian, Eritrean, South Sudanese, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Somali nationals. UNHCR is closely following-up on the situation of the 14 individuals who have already disembarked and ensuring the necessary assistance is provided and screening is conducted for solutions. Since the onset, UNHCR has advocated for a peaceful resolution of the situation and provided food, water and core relief items (CRIs) to alleviate the suffering of individuals onboard the vessel.

      https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/unhcr-flash-update-libya-9-15-november-2018-enar
      #statistiques #2018 #chiffres

    • Rescued at sea, locked up, then sold to smugglers

      In Libya, refugees returned by EU-funded ships are thrust back into a world of exploitation.

      The Souq al Khamis detention centre in Khoms, Libya, is so close to the sea that migrants and refugees can hear waves crashing on the shore. Its detainees – hundreds of men, women and children – were among 15,000 people caught trying to cross the Mediterranean in flimsy boats in 2018, after attempting to reach Italy and the safety of Europe.

      They’re now locked in rooms covered in graffiti, including warnings that refugees may be sold to smugglers by the guards that watch them.


      This detention centre is run by the UN-backed Libyan government’s department for combatting illegal migration (DCIM). Events here over the last few weeks show how a hardening of European migration policy is leaving desperate refugees with little room to escape from networks ready to exploit them.

      Since 2014, the EU has allocated more than €300 million to Libya with the aim of stopping migration. Funnelled through the Trust Fund for Africa, this includes roughly €40 million for the Libyan coast guard, which intercepts boats in the Mediterranean. Ireland’s contribution to the trust fund will be €15 million between 2016 and 2020.

      Scabies

      One of the last 2018 sea interceptions happened on December 29th, when, the UN says, 286 people were returned to Khoms. According to two current detainees, who message using hidden phones, the returned migrants arrived at Souq al Khamis with scabies and other health problems, and were desperate for medical attention.


      On New Year’s Eve, a detainee messaged to say the guards in the centre had tried to force an Eritrean man to return to smugglers, but others managed to break down the door and save him.

      On Sunday, January 5th, detainees said, the Libyan guards were pressurising the still-unregistered arrivals to leave by beating them with guns. “The leaders are trying to push them [to] get out every day,” one said.

      https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/rescued-at-sea-locked-up-then-sold-to-smugglers-1.3759181

    • Migranti, 100 persone trasferite su cargo e riportate in Libia. Alarm Phone: “Sono sotto choc, credevano di andare in Italia”

      Dopo l’allarme delle scorse ore e la chiamata del premier Conte a Tripoli, le persone (tra cui venti donne e dodici bambini, uno dei quali potrebbe essere morto di stenti) sono state trasferite sull’imbarcazione che batte bandiera della Sierra Leone in direzione Misurata. Ma stando alle ultime informazioni, le tensioni a bordo rendono difficoltoso lo sbarco. Intanto l’ong Sea Watch ha salvato 47 persone e chiede un porto dove attraccare

      https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2019/01/21/migranti-100-persone-trasferite-su-cargo-e-riportate-in-libia-alarm-phone-sono-sotto-choc-credevano-di-andare-in-italia/4911794

    • Migrants calling us in distress from the Mediterranean returned to Libya by deadly ‘refoulement’ industry

      When they called us from the sea, the 106 precarious travellers referred to their boat as a white balloon. This balloon, or rubber dinghy, was meant to carry them all the way to safety in Europe. The people on board – many men, about 20 women, and 12 children from central, west and north Africa – had left Khoms in Libya a day earlier, on the evening of January 19.

      Though they survived the night at sea, many of passengers on the boat were unwell, seasick and freezing. They decided to call for help and used their satellite phone at approximately 11am the next day. They reached out to the Alarm Phone, a hotline operated by international activists situated in Europe and Africa, that can be called by migrants in distress at sea. Alongside my work as a researcher on migration and borders, I am also a member of this activist network, and on that day I supported our shift team who received and documented the direct calls from the people on the boat in distress.

      The boat had been trying to get as far away as possible from the Libyan coast. Only then would the passengers stand a chance of escaping Libya’s coastguard. The European Union and Italy struck a deal in 2017 to train the Libyan coastguard in return for them stopping migrants reaching European shores. But a 2017 report by Amnesty International highlighted how the Libyan authorities operate in collusion with smuggling networks. Time and again, media reports suggest they have drastically violated the human rights of escaping migrants as well as the laws of the sea.

      The migrant travellers knew that if they were detected and caught, they would be abducted back to Libya, or illegally “refouled”. But Libya is a dangerous place for migrants in transit – as well as for Libyan nationals – given the ongoing civil conflict between several warring factions. In all likelihood, being sent back to Libya would mean being sent to detention centres described as “concentration-camp like” by German diplomats.

      The odds of reaching Europe were stacked against the people on the boat. Over the past year, the European-Libyan collaboration in containing migrants in North Africa, a research focus of mine, has resulted in a decrease of sea arrivals in Italy – from about 119,000 in 2017 to 23,000 in 2018. Precisely how many people were intercepted by the Libyan coastguards last year is unclear but the Libyan authorities have put the figure at around 15,000. The fact that this refoulement industry has led to a decrease in the number of migrant crossings in the central Mediterranean means that fewer people have been able to escape grave human rights violations and reach a place of safety.
      Shifting responsibility

      In repeated conversations, the 106 people on the boat made clear to the Alarm Phone activists that they would rather move on and endanger their lives by continuing to Europe than be returned by the Libyan coastguards. The activists stayed in touch with them, and for transparency reasons, the distress situation was made public via Twitter.

      Around noon, the situation on board deteriorated markedly and anxiety spread. With weather conditions worsening and after a boy had fallen unconscious, the people on the boat expressed for the first time their immediate fear of dying at sea and demanded Alarm Phone to alert all available authorities.

      The activists swiftly notified the Italian coastguards. But both the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, and in turn the Maltese authorities, suggested it was the Libyan coastguard’s responsibility to handle the distress call. And yet, eight different phone numbers of the Libyan coastguards could not be reached by the activists.

      In the afternoon, the situation had come across the radar of the Italian media. When the Alarm Phone activists informed the people on board that the public had also been made aware of the situation by the media one person succinctly responded: “I don’t need to be on the news, I need to be rescued.”

      And yet media attention catapulted the story into the highest political spheres in Italy. According to a report in the Italian national newspaper Corriere della Sera, the prime minister, Giuseppe Conte, took charge of the situation, stating that the fate of the migrant boat could not be left to Alarm Phone activists. Conte instructed the Italian foreign intelligence service to launch rapid negotiations with the Libyan coastguards. It took some time to persuade them, but eventually, the Libyans were convinced to take action.

      In the meantime, the precarious passengers on the boat reported of water leaking into their boat, of the freezing cold, and their fear of drowning. The last time the Alarm Phone reached them, around 8pm, they could see a plane in the distance but were unable to forward their GPS coordinates to the Alarm Phone due to the failing battery of their satellite phone.
      Sent back to Libya

      About three hours later, the Italian coastguards issued a press release: the Libyans had assumed responsibility and co-ordinated the rescue of several boats. According to the press release, a merchant vessel had rescued the boat and the 106 people would be returned to Libya.

      According to the survivors and Médecins Sans Frontières who treated them on arrival, at least six people appeared to have drowned during the voyage – presumably after the Alarm Phone lost contact with them. Another boy died after disembarkation.

      A day later, on January 21, members of a second group of 144 people called the Alarm Phone from another merchant vessel. Just like the first group, they had been refouled to Libya, but they were still on board. Some still believed that they would be brought to Europe.

      Speaking on the phone with the activists, they could see land but it was not European but Libyan land. Recognising they’d been returned to their place of torment, they panicked, cried and threatened collective suicide. The women were separated from the men – Alarm Phone activists could hear them shout in the background. In the evening, contact with this second group of migrants was lost.

      During the evening of January 23, several of the women of the group reached out to the activists. They said that during the night, Libyan security forces boarded the merchant vessel and transported small groups into the harbour of Misrata, where they were taken to a detention centre. They said they’d been beaten when refusing to disembark. One of them, bleeding, feared that she had already lost her unborn child.

      On the next day, the situation worsened further. The women told the activists that Libyan forces entered their cell in the morning, pointing guns at them, after some of the imprisoned had tried to escape. Reportedly, every man was beaten. The pictures they sent to the Alarm Phone made it into Italian news, showing unhygienic conditions, overcrowded cells, and bodies with torture marks.

      Just like the 106 travellers on the “white balloon”, this second group of 144 people had risked their lives but were now back in their hell.
      Profiteering

      It’s more than likely that for some of these migrant travellers, this was not their first attempt to escape Libya. The tens of thousands captured at sea and returned over the past years have found themselves entangled in the European-Libyan refoulement “industry”. Due to European promises of financial support or border technologies, regimes with often questionable human rights records have wilfully taken on the role as Europe’s frontier guards. In the Mediterranean, the Libyan coastguards are left to do the dirty work while European agencies – such as Frontex, Eunavfor Med as well as the Italian and Maltese coastguards – have withdrawn from the most contentious and deadly areas of the sea.

      It’s sadly not surprising that flagrant human rights violations have become the norm rather than the exception. Quite cynically, several factions of the Libyan coastguards have profited not merely from Europe’s financial support but also from playing a “double game” in which they continue to be involved in human smuggling while, disguised as coastguards, clampdown on the trade of rival smuggling networks. This means that the Libyan coastguards profit often from both letting migrant boats leave and from subsequently recapturing them.

      The detention camps in Libya, where torture and rape are everyday phenomena, are not merely containment zones of captured migrants – they form crucial extortion zones in this refoulement industry. Migrants are turned into “cash cows” and are repeatedly subjected to violent forms of extortion, often forced to call relatives at home and beg for their ransom.

      Despite this systematic abuse, migrant voices cannot be completely drowned out. They continue to appear, rebelliously, from detention and even from the middle of the sea, reminding us all about Europe’s complicity in the production of their suffering.

      https://theconversation.com/migrants-calling-us-in-distress-from-the-mediterranean-returned-to-

    • Libya coast guard detains 113 migrants during lull in fighting

      The Libyan coast guard has stopped 113 migrants trying to reach Italy over the past two days, the United Nations said on Wednesday, as boat departures resume following a lull in fighting between rival forces in Libya.

      The western Libyan coast is a major departure point for mainly African migrants fleeing conflict and poverty and trying to reach Italy across the Mediterranean Sea with the help of human traffickers.

      Smuggling activity had slowed when forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive to take the capital Tripoli, home to Libya’s internationally recognized government.

      But clashes eased on Tuesday after a push by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) back by artillery failed to make inroads toward the center.

      Shelling audible in central Tripoli was less intense on Wednesday than on previous days. Three weeks of clashes had killed 376 as of Tuesday, the World Health Organization said.

      The Libyan coast guard stopped two boats on Tuesday and one on Wednesday, carrying 113 migrants in all, and returned them to two western towns away from the Tripoli frontline, where they were put into detention centers, U.N. migration agency IOM said.

      A coast guard spokesman said the migrants were from Arab and sub-Saharan African countries as well as Bangladesh.

      Human rights groups have accused armed groups and members of the coast guard of being involved in human trafficking.

      Officials have been accused in the past of mistreating detainees, who are being held in their thousands as part of European-backed efforts to curb smuggling. A U.N. report in December referred to a “terrible litany” of violations including unlawful killings, torture, gang rape and slavery.

      Rights groups have also accused the European Union of complicity in the abuse as Italy and France have provided boats for the coast guard to step up patrols. That move has helped to reduce migrant departures.

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/libya-coast-guard-detains-113-migrants-during-lull-in-fighting-idUSKCN1S73R

    • Judgement in Italy recognizes that people rescued by #Vos_Thalassa acted lawfully when opposed disembarkation in #Libya. Two men spent months in prison, as Italian government had wished, till a judge established that they had acted in legitimate defence.
      Also interesting that judge argues that Italy-Libya Bilateral agreement on migration control must be considered illegitimate as in breach of international, EU and domestic law.

      https://dirittopenaleuomo.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/GIP-Trapani.pdf

      Reçu via FB par @isskein :
      https://www.facebook.com/isabelle.saintsaens/posts/10218154173470834?comment_id=10218154180551011&notif_id=1560196520660275&n
      #justice

    • The Commission and Italy tie themselves up in knots over Libya

      http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-344-Commission-and-Italy-tie-themselves-up-in-knots-over-libya.pdf

      –-> analyse de #Yasha_Maccanico sur la polémique entre Salvini et la Commission quand il a déclaré en mars que la Commission était tout a fait d’accord avec son approche (le retour des migrants aux champs logiques), la Commission l’a démenti et puis a sorti la lettre de Mme. Michou (JAI Commission) de laquelle provenaient les justifications utilisées par le ministre, qui disait à Leggeri que la collaboration avec la garde côtière libyenne des avions européennes était legale. Dans la lettre, elle admit que les italiens et la mission de Frontex font des activités qui devrait être capable de faire la Libye, si sa zone SAR fuisse authentique et pas une manière pour l’UE de se débarrasser de ses obligations légales et humanitaires. C’est un acte de auto-inculpation pour l’UE et pour l’Italie.

    • Returned to War and Torture: Malta and Frontex coordinate push-back to Libya

      On Saturday, 14 March 2020, RCC Malta coordinated a push-back operation from the Maltese Search and Rescue (SAR) zone to Libya in cooperation with the EU border agency Frontex and the so-called Libyan coastguards.[1] Similar to the events we documented on 18 October 2019, the Maltese authorities instructed the so-called Libyan coastguards to enter a European SAR zone in order to abduct about 49 people and force them back to Libya.[2] Instead of complying with refugee and human rights conventions, the Maltese authorities coordinated a grave violation of international law and of the principle of non-refoulment, as the rescued must be disembarked in a safe harbour.[3] Clearly, Libya is not a safe harbour but a place of war and systemic human rights abuses. Every week, the Alarm Phone receives testimonies of torture, rape and other forms of violence against migrants detained in Libyan camps and prisons.

      On the same day, we alerted the Armed Forces of Malta to a second boat in distress in the Maltese SAR zone with 112 people on board.[4] Before their eventual rescue, the people spent about 48 hours at sea. Malta delayed the rescue for more than 18 hours, putting 112 lives at severe risk. Non-assistance, delays, and pushbacks are becoming the norm in the Central Mediterranean, causing trauma in survivors, disappearances and deaths, both at sea and in Libya.

      Europe continues to delegate border enforcement to the Libyan authorities to evade their responsibility to rescue the distressed to Europe. We hold Europe accountable for the abuses and suffering inflicted on migrants at sea and in Libya. We condemn the role of European institutions and member states, including Malta and Italy, in these human rights violations through bilateral agreements as well as the financing, equipping, and training of the so-called Libyan coastguards.

      Summary of the push-back by proxy case:

      On Saturday 14 March 2020, at 15:33h CET, the Alarm Phone received a distress call from 49 people, including one pregnant woman and three children, who were trying to escape from the war in Libya. They had left Tripoli the evening before on a white fiberglass boat. They shared their GPS position with us, which clearly showed them within the Maltese SAR zone (34° 26′ 39 ” N, 14° 07′ 86″ E, at 15:33h). The people on board told us that they had lost their engine and that water was entering the boat. We immediately informed RCC Malta and the Italian coastguard via email. We received updated GPS positions from the people in distress at 16:22h (34° 26 81′ N, 014° 08′ 56″ E) and at 17:07h (N 34° 27′ 12″, E 014° 09′ 37″), both confirming once more that they were drifting within the Maltese SAR zone.

      At 17:42h, RCC Malta confirmed via phone that they had sent two patrol boats for the two SAR events in the Maltese SAR zone to which we had alerted them: one for the boat of 49 people and another one for the rubber boat with 112 people on board. Soon after, at 17:45h, we talked to the 49 people on the boat who told us that they could see a boat heading in their direction. Unfortunately, the conversation broke off and we were not able to clarify further details. This was our last contact to the people in distress after which we could not reach them any longer. Since then, we have tried to obtain further details from RCC Malta, but they claim to not have any information.

      However, confidential sources have informed us that a Frontex aerial asset had spotted the migrant boat already at 6:00h when it was still in the contested Libyan SAR zone. At 18.04h, the Libyan coastguard vessel Ras Al Jadar intercepted the boat in the Maltese SAR zone at the position N34° 26’, E 14° 07’. This means that the European border agency Frontex, MRCC Rome as well as RCC Malta were all aware of this boat in distress and colluded with the Libyan authorities to enter Maltese SAR and intercept the migrant boat.

      On Sunday 15 March 2020, at 7:00h, we were called by relatives of the people on board who told us that the people in distress had just informed them that they had been abducted by a Libyan vessel from within the Maltese SAR zone and returned to Libya, where, according to their testimonies, they were imprisoned and battered. In the afternoon, we were called by the people who were on the boat, and they testified that before the push-back occurred they saw a helicopter circling above them. About 30 minutes later, according to their testimonies, a vessel of the so-called Libyan coastguard arrived on scene. The people stated that the Libyan officers behaved brutally toward them, beating them repeatedly. They also stated that they were prevented from filming and documenting these abuses as their phones were confiscated. Moreover, the people reported that they had travelled together with another boat, a white rubber boat with around 60 people on board (including 7 women and 1 woman with a nine-month-old infant). Also this second boat[5] was intercepted and returned to Libya and its passengers experienced similar forms of violence and abuse.

      https://alarmphone.org/en/2020/03/15/returned-to-war-and-torture/?post_type_release_type=post

  • True scale of UK role in torture and rendition after 9/11 revealed - Two damning reports reveal British intelligence’s treatment of terrorism suspects
    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/uk-torture-isc-report.htm

    “British intelligence agencies were involved in the torture and kidnap of terrorism suspects after 9/11, according to two reports by the parliamentary intelligence and security committee.
    The reports published on Thursday amount to one of the most damning indictments of UK intelligence, revealing links to torture and rendition were much more widespread than previously reported.

    While there was no evidence of officers directly carrying out physical mistreatment of detainees, the reports say the overseas agency MI6 and the domestic service MI5 were involved in hundreds of torture cases and scores of rendition cases.”

    See: True scale of UK role in torture and rendition after 9/11 revealed - Two damning reports reveal British intelligence’s treatment of terrorism suspects (The Guardian, link)

    See: Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament:

    Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010 (Press release, pdf)

    Report: Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: 2001–2010 (pdf)

    Detainee mistreatment and rendition; Current issues (Press release, pdf)

    Report: Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: Current Issues (pdf)

    See also: Tony Bunyan, Statewatch Director, speech to the European Parliament hearing in Brussels on 23 January 2006: On the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners - EU governments have colluded by turning a “blind eye”, by failing to ask any questions or exercising any control (pdf)

    And: Statewatch Observatory on “rendition”

  • EU leaders consider centers outside bloc to process refugees

    Draft conclusions for the European Council summit next week propose the creation of ‘disembarkation platforms.’

