• Frontex boosts support to Italy
    2023-09-20

    Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, will expand its support for Italy following the recent spike in the number of arrivals of irregular migrants on the island of Lampedusa.

    Frontex has already agreed to double the number of flight hours of its aircraft that monitor the Central Mediterranean Sea and offered additional satellite images of the main departure areas of migrants from Tunisia. These measures will allow the Italian authorities to be better monitor the seas and will support any potential search and rescue operations.

    The agency also offered additional support in the registration and identification of migrants by contributing mobile migration teams, comprising about 30 experts, to the port cities of Reggio Calabria and Messina, where many of the migrants were transported to.

    “We are actively collaborating with Italian authorities and stand ready to bolster our support. This is not just an Italian challenge but a collective one for Europe. Together, we embrace the shared responsibility of safeguarding the EU’s external borders,” said Frontex Executive Director Hans Leijtens.

    Frontex already has nearly 40 officers and staff members on Lampedusa to help Italian authorities with the identification and registration of people arriving on the island, as well as one patrol vessel stationed there. In addition, the agency has two aircraft based on Lampedusa and one drone in Malta, assisting with aerial surveillance and providing early warning.

    Frontex is currently looking into sending additional officers to Lampedusa and increasing the number of patrolling hours of the vessels deployed in the area and support efforts to combat the criminal groups involved in people smuggling.

    The agency is also ready to step up its support with return activities. Apart from sending additional return experts and providing training, Frontex may organise identification missions to non-EU countries based on the needs of the Italian authorities to facilitate return procedures.

    Frontex is present in Italy through joint operation Themis, which in total consists of 283 officers and staff, five vessels, seven aircraft, 18 mobile offices and 4 vehicles for migration management.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-boosts-support-to-italy-IHEK3y
    #Frontex #Italie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #avions #enregistrement #Reggio_Calabria #identification #Messina #soutien #aide #mobile_migration_teams #Lampedusa #Themis #opération_Themis #militarisation_des_frontières

  • Grèce : au moins 78 morts dans un naufrage, le plus meurtrier de l’année dans le pays

    Au moins 78 migrants se sont noyés mercredi dans le naufrage de leur embarcation en mer méditerranée, dans le sud-ouest de la Grèce, tandis que 104 ont pu être secourus par les garde-côtes grecs. Selon des médias locaux, le bateau transportait au moins 600 personnes. Les recherches se poursuivaient mercredi pour tenter de retrouver d’autres survivants. Il s’agit du naufrage le plus meurtrier de l’année en Grèce.

    Au moins 78 personnes ont trouvé la mort dans un naufrage dans la nuit de mardi 13 à mercredi 14 juin au large de la Grèce. Quelques 104 naufragés ont pu être secourus par les garde-côtes grecs et transférés vers la ville de Kalamata, un port situé au sud ouest du pays.

    Les chaînes de télévision grecques ont montré les images de rescapés, couvertures grises sur les épaules et masques hygiéniques sur le visage, descendre d’un yacht portant l’inscription Georgetown, la capitale des îles Caïmans. D’autres étaient évacués sur des civières. Quatre d’entre eux ont été conduits à l’hôpital de Kalamata en raison de symptômes d’hypothermie.

    D’après les informations délivrées par les autorités grecques, les exilés sont majoritairement originaires d’Égypte, de Syrie et du Pakistan. Selon les premières informations, le bateau aurait quitté Tobrouk, à l’est de la Libye, en direction de l’Italie, vendredi 9 juin.

    600 migrants à bord du bateau

    Le nombre de passagers présents sur le bateau n’a pas été confirmé par les autorités grecques. Mais des médias locaux parlent d’au moins 600 personnes, ce qui laisse craindre la disparition de centaines de naufragés.

    L’opération de sauvetage se poursuivait mercredi après-midi dans les eaux internationales situées au large de la ville grecque de Pylos. Elle implique six navires des garde-côtes, un avion et un hélicoptère militaires ainsi qu’un drone de Frontex, l’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières.

    https://twitter.com/alarm_phone/status/1668913096667144193

    La Grèce a connu de nombreux naufrages d’embarcations de migrants, souvent vétustes et surchargées, mais il s’agit jusqu’ici du bilan humain le plus lourd depuis un précédent le 3 juin 2016 au cours duquel au moins 320 personnes avaient péri ou disparu.

    L’embarcation avait été repérée une première fois mardi par les garde-côtes italiens, qui ont alerté leurs homologues grecs et européens. Les migrants à bord « ont refusé toute aide », selon les autorités grecques. La plateforme d’aide aux migrants en mer, Alarm Phone, a signalé sur Twitter avoir été alertée le même jour par des exilés en détresse, non loin du lieu du naufrage.

    Selon une journaliste basée en Grèce, chaque passager avait payé 4 500 dollars (environ 4 000 euros) la traversée.

    Une année particulièrement meurtrière

    Depuis un an, on observe de plus en plus de départs de bateaux de migrants depuis l’est de la Libye. « Ce n’est pas inhabituel que des bateaux fassent cette route. Les départs depuis l’est de la Libye sont plus fréquents » depuis l’été dernier, expliquait l’an dernier à InfoMigrants Frederico Soda, chef de mission Libye auprès de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM). Les exilés prennent désormais la mer depuis cette zone, afin d’éviter les interceptions des garde-côtes libyens, qui se concentrent à l’ouest du pays.

    Mais la traversée n’est pas sans risque. L’est de la Libye est considérablement plus éloigné de l’Italie que la partie ouest, d’où embarquent la majorité des migrants. À titre d’exemple, 1 200 km séparent les deux villes côtières de Tobrouk (à l’Est) et Tripoli (à l’Ouest), situé en-dessous de la Sicile. Un trajet démarré depuis l’est de la Libye est ainsi « beaucoup plus long », précisait encore Federico Soda.

    La route méditerranéenne reste la plus meurtrière au monde. En 2022, 2 406 migrants ont péri dans cette zone maritime, soit une augmentation de 16% sur un an, selon le dernier rapport de l’OIM. Et l’année 2023 risque d’établir un nouveau record : depuis janvier, ce sont déjà 1 166 personnes qui ont péri ou ont disparu dans ces eaux, dont 1030 en Méditerranée centrale. Un tel nombre n’avait pas été observé depuis 2017.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/49667/grece--au-moins-78-morts-dans-un-naufrage-le-plus-meurtrier-de-lannee-
    #Pylos #Grèce #naufrage #asile #migrations #décès #morts #tragédie #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #14_juin_2023 #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #13_juin_2023

    • Après le naufrage en Grèce, les autorités grecques et européennes sous le feu des critiques

      À la suite de l’annonce de la disparition de plusieurs centaines de personnes dans un naufrage survenu mercredi au large de la Grèce, des dirigeants européens ont fait part de leurs condoléances. Ils ont reçu de nombreuses critiques condamnant les politiques migratoires européennes.

      C’est sans doute le naufrage le plus meurtrier depuis 2013. Mercredi 14 juin, vers 2h du matin, un bateau surchargé de migrants a fait naufrage au large de Pylos, dans le sud-ouest de la Grèce. Au moins 78 personnes sont mortes dans le drame et des centaines d’autres sont toujours portées disparues. Selon les témoignages des rescapés, qui ont donné des chiffres différents, entre 400 et 750 exilés se trouvaient sur le bateau parti de Tobrouk, dans l’est de la Libye.

      À la suite de ce drame, de nombreuses personnalités politiques grecques et européennes ont exprimé leur émotion sur les réseaux sociaux. La présidente de la Commission européenne Ursula von der Leyen s’est dit « profondément attristée par la nouvelle du naufrage au large des côtes grecques et par les nombreux décès signalés ». « Nous devons continuer à travailler ensemble, avec les États membres et les pays tiers, pour éviter de telles tragédies », a-t-elle ajouté.

      Ylva Johansson, commissaire européenne aux Affaires intérieures, s’est quant à elle dit « profondément affectée par cette tragédie meurtrière au large des côtes grecques ». « Nous avons le devoir moral collectif de démanteler les réseaux criminels. La meilleure façon d’assurer la sécurité des migrants est d’empêcher ces voyages catastrophiques... », a également indiqué la responsable.

      Les messages de soutien des deux dirigeantes ont entraîné de très nombreuses critiques d’internautes. Des défenseurs des droits des migrants, avocats et journalistes ont notamment dénoncé le « cynisme » des autorités européennes, les accusant de promouvoir une politique migratoire européenne dure.

      « Vies innocentes »

      La classe politique grecque a également réagi au drame. En campagne électorale en vue des législatives du 25 juin, l’ancien Premier ministre conservateur, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a décidé d’annuler un rassemblement électoral prévu pour la fin de journée à Patras, le grand port de cette région du Péloponnèse, a annoncé son parti Nouvelle Démocratie (ND).

      « Nous sommes tous choqués par le tragique naufrage survenu aujourd’hui dans les eaux internationales de la Méditerranée, au sud-ouest du Péloponnèse. Je suis attristé par la perte de tant de vies innocentes », a-t-il déclaré sur Twitter.

      Ce responsable politique s’est par ailleurs entretenu au téléphone avec le Premier ministre par intérim, Ioannis Sarmas. Il a également décrété trois jours de deuil dans le pays.

      Sur les réseaux sociaux, l’ancien Premier ministre n’a pas non plus été épargné par des internautes l’accusant d’hypocrisie face au drame de Pylos. Le dirigeant a mené une politique très dure envers les exilés durant ses quatre années à la tête du gouvernement. Athènes a été à de très nombreuses reprises accusée de pratiquer des refoulements illégaux de migrants en mer Égée et dans la région de l’Evros.
      Des bateaux escortés hors des SAR zones

      De nombreux membres d’organisations internationales ont également réagi au drame de Pylos. Vincent Cochetel, envoyé spécial du Haut-commissariat des nations unies aux réfugiés (HCR), en charge de la Méditerranée de l’ouest et centrale s’est dit « très attristé par cette nouvelle tragédie ». Le responsable a également confié son inquiétude « de voir ces derniers mois certains États côtiers escorter des bateaux en mauvais état en dehors de leur zone SAR pour s’assurer qu’ils atteignent d’autres zones SAR ».

      De son côté, Federico Soda, directeur du département des urgences à l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), a plaidé pour la mise en place de « mesures concrètes pour donner la priorité à la recherche et au sauvetage » et de « voies d’accès sûres pour les migrants ».

      L’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières (Frontex) s’est, quant à elle, déclarée « profondément touchée » par le drame. Dans le même message posté sur Twitter, l’agence assure que son avion de surveillance a repéré le bateau le mardi 13 juin au matin et affirme avoir « immédiatement informé les autorités compétentes ».

      Selon les autorités portuaires grecques, un avion de surveillance de Frontex avait effectivement vu le bateau mardi mais il n’est pas intervenu car les passagers ont « refusé toute aide ».

      Les ONG actives dans l’aide aux exilés ont également fait part de leur effroi face au drame de Pylos. Interrogé par Libération, le président de SOS Méditerranée France, François Thomas, a condamné une « nouvelle tragédie insupportable ». « Il n’existe aucune solidarité européenne. Les moyens de sauvetage sont de moins en moins importants, alors que l’Europe a des moyens. Quand est-ce que tout cela va s’arrêter ? », a-t-il dénoncé.

      Médecins sans frontières (MSF), qui intervient en Méditerranée centrale avec son navire humanitaire le Geo barents , a déclaré être « attristé et choqué » par le drame survenu mercredi. L’ONG précise que ses équipes en Grèce se tiennent prêtes à intervenir pour aider autant que possible les rescapés.

      Enquête ouverte

      Enfin, le pape François, très sensible à la thématique migratoire, est « profondément consterné » par le naufrage, a rapporté jeudi le Vatican dans un communiqué.

      « Sa sainteté le pape François envoie ses prières sincères pour les nombreux migrants qui sont morts, leurs proches et tous ceux qui ont été traumatisés par cette tragédie », peut-on lire dans un télégramme signé par le N.2 du Saint-Siège, le cardinal Pietro Parolin, et publié par le Vatican.

      Les opérations de secours se poursuivaient jeudi matin pour tenter de retrouver des survivants. Des moyens aériens et maritimes sont déployés mais les espoirs s’amenuisent à mesure que le temps passe. Jusqu’à présent, 104 personnes ont pu être secourues mais Athènes redoute que des centaines d’autres ne soient portées disparues, d’après les témoignages des survivants.

      Une enquête a été ouverte par la justice grecque sur le sauvetage de l’embarcation. La Cour suprême grecque a également ordonné une enquête pour définir les causes du drame qui a choqué le pays.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/49698/apres-le-naufrage-en-grece-les-autorites-grecques-et-europeennes-sous-

    • “They are urgently asking for help”: the SOS that was ignored

      The Hellenic Coast Guard attributed its failure to proceed to a rescue mission of the migrants before their trawler sunk to their refusal to receive assistance. International law experts, as well as active and former Coast Guard officials, refute the argument. And emails sent by the Alarm Phone group to authorities which are in Solomon’s possession, prove that the passengers of the vessel had sent out an SOS – one that was ignored.

      The first recovered bodies of the people who lost their lives 80 km southwest of Pylos between the 13th and 14th of June are transferred to the cemetery of Schisto. At least 78 dead and hundreds remain missing. 104 people have been rescued so far, while the search for survivors continues.

      But critical questions about possible mishandling by the Hellenic Coast Guard of the tragedy that led to the deadliest shipwreck recorded in recent years in the Mediterranean remain.

      The same goes for the responsibilities of Greece and Europe, whose policies have diverted asylum seekers to the deadly Calabria route, which bypasses Greece (for obvious reasons), while also failing to establish legal and safe routes.
      “Denied assistance“

      In the briefings and timeline of the events leading up to the tragedy, the HCG attributes the failure to rescue the migrants before the sinking of the fishing boat to their repeated “refusal to receive assistance” in their communications with the vessel.

      The HCG had been aware of the vessel since the early morning hours of Tuesday, 13/6, and was, according to its own log, in contact with the vessel from as early as 14:00 local time. But no rescue action was undertaken, because “the trawler did not request any assistance from the Coast Guard or Greece,” the HCG reported.

      The same argument is repeated at 18:00: “Repeatedly the fishing boat was asked by the merchant ship if it required additional assistance, was in danger or wanted anything else from Greece. They replied, “we want nothing more than to continue to Italy”.

      But does this absolve the Coast Guard of responsibility?

      International law experts as well as former and active members of the Coast Guard question the legal and humanitarian basis of this argument, even if there was indeed a “refusal of assistance”. And they point out to Solomon that the rescue operation should have begun immediately upon detection of the fishing vessel. For the following reasons, among others:

      - The vessel was obviously overloaded and unseaworthy, with the lives of the peopled on board, who did not even have life-saving equipment, being in constant danger.

      – Accepting a denial of rescue or other intervention by the HCG could make sense only if the vessel carried a state flag, had proper documents, had a proper captain and was safe. None of these applies in the case of the sunk trawler.

      - Coast Guard officials had to objectively assess the situation and take the necessary actions regardless of how the passengers of the trawler – or, to be precise, whoever the Coast Guard was in contact with- themselves assessed their own situation.

      - The fishing vessel was undoubtedly in a state of distress that mandated its rescue at the latest from the moment the Coast Guard received, through Alarm Phone, an SOS message, which was transmitted to the group by the passengers. This SOS call is not mentioned anywhere in the Coast Guard’s communications.

      Proof the Coast Guard knew of the danger

      In its own chronology of events, Watch the Med-Alarm Phone says it contacted the authorities at 17:53 local GR time.

      The email to the competent authorities, which is available to Solomon, indicates the coordinates where the overloaded vessel was located. It states that there are 750 people on board, including many women and children, and includes a telephone number for contacting the passengers themselves.

      “They are urgently asking for help,” the email reads.

      From this message, it follows also that FRONTEX, the HQ of the Greek Police and the Ministry of Citizen Protection, as well as the Coast Guard in Kalamata, were also informed.

      The message was also communicated to the UNCHR in Greece and Turkey, to NATO, as well as to Greece’s Ombudsman.

      Listen to the interview given to Solomon by Maro, an Alarm Phone member:

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bV4SptggF2U&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fwearesolomon.com%2F

      Solomon contacted the Hellenic Coast Guard, asking detailed questions: why was there no rescue operation after the migrants’ distress signal via Alarm Phone? Does a refusal to rescue exculpate the HCG? Why was the vessel (for security and identification purposes) not even checked, given it was not flying a flag? Why was the operation launched only after the vessel sank?

      A spokesman for the HCG did not answer the specific questions but instead referred to the Coast Guard’s press release.

      Solomon also contacted UNHCR, which confirmed receipt of the email.

      “Our Office was indeed notified yesterday (ed. note: 13/06) afternoon in correspondence received from Watch The Med – Alarm Phone, which referred to a vessel in distress southwest of the Peloponnese with a large number of passengers. We immediately informed the competent Greek authorities requesting urgent information about the coordination of a search and rescue operation to bring the people to safety”.

      “Please be informed that Frontex has immediately relayed the message to the Greek authorities,” Frontex responded to Alarm Phone’s message, in an email seen by Solomon.

      “Duty of rescue, not stand by and watch”

      The Coast Guard had to treat the incident as a vessel in distress from the very first moment and take all measures to rescue the people, explains Nora Markard, Professor of International Public Law and International Human Rights at the University of Münster.

      “As soon as the distress call was received via Alarm Phone, there was clearly distress. But when a ship is so evidently overloaded, it is in distress as soon as it leaves port, because it is unseaworthy. Even if the ship is still moving. And when there is distress, there is a duty to rescue, not to stand by and watch.

      International law defines distress as a situation where there is a reasonable certainty that a vessel or a person is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.

      “That requires an objective assessment. If a captain completely misjudges the situation and says the ship is fine, the ship is still in distress if the passengers are in grave danger by the condition of the ship,” Dr. Markard explains.

      International law unambiguously states that, on receiving information ‘from any source’ that persons are in distress at sea, the master of a ship that is in a position to render assistance must ‘proceed with all speed to their assistance’.

      In this particular case, the fishing vessel was not flying a flag, so the incident does not even fall under the category of respect for the sovereignty of the flag state.

      “When a ship doesn’t fly a flag at all, as it appears to be the case here, the law of the sea gives other states a right to visit the ship. This includes the right to board the ship to check it out,” says Markard.

      Apart from the distress call itself, the Hellenic Coast Guard, therefore, had the additional authority to examine the situation.

      “All ships and authorities alerted of the distress have an obligation to rescue, even if the ship in distress is not in their territorial waters but at high sea. Search and rescue zones often include waters that belong to the high sea,” explains Markard.

      “If the distress occurs in a state’s search and rescue zone, that state also has an obligation to coordinate the rescue. For example, it can requisition merchant ships to render assistance.”
      Coast Guard officer: “This was the definition of a vessel in distress”

      A former senior officer of the Greek Coast Guard with vast relevant experience seconds this and raises additional questions.

      Speaking to Solomon on condition of anonymity, he explained that the vessel was manifestly unseaworthy and the people on board in danger. Even a refusal to accept assistance was not a reason to leave it to its fate.

      The same official also points out there were delays in the response of the HCG (“valuable time was lost”) and an inadequate force of assets. He confirmed that refusal of assistance would only make sense in the case of a legal, documented, seaworthy and flagged vessel. “This was the definition of a vessel in distress”.

      Similar statements regarding the claims of the Greek Coast Guard were made by retired admiral of the Coast Guard and international expert, Nikos Spanos, to Greece’s public broadcaster ERT:

      “It’s like saying I can just watch you drown and do nothing. We don’t ask the crew on a boat in distress if they need help. They absolutely need help, from the moment the boat is adrift.”

      https://wearesolomon.com/mag/focus-area/migration/they-are-urgently-asking-for-help-the-sos-that-was-ignored

    • Chi c’era a bordo della barca naufragata al largo della Grecia

      Moshin Shazad, 32 anni, era un uomo con l’espressione seria, due figli piccoli, la moglie e la madre da mantenere. Per questo aveva deciso di partire da Lalamusa, una città nel Punjab, in Pakistan. Non riusciva a trovare un lavoro stabile e le bocche da sfamare erano diventate troppe, dopo la nascita del secondo figlio. Voleva raggiungere il cugino, Waheed Ali, che dal 2019 vive in Norvegia.

      È partito con altri quattro ragazzi, quattro amici, tra cui Abdul Khaliq e Sami Ullah. Ha telefonato al cugino poco dopo essere salito sul peschereccio stracarico che è partito da Tobruk, in Libia, ed è naufragato il 14 giugno, a 47 miglia da Pylos, in Grecia. “Diceva che sarebbe arrivato in Italia”, racconta Waheed Ali, che ora sta cercando il cugino tra i 108 sopravvissuti, di cui molti sono stati sistemati in un magazzino abbandonato di Kalamata, in Grecia, mentre una trentina sono stati trasferiti in ospedale. Molti erano in ipotermia. Ma Shazad potrebbe anche essere tra i dispersi.

      Shawq Muhammad al Ghazali, 22 anni, era uno studente originario di Daraa, in Siria, ed era rifugiato in Giordania, dove al momento vivono la sua famiglia e suo zio Ibhraim al Ghazali. Il ragazzo era partito da Amman per la Libia, e da lì, da Tobruk, si era imbarcato per raggiungere l’Europa. “Non ho sue notizie dall’8 giugno, il giorno della partenza dalla Libia”, dice lo zio. Secondo molti familiari, le autorità greche non stanno aiutando le famiglie ad avere notizie dei parenti o a capire se sono tra i vivi o tra i dispersi.

      I superstiti sono per lo più siriani (47) ed egiziani (43), poi ci sono dodici pachistani e due palestinesi, secondo le autorità greche. Tutti uomini. “Non riesco a sapere se è sopravvissuto, sono io che sto dando notizie alla famiglia in Pakistan, ma sono disperato, non riesco a capire e a sapere nulla. Del naufragio ho saputo dalla televisione”, afferma Waheed Ali.

      L’imbarcazione su cui viaggiavano Moshin Shazad e gli altri era partita da Tobruk l’8 giugno, era diretta in Italia, lungo una rotta da cui sono arrivati nel 2023 la metà dei migranti partiti dalla Libia.

      “Secondo le prime testimonianze sarebbe corretta la stima di 700-750 persone a bordo, tra cui almeno quaranta bambini, che probabilmente erano nella stiva. Se questi numeri fossero confermati, si tratterebbe del secondo naufragio più grave avvenuto nel Mediterraneo dopo quello dell’aprile 2015”, racconta Flavio Di Giacomo, dell’Organizzazione internazionale per le migrazioni (Oim). Settantotto corpi sono stati recuperati finora in mare al largo della penisola del Peloponneso. Ma l’Oim ha affermato di “temere che altre centinaia di persone” siano annegate. Il portavoce della guardia costiera greca Nikos Alexiou ha detto che l’imbarcazione è naufragata, dopo che le persone si sono spostate bruscamente su un lato. L’imbarcazione è affondata in quindici minuti.

      Frontex li aveva avvistati
      Secondo le autorità greche, un aereo di sorveglianza dell’agenzia europea Frontex aveva avvistato la barca il 13 giugno. In un comunicato Frontex ha confermato di avere visto l’imbarcazione in mattinata, alle 9.47 del giorno precedente al naufragio e di averlo comunicato alle autorità preposte al soccorso, cioè alla guardia costiera greca. Anche la guardia costiera italiana e due mercantili avevano segnalato alle autorità greche l’imbarcazione in difficoltà. Ma secondo la guardia costiera greca, i passeggeri dell’imbarcazione “hanno rifiutato qualsiasi aiuto”, perché i migranti si stavano dirigendo verso l’Italia.

      “Nel pomeriggio, una nave mercantile si è avvicinata alla barca e le ha fornito cibo e rifornimenti, mentre i (passeggeri) hanno rifiutato ogni ulteriore assistenza”, ha detto la guardia costiera greca in un comunicato. Una seconda nave mercantile in seguito ha offerto più rifornimenti e assistenza. Ma anche questa volta sono stati rifiutati, secondo i greci.

      In serata, una motovedetta della guardia costiera ha raggiunto la nave “e ha confermato la presenza di un gran numero di migranti sul ponte”, è scritto nel comunicato delle autorità greche. “Ma hanno rifiutato qualsiasi assistenza e hanno detto che volevano continuare in Italia”. Tuttavia le leggi internazionali sul soccorso in mare avrebbero imposto in ogni caso ai greci di intervenire per le condizioni in cui l’imbarcazione stava navigando. Diverse testimonianze contestano la versione delle autorità greche.

      Il motore della barca si è rotto poco prima delle 23 (gmt) del 13 giugno, da quel momento la barca è andata alla deriva. I naufraghi hanno chiesto aiuto, telefonando alla rete di volontari Alarmphone, già dal 13 giugno, dicendo di avere contattato anche “la polizia”. L’attivista Nawal Soufi, che vive in Italia, ha raccontato che i migranti con cui era in contatto telefonico le hanno detto che alcune imbarcazioni si sono avvicinate, distribuendo delle bottigliette di acqua.

      “Il 13 giugno 2023, nelle prime ore del mattino, i migranti a bordo di una barca carica di 750 persone mi hanno contattata comunicandomi la loro difficile situazione. Dopo cinque giorni di viaggio, l’acqua era finita, il conducente dell’imbarcazione li aveva abbandonati in mare aperto e c’erano anche sei cadaveri a bordo. Non sapevano esattamente dove si trovassero, ma grazie alla posizione istantanea del telefono Turaya (telefono satellitare, ndr), ho potuto ottenere la loro posizione esatta e ho allertato le autorità competenti”, scrive Soufi, condividendo la sua ricostruzione su Facebook.

      “La situazione si è complicata quando una nave si è avvicinata all’imbarcazione, legandola con delle corde su due punti della barca e iniziando a buttare bottiglie d’acqua. I migranti si sono sentiti in forte pericolo, poiché temevano che le corde potessero far capovolgere la barca e che le risse a bordo per ottenere l’acqua potessero causare il naufragio. Per questo motivo, si sono leggermente allontanati dalla nave per evitare un naufragio sicuro”, continua l’attivista nel suo post.

      “Durante la notte, la situazione a bordo dell’imbarcazione è diventata ancora più drammatica. Io sono rimasta in contatto con loro fino alle 23 ore greche, cercando di rassicurarli e di aiutarli a trovare una soluzione”. Fino all’ultima chiamata in cui “l’uomo con cui parlavo mi ha espressamente detto: ‘Sento che questa sarà la nostra ultima notte in vita’”, conclude. Il parlamentare greco Kriton Arsenis, che ha parlato con i sopravvissuti a Kalamata, ha confermato la versione dell’attivista Soufi e ha dichiarato che l’imbarcazione si è ribaltata dopo essere stata trainata con delle corde dai greci. Secondo Arsenis, i greci volevano spingere l’imbarcazione di migranti nelle acque di ricerca e soccorso italiane.

      https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2023/06/15/naufragio-grecia
      #Frontex

    • Grecia, strage di Pylos. «Nessuna pace per gli assassini»

      Mentre il mare inghiotte i corpi e lo Stato rinchiude i sopravvissuti si riempiono le strade delle città greche

      Da tempo, definiamo la politica migratoria europea “necropolitica”, ovvero – seguendo Achille Mbembe – una politica che crea le condizioni strutturali per produrre la morte di un gruppo di persone.

      Un’architettura di morte, che vediamo ogni giorno nel regime europeo del confine, sempre più legale, sofisticata, diffusa. Ci accorgiamo ora che ci hanno tolto anche la morte, nel senso che personalmente e collettivamente – noi “vivi” – le diamo, facendo esperienza di quella degli altri, vicini e lontani. Ci hanno tolto anche la morte perché hanno tolto il lutto a chi ha perso una persona cara, la possibilità di piangere un corpo morto, la possibilità di conoscerne il nome, di sapere chi, dove, quando, quanti.

      Probabilmente non sapremo mai quante persone sono affogate nella strage avvenuta tra martedì 13 e mercoledì 14 giugno ad 80 chilometri al largo del porto di Pylos. Gli stessi migranti, al telefono con l’attivista Nawal Soufi, parlavano di 750 persone a bordo, di cui molti bambini. La Guardia costiera ellenica dice 646. Le foto e le informazioni disponibili fino ad ora confermano quest’ordine di grandezza, ma le cifre sono destinate a rimanere indicative. Il naufragio è avvenuto nella zona con il mare più profondo di tutto il Mediterraneo: circa 60 km a sud-ovest di Pylos si trova la Fossa di Calipso, una depressione che supera i 5.000 metri di profondità. Gli esperti dicono che il recupero dei corpi sarà quindi particolarmente difficoltoso, il mare li inghiottirà per sempre. Ad oggi, sono solo 104 i superstiti, difficilmente questo numero aumenterà.

      Oltre la produzione della morte si situa forse l’annullamento, l’annientamento della persona (della vita). Sono parole che, chiaramente, richiamano il nazismo. Non sapere chi, non sapere quanti, non poter riavere i corpi – massivamente e sistematicamente – è qualcosa che, credo, si avvicina all’annientamento.

      I dettagli che iniziano a trapelare dipingono un quadro dei fatti che non solo seppellisce ogni retorica della “tragica fatalità”, ma svela le responsabilità dirette della HCG (Hellenic Coast Guard) nel causare il “capovolgimento” della barca. Come ricostruito dall’attivista Iasonas Apostolopoulos, sulla base delle dichiarazioni del parlamentare Kriton Arsenis, che ha potuto parlare con i sopravvissuti a Kalamata, la HCG avrebbe legato il peschereccio con delle corde e provato a trascinarlo. Sarebbe stato proprio questo tentativo di rimorchio a far ribaltare la barca. Queste ricostruzioni si allineano con i primi racconti di Nawal Soufi.

      https://twitter.com/ABoatReport/status/1669301668259741696/history

      Evidentemente, la differenza – se esiste – tra uccidere e lasciar morire sfuma: non è “solo” indifferenza complice, non è “semplicemente” girarsi dall’altra parte. L’omissione di soccorso è la punta dell’iceberg di un sistema complesso – quello dei confini europei – progettato per annientare la vita. Sistema di cui la guardia costiera è solo un tassello. Non è l’Europa che finge di non vedere, è l’Europa che, strutturalmente, con delle politiche precise e radicate nel tempo, produce morte.

      La versione ufficiale della HCG descrive invece il capovolgimento come frutto di una maldestra manovra – in mare piatto – del peschereccio stesso. Dall’altra parte, puntano tutto sulla colpevolizzazione delle vittime: “Ripetevano costantemente di voler salpare per l’Italia e di non volere alcun aiuto dalla Grecia”, si ribadisce ossessivamente nel comunicato. Ma è assodato che questo improbabile “non volevano essere aiutati”, secondo il diritto del mare, non giustifica il mancato soccorso, come chiarito dall’ordine degli avvocati di Kalamata – che si è offerto di supportare gratuitamente i sopravvissuti. Così come è assodato che la HCG sapeva tutto dalla mattina di martedì 13 giugno, alla luce dell’avvistamento da parte del velivolo di Frontex e degli SOS diffusi da Alarm Phone – pubblicati da wearesolomon – e inoltrati anche ad UNCHR, NATO, e al difensore civico greco.

      Ma non lasciamo non detti: probabilmente l’HCG voleva trascinare il peschereccio in zona SAR maltese o italiana. Questa volontà è stata più forte di quella di salvare 750 vite umane in evidente pericolo. Forse anche per questo, ai giornalisti è stato impedito di parlare con i sopravvissuti. Dopo delle pressioni, è stato permesso solo ai parlamentari.

      Come da copione, nove di loro, egiziani, sono stati arrestati accusati di traffico di esseri umani ed omicidio 1, mentre la maggior parte (71 persone) è stata trasferita nel campo di Malakasa 2, nel “centro di accoglienza e identificazione”: una struttura chiusa, controllata, isolata, priva di supporto psicologico e assistenza medica adeguata. Sono siriani, egiziani, pakistani e palestinesi. Non devono poter raccontare, devono capire che non c’è pietà, che nulla gli sarà concesso.

      Nel porto di Kalamata, sembra di rivivere i giorni di Cutro: arrivano i familiari da tutta Europa e non solo. Alcuni trovano i propri cari, molti non li troveranno. Nessun aiuto da parte dello Stato, nessuna informazione, dicono. Non c’è pace per i vivi, non c’è pace per i morti. Finora sono stati recuperati ed identificati 78 corpi, saranno trasportati con dei camion frigorifero al cimitero di Schisto.

      Intanto, si riempiono le strade della Grecia. Dal porto di Pylos ad Atene, Salonicco, Patrasso, Karditsa, Kalamata, migliaia di persone si sono messe in marcia. Ad Atene, giovedì sera, una marea umana si è scontrata con i soliti gangster in divisa.