    European Council President Donald Tusk has proposed that EU leaders create “regional disembarkation platforms” outside the European Union, where officials could quickly differentiate between refugees in need of protection and economic migrants who would potentially face return to their countries of origin.

    The proposal is an effort to break the acute political crisis over migration and asylum that has bedeviled EU leaders since 2015 — and even threatened in recent days to topple the German government — even as the numbers of arrivals have plummeted since the peak of the crisis.

    The disembarkation platform concept — which officials said would have to be implemented in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) — could create a formal mechanism by which the EU can bridge the divide between hard-line leaders calling for tough border controls and those insisting that EU nations obey international law and welcome refugees in need of protection.

    But the idea could also open EU leaders to criticism that they are outsourcing their political problem by creating centers for people seeking entry in countries on the periphery of the bloc. Among the potential partner nations are Tunisia and Albania, but officials say it is far too soon to speculate.

    The idea to create such facilities was suggested in 2016 by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the strongest critic of the EU’s policies on migration — especially on the relocation of refugees across Europe.

    More recently, French President Emmanuel Macron has endorsed the idea, and on Sunday Italian Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero said Italy wants to officially put the idea on the table at the European Council summit.

    According to the draft guidelines, the new sites would “establish a more predictable framework for dealing with those who nevertheless set out to sea and are rescued in Search And Rescue Operations.”

    The conclusions state: “Such platforms should provide for rapid processing to distinguish between economic migrants and those in need of international protection, and reduce the incentive to embark on perilous journeys.”
    https://www.politico.eu/article/regional-disembarkation-platforms-eu-leaders-consider-camps-outside-bloc-to

    Nouveau #mots, nouvelle absurdité #disembarkation_platform...!!!
    #tri #migrations #migrants_économiques #réfugiés #catégorisation #hotspots #externalisation #novlangue
    #regional_disembarkation_platforms #Tunisie #Albanie #plateformes_régionales_de_désembarquement

    cc @reka @isskein @i_s_

    • European Council meeting (28 J une 2018) – Draft conclusions

      In order to establish a more predictable framework for dealing with those who nevertheless set out to sea and are rescued in Search And Rescue Operations, the European Council supports the development of the concept of regional disembarkation platforms in close cooperation with UNHCR and IOM. Such platforms should provide for rapid processing to distinguish between economic migrants and those in need of international protection , and reduce the incentive to embark on perilous journeys.

      https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/draftEucoConclusionsJune.pdf
      #HCR #OIM #IOM

    • Une idée qui vient de la Hongrie...

      From protest to proposal : Eastern Europe tries new migration tactic

      “Asylum procedures should be completed outside the EU in closed and protected hotspots before the first entry on the territory of the EU,” states Orbán’s plan. “Third countries should be supported in establishing a system of reception and management of migratory flows … which should foresee careful on-site screening of refugees and economic migrants,” reads Renzi’s.

      https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-slovakia-from-protest-to-propose-eastern-europe-tries-

    • La UE estudia instalar centros de clasificación de inmigrantes en el norte de África

      Un borrador de documento para la cumbre afirma que la idea podría facilitar «un procesamiento rápido que distinga entre migrantes económicos y refugiados»

      La Unión Europea estudia la idea de construir centros para el procesamiento de inmigrantes en el norte de África en un intento por disuadir a la gente de emprender viajes a través del Mediterráneo que puedan poner en riesgo su vida, según indica un documento al que ha tenido acceso The Guardian.

      El Consejo Europeo de líderes de la UE «apoya el desarrollo del concepto de plataformas de desembarque regional», según señala un borrador de conclusiones de la cumbre europea que se llevará a cabo la próxima semana.

      La UE quiere estudiar la viabilidad de instalar estos centros en el norte de África, donde comienza la mayoría de los viajes de los inmigrantes que quieren llegar a suelo europeo. «Estas plataformas podrían facilitar un procesamiento rápido que distinga entre migrantes económicos y aquellos que necesitan protección internacional, y así reducir los incentivos a embarcarse en viajes peligrosos», sostiene el documento.

      La inmigración es un tema prioritario en la agenda de la próxima cumbre de dos días que se iniciará el 28 de junio. Los líderes de la UE intentarán llegar a un consenso sobre cómo manejar la crisis de los miles de refugiados e inmigrantes que llegan a Europa cada mes.

      Los líderes de Alemania y Francia, Angela Merkel y Emmanuel Macron, se han reunido este martes cerca de Berlín para fijar una posición común respecto a la inmigración y la eurozona, en medio de los temores sobre el desmoronamiento del proyecto europeo.

      Antes de la reunión, el ministro de Hacienda francés, Bruno Le Maire, afirmó que Europa está «en proceso de desintegración». «Vemos Estados que se están cerrando, intentando encontrar soluciones nacionales a problemas que requieren soluciones europeas», señaló. Así, llamó a construir «un nuevo proyecto europeo sobre inmigración», así como sobre asuntos económicos y financieros «que consoliden a Europa en un mundo en el que Estados Unidos está a un lado, China al otro y nosotros quedamos atrapados en el medio».

      El ministro de Interior alemán, Horst Seehofer, de línea dura, está presionando a la canciller Angela Merkel para que diseñe un plan europeo para finales de mes. Alemania sigue siendo el país europeo que más solicitudes de asilo recibe. Si no hay avance a nivel europeo, Seehofer quiere que la policía de las fronteras alemanas comience a negar la entrada a los inmigrantes.

      No queda claro cómo se llevaría a la práctica la propuesta europea de «plataformas de desembarque regional», o dónde se instalarían.

      En 2016, la UE llegó a un acuerdo con Turquía que redujo drásticamente el flujo migratorio, pero al bloque le ha resultado más difícil trabajar con los gobiernos del norte de África, especialmente con Libia, punto de partida de la mayoría de las embarcaciones que intentan llegar a Europa por el Mediterráneo.

      La Comisión Europea ha rechazado la posibilidad de llegar a un acuerdo con Libia parecido al de Turquía, debido a la inestabilidad del país. Sin embargo, el anterior Gobierno de Italia pactó con las milicias y tribus libias y colaboró para reconstituir la guardia costera libia. Estas acciones han contribuido a reducir drásticamente el número de personas que intenta cruzar el Mediterráneo, pero los críticos han denunciado un aumento en las violaciones de los derechos humanos.

      Según el documento filtrado, la UE prefiere construir los centros en colaboración con ACNUR, la agencia de la ONU para los refugiados, y con la Organización Internacional para la Migración, otro organismo relacionado con la ONU que con anterioridad ha criticado la escasez de rutas legales que tienen los inmigrantes y refugiados africanos para llegar a Europa.

      https://www.eldiario.es/theguardian/UE-instalar-procesamiento-inmigrantes-Africa_0_783922573.html

    • Commentaire d’Emmanuel Blanchard, via la mailing-list Migreurop :

      Au contraire de ce que suggère le titre choisi par ce journaliste (article ci-dessous), la proposition de créer ces plateformes de débarquement n’est pas vraiment « étonnante » tant elle ressemble aux « #processings_centers » et autres « #centres_d'identification » dont les projets ressurgissent régulièrement depuis le début des années 2000. Il y a cependant des évolutions (ces centres étaient pensés pour cantonner les exilés avant qu’ils prennent la mer et pas pour débarquer les boat-people secourus en mer) et le danger se rapproche : maintenant que ces camps existent sous le nom de hotpsots dans les iles grecques, il apparaît possible de les étendre dans des pays extérieurs ayant besoin du soutien financier ou politique de l’UE.

      #camps #cpa_camps

    • Europe Pushes to Outsource Asylum, Again

      With Dublin reform stalled, European leaders began to cast around for new ideas to solve the ongoing political crisis on migration and settled on a recurring proposition: the creation of asylum processing centres beyond the (strengthened) borders of the European Union.

      What exactly is up for discussion remains unclear. The plans championed by various EU leaders are diverse, yet the details remain fuzzy. What they have in common is a near-universal focus on shifting responsibility for dealing with refugees and migrants upstream. The idea of external processing looks good on paper, particularly in demonstrating to skeptical voters that governments have control over migration flows. But leaders also hope that by reducing inflows to the European Union, they will face less pressure to compromise on sharing responsibility for asylum within the bloc.

      The devil is in the detail. Proposals to externalize the processing of asylum claims are not new, but have largely fallen flat. Previous leaders balked at the idea of such elaborate constructions, especially when confronted with their significant practical complications. But public pressure to further slow arrivals of refugee and migrant boats has mounted in many countries, and leaders feel compelled to find an agreement. The result is a debate on migration increasingly divorced from reality.

      But before sitting down to the negotiating table, EU leaders may want to reflect on the exact model they wish to pursue, and the tradeoffs involved. Critically, does the concept of “regional disembarkation platforms” set out in the draft European Council conclusions offer a potential solution?

      Key Design Questions

      From Austria’s so-called Future European Protection System, to the “centres of international protection in transit countries” suggested by Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, to an outlier idea from the Danish Prime Minister to create centres to host failed asylum seekers in “undesirable” parts of Europe —a variety of models for externalization have been floated in recent weeks.

      Several proposals also envisage the simultaneous creation of joint processing centres within the European Union, coupled with the use of reception centres that restrict residents’ freedom of movement. While it is still unclear how such a plan would unfold, this commentary focuses on the external dimension alone.

      Where Would People Be Stopped and Processed?

      The proposals differ regarding where in the journey they would stop migrants and potential asylum seekers. French President Emmanuel Macron has vaguely referred to centres in key transit countries, such as Niger, Libya, and Chad, as well as closer to regions of origin. Others have focused more squarely on the North African coast.

      Centres operating far away from the European Union would likely function as a form of resettlement, stopping people en route (or even prior to the journey), and offering selected individuals an additional channel of EU entry in hopes that this would discourage the use of smugglers. Indeed, nascent EU efforts to resettle refugees evacuated from Libya to Niger (under the Evacuation Transit Mechanism, or ETM), demonstrate how this might work. At the other extreme, the model championed by Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz would see migrants and refugees returned to “safe zones” in Africa, where they would stay, even after arriving at the external EU border.

      The latter concept is problematic under current EU and international law. By returning arrivals to third countries without giving them the opportunity to submit an asylum claim, governments would be likely to run afoul of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits signatories from the “collective expulsion of aliens.” European Court of Human Rights case law also precludes the pushback of migrants rescued by European boats while crossing the Mediterranean. Conversely, however, if migrants and potential asylum seekers are stopped before entering EU waters, and without the involvement of European-flagged vessels, then no EU Member State has formal legal responsibility.

      A framework for regional cooperation on the disembarkation of migrant boats—being developed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) —may offer a middle ground. While details are scarce, it seems likely that the proposal would focus first on the development of a system for determining who would rescue migrants crossing the Mediterranean, and where they would be landed. Absent consensus within the European Union on responsibility sharing for asylum claims, UNHCR would attempt to create a new framework for responsibility sharing with both Northern and Southern Mediterranean states on search and rescue. However, to prove palatable to partners, such a scheme would require strong EU support, not least through the creation of regional disembarkation centres across North Africa where migrants and refugees “pulled back” from their journey would be sent. This approach would sidestep the application of EU law. To be viable, the European Union would likely need to offer North African partner states some assurance of support, including resettling some of those found in need of protection (as with the Niger ETM).

      Who Would Do the Processing?

      Once asylum seekers are pulled back, there is the question of who would make determinations regarding their protection. There are three options.

      First, Member States’ own asylum agencies could adjudicate protection claims, as Macron has occasionally suggested. Aside from the logistical challenges of seconding officials outside Europe, the question quickly arises as to who would adjudicate which applications? Member States have very different asylum systems, which produce markedly different outcomes for applicants, and would need extensive coordination.

      As a result, there is growing interest in developing an EU asylum agency capable of undertaking assessments on behalf of Member States. This appears a neat solution. However, governments would have to agree joint procedures and standards for processing claims and have confidence in the decisions made by through a joint processing arrangement. This is, if anything, an option only in the long term, as it would be years before any such agency is operational.

      Should the regional disembarkation idea gain ground, the European Union would have no legal responsibility to undertake assessment. Most Member States would be likely to consider UNHCR a key partner to manage any external process. But doing so could require UNHCR to redeploy limited staff resources from existing resettlement operations or from pressing humanitarian situations elsewhere. Moreover, outsourcing to UNHCR could still raise the issue of trust and transferability of decisions. Many Member States remain reluctant to rely solely on UNHCR to select refugees for resettlement, preferring to send their own teams to do the final selection.

      What Happens Next?

      The issue of what happens to people after their protection claims are assessed remains at the crux of questions around the feasibility of external processing. Proposals here differ starkly.

      On the one hand, some proposals would allow those recognized as in need of protection to subsequently enter the European Union. This is the option that—even if the European Union has circumvented any legal responsibility—would be deemed necessary to host countries as it would give them assurance that they are not overly burdened with providing protection. But doing so would require Member States to agree on some sort of distribution system or quotas for determining who would be settled where—crashing back into a responsibility-sharing problem that has plagued the European Union.

      By contrast, proposals that would explicitly not allow entry to anyone who had attempted to travel to Europe via the Mediterranean, taking a page from Australia’s playbook, are meant to assuage fears that such centres would become magnets for new travellers. Those with protection needs brought to such centres would be settled in countries outside the bloc. The challenges with this model centre squarely on the difficulty finding a “safe” country that would allow the settlement of potentially unlimited number of protection beneficiaries. Neither is likely to be the case in any arrangements the European Union would seek to make with external countries.

      Finally, there is the troubling question of what to do with those denied status or resettlement in the European Union. While the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or another agency might be able to help facilitate voluntary return, some might not be able to return home or may have been denied resettlement but nonetheless have protection needs. They are at risk of becoming a population in limbo, with long-term implications for their well-being and for the host country.


      https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/europe-pushes-outsource-asylum-again
      #schéma #visualisation

    • "L’UE devrait demander à la Tunisie ou l’Algérie d’accueillir des migrants"

      Afin d’éviter toute complicité des ONG, #Stephen_Smith propose notamment une participation des pays du sud de la Méditerranée. « L’Europe se bat un peu la coulpe et a l’impression que tout est pour elle. Or, la Libye a beaucoup de pays voisins. Pourquoi n’a-t-on pas songé à demander le soutien de la Tunisie ou de l’Algérie ? Habituellement, en cas de naufrage, la règle veut que les voyageurs soient transportés vers la prochaine terre sûre. Et, à partir de la Libye, cette terre n’est pas l’Italie. »

      http://www.rts.ch/info/monde/9678271--l-ue-devrait-demander-a-la-tunisie-ou-l-algerie-d-accueillir-des-migran
      #Tunisie #Algérie

    • Macron y Pedro Sánchez proponen «centros cerrados de desembarco» para los inmigrantes que lleguen a Europa

      Con el apoyo de Pedro Sánchez, el presidente francés expone su apuesta para la gestión de las llegadas de migrantes a las costas del sur de Europa

      En estos centros se tratarían los expedientes de los demandantes de asilo o se tramitaría su devolución a los países de origen

      https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/Macron-propone-centros-desembarco-inmigrantes_0_785321746.html
      #Espagne

    • EU admits no African country has agreed to host migration centre

      The European Union’s most senior migration official has admitted that no north African country has yet agreed to host migrant screening centres to process refugee claims.

      Details of an EU plan to prevent migrants drowning at sea emerged on Thursday after Italy criticised the agenda of an emergency summit for not offering enough to help it cope with arrivals.

      Dimitris Avramopoulos, the European commissioner for migration, said the EU wanted to “intensify cooperation” with Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Niger and Morocco, as he announced the intention to create a “regional disembarkation scheme”.
      Malta’s ’barbaric’ finch traps ruled illegal by EU court
      Read more

      So far no African country had agreed to host screening centres, he confirmed. “It has to be discussed with these countries, he said. “An official proposal has not been put on the table.”

      The idea for offshore migrant processing centres remains sketchy, with numerous political, practical and legal questions unanswered. It remains unclear, for example, whether migrants on a rescue ship in European waters could be returned to a north African country.

      Tahar Cherif, the Tunisian ambassador to the EU said: “The proposal was put to the head of our government a few months ago during a visit to Germany, it was also asked by Italy, and the answer is clear: no!

      “We have neither the capacity nor the means to organise these detention centres. We are already suffering a lot from what is happening in Libya, which has been the effect of European action.”

      He said his country was facing enough problems with unemployment, without wishing to add to them while Niger said its existing centres taking migrants out of detention camps in Libya are already full.

      The idea for the centres was thrown into the mix of EU migration policy before a series of crucial summits on migration in the next week.

      About 10 EU leaders will meet in Brussels on Sunday in a hastily convened emergency meeting aimed at preventing the collapse of the German coalition government.

      But the Italian government has been angered by draft conclusions for the summit, which stress the need to counter “secondary movements” – an issue that affects Germany.

      Under EU rules, a member state usually has responsibility for asylum seekers who have arrived in its territory, a regulation that has put frontline states Italy and Greece under huge pressure.

      But claimants often move to a second EU state, seeking a faster decision or to unite with family members.

      So-called “secondary movements” is the issue driving a wedge between Germany’s ruling coalition. The Bavarian CSU party has set the chancellor, Angela Merkel, a deadline of two weeks to find a solution. The interior minister, Horst Seehofer, has threatened to send away migrants at the border – a breach of EU rules that threatens to unravel the common asylum system.

      Tensions are running high after Italy’s prime minister, Giuseppe Conte, said he was not ready to discuss secondary movements “without having first tackled the emergency of ‘primary movements’ that Italy has ended up dealing with alone”.

      Italy’s far-right interior minister, Matteo Salvini, said: “If anyone in the EU thinks Italy should keep being a landing point and refugee camp, they have misunderstood.”

      The election of a populist government in Italy, combined with tensions in Germany’s ruling coalition, has created a political storm over migration despite the sharp fall in arrivals. In the first six months of this year 15,570 people crossed into Italy, a 77% drop on last year.

      The European commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, reluctantly agreed to host the weekend summit to help Merkel, after her governing coalition came close to breaking point.

      Avramopoulos stressed that the summit would be about “consultations” to prepare the ground for decisions to be taken by all 28 EU leaders at a European council meeting next Thursday.

      Warning that the future of the EU’s border-free travel area was at stake, Avramopoulos said: “The European leadership of today will be held accountable in the eyes of future generations if we allow all these forces of populism to blow up what has been achieved”.

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/21/eu-admits-no-african-country-has-agreed-to-host-migration-centre
      #cpa_camps

    • IOM-UNHCR Proposal to the European Union for a Regional Cooperative Arrangement Ensuring Predictable Disembarkation and Subsequent Processing of Persons Rescued at Sea

      Approximately 40,000 refugees and migrants have arrived in Europe via maritime routes in 2018 to date. This is almost six times less than over the same period in 2016, following a peak in arrivals by sea in 2015. According to EUROSTAT, approximately 30 per cent of those arriving on the European shores were in need of international protection; moreover, some have faced extreme hardship and abuse at the hands of unscrupulous traffickers during the journey.