      La risposta dello Stato è sempre la stessa, anche con i solidali. Sono piazze commosse ma piene di rabbia. Una rabbia degna. Puntano chiaramente il dito verso gli assassini: non solo la guardia costiera, ma lo Stato greco, l’Unione Europea, Frontex, questo sistema coloniale e razzista.

      Domenica 18 giugno nel pomeriggio un altro corteo, chiamato dalla Open Assembly Against Pushbacks and Border Violence, si muoverà dal Pireo verso gli uffici di Frontex: l’agenzia europea non potrà giocare la parte dei “buoni” che avevano segnalato per tempo la barca in pericolo.

      Dalle strade, si leva una promessa: non dimentichiamo, non perdoniamo.

    • Did migrants reject help before deadly Greek wreck, or beg for it? Coast guard, activists disagree

      This undated handout image provided by Greece’s coast guard on Wednesday, June14, 2023, shows scores of people covering practically every free stretch of deck on a battered fishing boat that later capsized and sank off southern Greece. A fishing boat carrying migrants trying to reach Europe capsized and sank off Greece on Wednesday, authorities said, leaving at least 79 dead and many more missing in one of the worst disasters of its kind this year.(Hellenic Coast Guard via AP)
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      This undated handout image provided by Greece’s coast guard on Wednesday, June14, 2023, shows scores of people covering practically every free stretch of deck on a battered fishing boat that later capsized and sank off southern Greece. A fishing boat carrying migrants trying to reach Europe capsized and sank off Greece on Wednesday, authorities said, leaving at least 79 dead and many more missing in one of the worst disasters of its kind this year.(Hellenic Coast Guard via AP)

      This much is clear: On June 9, an old steel fishing trawler left eastern Libya for Italy, carrying far too many people.

      As many as 750 men, women and children from Syria, Egypt, the Palestinian territories and Pakistan were on board, fleeing hopelessness in their home countries and trying to reach relatives in Europe.

      Five days later, the trawler sank off the coast of Greece in one of the deepest parts of the Mediterranean Sea. Only 104 people, all men, survived. The remains of 78 people were recovered.

      There are still more questions than answers about what led up to one of the worst shipwrecks in recent Mediterranean history.

      Activists, migration experts and opposition politicians have criticized Greek authorities for not acting earlier to rescue the migrants, even though a coast guard vessel escorted the trawler for hours and watched helplessly as it sank.

      Below is a timeline of events based on reports from Greek authorities, a commercial ship, and activists who said they were in touch with passengers. They describe sequences of events that at times converge, but also differ in key ways.

      The Greek Coast Guard said that the overcrowded trawler was moving steadily toward Italy, refusing almost all assistance, until minutes before it sank. This is in part supported by the account of a merchant tanker that was nearby.

      But activists said that people on board were in danger and made repeated pleas for help more than 15 hours before the vessel sank.

      International maritime law and coast guard experts said that conditions on the trawler clearly showed it was at risk, and should have prompted an immediate rescue operation, regardless of what people on board may have said.

      Much of these accounts could not immediately be independently verified.

      Missing from this timeline is the testimony of survivors, who have been transferred to a closed camp and kept away from journalists.

      All times are given in Greece’s time zone.

      FIRST CONTACT

      Around 11 a.m. on Tuesday, Italian authorities informed Greece that a fishing trawler packed with migrants was in international waters southwest of the Peloponnese. Greece said the Italian authorities were alerted by an activist.

      Around the same time, human rights activist Nawal Soufi wrote on social media that she had been contacted by a woman on a boat that had left Libya four days earlier.

      The migrants had run out of water, Soufi wrote, and shared GPS coordinates through a satellite phone showing they were approximately 100 km (62 miles) from Greece.

      “Dramatic situation on board. They need immediate rescue,” she wrote Tuesday morning.

      Over the course of the day, Soufi described some 20 calls with people on the trawler in a series of social media posts and a later audio recording. The Associated Press could not reach Soufi.

      A surveillance aircraft from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex spotted the overcrowded trawler at 11:47 p.m. and notified Greek authorities, the agency told AP. On Saturday, Frontex told AP its plane had to leave the scene after 10 minutes due to a fuel shortage but that it had also shared with Greece details and photos of the “heavily overcrowded” trawler.

      DIFFERING ACCOUNTS OF CONDITIONS ON BOARD

      At 2 p.m., Greek authorities established contact with someone on the trawler. The vessel “did not request any assistance from the Coast Guard or from Greece,” according to a statement.

      But activists said that people on the boat were already in desperate need by Tuesday afternoon.

      At 3:11 p.m., Soufi wrote, passengers told her that seven people were unconscious.

      Around the same time, Alarm Phone, a network of activists with no connection to Soufi who run a hotline for migrants in need of rescue, said they received a call from a person on the trawler.

      “They say they cannot survive the night, that they are in heavy distress,” Alarm Phone wrote.

      At 3:35 p.m., a Greek Coast Guard helicopter located the trawler. An aerial photo released showed it packed, with people covering almost every inch of the deck.

      From then until 9 p.m., Greek authorities said, they were in contact with people on the trawler via satellite phone, radio, and shouted conversations conducted by merchant vessels and a Coast Guard boat that arrived at night. They added that people on the trawler repeatedly said they wanted to continue to Italy and refused rescue.

      MERCHANT SHIPS BRING SUPPLIES

      At 5:10 p.m., Greek authorities asked a Maltese-flagged tanker called the Lucky Sailor to bring the trawler food and water.

      According to the company that manages the Lucky Sailor, people on the trawler “were very hesitant to receive any assistance,” and shouted that “they want to go to Italy.” Eventually, Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Limited wrote in a statement, the trawler was persuaded to accept supplies.

      Around 6 p.m., a Greek Coast Guard helicopter reported that the trawler was “sailing on a steady course and heading.”

      But at 6:20 p.m., Alarm Phone said that people on board reported that they were not moving, and that the “captain” had abandoned the trawler in a small boat.

      “Please any solution,” someone on board told Alarm Phone.

      The Greek authorities’ account suggested the trawler stopped around that time to receive supplies from the Lucky Sailor.

      At 6:55 p.m., Soufi wrote, migrants on board told her that six people had died and another two were very sick. No other account so far has mentioned deaths prior to the shipwreck, and the AP has not been able to verify this.

      Around 9 p.m., Greek authorities asked a second, Greek-flagged, merchant vessel to deliver water, and allowed the Lucky Sailor to leave.

      Then, at around 10:40 p.m., a Coast Guard boat from Crete reached the trawler, and remained nearby until it sank. According to the Coast Guard, the vessel “discreetly observed” the trawler from a distance. Once again, the Coast Guard said, the trawler did not appear to have any problems and was moving “at a steady course and speed.”

      THE FINAL HOURS

      According to Soufi’s account, attempts to deliver supplies may have contributed to the trawler’s troubles.

      Shortly after 11 p.m., she wrote that the trawler began rocking as its passengers tried to catch water bottles from another vessel. According to people on board, ropes were tied to the ship, destabilizing it and causing a “state of panic,” she said.

      The report from the Lucky Sailor said no lines were tied to the trawler, and supplies were delivered in watertight barrels tied to a rope.

      “Those on board the boat caught the line and pulled,” the company managing the Lucky Sailor told the AP.

      The other merchant vessel did not immediately reply to the AP’s questions.

      A spokesman for the Greek Coast Guard said late Friday that its vessel had briefly attached a light rope to the trawler at around 11 p.m. He stressed that none of the vessels had attempted to tow the trawler.

      Commander Nikos Alexiou told Greek channel Ant1 TV that the Coast Guard wanted to check on the trawler’s condition, but people on board again refused help and untied the rope before continuing course.

      Soufi’s last contact with the trawler was at 11 p.m. She said later in a voice memo that “they never expressed the will to continue sailing to Italy,” or refused assistance from Greece. “They were in danger and needed help.”

      THE WRECK

      According to authorities, the trawler kept moving until 1:40 a.m. Wednesday, when its engine stopped. The Coast Guard vessel then got closer to “determine the problem.”

      A few minutes later, Alarm Phone had a final exchange with people on the trawler. The activists were able to make out only: “Hello my friend … The ship you send is …” before the call cut off.

      At 2:04 a.m., more than 15 hours after Greek authorities first heard of the case, the Coast Guard reported that the trawler began rocking violently from side to side, and then capsized.

      People on deck were thrown into the sea, while others held onto the boat as it flipped. Many others, including women and children, were trapped below deck.

      Fifteen minutes later, the trawler vanished underwater.

      In the darkness of night, 104 people were rescued, and brought to shore on the Mayan Queen IV, a luxury yacht that was sailing in the vicinity of the shipwreck. Greek authorities retrieved 78 bodies. No other people have been found since Wednesday.

      As many as 500 people are missing.

      https://apnews.com/article/migrants-shipwreck-rescue-greece-coast-guard-c160027a00d1ad2f859b97e3e8e7643

    • Après le naufrage, des survivants dénoncent les gardes-côtes grecs et Frontex

      La version officielle grecque sur l’un des pires naufrages en Méditerranée est mise à mal par les témoignages de survivants. Le rôle de Frontex, l’agence européenne chargée des frontières extérieures, est également pointé du doigt. Une enquête a été ouverte.

      Plus de quatre jours après le naufrage d’un bateau de pêche en provenance de Libye, où s’étaient embarquées jusqu’à 750 personnes – notamment des ressortissantes et ressortissants égyptiens, syriens et pakistanais –, l’espoir est mince de retrouver des survivant·es au large des côtes sud de la Grèce.

      Les questions sont nombreuses en particulier sur l’action des gardes-côtes grecs, accusés par certains témoignages d’avoir provoqué l’accident. La Cour suprême grecque a ordonné une enquête sur les circonstances du drame, l’un des pires naufrages en Méditerranée avec des centaines de morts. Pour l’heure, 104 personnes ont été rescapées et 78 corps récupérés.

      Jeudi après-midi, Kriton Arsenis, ancien eurodéputé, a rencontré des survivants dans le port de Kalamata, sur la péninsule du Péloponnèse, en tant que membre de la délégation de Mera25, le parti de Yánis Varoufákis. « Les réfugiés nous ont dit que l’embarcation a chaviré pendant qu’elle était tirée par le bateau des gardes-côtes », a-t-il raconté.

      « Les survivants nous disent que le bateau a basculé alors qu’il faisait l’objet d’une manœuvre où il était tiré par les gardes-côtes helléniques, a déclaré de son côté Vincent Cochetel, envoyé spécial du Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés pour la Méditerranée occidentale et centrale. Ils nous disent qu’il était tiré non pas vers les côtes grecques, mais en dehors de la zone de secours en mer grecque. »

      Ces témoignages vont à l’encontre de la version officielle, qui, jusqu’à vendredi, expliquait que les gardes-côtes n’étaient pas intervenus.

      La Grèce est régulièrement accusée de refouler des migrant·es en mer, provoquant la crainte, derrière une aide supposée, d’être en réalité éloigné·es du territoire – une pratique illégale au regard du droit international maritime et de la Convention de Genève, qui doivent permettre à toute personne en situation de détresse d’être secourue et acheminée vers un port dit « sûr » et de pouvoir, si elle le souhaite, déposer une demande d’asile dans le pays qu’elle tentait de rallier.

      En mai dernier, des révélations du New York Times ont mis en lumière cette pratique, grâce à une vidéo d’un « push-back » prise sur le fait. Mediapart avait documenté un cas semblable en 2022, qui avait provoqué la mort de deux demandeurs d’asile.
      Le patron de Frontex sur place

      Le rôle de Frontex, l’agence européenne chargée des frontières extérieures, est également mis en question, car selon les autorités portuaires grecques, un avion de surveillance de Frontex avait repéré le bateau mardi après-midi mais les secours ne sont pas intervenus car les passagers ont « refusé toute aide ». Son patron Hans Leijtens s’est rendu à Kalamata pour établir les faits et « mieux comprendre ce qui s’est passé car Frontex a joué un rôle » dans ce naufrage « horrible ».

      « On ne demande pas aux personnes à bord d’un bateau à la dérive s’ils veulent de l’aide […], il aurait fallu une aide immédiate », a affirmé pour sa part à la télévision grecque ERT Nikos Spanos, expert international des incidents maritimes. D’après Alexis Tsipras, le chef de l’opposition grecque de gauche, qui s’est entretenu avec des rescapés, « il y a eu un appel à l’aide ».

      Le HCR et l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), deux agences des Nations unies, se sont félicités des enquêtes « qui ont été ordonnées en Grèce sur les circonstances qui ont conduit au chavirement du bateau et à la perte de tant de vies », tout en rappelant que « le devoir de secourir sans délai les personnes en détresse en mer est une règle fondamentale du droit maritime international ».

      Le HCR et l’OIM ont rappelé vendredi que depuis le début de l’année, au moins 72 778 migrants sont arrivés en Europe (dont 54 205 en Italie), par les routes migratoires en Méditerranée orientale, centrale, et occidentale ou par le nord-ouest de l’Afrique. Dans le même temps, au moins 1 037 migrants sont morts ou portés disparus.

      Neuf Égyptiens ont été arrêtés dans le port de Kalamata. Ils sont âgés de 20 à 40 ans et soupçonnés de « trafic illégal » d’êtres humains. Parmi les suspects, qui devraient comparaître lundi devant le juge d’instruction, figure le capitaine de l’embarcation qui a chaviré, d’après une source portuaire à l’AFP.

      Areti Glezou, travailleuse sociale au sein de l’ONG grecque Thalpo était en première ligne aux côtés des rescapés. Manifestement choquée, elle se souviendra longtemps de certains détails à glacer le sang. « Un homme me racontait qu’il a nagé pendant deux heures au côté de corps d’enfants avant d’être secouru. » Elle s’arrête, reprend son souffle et, les larmes aux yeux, elle poursuit : « Oui, ça, ils me l’ont tous dit, les cales étaient remplies de femmes et d’enfants. » Aucun n’aura été retrouvé vivant.

      Plus de 120 Syriens se trouvaient à bord et un grand nombre d’entre eux sont portés disparus, ont indiqué vendredi à l’AFP des membres de leurs familles et des militants locaux. La plupart sont originaires de la province instable de Deraa dans le sud du pays. Berceau du soulèvement antirégime déclenché en 2011, elle est revenue sous le contrôle des forces gouvernementales en juillet 2018. Plusieurs d’entre eux ont gagné la Libye, d’où était parti le bateau, en transitant par des pays voisins comme le Liban, la Jordanie ou encore l’Arabie saoudite.

      Vendredi matin, on a cependant vu des larmes de joie sur le port de Kalamata. Des deux côtés des barrières qui entourent le hangar où logent les rescapés, deux frères se sont aperçus. Fardi a retrouvé Mohamed vivant. Le grand a retrouvé le petit. Autour d’eux les sourires fleurissent sur les visages. Pour quelques brefs instants, journalistes, humanitaires et hommes en uniformes redeviennent d’abord des êtres humains. Comme un rayon de lumière qui illumine soudain un océan de tristesse.

      Une demi-heure plus tard, des bus viennent chercher les rescapés pour les emmener au camp de Malakasa dans la région d’Athènes. Le hangar est désormais vide.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/170623/apres-le-naufrage-des-survivants-denoncent-les-gardes-cotes-grecs-et-front

    • Naufrage de migrants en Méditerranée : ce que l’on sait sur les responsabilités des garde-côtes grecs

      Depuis le naufrage dramatique qui a fait 78 morts et possiblement plusieurs centaines d’autres mercredi 14 juin, les critiques ciblent l’absence d’intervention préalable des gardes-côtes grecs. Ces derniers rejettent la faute sur les passagers du navire.

      Le naufrage d’un bateau de migrants mercredi 14 juin avec des centaines de personnes à bord, au large de la Grèce, a soulevé de nombreuses questions sur les responsabilités des autorités. Voici ce que l’on sait depuis que ce chalutier vétuste a chaviré et coulé dans les eaux internationales, faisant au moins 78 morts.
      L’opération de sauvetage

      Les garde-côtes grecs ont affirmé mercredi matin « avoir été prévenus mardi par les autorités italiennes concernant un bateau avec à bord un grand nombre d’étrangers ». Des patrouilleurs grecs ont été mobilisés pour le repérer. « C’est un appareil aérien de Frontex [la décriée agence européenne de gardes-frontières, ndlr] qui a le premier repéré le bateau mardi après-midi, puis deux bateaux qui naviguaient dans la zone », selon les garde-côtes.

      Nawal Soufi, une bénévole travaillant pour la ligne téléphonique d’assistance à des migrants en danger Alarm Phone, assure sur son compte Facebook avoir reçu un SOS d’un bateau avec 750 personnes à bord en provenance de Libye.

      A 22 h 40 mardi, le chalutier notifie une panne du moteur. Le patrouilleur à proximité « a immédiatement tenté d’approcher le chalutier pour déterminer le problème », ont noté les garde-côtes. Vingt-quatre minutes plus tard, le patron du patrouilleur a annoncé par radio que le bateau avait chaviré. Il a coulé en quinze minutes.
      La défausse grecque contre les migrants

      Selon les garde-côtes grecs, « il n’y a pas eu de demande d’aide » des personnes à bord du bateau de pêche. « Après de nombreux appels du centre opérationnel des garde-côtes grecs pour les secourir, la réponse du bateau de pêche a été négative », selon le communiqué. « La salle des opérations […] a été en contact répété avec le bateau de pêche. Ils ont constamment répété qu’ils souhaitaient naviguer vers l’Italie », selon la même source.

      Le porte-parole du gouvernement a également expliqué vendredi que « les garde-côtes se sont rapprochés du bateau, ils ont jeté une corde pour le stabiliser, mais les migrants ont refusé l’aide ». « Ils disaient ‘‘No help, Go Italy’’ [’’Pas d’aide, on va en Italie’’, ndlr] », a-t-il ajouté.

      Pour sa part, le porte-parole de la police portuaire Nikolaos Alexiou a souligné qu’on ne pouvait « pas remorquer un bateau avec un si grand nombre de gens à bord par la force, il faut qu’ils coopèrent ».

      Selon un réfugié syrien en Allemagne, Reber Hebun, arrivé en Grèce pour retrouver son frère de 24 ans, survivant du naufrage, « les garde-côtes grecs n’ont rien fait pour les aider au début alors qu’ils étaient près d’eux », a-t-il dit après avoir parlé avec son frère. « Un bateau commercial a donné de l’eau et de la nourriture et tout le monde s’est précipité, le bateau a été déstabilisé à ce moment », selon lui.
      Les critiques envers les garde-côtes grecs

      Des experts et des ONG ont mis en cause les garde-côtes grecs qui auraient dû intervenir quoi qu’il arrive, selon eux. Pour Vincent Cochetel, envoyé spécial du Haut-Commissariat de l’ONU pour les réfugiés (HCR) pour la Méditerranée centrale et occidentale, « l’argument grec selon lequel les personnes ne voulaient pas être secourues pour poursuivre leur route vers l’Italie ne tient pas ». « C’est aux autorités grecques qu’il incombait de procéder ou, au moins, de coordonner une opération de sauvetage, en utilisant soit leurs propres navires de sauvetage soit en faisant appel à tout autre bateau sur zone, y compris à des navires marchands », a-t-il jugé. « Selon le droit maritime international, les autorités grecques auraient dû coordonner plus tôt cette opération de sauvetage, dès lors que Frontex avait repéré ce bateau en détresse », a-t-il poursuivi.

      « On ne demande pas aux personnes à bord d’un bateau à la dérive s’ils veulent de l’aide […] il aurait fallu une aide immédiate », a critiqué pour sa part Nikos Spanos, expert international des incidents maritimes.

      Hans Leijtens, le patron de Frontex, s’est rendu jeudi à Kalamata pour chercher à « mieux comprendre ce qui s’est passé car Frontex a joué un rôle » dans cet « horrible » naufrage.

      Vendredi, l’ONU a demandé des investigations rapides et des mesures « urgentes et décisives » pour éviter de nouveaux drames. « Il doit avoir une enquête approfondie sur les événements qui se sont déroulés au cours de cette tragédie. Et j’espère que nous pourrons trouver des réponses et apprendre de l’expérience », a souligné Jeremy Laurence, porte-parole du Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’homme.
      Des centaines de personnes à bord

      78 corps ont jusqu’ici été retrouvés en mer au large des côtes de la péninsule du Péloponnèse, selon les garde-côtes grecs, et 104 personnes ont pu être secourues à temps. Mais le bilan serait en réalité bien plus lourd. Le porte-parole du gouvernement grec, Ilias Siakantaris, avait assuré mercredi que des informations non confirmées faisaient état de 750 personnes à bord du chalutier. L’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) « redoute que des centaines de personnes supplémentaires » se soient noyées « dans l’une des tragédies les plus dévastatrices en Méditerranée en une décennie ».

      Parmi les personnes qui se trouvaient à bord, figuraient notamment plus 120 Syriens, et un grand nombre d’entre eux sont portés disparus, ont déploré vendredi des membres de leurs familles et des militants locaux. La plupart de ces migrants sont originaires de la province instable de Deraa dans le sud de la Syrie. Plusieurs d’entre eux ont gagné la Libye, d’où était parti le bateau, en transitant par des pays voisins comme le Liban, la Jordanie ou encore l’Arabie Saoudite, selon les mêmes sources.

      Les recherches se poursuivent mais les espoirs de retrouver des survivants s’amenuisent, trois jours après le drame. De nombreuses femmes et enfants auraient voyagé dans la cale du navire, qui a sombré dans une zone de la Méditerranée de plusieurs milliers de mètres de profondeur, la fosse Calypso.

      Par ailleurs, 9 personnes de nationalité égyptienne soupçonnées d’être des passeurs ont été arrêtées à la suite du drame.

      https://www.liberation.fr/international/europe/naufrage-de-migrants-en-mediterranee-ce-que-lon-sait-sur-les-responsabili

    • Message de Vicky Skoumbi envoyé sur la mailing-list de Migreurop, le 18 juin 2023 :

      une vidéo glaçante avec un #témoignage de survivants qui fait état de la #responsabilité criminelle des #garde-côtes_grecs, avec la traduction d’un post d’Iasonas Apostolopoulos

      https://www.facebook.com/519820384/videos/5877893008981441

      « Les garde-côtes grecs se sont approchés de nous et nous ont lancé une corde bleue. Ils ont commencé à nous remorquer. La façon dont ils nous tiraient n’était pas correcte. Nous criions. Le navire a alors commencé à prendre de la gîte sur la gauche, les garde-côtes se sont tournés vers le côté opposé et notre navire a commencé à prendre de la gîte sur le côté et à couler.

      Nous essayions de grimper sur le bateau, nous voulions survivre.

      Les garde-côtes ont détaché la corde. Nous criions à l’aide. Ils ont fait tourner leur navire, créant une grosse vague, et notre bateau a complètement chaviré. Les personnes qui se trouvaient sur le côté du bateau se sont retrouvées en dessous. Nous pouvions entendre les gens dans la cale frapper sur la tôle en fer.

      Le bateau a complètement coulé ».

      –—

      Le journaliste Fallah Elias de la chaîne allemande WDR a partagé sur Twitter le témoignage absolument choquant et horrifiant d’un naufragé secouru.

      https://twitter.com/falahelias/status/1670127871170322432

      Dans la vidéo, d’autres survivants pakistanais confirment que les garde-côtes grecs ont fait couler le bateau en le remorquant.

      Ni une, ni deux, ni trois, de nombreux témoignages désignent le gouvernement grec et les garde-côtes comme les seuls responsables du naufrage et de la noyade de centaines de personnes à Pylos. Au lieu de les secourir, ils ont tiré le bateau avec une corde jusqu’à ce qu’il chavire. Probablement pour les faire sortir de la zone de sauvetage grecque.

      Selon certaines informations, une centaine d’enfants figureraient parmi les morts.

      Si tout cela est vrai, il s’agit du plus grand homicide de l’histoire de l’Europe d’après-guerre.

      NE LAISSONS PAS L’AFFAIRE ÊTRE ÉTOUFFÉE !

      https://twitter.com/falahelias/status/1670127871170322432?s=46&t=0dqDdxigZeccg_TvNxhfAA

    • Möglicherweise waren Push-Backs der Küstenwache Schuld am Bootsunglück in Griechenland

      Es gibt Vorwürfe, dass das Boot mit Geflüchteten vor Griechenland wegen Push-Backs der griechischen Küstenwache gesunken ist. WDR-Journalist Bamdad Esmaili berichtet im Interview, was Überlebende des Unglücks erzählen.

      Nach dem Bootsunglück vor Griechenland mit hunderten Toten gibt es schwere Vorwürfe gegen die griechische Küstenwache, das Unglück verursacht zu haben. Die Rede ist von so genannten Push-Backs. Darunter versteht man Maßnahmen, mit denen flüchtende Menschen daran gehindert werden, die Grenze zu übertreten und einen Asylantrag zu stellen. In der EU-Grundrechte-Charta wird das Recht auf Asyl gemäß der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention allerdings garantiert.

      Die Küstenwache weist den Vorwurf von Push-Backs zurück - jetzt soll die europäische Polizeibehörde Europol ermitteln. WDR-Journalist Bamdad Esmaili ist in Griechenland und hat mit seinem Team mit Überlebenden sprechen können.

      WDR: Es gibt Vorwürfe gegen die griechische Küstenwache. Worum geht es da?

      Bamdad Esmaili: Es geht darum, dass es Vorwürfe gibt, dass die griechische Küstenwache dieses Boot in die Richtung von italienischem Gewässer gezogen hat - dass sie es sozusagen gepushbackt hat. Diesen Vorwurf hatten wir bislang nur gehört, gestern Abend gelang es meinem Kollegen, der arabisch spricht, dann mit ungefähr zehn überlebenden Geflüchteten zu sprechen. Sie haben unabhängig voneinander berichtet, dass dieses Boot tatsächlich gezogen wurde - nicht nur einmal, nicht nur zweimal, sondern insgesamt dreimal. Und dabei ist das Schiff dann ins Wanken gekommen und ist gesunken.

      WDR: Das heißt, das Ziehen dieses Bootes, der Versuch es nach Italien zu ziehen und damit aus der Zuständigkeit Griechenlands herauszuholen, ist für dieses Unglück - so scheint es zumindest im Moment - verantwortlich?

      Esmaili: Das ist der Vorwurf, der im Raum steht. Das muss natürlich erstmal bewiesen werden. Die Griechen lehnen das vehement ab und dementieren das. Sie sagen nach wie vor immer noch, dass sie Hilfe angeboten haben und das Schiff habe diese Hilfe nicht gewollt, weil sie demnach nach Italien wollten.

      WDR: Wir können davon ausgehen, dass es jetzt eine größere Untersuchung geben wird. Wie wird in Griechenland darüber diskutiert, was hören Sie da?

      Esmaili: Das ist zum Politikum geworden, weil nächste Woche Parlamentswahlen in Griechenland sind. Vor allem die Opposition nutzt dieses Thema jetzt aus und kritisiert die Regierung. Und es ist für drei Tage eine Staatstrauer angeordnet worden. Es gibt auch Proteste, Kundgebungen, es gab einen Trauermarsch in Athen, also das ist ein Riesenthema hier in Griechenland.

      WDR: Sie haben erwähnt, dass Sie mit Überlebenden sprechen konnten. Wie haben diese denn die Situation auf dem Schiff beschrieben? Abgesehen von der Frage, ob sie gezogen wurden und damit das Unglück ausgelöst wurde.

      Esmaili: Man muss sich das so vorstellen: Ein Schiff, das 30 Meter lang ist, war völlig überfüllt. Die Überlebenden erzählen uns, dass sie von den Schleppern gehört haben, dass 747 Personen auf diesem Schiff waren. Deswegen ist auch immer von knapp 750 Personen die Rede und die waren überall: Unten, oben auf dem Deck, seit Tagen unterwegs, ohne Nahrung, ohne Wasser. Da kann man sich vorstellen, wie die Stimmung auf dem Schiff war.

      WDR: Das heißt, man muss davon ausgehen, dass das Unglück zu hunderten Toten geführt hat. Was geschieht jetzt mit den Menschen, die gerettet wurden - auch mit denen, mit denen Sie gesprochen haben?

      Esmaili: Wir sind jetzt in Malakasa in der Nähe von Athen und dort sind 71 Personen untergebracht, die kommen ganz normal ins Asylverfahren. Knapp 30 Personen sind noch in Kalamata im Krankenhaus, die werden behandelt und dann kommen sie vermutlich auch ins ganz normale Asylverfahren.

      WDR: Ganz normale Asylverfahren nach dem, was sie erlebt haben, das ist sicherlich auch eine schwierige Situation. Wurde die Suche nach Überlebenden denn inzwischen eingestellt?

      Esmaili: Das kann ich so nicht bestätigen. Wir haben gestern Abend noch gehört, dass noch weiter gesucht wird, aber natürlich kann man nach so vielen Tagen und bei so vielen Menschen davon ausgehen, dass man kaum noch Überlebende aus dem Meer retten kann. Rund 100 Kinder sollen auch mit an Bord gewesen sein.

      https://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/bootsunglueck-mittelmeer-interview-bamdad-esmaili-100.html

    • Frontex statement following tragic shipwreck off Pylos

      We are shocked and saddened by the tragic events that unfolded off the coast of Greece. The Frontex Executive Director, who travelled to Greece after learning about the tragedy, has offered any support the authorities may need.

      People smugglers have once again trifled with human lives by forcing several hundred migrants on a fishing boat not designed to fit such a number of people. Many were trapped underneath the deck. Our thoughts go out to the families of the victims.

      On 13 June before noon, a Frontex plane spotted the fishing vessel inside the Greek search and rescue region in international waters. The ship was heavily overcrowded and was navigating at slow speed (6 knots) direction north-east.

      Frontex immediately informed the Greek and Italian authorities about the sighting, providing them with information about the condition of the vessel, speed and photos.

      The plane kept monitoring the vessel, constantly providing updates to all relevant national authorities until it ran out of fuel and had to return to base.

      As a Frontex drone was to patrol the Aegean on the same day, the agency offered to provide additional assistance ahead of the planned and scheduled flight. The Greek authorities asked the agency to send the drone to another search and rescue incident south off Crete with 80 people in danger.

      The drone, after attending to the incident south off Crete, flew to the last known position of the fishing vessel. The drone arrived at the scene four hours later at 04:05 (UTC) in the morning, when a large-scale search and rescue operation by Greek authorities was ongoing and there was no sign of the fishing boat. No Frontex plane or boat was present at the time of the tragedy.

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-statement-following-tragic-shipwreck-off-pylos-dJ5l9p

      –-
      Commentaire de Lena K. sur twitter :

      This might be important. According to Frontex, they offered a drone to fly over the location of the Pylos shipwreck in the evening of 13th, but the Greek authorities decided to send it to another distress incident south of Crete. Convenient (for both).

      https://twitter.com/lk2015r/status/1670143075040088068

    • Naufrage en Grèce : le bateau dérivait, contrairement à la version des garde-côtes

      Que s’est-il passé dans les heures précédant le terrible naufrage au large du Péloponnèse ? Les garde-côtes grecs affirment que le chalutier bondé faisait route vers l’Italie à une vitesse régulière et n’avait pas besoin d’être secouru. Une enquête de la BBC affirme le contraire : le chalutier était à l’arrêt et nécessitait une aide urgente.

      Version contre version. Depuis le terrible naufrage du mercredi 13 juin au large de la Grèce, qui a coûté la vie à au moins 500 personnes (https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/49759/au-moins-200-pakistanais-parmi-les-victimes-du-naufrage-en-grece), les autorités grecques campent sur leurs positions : le chalutier, qui comptait au moins 700 exilés à bord, n’était pas en danger imminent. Du moins, pas dans les heures précédant le naufrage.

      Selon le communiqué officiel du Premier ministre grec (https://www.primeminister.gr/2023/06/14/32002), Kyriakos Mitsotakis, le bateau, parti de Tobrouk en Libye, naviguait en direction de l’Italie. « À 15h35, le navire de pêche a été repéré par l’hélicoptère de la Garde côtière [grecque] naviguant à vitesse régulière », peut-on lire sur le communiqué. Il avait été repéré pour la première fois vers 11h du matin, et depuis, les autorités grecques le surveillait à distance. Pourquoi ne pas le secourir immédiatement ? Parce qu’il ne semblait pas en difficulté, se défendent les Grecs. « Le navire navigu[ait] avec un cap et une vitesse constantes », écrivent-ils dans leur rapport.

      Cette ligne de défense sera la même tout au long de la journée. À partir de 15h30 jusqu’à 21h, les autorités helléniques affirment avoir été à de nombreuses reprises en communication avec le bateau via téléphone satellite. À chaque fois, les garde-côtes notent que le chalutier navigue à vitesse régulière. Et que les exilés ne réclament aucune aide. « Les migrants criaient : ’Pas d’aide, on va en Italie’ », expliquait déjà vendredi 16 juin le porte-parole des garde-côtes grecs, Nikos Alexiou.

      Dans un autre communiqué publié le 19 juin (https://www.hcg.gr/el/drasthriothtes/dieykriniseis-anaforika-me-eyreia-epixeirhsh-ereynas-kai-diaswshs-allodapwn-se-d), Athènes maintient sa position et affirme que le bateau a parcouru une distance de 24 nautiques marins - soit 44 km - depuis le moment où il a été repéré jusqu’à son naufrage.

      « Le navire ne bouge pas »

      Seulement, l’enquête menée par la BBC (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65942426) contredit la version grecque. Grâce aux coordonnées GPS des autres navires présents dans la zone méditerranéenne, la BBC est arrivée à la conclusion que le bateau n’a pas bougé entre 18h et 21h, mardi 13 juin. Un premier chalutier – le Lucky sailor – s’en est approché, sur ordre des garde-côtes grecs, à 18h pour lui fournir des vivres et de l’eau. Trois heures plus tard, c’est au même point de coordonnées maritimes qu’un second navire – le Faithfull Warrior - s’est rendu pour un autre ravitaillement.

      Et la BBC de continuer. « Une vidéo – qui aurait été tournée depuis le Faithful Warrior – prétend montrer des vivres livrés au navire via une corde dans l’eau. La BBC a vérifié ces images et a découvert que le navire - qui ne bouge pas – correspond à la forme du navire de migrants en détresse. Les conditions météorologiques correspondent à celles signalées à l’époque. »

      Pourtant, dans le dernier communiqué du 19 juin, les Grecs ne parlent pas d’immobilisation du navire. « Dans la soirée, le navire de patrouille côtière [...] est arrivé dans la région et a repéré [le chalutier] se déplaçant par ses propres moyens, à faible vitesse », maintiennent-ils.

      Et d’insister. Lors des deux ravitaillements, le navire a dans un premier temps poursuivi sa route avant de finalement s’arrêter. « Une fois le processus [de ravitaillement] terminé, les occupants du bateau ont commencé à jeter les fournitures à la mer », notent-ils encore dans leur document.

      « Navire secoué par le vent et les vagues »

      Enfin, à 22h40, les garde-côtes affirment s’être approché du chalutier tout en restant « à distance ». Là encore, ils ne détectent aucun problème de navigation. Et proposent de l’aide au navire en difficulté. « [Le chalutier] s’est de nouveau arrêté quelques minutes à l’approche [de la garde-côtière] puis a continué son chemin ».

      Entre le dernier ravitaillement et l’immobilisation du chalutier - à cause d’une panne mécanique -, une distance d’environ 6 mille nautiques (11 km) a été parcouru. À aucun moment, selon Athènes, le navire n’a donc été immobile.

      À l’échelle de la Méditerranée, ces dizaines de mille nautiques parcourus par le chalutier ne signifie pas qu’il naviguait de plein gré, insiste la BBC. Mais plutôt qu’il se déplaçait à peine « ce que l’on peut attendre d’un navire en détresse secoué par le vent et les vagues dans la partie la plus profonde de la mer Méditerranée », explique la BBC. Selon le média, les garde-côtes auraient donc dû procéder au sauvetage.

      Vers 2h du matin, dans la nuit du mardi à mercredi, le bateau fera naufrage. Le bilan provisoire fait toujours état de 78 morts, et des centaines de disparus.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/49764/naufrage-en-grece--le-bateau-derivait-contrairement-a-la-version-des-g

    • Il video di Frontex e quel barcone stracarico in balia del mare

      Nel video di Frontex il barcone stracarico di migranti in navigazione tra la Libia, da dove era partito quattro giorni prima, e l’Europa. Le immagini sono state registrate il 13 giugno alle ore 9.48 Utc. Il naufragio è avvenuto la notte tra il 13 e il 14 giugno.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=Drz5OVIkWi0&embeds_referring_origin=https%3A%2F%2Fw

      Salgono a 80 le vittime accertate del tragico naufragio avvenuto a sud del Peloponneso, in Grecia, la settimana scorsa. I soccorsi hanno recuperato i corpi di altri due uomini a largo di Pylos. Le persone tratte in salvo sono ancora 104, mentre mancano all’appello almeno 600 persone, tra cui 100 bambini che al momento del naufragio si trovavano nella stiva. I corpi sono stati trasportati nel porto di Kalamata. Proseguono intanto le ricerche della Guardia costiera.

      Il racconto di un sopravvissuto

      «La Guardia costiera greca ci ha detto che ci avrebbe portato in acque italiane, che ci stavano spingendo. Era una nave da guerra. Poi la nostra barca si è ribaltata. Sono finito in mare, urlavo, non hanno fatto nulla per salvarci. Ho cercato di rimanere a galla per mezz’ora poi quando sono arrivate le barche della Guardia costiera mi sono allontanato perchè avevo paura. Ho visto la luce di una nave commerciale in lontananza e l’ho raggiunta». E’ la testimonianza-choc che sta circolando in queste ore su twitter. Si Tratta di un sopravvissuto siriano che racconta cosa è successo quella notte, fra martedì e mercoledì di una settimana fa, quando il barcone, partito dalla Libia, si è inabissando portandosi dietro almeno 600 persone (fra cui 100 bambini).

      La ricostruzione della Guardia costiera greca
      «In totale, il peschereccio ha percorso una distanza di circa 30 miglia nautiche dal momento del rilevamento al momento dell’affondamento» ha dichiarato la Guardia costiera greca in un comunicato. «Il chiarimento», precisa la nota, arriva a seguito delle «pubblicazioni della stampa internazionale e nazionale» secondo cui il peschereccio sovraffollato non si è mosso per almeno 7 ore prima di capovolgersi. «Nelle ore pomeridiane» di martedì 13 giugno, l’imbarcazione dei migranti «è stata avvicinata da una nave cisterna per fornire assistenza», continua il comunicato della Guardia costiera costiera sul naufragio del peschereccio a largo di Pylos. Nel testo si specifica nuovamente che i migranti a bordo avevano fatto resistenza e che poi il peschereccio si è fermato ed «è iniziato il rifornimento di viveri». Dalle ricostruzioni delle autorità elleniche si legge anche che una seconda nave cisterna si è impegnata ad avvicinarsi all’imbarcazione dei migranti per fornire provviste, ma il peschereccio avrebbe fatto resistenza e si sarebbe spostato verso ovest. Alla fine, la nave cisterna ha iniziato la procedura di rifornimento ma al termine di questa i migranti «hanno iniziato a gettare le provviste in mare». «L’intero processo di rifornimento di provviste agli occupanti del peschereccio da parte delle due navi commerciali è durato in totale più di quattro ore e trenta minuti», aggiunge la Guardia costiera, specificando che «nelle ore serali» è arrivata nella zona una loro motovedetta e «ha avvistato il peschereccio che si muoveva autonomamente, a bassa velocità». Secondo la ricostruzione delle autorità elleniche, la motovedetta «ha avviato una procedura di avvicinamento all’imbarcazione per accertarsi delle condizioni attuali del natante e dei suoi occupanti», mentre «la nave si è fermata di nuovo per alcuni minuti durante l’avvicinamento da parte della motovedetta e poi ha continuato la sua rotta».
      «Dal momento in cui è stato completato il processo di rifornimento fino all’immobilizzazione del peschereccio a causa di un guasto meccanico, il peschereccio ha percorso una distanza di circa 6 miglia nautiche» conclude la Guardia costiera greca.

      Islamabad: 300 cittadini pachistani annegati a Pylos
      Più di 300 pachistani sono annegati nel naufragio del peschereccio al largo delle coste greche del Peloponneso: il numero delle vittime è stato reso noto dal presidente del Senato di Islamabad Muhammad Sadiq Sanjrani inviando le condoglianze alle famiglie. Lo scrive la Cnn. «I nostri pensieri e le nostre preghiere sono con voi e preghiamo che le anime defunte trovino la pace eterna», ha detto Sanjrani. «Questo devastante incidente sottolinea l’urgenza di affrontare e condannare l’esecrabile traffico illegale di esseri umani». Le autorità greche non hanno ancora confermato il bilancio delle vittime pakistane.

      https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/naufragio-in-grecia-la-versione-dei-greci

    • A survivor of #Pylos shipwreck shared harrowing details:

      ➡️Two people died from thirst and hunger on the 4th and 5th days of the journey
      ➡️On the 4th day, people started drinking from the boat engine’s water. On the 5th day, a state of “slow death” was announced

      ➡️On 16 June, they started calling for any coastguard as they didn’t know they were in the Greek waters.
      ➡️A luxury yacht provided 4 boxes of water for almost 750 people & this created tension between people due to thirst.

      ➡️A giant Greek ship threw ropes to people & towed the boat. Then, they started throwing water bottles at them leading to an imbalance in the boat
      ➡️The boat started sinking. We started to beg to be rescued and showed them the dead bodies but the ship wasn’t qualified for rescue

      ➡️Around sunset, a Greek military ship with masked people wearing black approached, towed them with only one blue robe & increased their ship’s speed
      ➡️That was when the ship capsized. People started shouting as they sink. People on the Greek military ship were just watching
      Full testimony here:
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IOzLIXa1cQ8

      https://twitter.com/ecre/status/1670739249417560064

    • I superstiti del naufragio di Pylos accusano la Guardia costiera greca

      Nella notte tra il 13 e il 14 giugno le autorità greche avrebbero tentato di trainare il peschereccio partito dalla Libia con a bordo oltre 700 persone, provocandone l’inabissamento. Le testimonianze dei sopravvissuti, confinati subito dopo aver toccato terra, smontano la versione di Atene. Le vittime sarebbero almeno 643

      Secondo diverse testimonianze dei sopravvissuti il peschereccio con oltre 700 persone a bordo è affondato al largo delle coste greche, nelle prime ore di mercoledì 21 giugno, durante un tentativo fallito di rimorchio da parte della Guardia costiera greca. L’accusa è contenuta nelle dichiarazioni rilasciate da alcuni naufraghi all’autorità giudiziaria di Kalamata, città meridionale greca –visionate dall’Ap news (https://apnews.com/article/greece-migrant-shipwreck-smugglers-9daf86915e8bd89a1697dd1ee75504ac) e dal quotidiano ellenico Kathimerini- che smentiscono la versione delle autorità greche secondo cui la barca non sarebbe stata scortata nelle sue ultime ore di navigazione e non ci sarebbe stato alcun tentativo di abbordarla.

      “La nave greca ha gettato una corda ed è stata legata alla nostra prua -ha spiegato Abdul Rahman Alhaz, 24 anni, palestinese che è riuscito a salvarsi-. Dopo hanno iniziato a muoversi e a tirare, per poco più di due minuti. Noi gridavamo ‘Stop, stop’ perché la barca era sovraccarica. Poi ha cominciato a inclinarsi”.

      L’inabissamento del peschereccio partito dalla Libia avrebbe provocato almeno 643 vittime, secondo quanto è stato possibile ricostruire dalle testimonianze dei 104 sopravvissuti. Sarebbero 100 i bambini, sempre secondo i racconti di chi si è salvato dal naufragio, che con le donne erano stipati nella stiva della nave. Sulle dinamiche dell’incidente, però, fin da subito erano emersi versioni contrastanti.

      Un’inchiesta realizzata dalla BBC (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65942426) mostra che il peschereccio sovraffollato non si è mosso per almeno sette ore prima di capovolgersi mentre la guardia costiera, invece, nel comunicato stampa rilasciato successivamente al naufragio sottolinea che dalle 15.30 all’1.40 la navigazione è proseguita a “velocità e rotta costante”. La versione della BBC si basa sui dati di Marin traffic, che traccia i movimenti delle imbarcazioni nel Mediterraneo, e che confermerebbe che le navi inviate dalle autorità greche per fornire supporto all’imbarcazione carica di naufraghi siano intervenute tutte nella stessa zona e che quindi la nave avrebbe percorso “meno di poche miglia nautiche, come ci si può aspettare da una nave colpita dal vento o dalle onde nella parte più profonda del Mar Mediterraneo”. Inoltre, sempre secondo la testata inglese, la foto dell’imbarcazione pubblicata dai guardacoste ellenici giovedì 15 giugno, riferita a poche ore prima del capovolgimento, dimostra che la nave era ferma e soprattutto smentisce la versione secondo cui le stesse autorità “avevano osservato da una distanza discreta il susseguirsi dei fatti”.

      “Abbiamo lanciato una richiesta di soccorso il giorno prima del naufragio verso le 8 del mattino -ha raccontato un sopravvissuto alla Ong Consolidated rescue group- (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IOzLIXa1cQ8

      ). Non sapevamo neanche che fossimo in Grecia”. Alle 9.47 del mattino Frontex, l’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere europee, ha comunicato alle autorità italiane e greche la presenza di un peschereccio sovraffollato e la Centrale operativa di Roma intorno alle 11 ha comunicato la posizione della nave, nel Sud del Peloponneso, al centro operativo di Atene. Alle 13.50 da Mitilini si è alzato un elicottero della Guardia costiera greca diretto verso il peschereccio, raggiunto verso le 15.35. Le stesse autorità greche, intanto, stavano chiedendo alle imbarcazioni che navigavano nell’area di cambiare rotta. “Una barca ci ha rifornito di quattro boxes d’acqua da sei bottiglie l’una: le persone si colpivano per prenderla -continua il sopravvissuto-. Questa nave ci ha lanciato una corda per avvicinarci ma ci ha detto che non era loro compito salvarci e che presto sarebbe arrivata la Guardia costiera”. La situazione a bordo era tesa, racconta sempre l’uomo intervistato dal Consolidated rescue group, al quarto giorno di navigazione non c’era né acqua né cibo, due persone erano morte e giacevano sul vascello: al quinto giorno, quello precedente al naufragio, qualcuno beveva dal motore perché l’acqua era finita. Ma anche nel racconto dell’uomo quello che succede al calar del sole di martedì scorso, dopo l’intervento delle navi civili, ripercorre le testimonianze di decine di altri naufraghi. “La Guardia costiera, una volta arrivata, ci ha detto di seguirli così l’Italia ci avrebbe salvato. Lo abbiamo fatto per mezz’ora, poi il motore si è rotto. Erano vestiti di nero e mascherati, senza segni militari. Ci hanno tirati con una corta e poi sono ripartiti, la nave ha perso stabilità e poco dopo è affondata”.

      Da Atene le autorità hanno dichiarato che i naufraghi hanno più volte rifiutato il loro intervento perché volevano proseguire verso l’Italia. Diverse testimonianze dei naufraghi smentiscono questa versione. Nawal Soufi, attivista rifugiata indipendente che quel giorno ha lanciato per prima l’Sos per la barca in avaria, ha dichiarato di essere stata in contatto con le persone sulla barca fino alle 23 di martedì. “L’uomo con cui stavo parlando mi ha detto espressamente: ‘Sento che questa sarà la nostra ultima notte viva’”, ha scritto. Poco prima di mezzanotte il motore si è spento.

      El Pais (https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-06-20/greece-imposes-silence-around-shipwreck-of-overcrowded-migrant-boat.) ha accusato le autorità greche di “imporre il silenzio” ai sopravvissuti al naufragio. Durante la loro permanenza nel porto di Kalamata, i 104 naufraghi avevano infatti mobilità limitata e scarso accesso alle comunicazioni: la Guardia costiera, secondo quanto ricostruito dal quotidiano spagnolo, li avrebbe confinati all’interno di un complesso recintato da cui non è stato permesso loro di uscire. Successivamente, venerdì 16 giugno, sono stati trasferiti a Malakasa, un campo per richiedenti asilo vicino ad Atene. Ma anche in questa nuova sistemazione la possibilità di uscire e avere contatti con l’esterno è risultata limitata

      Intanto martedì 20 giugno il tribunale di Kalamata ha convalidato l’arresto di nove uomini di origine egiziana accusati di essere i membri dell’equipaggio: omicidio colposo, naufragio e partecipazione a un’organizzazione criminale sono i capi d’accusa. L’avvocato Athanassios Iliopoulos, che rappresenta un presunto trafficante di 22 anni, ha dichiarato all’Associated Press che tutti e nove i sospettati hanno negato le accuse in tribunale affermando di essere essi stessi naufraghi. Iliopoulos ha detto che il suo cliente ha riferito di aver venduto il suo camion preso in prestito dai suoi genitori per raccogliere 4.500 euro per il viaggio. Anche in Pakistan, dove è stato proclamato il lutto nazionale per le vittime del naufragio, l’ufficio del primo ministro Shehbaz Sharif ha annunciato che sono state arrestate dieci persone accusate di far parte dell’organizzazione. “Intensificheremo gli sforzi nella lotta contro le persone coinvolte nell’atroce crimine della tratta di esseri umani”, ha dichiarato il capo del governo. Per la presidente della Commissione europea Ursula von der Leyen “è urgente agire”, sottolineando che l’Ue dovrebbe aiutare i Paesi africani come la Tunisia, da cui molte persone partono, a stabilizzare le loro economie. Non ha in questo caso menzionato la Libia, luogo da cui il peschereccio del naufragio è partito.

      La Grecia è stata più volte accusata di violare sui propri confini le norme sul salvataggio in mare e i diritti delle persone in transito. A maggio 2023 un’inchiesta del New York Times ha mostrato, con tanto di video ad alta definizione, le autorità greche riportare indietro verso le coste turche decine di profughi già arrivati sul territorio, tra cui anche bambini, lasciando alla deriva l’imbarcazione. Altro che attività di search and rescue. Il portale di inchiesta Solomon (https://wearesolomon.com/mag/focus-area/migration/just-007-of-819m-border-budget-to-greece-earmarked-for-search-and-resc) ha ricostruito come degli 819 milioni di euro forniti ad Atene all’interno del “Fondo di gestione delle frontiere europee” appena lo 0,07% (neanche 600mila euro) sarà destinato allo sviluppo delle attività di ricerca e soccorso in mare. La maggior parte del denaro riguarda invece l’approvvigionamento di attrezzature di deterrenza come droni, veicoli di ogni tipo, termocamere, elicotteri e sistemi di sorveglianza automatizzati. Tutto ciò che non è servito per salvare 640 persone.

      https://altreconomia.it/i-superstiti-del-naufragio-di-pylos-accusano-la-guardia-costiera-greca

    • Greece shipwreck survivors were ’abandoned for 10 minutes’

      Survivors of the June 14 shipwreck off Greece have made serious accusations against the country’s Coast Guard in witness statements.

      Statements gathered from some of the 104 survivors of a recent shipwreck off Greece contain serious accusations against the Greek Coast Guard.

      Search operations for more corpses continue after the fishing vessel, which is believed to have been carrying up to 800 migrants, capsized last week south of Greece’s Peloponnese.
      Survivors blame Greek Coast Guard

      “When the ship capsized, the Coast Guard cut the rope and continued on its way. It went farther away as we were all screaming. After 10 minutes, they came back with small boats to pick up people but they did not go as far as the ship itself. They only picked up those who managed to swim away,” one survivor told the Greek newspaper Kathimerini, recounting the last minutes of shipwreck that left at least 82 dead and hundreds missing.

      Surviving witnesses have been questioned by the Kalamata port authority.

      Every person interviewed confirmed — with slight variations in their reconstructions — that the shipwreck had been caused by a Greek Coast Guard patrol boat.

      One of the survivors said the Coast Guard’s attempt to tow the overcrowded fishing vessel created turbulence in the water that eventually caused the ship to capsize.

      “They tried to pull it using force for two or three minutes and everyone whistled to try to make them stop, since they were pulling it strongly and creating waves,” one said.

      Another added that, “for the first few minutes we went forward, but then the Coast Guard turned to the right and the ship overturned.”
      Polemics inflame political conflict prior to vote

      These witness statements run counter to the Coast Guard’s official version. Captains aboard the patrol boat say they only hooked up to the vessel for a few minutes to check the situation onboard before the ship wrecked.

      The situation has inflamed political conflict ahead of Greece’s government elections, which will be held Sunday.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/49846/greece-shipwreck-survivors-were-abandoned-for-10-minutes

    • They knew the boat could sink. Boarding it didn’t feel like a choice.

      The story of how as many as 750 migrants came to board a rickety blue fishing trawler and end up in one of the Mediterranean’s deadliest shipwrecks is bigger than any one of the victims. But for everyone, it started somewhere, and for #Thaer_Khalid_al-Rahal it started with cancer.

      The leukemia diagnosis for his youngest son, 4-year-old Khalid, came early last year. The family had been living in a Jordanian refugee camp for a decade, waiting for official resettlement after fleeing Syria’s bitter war, and doctors said the United Nations’ refugee agency could help cover treatment costs. But agency funds dwindled and the child’s case worsened. When doctors said Khalid needed a bone-marrow transplant, the father confided in relatives that waiting to relocate through official channels was no longer an option. He needed to get to Europe to earn money and save his son.

      “Thaer thought he didn’t have a choice,” said his cousin, Abdulrahman Yousif al-Rahal, reached by phone in the Jordanian refugee camp of Zaatari.

      In Egypt, the journey for #Mohamed_Abdelnasser, 27, started with a creeping realization that his carpentry work could not earn enough to support his wife and two sons.

      For #Matloob_Hussain, 42, it began the day his Greek residency renewal was rejected, sending him back to Pakistan, where his salary helped put food on the table for 20 extended family members amid a crippling economic crisis.

      “Europe doesn’t understand,” said his brother Adiil Hussain, interviewed in Greece where they had lived together. “We don’t leave because we want to. There is simply nothing for us in Pakistan.”

      On Matloob’s earlier journey to Europe, he had been so scared of the water that he kept his eyes closed the whole time. This time, the smugglers promised him they would take him to Italy. They said they would use “a good boat.”

      The trawler left from the Libyan port city of #Tobruk on June 8. Just 104 survivors have reached the Greek mainland. Eighty-two bodies have been recovered, and hundreds more have been swallowed by the sea.

      As the Mediterranean became a stage for tragedy on June 14, a billionaire and several businessmen were preparing for their own voyage in the North Atlantic. The disappearance of their submersible as it dove toward the wreckage of the Titanic sparked a no-expenses-spared search-and-rescue mission and rolling headlines. The ship packed with refugees and migrants did not.

      About half the passengers are believed to have been from Pakistan. The country’s interior minister said Friday that an estimated 350 Pakistanis were on board, and that many may have died. Of the survivors from the boat, 47 are Syrian, 43 Egyptian, 12 Pakistani and two Palestinian.

      Some of the people on the trawler were escaping war. Many were family breadwinners, putting their own lives on the line to help others back home. Some were children. A list of the missing from two towns in the Nile Delta carries 43 names. Almost half of them are under 18 years old.

      This account of what pushed them to risk a notoriously dangerous crossing is based on interviews with survivors in Greece and relatives of the dead in Pakistan, Jordan and Egypt, as the news sent ripples of distress throughout communities from North Africa to South Asia. Some people spoke on the condition of anonymity, because they feared being drawn into government crackdowns on human smuggling networks.

      Rahal’s family said they do not know how he contacted the smugglers in Libya, but remember watching as he creased under the fatigue and shame of having to ask anyone he could for the thousands of dollars they were requesting for safe passage to Italy.

      Thirteen men left from El Na’amna village, south of the Egyptian capital, Cairo, in the hope of achieving the same. Ten miles away in Ibrash, another village, Abdelnasser left the house as he usually did for his 2 a.m. factory shift but joined a packed car to Libya instead, along with 29 other young men and boys. “He told us nothing,” said his father, Amr. “We would have stopped him.”

      Many of the families said the departures caught them by surprise and that local intermediaries working for the smugglers later communicated with relatives in Egypt to gather the requested funds.

      In El Na’amna, several people said the figure was $4,500 per person — a sum impossibly high for most rural Egyptians. In Ibrash, Abdelnasser’s uncle said, two of the delegates who arrived to collect the money were disguised in women’s dress. Another woman did the talking. She collected the money, photographed receipts, and then told the family that the deal was done.

      ‘He said the boat was very bad’

      The time spent waiting in Libya was harder than the migrants expected, said family members who spoke with them throughout that period. The port city of Tobruk had become a transit hub for people, and the migrants reported that the smugglers treated them like goods to be traded. The lucky ones rented cramped apartments where they could wait near the bright blue sea.

      Travelers who had arranged to meet their intermediaries in the city of Benghazi were transported in large refrigerator trucks to the desert. One survivor described a house there “with a big yard and big walls and people at the door with guns.” It was so busy that people slept in the yard outside. Inside, a 24-year-old Pakistani migrant, Bilal Hassan, tried to lighten the mood by reciting Punjabi poetry. He is smiling in the video he sent his family, but other men in the room look tense.

      Some migrants told their families they were getting anxious and didn’t trust their smugglers. Others sent brief messages to reassure and say that they were fine.

      Rahal spoke to his wife, Nermin, every day. A month passed with no news of onward passage and his mood darkened. He worried about Khalid. In Jordan, the boy kept asking when he would see his father again. “I don’t know,” Rahal texted in reply. When one smuggler’s offer fell through, he found another who promised to get the job done faster. In voice messages to his cousin, he sounded tired.

      “I’ll manage to get the money,” he said.

      His last call to his wife was June 8. Men from the smuggling network were yelling at the migrants to pack together as closely as possible in rubber dinghies that would take them to the trawler. Up ahead, the blue fishing boat looked like it was already full.

      Matloob Hussein, the Pakistani who had lived in Greece, called his brother from the trawler. “He said the boat was very bad,” Adiil recounted. “He said they had loaded people on the boat like cattle. He said he was below deck and that he preferred it so he didn’t have to see that he was surrounded by water.”

      When Adiil asked why his brother hadn’t refused to board, Matloob said the smugglers had guns and knives. As the boat pulled out of Tobruk’s concrete port, he told Adiil he was turning his phone off — he did not expect to have a signal again until they arrived.

      After the calls to loved ones stopped, from the foothills of Kashmir to the villages of the Nile Delta, families held their breath.

      It felt, said one relative, like a film that had just stopped halfway through.

      In hometowns and villages, waiting for news

      News of the blue trawler’s capsize trickled out on the morning of June 14. The coast guard’s initial report said that at least 17 people had drowned while noting that more than 100 had been saved. On the Greek mainland, relatives waited for updates in the baking sun outside a migrant reception center. Back in hometowns and villages, some people kept their cellphones plugged into the power sockets so they did not risk missing a call.

      The residents of El Na’amna and Ibrash didn’t know what to do. Police arrested a local smuggler but provided no updates on the whereabouts of the missing. Rumors swirled that most were dead. The mother of 23-year-old Amr Elsayed described a grief so full that she felt as if she were burning.

      A Pakistani community leader in Greece, Javed Aslam, said he was in direct contact with more than 200 families asking for news. Accounts from survivors suggested that almost all the Pakistani passengers, along with many women and children, had been stuck on the lower levels of the boat as it went down.

      Adiil came looking for his brother. He was turned away from the hospital where survivors had been treated, but left his details anyway. Outside the Malakasa reception center, where the survivors were staying, 15 miles north of Athens, several Pakistanis seemed to know Matloob as “the man in the yellow T-shirt.” No one had seen him since the wreck.

      Perhaps it was crazy, Adiil said Thursday, but somehow he still had hope. He had registered his DNA with the local authorities and he had spoken to other families there every day. Now he didn’t know what to do with himself. His eyes were red from crying. He carried creased photographs of his brother in his pocket.

      In one image, Matloob is standing with his dark-eyed daughter, 10-year-old Arfa. Adiil had told the girl that her father was in the hospital, but that fiction was weighing more on him by the day as she kept asking why they couldn’t speak.

      Khalid had been asking for his father, too, but no one knew how to make a 4-year-old understand something they barely understood themselves.

      Nermin, relatives said, was “in bad shape.” She had a funeral to organize without a body. But first she had to take Khalid to the hospital for his biopsy, to learn how far the cancer had spread.

      https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/24/greek-migrant-boat-victims

    • ‘If they had left us be, we wouldn’t have drowned:’ CNN investigation raises questions about Greek coast guard’s account of shipwreck tragedy

      The hull of the fishing trawler lifted out of the water as it sank, catapulting people from the top deck into the black sea below. In the darkness, they grabbed onto whatever they could to stay afloat, pushing each other underwater in a frantic fight for survival. Some were screaming, many began to recite their final prayers.

      “I can still hear the voice of a woman calling out for help,” one survivor of the migrant boat disaster off the coast of Greece told CNN. “You’d swim and move floating bodies out of your way.”

      With hundreds of people still missing after the overloaded vessel capsized in the Mediterranean on June 14, the testimonies of those who were onboard paint a picture of chaos and desperation. They also call into question the Greek coast guard’s version of events, suggesting more lives could have been saved, and may even point to fault on the part of Greek authorities.

      Rights groups allege the tragedy is both further evidence and a result of a new pattern in illegal pushbacks of migrant boats to other nations’ waters, with deadly consequences.

      This boat was carrying up to 750 Pakistani, Syrian, Egyptian and Palestinian refugees and migrants. Only 104 people have been rescued alive.

      CNN has interviewed multiple survivors of the shipwreck and their relatives, all of whom have wished to remain anonymous for security reasons and the fear of retribution from authorities in both Greece and at home.

      One survivor from Syria, whom CNN is identifying as Rami, described how a Greek coast guard vessel approached the trawler multiple times to try to attach a rope to tow the ship, with disastrous results.

      “The third time they towed us, the boat swayed to the right and everyone was screaming, people began falling into the sea, and the boat capsized and no one saw anyone anymore,” he said. “Brothers were separated, cousins were separated.”

      Another Syrian man, identified as Mostafa, also believes it was the maneuver by the coast guard that caused the disaster. “The Greek captain pulled us too fast, it was extremely fast, this caused our boat to sink,” he said.

      The Hellenic Coast Guard has repeatedly denied attempting to tow the vessel. An official investigation into the cause of the tragedy is still ongoing.

      Coast guard spokesman Nikos Alexiou told CNN over the phone last week: “When the boat capsized, we were not even next to (the) boat. How could we be towing it?” Instead, he insisted they had only been “observing at a close distance” and that “a shift in weight probably caused by panic” had caused the boat to tip.

      The Hellenic Coast Guard has declined to answer CNN’s specific requests for response to the survivor testimonies.

      Direct accounts from those who survived the wreck have been limited, due to their concerns about speaking out and the media having little access to the survivors. CNN interviewed Rami and Mostafa outside the Malakasa migrant camp near Athens, where journalists are not permitted entry.

      The Syrian men said the conditions on board the migrant boat deteriorated fast in the more than five days after it set off from Tobruk, Libya, in route to Italy. They had run out of water and had resorted to drinking from storage bottles that people had urinated in.

      “People were dying. People were fainting. We used a rope to dip clothes into the sea and use that to squeeze water on people who had lost consciousness,” Rami said.

      CNN’s analysis of marine traffic data, combined with information from NGOs, merchant vessels and the European Union border patrol agency, Frontex, suggests that Greek authorities were aware of the distressed vessel for at least 13 hours before it eventually sank early on June 14.

      The Greek coast guard has maintained that people onboard the trawler had refused rescue and insisted they wanted to continue their journey to Italy. But survivors, relatives and activists say they had asked for help multiple times.

      Earlier in the day, other ships tried to help the trawler. Directed by the Greek coast guard, two merchant vessels – Lucky Sailor and Faithful Warrior – approached the boat between 6 and 9 p.m. on June 13 to offer supplies, according to marine traffic data and the logs of those ships. But according to survivors this only caused more havoc onboard.

      “Fights broke out over food and water, people were screaming and shouting,” Mostafa said. “If it wasn’t for people trying to calm the situation down, the boat was on the verge of sinking several times.”

      By early evening, six people had already died onboard, according to an audio recording reviewed by CNN from Italian activist Nawal Soufi, who took a distress call from the migrant boat at around 7 p.m. Soufi’s communication with the vessel also corroborated Mostafa’s account that people moved from one side of the boat to the other after water bottles were passed from the cargo ships, causing it to sway dangerously.

      The haunting final words sent from the migrant boat came just minutes before it capsized. According to a timeline published by NGO Alarm Phone they received a call, at around 1:45 a.m., with the words “Hello my friend… The ship you send is…” Then the call cuts out.

      The coast guard says the vessel began to sink at around 2 a.m.

      The next known activity in the area, according to marine traffic data, was the arrival of a cluster of vessels starting around 3 a.m. The Mayan Queen superyacht was the first on the scene for what soon became a mass rescue operation.

      A responsibility to rescue

      Human rights groups say the authorities had a duty to act to save lives, regardless of what people on board were saying to the coast guard before the migrant boat capsized.

      “The boat was overcrowded, was unseaworthy and should have been rescued and people taken to safety, that’s quite clear,” UNHCR Special Envoy for the Central Mediterranean Vincent Cochetel told CNN in an interview. “There was a responsibility for the Greek authorities to coordinate a rescue to bring those people safely to land.”