      Despite the reduced arrival rates, new challenges resulting from divergent EU Member State views have revealed a need to revisit regional arrangements to relieve front line states from having the sole responsibility for the disembarkation and further processing of people rescued at sea.

      IOM and UNHCR stand ready to support a common approach, and call on all countries in the Mediterranean region to come together to implement a predictable and responsible disembarkation mechanism in a manner that prioritizes human rights and safety first, delinked from the subsequent processing of status and related follow-up responsibilities, post-disembarkation, for those rescued in international waters.

      It is increasingly recognized that disembarkation cannot be the sole responsibility of one country or regional grouping. It should be a shared responsibility across the Mediterranean Basin, with due respect for the safety and dignity of all people on the move. A comprehensive approach is required to realize effective and sustainable responses.

      People on the move to and through the Mediterranean have different migratory status, with the majority of them not qualifying for international or subsidiary protection. Addressing the drivers of forced displacement and irregular migration needs to be given renewed attention through effective conflict-prevention and crisis settlement processes, strengthening good governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights efforts, stabilization and recovery, as well as poverty reduction.

      Priority efforts need to focus on strengthening protection capacities in regions of origin, including through developing sustainable asylum systems; providing sufficient needs-based support for humanitarian operations and adopting a development-oriented approach to assistance; as well as expanding opportunities for resettlement, family reunification and safe pathways for refugees which are currently well below existing needs and pledges being made. Efforts toward opening safe and regular pathways for migrants need also to be undertaken (family reunification, labour and education opportunities, humanitarian visas for vulnerable migrants).

      Against this background, with a focus on the immediate disembarkation concerns at hand, the current proposal for a regional disembarkation mechanism aims to ensure that:

      People rescued-at-sea in international waters are quickly disembarked in a predictable manner in line with international maritime law, in conditions that uphold respect for their rights including non-refoulement, and avoid serious harm or other risks;
      Responsible post-disembarkation processing, supported – as appropriate- by IOM and UNHCR, leads to rapid and effective differentiated solutions and reduces onward movement through an effective cooperative arrangement.

      Functioning of the mechanism is premised on a set of principles and common objectives:

      The effective functioning of maritime commerce requires ships’ masters to have full confidence in prompt and predictable disembarkation;
      Efforts to reduce loss of life at sea are maximized, in line with existing international obligations and frameworks, and saving lives remains the international community’s priority;
      Strengthened efforts to build the capacity of Coast Guards in Mediterranean countries (not just in Libya) to perform effective rescue operations in their respective SAR;
      National Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC) are able to carry out their work effectively for the purposes of search and rescue operations based on long- standing and effective practices to save lives;
      People rescued at sea in the Mediterranean are quickly disembarked in safe ports in a predictable manner in line with established rescue at sea arrangements and international maritime law, coordinated through the responsible MRCCs;
      Measures for cooperative arrangements to support States providing for disembarkation are well-established;
      The right to seek asylum is safeguarded, and the human rights of all individuals such as non-refoulement are respected, including the right not to be disembarked in or transferred to a place where there is a risk of persecution, torture, or other serious harm;
      Efforts to address human smuggling and trafficking are reinvigorated, including measures to ensure protection and/or referrals for victims of trafficking and ensuring the effective prosecution of those involved in / or facilitating human trafficking or smuggling;
      Rescue at sea capacity coordinated by effective MRCCs that operate in accordance with international law is reinforced.

      As such, the proposal does not affect existing legal norms and responsibilities applicable under international law (Note 1) Rather it seeks to facilitate their application in accordance with a regional collaborative approach and the principle of international cooperation. This proposal relies on functional arrangements for intra-EU solidarity in managing all consequences of rescue, disembarkation and processing. It also relies on operational arrangements which would need to be sought and formalised through a set of understandings among all concerned States.

      https://www.iom.int/news/iom-unhcr-proposal-european-union-regional-cooperative-arrangement-ensuring-pre

      Question : c’est quoi la différence entre la proposition IOM/HCR et la proposition UE ?

    • THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY OF DISEMBARKATION OPTIONS

      This note presents a first assessment of the legal and practical feasibility of the three different scenarios on disembarkation presented at the Informal Working Meeting of 24 June 2018. Under international maritime law, people rescued at sea must be disembarked at a place of safety. International law sets out elements of what a place of safety can be and how it can be designated, without excluding the possibility of having regional arrangements for disembarkation.


      https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/migration-disembarkation-june2018_en.pdf
      #scénario

    • #Palerme :
      ❝La Commission régionale de l’Urbanisme a rejeté le projet de pré-faisabilité du « #hotspot » à Palerme, confirmant l’avis du Conseil municipal de Palerme. L’avis de la Commission régionale reste technique. Le maire de Palerme a rappelé que "la ville de Palerme et toute sa communauté sont opposés à la création de centres dans lesquels la dignité des personnes est violée (...). Palerme reste une ville qui croit dans les valeurs de l’accueil, de la solidarité et des rencontres entre les peuples et les cultures, les mettant en pratique au quotidien. En cela, notre « non » à l’hotspot n’est pas et ne sera pas seulement un choix technique, mais plutôt un choix relatif à des principes et des valeurs".
      > Pour en savoir plus (IT) : http://www.palermotoday.it/politica/hotspot-zen-progetto-bocciato-regione.html

      –-> Reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop

    • Ne dites pas que ce sont des #camps !

      Les camps devraient être la solution. C’est en Afrique, peut-être en Libye ou au Niger, que les migrants seront arrêtés avant qu’ils puissent commencer leur dangereux voyage en mer vers l’Europe. Ainsi l’a décidé l’UE. Des camps attendront également les réfugiés qui réussiraient toutefois à arriver dans un pays de l’UE. Des camps sur le sol européen. Où seront-ils établis ? Cela n’est pas encore défini, mais ce seront des installations fermées et surveillées parce que les détenus devront être « enregistrés » et les personnes non autorisées seront expulsées. Ils ne pourront pas s’enfuir.

      L’intérêt pour les camps concerne également les responsables politiques allemands. Le gouvernement allemand veut élargir le no man’s land à la frontière germano-autrichienne afin que les réfugiés puissent être arrêtés avant d’entrer officiellement en Allemagne et avoir ainsi droit à une procédure d’asile régulière. Une « fiction de non-entrée » est créée, comme le stipule précisément l’accord. Un État qui magouille. Pendant ce temps, la chancelière Angela Merkel a déclaré que personne ne sera détenu plus de quarante-huit heures, même dans le no man’s land. Il reste encore à voir si l’Autriche y accédera. Le plan est pour l’instant plus un fantasme qu’une politique réalisable, ce qui est bien pire. Bien sûr, tous ces centres fermés de rassemblement de migrants ne peuvent pas être appelés camps. Cela évoquerait des images effrayantes : les camps de concentration nazis, le système des goulags soviétiques, les camps de réfugiés palestiniens de plusieurs générations, le camp de détention de Guantánamo.

      Non, en Allemagne, ces « non-prisons » devraient être appelées « centres de transit ». Un terme amical, efficace, pratique, comme la zone de transit d’un aéroport où les voyageurs changent d’avion. Un terme inventé par les mêmes personnes qui désignent le fait d’échapper à la guerre et à la pauvreté comme du « tourisme d’asile ». Les responsables politiques de l’UE sont encore indécis quant à la terminologie de leurs camps. On a pu lire le terme de « centres de protection » mais aussi celui de « plateformes d’atterrissage et de débarquement », ce qui fait penser à une aventure et à un voyage en mer.

      Tout cela est du vernis linguistique. La réalité est que l’Europe en est maintenant à créer des camps fermés et surveillés pour des personnes qui n’ont pas commis de crime. Les camps vont devenir quelque chose qui s’inscrit dans le quotidien, quelque chose de normal. Si possible dans des endroits lointains et horribles, si nécessaire sur place. Enfermer, compter, enregistrer.

      La facilité avec laquelle tout cela est mis en œuvre est déconcertante. Deux ans seulement après que le public européen a condamné l’Australie pour ses camps brutaux de prisonniers gérés par des sociétés privées sur les îles de Nauru et Manus, dans l’océan Pacifique, nous sommes prêts à abandonner nos inhibitions. Pourquoi ne pas payer les Libyens pour intercepter et stocker des personnes ?

      Derrière le terme allemand « Lager » (« camp ») se cache un ancien mot correspondant à « liegen », qui signifie « être allongé ». Les camps sont ainsi faits pour se reposer. Aujourd’hui, le terme de « camp » implique quelque chose de temporaire : un camp n’est que pour une courte période, c’est pourquoi il peut aussi être rustique, comme un camp de vacances pour les enfants ou un dortoir. Des camps d’urgence sont mis en place après des catastrophes, des inondations, des glissements de terrain, des guerres. Ils sont là pour soulager les souffrances, mais ne doivent pas être permanents.

      Si les responsables politiques participent activement à l’internement de personnes dans des camps en l’absence de catastrophe, alors il s’agit d’autre chose. Il s’agit de contrôle, d’#ordre, de #rééducation, de #domination. Les puissances coloniales tenaient des camps, depuis les camps de barbelés des Britanniques au Kenya jusqu’aux camps de Héréros dans le Sud-Ouest africain. C’est dans des camps que les États-Unis ont enfermé des Américains d’origine japonaise pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les responsables de ces camps n’avaient pas pour préoccupation le logement, mais bien la garde et la gestion de « personnes problématiques ».

      Dans de tels camps, la #violence extrême et la #déshumanisation des détenus allaient et vont généralement de pair avec une gestion froide. Exploiter un camp nécessite de l’#organisation. La technologie de #contrôle à distance aide le personnel à commettre des atrocités et transforme des gens ordinaires en criminels. Dans son essai controversé « Le siècle des camps », le regretté sociologue #Zygmunt_Bauman qualifie le camp de symptôme de #modernité. Pour lui, l’association d’une #exclusion_brutale et d’une #efficacité dans l’ordre semblable à celle d’un jardinier est une caractéristique de notre époque.

      Que Bauman fasse des camps de concentration nazis un « distillat » d’un problème majeur et moderne pour sa thèse lui a justement valu des critiques. Il ignore la singularité de l’Holocauste. Contrairement aux camps coloniaux, les camps de concentration étaient en effet des camps d’extermination qui n’avaient plus pour fonction d’apprêter des groupes ou de les rééduquer, ni même de les dissuader. Il s’agissait de « violence pour elle-même », comme l’écrit le sociologue #Wolfgang_Sofsky, de folie de la #pureté et d’éradication des personnes #indésirables.

      L’Europe croit être à l’abri de cette folie. Pour les gouvernants allemands, le slogan « Plus jamais de camps en Allemagne » est un slogan ridicule parce qu’il évoque des images qui n’ont rien à voir avec le présent. Dans les différents camps de migrants en Europe et à l’extérieur, il n’est certes pas question d’une extermination mais « seulement » de contrôle de l’accès et de #dissuasion. C’est ce dernier objectif qui est explicitement recherché : répandre dans le monde l’idée de camps de l’horreur au lieu du paradis européen.

      Mais il n’y a pas de raison de maintenir la sérénité. L’analyse de Zygmunt Bauman parlait de la mince couche de #civilisation par-dessus la #barbarie. La leçon tirée de l’expérience des camps du XXe siècle est la suivante : « Il n’y a pas de société ordonnée sans #peur et sans #humiliation ». La #pensée_totalitaire peut à nouveau prospérer, même dans les sociétés apparemment démocratiques.

      https://www.tdg.ch/monde/europe/dites-camps/story/31177430
      #totalitarisme

      Et ce passage pour lequel je suis tentée d’utiliser le tag #frontières_mobiles (#Allemagne et #Autriche) :

      L’intérêt pour les camps concerne également les responsables politiques allemands. Le gouvernement allemand veut élargir le no #man’s_land à la frontière germano-autrichienne afin que les réfugiés puissent être arrêtés avant d’entrer officiellement en Allemagne et avoir ainsi droit à une procédure d’asile régulière. Une « #fiction_de_non-entrée » est créée, comme le stipule précisément l’accord.

      Et sur la question de la #terminologie (#mots #vocabulaire) :

      Bien sûr, tous ces #centres_fermés de rassemblement de migrants ne peuvent pas être appelés camps. Cela évoquerait des images effrayantes : les camps de concentration nazis, le système des goulags soviétiques, les camps de réfugiés palestiniens de plusieurs générations, le camp de détention de Guantánamo.

      Non, en Allemagne, ces « #non-prisons » devraient être appelées « #centres_de_transit ». Un terme amical, efficace, pratique, comme la zone de transit d’un aéroport où les voyageurs changent d’avion. Un terme inventé par les mêmes personnes qui désignent le fait d’échapper à la guerre et à la pauvreté comme du « #tourisme_d’asile ». Les responsables politiques de l’UE sont encore indécis quant à la terminologie de leurs camps. On a pu lire le terme de « #centres_de_protection » mais aussi celui de « #plateformes_d’atterrissage_et_de_débarquement », ce qui fait penser à une aventure et à un voyage en mer.

      Tout cela est du #vernis_linguistique. La réalité est que l’Europe en est maintenant à créer des camps fermés et surveillés pour des personnes qui n’ont pas commis de crime. Les camps vont devenir quelque chose qui s’inscrit dans le quotidien, quelque chose de normal. Si possible dans des endroits lointains et horribles, si nécessaire sur place. Enfermer, compter, enregistrer.

      #shopping_de_l'asile #normalisation
      #cpa_camps

    • L’#Autriche veut proscrire toute demande d’asile sur le territoire de l’Union européenne

      A la veille d’une réunion, jeudi, entre les ministres de l’intérieur de l’UE sur la question migratoire, Vienne déclare vouloir proposer un changement des règles d’asile pour que les demandes soient étudiées hors d’Europe.

      https://mobile.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2018/07/10/l-autriche-veut-proscrire-toute-demande-d-asile-sur-le-territoire-de-

    • Record deaths at sea: will ‘regional disembarkation’ help save lives?
      ❝What is the aim of European policy on Mediterranean migration?

      Europe’s strategic ambition is clear: reduce the number of people who embark on journeys across the Mediterranean by boat. The more European countries struggle to share responsibility for those who are rescued at sea and brought to Europe, the stronger the desire to dissuade migrants from getting on a boat in the first place. Moreover, stemming the departures is said to be the only way of reducing the death toll.

      The challenge, as the European Council put it, is to ‘eliminate the incentive to embark’ on journeys across the Mediterranean. And the new migration agreement proposes a solution: setting up ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ outside the European Union. The logic is that if people rescued at sea are sent back to the coast they left, nobody will take the risk and pay the cost of getting on smugglers’ boats.
      Would this even work?

      Addressing the challenges of irregular migration is truly difficult. Still, it is baffling how the proposal for regional disembarkation platforms is embroiled in contradictions. The agreement itself is scant on specifics, but the challenges will surface as the policy makers have to make key decisions about how these platforms would work.

      First, will they be entry points for seeking asylum in Europe? The agreement suggests that the platforms might play this role. But if the platforms are entry points to the European asylum procedure, they will attract thousands of refugees who currently have no other option to apply for asylum in Europe than paying smugglers to set out to sea.

      This scenario raises a second question: what will be the possible ways of accessing the platforms? If they are reserved for refugees who have paid smugglers and are rescued at sea, access to protection will be just as reliant on smugglers as it is today. But if anyone can come knocking on the gate to the platforms, without having to be rescued first, the asylum caseload would swell. Such an outcome would be unacceptable to EU member states. As a recent EC note remarked, ‘to allow individuals to “apply” for asylum outside the EU […] is currently neither possible nor desirable.

      These two questions lay out the basic scenarios for how the regional disembarkation platforms would operate. Thinking through these scenarios it’s not clear if these platforms can ever be workable. Moreover, putting these platforms in place directly contradicts the European Council’s stated objectives:

      – dissuading smuggling journeys
      – distinguishing individual cases in full respect of international law
      – not creating a pull factor

      How does this relate to broader EU policies on migration?

      In some way, regional disembarkation platforms are a logical next step along the course the EU has been pursuing for years now. To stop refugees and other migrants from reaching its shores, the EU has been using a multi-pronged approach. On the one hand, the bloc has increased the use of aid to tackle the ‘root causes’ of migration – the logic being that if potential migrants are given other opportunities (e.g. skills training), they will be deterred from leaving. Similarly, information campaigns targeting aspiring migrants seek to deter people from setting out on dangerous journeys.

      Another major focus has been that of externalisation of border management – basically shifting border management to countries outside the EU: a key component of the EU-Turkey Deal is Turkey agreeing to take back refugees who crossed into Greece. Externalisation serves two purposes: keeping migrants physically out of Europe, but also as a deterrence measure sending potential migrants the implicit message that it won’t be easy to come to Europe.

      Regional disembarkation platforms are part of this process of externalisation. But there are key differences that make this proposal more extreme than policies pursued so far. Other externalization measures have aimed at preventing potential asylum seekers from reaching the point where they become eligible to launch a claim in Europe. The platforms will apparently serve a different role, by enabling the physical return of asylum seekers who have become Europe’s responsibility after being rescued by European ships in international waters.
      What do we know about efforts to deter irregular migration?

      The dim outlook for regional disembarkation platforms reflects more general limitations of deterrence measures in migration policy. Using decades worth of data, Michael Clemens and colleagues have shown that along the US-Mexico border greater deterrence and enforcement efforts have only reduced irregular migration when accompanied by greater legal migration pathways. Research by ODI has shown that information about deterrence measures and anti-migration messages rarely featured in migrant decision-making process. We will explore this further in our upcoming MIGNEX research project, which includes large-scale analyses of the drivers of migration in ten countries of origin and transit.
      Blocking access to asylum is not a life-saving measure

      The European Council presents regional disembarkation platforms as a strategy for ‘preventing tragic loss of life’. The irony of this argument is that these platforms will only deter sea crossings if they are dead ends where people who are rescued at sea are barred from seeking asylum in Europe. It is difficult to see how such a setup would be legally feasible, or indeed, ‘in line with our principles and values’, as the Council states.

      If the legal obstacles were overcome, there may indeed be fewer deaths at sea. But some of the deaths would simply occur out of sight instead. Refugees flee danger. Blocking access to seeking asylum puts more lives at risk and cannot be justified as a measure to save lives at sea.

      For now, the European Council glosses over the dilemmas that the regional disembarkation platforms will create. Facing the realities of the situation would not make perfect solutions appear, but it would enable an open debate in search of a defensible and effective migration policy.


      $https://blogs.prio.org/2018/07/record-deaths-at-sea-will-regional-disembarkation-help-save-lives

    • Austrian Presidency document: “a new, better protection system under which no applications for asylum are filed on EU territory”

      A crude paper authored by the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the EU and circulated to other Member States’s security officials refers disparagingly to “regions that are characterised by patriarchal, anti-freedom and/or backward-looking religious attitudes” and calls for “a halt to illegal migration to Europe” and the “development of a new, better protection system under which no applications for asylum are filed on EU territory,” with some minor exceptions.