      Cochetel also pointed to a growing trend by countries, including Greece, to assist migrant boats in leaving their waters. “That’s a practice we’ve seen in recent months. Some coastal states provide food, provide water, sometimes life jackets, sometimes even fuel to allow such boats to continue to only one destination: Italy. And that’s not fair, Italy cannot cope with that responsibility alone.”

      Survivors who say the coast guard tried to tow their boat say they don’t know what the aim was.

      There have been multiple documented examples in recent years of Greek patrol boats engaging in so-called “pushbacks” of migrant vessels from Greek waters in recent years, including in a CNN investigation in 2020.

      “It looks like what the Greeks have been doing since March 2020 as a matter of policy, which is pushbacks and trying to tow a boat to another country’s water in order to avoid the legal responsibility to rescue,” Omer Shatz, legal director of NGO Front-LEX, told CNN. “Because rescue means disembarkation and disembarkation means processing of asylum requests.”

      Pushbacks are state measures aimed at forcing refugees and migrants out of their territory, while impeding access to legal and procedural frameworks, according to the Berlin-based European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR). They are a violation of international law, as well as European regulations.

      And such measures do not appear to have deterred human traffickers whose businesses prey on vulnerable and desperate migrants.

      In an interview with CNN last month, then Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis denied that his country engaged in intentional pushbacks and described them as a “completely unacceptable practice.” Mitsotakis is widely expected to win a second term in office in Sunday’s election, after failing to get an outright majority in a vote last month.

      A series of Greek governments have been criticized for their handling of migration policy, including conditions in migrant camps, particularly following the 2015-16 refugee crisis, when more than 1 million people entered Europe through the country.

      For those who lived through last week’s sinking, the harrowing experience will never be forgotten.

      Mostafa and Rami both say they wish they had never made the journey, despite the fact they are now in Europe and are able to claim asylum.

      Most of all, Mostafa says, he wishes the Greek coast guard had never approached their boat: “If they had left us be, we wouldn’t have drowned.”

      https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/23/europe/greece-migrant-boat-disaster-investigation-intl-cmd/index.html
      #témoignage

    • Greece shipwreck survivors faced ’unacceptable’ conditions on arrival in country

      NGOs say survivors of sinking are being held in a closed centre with limited access to psychological support

      Survivors of the Pylos shipwreck, which has left an estimated 500 people missing, faced an “unacceptable” reception in Greece and continue to be held in conditions unsuitable for vulnerable people, NGO workers say.

      The overloaded fishing trawler carrying an estimated 750 people capsized and sank in front of the Greek coastguard last week, following an allegedly botched attempt by the coastguard to tow the vessel.

      The survivors, put at 104 and all men - as no women or children are said to have survived the wreck - were taken to Kalamata, a city on the Peloponnese peninsula, where they were kept in a storage warehouse for two to three days before being transferred to an asylum registration facility at Malakasa, north of Athens.

      “We witnessed an unacceptable reception of extremely vulnerable people in Kalamata,” Eleni Spathanaa, a volunteer lawyer for Refugee Support Aegean, an organisation providing legal advice for the survivors of the wreck, told Middle East Eye.

      Survivors slept on mattresses on the warehouse floor, and the area around it was ringed with fencing. A video posted on Twitter showed a Syrian teenager attempting to embrace his brother through the bars.

      According to Spathanaa, in the first few days no concerted effort was made by authorities to facilitate contact with the survivors’ families, although the Greek Red Cross was providing some access to mobile phones.

      A suffocating experience

      The survivors were transported to a registration facility in Malakasa on 16 and 17 June.

      According to Spathanaa, conditions at #Malakasa are not much of an improvement on those at Kalamata. Survivors are housed in shared shipping containers, and, as at #Kalamata, the facility is ring-fenced, with access severely restricted.

      The prison-like conditions came as a shock.

      “We witnessed... people devastated [and in] shock. They could not even understand where they were,” said Spathanaa. "I could not understand why they were put in a closed centre. Of course, these conditions are not suitable for people who have just survived a shipwreck.

      “These people were [contained], after such a suffocating experience - all of them have lost friends, some of them close relatives... they cannot even conceive what has happened.”

      According to Spathanaa, some of the survivors’ basic needs are not being met at the facility, with some reporting that requests for extra clothing to keep warm at night have been refused. Requests for tea, coffee and cigarettes were also reportedly denied.

      Spathanaa and her colleagues also found that, despite suffering from acute distress, the survivors were being “fast-tracked” through the process of registration for asylum applications.

      “This was quite problematic because most of the people [we met] had not even seen a lawyer before passing through this process,” she said.

      Emergency psychological and medical aid at the facility is being provided by the NGO Doctors Without Borders (MSF). “We saw a lot of distress,” MSF head of mission Sonia Balleron told MEE. “The medical team is clear that [the survivors] are all potentially at risk of PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder].”

      The team have reported treating chemical burns, injuries from exposure to the sun and sea water, as well as hypo-glycaemic shock (the effect of low blood sugar), due to the people aboard the boat being deprived of food for up to six days.

      According to Balleron, many of the survivors are suffering from sleep disorders and night terrors in the wake of the disaster.

      “What we hear mostly... is people [recalling] seeing their friends dying in front of their eyes,” said Balleron. “They also talk about not knowing who survived and who died, which is causing a lot of stress. Families are calling a lot to try to understand if their relatives are among the survivors or not.”
      A political choice

      For Spathanaa, the conditions experienced by the survivors of the wreck on arrival in Kalamata and Malakasa are no accident, but a “political choice”.

      At the end of 2022, the ESTIA accommodation scheme, an EU funded housing programme for vulnerable asylum seekers, was terminated. The programme, which was started in 2015, was intended to assist families with children, people with disabilities and survivors of torture with suitable housing and medical care.

      When it closed on 16 December, vulnerable asylum seekers were transferred from ESTIA accommodation to remote camps with as little as 24 hours’ notice. Human rights groups warned that the curtailment of the scheme could exacerbate isolation of asylum seekers and “re-traumatise” survivors of violence and torture.

      “We have these vulnerable survivors, and we don’t have the option of sheltering them in dignified and suitable conditions,” said Spathanaa. “I don’t think if the shipwreck’s passengers were tourists, that they would treat them like that. They wouldn’t put them in a warehouse.”

      This is not lost on the international community. Social media posts in the wake of the disaster have highlighted the discrepancy in the efforts by the Greek coastguard to prevent last week’s wreck with the resources expended on recovering the missing Titan submarine in the Atlantic Ocean.

      Widespread protests in Greece over the authorities’ inaction to the disaster have also highlighted the inequities that play out in the waters of the Mediterranean: on 18 June, two cruise ships were greeted at Thessaloniki port with a banner reading: “Tourists enjoy your cruise in Europe’s biggest migrants cemetery.”

      https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/greece-shipwreck-survivors-unacceptable-conditions-upon-arrival
      #emprisonnement #survivants

    • On the night of June 14, Captain Richard Kirkby is piloting the Mayan Queen IV, a luxury yacht belonging to a Mexican multibillionaire, through the calm, black waters of the Mediterranean when he receives an emergency call. “Ship sinking. Large number of people. Vessels in the vicinity are requested to initiate search and rescue operations.” The crew hears the screams from people drowning before they can see them.

      The shipwreck that takes place that night would turn out to be the deadliest in the Mediterranean in many years. Around 750 people are thought to have been on board the fishing boat that went down off the coast of the Peloponnese. When the Mayan Queen IV reaches the site at 2:55 a.m., only the lights of another ship can be seen. They belong to the Greek Coast Guard, vessel LS 920 – according to investigation files that DER SPIEGEL and its partners have acquired.

      But the Greeks cannot be reached via radio. So three crew members from the Mayan Queen IV climb into a life boat and start searching for survivors, constantly heading toward the cries for help. They stay as quiet as they can so as not to miss a single voice. Ultimately, they will pull 15 people out of the water.

      Early in the morning, the Greek Coast Guard requests permission to bring additional survivors on board. The Greek vessel is too small to safely bring all the survivors to shore. But the Mayan Queen IV – a ship with four decks, tinted windows and a helicopter landing pad – is large enough. At 7:20 a.m., the yacht sets course for Kalamata. On board are 100 of a total of 104 survivors – migrants wrapped in silver emergency blankets cowering where the super-rich are normally sunning themselves.
      Survivors if the shipwreck in the port of Kalamata: “Ship sinking. Large number of people.”

      Hundreds of refugees don’t survive this night – despite the fact that the Greek Coast Guard arrived at the site several hours before the accident. As early as the morning of the previous day, an Italian agency had sent them a warning and a non-governmental organization had forwarded an SOS from the fishing boat. Even the European Union border control agency Frontex had identified the ship’s plight and offered additional assistance. How can it be that hundreds of migrants died anyway? It is a question that has plagued the Greek Coast Guard for the last two weeks.

      The accusations that survivors have leveled at the Greeks are serious: Did the Coast Guard leave the people to their fate for too long? Were they trying to pull the ship into Italian waters – as some testimony seems to indicate? Perhaps to keep hundreds of migrants from landing in Greece?

      A team of reporters from DER SPIEGEL joined forces with the nonprofit newsroom Lighthouse Reports, investigative journalism consortium Reporters United, the Spanish newspaper El País, the Syrian investigative reporting outlet Siraj and the German public broadcaster ARD to explore these questions. The reporters interviewed survivors, many of whom had already turned to the aid organization Consolidated Rescue Group. They examined leaked investigative reports, videos and geodata and spoke with sources inside Frontex.

      The reporting indicates that, at the very least, the Greek Coast Guard may have made grave errors. Sixteen refugees have accused the Greeks, for example, of causing the fishing boat to capsize, while seven are convinced that Greek rescue attempts were hesitant at best – which would mean they were willing to accept the deaths of hundreds of people. There are also serious doubts about the willingness of Greek authorities to thoroughly investigate the disaster. The leaked investigation reports raise questions as to whether Greek officials may have altered testimony in their favor.

      One of those who survived, we’ll call him Manhal Abdulkareem, tells his story in mid-June from the Greek camp Malakasa. He requests that we not use his real name or even describe him out of fear of how the Greek authorities might react. What he has to say does not paint them in a positive light.

      The Syrian once worked as a stonemason in Jordan. Last spring, he decided to risk the crossing to Italy. He traveled to Libya and boarded the vessel in the port city of Tobruk on June 9. Abdulkareem is one of hundreds of people who crowded onto the vessel, and he was one of the lucky ones: He was able to buy himself a place on deck. Later, it would save his life.

      Other refugees crowded into the boat’s cold storage room. According to survivors, women and children were below decks, many of them from Pakistan. For them, the belly of the ship would turn into a coffin.

      Abdulkareem’s account of the initial days onboard the ship is consistent with the stories told by other survivors. He says that they began running out of water on the third of five days onboard, that the motor cut out on several occasions and that the captain seemed to have lost his orientation. The goal of reaching Italy was more distant than ever.

      The Greek Coast Guard was also aware of the dire situation onboard the fishing boat. On the morning of June 13, they received the first warning from the Italian Coast Guard. Frontex agents filmed the ship from the air at midday. At 5:13 p.m. local time, the non-governmental organization Alarmphone wrote an email to the Greek authorities. The email noted that there were 750 people on the ship. “They are requesting urgent assistance.”

      At the time of the call for help, the fishing vessel was around 80 kilometers (50 miles) off the coast of the Peloponnese. Nevertheless, the Greek Coast Guard sent a ship that was anchored in far-away Crete.

      At least two freighters supplied the fishing vessel with water, but they didn’t take anyone onboard. Abdulkareem and other survivors say that by this point, two passengers on the boat had already died. The Greek Coast Guard ship only arrived at 10:40 p.m.

      There are two versions for what then took place.

      Manhal Abdulkareem reports that the Greek Coast Guard escorted their ship for a time, until the fishing boat’s engine again cut out. Then, he says, the Coast Guard attached a rope to the vessel. “We thought they knew what they were doing,” says Abdulkareem.

      The Coast Guard, he says, towed the vessel at a rapid speed, first to the right, then the left, and then back to the right – and then it capsized. Fifteen additional survivors tell a similar story. Some believe the behavior of the Coast Guard was accidental. Others think it was intentional.

      When the vessel capsized, there were people trapped inside its hull. One survivor says he heard them knocking. Those who were on deck jumped into the water. “People were falling on us,” says one man from Egypt. Some clung to the sinking vessel, while others grabbed in a panic for anything that was floating, including other people.

      “I know how to swim, but that wasn’t enough,” Abdulkareem would later say. He says he had to avoid others so that he wouldn’t be pulled down into the depths. Four survivors say that the Coast Guard put those in the water in even greater danger by maneuvering in such a way that created large waves.

      While still in the water, Abdulkareem began searching for his brother, but was unable to find him. As the vessel was sinking, say survivors, the Greek Coast Guard ship pulled back to a distance of hundreds of meters.

      Abdulkareem and six others accuse the Greeks of delayed rescue efforts and only launching inflatable dinghies after significant time had passed. Some estimate that several minutes passed before they took any action at all. Others say the delay was fully half an hour. “They could have saved many people,” says a survivor from Syria. Abdulkareem’s brother still hasn’t been found.

      The Greek Coast Guard has a competing account for what took place. According to an official log from June 14, their ship reported on the evening prior to the disaster that the refugees were “on a stable course” – a claim that video evidence and tracking data refute. The people on board, according to the official account, rejected assistance because they “wanted nothing more than to continue onward to Italy.” If the Greek Coast Guard is to be believed, the fishing boat capsized shortly after 2 a.m. The first official log provides no cause for the accident.

      Later, the Greek government spokesman said that the Coast Guard had attached a rope to the boat. But only to “stabilize” the vessel. By the time of the accident, the rope had already been cast off, the spokesman said, and the fishing vessel had never been towed. The rope, he insists, was not the cause of the shipwreck. In an interview with CNN, a Coast Guard spokesman speculated that panic may have broken out onboard, leading to the boat listing to one side.

      There is no proof for either version. But doubts about the Greek account are significant, even within Frontex. At the agency’s headquarters in Warsaw, EU border guards can follow in real time what is taking place on the EU’s external borders. In this case, the agents must have realized early on the danger that the migrants were in.

      On two occasions – at 6:35 p.m. and at 9:34 p.m. – they offered to send the airplane back to the ship that the migrants had already seen at midday. It was refueled and ready to take off, according to an internal memo that DER SPIEGEL has obtained. But the Greek Rescue Coordination Center in Piraeus, Frontex says, ignored the offer. The plane remained on the ground.

      The only other available aircraft, a Frontex drone, was initially sent to another distress call, according to Frontex. It only arrived at the scene after the fishing vessel had sunk. In Brussels, hardly anyone believes that the rebuff of Frontex was an accident. Many see a pattern: Greek authorities systematically send away Frontex units, says one Brussels official. That happens particularly often, the official says, in situations that later turn out to be controversial.

      The mistrust with which Athens now finds itself confronted – even from EU institutions – has a lot to do with previous violations of international law on the Aegean. The Greek Coast Guard has repeatedly towed groups of refugees back into Turkish waters – before then abandoning them on life rafts with no means of propulsion.

      Proof for such pushbacks has become so overwhelming that the Frontex fundamental rights officer recently recommended that the organization suspend cooperation with the Greek Coast Guard. The “strongest possible measures” are necessary to ensure that the Greeks once again begin complying with applicable law, reads an internal memo that DER SPIEGEL has obtained. Joint missions can only be resumed once a new basis for trust has been established, the memo continues.

      The skepticism has become so great that Frontex has even sent a team to Greece to question survivors itself. Two Frontex officials say that the results of investigations conducted thus far seem to contradict the Greek version of events. One Greek lawyer is even demanding an official state investigation of the Coast Guard for manslaughter through failure to render aid.

      Most survivors, though, don’t believe that the Greek state will investigate the role played by its own Coast Guard. The treatment they received in the days following the catastrophe was too poor for such optimism.

      Sami Al Yafi, a young Syrian, is one of them. He, too, has asked that his real name not be printed out of fear of the Greek authorities. He accuses the Coast Guard of manipulating his statement. He claims to have clearly testified that the Coast Guard had caused the ship to capsize, but he was unable to find that statement in the transcript of his interview. An additional survivor says that he had a similar experience.

      There are also corresponding inconsistencies in the investigation file. In six instances, according to the file, survivors said nothing about a tow rope in their first interview with the Coast Guard – or at least there is no mention of such in the minutes taken by the Coast Guard. Later, in interviews with public prosecutors, they then accused the Coast Guard of causing the capsizing by towing the vessel.

      Moreover, the minutes taken by the Greek Coast Guard frequently include the exact same formulations. According to those minutes, four survivors used exactly the same words in describing the events – despite the fact that the interviews were led by different interpreters. In one case, a member of the Coast Guard apparently acted as an interpreter.

      When approached for comment, Greek officials said they were unable to comment on the accusations. The accounts, they said, are part of a confidential investigation. They said they were also unable to comment on the actions of the Coast Guard.

      Manhal Abdulkareem, the man who lost his brother, isn’t satisfied. “We are a group of 104 survivors,” he says. All of them know, he says, who caused the boat to capsize.

      On at least one occasion, Greek officials have been found guilty of accusations similar to those that have now been lodged by Abdulkareem and other survivors. It was left up to the European Court of Human Rights to pass that verdict. Last year, the court found that the Greek Coast Guard in 2014 towed a refugee boat until it capsized. Three women and eight children died in that incident. Then, too, the Coast Guard claimed that panic had broken out onboard the vessel and that the refugees themselves had caused the boat to capsize. It is the exact same story they are currently telling.

      https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/new-accusations-against-the-greek-coast-guard-we-thought-they-knew-what-they

    • Everyone Knew the Migrant Ship Was Doomed. No One Helped.

      Satellite imagery, sealed court documents and interviews with survivors suggest that hundreds of deaths were preventable.

      From air and by sea, using radar, telephone and radio, officials watched and listened for 13 hours as the migrant ship Adriana lost power, then drifted aimlessly off the coast of Greece in a slowly unfolding humanitarian disaster.

      As terrified passengers telephoned for help, humanitarian workers assured them that a rescue team was coming. European border officials, watching aerial footage, prepared to witness what was certain to be a heroic operation.

      Yet the Adriana capsized and sank in the presence of a single Greek Coast Guard ship last month, killing more than 600 migrants in a maritime tragedy that was shocking even for the world’s deadliest migrant route.

      Satellite imagery, sealed court documents, more than 20 interviews with survivors and officials, and a flurry of radio signals transmitted in the final hours suggest that the scale of death was preventable.

      Dozens of officials and coast guard crews monitored the ship, yet the Greek government treated the situation like a law enforcement operation, not a rescue. Rather than send a navy hospital ship or rescue specialists, the authorities sent a team that included four masked, armed men from a coast guard special operations unit.

      The Greek authorities have repeatedly said that the Adriana was sailing to Italy, and that the migrants did not want to be rescued. But satellite imagery and tracking data obtained by The New York Times show definitively that the Adriana was drifting in a loop for its last six and a half hours. And in sworn testimony, survivors described passengers on the ship’s upper decks calling for help and even trying to jump aboard a commercial tanker that had stopped to provide drinking water.

      On board the Adriana, the roughly 750 passengers descended into violence and desperation. Every movement threatened to capsize the ship. Survivors described beatings and panic as they waited for a rescue that would never come.

      The sinking of the Adriana is an extreme example of a longtime standoff in the Mediterranean. Ruthless smugglers in North Africa cram people onto shoddy vessels, and passengers hope that, if things go wrong, they will be taken to safety. But European coast guards often postpone rescues out of fear that helping will embolden smugglers to send more people on ever-flimsier ships. And as European politics have swung to the right, each new arriving ship is a potential political flashpoint.

      So even as passengers on the Adriana called for help, the authorities chose to listen to the boat’s captain, a 22-year-old Egyptian man who said he wanted to continue to Italy. Smuggling captains are typically paid only when they reach their destinations.

      The Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs said it would not respond to detailed questions because the shipwreck was under criminal investigation.

      Despite many hours of on-and-off surveillance, the only eyewitnesses to the Adriana’s final moments were the survivors and 13 crew members aboard the coast guard ship, known as the 920. A Maritime Ministry spokesman has said that the ship’s night-vision camera was switched off at the time. Court documents show that the coast guard captain gave the authorities a CD-ROM containing video recordings, but the source of the recordings is unclear, and they have not been made public.

      Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis of Greece defended the coast guard during comments in Brussels this past week, calling its critics “profoundly unfair.” The sinking has brought rare public criticism from officials in the European Union, which has remained silent as the Greek government has hardened its stance toward migrants.

      In Greece, nine Egyptian survivors from the Adriana were arrested and charged with smuggling and causing the shipwreck. In sworn testimonies and interviews, survivors said that many of the nine brutalized and extorted passengers. But interviews with relatives of those accused paint a more complicated picture. At least one of the men charged with being a smuggler had himself paid a full fee of more than $4,000 to be on the ship.

      Collectively paying as much as $3.5 million to be smuggled to Italy, migrants crammed into the Adriana in what survivors recalled was a hellish class system: Pakistanis at the bottom; women and children in the middle; and Syrians, Palestinians and Egyptians at the top.

      An extra $50 or so could earn someone a spot on the deck. For some, that turned out to be the difference between life and death.

      Many of the passengers, at least 350, came from Pakistan, the Pakistani government said. Most were in the lower decks and the ship’s hold. Of them, 12 survived.

      The women and young children went down with the ship.
      Setting Sail

      Kamiran Ahmad, a Syrian teenager, a month shy of his 18th birthday, had arrived in Tobruk, Libya, with hopes for a new life. He had worked with his father, a tailor, after school. His parents sold land to pay smugglers to take him to Italy, praying that he would make it to Germany to study, work and maybe send some money home.
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      “We had no choice but to send him by sea,” his father said in an interview.

      But as the Adriana set sail at dawn on June 9, Kamiran was worried. His cousin, Roghaayan Adil Ehmed, 24, who went with him, could not swim. And the boat was overcrowded, with nearly twice as many passengers as he had been told.

      No life vests were available, so Roghaayan paid $600 to get himself, Kamiran and a friend to an upper deck.

      They were part of a group of 11 young men and boys from Kobani, a mainly Kurdish city in Syria devastated by more than decade of war. The group stayed in dingy, rented rooms in Beirut, Lebanon, then flew to Egypt and on to Libya.

      The youngest, Waleed Mohammad Qasem, 14, wanted to be a doctor. When he heard that his uncle Mohammad Fawzi Sheikhi was going to Europe, he begged to go. On the flight to Egypt, the two smiled for a selfie.

      Haseeb ur-Rehman, 20, a motorcycle mechanic from the Pakistan-administrated Kashmir, felt he had to leave home to help his family survive. Together with three friends, he paid $8,000 and left for Libya.

      He was one of the few Pakistanis who managed to snatch a spot on deck.

      The journey, if all went well, would take three days.

      As early as the second day, survivors recalled, the engine started breaking down.
      Lost

      By Day 3, food and clean drinking water had run out. Some migrants put dried prunes in seawater, hoping the sweetness would mellow the saltiness. Others paid young men $20 for dirty water.

      Unrest spread as it became clear that the captain, who was spending most of his time on a satellite phone, had lost his way.

      When Pakistanis pushed toward the upper deck, Egyptian men working with the captain beat them, often with a belt, according to testimony. Those men, some of whom are among the nine arrested in Greece, emerged as enforcers of discipline.

      Ahmed Ezzat, 26, from the Nile Delta, was among them. He is accused of smuggling people and causing the shipwreck. In an interview, his brother, Islam Ezzat, said that Ahmed disappeared from their village in mid-May and re-emerged in Libya weeks later. He said a smuggler had sent someone to the family home to collect 140,000 Egyptian pounds, or $4,500, the standard fee for a spot on the Adriana.

      Islam said he did not believe Ahmed had been involved in the smuggling because he had paid the fee. He said the family was cooperating with the Egyptian authorities. Ahmed, like the others who have been charged, has pleaded not guilty.
      ‘They Will Rescue You’

      By Day 4, according to testimonies and interviews, six people in the hold of the ship, including at least one child, had died.

      The next day, June 13, as the Adriana lurched toward Italy between engine breakdowns, migrants on deck persuaded the captain to send a distress call to the Italian authorities.

      The Adriana was in international waters then, and the captain was focused on getting to Italy. Experts who study this migratory route say that captains are typically paid on arrival. That is supported by some survivors who said their fees were held by middlemen, to be paid once they had arrived safely in Italy.

      The captain, some survivors recalled, said the Italian authorities would rescue the ship and take people to shore.

      Just before 1 p.m., a glimmer of hope appeared in the sky. A plane.

      Frontex, the European Union border agency, had been alerted by the Italian authorities that the Adriana was in trouble and rushed to its coordinates. There was no doubt the ship was perilously overloaded, E.U. officials said, and unlikely to make it to any port without help.

      Images of the rusty blue fishing boat appeared in the Frontex command center in Warsaw, where two German journalists happened to be touring, a Frontex spokesman said. The Adriana was a chance to showcase the agency’s ability to detect ships in distress and save lives.

      Now that Frontex had seen the ship, which was in Greece’s search-and-rescue area of international waters, the Greek authorities would surely rush to help.

      Two hours later, a Greek Coast Guard helicopter flew past. Its aerial photographs show the ship’s upper decks crammed with people waving their hands.

      Nawal Soufi, an Italian activist, fielded calls from frantic migrants.

      “I’m sure that they will rescue you,” she told them. “But be patient. It won’t be immediate.”
      Mayday

      Around 7 p.m. on June 13, almost seven hours after Frontex spotted the Adriana, the Greek authorities asked two nearby commercial tankers to bring the migrants water, food and diesel to continue their journey, according to video recordings and court documents.

      A crucial part of the Greek authorities’ explanation for not rescuing the Adriana is their claim that it was actively sailing toward Italy. When the BBC, using data from neighboring vessels, reported that the Adriana had been practically idle for several hours before it sank, the Greek government noted that the ship had covered 30 nautical miles toward Italy since its detection by Frontex.

      But satellite imagery and data from the ship-tracking platform MarineTraffic show that the Adriana was adrift for its final seven hours or so. Radar satellite imagery from the European Space Agency shows that by the time the Greeks summoned the commercial ships, the Adriana had already reached its closest point to Italy.

      From then on, it was drifting backward.

      The first tanker, the Lucky Sailor, arrived within minutes. The second, the Faithful Warrior, arrived in about two and a half hours. The captain of the Faithful Warrior reported that some passengers had thrown back supplies and screamed that they wanted to continue to Italy. How many people actually rejected help is unclear, but they included the Adriana’s captain and the handful of men who terrorized the passengers, according to survivors’ testimonies and interviews.

      Others were placing distress calls. Alarm Phone, a nonprofit group that fields migrant mayday calls, immediately and repeatedly told the Greek authorities, Frontex and the United Nations refugee agency that people on the Adriana were desperate to be rescued. Several passengers testified that they had tried to jump aboard the Faithful Warrior. But the migrants said that the frenzy only destabilized the Adriana, so the Faithful Warrior withdrew.

      As night fell, the Faithful Warrior’s captain told the Greek control center that the Adriana was “rocking dangerously.”

      Radio transmission records show that, over five hours, the Greek control center transmitted five messages across the Mediterranean using a channel reserved for safety and distress calls.

      Henrik Flornaes, a Danish father of two on a yacht far from the area, said he heard two mayday relay signals that night. They provided coordinates near the location of the Adriana, he said.

      A mayday relay directs nearby ships to begin a search and rescue.

      But the Greek Coast Guard itself mounted no such mission at this point.
      An End Foretold

      As midnight of June 14 approached, the Greek Coast Guard vessel 920, the only government ship dispatched to the scene, arrived alongside the Adriana.

      The presence of the 920 did not reassure the migrants. Several said in interviews that they were unsettled by the masked men. In the past, the Greek government has used the coast guard to deter migration. In May, The Times published video footage showing officers rounding up migrants and ditching them on a raft in the Aegean Sea.

      The mission of the 920 is unclear, as is what happened after it arrived and floated nearby for three hours. Some survivors say it tried to tow the Adriana, capsizing it. The coast guard denied that at first, then acknowledged throwing a rope to the trawler, but said that was hours before it sank.

      To be sure, attempts to remove passengers might have backfired. Sudden changes in weight distribution on an overcrowded, swaying ship could have capsized it. And while the 920 was larger was than the Adriana, it was not clear if had space to accommodate the migrant passengers.

      But Greece, one of the world’s foremost maritime nations, was equipped to carry out a rescue. Navy ships, including those with medical resources, could have arrived in the 13 hours after the Frontex alert.

      Exactly what capsized the ship is unclear. The coast guard blames a commotion on the ship. But everyone agrees that it swayed once to the left, then to the right, and then flipped.

      Those on deck were tossed into the sea. Panicking people stepped on each other in the dark, desperately using each other to come up for air, to stay alive.

      At the water’s surface, some clung to pieces of wood, surrounded by drowned friends, relatives and strangers. Others climbed onto the ship’s sinking hull. Coast guard crew members pulled dozens of people from the sea. One person testified that he had initially swum away from the 920, fearing that the crew would drown him.

      Waleed Mohammad Qasem, the 14-year-old who wanted to be a doctor, drowned. So did his uncle, who had posed with him for a selfie. The ship’s captain also died.

      Hundreds of people, including the women and young children, inside the Adriana stood no chance. They would have been flipped upside down, hurled together against the ship as the sea poured in. The ship took them down within a minute.

      Haseeb ur-Rehman, the Pakistani motorcycle mechanic on the top deck, survived. “It was in my destiny,” he said from a migrant camp near Athens. “Otherwise, my body would have been lost, like the other people in the boat.”

      Near the end, Kamiran Ahmad, the teenager who had hoped to study in Germany, turned to his cousin Roghaayan. From the migrant center in Greece, the older cousin remembered his words: “Didn’t I tell you we were going to die? Didn’t I tell you we were already dead?”

      Both went into the water. Kamiran’s body has not been recovered.

      https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/01/world/europe/greece-migrant-ship.html

  • Nessuno vuole mettere limiti all’attività dell’Agenzia Frontex

    Le istituzioni dell’Ue, ossessionate dal controllo delle frontiere, sembrano ignorare i problemi strutturali denunciati anche dall’Ufficio europeo antifrode. E lavorano per dispiegare le “divise blu” pure nei Paesi “chiave” oltre confine

    “Questa causa fa parte di un mosaico di una più ampia campagna contro Frontex: ogni attacco verso di noi è un attacco all’Unione europea”. Con questi toni gli avvocati dell’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere europee si sono difesi di fronte alla Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea. Il 9 marzo, per la prima volta in oltre 19 anni di attività (ci sono altri due casi pendenti, presentati dalla Ong Front-Lex), le “divise blu” si sono trovate di fronte a un giudice grazie alla tenacia dell’avvocata olandese Lisa-Marie Komp.

    Non è successo, invece, per le scioccanti rivelazioni del rapporto dell’Ufficio europeo antifrode (Olaf) che ha ricostruito nel dettaglio come l’Agenzia abbia insabbiato centinaia di respingimenti violenti: quell’indagine è “semplicemente” costata la leadership all’allora direttore Fabrice Leggeri, nell’aprile 2022, ma niente di più. “Tutto è rimasto nel campo delle opinioni e nessuno è andato a fondo sui problemi strutturali -spiega Laura Salzano, dottoranda in Diritto europeo dell’immigrazione presso l’Università di Barcellona-. C’erano tutti gli estremi per portare l’Agenzia di fronte alla Corte di giustizia e invece nulla è stato fatto nonostante sia un’istituzione pubblica con un budget esplosivo che lavora con i più vulnerabili”. Non solo l’impunità ma anche la cieca fiducia ribadita più volte da diverse istituzioni europee. Il 28 giugno 2022 il Consiglio europeo, a soli due mesi dalle dimissioni di Leggeri, dà il via libera all’apertura dei negoziati per portare gli agenti di Frontex in Senegal con la proposta di garantire un’immunità totale nel Paese per le loro azioni.

    A ottobre, invece, a pochi giorni dalla divulgazione del rapporto Olaf -tenuto segreto per oltre quattro mesi- la Commissione europea chiarisce che l’Agenzia “si è già assunta piena responsabilità di quanto successo”. Ancora, a febbraio 2023 il Consiglio europeo le assicura nuovamente “pieno supporto”. Un dato preoccupante soprattutto con riferimento all’espansione di Frontex che mira a diventare un attore sempre più presente nei Paesi chiave per la gestione del fenomeno migratorio, a migliaia di chilometri di distanza dal suo quartier generale di Varsavia.

    “I suoi problemi sono strutturali ma le istituzioni europee fanno finta di niente: se già è difficile controllare gli agenti sui ‘nostri’ confini, figuriamoci in Paesi al di fuori dell’Ue”, spiega Yasha Maccanico, membro del centro di ricerca indipendente Statewatch.