      See: Austrian Presidency: Informal Meeting of COSI, Vienna, Austria, 2-3 July 2018: Strengthening EU External Border Protection and a Crisis-Resistant EU Asylum System (pdf): http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/EU-austria-Informal-Meeting-%20COSI.pdf

      The document was produced for an ’Informal Meeting of COSI’ (the Council of the EU’s Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security) which took place on 2 and 3 July in Vienna, and the proposals it contains were the subject of numerous subsequent press articles - with the Austrian President one of the many who criticised the government’s ultra-hardline approach.

      See: Austrian president criticises government’s asylum proposals (The Local, link); Austrian proposal requires asylum seekers to apply outside EU: Profil (Reuters, link); Right of asylum: Austria’s unsettling proposals to member states (EurActiv, link)

      Some of the proposals were also discussed at an informal meeting of the EU’s interior ministers on Friday 13 July, where the topic of “return centres” was also raised. The Luxembourg interior minister Jean Asselborn reportedly said that such an idea “shouldn’t be discussed by civilized Europeans.” See: No firm EU agreement on Austrian proposals for reducing migration (The Local, link)

      The Austrian Presidency paper proposes:

      "2.1. By 2020

      By 2020 the following goals could be defined:

      Saving as many human lives as possible;
      Clear strengthening of the legal framework and the operational capabilities of FRONTEX with respect to its two main tasks: support in protecting the Union’s external border and in the field of return;
      Increasing countering and destruction of people smugglers’ and human traffickers‘ business models;
      Significant reduction in illegal migration;
      More sustainable and more effective return measures as well as establishment of instruments that foster third countries’ willingness to cooperate on all relevant aspects, including the fight against people smuggling, providing protection and readmission;
      Development of a holistic concept for a forward-looking migration policy (in the spirit of a “whole of government approach“) and a future European protection system in cooperation with third countries that is supported by all and does not overburden all those involved – neither in terms of resources nor with regard to the fundamental rights and freedoms they uphold.

      2.2. By 2025

      By 2025 the following goals could be realised:

      Full control of the EU’s external borders and their comprehensive protection have been ensured.
      The new, better European protection system has been implemented across the EU in cooperation with third countries; important goals could include:
      no incentives anymore to get into boats, thus putting an end to smuggled persons dying in the Mediterranean;
      smart help and assistance for those in real need of protection, i.e. provided primarily in the respective region;
      asylum in Europe is granted only to those who respect European values and the fundamental rights and freedoms upheld in the EU;
      no overburdening of the EU Member States’ capabilities;
      lower long-term costs;
      prevention of secondary migration.
      Based on these principles, the EU Member States have returned to a consensual European border protection and asylum policy.”

      And includes the following statements, amongst others:

      “...more and more Member States are open to exploring a new approach. Under the working title “Future European Protection System” (FEPS) and based on an Austrian initiative, a complete paradigm shift in EU asylum policy has been under consideration at senior officials’ level for some time now. The findings are considered in the “Vienna Process” in the context of which the topic of external border protection is also dealt with. A number of EU Member States, the EU Commission and external experts contribute towards further reflections and deliberations on these two important topics.”

      “...ultimately, there is no effective EU external border protection in place against illegal migration and the existing EU asylum system does not enable an early distinction between those who are in need of protection and those who are not.”

      “Disembarkment following rescue at sea as a rule only takes place in EU Member States. This means that apprehensions at sea not only remain ineffective (non-refoulement, examination of applications for asylum), but are exploited in people smugglers’ business models.”

      “Due to factors related to their background as well as their poor perspectives, they [smuggled migrants] repeatedly have considerable problems with living in free societies or even reject them. Among them are a large number of barely or poorly educated young men who have travelled to Europe alone. Many of these are particularly susceptible to ideologies that are hostile to freedom and/or are prone to turning to crime.

      As a result of the prevailing weaknesses in the fields of external border protection and asylum, it is to be expected that the negative consequences of past and current policies will continue to be felt for many years to come. As experience with immigration from regions that are characterised by patriarchal, anti-freedom and/or backward-looking religious attitudes has shown, problems related to integration, safety and security may even increase significantly over several generations.”

      See: Austrian Presidency: Informal Meeting of COSI, Vienna, Austria, 2-3 July 2018: Strengthening EU External Border Protection and a Crisis-Resistant EU Asylum System (pdf)

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/eu-austrian-pres-asylum-paper.htm

    • Libya rejects EU plan for refugee and migrant centres

      Blow to Italy as Tripoli snubs proposal to set up processing centres in Africa

      Libya has rejected a EU plan to establish refugee and migrant processing centres in the country, adding that it would not be swayed by any financial inducements to change its decision.

      The formal rejection by the Libyan prime minister, Fayez al-Sarraj, is a blow to Italy, which is regarded as being close to his Tripoli administration.

      In June, Italy proposed reception and identification centres in Africa as a means of resolving divisions among European governments.

      The impasse came as the EU said it was willing to work as a temporary crisis centre to oversee the distribution of refugees and migrants from ships landing in Europe from Libya. Italy has said it is not willing to open its ports and may even reject those rescued by the EU Sophia search and rescue mission, a position that has infuriated other EU states.

      Speaking to the German newspaper Bild, Serraj said: “We are absolutely opposed to Europe officially wanting us to accommodate illegal immigrants the EU does not want to take in.”

      He dismissed accusations that Libya’s coastguard had shot at aid workers in ships trying to rescue people from the Mediterranean.

      “We save hundreds of people off the coast of Libya every day – our ships are constantly on the move,” he said. In practice, Libya is already running detention camps, largely as holding pens, but they are not run as EU processing centres for asylum claims.

      European foreign ministers agreed at a meeting on Monday to do more to train the Libyan coastguard by setting up the EU’s own training team inside Libya.

      The European parliament president, Antonio Tajani, said after a trip to Niger, one of the chief funnels for people into Libya, that the EU needed to plough more money into the Sahel region to reduce the need to leave the area. He said the number of people reaching Libya from Niger was collapsing.

      Tajani said: “Until 2016, 90% of irregular migrants travelled through the Niger to Libya and Europe. In just two years, Niger reduced migration flows by 95%, from over 300,000 to about 10,000 in 2018.”

      He said he would host a European conference in Brussels in October to support democratic elections in Libya scheduled for December.

      At the same time, Italy is to host a further conference in Rome in September seen as a follow-on to a conference held in May by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, that led to a commitment to hold elections this year.

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/20/libya-rejects-eu-plan-for-migrant-centres?CMP=Share_iOSApp_OtherSpeakin

    • UNHCR ed OIM discutono con la Commissione europea sulle piattaforme di sbarco, ma gli stati dicono no.

      Lunedì 30 luglio si svolgerà a Ginevra un incontro di rappresentanti dell’UNHCR e dell’OIM con la Commissione Europea per discutere sulle piattaforme di sbarco che Bruxelles vorrebbe imporre nei paesi di transito, come gli stati nordafricani, e negli stati di sbarco, soprattutto in Italia. Per selezionare rapidamente migranti economici e richiedenti asilo, e dunque procedere al respingimento immediato dei primi, senza alcuna garanzia di difesa, ed all’avvio delle procedure di asilo, per gli altri, senza alcuna garanzia di resettlement o di relocation ( ricollocazione) in un paese diverso da quello di primo ingresso. La Commissione dichiara che, soltanto dopo avere trovato un “approccio comune a livello europeo “, si rivolgeranno proposte ai paesi terzi. Gli stati nordafricani hanno però respinto in blocco questa proposta, e le autorità locali dei paesi di primo ingresso più interessati dagli sbarchi, confernano la loro opposizione a nuovi Hotspot. Le risorse previste per questa esternalizzazione delle frontiere sono ridicole. Per non parlare dei costi in termini di vite e di sfregio dei diritti umani.

      Un progetto che si salda strettamente con l’incremeno degli aiuti alla sedicente Guardia costiera “libica”, alla quale si affida già adesso, nella prassi quotidiana, un numero sempre più elevato di intercettazioni in acque internazionali, di fatto respingimenti collettivi, perchè realizzati con il coordinamento e l’assistenza di unità militari della Marina italiana che ha una base a Tripoli, nell’ambito della missione Nauras. Intanto la accresciuta assistenza italiana alla Marina ed alla Guardia costiera di Tripoli rischia di contribuire all’inasprimento del conflitto tra le diverse milizie ed allontana le probabilità di una reale pacificazione, premessa indispensabile per lo svolgimento delle elezioni. Le stesse milizie che continuano a trattenere in Libia, in condizioni disumane, centinaia di migliaia di persone.

      Dietro la realizzazione delle “piattaforme di sbarco” in Nordafrica, proposte anche dal Consiglio europeo del 28 giugno scorso, il ritiro dalle responsabilità di coordinamento dei soccorsi in acque internazionali da parte degli stati che fin qui ne sono stati responsabili in conformità al diritto internazionale generalmente riconosciuto. Per ragioni diverse, nè la Tunisia, ne la Libia, possono essere riconosciuti come “paesi terzi sicuri” con porti di sbarco che siano qualificabili come place of safety. Come avveniva fino a qualche mese fa, secondo il diritto internazionale, dopo i soccorsi in acque internazionali, i naufraghi vanno sbarcati non nel porto più vicino, na nel porto sicuro più vicino. Ma questa regola, a partire dal caso della nave Aquarius di SOS Mediterraneè, il 10 giugno scorso, è stata continuamente violata dal governo italiano e dalle autorità amministrative e militari che questo governo controlla. Molto grave, ma prevedibile, il comportamento di chiusura da parte di Malta, che continua a trattenere sotto sequstro due navi umanitarie, la Lifeline e la Seawatch. Sempre più spesso le dispute tra stati che negano a naufraghi un porto sicuro di sbarco rischiano di fare altre vittime

      La soluzione che si prospetta adesso con la nave SAROST 5,dopo gli appelli delle ONG tunisine, lo sbarco a Zarzis dei migranti soccorsi il 15 luglio, un caso eccezionale ben diverso da altri soccorsi operati in precedenza in acque internazionali, non costituisce un precedente, perchè la SAROST 5 batte bandiera tunisina. Dunque i naufraghi a bordo della nave si trovavano già in territorio tunisino subito dopo il loro recupero in mare. In futuro, quando i soccorsi in acque internazionali saranno comunque operati da imbarcazioni miitari o private ( incluse le ONG) con diversa bandiera, il problema del porto sicuro di sbarco si proporrà in termini ancora più gravi, con un ulteriore incremento delle vittime e delle sofferenze inflitte ai sopravvissuti, a fronte dei dinieghi degli stati che non rispettano il diritto internazionale ed impediscono la individuazione, nei tempi più rapidi, di un vero “place of safety”.

      Nel 2013 il caso del mercantile turco SALAMIS, che sotto cooordinamento della Centrale operativa (IMRCC) di Roma, aveva soccorso naufraghi a sud di Malta, in acque internazionali, si era concluso con lo sbarco in Italia, in conformità del diritto internazionale. Con lo sbarco dei migranti soccorsi dalla SAROST 5 nel porto di Zarzis,in Tunisia, per ragioni di emergenza sanitaria, si consuma invece una ennesima violazione del diritto internazionale, dopo i rifiuti frapposti dalle autorità italiane e maltesi. Stati che creano sofferenze, come strumento politico e di propaganda, fino al punto da costringere i comandanti delle navi a dichiarare lo stato di emergenza. Alla fine il governo tunisino, nel giorno della fiducia al governo e dell’insediamento del nuovo ministro dell’interno, ha ceduto alle pressioni internazionali, ed ha accettato per ragioni umanitarie lo sbarco di persone che da due settimane erano bloccate a bordo di un rimorchiatore di servizio ad una piattaforma petrolifera, in condizioni psico-fisiche sempre più gravi. Un trattamento inumano e degradante imposto da quelle autorità e di quegli stati che, immediatamente avvertiti dal comandante della SAROST 5 quando ancora si trovava in acque internazionali, hanno respinto la richiesta di garantire in tempi più rapidi ed umani un porto di sbarco sicuro.

      Di fronte al probabile ripetersi di altri casi di abbandono in acque internazionali, con possibili pressioni ancora più forti sulla Tunisia, è importante che l’UNHCR e l’OIM impongano agli stati membri ed all’Unione Europea il rispetto del diritto internazionale e l’obbligo di soccorso in mare, nel modo più immediato. Le prassi amministraive di “chiusura dei porti” non sono sorrette ada alcuna base legale, e neppure sono concretizzate in provvedimenti amministrativi, motivati ed impugnabili davanti ad una qualsiasi autorità giurisdizionale. Non si può continuare a governare tratendo in inganno il corpo elettorale, distorcendo persino le posizioni delle grandi organizzazioni internazionali. Fino ad un mese fa sia l’UNHCR che l’OIM avevano respinto la proposta della Commissione che voleva creare piattaforme di sbarco al di fuori dei confini europei. Una proposta che adesso viene ripresentata con vigore ancora maggiore, sotto la presidenza UE affidata all’Austria di Kurz, con la spinta di Orban e di Salvini verso la “soluzione finale” verso migranti ed ONG.

      Le Nazioni Unite conoscono bene la situazione in Libia. Occorre garantire a tutti i naufraghi soccorsi in acque internazionali un porto sicuro di sbarco, che non deve essere quello più vicino, se non offre la piena garanzia di una tutela effettiva dei diritti fondamentali e del diritto di chiedere asilo delle persone sbarcate. Non basta la presenza fisica di operatori dell’UNHCR e dell’OIM in alcuni punti di sbarco, come si sta verificando da mesi in Tripolitania, per riconoscere l’esistenza di un place of safety in paesi che anche secondo le grandi istituzioni internazionali, come per i tribunali italiani, non sono in grado di garantire place of safety in conformità alle Convenzioni internazionali.

      Se si dovesse decidere di riportare i migranti intercettati in acque internazionali e sbarcati nei paesi nordafricani, ammesso che posa succedere( anche se i migranti considerati “illegali” in Nordafrica saranno costretti a firmare una richiesta di resettlement, se non di rimpatrio volontario), magari per essere riportati indietro in un campo profughi in Niger, sarebbero violati i principi base di protezione delle persone, in quanto eseri umani, ai quali si ispirano le Convenzioni internazionali e la Costituzione italiana. La Convenzione di Ginevra non esclude il diritto dei richeidenti asilo a rivolgersi ad paese piuttosto che ad un altro. L’evacuazione dalle aree di crisi non esclude il diritto di accesso alle frontiere di un paese europeo perchè la richiesta di asilo sua valutata con le garanzie sostanziali e procedurali previste dalla normativa interna e sovranazionale.

      Se l’UNHCR e l’OIM cederanno alle pressioni dei governi, diventeranno complici degli abusi che i migranti continuano a subire nei paesi del nordafrica nei quali vengono respinti e detenuti.

      Le Organizzazioni non governative che, insieme ai naufraghi che soccorrono, continuano ad essere bersaglio di una campagna di odio che non accenna ad attenuarsi, continueranno, nei limiti dei propri mezzi a denunciare quanto accade ed a soccorrere le persone che in acque internazionali potranno raggiungere prima che facciano naufragio. La loro attività di ricerca e salvataggio appare tuttavia fortemente ridotta, anche per la illegittima “chiusura dei porti” decisa dal governo italiano, in assenza di qualsiasi provvedimento che ne fornisca una base legale, tale almeno da potere essere impugnato. Una lesione forse irreversibile dello stato di diritto (rule of law) alle frontiere marittime.Una responsabilità ancora maggiore per le autorità militari alle quali sarebbe affidato il coordinamento delle attività di ricerca e soccorso in mare (SAR). La percentuale delle vittime calcolate sul numero dei migranti che ancora riescono a fuggire dalla Libia non è mai stata tanto alta. Non si deve ridurre il valore del rispetto della vita umana alla riduzione numerica degli arrivi o dei soccorsi in mare.

      Dietro la conclamata esigenza di contrastare i trafficanti si cela una micidiale arma elettorale che sta permettendo il capovolgimento della narrazione dei fatti e la criminalizzazione della solidarietà. Il ruolo delle città dell’accoglienza e dei rappresentanti politici che ancora si oppongono a questa deriva disumana contro i migranti e le ONG, devono passare dalle parole ai fatti e dare concretezza alle dichiarazioni di solidarietà ed all’impegno di aprire i porti, ed aprire le città. Tutti i cittadini solidali sono chiamati ad esporsi in prima persona, saldando il ruolo delle autonomie locali con la capacità di autorganizzazione. Sarà una stagione lunga e dolorosa di conflitto, senza una rappresentanza polkitica capace di praticare una vera opposizione. Ma non ci sono possibilità di mediazione con chi dimostra di valutare una parte dell’umanità come “untermenschen” ( sottouomini), praticando l’abbandono in mare ed il respingimento collettivo verso luoghi di internamento e tortura, in modo da creare le premesse per una discriminazione istituzionale che nei territori si sta già traducendo in una violenza diffusa contro i più deboli. Oggi tocca ai migranti, dai naufraghi a quelli accolti nei centri in Italia, domani saranno nel mirino le componenti minoritarie dell’intera popolazione.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2018/07/29/unhcr-ed-oim-discutono-con-la-commissione-europea-sulle-piattaforme-di-sbarco

    • Libya rejects establishment of reception centres for irregular migrants on its territory

      Foreign Minister of the Presidential Council’s government Mohamed Sayala said Libya refuses the idea of setting up reception centres for irregular migrants on its territory, as did Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

      “The country’s immigrant housing centres are sheltering around 30,000 immigrants, and Libya has cooperated with the European Union to return migrants to their countries of origin, but some countries refused to receive them,” Sayala said to the Austrian newspaper Die Presse.

      “Libya has signed agreements with Chad, Niger and Sudan to enhance the security of the crossing borders in order to curb the flow of migrants,” the Foreign Minister added.

      https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/libya-rejects-establishment-reception-centres-irregular-migrants-its-t

    • Juncker says N.Africa migrant “camps” not on EU agenda

      European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said on Friday that a suggestion that the European Union might try to set up migrant camps in North Africa was no longer on the agenda.

      EU member states are in disagreement over how the bloc should deal with tens of thousands of migrants arriving every year in Europe, the bulk of them by sea from Turkey and North Africa.

      In June, a summit of all EU leaders asked the Commission to study ways to set up “regional disembarkation platforms” in North African countries, including Tunisia, for migrants rescued by European vessels in the Mediterranean.

      However, there has been little appetite in Africa and EU officials have long questioned the legality and practicality of such camps — a view underlined in Juncker’s blunt reply.

      “This is no longer on the agenda and never should have been,” Juncker told a news conference in Tunis with Tunisian Prime Minister Youssef Chahed.

      http://news.trust.org/item/20181026131801-1t7he
      #cpa_camps

    • Juncker says North Africa migrant ’camps’ not on EU agenda

      European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said on Friday that a suggestion that the European Union might try to set up migrant camps in North Africa was no longer on the agenda.