    A fine febbraio 2023 l’Agenzia ha festeggiato la conclusione di un progetto che prevede la consegna di attrezzature ai membri dell’Africa-Frontex intelligence community (Afic), finanziata dalla Commissione, che ha permesso dal 2010 in avanti l’apertura di “Cellule di analisi del rischio” (Rac) gestite da analisti locali formati dall’Agenzia con l’obiettivo di “raccogliere e analizzare informazioni strategiche su crimini transfrontalieri” oltre che a “sostenere le autorità nella gestione dei confini”. A partire dal 2021 una potenziata infrastruttura garantisce “comunicazioni sicure e istantanee” tra le Rac e gli agenti nella sede di Varsavia. Questo è il “primo livello” di collaborazione tra Frontex e le autorità di Paesi terzi che oggi vede, come detto, “cellule” attive in Nigeria, Gambia, Niger, Ghana, Senegal, Costa d’Avorio, Togo e Mauritania oltre a una ventina di Stati coinvolti nelle attività di formazione degli analisti, pronti ad attivare le Rac in futuro. “Lo scambio di dati sui flussi è pericoloso perché l’obiettivo delle politiche europee non è proteggere i diritti delle persone, ma fermarle nei Paesi più poveri”, continua Maccanico.

    Un gradino al di sopra delle collaborazioni più informali, come nell’Afic, ci sono i cosiddetti working arrangement (accordi di cooperazione) che permettono di collaborare con le autorità di un Paese in modo ufficiale. “Non serve il via libera del Parlamento europeo e di fatto non c’è nessun controllo né prima della sottoscrizione né ex post -riprende Salzano-. Se ci fosse uno scambio di dati e informazioni dovrebbe esserci il via libera del Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, ma a oggi, questo parere, è stato richiesto solo nel caso del Niger”. A marzo 2023 sono invece 18 i Paesi che hanno siglato accordi simili: da Stati Uniti e Canada, passando per Capo Verde fino alla Federazione Russa. “Sappiamo che i contatti con Mosca dovrebbero essere quotidiani. Dall’inizio del conflitto ho chiesto più volte all’Agenzia se queste comunicazioni sono state interrotte: nessuno mi ha mai risposto”, sottolinea Salzano.

    Obiettivo ultimo dell’Agenzia è riuscire a dispiegare agenti e mezzi anche nei Paesi terzi: una delle novità del regolamento del 2019 rispetto al precedente (2016) è proprio la possibilità di lanciare operazioni non solo nei “Paesi vicini” ma in tutto il mondo. Per farlo sono necessari gli status agreement, accordi internazionali che impegnano formalmente anche le istituzioni europee. Sono cinque quelli attivi (Serbia, Albania, Montenegro e Macedonia del Nord, Moldova) ma sono in via di sottoscrizione quelli con Senegal e Mauritania per limitare le partenze (poco più di 15mila nel 2022) verso le isole Canarie, mille chilometri più a Nord: accordi per ora “fermi”, secondo quanto ricostruito dalla parlamentare europea olandese Tineke Strik che a fine febbraio ha visitato i due Stati, ma che danno conto della linea che si vuole seguire. Un quadro noto, i cui dettagli però spesso restano nascosti.

    È quanto emerge dal report “Accesso negato”, pubblicato da Statewatch a metà marzo 2023, che ricostruisce altri due casi di scarsa trasparenza negli accordi, Niger e Marocco, due Paesi chiave nella strategia europea di esternalizzazione delle frontiere. “Con la ‘scusa’ della tutela della riservatezza nelle relazioni internazionali e mettendo la questione migratoria sotto il cappello dell’antiterrorismo l’accesso ai dettagli degli accordi non è consentito”, spiega Maccanico, uno dei curatori dello studio. Non si conoscono, per esempio, i compiti specifici degli agenti, per cui si propone addirittura l’immunità totale. “In alcuni accordi, come in Macedonia del Nord, si è poi ‘ripiegato’ su un’immunità connessa solo ai compiti che rientrano nel mandato dell’Agenzia -osserva Salzano-. Ma il problema non cambia: dove finisce la sua responsabilità e dove inizia quella del Paese membro?”. Una zona grigia funzionale a Frontex, anche quando opera sul territorio europeo.

    Lo sa bene l’avvocata tedesca Lisa-Marie Komp che, come detto, ha portato l’Agenzia di fronte alla Corte di giustizia dell’Ue. Il caso, su cui il giudice si pronuncerà nei prossimi mesi, riguarda il rimpatrio nel 2016 di una famiglia siriana con quattro bambini piccoli che, pochi giorni dopo aver presentato richiesta d’asilo in Grecia, è stata caricata su un aereo e riportata in Turchia: quel volo è stato gestito da Frontex, in collaborazione con le autorità greche. “L’Agenzia cerca di scaricare le responsabilità su di loro ma il suo mandato stabilisce chiaramente che è tenuta a monitorare il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali durante queste operazioni -spiega-. Serve chiarire che tutti devono rispettare la legge, compresa l’Agenzia le cui azioni hanno un grande impatto sulla vita di molte persone”.

    Le illegittimità nell’attività dei rimpatri sono note da tempo e il caso della famiglia siriana non è isolato. “Quando c’è una forte discrepanza nelle decisioni sulle domande d’asilo tra i diversi Paesi europei, l’attività di semplice ‘coordinamento’ e preparazione delle attività di rimpatrio può tradursi nella violazione del principio di non respingimento”, spiega Mariana Gkliati, docente di Migrazione e Asilo all’università olandese di Tilburg. Nonostante questi problemi e un sistema d’asilo sempre più fragile, negli ultimi anni i poteri e le risorse a disposizione per l’Agenzia sui rimpatri sono esplosi: nel 2022 questa specifica voce di bilancio prevedeva quasi 79 milioni di euro (+690% rispetto ai dieci milioni del 2012).

    E la crescita sembra destinata a non fermarsi. Frontex nel 2023 stima di poter rimpatriare 800 persone in Iraq, 316 in Pakistan, 200 in Gambia, 75 in Afghanistan, 57 in Siria, 60 in Russia e 36 in Ucraina come si legge in un bando pubblicato a inizio febbraio 2023 che ha come obiettivo la ricerca di partner in questi Paesi (e in altri, in totale 43) per garantire assistenza di breve e medio periodo (12 mesi) alle persone rimpatriate. Un’altra gara pubblica dà conto della centralità dell’Agenzia nella “strategia dei rimpatri” europea: 120 milioni di euro nel novembre 2022 per l’acquisto di “servizi di viaggio relativi ai rimpatri mediante voli di linea”. Migliaia di biglietti e un nuovo sistema informatico per gestire al meglio le prenotazioni, con un’enorme mole di dati personali delle persone “irregolari” che arriveranno nelle “mani” di Frontex. Mani affidabili, secondo la Commissione europea.

    Ma il 7 ottobre 2022 il Parlamento, nel “bocciare” nuovamente Frontex rispetto al via libera sul bilancio 2020, dava conto del “rammarico per l’assenza di procedimenti disciplinari” nei confronti di Leggeri e della “preoccupazione” per la mancata attivazione dell’articolo 46 (che prevede il ritiro degli agenti quando siano sistematiche le violazioni dei diritti umani) con riferimento alla Grecia, in cui l’Agenzia opera con 518 agenti, 11 navi e 30 mezzi. “I respingimenti e la violenza sui confini continuano sia alle frontiere terrestri sia a quelle marittime così come non si è interrotto il sostegno alle autorità greche”, spiega la ricercatrice indipendente Lena Karamanidou. La “scusa” ufficiale è che la presenza di agenti migliori la situazione ma non è così. “Al confine terrestre di Evros, la violenza è stata documentata per tutto il tempo in cui Frontex è stata presente, fin dal 2010. È difficile immaginare come possa farlo in futuro vista la sistematicità delle violenze su questo confine”. Su quella frontiera si giocherà anche la presunta nuova reputazione dell’Agenzia guidata dal primo marzo dall’olandese Hans Leijtens: un tentativo di “ripulire” l’immagine che è già in corso.

    Frontex nei confronti delle persone in fuga dal conflitto in Ucraina ha tenuto fin dall’inizio un altro registro: i “migranti irregolari” sono diventati “persone che scappano da zone di conflitto”; l’obiettivo di “combattere l’immigrazione irregolare” si è trasformato nella gestione “efficace dell’attraversamento dei confini”. “Gli ultimi mesi hanno mostrato il potenziale di Frontex di evolversi in un attore affidabile della gestione delle frontiere che opera con efficienza, trasparenza e pieno rispetto dei diritti umani”, sottolinea Gkliati nello studio “Frontex assisting in the ukrainian displacement. A welcoming committee at racialised passage?”, pubblicato nel marzo 2023. Una conferma ulteriore, per Salzano, dei limiti strutturali dell’Agenzia: “La legge va rispettata indipendentemente dalla cornice in cui operi: la tutela dei diritti umani prescinde dagli umori della politica”.

    https://altreconomia.it/nessuno-vuole-mettere-limiti-allattivita-dellagenzia-frontex

    #Frontex #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #justice #Lisa-Marie_Komp #OLAF #Sénégal #externalisation #Africa-Frontex_intelligence_community (#Afic) #Rac #Nigeria #Gambie #Niger #Ghana #Côte_d'Ivoire #Togo #Mauritanie #status_agreement #échange_de_données #working_arrangement #Serbie #Monténégro #Albanie #Moldavie #Macédoine_du_Nord #CJUE #cours_de_justice #renvois #expulsions

    • I rischi della presenza di Frontex in Africa: tanto potere, poca responsabilità

      L’eurodeputata #Tineke_Strik è stata in Senegal e Mauritania a fine febbraio 2023: in un’intervista ad Altreconomia ricostruisce lo stato dell’arte degli accordi che l’Ue vorrebbe concludere con i due Paesi ritenuti “chiave” nel contrasto ai flussi migratori. Denunciando la necessità di una riforma strutturale dell’Agenzia.

      A un anno di distanza dalle dimissioni del suo ex direttore Fabrice Leggeri, le istituzioni europee non vogliono mettere limiti all’attività di Frontex. Come abbiamo ricostruito sul numero di aprile di Altreconomia, infatti, l’Agenzia -che dal primo marzo 2023 è guidata da Hans Leijtens- continua a svolgere un ruolo centrale nelle politiche migratorie dell’Unione europea nonostante le pesanti rivelazioni dell’Ufficio europeo antifrode (Olaf), che ha ricostruito nel dettaglio il malfunzionamento nelle operazioni delle divise blu lungo i confini europei.

      Ma non solo. Un aspetto particolarmente preoccupante sono le operazioni al di fuori dei Paesi dell’Unione, che rientrano sempre di più tra le priorità di Frontex in un’ottica di esternalizzazione delle frontiere per “fermare” preventivamente i flussi di persone dirette verso l’Europa. Non a caso, a luglio 2022, nonostante i contenuti del rapporto Olaf chiuso solo pochi mesi prima, la Commissione europea ha dato il via libera ai negoziati con Senegal e Mauritania per stringere un cosiddetto working arrangement e permettere così agli “agenti europei” di operare nei due Paesi africani (segnaliamo anche la recente ricerca pubblicata dall’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione sul tema).

      Per monitorare lo stato dell’arte di questi accordi l’eurodeputata Tineke Strik, tra le poche a opporsi e a denunciare senza sconti gli effetti delle politiche migratorie europee e il ruolo di Frontex, a fine febbraio 2023 ha svolto una missione di monitoraggio nei due Paesi. Già professoressa di Diritto della cittadinanza e delle migrazioni dell’Università di Radboud di Nimega, in Olanda, è stata eletta al Parlamento europeo nel 2019 nelle fila di GroenLinks (Sinistra verde). L’abbiamo intervistata.

      Onorevole Strik, secondo quanto ricostruito dalla vostra visita (ha partecipato alla missione anche Cornelia Erns, di LeftEu, ndr), a che punto sono i negoziati con il Senegal?
      TS La nostra impressione è che le autorità senegalesi non siano così desiderose di concludere un accordo di status con l’Unione europea sulla presenza di Frontex nel Paese. L’approccio di Bruxelles nei confronti della migrazione come sappiamo è molto incentrato su sicurezza e gestione delle frontiere; i senegalesi, invece, sono più interessati a un intervento sostenibile e incentrato sullo sviluppo, che offra soluzioni e affronti le cause profonde che spingono le persone a partire. Sono molti i cittadini del Senegal emigrano verso l’Europa: idealmente, il governo vuole che rimangano nel Paese, ma capisce meglio di quanto non lo facciano le istituzioni Ue che si può intervenire sulla migrazione solo affrontando le cause alla radice e migliorando la situazione nel contesto di partenza. Allo stesso tempo, le navi europee continuano a pescare lungo le coste del Paese (minacciando la pesca artigianale, ndr), le aziende europee evadono le tasse e il latte sovvenzionato dall’Ue viene scaricato sul mercato senegalese, causando disoccupazione e impedendo lo sviluppo dell’economia locale. Sono soprattutto gli accordi di pesca ad aver alimentato le partenze dal Senegal, dal momento che le comunità di pescatori sono state private della loro principale fonte di reddito. Serve domandarsi se l’Unione sia veramente interessata allo sviluppo e ad affrontare le cause profonde della migrazione. E lo stesso discorso può essere fatto su molti dei Paesi d’origine delle persone che cercano poi protezione in Europa.

      Dakar vede di buon occhio l’intervento dell’Unione europea? Quale tipo di operazioni andrebbero a svolgere gli agenti di Frontex nel Paese?
      TS Abbiamo avuto la sensazione che l’Ue non ascoltasse le richieste delle autorità senegalesi -ad esempio in materia di rilascio di visti d’ingresso- e ci hanno espresso preoccupazioni relative ai diritti fondamentali in merito a qualsiasi potenziale cooperazione con Frontex, data la reputazione dell’Agenzia. È difficile dire che tipo di supporto sia previsto, ma nei negoziati l’Unione sta puntando sia alle frontiere terrestri sia a quelle marittime.

      Che cosa sta avvenendo in Mauritania?
      TS Sebbene questo Paese sembri disposto a concludere un accordo sullo status di Frontex -soprattutto nell’ottica di ottenere un maggiore riconoscimento da parte dell’Europa-, preferisce comunque mantenere l’autonomia nella gestione delle proprie frontiere e quindi non prevede una presenza permanente dei funzionari dell’Agenzia nel Paese. Considerano l’accordo sullo status più come un quadro giuridico, per consentire la presenza di Frontex in caso di aumento della pressione migratoria. Inoltre, come il Senegal, ritengono che l’Europa debba ascoltare e accogliere le loro richieste, che riguardano principalmente i visti e altre aree di cooperazione. Anche in questo caso, Bruxelles chiede il mandato più ampio possibile per gli agenti in divisa blu durante i negoziati per “mantenere aperte le opzioni [più ampie]”, come dicono loro stessi. Ma credo sia chiaro che il loro obiettivo è quello di operare sia alle frontiere marittime sia a quelle terrestri.
      Questo a livello “istituzionale”. Qual è invece la posizione della società civile?
      TS In entrambi i Paesi è molto critica. In parte a causa della cattiva reputazione di Frontex in relazione ai diritti umani, ma anche a causa dell’esperienza che i cittadini senegalesi e mauritani hanno già sperimentato con la Guardia civil spagnola, presente nei due Stati, che ritengono stia intaccando la sovranità per quanto riguarda la gestione delle frontiere. È previsto che il mandato di Frontex sia addirittura esecutivo, a differenza di quello della Guardia civil, che può impegnarsi solo in pattugliamenti congiunti in cui le autorità nazionali sono al comando. Quindi la sovranità di entrambi i Paesi sarebbe ulteriormente minata.

      Perché a suo avviso sarebbe problematica la presenza di agenti di Frontex nei due Paesi?
      TS L’immunità che l’Unione europea vorrebbe per i propri operativi dispiegati in Africa non è solo connessa allo svolgimento delle loro funzioni ma si estende al di fuori di esse, a questo si aggiunge la possibilità di essere armati. Penso sia problematico il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali dei naufraghi intercettati in mare, poiché è difficile ottenere l’accesso all’asilo sia in Senegal sia in Mauritania. In questo Paese, ad esempio, l’Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati (Unhcr) impiega molto tempo per determinare il loro bisogno di protezione: fanno eccezione i maliani, che riescono a ottenerla in “appena” due anni. E durante l’attesa queste persone non hanno quasi diritti.

      Ma se ottengono la protezione è comunque molto difficile registrarsi presso l’amministrazione, cosa necessaria per avere accesso al mercato del lavoro, alle scuole o all’assistenza sanitaria. E le conseguenze che ne derivano sono le continue retate, i fermi e le deportazioni alla frontiera, per impedire alle persone di partire. A causa delle attuali intercettazioni in mare, le rotte migratorie si stanno spostando sulla terra ferma e puntano verso l’Algeria: l’attraversamento del deserto può essere mortale. Il problema principale è che Frontex deve rispettare il diritto dell’Unione europea anche se opera in un Paese terzo in cui si applicano norme giuridiche diverse, ma l’Agenzia andrà a operare sotto il comando delle guardie di frontiera di un Paese che non è vincolato dalle “regole” europee. Come può Frontex garantire di non essere coinvolta in operazioni che violano le norme fondamentali del diritto comunitario, se determinate azioni non sono illegali in quel Paese? Sulla carta è possibile presentare un reclamo a Frontex, ma poi nella pratica questo strumento in quali termini sarebbe accessibile ed efficace?

      Un anno dopo le dimissioni dell’ex direttore Leggeri ritiene che Frontex si sia pienamente assunta la responsabilità di quanto accaduto? Può davvero, secondo lei, diventare un attore affidabile per l’Ue?
      TS Prima devono accadere molte cose. Non abbiamo ancora visto una riforma fondamentale: c’è ancora un forte bisogno di maggiore trasparenza, di un atteggiamento più fermo nei confronti degli Stati membri ospitanti e di un uso conseguente dell’articolo 46 che prevede la sospensione delle operazioni in caso di violazioni dei diritti umani (abbiamo già raccontato il ruolo dell’Agenzia nei respingimenti tra Grecia e Turchia, ndr). Questi problemi saranno ovviamente esacerbati nella cooperazione con i Paesi terzi, perché la responsabilità sarà ancora più difficile da raggiungere.

      https://altreconomia.it/i-rischi-della-presenza-di-frontex-in-africa-tanto-potere-poca-responsa

    • «Un laboratorio di esternalizzazione tra frontiere di terra e di mare». La missione di ASGI in Senegal e Mauritania

      Lo scorso 29 marzo è stato pubblicato il rapporto «Un laboratorio di esternalizzazione tra frontiere di terra e di mare» (https://www.asgi.it/notizie/rapporto-asgi-della-senegal-mauritania), frutto del sopralluogo giuridico effettuato tra il 7 e il 13 maggio 2022 da una delegazione di ASGI composta da Alice Fill, Lorenzo Figoni, Matteo Astuti, Diletta Agresta, Adelaide Massimi (avvocate e avvocati, operatori e operatrici legali, ricercatori e ricercatrici).

      Il sopralluogo aveva l’obiettivo di analizzare lo sviluppo delle politiche di esternalizzazione del controllo della mobilità e di blocco delle frontiere implementate dall’Unione Europea in Mauritania e in Senegal – due paesi a cui, come la Turchia o gli stati balcanici più orientali, gli stati membri hanno delegato la gestione dei flussi migratori concordando politiche sempre più ostacolanti per lo spostamento delle persone.

      Nel corso del sopralluogo sono stati intervistati, tra Mauritania e Senegal, più di 40 interlocutori afferenti a istituzioni, società civile, popolazione migrante e organizzazioni, tra cui OIM, UNHCR, delegazioni dell’UE. Intercettare questi soggetti ha consentito ad ASGI di andare oltre le informazioni vincolate all’ufficialità delle dichiarazioni pubbliche e di approfondire le pratiche illegittime portate avanti su questi territori.

      Il report parte dalle già assodate intenzioni di collaborazione tra l’Unione Europea e le autorità senegalesi e mauritane – una collaborazione che in entrambi i paesi sembra connotata nel senso del controllo e della sorveglianza; per quanto riguarda il Senegal, si fa menzione del ben noto status agreement, proposto nel febbraio 2022 a Dakar dalla Commissaria europea agli affari interni Ylva Johansson, con il quale si intende estendere il controllo di Frontex in Senegal.

      L’obiettivo di tale accordo era il controllo della cosiddetta rotta delle Canarie, che tra il 2018 e il 2022 è stata sempre più battuta. Sebbene la proposta abbia generato accese discussioni nella società civile senegalese, preoccupata all’idea di cedere parte della sovranità del paese sul controllo delle frontiere esterne, con tale accordo, elaborato con un disegno molto simile a quello che regola le modalità di intervento di Frontex nei Balcani, si legittimerebbe ufficialmente l’attività di controllo dell’agenzia UE in paesi terzi, e in particolare fuori dal continente europeo.

      Per quanto riguarda la Mauritania, si menziona l’Action Plan pubblicato da Frontex il 7 giugno 2022, con il quale si prospetta una possibilità di collaborare operativamente sul territorio mauritano, in particolare per lo sviluppo di governance in materia migratoria.

      Senegal

      Sin dai primi anni Duemila, il dialogo tra istituzioni europee e senegalesi è stato focalizzato sulle politiche di riammissione dei cittadini senegalesi presenti in UE in maniera irregolare e dei cosiddetti ritorni volontari, le politiche di gestione delle frontiere senegalesi e il controllo della costa, la promozione di una legislazione anti-trafficking e anti-smuggling. Tutto questo si è intensificato quando, a partire dal 2018, la rotta delle Canarie è tornata a essere una rotta molto percorsa. L’operatività delle agenzie europee in Senegal per la gestione delle migrazioni si declina principalmente nei seguenti obiettivi:

      1. Monitoraggio delle frontiere terrestri e marittime. Il memorandum firmato nel 2006 da Senegal e Spagna ha sancito la collaborazione ufficiale tra le forze di polizia europee e quelle senegalesi in operazioni congiunte di pattugliamento; a questo si aggiunge, sempre nello stesso anno, una presenza sempre più intensiva di Frontex al largo delle coste senegalesi.

      2. Lotta alla tratta e al traffico. Su questo fronte dell’operatività congiunta tra forze senegalesi ed europee, la normativa di riferimento è la legge n. 06 del 10 maggio 2005, che offre delle direttive per il contrasto della tratta di persone e del traffico. Tale documento, non distinguendo mai fra “tratta” e “traffico”, di fatto criminalizza la migrazione irregolare tout court, dal momento che viene utilizzato in maniera estensiva (e arbitraria) come strumento di controllo e di repressione della mobilità – fu utilizzato, ad esempio, per accusare di traffico di esseri umani un padre che aveva imbarcato suo figlio su un mezzo che poi naufragato.

      Il sistema di asilo in Senegal

      Il Senegal aderisce alla Convenzione del 1951 sullo status de rifugiati e del relativo Protocollo del 1967; la valutazione delle domande di asilo fa capo alla Commissione Nazionale di Eleggibilità (CNE), che al deposito della richiesta di asilo emette un permesso di soggiorno della durata di 3 mesi, rinnovabile fino all’esito dell’audizione di fronte alla CNE; l’esito della CNE è ricorribile in primo grado presso la Commissione stessa e, nel caso di ulteriore rifiuto, presso il Presidente della Repubblica. Quando il richiedente asilo depone la propria domanda, subentra l’UNHCR, che nel paese è molto presente e finanzia ONG locali per fornire assistenza.

      Il 5 aprile 2022 l’Assemblea Nazionale senegalese ha approvato una nuova legge sullo status dei rifugiati e degli apolidi, una legge che, stando a diverse associazioni locali, sulla carta estenderebbe i diritti cui i rifugiati hanno accesso; tuttavia, le stesse associazioni temono che a tale miglioramento possa non seguire un’applicazione effettiva della normativa.
      Mauritania

      Data la collocazione geografica del paese, a ridosso dell’Atlantico e delle isole Canarie, in prossimità di paesi ad alto indice di emigrazione (Senegal, Mali, Marocco), la Mauritania rappresenta un territorio strategico per il monitoraggio dei flussi migratori diretti in Europa. Pertanto, analogamente a quanto avvenuto in Senegal, anche in Mauritania la Spagna ha proceduto a rafforzare la cooperazione in tema di politiche migratorie e di gestione del controllo delle frontiere e a incrementare la presenta e l’impegno di attori esterni – in primis di agenzie quali Frontex – per interventi di contenimento dei flussi e di riammissione di cittadini stranieri in Mauritania.

      Relativamente alla Mauritania, l’obiettivo principale delle istituzioni europee sembra essere la prevenzione dell’immigrazione lungo la rotta delle Canarie. La normativa di riferimento è l’Accordo di riammissione bilaterale firmato con la Spagna nel luglio 2003. Con tale accordo, la Spagna può chiedere alla Mauritania di riammettere sul proprio territorio cittadini mauritani e non solo, anche altri cittadini provenienti da paesi terzi che “si presume” siano transitati per la Mauritania prima di entrare irregolarmente in Spagna. Oltre a tali interventi, il report di ASGI menziona l’Operazione Hera di Frontex e vari interventi di cooperazione allo sviluppo promossi dalla Spagna “con finalità tutt’altro che umanitarie”, bensì di gestione della mobilità.

      In tale regione, nella fase degli sbarchi risulta molto dubbio il ruolo giocato da organizzazioni come OIM e UNHCR, poiché non è codificato; interlocutori diversi hanno fornito informazioni contrastanti sulla disponibilità di UNHCR a intervenire in supporto e su segnalazione delle ONG presenti al momento dello sbarco. In ogni caso, se effettivamente UNHCR fosse assente agli sbarchi, ciò determinerebbe una sostanziale impossibilità di accesso alle procedure di protezione internazionale da parte di qualsiasi potenziale richiedente asilo che venga intercettato in mare.

      Anche in questo territorio la costruzione della figura del “trafficante” diventa un dispositivo di criminalizzazione e repressione della mobilità sulla rotta atlantica, strumentale alla soddisfazione di richieste europee.
      La detenzione dei cittadini stranieri

      Tra Nouakchott e Nouadhibou vi sono tre centri di detenzione per persone migranti; uno di questi (il Centro di Detenzione di Nouadhibou 2 (anche detto “El Guantanamito”), venne realizzato grazie a dei fondi di un’agenzia di cooperazione spagnola. Sovraffollamento, precarietà igienico-sanitaria e impossibilità di accesso a cure e assistenza legale hanno caratterizzato tali centri. Quando El Guantanamito fu chiuso, i commissariati di polizia sono diventati i principali luoghi deputati alla detenzione dei cittadini stranieri; in tali centri, vengono detenute non solo le persone intercettate in prossimità delle coste mauritane, ma anche i cittadini stranieri riammessi dalla Spagna, e anche le persone presenti irregolarmente su territorio mauritano. Risulta delicato il tema dell’accesso a tali commissariati, dal momento che il sopralluogo ha rilevato che le ONG non hanno il permesso di entrarvi, mentre le organizzazioni internazionali sì – ciò nonostante, nessuna delle persone precedentemente sottoposte a detenzione con cui la delegazione ASGI ha avuto modo di interloquire ha dichiarato di aver riscontrato la presenza di organizzazioni all’interno di questi centri.

      La detenzione amministrativa risulta essere “un tassello essenziale della politica di contenimento dei flussi di cittadini stranieri in Mauritania”. Il passaggio successivo alla detenzione delle persone migranti è l’allontanamento, che si svolge in forma di veri e propri respingimenti sommari e informali, senza che i migranti siano messi nelle condizioni né di dichiarare la propria nazionalità né di conoscere la procedura di ritorno volontario.
      Il ruolo delle organizzazioni internazionali in Mauritania

      OIM riveste un ruolo centrale nel panorama delle politiche di esternalizzazione e di blocco dei cittadini stranieri in Mauritania, tramite il supporto delle autorità di pubblica sicurezza mauritane nello sviluppo di politiche di contenimento della libertà di movimento – strategie e interventi che suggeriscono una connotazione securitaria della presenza dell’associazione nel paese, a scapito di una umanitaria.

      Nonostante anche la Mauritania sia firmataria della Convenzione di Ginevra, non esiste a oggi una legge nazionale sul diritto di asilo nel paese. UNHCR testimonia come dal 2015 esiste un progetto di legge sull’asilo, ma che questo sia tuttora “in attesa di adozione”.

      Pertanto, le procedure di asilo in Mauritania sono gestite interamente da UNHCR. Tali procedure si differenziano a seconda della pericolosità delle regioni di provenienza delle persone migranti; in particolare, i migranti maliani provenienti dalle regioni considerate più pericolose vengono registrati come rifugiati prima facie, quanto non accade invece per i richiedenti asilo provenienti dalle aree urbane, per loro, l’iter dell’asilo è ben più lungo, e prevede una sorta di “pre-pre-registrazione” presso un ente partner di UNHCR, cui segue una pre-registrazione accordata da UNHCR previo appuntamento, e solo in seguito alla registrazione viene riconosciuto un certificato di richiesta di asilo, valido per sei mesi, in attesa di audizione per la determinazione dello status di rifugiato.

      Le tempistiche per il riconoscimento di protezione, poi, sono differenti a seconda del grado di vulnerabilità del richiedente e in taluni casi potevano condurre ad anni e anni di attesa. Alla complessità della procedura si aggiunge che non tutti i potenziali richiedenti asilo possono accedervi – ad esempio, chi proviene da alcuni stati, come la Sierra Leone, considerati “paesi sicuri” secondo una categorizzazione fornita dall’Unione Africana.
      Conclusioni

      In fase conclusiva, il report si sofferma sul ruolo fondamentale giocato dall’Unione Europea nel forzare le politiche senegalesi e mauritane nel senso della sicurezza e del contenimento, a scapito della tutela delle persone migranti nei loro diritti fondamentali. Le principali preoccupazioni evidenziate sono rappresentate dalla prospettiva della conclusione dello status agreement tra Frontex e i due paesi, perché tale ratifica ufficializzerebbe non solo la presenza, ma un ruolo legittimo e attivo di un’agenzia europea nel controllo di frontiere che si dispiegano ben oltre i confini territoriali comunitari, ben oltre le acque territoriali, spingendo le maglie del controllo dei flussi fin dentro le terre di quegli stati da cui le persone fuggono puntando all’Unione Europea. La delegazione, tuttavia, sottolinea che vi sono aree in cui la società civile senegalese e mauritana risulta particolarmente politicizzata, dunque in grado di esprimere insofferenza o aperta contrarietà nei confronti delle ingerenze europee nei loro paesi. Infine, da interviste, colloqui e incontri con diretti interessati e testimoni, il ruolo di organizzazioni internazionali come le citate OIM e UNHCR appare nella maggior parte dei casi “fluido o sfuggevole”; una prospettiva, questa, che sembra confermare l’ambivalenza delle grandi organizzazioni internazionali, soggetti messi innanzitutto al servizio degli interessi delle istituzioni europee.

      Il report si conclude auspicando una prosecuzione di studio e analisi al fine di continuare a monitorare gli sviluppi politici e legislativi che legano l’Unione Europea e questi territori nella gestione operativa delle migrazioni.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/05/un-laboratorio-di-esternalizzazione-tra-frontiere-di-terra-e-di-mare

    • Pubblicato il rapporto #ASGI della missione in Senegal e Mauritania

      Il Senegal e la Mauritania sono paesi fondamentali lungo la rotta che conduce dall’Africa occidentale alle isole Canarie. Nel 2020, dopo alcuni anni in cui la rotta era stata meno utilizzata, vi è stato un incremento del 900% degli arrivi rispetto all’anno precedente. Il dato ha portato la Spagna e le istituzioni europee a concentrarsi nuovamente sui due paesi. La cosiddetta Rotta Atlantica, che a partire dal 2006 era stata teatro di sperimentazioni di pratiche di contenimento e selezione della mobilità e di delega dei controlli alle frontiere e del diritto di asilo, è tornata all’attenzione internazionale: da febbraio 2022 sono in corso negoziazioni per la firma di un accordo di status con Frontex per permettere il dispiegamento dei suoi agenti in Senegal e Mauritania.

      Al fine di indagare l’attuazione delle politiche di esternalizzazione e i loro effetti, dal 7 al 13 maggio 2022 un gruppo di socз ASGI – avvocatз, operatorз legali e ricercatorз – ha effettuato un sopralluogo giuridico a Nouakchott, Mauritania e a Dakar, Senegal.

      Il report restituisce il quadro ricostruito nel corso del sopralluogo, durante il quale è stato possibile intervistare oltre 45 interlocutori tra istituzioni, organizzazioni internazionali, ONG e persone migranti.

      https://www.asgi.it/notizie/rapporto-asgi-della-senegal-mauritania
      #rapport

    • Au Sénégal, les desseins de Frontex se heurtent aux résistances locales

      Tout semblait devoir aller très vite : début 2022, l’Union européenne propose de déployer sa force anti-migration Frontex sur les côtes sénégalaises, et le président Macky Sall y semble favorable. Mais c’était compter sans l’opposition de la société civile, qui refuse de voir le Sénégal ériger des murs à la place de l’Europe.

      Agents armés, navires, drones et systèmes de sécurité sophistiqués : Frontex, l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes créée en 2004, a sorti le grand jeu pour dissuader les Africains de prendre la direction des îles Canaries – et donc de l’Europe –, l’une des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières au monde. Cet arsenal, auquel s’ajoutent des programmes de formation de la police aux frontières, est la pierre angulaire de la proposition faite début 2022 par le Conseil de l’Europe au Sénégal. Finalement, Dakar a refusé de la signer sous la pression de la société civile, même si les négociations ne sont pas closes. Dans un climat politique incandescent à l’approche de l’élection présidentielle de 2024, le président sénégalais, Macky Sall, soupçonné de vouloir briguer un troisième mandat, a préféré prendre son temps et a fini par revenir sur sa position initiale, qui semblait ouverte à cette collaboration. Dans le même temps, la Mauritanie voisine, elle, a entamé des négociations avec Bruxelles.

      L’histoire débute le 11 février 2022 : lors d’une conférence de presse à Dakar, la commissaire aux Affaires intérieures du Conseil de l’Europe, Ylva Johansson, officialise la proposition européenne de déployer Frontex sur les côtes sénégalaises. « C’est mon offre et j’espère que le gouvernement sénégalais sera intéressé par cette opportunité unique », indique-t-elle. En cas d’accord, elle annonce que l’agence européenne sera déployée dans le pays au plus tard au cours de l’été 2022. Dans les jours qui ont suivi l’annonce de Mme Johansson, plusieurs associations de la société civile sénégalaise ont organisé des manifestations et des sit-in à Dakar contre la signature de cet accord, jugé contraire aux intérêts nationaux et régionaux.

      Une frontière déplacée vers la côte sénégalaise

      « Il s’agit d’un #dispositif_policier très coûteux qui ne permet pas de résoudre les problèmes d’immigration tant en Afrique qu’en Europe. C’est pourquoi il est impopulaire en Afrique. Frontex participe, avec des moyens militaires, à l’édification de murs chez nous, en déplaçant la frontière européenne vers la côte sénégalaise. C’est inacceptable, dénonce Seydi Gassama, le directeur exécutif d’Amnesty International au Sénégal. L’UE exerce une forte pression sur les États africains. Une grande partie de l’aide européenne au développement est désormais conditionnée à la lutte contre la migration irrégulière. Les États africains doivent pouvoir jouer un rôle actif dans ce jeu, ils ne doivent pas accepter ce qu’on leur impose, c’est-à-dire des politiques contraires aux intérêts de leurs propres communautés. » Le défenseur des droits humains rappelle que les transferts de fonds des migrants pèsent très lourd dans l’économie du pays : selon les chiffres de la Banque mondiale, ils ont atteint 2,66 milliards de dollars (2,47 milliards d’euros) au Sénégal en 2021, soit 9,6 % du PIB (presque le double du total de l’aide internationale au développement allouée au pays, de l’ordre de 1,38 milliard de dollars en 2021). « Aujourd’hui, en visitant la plupart des villages sénégalais, que ce soit dans la région de Fouta, au Sénégal oriental ou en Haute-Casamance, il est clair que tout ce qui fonctionne – hôpitaux, dispensaires, routes, écoles – a été construit grâce aux envois de fonds des émigrés », souligne M. Gassama.

      « Quitter son lieu de naissance pour aller vivre dans un autre pays est un droit humain fondamental, consacré par l’article 13 de la Convention de Genève de 1951, poursuit-il. Les sociétés capitalistes comme celles de l’Union européenne ne peuvent pas dire aux pays africains : “Vous devez accepter la libre circulation des capitaux et des services, alors que nous n’acceptons pas la libre circulation des travailleurs”. » Selon lui, « l’Europe devrait garantir des routes migratoires régulières, quasi inexistantes aujourd’hui, et s’attaquer simultanément aux racines profondes de l’exclusion, de la pauvreté, de la crise démocratique et de l’instabilité dans les pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest afin d’offrir aux jeunes des perspectives alternatives à l’émigration et au recrutement dans les rangs des groupes djihadistes ».

      Depuis le siège du Forum social sénégalais (FSS), à Dakar, Mamadou Mignane Diouf abonde : « L’UE a un comportement inhumain, intellectuellement et diplomatiquement malhonnête. » Le coordinateur du FSS cite le cas récent de l’accueil réservé aux réfugiés ukrainiens ayant fui la guerre, qui contraste avec les naufrages incessants en Méditerranée et dans l’océan Atlantique, et avec la fermeture des ports italiens aux bateaux des ONG internationales engagées dans des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage des migrants. « Quel est ce monde dans lequel les droits de l’homme ne sont accordés qu’à certaines personnes en fonction de leur origine ?, se désole-t-il. À chaque réunion internationale sur la migration, nous répétons aux dirigeants européens que s’ils investissaient un tiers de ce qu’ils allouent à Frontex dans des politiques de développement local transparentes, les jeunes Africains ne seraient plus contraints de partir. » Le budget total alloué à Frontex, en constante augmentation depuis 2016, a dépassé les 754 millions d’euros en 2022, contre 535 millions l’année précédente.
      Une des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières

      Boubacar Seye, directeur de l’ONG Horizon sans Frontières, parle de son côté d’une « gestion catastrophique et inhumaine des frontières et des phénomènes migratoires ». Selon les estimations de l’ONG espagnole Caminando Fronteras, engagée dans la surveillance quotidienne de ce qu’elle appelle la « nécro-frontière ouest-euro-africaine », entre 2018 et 2022, 7 865 personnes originaires de 31 pays différents, dont 1 273 femmes et 383 enfants, auraient trouvé la mort en tentant de rejoindre les côtes espagnoles des Canaries à bord de pirogues en bois et de canots pneumatiques cabossés – soit une moyenne de 6 victimes chaque jour. Il s’agit de l’une des routes migratoires les plus dangereuses et les plus meurtrières au monde, avec le triste record, ces cinq dernières années, d’au moins 250 bateaux qui auraient coulé avec leurs passagers à bord. Le dernier naufrage connu a eu lieu le 2 octobre 2022. Selon le récit d’un jeune Ivoirien de 27 ans, seul survivant, le bateau a coulé après neuf jours de mer, emportant avec lui 33 vies.

      Selon les chiffres fournis par le ministère espagnol de l’Intérieur, environ 15 000 personnes sont arrivées aux îles Canaries en 2022 – un chiffre en baisse par rapport à 2021 (21 000) et 2020 (23 000). Et pour cause : la Guardia Civil espagnole a déployé des navires et des hélicoptères sur les côtes du Sénégal et de la Mauritanie, dans le cadre de l’opération « Hera » mise en place dès 2006 (l’année de la « crise des pirogues ») grâce à des accords de coopération militaire avec les deux pays africains, et en coordination avec Frontex.

      « Les frontières de l’Europe sont devenues des lieux de souffrance, des cimetières, au lieu d’être des entrelacs de communication et de partage, dénonce Boubacar Seye, qui a obtenu la nationalité espagnole. L’Europe se barricade derrière des frontières juridiques, politiques et physiques. Aujourd’hui, les frontières sont équipées de moyens de surveillance très avancés. Mais, malgré tout, les naufrages et les massacres d’innocents continuent. Il y a manifestement un problème. » Une question surtout le hante : « Combien d’argent a-t-on injecté dans la lutte contre la migration irrégulière en Afrique au fil des ans ? Il n’y a jamais eu d’évaluation. Demander publiquement un audit transparent, en tant que citoyen européen et chercheur, m’a coûté la prison. » L’activiste a été détenu pendant une vingtaine de jours en janvier 2021 au Sénégal pour avoir osé demander des comptes sur l’utilisation des fonds européens. De la fenêtre de son bureau, à Dakar, il regarde l’océan et s’alarme : « L’ère post-Covid et post-guerre en Ukraine va générer encore plus de tensions géopolitiques liées aux migrations. »
      Un outil policier contesté à gauche

      Bruxelles, novembre 2022. Nous rencontrons des professeurs, des experts des questions migratoires et des militants belges qui dénoncent l’approche néocoloniale des politiques migratoires de l’Union européenne (UE). Il est en revanche plus difficile d’échanger quelques mots avec les députés européens, occupés à courir d’une aile à l’autre du Parlement européen, où l’on n’entre que sur invitation. Quelques heures avant la fin de notre mission, nous parvenons toutefois à rencontrer Amandine Bach, conseillère politique sur les questions migratoires pour le groupe parlementaire de gauche The Left. « Nous sommes le seul parti qui s’oppose systématiquement à Frontex en tant qu’outil policier pour gérer et contenir les flux migratoires vers l’UE », affirme-t-elle.

      Mme Bach souligne la différence entre « statut agreement » (accord sur le statut) et « working arrangement » (arrangement de travail) : « Il ne s’agit pas d’une simple question juridique. Le premier, c’est-à-dire celui initialement proposé au Sénégal, est un accord formel qui permet à Frontex un déploiement pleinement opérationnel. Il est négocié par le Conseil de l’Europe, puis soumis au vote du Parlement européen, qui ne peut que le ratifier ou non, sans possibilité de proposer des amendements. Le second, en revanche, est plus symbolique qu’opérationnel et offre un cadre juridique plus simple. Il n’est pas discuté par le Parlement et n’implique pas le déploiement d’agents et de moyens, mais il réglemente la coopération et l’échange d’informations entre l’agence européenne et les États tiers. » Autre différence substantielle : seul l’accord sur le statut peut donner – en fonction de ce qui a été négocié entre les parties – une immunité partielle ou totale aux agents de Frontex sur le sol non européen. L’agence dispose actuellement de tels accords dans les Balkans, avec des déploiements en Serbie et en Albanie (d’autres accords seront bientôt opérationnels en Macédoine du Nord et peut-être en Bosnie, pays avec lequel des négociations sont en cours).

      Cornelia Ernst (du groupe parlementaire The Left), la rapporteuse de l’accord entre Frontex et le Sénégal nommée en décembre 2022, va droit au but : « Je suis sceptique, j’ai beaucoup de doutes sur ce type d’accord. La Commission européenne ne discute pas seulement avec le Sénégal, mais aussi avec la Mauritanie et d’autres pays africains. Le Sénégal est un pays de transit pour les réfugiés de toute l’Afrique de l’Ouest, et l’UE lui offre donc de l’argent dans l’espoir qu’il accepte d’arrêter les réfugiés. Nous pensons que cela met en danger la liberté de circulation et d’autres droits sociaux fondamentaux des personnes, ainsi que le développement des pays concernés, comme cela s’est déjà produit au Soudan. » Et d’ajouter : « J’ai entendu dire que le Sénégal n’est pas intéressé pour le moment par un “statut agreement”, mais n’est pas fermé à un “working arrangement” avec Frontex, contrairement à la Mauritanie, qui négocie un accord substantiel qui devrait prévoir un déploiement de Frontex. »

      Selon Mme Ernst, la stratégie de Frontex consiste à envoyer des agents, des armes, des véhicules, des drones, des bateaux et des équipements de surveillance sophistiqués, tels que des caméras thermiques, et à fournir une formation aux gardes-frontières locaux. C’est ainsi qu’ils entendent « protéger » l’Europe en empêchant les réfugiés de poursuivre leur voyage. La question est de savoir ce qu’il adviendra de ces réfugiés bloqués au Sénégal ou en Mauritanie en cas d’accord.
      Des rapports accablants

      Principal outil de dissuasion développé par l’UE en réponse à la « crise migratoire » de 2015-2016, Frontex a bénéficié en 2019 d’un renforcement substantiel de son mandat, avec le déploiement de 10 000 gardes-frontières prévu d’ici à 2027 (ils sont environ 1 500 aujourd’hui) et des pouvoirs accrus en matière de coopération avec les pays non européens, y compris ceux qui ne sont pas limitrophes de l’UE. Mais les résultats son maigres. Un rapport de la Cour des comptes européenne d’août 2021 souligne « l’inefficacité de Frontex dans la lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière et la criminalité transfrontalière ». Un autre rapport de l’Office européen de lutte antifraude (Olaf), publié en mars 2022, a quant à lui révélé des responsabilités directes et indirectes dans des « actes de mauvaise conduite » à l’encontre des exilés, allant du harcèlement aux violations des droits fondamentaux en Grèce, en passant par le refoulement illégal de migrants dans le cadre d’opérations de rapatriement en Hongrie.

      Ces rapports pointent du doigt les plus hautes sphères de Frontex, tout comme le Frontex Scrutiny Working Group (FSWG), une commission d’enquête créée en février 2021 par le Parlement européen dans le but de « contrôler en permanence tous les aspects du fonctionnement de Frontex, y compris le renforcement de son rôle et de ses ressources pour la gestion intégrée des frontières et l’application correcte du droit communautaire ». Ces révélations ont conduit, en mars 2021, à la décision du Parlement européen de suspendre temporairement l’extension du budget de Frontex et, en mai 2022, à la démission de Fabrice Leggeri, qui était à la tête de l’agence depuis 2015.
      Un tabou à Dakar

      « Actuellement aucun cadre juridique n’a été défini avec un État africain », affirme Frontex. Si dans un premier temps l’agence nous a indiqué que les discussions avec le Sénégal étaient en cours – « tant que les négociations sur l’accord de statut sont en cours, nous ne pouvons pas les commenter » (19 janvier 2023) –, elle a rétropédalé quelques jours plus tard en précisant que « si les négociations de la Commission européenne avec le Sénégal sur un accord de statut n’ont pas encore commencé, Frontex est au courant des négociations en cours entre la Commission européenne et la Mauritanie » (1er février 2023).

      Interrogé sur les négociations avec le Sénégal, la chargée de communication de Frontex, Paulina Bakula, nous a envoyé par courriel la réponse suivant : « Nous entretenons une relation de coopération étroite avec les autorités sénégalaises chargées de la gestion des frontières et de la lutte contre la criminalité transfrontalière, en particulier avec la Direction générale de la police nationale, mais aussi avec la gendarmerie, l’armée de l’air et la marine. » En effet, la coopération avec le Sénégal a été renforcée avec la mise en place d’un officier de liaison Frontex à Dakar en janvier 2020. « Compte tenu de la pression continue sur la route Canaries-océan Atlantique, poursuit Paulina Bakula, le Sénégal reste l’un des pays prioritaires pour la coopération opérationnelle de Frontex en Afrique de l’Ouest. Cependant, en l’absence d’un cadre juridique pour la coopération avec le Sénégal, l’agence a actuellement des possibilités très limitées de fournir un soutien opérationnel. »

      Interpellée sur la question des droits de l’homme en cas de déploiement opérationnel en Afrique de l’Ouest, Paulina Bakula écrit : « Si l’UE conclut de tels accords avec des partenaires africains à l’avenir, il incombera à Frontex de veiller à ce qu’ils soient mis en œuvre dans le plein respect des droits fondamentaux et que des garanties efficaces soient mises en place pendant les activités opérationnelles. »

      Malgré des demandes d’entretien répétées durant huit mois, formalisées à la fois par courriel et par courrier, aucune autorité sénégalaise n’a accepté de répondre à nos questions. « Le gouvernement est conscient de la sensibilité du sujet pour l’opinion publique nationale et régionale, c’est pourquoi il ne veut pas en parler. Et il ne le fera probablement pas avant les élections présidentielles de 2024 », confie, sous le couvert de l’anonymat, un homme politique sénégalais. Il constate que la question migratoire est devenue, ces dernières années, autant un ciment pour la société civile qu’un tabou pour la classe politique ouest-africaine.

      https://afriquexxi.info/Au-Senegal-les-desseins-de-Frontex-se-heurtent-aux-resistances-locales
      #conditionnalité #conditionnalité_de_l'aide_au_développement #remittances #résistance

    • What is Frontex doing in Senegal? Secret services also participate in their network of “#Risk_Analysis_Cells

      Frontex has been allowed to conclude stationing agreements with third countries since 2016. However, the government in Dakar does not currently want to allow EU border police into the country. Nevertheless, Frontex has been active there since 2006.

      When Frontex was founded in 2004, the EU states wrote into its border agency’s charter that it could only be deployed within the Union. With developments often described as the “refugee crisis,” that changed in the new 2016 regulation, which since then has allowed the EU Commission to negotiate agreements with third countries to send Frontex there. So far, four Balkan states have decided to let the EU migration defense agency into the country – Bosnia and Herzegovina could become the fifth candidate.

      Frontex also wanted to conclude a status agreement with Senegal based on this model (https://digit.site36.net/2022/02/11/status-agreement-with-senegal-frontex-wants-to-operate-in-africa-for-t). In February 2022, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, announced that such a treaty would be ready for signing by the summer (https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220211-eu-seeks-to-deploy-border-agency-to-senegal). However, this did not happen: Despite high-level visits from the EU (https://digit.site36.net/2022/02/11/status-agreement-with-senegal-frontex-wants-to-operate-in-africa-for-t), the government in Dakar is apparently not even prepared to sign a so-called working agreement. It would allow authorities in the country to exchange personal data with Frontex.

      Senegal is surrounded by more than 2,600 kilometers of external border; like neighboring Mali, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, the government has joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Similar to the Schengen area, the agreement also regulates the free movement of people and goods in a total of 15 countries. Senegal is considered a safe country of origin by Germany and other EU member states like Luxembourg.

      Even without new agreements, Frontex has been active on migration from Senegal practically since its founding: the border agency’s first (and, with its end in 2019, longest) mission started in 2006 under the name “#Hera” between West Africa and the Canary Islands in the Atlantic (https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/analyses/no-307-frontex-operation-hera.pdf). Border authorities from Mauritania were also involved. The background to this was the sharp increase in crossings from the countries at the time, which were said to have declined successfully under “Hera.” For this purpose, Frontex received permission from Dakar to enter territorial waters of Senegal with vessels dispatched from member states.

      Senegal has already been a member of the “#Africa-Frontex_Intelligence_Community” (#AFIC) since 2015. This “community”, which has been in existence since 2010, aims to improve Frontex’s risk analysis and involves various security agencies to this end. The aim is to combat cross-border crimes, which include smuggling as well as terrorism. Today, 30 African countries are members of AFIC. Frontex has opened an AFIC office in five of these countries, including Senegal since 2019 (https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-opens-risk-analysis-cell-in-senegal-6nkN3B). The tasks of the Frontex liaison officer stationed there include communicating with the authorities responsible for border management and assisting with deportations from EU member states.

      The personnel of the national “Risk Analysis Cells” are trained by Frontex. Their staff are to collect strategic data on crime and analyze their modus operandi, EU satellite surveillance is also used for this purpose (https://twitter.com/matthimon/status/855425552148295680). Personal data is not processed in the process. From the information gathered, Frontex produces, in addition to various dossiers, an annual situation report, which the agency calls an “#Pre-frontier_information_picture.”

      Officially, only national law enforcement agencies participate in the AFIC network, provided they have received a “mandate for border management” from their governments. In Senegal, these are the National Police and the Air and Border Police, in addition to the “Department for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Similar Practices.” According to the German government, the EU civil-military missions in Niger and Libya are also involved in AFIC’s work.

      Information is not exchanged with intelligence services “within the framework of AFIC activities by definition,” explains the EU Commission in its answer to a parliamentary question. However, the word “by definition” does not exclude the possibility that they are nevertheless involved and also contribute strategic information. In addition, in many countries, police authorities also take on intelligence activities – quite differently from how this is regulated in Germany, for example, in the separation requirement for these authorities. However, according to Frontex’s response to a FOIA request, intelligence agencies are also directly involved in AFIC: Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire send their domestic secret services to AFIC meetings, and a “#Center_for_Monitoring_and_Profiling” from Senegal also participates.

      Cooperation with Senegal is paying off for the EU: Since 2021, the total number of arrivals of refugees and migrants from Senegal via the so-called Atlantic route as well as the Western Mediterranean route has decreased significantly. The recognition rate for asylum seekers from the country is currently around ten percent in the EU.

      https://digit.site36.net/2023/08/27/what-is-frontex-doing-in-senegal-secret-services-also-participate-in-t
      #services_de_renseignement #données #services_secrets

  • EU Commissioner Johansson opens first #High_Level_Network_for_returns

    On 8 September, experts from Frontex, Member States and the European Commission met in Brussels to open the first High-Level Network on Returns to discuss the main challenges and developments affecting return operations in the European Union.

    EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson opened the meeting:

    “Today I am proud to launch this high-level network on returns. To return people with dignity, effectively and rapidly, I made returns a cornerstone of the new pact on migration and asylum.

    “What’s clear: we’re at our best when we work together,” she added.

    This new network is composed of representatives from Member States and Schengen Associated Countries` institutions responsible for return and was founded to coordinate the efforts made by all Member States to ensure effective returns on EU level. The event was chaired by the EU Return Coordinator Mari Juritsch.

    Lars Gerdes, Frontex Deputy Executive Director for Returns and Operations, underlined the agency’s growing role when it comes to returns:

    “Frontex plays a key role in implementing the EU strategy on return by providing technical and operational support the Member States in the whole return process, including on voluntary returns, post arrival and reintegration.”

    “With our support, the number of people who return to their countries of origin keeps growing. This year, people who returned voluntarily make up for 58% of the total number of persons returned by scheduled flights,” he added.

    The agency also continued to increase the number of flights with forced-return monitors on board. Out of 136 forced return operations coordinated by Frontex in the first half of this year, 104 had monitors on board.

    In April, Frontex has started providing reintegration assistance to migrants returned to their countries of origin and already more than 200 people have received assistance. The Frontex Joint Reintegration Services already covers 26 countries and will be further expanded.

    In 2022, there has been a significant increase in the number of voluntary returns supported by the agency and their number keeps growing. So far this year, Frontex supported the voluntary return of 5327 non-EU nationals, compared to 4589 the year before. We also provide experts who work at the main international airports in the EU to support with return-related matters.

    Frontex is responsible for the coordination of return operations, but it is crucial to understand that the decision about who should be returned is always taken by the judicial or administrative authorities of the Member States.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-commissioner-johansson-opens-first-frontex-return-network-BGbBhM
    #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #EU #UE #Frontex
    #dignité (sic) #efficacité (sic) #rapidité (sic) #Mari_Juritsch #Lars_Gerdes #réintégration #post-arrivée #retours_volontaires #retours_forcés #Frontex_Joint_Reintegration_Services #aéroports

    ping @isskein @_kg_ @karine4 @rhoumour

  • Adbusting: Killing people in a brand new uniform!

    Am 09. Mai ist der selbsternannte Europatag der Europäischen Union. Doch anlässlich dieser „Feierlichkeiten“ sah sich eine anonyme Aktionsgruppe gezwungen dies nicht unkommentiert zu lassen: heute morgen erschienen an mehreren Bushaltestellen in unmittelbarer Nähe zur CDU und SPD Parteizentrale in Berlin Werbeplakate im Namen der europäischen Grenzschutzagentur FRONTEX, die die neue, einheitliche Uniform präsentieren, die 1A zum illegalen pushbacken geeignet ist . Dabei ist die Aktionsgruppe dem Aufruf des Frontex Foto Wettbewerbs gefolgt und hat die Realität menschenverachtender Handlungen von Frontex deutlich gemacht. Auf den Plakaten wird die Realität an den europäischen Außengrenzen mit dem Spruch „Killing people in a brand new uniforms“ benannt.

    NGOs wie AlarmPhone, Sea-Watch und Border Violence Monitoring Network berichten regelmäßig von illegalen Pushbacks, die unter der Leitung von oder in Zusammenarbeit mit FRONTEX passieren. Menschen werden illegal nach Libyen zurückgebracht wo mitunter Folter und Tod auf sie warten, auf dem Mittelmeer zurückgedränkt oder beim Ertrinken im Stich gelassen. Auf europäischem Festland werden Menschen in nicht-EU Staaten deportiert und vorher misshandelt. Somit wird systematisch ihr Recht auf Asyl verwehrt.^1,2 Die EU betreibt dadurch eine konsequent menschenverachtende Abschottungspolitik, die das Sterben tausender Menschen zur Folge hat. Umgesetzt wird diese Politik maßgeblich durch FRONTEX.

    Diese Außenpolitik ist nichts Neues und wird auch nicht erst seit der sogenannten ‚Flüchtlingskrise‘ 2015 verfolgt. Die konsequente Abschottung war insbesondere Folge des Schengen-Abkommens, das zwar die innereuropäische Reisefreiheit ermöglichte, jedoch gleichzeitig zu einem verschärften Grenzschutz der Außengrenzen führte. Schon 1998 schlug die österreichische EU-Ratspräsident*innenschaft vor, die Außengrenzen Europas systematischer abzusichern und somit die Einreise von Nicht-EU Bürger*innen stärker zu kontrollieren und noch weiter einzuschränken. Die EU verfolgt ihre Abschottungs- und Aufrüstungspolitik systematisch und das schon seit langem.

    Regelmäßig werden von der EU Abkommen und Leitfäden festgelegt, die stärkere Grenzkontrollen fordern und umsetzten. So zum Beispiel die European Neighboorhood Policy, die stärkere Grenzkontrollen durch nicht-EU Nachbarstaaten festlegt. Gekoppelt sind solche Abkommen oft an sogenannte „Entwicklungshilfe“, die kooperierende Länder erhalten wenn sie sich am Grenzschutz beteiligen. Das ökonomische Ausbeutungsverhältnis zwischen den Ländern wird dabei gezielt als Druckmittel genutzt und zeigt erneut, wie die EU ökonomische Privilegien ausnutzt. Dass die Ressourcen sich aus kolonialer Vergangenheit und kapitalistischer Ausbeutungspraxis ergeben, spielt dabei keine Rolle: Stattdessen werden diese Maßnahmen von der EU als humanitär verkauft.

    FRONTEX hat angekündigt, die bisherige stehende Truppe von 1.500 Einsatzkräften bis 2027 auf 10.000 Kräfte aufzustocken. Die geplanten 3.000 Offiziere sind dabei direkt der Zentrale in Warschau unterstellt und sollen mit eigenen Waffen und Munition ausgestattet werden. Da es bis jetzt keine Rechtsgrundlage für eigene Schusswaffen gibt, konnte dieses Vorhaben bisher nicht umgesetzt werden – das Zeichen ist jedoch klar, FRONTEX will sich und soll weiter militarisiert und aufgerüstet werden.^3

    Diese Aufrüstung wird Flucht und Migration tödlicher und das Vorgehen von FRONTEX und anderen Grenzbehörden noch menschenverachtender machen. Gegen das Europäische Grenzregime, gegen FRONTEX und die Militarisierung der Außengrenzen! Freedom of movement is everybody’s right!

    Quellen und Verweise

    Link zum Frontex Fotowettbewerb (freuen sich bestimmt über Bilder ihrer tatsächlchen Arbeit) : https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-photo-c...

    Europatag 9.5 ?! Was es da zu feiern gebe ist unklar - am 9.Mai sich mit so einer scheiße befassen zu müssen statt den „Tag des Sieges“ zu feiern ist höchst ärgerlich

    Bisher tragen Einsatzkräfte, die im Rahmen von FRONTEX Operationen im Einsatz sind, die Uniformen ihrer Entsenderstaaten.

    1 https://alarmphone.org/en/2020/03/15/returned-to-war-and-torture
    2 https://www.borderviolence.eu/frontex-ignore-rights-violations-at-the-evros-border
    3 https://digit.site36.net/2020/09/22/frontexs-weapon-problem

    https://de.indymedia.org/node/148213

    #frontex #contre-campagne #affiches #Berlin #Allemagne #campagne #résistance

    ping @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

  • #Frontex to expand cooperation with Operation #IRINI

    Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and Operation #EUNAVFOR_MED IRINI have agreed last Friday to expand their cooperation to address challenges and threats to EU security in the Central Mediterranean region.

    Under a new working arrangement, Frontex will be supporting Operation IRINI with information gathered as part of the agency’s risk analysis activities, such as tracking vessels of interests on the high seas, as well as data from its aerial surveillance in the Central Mediterranean. The agreement also foresees the exchange of experts. Currently, an EUNAVFOR MED expert is based at the Warsaw headquarters of Frontex to support information exchange and cooperation in search and rescue operations.

    “Operation IRINI is a as a valuable operational partner for us. Frontex will provide information that will help tackle security challenges in the Central Mediterranean. We also work together to help save lives at sea,” said Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri.

    “I am happy to sign the agreement with Frontex in order to strengthen our common action in order to ensure the security of EU borders and stem illicit traffic in the Mediterranean Sea,” said Admiral #Fabio_Agostini, IRINI Operation Commander, during the virtual ceremony.

    The working arrangement was signed during a virtual ceremony by Frontex’s Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri and Rear Admiral Fabio Agostini, the Commander of Operation IRINI and attended by Director-General for Migration and Home Affairs #Monique_Pariat.

    EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI is tasked with the implementation of the United Nation Security Council Resolutions on the arms embargo on Libya through the use of aerial, satellite and maritime assets.
    Cooperation with EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy missions is an integral part of Frontex’s activities. Before the launch of IRINI, the agency worked with EUNAVFOR Med Sophia to together combat people smuggling and trafficking and helped the mission build a comprehensive picture of cross-border criminal activities in the Central Mediterranean.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/news-release/frontex-to-expand-cooperation-with-operation-irini-IYCjyo

    #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #operation_IRINI #EUNAVFOR_MED_IRINI #militarisation_des_frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Méditerranée_Centrale #information #données #sécurité #sauvetage #accord

    ping @isskein @karine4 @etraces

  • Artificial intelligence : #Frontex improves its maritime surveillance

    Frontex wants to use a new platform to automatically detect and assess „risks“ on the seas of the European Union. Suspected irregular activities are to be displayed in a constantly updated „threat map“ with the help of self-learning software.

    The EU border agency has renewed a contract with Israeli company Windward for a „maritime analytics“ platform. It will put the application into regular operation. Frontex had initially procured a licence for around 800,000 Euros. For now 2.6 million Euros, the agency will receive access for four workstations. The contract can be extended three times for one year at a time.

    Windward specialises in the digital aggregation and assessment of vessel tracking and maritime surveillance data. Investors in the company, which was founded in 2011, include former US CIA director David Petraeus and former CEO’s of Thomson Reuters and British Petroleum. The former chief of staff of the Israeli military, Gabi Ashkenazi, is considered one of the advisors.

    Signature for each observed ship

    The platform is based on artificial intelligence techniques. For analysis, it uses maritime reporting systems, including position data from the AIS transponders of larger ships and weather data. These are enriched with information about the ship owners and shipping companies as well as the history of previous ship movements. For this purpose, the software queries openly accessible information from the internet.

    In this way, a „fingerprint“ is created for each observed ship, which can be used to identify suspicious activities. If the captain switches off the transponder, for example, the analysis platform can recognise this as a suspicuous event and take over further tracking based on the recorded patterns. It is also possible to integrate satellite images.

    Windward uses the register of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as its database, which lists about 70,000 ships. Allegedly, however, it also processes data on a total of 400,000 watercraft, including smaller fishing boats. One of the clients is therefore the UN Security Council, which uses the technology to monitor sanctions.

    Against „bad guys“ at sea

    The company advertises its applications with the slogan „Catch the bad guys at sea“. At Frontex, the application is used to combat and prevent unwanted migration and cross-border crime as well as terrorism. Subsequently, „policy makers“ and law enforcement agencies are to be informed about results. For this purpose, the „risks“ found are visualised in a „threat map“.

    Windward put such a „threat map“ online two years ago. At the time, the software rated the Black Sea as significantly more risky than the Mediterranean. Commercial shipping activity off the Crimea was interpreted as „probable sanction evasions“. Ship owners from the British Guernsey Islands as well as Romania recorded the highest proportion of ships exhibiting „risky“ behaviour. 42 vessels were classified as suspicious for drug smuggling based on their patterns.

    Frontex „early warning“ units

    The information from maritime surveillance is likely to be processed first by the „Risk Analysis Unit“ (RAU) at Frontex. It is supposed to support strategic decisions taken by the headquarters in Warsaw on issues of border control, return, prevention of cross-border crime as well as threats of a „hybrid nature“. Frontex calls the applications used there „intelligence products“ and „integrated data services“. Their results flow together in the „Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model“ (CIRAM).

    For the operational monitoring of the situation at the EU’s external borders, the agency also maintains the „Frontex Situation Centre“ (FSC). The department is supposed to provide a constantly updated picture of migration movements, if possible in real time. From these reports, Frontex produces „early warnings“ and situation reports to the border authorities of the member states as well as to the Commission and the Council in Brussels.