      EU member states are in disagreement over how the bloc should deal with tens of thousands of migrants arriving every year in Europe, the bulk of them by sea from Turkey and North Africa.

      In June, a summit of all EU leaders asked the Commission to study ways to set up “regional disembarkation platforms” in North African countries, including Tunisia, for migrants rescued by European vessels in the Mediterranean.

      However, there has been little appetite in Africa and EU officials have long questioned the legality and practicality of such camps — a view underlined in Juncker’s blunt reply.

      “This is no longer on the agenda and never should have been,” Juncker told a news conference in Tunis with Tunisian Prime Minister Youssef Chahed.


      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-africa/juncker-says-north-africa-migrant-camps-not-on-eu-agenda-idUSKCN1N01TU

    • Refugee centers in Tunisia ’out of the question’, president says

      The Tunisian President, Beji Caid Essebsi, has said his country will not host EU refugee reception centers. He also told DW that Tunisia was a safe country, despite a terrorist attack in the capital earlier this week.

      President Essebsi made the statement in Berlin, where he attended Chancellor Angela Merkel’s African business summit. In an interview with DW’s Dima Tarhini, the 91-year-old leader said opening refugee reception centers in countries such as Tunisia was “out of the question.”

      “Tunisia has much more experience with refugees than many European countries. After the Libyan revolution, more than 1.3 million refugees from various countries streamed into Tunisia. Fortunately, most of them returned to their home countries with our help. Europe has never experienced anything comparable. And we, unlike Europe, do not have the capacities to open reception centers. Every country needs to pull its own weight on this issue.”

      The European Union wants greater cooperation on migration with North African nations Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Niger and Morocco. Earlier this year, the EU migration commissioner announced a plan for a “regional disembarkation scheme”. Under the proposed deal, African countries would host migrant screening centers to process refugee claims. The Tunisian government has already expressed opposition to the idea.

      Despite terrorism, a ’safe country’

      During President Essebsi’s visit to Berlin, a 30-year-old woman blew herself up with a homemade bomb in the Tunisian capital, injuring at least eight people.

      “We thought we had eradicated terrorism, but it turns out that it still exists and that it can strike in the heart of the capital,” President Essebsi said in a statement to the press.

      The suicide attack led to renewed questions about whether Tunisia should be considered a safe country of origin for asylum seekers.

      Tarhini: In Germany, in the context of repatriating asylum-seekers, it has been questioned just how safe Tunisia really is. Tunisia is considered a safe North African country. What is your opinion on this?

      Beji Caid Essebsi: "Tunisia is a safe country; that is the truth. It is much safer than many other countries. Regarding refugees and the problem that they pose for Europe and other regions: Tunisia guarantees the freedom of its citizens, no matter what their conduct. If Tunisians abroad do something wrong and are sent back, then we will take them in. But not citizens of other countries.

      http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/13062/refugee-centers-in-tunisia-out-of-the-question-president-says?ref=tw
      #Tunisie
      ping @_kg_

    • Les plateformes de débarquement pour migrants enterrées ?

      « Les Plateformes de débarquement en Afrique ne sont plus à l’ordre du jour et n’auraient jamais dû l’être », a déclaré le président de la Commission européenne Juncker, ce 26 octobre, lors d’une conférence de presse à Tunis avec le Premier ministre tunisien, Youssef Chahed .

      Etonnant ? Rembobinons la bande-son 4 mois en arrière...

      Les plateformes de débarquement sont une proposition de la Commission européenne faite, à Bruxelles, le 28 juin lors d’un Conseil européen. Son objectif était d’empêcher l’arrivée des personnes migrantes, dites irrégulières, sur le sol européen. Comment ? En les bloquant, en amont, dans des centres fermés, le temps d’examiner leur profil et demande. Et en y débarquant systématiquement les naufragés repêchés en Méditerranée. Ces plates-formes seraient situées sur les côtes africaines notamment en Tunisie et au Maroc. L’Egypte a été également évoquée.

      Cette proposition s’inscrivait dans l’approche dominante de « l’externalisation » de la gestion des frontières prônée de façon croissante par les institutions européennes et ses membres depuis une vingtaine d’années. Depuis 2015, cette approche constitue l’une des orientations majeures des politiques migratoires européennes.

      Pourquoi dès lors, la Commission fait-elle marche arrière quant à ce projet ? Plusieurs raisons peuvent être avancées.

      La première réside dans le fait que cette approche n’atteint pas ses objectifs (endiguer les départs et augmenter les expulsions des personnes en situation irrégulière). Il suffit de voir la situation dans les hotspots d’Italie et de Grèce depuis 2015. A Moria, sur l’île de Lesbos, MSF parle de crise humanitaire due au surpeuplement, aux infrastructures et conditions d’accueil déplorables, ainsi qu’à l’insécurité mettant à mal l’ensemble des droits fondamentaux des personnes, notamment ceux des femmes et des mineurs. Les plus vulnérables se retrouvent dans un cul-de-sac.
      « Moria est devenu pour beaucoup un lieu de transit prolongé le temps que leur demande d’asile soit étudiée », souligne Dimitris Vafeas, le directeur adjoint du camp de Moria. D’autres exemples sont ceux du Niger ou encore de la Libye qui laissent les personnes migrantes dans une situation « d’encampement » permanent ou d’errance circulaire sans fin, faute de voies légales de migrations.

      La seconde explication trouve sa source dans le fait que cette approche ne respecte pas le droit international. En effet, d’une part, selon la Convention de Genève, chacun a le droit de quitter son pays et de demander l’asile dans un pays où sa sécurité sera assurée. Le droit international, s’il autorise un pays à refuser l’immigration, prohibe l’instauration du délit d’émigration : la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme stipule ainsi en son article 13 le droit de « quitter tout pays y compris le sien ». De plus, le droit maritime prévoit que tout naufragé sauvé en mer doit être conduit vers le port proche le plus sûr, ce qui implique que les personnes rescapées au large des côtes européennes doivent y être conduite. Enfin, plusieurs pays, à commencer par la Libye, ne représentent en aucun cas des « lieux sûrs », au regard des conditions auxquelles y font face les migrants. Même au Maroc, il y a quelques semaines, le GADEM, association marocaine de défense des droits de l’homme, sortait un rapport dramatique faisant état des violences multiples qu’encourent les personnes migrantes au Maroc.

      La troisième raison est que la majorité des pays en développement ne veulent pas entendre parler de ces plates-formes. Ils accueillent déjà 85 % des personnes réfugiées alors que l’Europe n’en accueille que 6%. Les pays africains tentent donc de faire bloc afin d’installer un rapport de force face aux Européens. Ils savent qu’ils sont désormais des acteurs incontournables du dossier migratoire sur la scène internationale. Cependant, les sommes mises sur la table, tels que les budgets de l’APD, risquent à terme d’effriter ce bloc d’argile, même si ces montants doivent être mis en regard des transferts des diasporas (remittances), nettement plus importants et qui rendent donc les dirigeants des pays d’origine enclins à favoriser les migrations.

      Il est donc temps, vu cet échec, que la Commission européenne change de cap et axe ses politiques non pas sur l’externalisation des questions de l’asile et de la migration, mais sur le renforcement de la solidarité intra-européenne dans l’accueil et sur la mise en œuvre de nouvelles voies sûre et légales de migration. Cela lui permettrait, enfin, de respecter le droit international et de consacrer son APD à la réalisation des Objectifs de développement plutôt qu’à la lutte contre les migrations, fussent-elles irrégulières.

      https://www.cncd.be/Les-plateformes-de-debarquement

    • L’UE bat partiellement en retraite sur les hotspots en Afrique

      Le Conseil voulait débarquer les migrants sauvés en Méditerranée sur les côtes africaines. Face à l’opposition des États africains, le projet a été abandonné, mais l’UE fait toujours pression sur les pays de transit.

      Au sommet du Conseil de juin dernier, les dirigeants européens ont demandé à la Commission d’étudier la possibilité d’instaurer des « plateformes de débarquement régionales » en Afrique, afin d’y envoyer les migrants repêchés par des bateaux européens en Méditerranée.

      L’initiative a tourné court. Dans les jours qui ont suivi le sommet, le Maroc et l’Union africaine se sont mobilisés pour assurer un rejet généralisé des « hotspots » sur les territoires africains.

      Nasser Bourita, le ministre marocain aux Affaires étrangères, a accusé les dirigeants européens de réagir de manière excessive, et souligné que le nombre de migrants tentant d’entrer en Europe a largement chuté. À ce jour, ils sont 80 000 à être arrivés cette année, contre 300 000 en 2016.

      La société civile s’est aussi opposée au projet, estimant que ces camps de migrants seraient contraires aux engagements de l’UE en termes de droits de l’Homme.

      Lors d’une visite en Tunisie le 26 octobre, Jean-Claude Juncker, président de la Commission européenne, a assuré que l’UE ne tentait pas de mettre en place des camps de réfugiés dans le nord de l’Afrique. « Ce n’est plus au programme, et ça n’aurait jamais dû l’être », a-t-il indiqué lors d’une conférence de presse avec le Premier ministre tunisien, Youssef Chahed.

      Une semaine après, la porte-parole de la Commission, Natasha Bertaud, a expliqué que l’exécutif européen préférait à présent parler d’« arrangements de débarquement régionaux ». L’UE a donc commencé à préparer des accords spécifiques avec chacun des pays concernés, dont un échange de financements contre un meilleur contrôle migratoire. Le but est ainsi d’empêcher les migrants d’arriver en Europe.

      Accords en négociations

      Depuis le mois de septembre, des discussions sont en cours entre Bruxelles et le gouvernement égyptien d’Abdel Fattah al-Sissi. Un accord « cash contre migrants » devrait être finalisé avant le sommet UE-Ligue arabe qui aura lieu en février au Caire.

      S’il parait évident que l’Europe ne répétera pas son offre de 4 milliards à la Turquie, l’Égypte devrait demander une aide considérable et des prêts avantageux en échange d’un durcissement du contrôle migratoire. Des accords similaires devraient être conclus avec le Maroc, la Tunisie et la Libye.

      Le timing n’est pas dû au hasard, puisque Abdel Fattah al-Sissi succédera en janvier au Rwandais Paul Kagame à la présidence de l’Union africaine, et que le sommet de février sera centré sur l’immigration.

      Ce n’est pourtant pas parce que l’idée des « hotspots » a été abandonnée que les pays africains échappent aux pressions européennes.

      Le 1er novembre, Reuters indiquait que le ministère marocain des Affaires étrangères avait mis en place une nouvelle obligation pour les ressortissants du Congo Brazzaville, de Guinée et du Mali, qui devront à présent demander un permis de voyage quatre jours avant leur arrivée au Maroc. La plupart des migrants espérant atteindre l’Europe via le Maroc sont guinéens ou maliens.

      L’Espagne fait en effet pression sur Rabat pour réduire le nombre d’arrivées de migrants, notamment via ses enclaves de Ceuta et Melilla.

      Redéfinitions à venir

      Par ailleurs, les conditions de renvoi des migrants seront redéfinies dans le texte qui remplacera l’accord de Cotonou, mais il est clair que l’Europe ne voudra pas les rendre plus strictes. Les discussions entre l’UE et les pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique, viennent de commencer.

      L’accord, qui expire en 2020, prévoit que les États africains réintègrent les migrants qui n’obtiennent pas l’autorisation de rester en Europe, une mesure qui n’a cependant pas été mise en pratique. « Les dirigeants africains ne respecteront jamais ces articles sur la migration », indique une source proche des négociations.

      L’Union africaine n’est pas parvenue à unir ses membres pour négocier le successeur de l’accord de Cotonou sur la base d’une position commune face à l’UE, mais les avis sont plus convergents sur la question migratoire. Selon une représentante de la société civile, son plan d’action sur l’immigration est « l’un des meilleurs documents sur la migration ».

      Contrairement à l’UE, divisée entre des pays plutôt accueillants et d’autres comme la Hongrie, la Pologne ou l’Italie, qui défendent des règles extrêmement strictes, les membres de l’Union africaine sont sur la même longueur d’onde sur le sujet. « L’UE n’est pas en position de négocier sur l’immigration, mais l’Union africaine l’est », conclut cette même source.

      Pour montrer à ses citoyens qu’elle agit, l’UE pourrait donc finir par mettre en place des arrangements de contrôle migratoire fragmentés et chers.

      https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/eu-lowers-its-ambitions-on-african-migration-control

    • EP lawyers back EU plans for migrant centres in Africa

      Lawyers working at the European Parliament on Tuesday (27 November) struggled to provide a detailed analysis of whether stalled EU plans to offload rescued migrants in north Africa were legal - but ultimately backed the controversial concept.

      “It was at least a brave attempt to piece together, sort of like bits of circumstantial evidence from a kind of a crime scene, to see what the hell this is,” British centre-left MEP Claude Moraes said of their efforts.

      Speaking at the parliament’s civil liberties committee, a lawyer from the legal service was only able to provide an oral summary of their report, citing confidentiality issues.

      But EUobserver has obtained a full copy of the 10-page confidential report, which attempted to provide a legal analysis of stalled EU plans to set up so-called ’regional disembarkation platforms’ in north Africa and controlled centres in Europe.

      The report broadly rubber stamps the legality of both concepts, but with conditions.

      It says “controlled centres and/or disembarkation platforms of a similar nature could be, in principle, lawfully established in the European Union territory.”

      It states disembarkation platforms “could lawfully be established outside of the European Union, in order to receive migrants rescued outside the territory of the Union’s member states.”

      It also says EU law does not apply to migrants rescued at high sea, even with a boat flying an EU-member state flag.

      “We can’t consider a vessel flying a flag of a member state to be an extension of a member state,” the lawyer told the MEPs.

      EU law is also not applied if the migrant is rescued in the territorial waters of an African coastal state, states the report.

      It also notes that people rescued in EU territorial waters cannot then be sent to disembarkation platforms in an non-EU state.

      Morocco and other bordering coastal states must apply the 1951 Geneva Convention and must be considered safe before allowing them to host any disembarkation platform.

      Earlier this year, the European Commission tasked the EU’s asylum support office to analyse the safety of both Morocco and Tunisia.

      But neither country has voiced any interest in hosting such platforms.

      The two countries were then presented over the summer by EU heads of state and government as a possible solution to further stem boat migrants from taking to the seas in their efforts to reach Europe.

      The concepts, initially hatched by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN refugee agency (UNHCR), were met with disdain by north African states, who viewed them as a veiled attempt by the EU to outsource its problem back onto them.

      Furthermore, not a single EU state has expressed any interest to host a controlled centre.

      Human rights defenders have also raised alarm given the poor treatment of thousands of refugees and migrants stuck in over-crowded camps on the Greek islands.

      Attempting to replicate similar camps or centres elsewhere has only heightened those fears.

      But the EU says it is pressing ahead anyway.

      “The disembarkation arrangement, the discussion, is proceeding in the Council,” said Vincet Piket, a senior official in the EU’s foreign policy branch, the EEAS.

      https://euobserver.com/migration/143513

    • Et il y a des personnes, qui travaillent pour le HCR, ici #Vincent_Cochetel, qui croient en les plateformes de désembarquement évidemment...

      Good statement of search and rescue organisations, but I would like to see the same advocacy efforts with North African countries. A predictable regional disembarkation mechanism must be a shared responsibility on both sides of the Mediterranean.

      https://twitter.com/cochetel/status/1073190725473484801?s=19

    • African Union seeks to kill EU plan to process migrants in Africa

      Exclusive: Leaked paper shows determination to dissuade coastal states from cooperating.

      The African Union is seeking to kill off the EU’s latest blueprint for stemming migration, claiming that it would breach international law by establishing “de facto detention centres” on African soil, trampling over the rights of those being held.

      A “#common_African_position_paper” leaked to the Guardian reveals the determination of the 55-member state body, currently headed by Egypt, to dissuade any of its coastal states from cooperating with Brussels on the plan.

      The EU set plans for “regional disembarkation platforms” in motion last summer to allow migrants found in European waters to have their asylum requests processed on African soil.

      Brussels has a similar arrangement in place with Libya, where there are 800,000 migrants, 20,000 of whom are being held in government detention centres. The Libyan authorities have been accused of multiple and grave human rights abuses. A UN report recently stated that migrants in the country faced “unimaginable horrors”.

      Some northern states, including Morocco, have already rejected the EU’s proposal over the new “platforms”, but there are concerns within the African Union (AU) that other member governments could be persuaded by the offer of development funds.

      Italy’s far-right interior minister Matteo Salvini has called for the centres to be based around the Sahel region, in Niger, Chad, Mali and Sudan. An inaugural summit between the EU and the League of Arab States is being held in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt on Sunday and Monday, and migration is expected to be discussed.

      “When the EU wants something, it usually gets it,” said a senior AU official. “African capitals worry that this plan will see the establishment of something like modern-day slave markets, with the ‘best’ Africans being allowed into Europe and the rest tossed back – and it is not far from the truth.”

      They added: “The feelings are very, very raw about this. And it feels that this summit is about the EU trying to work on some countries to cooperate. Bilaterally, some countries will always look at the money.”

      EU officials, in turn, have been coy about the purposes of the summit, insisting that it is merely an attempt to engage on issues of joint importance.

      The leaked draft joint position of the AU notes that Brussels has yet to fully flesh out the concept of the “regional disembarkation platforms”. But it adds: “The establishment of disembarkation platforms on the African Continent for the processing of the asylum claims of Africans seeking international protection in Europe would contravene International Law, EU Law and the Legal instruments of the AU with regard to refugees and displaced persons.

      “The setup of ‘disembarkation platforms’ would be tantamount to de facto ‘detention centres’ where the fundamental rights of African migrants will be violated and the principle of solitary among AU member states greatly undermined. The collection of biometric data of citizens of AU Members by international organisations violates the sovereignty of African Countries over their citizens.”

      The AU also criticises Brussels for bypassing its structures and warns of wider repercussions. “The AU views the decision by the EU to support the concept of ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ in Africa and the ongoing bilateral consultation with AU member states, without the involvement of the AU and its relevant institutions, as undermining the significant progress achieved in the partnership frameworks and dialogues between our two unions,” the paper says.

      Confidential legal advice commissioned by the European parliament also raises concerns about the legality of establishing processing centres on African soil for those found in European waters.

      The paper, seen by the Guardian, warns that “migrants, after they have been rescued (or a fortiori after they have been brought back on to European Union territory), could not be sent to platforms outside of the European Union without being granted access to the EU asylum procedures and without being granted the possibility to wait for the complete examination of their request”.

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/african-union-seeks-to-kill-eu-plan-to-process-migrants-in-africa

  • Budget de l’Union : La Commission propose une importante augmentation des financements visant à renforcer la gestion des migrations et des frontières

    Pour le prochain #budget à long terme de l’UE se rapportant à la période 2021-2027, la Commission propose de quasiment tripler les financements destinés à la gestion des #migrations et des #frontières, qui atteindraient 34,9 milliards d’euros contre 13 milliards d’euros au cours de la période précédente.

    La proposition de la Commission est une réponse aux défis accrus qui se posent en matière de migration et de #sécurité, avec des instruments de financement plus flexibles pour faire face aux événements imprévus, la #protection_des_frontières étant au cœur du nouveau budget. Un nouveau fonds séparé pour la gestion intégrée des frontières sera créé et l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes sera renforcée par un nouveau corps permanent de quelque 10 000 #gardes-frontières. Ce nouveau fonds aidera aussi les États membres à effectuer les contrôles douaniers en finançant des équipements de contrôle douanier.

    M. Frans Timmermans, premier vice-président, a fait la déclaration suivante : « Sur la base de l’expérience passée et sachant que la migration restera un défi à l’avenir, nous proposons une augmentation des financements sans précédent. Le renforcement de nos frontières communes, notamment avec l’#Agence_européenne_de_garde-frontières_et_de_garde-côtes, continuera de figurer parmi les grandes #priorités. Une #flexibilité accrue de nos instruments de financement signifie que nous sommes prêts à fournir un soutien rapide aux États membres ; au moment et à l’endroit où ils en ont besoin - en particulier en cas de #crise. »

    M. Dimitris Avramopoulos, commissaire pour la migration, les affaires intérieures et la citoyenneté, a déclaré quant à lui : « Une meilleure gestion de nos frontières extérieures et des flux migratoires restera une priorité clé pour l’Union européenne, les États membres et nos citoyens dans les années à venir. Des défis plus grands exigent de faire appel à des ressources plus importantes - c’est pourquoi nous proposons de quasiment tripler le budget dans ce domaine. Le renforcement des financements jouera un rôle essentiel en nous permettant de mettre en œuvre nos priorités politiques : davantage sécuriser nos #frontières_extérieures, continuer à accorder une protection à ceux qui en ont besoin, mieux soutenir la #migration_légale et les efforts d’#intégration, lutter contre la migration irrégulière, et assurer le retour effectif et rapide de ceux qui ne bénéficient pas du droit de séjour. »

    M. Pierre Moscovici, commissaire pour les affaires économiques et financières, la fiscalité et les douanes, s’est exprimé en ces termes : « Les 115 000 fonctionnaires des douanes de l’UE sont en première ligne pour protéger les citoyens européens contre les produits contrefaits ou dangereux et les autres formes de commerce illicite. Afin de les soutenir dans cette mission capitale, nous proposons aujourd’hui un nouveau fonds doté de 1,3 milliard d’euros, afin que les pays de l’UE puissent acquérir les équipements douaniers les plus avancés. L’#union_douanière de l’UE fêtera son 50e anniversaire le mois prochain : nous devons veiller à ce qu’elle continue à prendre de l’ampleur. »

    Durant la crise des réfugiés de 2015 et de 2016, l’appui financier et technique que l’Union européenne a fourni aux États membres a été déterminant dans le soutien apporté à ceux d’entre eux qui se trouvaient sous pression, dans le développement des capacités de recherche et de sauvetage, dans l’intensification des retours et dans l’amélioration de la gestion des frontières extérieures. Tirant les enseignements du passé, la Commission propose de quasiment tripler les financements destinés aux domaines essentiels que représentent la gestion des migrations et celle des frontières.

    1. #Sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’UE

    La protection effective des frontières extérieures de l’UE est essentielle pour gérer les flux migratoires et garantir la sécurité intérieure. Des frontières extérieures solides sont aussi ce qui permet à l’UE de maintenir un espace Schengen sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures. La Commission propose d’allouer 21,3 milliards d’euros à la gestion globale des frontières et de créer un nouveau #Fonds_pour_la_gestion_intégrée_des_frontières (#FGIF) doté d’une enveloppe supérieure à 9,3 milliards d’euros.

    Les principaux éléments du nouveau Fonds sont les suivants :

    – Une palette adéquate de priorités :

    Renforcement des frontières extérieures de l’Europe : Le nouveau #Fonds s’inscrira dans le prolongement du travail réalisé ces dernières années et s’appuiera sur lui pour mieux protéger les frontières de l’UE, avec la mise en place du corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, des vérifications systématiques aux frontières, de nouveaux systèmes informatiques à grande échelle et interopérables, y compris le futur système d’entrée/sortie. Le financement sera mis à disposition dans des domaines tels que la lutte contre le #trafic_de_migrants et la #traite des êtres humains, les opérations visant à intercepter et stopper les personnes représentant une #menace, l’appui aux opérations de recherche et de sauvetage en mer, les équipements et la formation des gardes-frontières, ainsi que l’appui opérationnel rapide aux États membres sous pression.
    Une politique des #visas plus solide et plus efficace : Le Fonds garantira également l’évolution continue et la modernisation de la politique des visas de l’UE, tout en renforçant la sécurité et en atténuant les risques liés à la migration irrégulière.

    – Soutien aux États membres : Le nouveau Fonds consacrera un financement à long terme de 4,8 milliards d’euros aux mesures prises par les États membres en matière de gestion des frontières et à la politique des visas. Le financement correspondra exactement aux besoins des États membres et un examen à mi-parcours tiendra compte de pressions nouvelles ou supplémentaires. Chaque État membre recevra un montant forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros, le reste étant distribué selon la charge de travail, la pression et le niveau de menace aux frontières extérieures terrestres (30 %), aux frontières extérieures maritimes (35 %), dans les aéroports (20 %) et dans les bureaux consulaires (15 %).

    – Une réponse souple et rapide : Un montant de 3,2 milliards d’euros sera consacré à des actions d’appui ciblé aux États membres, aux projets de dimension européenne, et permettra de faire face aux besoins urgents. Le nouveau Fonds a été conçu pour garantir une souplesse suffisante permettant de fournir aux États membres une aide d’urgence en cas de besoin et de faire face aux priorités nouvelles et critiques à mesure qu’elles surviennent.

    – Des équipements de contrôle douanier plus performants aux frontières extérieures : Le nouvel instrument comportera une enveloppe de 1,3 milliard d’euros pour aider les États membres à acquérir, entretenir et remplacer des équipements douaniers modernes, tels que de nouveaux #scanners, des systèmes de reconnaissance automatique des plaques minéralogiques, des équipes de #chiens_renifleurs et des #laboratoires_mobiles d’analyse d’échantillons.

    – Renforcement des organismes chargés de la gestion des frontières : En plus de ce Fonds, une enveloppe supérieure à 12 milliards d’euros devant être présentée séparément sera consacrée à la poursuite du renforcement de l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes et de l’agence #eu-LISA.

    2. Migrations : soutenir une politique solide, réaliste et équitable

    La Commission propose de renforcer le financement destiné à la gestion des migrations à raison de 51 % et de le porter ainsi à 10,4 milliards d’euros au titre du Fonds « Asile et migration » renouvelé (#FAM). Le Fonds soutiendra les efforts déployés par les États membres dans trois domaines clés : l’asile, la migration légale et l’intégration, la lutte contre la migration irrégulière et le retour. Les principaux éléments du nouveau Fonds sont les suivants :

    – Une palette adéquate de priorités : Le nouveau Fonds continuera de fournir un appui vital aux systèmes d’asile nationaux et mettra un accent renouvelé sur la mise à disposition des aides de l’UE en faveur des questions les plus urgentes, telles que :

    Un #régime_d'asile_européen plus solide et plus efficace : Le Fonds contribuera à renforcer et à développer tous les aspects du #régime_d'asile_européen_commun, y compris sa dimension extérieure :
    Un soutien accru à la migration légale et à l’intégration : Le Fonds consacrera des ressources additionnelles au soutien de l’intégration précoce des ressortissants de pays tiers séjournant légalement dans l’UE sur le court terme, lesquelles seront complétées par un financement au titre du #Fonds_de_cohésion_pour_l'intégration_socio-économique à plus long terme.
    Des retours plus rapides et plus fréquents : Le Fonds soutiendra une approche plus coordonnée pour lutter contre la migration irrégulière, améliorer l’efficacité des retours et intensifier davantage la coopération avec les pays tiers en matière de réadmission.

    – Soutien aux États membres : Le Fonds consacrera un financement à long terme de 6,3 milliards d’euros à des actions de soutien aux États membres dans la gestion de la migration, en concordance avec leurs besoins. Un examen à mi-parcours tiendra compte de pressions nouvelles ou supplémentaires. Chaque État membre recevra un montant forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros, le reste étant distribué sur la base d’une évaluation des pressions s’exerçant sur lui et en tenant compte des proportions prévues en matière d’asile (30 %), de migration légale et d’intégration (30 %) et de retour (40 %).

    – Une meilleure préparation : Une enveloppe de 4,2 milliards d’euros sera réservée aux projets présentant une véritable valeur ajoutée européenne, telle que la #réinstallation, ou pour répondre à des besoins impérieux et pour faire parvenir des financements d’urgence aux États membres au moment et à l’endroit où ils en ont besoin.

    Une plus grande coordination entre les instruments de financement de l’UE : Le Fonds « Asile et migration » sera complété par les fonds additionnels affectés au titre des instruments de politique extérieure de l’UE pour accélérer la coopération en matière de migration avec les pays partenaires, notamment dans le cadre des efforts visant à lutter contre la migration irrégulière, à améliorer les perspectives dans les pays d’origine, à renforcer la coopération en matière de retour, de réadmission, et de migration légale ;

    – Renforcement des organismes de l’UE : En plus de ce fonds, une enveloppe de près de 900 millions d’euros devant être présentée séparément sera consacrée au renforcement de la nouvelle #Agence_de_l'Union_européenne_pour_l'asile.

    Prochaines étapes

    Il est essentiel de parvenir à un accord rapide sur le budget global à long terme de l’UE et sur ses propositions sectorielles de manière à garantir que les fonds de l’UE commencent à produire leurs effets le plus tôt possible sur le terrain.

    Des retards pourraient compromettre la capacité de l’Union européenne à réagir aux crises si elles venaient à éclater, et pourraient priver les projets de ressources essentielles - telles que les programmes européens d’aide au retour volontaire et de réadmission, et la poursuite du financement de l’UE en faveur de la réinstallation.

    Un accord sur le prochain budget à long terme en 2019 permettrait d’assurer une transition sans heurts entre l’actuel budget à long terme (2014-2020) et le nouveau, ce qui garantirait la prévisibilité et la continuité du financement, pour le bénéfice de tous.

    Historique du dossier

    Depuis le début du mandat de la Commission Juncker, la gestion des frontières et celle des migrations constituent une priorité politique - depuis les orientations politiques présentées en juillet 2014 par le président Juncker jusqu’à son dernier discours sur l’état de l’Union prononcé le 13 septembre 2017.

    Cependant, l’Europe a été surprise par l’ampleur et l’urgence de la crise des réfugiés de 2015-2016. Pour éviter une crise humanitaire et permettre une réponse commune à ce défi sans précédent, ainsi qu’aux nouvelles menaces pesant sur la sécurité, l’UE a fait usage de toute la souplesse possible dans le budget existant afin de mobiliser des fonds supplémentaires. En plus des dotations initiales pour la période 2014-2020 s’élevant à 6,9 milliards d’euros pour l’#AMIF et le #FSI (frontières et police), un montant supplémentaire de 3,9 milliards d’euros a été mobilisé pour atteindre 10,8 milliards d’euros en faveur de la migration, de la gestion des frontières et de la sécurité intérieure - et cela ne comprend même pas le financement important mobilisé pour faire face à la crise des réfugiés à l’extérieur de l’UE.

    Tirant les enseignements du passé, la Commission propose à présent de doubler le financement dans tous les domaines, avec 10,4 milliards d’euros pour la migration, 9,3 milliards d’euros pour la gestion des frontières, 2,5 milliards d’euros pour la sécurité intérieure et 1,2 milliard d’euros pour le déclassement sécurisé des installations nucléaires dans certains États membres - soit plus de 23 milliards d’euros au total.

    En outre, le soutien aux organismes de l’UE dans le domaine de la sécurité, de la gestion des frontières et des migrations sera revu à la hausse, passant de 4,2 milliards à 14 milliards d’euros.

    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4106_fr.htm
    #EU #UE #migrations #asile #réfugiés #renvois #expulsions #interopérabilité #Fonds_Asile_et_migration #machine_à_expulser #accords_de_réadmission #coopération_internationale #aide_au_développement

    –-----------------

    Comme dit Sara Prestianni, voici la réponse à la tragédie de l’Aquarius...
    –-> « la #protection_des_frontières étant au cœur du nouveau budget »
     :-(

    Création d’ « un nouveau fonds séparé pour la gestion intégrée des frontières sera créé et l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes sera renforcée par un nouveau corps permanent de quelque 10 000 #gardes-frontières. Ce nouveau fonds aidera aussi les États membres à effectuer les contrôles douaniers en finançant des équipements de contrôle douanier »
    #Frontex n’est plus suffisant... un nouveau fonds est nécessaire... yuppi !
    #contrôles_frontaliers #complexe_militaro-industriel

    • Voici une contre-proposition, de #Gabriele_Del_Grande:

      Lettera al Ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini

      Confesso che su una cosa sono d’accordo con Salvini: la rotta libica va chiusa. Basta tragedie in mare, basta dare soldi alle mafie libiche del contrabbando. Sogno anch’io un Mediterraneo a sbarchi zero. Il problema però è capire come ci si arriva. E su questo, avendo alle spalle dieci anni di inchieste sul tema, mi permetto di dare un consiglio al ministro perché mi pare che stia ripetendo gli stessi errori dei suoi predecessori.

      Blocco navale, respingimenti in mare, centri di detenzione in Libia. La ricetta è la stessa da almeno quindici anni. Pisanu, Amato, Maroni, Cancellieri, Alfano, Minniti. Ci hanno provato tutti. E ogni volta è stato un fallimento: miliardi di euro persi e migliaia di morti in mare.

      Questa volta non sarà diverso. Per il semplice fatto che alla base di tutto ci sono due leggi di mercato che invece continuano ad essere ignorate. La prima è che la domanda genera l’offerta. La seconda è che il proibizionismo sostiene le mafie.

      In altre parole, finché qualcuno sarà disposto a pagare per viaggiare dall’Africa all’Europa, qualcuno gli offrirà la possibilità di farlo. E se non saranno le compagnie aeree a farlo, lo farà il contrabbando.

      Viviamo in un mondo globalizzato, dove i lavoratori si spostano da un paese all’altro in cerca di un salario migliore. L’Europa, che da decenni importa manodopera a basso costo in grande quantità, in questi anni ha firmato accordi di libera circolazione con decine di paesi extraeuropei. Che poi sono i paesi da dove provengono la maggior parte dei nostri lavoratori emigrati: Romania, Albania, Ucraina, Polonia, i Balcani, tutto il Sud America. La stessa Europa però, continua a proibire ai lavoratori africani la possibilità di emigrare legalmente sul suo territorio. In altre parole, le ambasciate europee in Africa hanno smesso di rilasciare visti o hanno reso quasi impossibile ottenerne uno.

      Siamo arrivati al punto che l’ultima e unica via praticabile per l’emigrazione dall’Africa all’Europa è quella del contrabbando libico. Le mafie libiche hanno ormai il monopolio della mobilità sud-nord del Mediterraneo centrale. Riescono a spostare fino a centomila passeggeri ogni anno con un fatturato di centinaia di milioni di dollari ma anche con migliaia di morti.

      Eppure non è sempre stato così. Davvero ci siamo dimenticati che gli sbarchi non esistevano prima degli anni Novanta? Vi siete mai chiesti perché? E vi siete mai chiesti perché nel 2018 anziché comprarsi un biglietto aereo una famiglia debba pagare il prezzo della propria morte su una barca sfasciata in mezzo al mare? Il motivo è molto semplice: fino agli anni Novanta era relativamente semplice ottenere un visto nelle ambasciate europee in Africa. In seguito, man mano che l’Europa ha smesso di rilasciare visti, le mafie del contrabbando hanno preso il sopravvento.

      Allora, se davvero Salvini vuole porre fine, come dice, al business delle mafie libiche del contrabbando, riformi i regolamenti dei visti anziché percorrere la strada del suo predecessore. Non invii i nostri servizi segreti in Libia con le valigette di contante per pagare le mafie del contrabbando affinché cambino mestiere e ci facciano da cane da guardia. Non costruisca altre prigioni oltremare con i soldi dei contribuenti italiani. Perché sono i nostri soldi e non vogliamo darli né alle mafie né alle polizie di paesi come la Libia o la Turchia.

      Noi quelle tasse le abbiamo pagate per veder finanziato il welfare! Per aprire gli asili nido che non ci sono. Per costruire le case popolari che non ci sono. Per finanziare la scuola e la sanità che stanno smantellando. Per creare lavoro. E allora sì smetteremo di farci la guerra fra poveri. E allora sì avremo un obiettivo comune per il quale lottare. Perché anche quella è una balla. Che non ci sono soldi per i servizi. I soldi ci sono, ma come vengono spesi? Quanti miliardi abbiamo pagato sottobanco alle milizie libiche colluse con le mafie del contrabbando negli anni passati? Quanti asili nido ci potevamo aprire con quegli stessi denari?

      Salvini non perda tempo. Faccia sbarcare i seicento naufraghi della Acquarius e anziché prendersela con le ONG, chiami la Farnesina e riscrivano insieme i regolamenti per il rilascio dei visti nei paesi africani. Introduca il visto per ricerca di lavoro, il meccanismo dello sponsor, il ricongiungimento familiare. E con l’occasione vada a negoziare in Europa affinché siano visti validi per circolare in tutta la zona UE e cercarsi un lavoro in tutta la UE anziché pesare su un sistema d’accoglienza che fa acqua da tutte le parti.

      Perché io continuo a non capire come mai un ventenne di Lagos o Bamako, debba spendere cinquemila euro per passare il deserto e il mare, essere arrestato in Libia, torturato, venduto, vedere morire i compagni di viaggio e arrivare in Italia magari dopo un anno, traumatizzato e senza più un soldo, quando con un visto sul passaporto avrebbe potuto comprarsi un biglietto aereo da cinquecento euro e spendere il resto dei propri soldi per affittarsi una stanza e cercarsi un lavoro. Esattamente come hanno fatto cinque milioni di lavoratori immigrati in Italia, che guardate bene non sono passati per gli sbarchi e tantomeno per l’accoglienza. Sono arrivati dalla Romania, dall’Albania, dalla Cina, dal Marocco e si sono rimboccati le maniche. Esattamente come hanno fatto cinque milioni di italiani, me compreso, emigrati all’estero in questi decenni. Esattamente come vorrebbero fare i centomila parcheggiati nel limbo dell’accoglienza.