    More surveillance capacity in Warsaw

    According to its own information, Windward’s clients include the Italian Guardia di Finanza, which is responsible for controlling Italian territorial waters. The Ministry of the Interior in Rome is also responsible for numerous EU projects aimed at improving surveillance of the central Mediterranean. For the training and equipment of the Libyan coast guard, Italy receives around 67 million euros from EU funds in three different projects. Italian coast guard authorities are also installing a surveillance system for Tunisia’s external maritime borders.

    Frontex now wants to improve its own surveillance capacities with further tenders. Together with the fisheries agency, The agency is awarding further contracts for manned maritime surveillance. It has been operating such a „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS) in the central Mediterranean since 2017 and in the Adriatic Sea since 2018. Frontex also wants to station large drones in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, it is testing Aerostats in the eastern Mediterranean for a second time. These are zeppelins attached to a 1,000-metre long line.

    https://digit.site36.net/2021/01/15/artificial-intelligence-frontex-improves-its-maritime-surveillance
    #intelligence_artificielle #surveillance #surveillance_maritime #mer #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #AI #Windward #Israël #complexe_militaro-industriel #militarisation_des_frontières #David_Petraeus #Thomson_Reuters #British_Petroleum #armée_israélienne #Gabi_Ashkenazi #International_Maritime_Organisation (#IMO) #thread_map #Risk_Analysis_Unit (#RAU) #Common_Integrated_Risk_Analysis_Model (#CIRAM) #Frontex_Situation_Centre (#FSC) #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #zeppelins

    ping @etraces

    • Data et nouvelles technologies, la face cachée du contrôle des mobilités

      Dans un rapport de juillet 2020, l’Agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle (#EU-Lisa) présente l’intelligence artificielle (IA) comme l’une des « technologies prioritaires » à développer. Le rapport souligne les avantages de l’IA en matière migratoire et aux frontières, grâce, entre autres, à la technologie de #reconnaissance_faciale.

      L’intelligence artificielle est de plus en plus privilégiée par les acteurs publics, les institutions de l’UE et les acteurs privés, mais aussi par le #HCR et l’#OIM. Les agences de l’UE, comme Frontex ou EU-Lisa, ont été particulièrement actives dans l’#expérimentation des nouvelles technologies, brouillant parfois la distinction entre essais et mise en oeuvre. En plus des outils traditionnels de surveillance, une panoplie de technologies est désormais déployée aux frontières de l’Europe et au-delà, qu’il s’agisse de l’ajout de nouvelles #bases_de_données, de technologies financières innovantes, ou plus simplement de la récupération par les #GAFAM des données laissées volontairement ou pas par les migrant·e·s et réfugié∙e∙s durant le parcours migratoire.

      La pandémie #Covid-19 est arrivée à point nommé pour dynamiser les orientations déjà prises, en permettant de tester ou de généraliser des technologies utilisées pour le contrôle des mobilités sans que l’ensemble des droits des exilé·e·s ne soit pris en considération. L’OIM, par exemple, a mis à disposition des Etats sa #Matrice_de_suivi_des_déplacements (#DTM) durant cette période afin de contrôler les « flux migratoires ». De nouvelles technologies au service de vieilles obsessions…

      http://www.migreurop.org/article3021.html

      Pour télécharger le rapport :
      www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/note_12_fr.pdf

      ping @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_ @i_s_

    • La #technopolice aux frontières

      Comment le #business de la #sécurité et de la #surveillance au sein de l’#Union_européenne, en plus de bafouer des #droits_fondamentaux, utilise les personnes exilées comme #laboratoire de recherche, et ce sur des #fonds_publics européens.

      On a beaucoup parlé ici ces derniers mois de surveillance des manifestations ou de surveillance de l’espace public dans nos villes, mais la technopolice est avant tout déployée aux #frontières – et notamment chez nous, aux frontières de la « forteresse Europe ». Ces #dispositifs_technopoliciers sont financés, soutenus et expérimentés par l’Union européenne pour les frontières de l’UE d’abord, et ensuite vendus. Cette surveillance des frontières représente un #marché colossal et profite grandement de l’échelle communautaire et de ses programmes de #recherche_et_développement (#R&D) comme #Horizon_2020.

      #Roborder – des essaims de #drones_autonomes aux frontières

      C’est le cas du projet Roborder – un « jeu de mots » entre robot et border, frontière en anglais. Débuté en 2017, il prévoit de surveiller les frontières par des essaims de #drones autonomes, fonctionnant et patrouillant ensemble. L’#intelligence_artificielle de ces drones leur permettrait de reconnaître les humains et de distinguer si ces derniers commettent des infractions (comme celui de passer une frontière ?) et leur dangerosité pour ensuite prévenir la #police_aux_frontières. Ces drones peuvent se mouvoir dans les airs, sous l’eau, sur l’eau et dans des engins au sol. Dotés de multiples capteurs, en plus de la détection d’activités criminelles, ces drones seraient destinés à repérer des “#radio-fréquences non fiables”, c’est-à-dire à écouter les #communications et également à mesurer la #pollution_marine.
      Pour l’instant, ces essaims de drones autonomes ne seraient pas pourvus d’armes. Roborder est actuellement expérimenté en #Grèce, au #Portugal et en #Hongrie.

      Un #financement européen pour des usages « civils »

      Ce projet est financé à hauteur de 8 millions d’euros par le programme Horizon 2020 (subventionné lui-même par la #Cordis, organe de R&D de la Commission européenne). Horizon 2020 représente 50% du financement public total pour la recherche en sécurité de l’UE. Roborder est coordonné par le centre de recherches et technologie de #Hellas (le #CERTH), en Grèce et comme le montre l’association #Homo_Digitalis le nombre de projets Horizon 2020 ne fait qu’augmenter en Grèce. En plus du CERTH grec s’ajoutent environ 25 participants venus de tous les pays de l’UE (où on retrouve les services de police d’#Irlande_du_Nord, le ministère de la défense grecque, ou encore des entreprises de drones allemandes, etc.).

      L’une des conditions pour le financement de projets de ce genre par Horizon 2020 est que les technologies développées restent dans l’utilisation civile, et ne puissent pas servir à des fins militaires. Cette affirmation pourrait ressembler à un garde-fou, mais en réalité la distinction entre usage civil et militaire est loin d’être clairement établie. Comme le montre Stephen Graham, très souvent les #technologies, à la base militaires, sont réinjectées dans la sécurité, particulièrement aux frontières où la migration est criminalisée. Et cette porosité entre la sécurité et le #militaire est induite par la nécessité de trouver des débouchés pour rentabiliser la #recherche_militaire. C’est ce qu’on peut observer avec les drones ou bien le gaz lacrymogène. Ici, il est plutôt question d’une logique inverse : potentiellement le passage d’un usage dit “civil” de la #sécurité_intérieure à une application militaire, à travers des ventes futures de ces dispositifs. Mais on peut aussi considérer la surveillance, la détection de personnes et la #répression_aux_frontières comme une matérialisation de la #militarisation de l’Europe à ses frontières. Dans ce cas-là, Roborder serait un projet à fins militaires.

      De plus, dans les faits, comme le montre The Intercept (https://theintercept.com/2019/05/11/drones-artificial-intelligence-europe-roborder), une fois le projet terminé celui-ci est vendu. Sans qu’on sache trop à qui. Et, toujours selon le journal, beaucoup sont déjà intéressés par Roborder.

      #IborderCtrl – détection d’#émotions aux frontières

      Si les essaims de drones sont impressionnants, il existe d’autres projets dans la même veine. On peut citer notamment le projet qui a pour nom IborderCtrl, testé en Grèce, Hongrie et #Lettonie.

      Il consiste notamment en de l’#analyse_d’émotions (à côté d’autres projets de #reconnaissances_biométriques) : les personnes désirant passer une frontière doivent se soumettre à des questions et voient leur #visage passer au crible d’un #algorithme qui déterminera si elles mentent ou non. Le projet prétend « accélérer le #contrôle_aux_frontières » : si le #détecteur_de_mensonges estime qu’une personne dit la vérité, un code lui est donné pour passer le contrôle facilement ; si l’algorithme considère qu’une personne ment, elle est envoyée dans une seconde file, vers des gardes-frontières qui lui feront passer un #interrogatoire. L’analyse d’émotions prétend reposer sur un examen de « 38 #micro-mouvements du visage » comme l’angle de la tête ou le mouvement des yeux. Un spectacle de gadgets pseudoscientifiques qui permet surtout de donner l’apparence de la #neutralité_technologique à des politiques d’#exclusion et de #déshumanisation.

      Ce projet a également été financé par Horizon 2020 à hauteur de 4,5 millions d’euros. S’il semble aujourd’hui avoir été arrêté, l’eurodéputé allemand Patrick Breyer a saisi la Cour de justice de l’Union Européenne pour obtenir plus d’informations sur ce projet, ce qui lui a été refusé pour… atteinte au #secret_commercial. Ici encore, on voit que le champ “civil” et non “militaire” du projet est loin de représenter un garde-fou.

      Conclusion

      Ainsi, l’Union européenne participe activement au puissant marché de la surveillance et de la répression. Ici, les frontières et les personnes exilées sont utilisées comme des ressources de laboratoire. Dans une optique de militarisation toujours plus forte des frontières de la forteresse Europe et d’une recherche de profit et de développement des entreprises et centres de recherche européens. Les frontières constituent un nouveau marché et une nouvelle manne financière de la technopolice.

      Les chiffres montrent par ailleurs l’explosion du budget de l’agence européenne #Frontex (de 137 millions d’euros en 2015 à 322 millions d’euros en 2020, chiffres de la Cour des comptes européenne) et une automatisation toujours plus grande de la surveillance des frontières. Et parallèlement, le ratio entre le nombre de personnes qui tentent de franchir la Méditerranée et le nombre de celles qui y laissent la vie ne fait qu’augmenter. Cette automatisation de la surveillance aux frontières n’est donc qu’une nouvelle façon pour les autorités européennes d’accentuer le drame qui continue de se jouer en Méditerranée, pour une “efficacité” qui finalement ne profite qu’aux industries de la surveillance.

      Dans nos rues comme à nos frontières nous devons refuser la Technopolice et la combattre pied à pied !

      https://technopolice.fr/blog/la-technopolice-aux-frontieres

    • Artificial Intelligence - based capabilities for European Border and Coast Guard

      In 2019, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commissioned #RAND Europe to carry out an Artificial intelligence (AI) research study.

      The purpose of the study was to provide an overview of the main opportunities, challenges and requirements for the adoption of AI-based capabilities in border managament. Frontex’s intent was also to find synergies with ongoing AI studies and initiatives in the EU and contribute to a Europe-wide AI landscape by adding the border security dimension.

      Some of the analysed technologies included automated border control, object recognition to detect suspicious vehicles or cargo and the use of geospatial data analytics for operational awareness and threat detection.

      As part of the study, RAND provided Frontex in 2020 with a comprehensive report and an executive summary with conclusions and recommendations.

      The findings will support Frontex in shaping the future landscape of AI-based capabilities for Integrated Border Management, including AI-related research and innovation projects which could be initiated by Frontex (e.g. under #EU_Innovation_Hub) or recommended to be conducted under the EU Research and Innovation Programme (#Horizon_Europe).

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/artificial-intelligence-based-capabilities-for-european-border-and-co

    • Pour les réfugiés, la #biométrie tout au long du chemin

      Par-delà les murs qui poussent aux frontières du monde depuis les années 1990, les réfugiés, migrants et demandeurs d’asile sont de plus en plus confrontés à l’extension des bases de #données_biométriques. Un « #mur_virtuel » s’étend ainsi à l’extérieur, aux frontières et à l’intérieur de l’espace Schengen, construit autour de programmes et de #bases_de_données.

      Des réfugiés qui paient avec leurs #iris, des migrants identifiés par leurs #empreintes_digitales, des capteurs de #reconnaissance_faciale, mais aussi d’#émotions… Réunis sous la bannière de la « #frontière_intelligente », ces #dispositifs_technologiques, reposant sur l’#anticipation, l’#identification et l’#automatisation du franchissement de la #frontière grâce aux bases de données biométriques, ont pour but de trier les voyageurs, facilitant le parcours des uns et bloquant celui des autres.

      L’Union européenne dispose ainsi d’une batterie de bases de données qui viennent compléter les contrôles aux frontières. Depuis 2011, une agence dédiée, l’#Agence_européenne_pour_la_gestion_opérationnelle_des_systèmes_d’information_à_grande_échelle, l’#EU-Lisa, a pour but d’élaborer et de développer, en lien avec des entreprises privées, le suivi des demandeurs d’asile.

      Elle gère ainsi plusieurs bases compilant des #données_biométriques. L’une d’elles, le « #Entry_and_Exit_System » (#EES), sera déployée en 2022, pour un coût évalué à 480 millions d’euros. L’EES a pour mission de collecter jusqu’à 400 millions de données sur les personnes non européennes franchissant les frontières de l’espace Schengen, afin de contrôler en temps réel les dépassements de durée légale de #visa. En cas de séjour prolongé devenu illégal, l’alerte sera donnée à l’ensemble des polices européennes.

      Se brûler les doigts pour ne pas être enregistré

      L’EU-Lisa gère également le fichier #Eurodac, qui consigne les empreintes digitales de chacun des demandeurs d’asile de l’Union européenne. Utilisé pour appliquer le #règlement_Dublin III, selon lequel la demande d’asile est déposée et traitée dans le pays européen où le migrant a été enregistré la première fois, il entraîne des stratégies de #résistance.

      « On a vu des migrants refuser de donner leurs empreintes à leur arrivée en Grèce, ou même se brûler les doigts pour ne pas être enregistrés dans Eurodac, rappelle Damien Simonneau, chercheur à l’Institut Convergences Migrations du Collège de France. Ils savent que s’ils ont, par exemple, de la famille en Allemagne, mais qu’ils ont été enregistrés en Grèce, ils seront renvoyés en Grèce pour que leur demande y soit traitée, ce qui a des conséquences énormes sur leur vie. » La procédure d’instruction dure en effet de 12 à 18 mois en moyenne.

      La collecte de données biométriques jalonne ainsi les parcours migratoires, des pays de départs jusqu’aux déplacements au sein de l’Union européenne, dans un but de limitation et de #contrôle. Pour lutter contre « la criminalité transfrontalière » et « l’immigration clandestine », le système de surveillance des zones frontières #Eurosur permet, via un partage d’informations en temps réel, d’intercepter avant leur arrivée les personnes tentant d’atteindre l’Union européenne.

      Des contrôles dans les pays de départ

      Pour le Transnational Institute, auteur avec le think tank Stop Wapenhandel et le Centre Delàs de plusieurs études sur les frontières, l’utilisation de ces bases de données témoigne d’une stratégie claire de la part de l’Union européenne. « Un des objectifs de l’expansion des #frontières_virtuelles, écrivent-ils ainsi dans le rapport Building Walls (https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/building_walls_-_full_report_-_english.pdf), paru en 2018, est d’intercepter les réfugiés et les migrants avant même qu’ils n’atteignent les frontières européennes, pour ne pas avoir à traiter avec eux. »

      Si ces techniques permettent de pré-trier les demandes pour fluidifier le passage des frontières, en accélérant les déplacements autorisés, elles peuvent également, selon Damien Simonneau, avoir des effets pervers. « L’utilisation de ces mécanismes repose sur l’idée que la #technologie est un facilitateur, et il est vrai que l’#autonomisation de certaines démarches peut faciliter les déplacements de personnes autorisées à franchir les frontières, expose-t-il. Mais les technologies sont faillibles, et peuvent produire des #discriminations. »

      Ces #techniques_virtuelles, aux conséquences bien réelles, bouleversent ainsi le rapport à la frontière et les parcours migratoires. « Le migrant est confronté à de multiples points "frontière", disséminés un peu partout, analyse Damien Simonneau. Cela crée des #obstacles supplémentaires aux parcours migratoires : le contrôle n’est quasiment plus lié au franchissement d’une frontière nationale, il est déterritorialisé et peut se produire n’importe où, en amont comme en aval de la frontière de l’État. »

      Ainsi, la « politique d’#externalisation de l’Union européenne » permet au contrôle migratoire de s’exercer dans les pays de départ. Le programme européen « #SIV » collecte par exemple dès leur formulation dans les #consulats les données biométriques liées aux #demandes_de_visas.

      Plus encore, l’Union européenne délègue une partie de la gestion de ses frontières à d’autres pays : « Dans certains États du Sahel, explique Damien Simonneau, l’aide humanitaire et de développement est conditionnée à l’amélioration des contrôles aux frontières. »

      Un programme de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), le programme #MIDAS, financé par l’Union européenne, est ainsi employé par 23 pays, majoritairement en Afrique, mais aussi en Asie et en Amérique. Son but est de « collecter, traiter, stocker et analyser les informations [biométriques et biographiques] des voyageurs en temps réel » pour aider les polices locales à contrôler leurs frontières. Mais selon le réseau Migreurop, ces données peuvent également être transmises aux agences policières européennes. L’UE exerce ainsi un droit de regard, via Frontex, sur le système d’information et d’analyse de données sur la migration, installé à Makalondi au Niger.

      Des réfugiés qui paient avec leurs yeux

      Un mélange des genres, entre organisations humanitaires et États, entre protection, logistique et surveillance, qui se retrouve également dans les #camps_de_réfugiés. Dans les camps jordaniens de #Zaatari et d’#Azarq, par exemple, près de la frontière syrienne, les réfugiés paient depuis 2016 leurs aliments avec leurs iris.

      L’#aide_humanitaire_alimentaire distribuée par le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) leur est en effet versée sur un compte relié à leurs données biométriques. Il leur suffit de passer leurs yeux dans un scanner pour régler leurs achats. Une pratique qui facilite grandement la gestion #logistique du camp par le #HCR et le PAM, en permettant la #traçabilité des échanges et en évitant les fraudes et les vols.

      Mais selon Léa Macias, anthropologue à l’EHESS, cela a aussi des inconvénients. « Si ce paiement avec les yeux peut rassurer certains réfugiés, dans la mesure où cela les protège contre les vols, développe-t-elle, le procédé est également perçu comme une #violence. Les réfugiés ont bien conscience que personne d’autre au monde, dans une situation normale, ne paie ainsi avec son #corps. »

      Le danger de la fuite de données

      La chercheuse s’inquiète également du devenir des données ainsi collectées, et se pose la question de l’intérêt des réfugiés dans ce processus. « Les humanitaires sont poussés à utiliser ces nouvelles technologies, expose-t-elle, qui sont vues comme un gage de fiabilité par les bailleurs de fonds. Mais la #technologisation n’est pas toujours dans l’intérêt des réfugiés. En cas de fuite ou de hackage des bases de données, cela les expose même à des dangers. »

      Un rapport de Human Rights Watch (HRW) (https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/15/un-shared-rohingya-data-without-informed-consent), publié mardi 15 juin, alerte ainsi sur des #transferts_de_données biométriques appartenant à des #Rohingyas réfugiés au Bangladesh. Ces données, collectées par le Haut-commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR) de l’ONU, ont été transmises par le gouvernement du Bangladesh à l’État birman. Si le HCR a réagi (https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2021/6/60c85a7b4/news-comment-statement-refugee-registration-data-collection-bangladesh.html) en affirmant que les personnes concernées avaient donné leur accord à ce #transfert_de_données pour préparer un éventuel retour en Birmanie, rien ne permet cependant de garantir qu’ils seront bien reçus si leur nom « bipe » au moment de passer la frontière.

      https://www.rfi.fr/fr/technologies/20210620-pour-les-r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s-la-biom%C3%A9trie-tout-au-long-du-chemin

      #smart_borders #tri #catégorisation #déterritorialisation #réfugiés_rohingyas

      –---

      Sur les doigts brûlés pour ne pas se faire identifier par les empreintes digitales, voir la scène du film Qu’ils reposent en paix de Sylvain George, dont j’ai fait une brève recension :

      Instant tragique : ce qu’un migrant appelle la « prière ». Ce moment collectif où les migrants tentent de faire disparaître leurs empreintes digitales. Étape symbolique où ils se défont de leur propre identité.

      https://visionscarto.net/a-calais-l-etat-ne-peut-dissoudre

  • Migrations : l’agence européenne #Frontex mise en cause pour des #refoulements en mer

    Des investigations menées par plusieurs médias dénoncent les pratiques illégales des #gardes-frontières_grecs impliquant parfois l’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières.

    Une enquête de plusieurs médias, dont le magazine allemand Spiegel, affirme que Frontex, l’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières, est impliquée dans plusieurs incidents de refoulement en mer de bateaux de demandeurs d’asile traversant la mer Egée entre la Turquie et la Grèce.

    Les investigations menées « montrent pour la première fois que les responsables de Frontex sont conscients des pratiques illégales des gardes-frontières grecs – et sont en partie impliqués dans les refoulements eux-mêmes », écrit le Spiegel dans un article disponible en ligne samedi 24 octobre.
    Les journalistes assurent avoir documenté six cas survenus depuis avril en mer Egée dans lesquels des équipes de Frontex ont au minimum assisté sans réagir à des refoulements vers la Turquie de bateaux de réfugiés se trouvant dans les eaux grecques, une pratique illégale. Dans un cas, en juin, une vidéo montre un navire de Frontex bloquant un bateau de réfugiés, puis, dans une autre scène enregistrée, passant devant le bateau de réfugiés à grande vitesse avant de quitter les lieux.

    Des dizaines de vidéos, d’images satellites, de récits comparés

    Outre le Spiegel, les recherches ont été menées par un magazine de la chaîne allemande ARD, le collectif de journalistes Lighthouse Reports, la plate-forme d’investigations Bellingcat et la chaîne de télévision japonaise TV Asahi. Les auteurs expliquent avoir comparé des « dizaines » de vidéos, d’images satellites, de récits de témoins oculaires, dont des réfugiés et des employés de Frontex. L’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières a engagé plus de 600 agents en Grèce, une des portes d’entrée de l’Union européenne, ainsi que des bateaux, des drones et des avions, selon l’article.

    Frontex n’a pas commenté les cas précis soulevés par la recherche, explique le Spiegel, mais a déclaré que ses agents étaient liés par un code de conduite en matière de droits de l’homme et respectaient l’interdiction des refoulements. Sans mentionner l’article, Frontex a annoncé vendredi soir sur son compte Twitter avoir été « en contact avec les autorités grecques à propos d’incidents en mer ces derniers mois » et qu’Athènes avait ouvert une « enquête interne ». Frontex agit « dans le respect des droits fondamentaux et de la loi internationale », souligne l’agence sur Twitter.
    Le gouvernement conservateur grec a toujours rejeté les allégations de refoulements illégaux à ses frontières dont font régulièrement état plusieurs organisations non gouvernementales.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/10/24/migrations-l-agence-europeenne-frontex-mise-en-cause-pour-des-refoulements-e
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #Mer_Egée #Grèce #Turquie

    ping @isskein @karine4

    • Frontex at Fault : European Border Force Complicit in ‘Illegal’ Pushbacks

      Vessels from the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, have been complicit in maritime “pushback” operations to drive away refugees and migrants attempting to enter the European Union via Greek waters, a joint investigation by Bellingcat, Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, ARD and TV Asahi has found.

      Open source data suggests Frontex assets were actively involved in one pushback incident at the Greek-Turkish maritime border in the Aegean Sea, were present at another and have been in the vicinity of four more since March.

      Although Frontex assets were not at the immediate scene of those latter four incidents, the signature of a pushback is distinctive, and would likely have been visible on radar, with visual tools common on such vessels or to the naked eye.

      The Greek Coast Guard (HCG) has long been accused of illegal pushbacks.

      These are described by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), a legal and educational non-profit, as incidents where refugees and migrants are forced back over a border without consideration of individual circumstances and without any possibility to apply for asylum or to put forward arguments against the measures taken.

      In the Aegean Sea, pushbacks generally occur in two ways. The first type is the most common: Dinghies travelling from Turkey to Greece are blocked from landing on Greek soil by the HCG. This could mean either physically blocking the dinghy until it runs out of fuel, or disabling the engine. After the engine no longer works the dinghy can then either be pushed back into Turkish territorial water with waves, or towed if the wind is not favourable.

      The second type of pushback is employed when people have managed to land on Greek soil. In this case they are detained, placed in a liferaft with no means of propulsion, towed into the middle of the Aegean Sea and then abandoned.

      Pushbacks will often result in standoffs between the HCG and Turkish Coast Guard (TCG), both of which will standby, refusing to aid dinghies in distress and carrying out unsafe manoeuvres around them.

      The role of Frontex assets in such incidents, however, has never been recorded before.

      Dana Schmalz, an international law expert at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg said the incidents highlighted in this investigation were likely “illegal” and “violate the prohibition of refoulement and maritime law.” The prohibition of refoulement refers to rules banning the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers and is described by the UN Refugee Agency as a “rule of customary international law.”

      Schmalz added that if Frontex personnel stopped an overcrowded dinghy of the type seen in footage documented during this investigation, they would be obliged to rescue its occupants immediately. “If they don’t do that, even make waves [or] instead drive away and then let the Greeks do the dirty work – then they are involved in the illegal pushback.”

      Despite being presented with numerous examples of the practice, a spokesperson for the Greek Maritime Ministry Greek denied claims of pushbacks, describing allegations of illegal actions relating to the incidents documented in this article as “tendentious.” They added that HCG officers act in compliance with the country’s international obligations.

      Frontex said that the host states it works with have the final say in how operations on its territory or search and rescue zone are carried out. However, it added that Frontex had notified HCG which confirmed an internal inquiry had been launched into each of the reported incidents. Yet Frontex did not say when it notified HCG or when the inquiry had begun.

      On July 24, the director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, told the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) at the European Parliament that the agency had observed and recorded just a single incident which may have been a pushback in the Aegean.

      Our investigation — which looked at the presence of Frontex assets in the Aegean Sea and observed their movements over many months — appears to contradict that assertion.

      This was despite the difficulty in tracking many Frontex assets because their transponder information was either not registered, not turned on, or was out of range. As such, we were only able to view a snapshot of Frontex operations.

      Frontex, an agency of the European Union, is tasked with border control of the Schengen Area. Its activities in the Aegean are called Operation Poseidon.
      How we Recorded Pushbacks: Identification of Assets

      There were two main steps to establishing that Frontex had participated in pushback operations. The first was to identify what assets had been deployed in Operation Poseidon. The second was to establish whether these assets had participated in pushback operations.

      The first step was carried out using open sources. These included social media posts, vessel tracking sites and information published by Frontex itself. We were also able to establish the number of personnel and assets present in the operational area thanks to questions asked in the European Parliament.

      According to this response, Operation Poseidon has 185 personnel, one offshore patrol vessel (OPV), eight coastal patrol boats (CPB), one coastal patrol vessel (CPV), four thermal vision vehicles (TVV) and three patrol cars.

      There is also a “Rapid Border Intervention”, which contains additional assets on top of those dedicated to Operation Poseidon. This includes 74 personnel, two CPBs, two CPVs, one helicopter and three TVVs.

      In total we used open sources to identify 22 assets, including vessels, helicopters and planes, which operated in the Aegean during 2020. Although this is more than the total given in the answer to parliamentary questions above, some of these assets were rotating in or out of theater.
      Tracking Assets

      Some assets featured regularly on the open source record. For example, Romanian and Bulgarian vessels regularly transit through the Bosphorus strait, where there is an active ship-spotting community. As such it was possible to identify their operational rotations, including vessels heading to and returning from deployments roughly every three months. However, other assets were more difficult to track, and their presence on the open source record consisted of a single image or video.


      https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1262417193083510784

      In order to track these assets and identify if they had participated in pushbacks, we required far more data than was available on social media. As such, we turned to AIS and transponder data, publicly available information about the location of particular ships or aircraft, available through sites such as Marine Traffic or Flight Radar 24.

      Many of the assets we identified either did not have their information publicly listed, or appeared to only turn on their transponders under certain circumstances, such as when in port. This made them extremely difficult to track. However, some assets did have their transponders on. We began to collect this data, buying additional, more granular data from ship and flight tracking companies on dates when pushbacks had been reported.

      We combined this tracking data with our own database of reported pushbacks, which we obtained through both public reports and information collected by NGOs such as Consolidated Rescue Group (CRG), Monitoring Rescue Cell (MRC) and Alarm Phone, who track these events. These included the coordinates of reported pushback events, frequently sent by the occupants of the dinghies. By overlaying these datasets we identified multiple pushback incidents in which Frontex assets were in the vicinity. Once we had identified these priority incidents we could then examine the specifics of what had happened.
      Incidents

      Using this data we identified six pushback incidents since March in which Frontex assets were either in the vicinity or participated directly. We have separated these into four “proximity incidents,” where Frontex assets were within five kilometers of the incident, and two “confirmed incidents,” where we can be certain that Frontex were present at the site of pushbacks themselves.
      Proximity Incidents

      April 28-29: In an incident we have previously reported, a group of refugees and migrants made landfall on Samos. They claim they were then detained, placed in a life-raft without any means of propulsion and towed into the middle of the Mycale Strait. A surveillance plane overflew the area twice while this pushback took place.

      June 4: Two dinghies were reported to have been pushed back from Northern Lesbos. Portuguese vessel Nortada appears to have been present around 15 kilometers from the first incident and just over one kilometer away from the second.

      June 5: A dinghy was reported to have been pushed back from Northern Lesbos. Portuguese vessel Nortada was approximately two to three kilometers away.

      August 19: A dinghy was reported to have been pushed back from Northern Lesbos. Portuguese vessel Molivos was five kilometers away and appears to have changed course and headed towards the pushback before its transponder either lost signal or was turned off.

      In these cases, Frontex assets were recorded as being within a certain range, rather than participating directly. Their exact knowledge of what was happening at these distances is difficult to confirm. Operation Poseidon’s mission includes a significant number of tasks requiring surveillance, and its assets are able to use both radar and visual tools, such as low-light or infrared cameras, to observe the environment around them.

      For example, we know that the Molivos is equipped with an FLIR camera similar to this one seen on another Portuguese Frontex vessel. This model is capable of x36 magnification, with low light and infrared cameras.

      The boats that migrants use to make this crossing are very basic, inflatable rubber dinghies several meters long with a single outboard motor. Due to their construction, it is unlikely that these boats would be visible on radar. However, pushbacks don’t just involve a single dinghy. By their definition they must involve at least one other vessel. From images and videos of pushbacks we have reviewed, it is clear that they often involve multiple ships from both the Greek and Turkish coast guards.

      As stated above, ships from both Greece and Turkey will frequently attempt to push the dinghies across the sea border using waves. These vessels manoeuvre in a circular pattern at a relatively high speed close to the dinghy. This manoeuvre is not only dangerous because of the risk of collision, the waves it generates also represent a threat to the overcrowded and often fragile dinghies.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8BdEHtBWp4&feature=emb_logo

      As such, although a dinghy itself may not show up on radar, the signature of a pushback would. Multiple large and small vessels from both TCG and HCG, some of which are carrying out unusual manoeuvres in order to create waves, would be very difficult to miss. Indeed you can even see this kind of event from space.

      There’s also the matter of visual range. The same factors that make a pushback visible on radar will also make it visible to the eye or other visual systems such as surveillance cameras. Even at a range of a few kilometers in calm seas and good conditions, a dinghy would likely be visible, although exact details such as the nature of its passengers might not be. The other aspects of pushbacks which we have already described would also certainly be visible.

      The case of the April 28-29 pushback is a good illustration of surveillance assets passing very close to the results of a pushback.
      April 28

      In an incident previously covered by Bellingcat, a group of 22 migrants who landed on Samos were detained by Greek law enforcement. They were then placed on a life raft without any means of propulsion, and towed into the middle of the Mycale Strait by the Greek coast guard. In response to our request for comment at the time, the Greek government denied these people had ever reached Greek territory, despite witness statements, images, and videos showing this had in fact happened.

      As the life raft was floating in the strait, a private sureveillance plane passed over the area twice at 5,000 feet, once at 02:41 AM and once at 03:18 AM. This plane, G-WKTH, belongs to DEA Aviation, which provides aerial surveillance services to Frontex. In a promotional video from Frontex, it is claimed these feeds are live-streamed back to the Frontex HQ in Warsaw

      The plane is reportedly equipped with an MX-15 camera, which has both low-light and infrared sensors. Considering this plane is specifically employed for aerial surveillance, it would be surprising if it did not identify the life raft full of people and, according to one member of this group, the presence of Greek and later Turkish vessels.

      Indeed, the Frontex executive director’s response to the LIBE committee of the European Parliament indicates this may have been the incident Frontex reported as having seen. In this reply a “Serious Incident Report (‘SIR’) was created based on a sighting of an incident by aerial surveillance where people were transferred on a rubber boat from a vessel and later on rescued by Turkish authorities.
      Active incidents

      In two cases on June 8 and August 15, it seems certain that Frontex was aware of pushbacks as they took place. Indeed, on June 8, it appears that a Frontex vessel participated in a pushback, physically blocking a dinghy from reaching Greek territory.