      Centomila persone costrette ad anni di attesa per avere un permesso di soggiorno che già sappiamo non arriverà in almeno un caso su due. Perché almeno in un caso su due abbiamo davanti dei lavoratori e non dei profughi di guerra. Per loro non è previsto l’asilo politico. Ma non è previsto nemmeno il rimpatrio, perché sono troppo numerosi e perché non c’è la collaborazione dei loro paesi di origine. Significa che di qui a un anno almeno cinquantamila persone andranno ad allungare le file dei senza documenti e del mercato nero del lavoro.

      Salvini dia a tutti loro un permesso di soggiorno per motivi umanitari e un titolo di viaggio con cui possano uscire dal limbo dell’accoglienza e andare a firmare un contratto di lavoro, che sia in Italia o in Germania. E dare così un senso ai progetti che hanno seguito finora. Perché l’integrazione la fa il lavoro. E se il lavoro è in Germania, in Danimarca o in Norvegia, non ha senso costringere le persone dentro una mappa per motivi burocratici. Altro che riforma Dublino, noi dobbiamo chiedere la libera circolazione dentro l’Europa dei lavoratori immigrati. Perché non possiamo permetterci di avere cittadini di serie a e di serie b. E guardate che lo dobbiamo soprattutto a noi stessi.

      Perché chiunque di noi abbia dei bambini, sa che cresceranno in una società cosmopolita. Già adesso i loro migliori amici all’asilo sono arabi, cinesi, africani. Sdoganare un discorso razzista è una bomba a orologeria per la società del domani. Perché forse non ce ne siamo accorti, ma siamo già un noi. Il noi e loro è un discorso antiquato. Un discorso che forse suona ancora logico alle orecchie di qualche vecchio nazionalista. Ma che i miei figli non capirebbero mai. Perché io non riuscirei mai a spiegare ai miei bambini che ci sono dei bimbi come loro ripescati in mare dalla nave di una ONG e da due giorni sono bloccati al largo perché nessuno li vuole sbarcare a terra.

      Chissà, forse dovremmo ripartire da lì. Da quel noi e da quelle battaglie comuni. Dopotutto, siamo o non siamo una generazione a cui il mercato ha rubato il futuro e la dignità? Siamo o non siamo una generazione che ha ripreso a emigrare? E allora basta con le guerre tra poveri. Basta con le politiche forti coi deboli e deboli coi forti.

      Legalizzate l’emigrazione Africa –Europa, rilasciate visti validi per la ricerca di lavoro in tutta l’Europa, togliete alle mafie libiche il monopolio della mobilità sud-nord e facciamo tornare il Mediterraneo ad essere un mare di pace anziché una fossa comune. O forse trentamila morti non sono abbastanza?

      https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2105161009497488&id=100000108285082

    • Questions et réponses : les futurs financements de l’UE en faveur de la gestion des frontières et des migrations

      Quel sera le montant des financements disponibles pour la gestion des frontières et des migrations ?

      34,9 milliards d’euros.

      Tirant les enseignements du passé, et sachant que la question des migrations et de la gestion des frontières demeurera un défi à l’avenir, la Commission propose d’augmenter fortement les financements en la matière au titre du prochain budget de l’UE pour la période 2021-2027.

      Un montant de financements sans précédent sera alloué par l’intermédiaire de deux Fonds principaux :

      le nouveau Fonds « Asile et migration » (qui continuera de s’appeler FAMI sous sa dénomination abrégée) sera modifié et renforcé ;
      l’instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure sera intégré à un nouveau Fonds, le Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières (FGIF), qui comprendra aussi un autre instrument, également nouveau, l’instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier.

      Au total, ce sont 34,9 milliards d’euros qui seront mis à disposition sur la prochaine période de 7 ans, contre 13 milliards d’euros environ pour la période budgétaire en cours :

      il est proposé d’augmenter de 51 % le budget alloué à la politique migratoire, qui passerait ainsi de 6,9 milliards d’euros actuellement à 10,4 milliards d’euros ;
      dans le cadre du nouveau Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières (FGIF), il est proposé de multiplier par quatre les financements alloués à la gestion des frontières, qui passeraient de 2,7 milliards d’euros actuellement (pour la période 2014-2020) à un montant qui pourrait atteindre 9,3 milliards d’euros (+ 241%).

      En outre, la Commission a proposé d’octroyer plus de 12 milliards d’euros à l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes et à l’agence eu-LISA et près de 900 millions d’euros à l’Agence de l’Union européenne pour l’asile (actuellement le Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile, EASO). Cette proposition sera présentée ultérieurement.

      1. Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières (FGIF)

      Pourquoi créer un nouveau Fonds distinct pour la gestion des frontières ?

      Dans le cadre de l’actuel budget de l’UE, la gestion des frontières relève du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure (FSI), qui est scindé en FSI-Frontières et FSI-Police.

      Si un Fonds dédié à la gestion des frontières est créé en vertu du prochain cadre financier pluriannuel, c’est parce qu’aussi bien la gestion des frontières que la sécurité intérieure sont devenues des priorités de plus en plus pressantes, qui méritent chacune que des instruments financiers dédiés et plus ciblés leur soient consacrés.

      Pour pouvoir gérer les flux migratoires et garantir la sécurité intérieure, il est crucial de protéger efficacement les frontières extérieures de l’UE. Des frontières extérieures fortes sont aussi ce qui permet à l’UE de conserver un espace Schengen sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

      Le nouveau Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières comprend l’instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas et inclura également un nouvel instrument : l’instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier, en reconnaissance du rôle joué par les autorités douanières dans la défense de toutes les frontières de l’UE (frontières maritimes, aériennes et terrestres et transits postaux), ainsi que dans la facilitation des échanges et la protection des personnes contre les marchandises dangereuses et les contrefaçons.

      Quelles sont les priorités du nouveau Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières ?

      Au cours des dernières années, un certain nombre de mesures ont été prises afin de répondre aux priorités du moment, mais aussi de poser tous les fondements importants nécessaires pour garantir la solidité des frontières.

      Le nouveau Fonds confortera ces efforts et apportera un soutien renforcé à la sécurisation de nos frontières extérieures, en s’attachant prioritairement :

      à soutenir davantage les États membres dans leurs efforts de sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’UE ;
      à favoriser une plus grande uniformité des contrôles douaniers ;
      à garantir que les systèmes informatiques à grande échelle utilisés pour gérer les frontières sont solides et fonctionnent sans problème les uns avec les autres, ainsi qu’avec les systèmes nationaux ;
      à garantir l’adaptabilité de la politique commune des visas de l’UE à l’évolution des problèmes de sécurité et des défis liés à la migration, ainsi qu’aux nouvelles possibilités offertes par le progrès technologique.

      Comment les financements seront-ils répartis ?

      La dotation totale de 9,3 milliards d’euros au Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières se répartit comme suit :

      4,8 milliards d’euros iront à des financements à long terme destinés à soutenir les mesures de gestion des frontières et la politique des visas des États membres, dont un financement initial aux États membres de 4 milliards d’euros (soit 50 %) et un ajustement de 0,8 milliard d’euros (soit 10 %) à mi-parcours pour tenir compte des pressions nouvelles ou supplémentaires ;
      3,2 milliards d’euros (soit 40 %), distribués sur l’ensemble de la période de financement, iront à un « mécanisme thématique », destiné à apporter un soutien ciblé aux États membres, à financer des projets à valeur ajoutée européenne et à répondre en outre aux urgences ;
      1,3 milliard d’euros ira à l’instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier.

      Les financements alloués aux États membres reflèteront précisément les besoins de chacun. Au début de la période de programmation, chaque État membre recevra une somme forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros, tandis que le solde sera distribué en fonction de la charge de travail, de la pression et du niveau de menace aux frontières extérieures terrestres (30 %) et maritimes (35 %), dans les aéroports (20 %) et dans les bureaux consulaires (15 %).

      En outre, sur les 4,8 milliards d’euros alloués aux États membres, 157,2 millions d’euros seront réservés au régime de transit spécial appliqué par la Lituanie.

      Comment les dotations nationales au titre de l’instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas seront-elles calculées ? Pourquoi n’est-il pas possible de fournir dès à présent la ventilation par État membre ?

      Chaque État membre recevra une somme forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros au début de la période de financement. Au-delà, leurs dotations respectives seront calculées sur la base d’une évaluation des besoins les plus pressants. Cette évaluation sera de nouveau réalisée à mi-parcours.

      Pour chaque État membre, cette évaluation tiendra compte :

      de la longueur de tout tronçon des frontières extérieures terrestres et maritimes que gère cet État membre et de la charge de travail liée (sur la base du nombre de franchissements et du nombre de refus d’entrée), ainsi que du niveau de menace (sur la base d’une évaluation de la vulnérabilité réalisée par l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes) ;
      de la charge de travail (sur la base du nombre de franchissements et du nombre de refus d’entrée) dans les aéroports de cet État membre ;
      du nombre de bureaux consulaires que compte cet État membre et de la charge de travail liée (sur la base du nombre de demandes de visa).

      Les calculs se fonderont sur des données statistiques collectées par Eurostat, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes et les États membres sur les trois années (36 mois) ayant précédé l’entrée en application du nouveau budget.

      De plus, outre leurs dotations et en application des calculs susmentionnés, les États membres recevront, tout au long de la période de programmation, des financements ciblés en faveur de priorités thématiques ou en réponse à des besoins pressants. Ces financements proviendront du « mécanisme thématique ».

      Étant donné que le prochain budget à long terme doit couvrir une période s’ouvrant en 2021, il n’est pas possible de prédire dès à présent ce que montreront les données futures. Une ventilation basée sur les données d’aujourd’hui donnerait une image biaisée, ne correspondant pas à ce que seront les dotations effectives.

      Ce budget revu à la hausse servira-t-il aussi à renforcer les agences de l’UE chargées de la gestion des frontières ?

      Oui. Outre les 9,3 milliards d’euros alloués au Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières, et au titre d’une proposition qui sera présentée séparément, plus de 12 milliards d’euros serviront à renforcer encore l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, y compris par le financement d’un corps permanent de quelque 10 000 garde-frontières, ainsi qu’à financer l’agence eu-LISA (l’Agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle au sein de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice).

      La Commission va-t-elle désormais financer aussi la construction de clôtures ?

      Non. Le travail de la Commission vise à garantir un contrôle adéquat des frontières, non à les fermer. La Commission n’a jamais financé de clôtures et n’entend pas le faire non plus dans le cadre du nouveau budget de l’UE.

      Le Fonds soutiendra-t-il la réalisation de vérifications systématiques obligatoires aux frontières extérieures ?

      Oui.

      Depuis le 7 avril 2017, outre les vérifications systématiques qui étaient déjà réalisées sur tous les ressortissants de pays tiers entrant dans l’espace Schengen, les États membres sont tenus de procéder à des vérifications systématiques, dans les bases de données pertinentes, sur les citoyens de l’UE qui franchissent les frontières extérieures de l’UE.

      Le nouveau Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières (via son instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas) apportera un soutien supplémentaire aux États membres, pour les aider à s’acquitter de ces responsabilités.

      Il s’agira d’un soutien aux infrastructures, aux équipements (tels que des scanners de documents) et aux systèmes informatiques utilisés pour contrôler les frontières, mais aussi d’un soutien à la formation des garde-frontières et à des actions visant à améliorer la coopération interservices. Les États membres pourront également couvrir les frais de personnel et de fonctionnement liés aux vérifications systématiques obligatoires aux frontières extérieures.

      Comment le nouvel instrument relatif aux visas soutiendra-t-il l’élaboration de la politique commune des visas ?

      Le nouveau Fonds aidera à moderniser la politique commune des visas de l’UE. Les financements seront essentiels, notamment parce qu’ils permettront d’améliorer l’efficacité du traitement des demandes de visa, par exemple en termes de détection et d’évaluation des risques de sécurité et de migration irrégulière, et de faciliter les procédures de visa pour les voyageurs de bonne foi.

      En 2018, la Commission a présenté une proposition de modification ciblée du code des visas et une proposition de révision du cadre juridique sous-tendant le système d’information sur les visas (VIS). Il faudra soutenir financièrement la mise en œuvre de certaines des mesures proposées, telles que la modernisation du VIS aux fins de son utilisation combinée avec d’autres systèmes d’information de l’Union et d’une coopération améliorée entre les autorités des États membres dans le cadre du traitement des demandes de visa.

      Le Fonds servira en outre à évaluer plus avant la possibilité de numériser le traitement des demandes de visa. Sur le moyen à long terme, il sera essentiel à la mise en place de procédures électroniques de visa rapides, sûres et conviviales, pour le plus grand avantage tant des demandeurs de visa que des consulats.

      Pourquoi accorder une telle importance aux contrôles douaniers ?

      L’union douanière est unique au monde. Elle constitue un fondement de l’Union européenne et elle est essentielle au bon fonctionnement du marché unique. Une fois les formalités douanières accomplies dans un État membre, les marchandises peuvent circuler librement sur le territoire de l’Union, puisque tous les États membres sont censés appliquer les mêmes règles en matière de recettes et de protection aux frontières extérieures. Les administrations douanières de l’UE doivent coopérer étroitement pour faciliter les échanges et protéger la santé et la sécurité de tous les citoyens de l’UE. L’UE est l’un des plus grands blocs commerciaux du monde : en 2015, elle a pesé pour près de 15 % (représentant 3 500 milliards d’euros) dans les échanges mondiaux de marchandises.

      Pour gérer ce volume d’échanges internationaux, il faut traiter chaque année, de manière rapide et efficace, des millions de déclarations en douane. Mais les douanes jouent également un rôle protecteur. Elles participent activement à la lutte contre le terrorisme, en procédant à des vérifications pour détecter le trafic d’armes et le commerce illégal d’œuvres d’art et de biens culturels, et elles protègent les consommateurs contre les marchandises qui présentent un risque pour leur santé et leur sécurité. Ainsi, 454,2 tonnes de stupéfiants, 35 millions de marchandises de contrefaçon et 3,2 milliards de cigarettes ont été saisis dans l’Union en 2014. La réalisation de contrôles appropriés passe par l’échange rapide d’informations de haute qualité et à jour et par une bonne coordination entre les administrations douanières de nos États membres.

      Que prévoit le nouvel « instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier » ?

      Le nouvel instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier vise à aider les États membres à effectuer les contrôles douaniers en finançant les équipements nécessaires. Si ce nouvel instrument, doté d’une enveloppe de 1,3 milliard d’euros, est créé, c’est afin de permettre l’acquisition, la maintenance et le remplacement d’équipements douaniers innovants, dès lors que ni le Programme « Douane » ni d’autres instruments financiers existants ne sont disponibles à cette fin.

      Cet instrument financera les équipements douaniers pour les quatre types de frontières (terrestres, maritimes, aériennes et postales), un groupe de travail composé d’États membres volontaires étant chargé de superviser et d’évaluer les besoins en équipement pour chaque type de frontière. Les fonds seront mis à la disposition de tous les États membres. Des travaux ont déjà été menés par l’équipe d’experts douaniers de la frontière terrestre est et sud-est de l’Union (CELBET), qui réunit les onze États membres chargés des frontières terrestres de l’Union. L’équipe CELBET poursuivra ses activités. S’agissant des autres types de frontières, les travaux peuvent désormais commencer afin que les besoins des États membres puissent être évalués, et des fonds alloués, dès l’entrée en vigueur, en 2021, de l’instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier.

      Quel type d’équipement est-il possible d’acquérir au moyen du nouvel instrument ?

      L’instrument a pour objectif de financer des équipements qui ne sont pas intrusifs, mais qui permettent la réalisation de contrôles douaniers efficaces et efficients. Parmi les équipements que les États membres pourraient acquérir ou moderniser ou dont ils pourraient solliciter la maintenance, citons les scanners, les systèmes de détection automatisée des plaques d’immatriculation, les équipes de chiens renifleurs et les laboratoires mobiles d’analyse d’échantillons. Les besoins en équipement seront définis dans le cadre du Programme « Douane » qui s’applique parallèlement au nouvel instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier annoncé aujourd’hui. Les équipements de contrôle douanier mis à disposition au titre de ce Fonds pourront également être utilisés pour d’autres contrôles de conformité, réalisés, par exemple, en application de dispositions en matière de visas ou de prescriptions de police, le cas échéant, ce qui permettra d’en maximiser l’impact.

      L’instrument établit des priorités en matière de financement des équipements selon certains critères d’éligibilité. Les équipements pourront être achetés au titre de la nouvelle réglementation uniquement s’ils se rapportent à au moins un des six objectifs suivants : inspections non intrusives ; détection d’objets cachés sur des êtres humains ; détection des rayonnements et identification de nucléides ; analyse d’échantillons en laboratoire ; échantillonnage et analyse sur le terrain des échantillons ; et fouille à l’aide de dispositifs portables, Cette liste pourra être réexaminée en tant que de besoin. L’instrument soutiendra également l’acquisition ou la modernisation d’équipements de contrôle douanier pour l’expérimentation de nouveaux dispositifs ou de nouvelles conditions sur le terrain avant que les États membres n’entament des achats à grande échelle d’équipements neufs.

      2. Fonds « Asile et migration » (FAMI)

      Quelles sont les priorités du Fonds « Asile et migration » ?

      Au cours des vingt dernières années, l’Union européenne a mis en place des normes communes en matière d’asile qui comptent parmi les plus élevées au monde. S’agissant des migrations, la politique européenne a progressé à pas de géant ces trois dernières années, sous l’effet de l’agenda européen en matière de migration proposé par la Commission Juncker en mai 2015. Une ligne de conduite plus homogène se dégage peu à peu pour faire face au phénomène.

      Outre qu’il soutiendra les efforts déployés actuellement, le nouveau Fonds accroîtra encore le soutien octroyé à la gestion des migrations, en s’attachant prioritairement :

      à offrir davantage de soutien aux États membres soumis aux pressions migratoires les plus fortes ;
      à soutenir davantage la migration légale et l’intégration rapide des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour régulier ;
      à lutter contre l’immigration irrégulière, en accroissant le nombre de retours effectifs des personnes qui n’ont pas le droit de séjourner dans l’UE et en renforçant la coopération en matière de réadmission avec les pays tiers ;
      à équiper l’Union de moyens plus rapides et plus souples pour faire face aux crises.

      Comment les fonds prévus au titre du FAMI seront-ils répartis entre les États membres ?

      La Commission a proposé de consacrer 10,4 milliards d’euros au nouveau Fonds « Asile et migration » (FAMI).

      Un montant de 4,2 milliards d’euros (40 %) de cette enveloppe sera distribué tout au long de la période de financement pour apporter un appui ciblé aux États membres, qui concernera des projets ayant une véritable valeur ajoutée européenne comme la réinstallation ou servira à répondre à des besoins urgents et à orienter les financements d’urgence vers les États membres au moment et à l’endroit où ils en ont besoin.

      Le Fonds consacrera 6,3 milliards d’euros (60 %) à des financements de long terme destinés à soutenir les États membres en matière de gestion des migrations.

      Dans ce cadre sont prévus une dotation initiale accordée aux États membres (50 % de l’intégralité du Fonds, soit 5,2 milliards d’euros) et un ajustement à mi-parcours pour tenir compte de pressions nouvelles ou supplémentaires (10 %, soit 1,1 milliard d’euros).

      Chaque État membre recevra une somme forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros, tandis que le solde sera réparti en fonction de la pression migratoire et des besoins des États membres dans les domaines de l’asile (30 %), de l’intégration et de la migration régulière (30 %) et de la lutte contre l’immigration illégale et du retour (40 %).

      Comment les dotations nationales seront-elles calculées ? Pourquoi n’est-il pas possible de fournir dès à présent la ventilation par État membre ?

      Les financements alloués aux États membres reflèteront précisément les besoins de chacun. Au début de la période de programmation, chaque État membre recevra un montant forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros. Au-delà, leurs dotations respectives seront calculées sur la base d’une évaluation des besoins les plus pressants. Le solde sera réparti en fonction de la pression migratoire et des besoins des États membres en matière d’asile. Pour chaque État membre, cette évaluation tiendra compte :

      pour l’asile (pondération de 30 %) : du nombre de bénéficiaires reconnus d’une protection internationale (30 %), de demandeurs d’asile (60 %) et de personnes réinstallées (10 %) ;
      pour la migration légale et l’intégration (pondération de 30 %) : du nombre de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour régulier (40 %) et du nombre de ressortissants de pays tiers qui ont obtenu un premier permis de séjour (les travailleurs saisonniers, les étudiants et les chercheurs ne relèvent pas de cette catégorie) ;
      pour le retour (pondération de 40 %) : du nombre de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier qui ont fait l’objet d’une décision de retour (50 %) et du nombre de retours effectivement réalisés (50 %).

      Les calculs seront basés sur des données statistiques recueillies par Eurostat au cours des trois années civiles précédant l’entrée en application du nouveau budget.

      Étant donné que le prochain budget à long terme doit couvrir une période s’ouvrant en 2021, il n’est possible de prédire dès à présent ce que montreront des données futures. Une ventilation basée sur les données d’aujourd’hui donnerait une image biaisée, ne correspondant pas à ce que seront les dotations effectives.

      Quelles sont les mesures qui ont été prises au titre des Fonds actuels pour soutenir les États membres au cours de la crise migratoire ?

      Dans l’ensemble, l’actuel Fonds « Asile, migration et intégration » (FAMII) a soutenu efficacement et avec succès la réponse commune apportée par l’Union à l’aggravation des problèmes de migration et de sécurité, tout en envoyant également un message de solidarité aux États membres situés en première ligne. Par ailleurs, face à la crise migratoire, aux difficultés accrues sur le plan de la sécurité et à un environnement politique en perpétuelle évolution, la Commission a dû recourir à une multitude de modalités financières ad hoc pour appuyer une réponse commune et adéquate de l’UE, et ce d’autant plus que les mécanismes et réserves de flexibilité ont été créés à une époque où les flux migratoires étaient stables.

      Les augmentations budgétaires réalisées jusqu’au milieu de la période de financement actuelle 2014-2020 ont clairement prouvé que les moyens budgétaires avaient atteint leurs limites. La dotation du Fonds « Asile, migration et intégration » a plus que doublé (+ 123 %), les financements destinés aux organismes décentralisés pratiquement doublé (+ 86 %), et l’aide d’urgence augmenté de près de 500 %. Outre des instruments de financement de l’Union, dont certains devaient être modifiés pour être utilisés à l’intérieur de l’Union (notamment l’instrument d’aide d’urgence), l’Union a dû mettre en place des solutions de financement innovantes comme les Fonds fiduciaires pour mobiliser des financements au-delà des limites du cadre financier.

      L’expérience acquise avec l’actuel cadre financier fait apparaître un besoin évident de montants de financement considérablement accrus et d’une plus grande souplesse, de manière à garantir une gestion budgétaire saine et prévisible.

      Qu’en est-il de l’intégration qui figurant dans le Fonds précédent ?

      La Commission propose de donner un nouvel élan au soutien aux politiques d’intégration au titre du prochain budget à long terme en associant la force de frappe de plusieurs instruments de financement.

      Au titre du Fonds « Asile et migration », le soutien à l’intégration se concentrera sur les mesures d’intégration rapide et aura pour objectif d’apporter une aide lors des premières étapes clés de l’intégration comme les cours de langue, tout en soutenant également le renforcement des capacités des autorités chargées de la politique d’intégration, les guichets uniques d’information pour les migrants en séjour régulier récemment arrivés et les échanges entre les migrants en séjour régulier récemment arrivés et les membres de la communauté d’accueil.

      L’intégration à plus long terme bénéficiera d’un soutien au titre des Fonds de cohésion de l’UE, en particulier le futur Fonds social européen + et le futur Fonds européen de développement régional. Ces mesures d’intégration à long terme incluront des mesures d’appui structurel comme la formation professionnelle, l’éducation et le logement.

      Y aura-t-il des financements à la réinstallation ?

      Oui. La Commission propose que les États membres reçoivent 10 000 euros par personne réinstallée, comme dans le cadre des actuels programmes de réinstallation de l’UE.

      Comment les politiques de retour seront-elles soutenues ?

      Des retours effectifs sont une composante essentielle d’une politique migratoire de l’UE qui soit équitable et humaine, mais aussi – et c’est tout aussi important – viable. Le Fonds aidera à combattre la migration irrégulière, en garantissant la pérennité du retour et la réadmission effective dans les pays tiers. Comme pour toutes les politiques de l’UE, cela se fera dans le plein respect des droits fondamentaux et de la dignité des personnes faisant l’objet d’une mesure de retour.

      Seront soutenus : la mise en œuvre des retours ; le renforcement des infrastructures de retour et des capacités de rétention ; le développement de la coopération avec les pays d’origine, afin de faciliter la conclusion d’accords de réadmission, assortis de modalités pratiques, et leur mise en œuvre ; et la réintégration. Le Fonds soutiendra également les mesures visant d’abord à prévenir la migration irrégulière (campagnes d’information, collecte de données, suivi des flux et des routes migratoires, etc.).

      Quel est le lien avec la gestion des flux migratoires externes ?

      Les dimensions interne et externe à l’UE de la gestion des migrations sont étroitement liées. Le Fonds « Asile et migration » sera à même de soutenir la dimension externe des politiques internes de l’Union.

      Ce soutien sera largement complété par les fonds alloués, au titre de la politique extérieure de l’Union, à la lutte contre la dimension extérieure de la migration irrégulière, et notamment aux efforts déployés pour remédier à ses causes profondes, améliorer les perspectives d’avenir qu’offrent les pays d’origine et développer la coopération en matière de retour, de réadmission et de migration légale (voir les propositions sectorielles distinctes qui seront présentées dans les jours à venir).

      Les autorités locales et les organisations de la société civile pourront-elles également bénéficier de financements du Fonds ?

      La Commission considère que les administrations locales et régionales et la société civile jouent un rôle fondamental, notamment en matière d’intégration, et devraient en conséquence recevoir autant de soutien que possible.

      C’est pourquoi, alors que les fonds allaient jusqu’à présent aux autorités nationales en couverture de 75 % des coûts d’une mesure (taux de cofinancement), à l’avenir, lorsque des régions, des municipalités ou des organisations de la société civile mettront en œuvre semblables mesures, le budget de l’UE couvrira 90 % des coûts.

      Pourquoi des financements au nouveau système de Dublin sont-ils prévus au titre du FAMI, alors qu’il n’y a pas encore eu d’accord à ce sujet ?

      La proposition relative au FAMI prévoit d’ores et déjà un soutien au transfert des demandeurs d’asile en application du règlement de Dublin tel qu’il est proposé de le réformer. Les financements couvriraient les mesures de premier accueil et d’assistance de base, l’aide à l’intégration si le demandeur reçoit un statut de protection et l’aide aux personnes qui devraient faire l’objet d’une mesure de retour au cas où elles n’obtiendraient pas de protection ou de droit de séjour.

      La proposition reflète le règlement de Dublin en l’état actuel des négociations, mais elle sera adaptée en fonction du résultat final de ces négociations.

      Comment le suivi des fonds alloués à la gestion des frontières et des migrations sera-t-il assuré ?

      La Commission suivra la mise en œuvre des actions en gestion directe et indirecte. Pour les fonds dont la gestion est partagée entre l’UE et les États membres, la responsabilité première d’assurer le suivi des projets financés par l’UE incombera à ces derniers. Les autorités administrant les fonds de l’UE dans les États membres doivent mettre en place des systèmes de gestion et de contrôle satisfaisant aux exigences de l’UE, y compris en matière de suivi. Le suivi des actions faisant l’objet d’une gestion partagée sera assuré par chaque État membre, dans le cadre d’un système de gestion et de contrôle conforme au droit de l’UE (règlement portant dispositions communes). Une priorité nouvelle sera accordée à la réalisation d’évaluations régulières selon des indicateurs de performance (les États membres devront communiquer des données pour chaque programme, jusqu’à six fois par an).

      Les États membres devront également communiquer un rapport annuel de performance, fournissant des informations sur l’état de mise en œuvre du programme et indiquant si les valeurs intermédiaires et les valeurs cibles ont été atteintes. Une réunion de réexamen sera organisée tous les deux ans entre la Commission et chaque État membre pour apprécier la performance de chaque programme. À la fin de la période, chaque État membre présentera un rapport de performance final.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-4127_fr.htm

    • LE VERE RAGIONI DELL’IMMIGRAZIONE AFRICANA : IL FURTO DELLA TERRA

      L’Unione europea ha appena deciso di triplicare i fondi per la gestione dei migranti: la somma messa a bilancio passerà dagli attuali 13 miliardi di euro (anni 2014-2021) ai futuri 35 miliardi di euro (anni 2021-2027).
      Prima di compiere l’analisi dei costi preventivati, dove i soldi vanno, per fare cosa, dobbiamo sapere cosa noi prendiamo dall’Africa, e cosa restituiamo all’Africa. Se noi aiutiamo loro oppure se loro, magari, danno una mano a noi.
      Conviene ripetere e magari ripubblicare. Quindi partire dalle basi, dai luoghi in cui i migranti partono.

      https://raiawadunia.com/le-vere-ragioni-dellimmigrazione-africana-il-furto-della-terra
      #land_grabbing #accaparement_de_terres

    • UE- #JAI : course effrénée au renforcement de Frontex au détriment des #droits_fondamentaux Featured

      Le 12 octobre, les #Conseil_Justice_et_Affaires_Intérieurs discutera de la nouvelle proposition de #réforme de Frontex, l’#agence_européenne_des_garde-côtes_et_garde-frontières, deux ans après la dernière révision du mandat en 2016. Peu importe les critiques relatives aux violations des droits inhérentes à ses activités : l’agence est en passe d’acquérir des #compétences_exécutives ainsi qu’un rôle accru pour expulser depuis les Etats membres et depuis les Etats non européens.

      Le collectif Frontexit réitère ses très fortes préoccupations quant à cette énième réforme et appelle le Etats membres et les parlementaires européens à refuser cette course législative symbole d’une obsession du contrôle des frontières au détriment des droits des personnes migrantes.

      La Commission européenne propose de porter le #personnel de Frontex à 10’000 hommes d’ici 2020 et son #budget à 1,3 milliards pour la période 2019/2020, soit une augmentation de plus de 6000% du budget prévisionnel en à peine 12 ans. L’agence jouera un rôle central et inédit dans la préparation des décisions de retour depuis les Etats-membres et dans la conduite des #expulsions entre/depuis des pays « tiers » sans prérogatives claires.

      Face au doublement du nombre de personnes expulsées depuis l’UE entre 2015 et 2017, au vu des mécanismes de contrôle politiques faibles, voire inexistants (aucune activité hors UE sous contrôle du Parlement européen) et des réponses aux violations des droits ineffectives et inefficaces, cette réforme mettra davantage en danger les personnes migrantes et affaiblira leurs maigres droits.

      L’UE poursuit une course effrénée au renforcement de Frontex alors qu’aucune étude d’impact de ses activités actuelles sur les droits fondamentaux n’a été réalisée. Il est urgent que les parlementaires européens exercent un droit de contrôle sur les activités de Frontex y compris hors de l’UE (déploiement croissant de l’agence en Afrique par exemple), de l’arsenal à sa disposition (#EUROSUR compris) et de leurs conséquences.

      Aucune justification tangible n’existe pour cette énième révision du mandat, si ce n’est – aux dires de l’UE – l’urgence de la situation. Pourtant, cette urgence n’existe pas (le nombre d’arrivées a été divisé par cinq depuis 2015 selon l’OIM), pas plus que la soi-disant « crise migratoire ». L’effondrement du nombre des arrivées est directement imputable à l’augmentation des dispositifs sécuritaires aux frontières et à la coopération sans limite avec des pays où les violations des droits sont légion.

      Frontex, prompte à qualifier de « passeurs » des pêcheurs tunisiens qui sauvent des vies, prompte à collaborer voire dispenser des formations à des Etats où les violations des droits sont documentées, est à l’image d’une Europe qui s’enfonce dans une logique toujours plus sécuritaire au détriment des droits des personnes exilées, mais également de leurs soutiens.

      Cette #fermeture_des_frontières est également une menace pour le respect des droits des personnes qui se voient obligées d’exercer leur droit à quitter tout pays par des voies toujours plus dangereuses.

      http://www.frontexit.org/fr/actus/item/904-ue-jai-course-effrenee-au-renforcement-de-frontex-au-detriment-des-dr
      #droits_humains

    • NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights

      The Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights has expressed “serious concerns about the effectiveness of Frontex’s serious incident reporting mechanism,” saying that it should be revised and that the border agency must “take additional measures to set up an effective system to monitor respect for fundamental rights in the context of its activities.”

      The inadequacy of the serious incident reporting (SIR) mechanism is raised in the latest annual report of the Consultative Forum (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/eu-frontex-consultative-forum-annual-report-2018.pdf), which is made up of nine civil society organisations, two EU agencies and four UN agencies and other intergovernmental bodies. It was established in October 2012 to provide independent advice to the agency on fundamental rights.

      Its report notes that during 2018, Frontex “only received 3 serious incident reports for alleged violations of fundamental rights and 10 complaints,” described by as an “almost negligible number” given that the agency has some 1,500 officers deployed at the external borders of the EU.

      Fundamental rights violations

      The Consultative Forum highlights “fundamental rights violations in areas where the Agency is operational, including the Hungarian-Serbian and the Greek-Turkish land borders.”

      For example, interviews by Human Rights Watch with asylum seekers in Greece and Turkey found that:

      “Greek law enforcement officers at the land border with Turkey in the northeastern Evros region routinely summarily return asylum seekers and migrants… The officers in some cases use violence and often confiscate and destroy the migrants’ belongings.” (https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/18/greece-violent-pushbacks-turkey-border)

      This is simply the latest in a long line of reports and investigations documenting mistreatment and abuse at the Greek-Turkish border, where The Christian Science Monitor also heard allegations that Frontex was directly involved in pushback operations (https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2018/1221/Are-Greek-and-EU-officials-illegally-deporting-migrants-to-Turkey).

      The Consultative Forum’s report also points to numerous instances of collective expulsion from Croatia to Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina; ill-treatment at the Bulgarian-Turkish border; and what the Hungarian Helsinki Committee refers to as “systemic violations of asylum-seekers’ human rights in Hungary.” (https://www.osce.org/odihr/396917?download=true)

      Repeat: suspend activities at Hungary-Serbia border

      In its report, the Consultative Forum repeats a recommendation it has made previously: until fundamental rights can be guaranteed, the Executive Director should use the powers available under the 2016 Frontex Regulation to “suspend operational activities” at the Hungarian-Serbian border.

      The agency offers little obvious information about its activities at that border on its website (https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/main-operations/operations-in-the-western-balkans), merely stating that it “deploys specialised officers and border surveillance vehicles and other equipment” in both Hungary and Croatia, where its officers “assist the national authorities in the detection of forged documents, stolen cars, illegal drugs and weapons.”

      The December 2018 report by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee cited above doesn’t mention Frontex, but details serious malpractice by the Hungarian state: immediate pushbacks that negate the right to seek asylum; a lack of procedural safeguards for those that do manage to claim asylum; and a lack of state support to integrate and assist those that receive protection.

      Lack of staff “seriously undermining” fundamental rights obligations

      The Consultative Forum’s report also repeats a longstanding complaint that the inadequate provision of staff to the agency’s Fundamental Rights Officer is “seriously undermining the fulfilment” of their mandate “and, more generally Frontex’s capacity to fulfil its fundamental rights obligations”.

      According to the report, while there were 58 posts for administrators foreseen in the agency’s recruitment plan for 2018, not a single one was allocated to the Fundamental Rights Officer.

      Furthermore, “during the year, only three Senior Assistants… joined the Fundamental Rights Office,” and its work “continues to be compromised in areas such as monitoring of operations, handling of complaints, provision of advice on training, risk analysis, third country cooperation and return activities” - in short, those areas of the agency’s work raising the most high-profile fundamental rights concerns.

      Independence of Fundamental Rights Office at risk

      The report also warns that the independence of the Fundamental Rights Office is at risk.

      The problem centres on the appointment of an Advisor in the Executive Director’s Cabinet as interim replacement for the Fundamental Rights Officer, who in the second half of 2018 “took an extended period of sick leave”.

      The Consultative Forum has “noted that the appointment of a member of the Executive Director’s cabinet as Fundamental Rights Officer ad interim raises issues under the EBCG [Frontex] Regulation.”

      In particular, the “previous and future reporting expectations on the incumbent in relation to the Executive Director” make it:

      “difficult… to ensure that the Fundamental Rights Officer ad interim and the Fundamental Rights Officer’s team maintain their independence in the performance of their duties and avoid potential conflicts of interest.”

      A long list of issues

      The report also examines a number of other issues concerning fundamental rights and the agency’s work, including the ongoing amendments to its governing legislation; the treatment of stateless persons in Frontex operations; “gender mainstreaming at Frontex”; and the need for a revision of the Fundamental Rights Strategy, amongst other things.

      Full report: Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights: Sixth annual report (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/eu-frontex-consultative-forum-annual-report-2018.pdf)

      Further reading

      Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations (Statewatch News Online, 21 May 2018: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm)

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm

  • EU plans to include fingerprints in identity cards are unjustified and unnecessary
    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jun/eu-id-cards-pr.htm

    Proposals for mandatory fingerprints in national ID cards to “facilitate free movement” will affect 370 million people The European Commission has published a proposal calling for the mandatory inclusion of biometrics (two fingerprints and a facial image) in all EU Member States’ identity cards. The demands to include fingerprints are an unnecessary and unjustified infringement on the right to privacy of almost 85% of EU citizens, as explained in a new analysis published today by civil (...)

    #Identité #biométrie #empreintes #facial

    ##Identité