      We will first address the incident on August 15, where a Frontext vessel was present at the scene of a pushback, before examining the June 8, where a Frontex asset appears to have participated in a pushback.
      August 15

      On the morning of August 15 there were reports of a confrontation between the Greek and Turkish coast guards. As well as multiple photos posted to social media by locals, this was also reported as a pushback by CRG, MRC, Alarm Phone and Aegean Boat Report.

      CRG and MRC also posted videos from people on this dinghy, with CRG’s video showing an engine without a starter cord, claiming it had been taken by the Greek Coast Guard. In the videos, the dinghy is surrounded by vessels from both the Greek and Turkish coast guards. We have previously noted that disabling the motor of dinghies is a tactic that has reportedly been used by the Greek Coast Guard.

      Most of the images of this incident are taken from a distance, making identification of the vessels difficult. However, we were also sent an image of this confrontation that is very clear. In this image we can clearly see the presence of MAI1102, a Romanian border forces vessel which had just arrived in theater.

      The metadata of this image is consistent with the date and time of this incident. Indeed, the ships can be seen arrayed in almost exactly the same manner in a video filmed by the people on the boat.

      Although it is not possible to be certain of exactly how far away MAI1102 is from this pushback, we can see that it is certainly within visual range of the confrontation and the dinghy itself.
      June 8

      On the morning of June 8 a pushback was reported to have taken place, again off the north-east coast of Lesbos. The Turkish coast guard reported it rescued 47 migrants after a pushback by the Greek Coast Guard that day. Footage published by Anadolu Agency appeared to show the Romanian Frontex vessel MAI1103 blocking a dinghy.

      We investigated this incident further, obtaining other videos from the TCG, as well as tracking data of vessels that appeared to be in the vicinity at the time, such as the NATO ship, Berlin. Using these sources we were able to reconstruct what happened.

      After initially trying to cross under the cover of darkness, the dinghy was intercepted and physically blocked from proceeding by MAI1103 early in the morning.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoNJXY3pa_U&feature=emb_logo

      We can see the exact time and a set of coordinates in one of the videos we obtained.

      We plotted the coordinates visible on the screen as they changed. It became clear these were not the location of the vessel with the camera, but rather the location of the dinghy and MAI1103.

      We can visually confirm the general location by comparing a panoramic view that is visible in one of the videos against the appearance of the landscape from the coordinates which appear on the camera feed.

      We can now start to build a picture of what happened that morning.

      We can see that the dinghy was extremely close to MAI1103, and is being physically blocked by the ship. Indeed the two vessels are close enough that it appears that personnel on MAI1103 are communicating with people in the dinghy.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qD_I--2LPA&feature=emb_logo

      At one point MAI1103 makes a pass close to the dinghy at enough speed to generate waves, a maneuver that previously only HCG and TCG have been seen making. It is especially dangerous due to the overloaded and unseaworthy nature of the dinghies.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9iUm1_e2R6A&feature=emb_logo

      Eventually HCG vessels arrive and MAI1103 leaves, resulting in a standoff between the TCG and HCG. This lasted several hours and gradually moved to the north-west, observed by the NATO ship Berlin.

      During this period the dinghy was approached at least twice by a rigid-hulled inflatable boat 060 (RHIB) from the HCG.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5WODSvxnmoc&feature=emb_logo

      In what appears to be the final segment of video taken at about 09:30 AM we see the TCG radar screen, which can be exactly matched with the Turkish coast. This radar screen matches perfectly with the location and heading of the Berlin at this time, as we can see by overlaying a plot of the Berlin’s course with the radar screen.

      As well as matching the movement of vessels to AIS data, we can further verify that these videos are from the same incident by examining the passengers in the dinghy. We can see that in the earliest videos, showing the MAI1103 with the dinghy, there is clearly a person wearing a white hood, alongside someone who appears to be wearing a reddish top. The presence of these passengers helps to verify that all these videos are indeed from the same incident on June 8.

      In the final stage of the pushback at 10:30 AM it is possible to see the Portuguese Frontex vessel Nortada within 5 km with both AIS data and on the TCG radar screen. The Nortada had been in that vicinity since at least 09:11 AM that morning. Although it may not have been able to pick up this dinghy on its radar, it would have certainly been within visual range of the larger ships surrounding it. After the pushback, the Nortada continued its patrol off North Lesbos.

      Conclusion

      Over the course of this investigation we collected a huge amount of information on Frontex activities in the Aegean Sea. Most of Frontex’s assets were impossible to track because their transponder information was either not registered, not turned on, or was out of range. As such, we were only able to view a snapshot of Frontex operations.

      Despite this limited view, we still managed to identify multiple instances in which Frontex was either present at pushbacks, or close enough to be able to understand what was taking place. In at least one incident it appears that a Frontex vessel actively participated in a pushback. It is possible that there are other incidents we have not been able to capture.

      In a statement provided in response to this investigation, Frontex stated that it applies “the highest standards of border control to its operations” and that its officers are bound by a code of conduct that looks to prevent refoulement and to uphold human rights.

      The statement continued that Frontex’s executive director had notified the HGC regarding all reported incidents and that Greek authorities confirmed that an internal inquiry had been launched.

      A spokesperson for the Greek Maritime Ministry said the actions of HCG officers were “carried out in full compliance with the country’s international obligations, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.”

      The spokesperson added that thousands of migrants had been rescued throughout the refugee crisis of recent years by the HCG, that allegations of illegality were “tendentious” and that the “operation practices of the Greek authorities have never included such [illegal] actions.”

      https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/10/23/frontex-at-fault-european-border-force-complicit-in-illegal-pushbacks

      #forensic_architecture #architecture_forensique

    • EU Border Agency Frontex Complicit in Greek Refugee Pushback Campaign

      Greek border guards have been forcing large numbers of refugees back to sea in pushback operations that violate international law. #DER_SPIEGEL and its reporting partners have learned that the European Union is also complicit in the highly controversial practice.

      Jouma al-Badi thought he was safe when he first set foot on European soil on April 28. Together with 21 other refugees, he had been taken in a rubber dinghy from Turkey to the Greek island of Samos. The young Syrian planned to apply for political asylum. He documented his arrival in videos. Local residents also remember the refugees.

      Greek security forces captured the migrants. Under international law, it is their duty to give the new arrivals a hearing and field their applications for asylum. Instead, according to al-Badi, the officers dragged them back out to sea and released them on an inflatable rubber raft. Videos obtained by DER SPIEGEL also show him on the raft.

      For an entire night and a morning, Greek border guards kept pushing the men and women away as their raft floated around in circles. The Turkish coast guard filmed the maneuver.

      An aircraft used by the European border protection agency Frontex also passed over the refugees. The crew of the surveillance plane, with the registration identifier "G-WKTH,” were part of a European Union operation in Greece. The plane twice flew over the Strait of Mykali, where al-Badi and the other migrants were located. According to flight data that has been viewed by DER SPIEGEL, the first flight happened at 2:41 a.m. and the second at 3:18 a.m.

      The plane’s crew has a standard MX-15 camera on board with an infrared sensor and a sensor for poor lighting conditions. Even at night, the sensors are capable of detecting small objects on the water. According to a Frontex promotional video, the camera images are streamed live to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, Poland. But Frontex didn’t send any help.

      The waves struck the Syrian in the face. He eventually ran out of strength and thought he was going to die.

      The Greek government denies it conducted pushbacks of refugees to Turkey, even though DER SPIEGEL and other media have fully documented several of these operations, known as pushbacks. Greek border guards are growing increasingly ruthless. As in the case of al-Badi, they are now pushing even refugees who have reached the Greek isles back to sea in operations that are illegal under international law.

      Frontex officials have publicly claimed that they know nothing about pushbacks by Greek border guards. The agency has 600 employees deployed in Greece as well as ships, drones and aircraft.

      Together with Lighthouse Reports, Bellingcat, "Report Mainz” — a program on ARD, the German public broadcaster — and Japanese broadcaster TV Asahi, DER SPIEGEL spent several months reporting in the Aegean Sea region. The reporters tracked the positions of Frontex units and compared them with position data from pushbacks recorded by NGOs and migrants. They interviewed witnesses, refugees and Frontex staff. They viewed internal documents and dozens of videos and satellite photos.

      Their research proves for the first time that Frontex officials know about the Greek border guards’ illegal practices – and that the agency itself is at times involved in the pushbacks. Breaking the law has become an everyday occurrence at Europe’s borders, and the EU is allowing it to happen.

      Samira Mohammad could already see Lesbos when the men with the masks arrived. The Syrian woman, who does not want to provide her real name, is 45 years old. That morning of August 15, she was sitting in a rubber dinghy with dozens of other people. She recalls how Greek border guards tried in vain to stop the arrivals and how they steered toward the boat repeatedly and pushed it back toward Turkey multiple times. She says the Turkish coast guard held them off. Locals even have a name for the cynical game: "Greek water polo.”

      Mohammad claims the Greek officials took their gasoline and destroyed the engine. And that masked Greek border guards then boarded the dinghy. Several refugees claim that they forced the migrants to tie the shaky rubber dinghy to a speedboat at gunpoint. The border guards then towed the boat toward Turkey. Videos corroborate the statements made by the refugees, and the destroyed engine is clearly visible.

      Mohammad said she was scared to death during those moments. Her entire family had been onboard, including her pregnant daughter-in-law, who was later hospitalized with severe bleeding.

      The maneuver off the coast of Lesbos lasted hours, and the Turkish Navy didn’t rescue the refugees until noon.

      A Romanian Frontex boat was also on site that morning. The MAI 1102 was located only a few hundred meters away from the refugee boat. The boat can be clearly identified in a photo. A German navy ship on a NATO mission that observed the incident reported it to the German government. It also stated that Frontex people had been present. This is documented in an internal paper that has been obtained by DER SPIEGEL. Nevertheless, this pushback has never been revealed publicly before now.

      On June 8, Frontex officials went one step further, with the MAI 1103, a ship also flying the Romanian flag. It directly blocked a refugee boat. The incident can be seen in several videos recorded by the Turkish coast guard and verified by DER SPIEGEL. It shows officials standing on the deck, where they are obviously communicating with the refugees floating in the water in front of them.

      Later, the MAI 1103 passes the refugees traveling at high speed, with waves beating against the boat. The Romanian officials then withdrew and the Greek coast guard took over the operation.

      "These pushbacks violate the ban on collective expulsions and international maritime law,” says Dana Schmalz, an expert on international law at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg. She notes that if Frontex officials stopped a completely overcrowded inflatable boat, they would be required to rescue the people immediately. "If they don’t do that and even make waves instead, only to drive away and let the Greeks do the dirty work, then they are still involved in the illegal pushback,” she says.

      Reporting by DER SPIEGEL and its partners found that a Frontex surveillance plane or Portuguese or Romanian Frontex ships were near at least six pushbacks in the area since April. The number of undetected cases could actually be much higher.

      The vast majority of Frontex vessels patrol the Aegean Sea with their AIS transponders switched off or untraceable in order to prevent giving away their positions. Their presence can only be verified with difficulty through videos and photos.

      When contacted for comment by DER SPIEGEL, Frontex did not deny the individual incidents, instead stating that the officials protected the fundamental rights of migrants and respected their right to non-refoulement. It further stated that the incidents that had been reported were forwarded to the Greek coast guard, which opened an investigation into the matter. The Greek government gave a blanket denial to the allegations, saying that it complies with the law and does not carry out illegal deportations.

      Under Frontex’s statutes, police officers are required to file so-called Serious Incident Reports to document violations of the law. But people familiar with the situation say that fewer and fewer of these reports are getting filed. The sources said the Frontex border guards, who are sent to Greece from all over Europe, frown upon such reports because they cause trouble for the host country.

      https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/eu-border-agency-frontex-complicit-in-greek-refugee-pushback-campaign-a-4b6c

      –---

      en allemand :
      https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlinge-frontex-in-griechenland-in-illegale-pushbacks-verwickelt-a-0000

    • Bruxelles veut des explications de Frontex, accusée de procéder à des refoulements illégaux de migrants

      La #Commission_européenne a sollicité une réunion extraordinaire urgente du conseil d’administration de Frontex, l’agence européenne pour la protection des frontières, mise en cause pour des refoulements illégaux de migrants en mer Égée. Un article d’Euroefe.

      « Après s’être coordonnés avec la présidente de la Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, mes services ont demandé, au nom de la Commission, la convocation d’une réunion extraordinaire du conseil d’administration de Frontex le 10 novembre pour discuter des incidents présumés de refoulement en Grèce et de la protection des droits fondamentaux », a écrit Ylva Johansson, la commissaire chargée des migrations, dans un tweet.

      D’après des enquêtes menées par différents médias, Frontex aurait procédé à des refoulements illégaux de migrants en mer Égée, à la frontière entre la Turquie et la Grèce. Et ce à au moins six reprises.

      L’hebdomadaire allemand Der Spiegel a révélé le 23 octobre qu’il avait enquêté sur ces incidents en collaboration avec les médias numériques néerlandais Lighthouse Reports et britannique Bellingcat, ainsi qu’avec deux chaînes de télévision, l’Allemande ARD et la Japonaise Asahi.

      Ces médias disposent de films montrant comment, depuis le mois d’avril, des agents de Frontex ont procédé à ce que l’on appelle des « pushbacks » (refoulements) de migrants pour les empêcher d’atteindre le sol européen, une pratique illégale.

      Une vidéo montre comment un bateau de l’agence européenne bloque le passage d’une embarcation occupée par des migrants, avant de les dépasser à grande vitesse, provoquant ainsi de grosses vagues. Par la suite, les garde-côtes grecs obligent la barque à faire demi-tour vers la Turquie.

      De son côté, Frontex a nié les accusations et assuré au Spiegel que ses agents protégeaient les droits fondamentaux des migrants et respectaient le droit au non-refoulement.

      Le gouvernement grec a également nié catégoriquement ces accusations.

      https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/bruxelles-veut-des-explications-de-frontex-accusee-de-proceder-a-des-refoulements-illegaux-de-migrants/?_ga=2.223583131.1633915392.1603989521-379746837.1590938192

    • Greek coast guard performed huge pushback involving 197 people and 7 life rafts!

      A boat carrying 197 people tried to cross from Turkey to Italy on Tuesday, but got in to bad weather and sat course towards Crete. Close to the south shore of Crete they had engine problems and the Greek Coast Guard was alerted 09.00.
      The coast guard divided the people on two coast guard vessels, 121 men and boys on one vessel and 76 people, families on the other. Reports from the refugees clearly states that some of them where abuse while onboard the HCG vessel, footage and video testimony has been provided. Most of their phones was confiscated by the Greek coast guard, but a few managed to hide their phones, and was able to send out distress messages.
      The first group containing the 121 males was forced in to 3 life rafts before first light on Wednesday the 21th just north of Rhodes, and found and picked up by Turkish coast guard 08.50 south of Marmaris.
      The second group with the families, 76 people, was put in 4 life rafts around noon north west of Simi, drifting for hours and not picked up by Turkish coast guard before 17.30 south west of Datça.
      This shows that the Greek coast guard is determined to prevent anyone to reach Greek soil, no matter the consequences or potential harm they may inflict on innocent people fleeing war and persecution.
      This is by far the largest pushback Aegean Boat Report has been able to document, but I guess nothing is a surprise anymore. No measures have been taken by the EU to try to stop this illegal practice by the Greek government, even do they have received overwhelming amounts of evidence.

      https://www.facebook.com/AegeanBoatReport/posts/951612422028529

    • Έστειλαν πίσω 200 πρόσφυγες γιατί ήταν… τζιχαντιστές

      Τεκμηριωμένη καταγγελία για τη μεγαλύτερη ώς τώρα καταγεγραμμένη επαναπροώθηση προσφύγων από το Λιμενικό προς την Τουρκία με μεγάλη και κρυφή επιχείρηση του Λιμενικού εν μέσω σφοδρής κακοκαιρίας νότια της Κρήτης ● Έντεχνη προσπάθεια οι 200 άνθρωποι, μεταξύ αυτών και γυναικόπαιδα, να εμφανιστούν ως… ισλαμιστές τρομοκράτες.

      Ακόμα μια καταγγελία για βίαιες επαναπροωθήσεις προσφύγων από το Λιμενικό έρχεται στο φως τις τελευταίες ημέρες, την ίδια στιγμή που η κυβέρνηση πανηγυρίζει για τη μείωση των προσφυγικών ροών προς τα νησιά, χωρίς όμως να εξηγεί πώς έχει επιτευχθεί η μείωση αυτή.

      Η υπόθεση αφορά πλοιάριο με περίπου 200 ανθρώπους που έφτασαν στα ανοιχτά της Κρήτης, προερχόμενοι από Τουρκία και με τελικό προορισμό την Ιταλία. Στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση υπάρχει μια περίεργη αλληλουχία γεγονότων και « ειδήσεων » τόσο στα κρητικά όσο και τα κεντρικά ΜΜΕ. Το πρωί της Τρίτης 20 Οκτωβρίου σε όλα τα ηλεκτρονικά ΜΜΕ της Κρήτης μεταδίδεται η είδηση για « κινητοποίηση του Λιμενικού » για σκάφος με 200 μετανάστες στη θαλάσσια περιοχή νότια της νήσου Χρυσής (Γαϊδουρονήσι), στην Ιεράπετρα. Το προηγούμενο βράδυ η Κρήτη είχε χτυπηθεί σφοδρά από την κακοκαιρία και το πρωί τα βλέμματα όλων ήταν στις εκτεταμένες καταστροφές που προκάλεσε το χαλάζι σε καλλιέργειες και υποδομές, κυρίως στην ανατολική πλευρά του νησιού. Την ίδια κακοκαιρία προφανώς αντιμετώπισαν και οι 200 επιβαίνοντες στο σκάφος, μεταξύ των οποίων υπήρχαν γυναίκες και παιδιά.

      Στις πρώτες αναφορές και σε ερωτήσεις δημοσιογράφων προς το Λιμεναρχείο Ιεράπετρας γινόταν λόγος για « αδυναμία του Λιμενικού να εντοπίσει το πλοιάριο », ωστόσο δινόταν η πληροφορία πως τα σκάφη θα έμεναν στα ανοιχτά λόγω της κακοκαιρίας και για την περίπτωση που χρειαστεί, να παράσχουν βοήθεια αν εντοπίσουν τους πρόσφυγες. Λίγες ώρες αργότερα η είδηση εξαφανίστηκε από τα ΜΜΕ και δημιουργήθηκε η εντύπωση πως τα σκάφη του Λιμενικού δεν βρήκαν ποτέ το πλοιάριο με τους πρόσφυγες.
      Τους βρήκαν ;

      Ωστόσο τα πράγματα φαίνεται πως έγιναν διαφορετικά. Τέσσερις μέρες μετά, η οργάνωση Aegean Boat Report, η οποία και στο παρελθόν έχει αποκαλύψει παράνομες επιχειρήσεις επαναπροώθησης λέμβων με μετανάστες προς την Τουρκία από τις ελληνικές αρχές και τη Frontex, καταγγέλλει πως το Λιμενικό όχι μόνο βρήκε τους πρόσφυγες στα ανοιχτά της Κρήτης αλλά προχώρησε και με συνοπτικές διαδικασίες στην επαναπροώθησή τους στην Τουρκία. Η οργάνωση καταγγέλλει πως η ελληνική Ακτοφυλακή εντόπισε τους πρόσφυγες στις 9 το πρωί της Τρίτης (όπως δηλαδή μετέδιδαν αρχικά και τα κρητικά ΜΜΕ). Στη συνέχεια, πάντα σύμφωνα με την καταγγελία, οι άνδρες του Λιμενικού επιβίβασαν τους 197 πρόσφυγες σε δύο επιχειρησιακά σκάφη χωρίζοντάς τους σε δύο ομάδες. Στην πρώτη ομάδα μπήκαν 121 άνδρες και αγόρια, ενώ στη δεύτερη μπήκαν οικογένειες με γυναίκες και παιδιά, συνολικά 76 άτομα. Και οι δύο ομάδες, πάντα σύμφωνα με την καταγγελία, μεταφέρθηκαν στη θαλάσσια περιοχή βόρεια της Ρόδου, όπου και εξαναγκάστηκαν με τη βία να επιβιβαστούν σε συνολικά επτά θαλάσσιες σωστικές σχεδίες αφού προηγουμένως τους είχαν αφαιρεθεί όλα τα κινητά τηλέφωνα. Και οι επτά σχεδίες « σπρώχτηκαν » προς τις ακτές της Τουρκίας, εν μέσω κακοκαιρίας και κατά παράβαση των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων και του δίκαιου της θάλασσας.

      Στιγμιότυπα από την επαναπροώθηση των προσφύγων (Φωτογραφίες από την οργάνωση Aegean Boat Report).


      Οι τρεις πρώτες σχεδίες, με 121 άτομα, εξωθήθηκαν τα ξημερώματα της Τετάρτης 21/10 προς την περιοχή της Μαρμαρίδας, όπου και εντοπίστηκαν από το τουρκικό Λιμενικό που τους περισυνέλεξε. Το δεύτερο γκρουπ, όπου βρίσκονταν οι γυναίκες και τα παιδιά, εξαναγκάστηκε να επιβιβαστεί σε τέσσερις σωστικές σχεδίες και επαναπροωθήθηκε προς την Τουρκία από τη θαλάσσια περιοχή δυτικά της Σύμης, το μεσημέρι της Τετάρτης. Τους περισυνέλεξε το τουρκικό Λιμενικό το απόγευμα της ίδιας μέρας στην περιοχή νοτιοδυτικά της πόλης Ντάκτα. Οπως αναφέρουν μάλιστα κάποιοι από τους επιβαίνοντες, χτυπήθηκαν από τους Ελληνες λιμενικούς, ενώ υπάρχει και σχετικό φωτογραφικό υλικό που τραβήχτηκε μετά την περισυλλογή τους από τις τουρκικές αρχές. Σε μία από τις φωτογραφίες φαίνεται ένας άνθρωπος με μώλωπες στην κοιλιά και με γύψο σε σημεία και των δύο χεριών του.


      Πρωτοσέλιδο

      Την ίδια μέρα, πάντως, που έγινε η καταγγελία από την Aegean Boat Report (το Σάββατο) η εφημερίδα « ΤΑ ΝΕΑ » κυκλοφορούσε με τίτλο « Προετοιμαστείτε για Τζιχαντιστές », αναφερόμενη στο μήνυμα που, σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες της εφημερίδας, έστειλε σε Ελλάδα και Κύπρο ο Αιγύπτιος πρόεδρος Αλ Σίσι κατά την τριμερή συνάντηση που πραγματοποιήθηκε στη Λευκωσία. Το μήνυμα υποτίθεται πως αφορούσε τις πληροφορίες που έχει η Αίγυπτος για τις κινήσεις του Ερντογάν και το πώς χρησιμοποιεί τον ισλαμιστικό παράγοντα. Σε κάποια κρητικά ΜΜΕ οι δύο υποθέσεις δεν άργησαν να συνδεθούν με αναφορές για το… περίεργο σκάφος στο οποίο, σύμφωνα με τα δημοσιεύματα, επέβαιναν « άτομα εμφανιζόμενα ως μετανάστες » και το οποίο, σύμφωνα με τις διοχετευμένες πληροφορίες, έχει κινητοποιήσει όχι μόνο το Λιμενικό αλλά και τον Στρατό, την ΕΥΠ ακόμα και ξένες μυστικές υπηρεσίες !

      Όπως αποκαλύπτεται, πάντως, οι επικίνδυνοι « τζιχαντιστές », τόσο οι άνδρες όσο και τα γυναικόπαιδα, είχαν ήδη από την Τετάρτη επαναπροωθηθεί παράνομα στην Τουρκία. Η Οργάνωση Aegean Boat Report αναφέρει πως αυτή είναι η μεγαλύτερη περίπτωση « pushback » που καταφέρνει να καταγράψει και τονίζει πως η Ευρωπαϊκή Ενωση δεν έχει επιβάλει ακόμα καμία κύρωση στην Ελλάδα για τις παράνομες επαναπροωθήσεις, παρά τα ακλόνητα στοιχεία που έχουν τεθεί στη διάθεση των ευρωπαϊκών αρχών.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/efkriti/koinonia/265835_esteilan-piso-200-prosfyges-giati-itan-tzihantistes

    • Greece’s coast guard accused of mass migrant pushbacks

      An NGO, the #Aegean_Boat_Report (ABR), has accused the Greek coast guard of pushing back 197 migrants at sea last week.

      Greek coast guards have been accused by the NGO Aegean Boat Report (ABR) of performing illegal pushbacks involving 197 people and seven life rafts off the coast of the island of Crete in the Southern Aegean.

      A boat carrying 197 people was on its way trying to cross from Turkey to Italy on October 20 but ran into bad weather and changed course towards Crete, the NGO said.

      Close to the south shore of Crete, the vessel reported engine problems and, according to the Norwegian organization, the Greek coast guard was alerted at 9 am.

      ’’The Greek coast guard divided the people into two groups onto two coast guard vessels, 121 men and boys on one vessel, and 76 people, mostly families, on the other.

      Abuse on board

      Reports from the refugees clearly state that some of them were abused while onboard the Hellenic coast guard vessel, with footage and video testimony being provided,’’ said ABR via a media statement.

      According to ABR, the first group with the 121 men and boys were forced into three life rafts in the early hours of Wednesday, October 21 just north of Rhodes, before being found and picked up by the Turkish coast guard at 8:50 am south of Marmaris.

      The second group of 76 people, made up of families, were put into four life rafts at around noon north-west of the islands of Simi, drifting for hours and not picked up by Turkish coast guards before 5:30 pm south-west of Data.

      ’Largest pushback’ ABR has documented

      ’’This shows that the Greek coast guard is determined to prevent anyone from reaching Greek soil, no matter the consequences or potential harm they may inflict on innocent people fleeing war and persecution’’, added ABR.

      ’’This is by far the largest pushback Aegean Boat Report has been able to document, but I guess nothing is a surprise anymore. No measures have been taken by the EU to try to stop this illegal practice by the Greek government, even if they have received overwhelming amounts of evidence.’’

      29 NGOs and humanitarian groups sent an open letter to Parliament Last week’s incidents were reported after an appeal was launched by several prominent NGOs and humanitarian groups earlier this month on the topic of illegal pushbacks.

      A total of 29 organizations sent an open letter to Parliament urging it to investigate reports of illegal pushbacks at the country’s land and sea borders with neighboring Turkey.

      The letter called on the Greek Parliament to ’’immediately conduct an effective, transparent and impartial investigation into allegations that personnel from the Coast Guard, the Greek Police and the Greek Army, sometimes in close cooperation with masked men in uniform, have engaged in such actions, which are not only illegal but also endanger the lives and safety of displaced people."

      Tensions on migration in Greece

      Tensions on the migrant issue in Greece continue to run high following September’s fires which destroyed the controversial Moria open camp on Lesbos, and widespread lockdowns at refugee camps across the country following outbreaks of coronavirus cases.

      The reports of pushbacks taking place have prompted action from humanitarian rights groups, with the joint-appeal calling for disciplinary and criminal sanctions, as deemed appropriate, “on anyone in uniform who are found to have participated in such illegal activities, but also for their superiors who are responsible for the administration of these bodies.”

      “The investigation should establish the identity and relationship of the masked men and other unidentified officers to law enforcement, and take steps to hold them to account.”

      State pushes ahead with migrant camps

      Meanwhile, in related developments, the government is pressing ahead with plans to create more secure and strictly controlled ’’closed’’ migrant reception centers on the Aegean islands.

      With the COVID-19 pandemic creating further challenges and complications for the operation of existing camps, most of which are under lockdown due to positive cases of the virus, the state is aiming to build new ’’permanent’’ structures, starting with one on Lesbos.

      The situation on Lesbos is the primary concern right now, as the current temporary facility which was hastily set up in the Kara Tepe area on the coast after Moria was burned down, has already flooded twice with the first rainfalls of the season.

      Lesbos Mayor Stratis Kytelis met with government officials in Athens last week to discuss the location of a new permanent facility on the island, although the plans are being met with resistance from local community groups.Greece’s health authorities, meanwhile, are also conducting regular COVID-19 tests at migrant camps on the Aegean islands to ensure that any outbreak is quickly contained.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/28139/greece-s-coast-guard-accused-of-mass-migrant-pushbacks

    • Frontex sous pression après des accusations de refoulement de migrants aux portes de la Grèce

      C’est une première : mardi 10 novembre, le conseil d’administration de l’Agence européenne des garde-frontières et de garde-côtes Frontex devra examiner des accusations de refoulements illégaux (ou « pushbacks ») de migrants en mer Egée. Elles ont été portées contre Frontex par un groupe de médias. En octobre, le site d’investigation Bellingcat et le magazine Der Spiegel notamment, avaient rapporté, images et témoignages à l’appui, six épisodes au cours desquels des embarcations avaient été bloquées, contrairement aux règles internationales sur le non-refoulement.

      Celles-ci stipulent que des personnes ne peuvent être renvoyées vers un pays, avant un examen de leur situation, si leur existence est en danger en raison de leur race, leur religion, leur nationalité ou leur appartenance à un groupe social ou politique.

      Il aura apparemment fallu une intervention ferme de la Commission européenne pour que la direction de Frontex, devenue le premier corps en uniforme et la plus importante agence de l’Union avec un budget de quelque 500 millions d’euros, accepte de convoquer un conseil extraordinaire. Dans un premier temps, elle s’était contentée d’affirmer, le 24 octobre, qu’elle respectait la loi internationale et était en contact avec la Grèce, qui devait ouvrir « une enquête interne ».
      Enquête interne

      « Si l’agence est impliquée dans de telles actions, c’est totalement inacceptable », déclarait pour sa part la commissaire à la migration, Ylva Johansson, le 26 octobre. Le lendemain, Frontex promettait une enquête interne et, même si elle n’exerce pas une tutelle directe sur l’agence, la Commission obtenait la convocation d’une réunion. A charge pour Fabrice Leggeri, le directeur français, de fournir des explications détaillées.

      « La Grèce ne participe pas à des refoulements, a affirmé de son côté le ministre grec des migrations, Notis Mitarachi. Nous gardons nos frontières en respectant le droit international et nous continuons à sauver des centaines de migrants tous les jours en Méditerranée », a-t-il précisé.

      Athènes fait face depuis des mois à de nombreuses accusations de refoulement en mer Egée et à la frontière terrestre avec la Turquie, dans l’Evros. Le 14 août déjà, le New York Times avait affirmé que les gardes-côtes grecs avaient abandonné en « pleine mer » des canots remplis de migrants. Interviewé par CNN, le premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis avait démenti : « Cela n’est jamais arrivé. Nous sommes les victimes d’une vaste campagne de désinformation », suggérant que les journalistes avaient interrogé principalement des sources turques voulant décrédibiliser les autorités grecques.

      Depuis l’envoi par la Turquie de milliers de réfugiés à la frontière terrestre de l’Evros, en mars, Athènes a toujours assuré vouloir « protéger ses frontières » qui sont aussi celles de l’Europe et faire face à « une menace ». Le gouvernement a renforcé le contrôle des frontières en embauchant notamment du personnel supplémentaire. Entre avril et juillet, les arrivées à Lesbos ont diminué de 85 % par rapport à l’année dernière, selon le ministère des migrations.
      Des « abus sont trop nombreux pour être ignorés »

      Pour de nombreuses ONG présentes sur le terrain, cette diminution spectaculaire est le résultat de « pushbacks ». Selon Human Rights Watch, « les preuves et les rapports décrivant les abus sont trop nombreux pour être ignorés ». L’organisation dit avoir interrogé des victimes et des témoins qui décrivent comment les garde-côtes grecs, la police, et des hommes masqués et vêtus d’habits sombres ont effectué depuis les îles de Rhodes, de Samos et Simi, des refoulements illégaux de personnes sur de petits canots gonflables.

      A la fin août, le Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR) de l’ONU se disait « inquiet de l’augmentation des publications depuis mars 2020 attestant de refoulements illégaux ». « Le HCR a reçu des rapports et des témoignages de personnes abandonnées en pleine mer pendant un long moment, souvent sur des rafiots surpeuplés », précisait le communiqué.

      L’Observatoire grec des accords d’Helsinki a déjà déposé une plainte auprès de la Cour suprême grecque pour le refoulement de plus de 1 300 personnes en s’appuyant sur les témoignages recueillis par plusieurs ONG. En septembre, 29 organisations de défense des droits de l’homme ont par ailleurs adressé une lettre au premier ministre et au parlement grecs pour réclamer une enquête. Leur courrier est encore sans réponse alors que 35 membres d’ONG font, eux, l’objet d’une investigation : ils sont suspectés d’avoir renseigné des migrants sur les positions des gardes-côtes ainsi que des passeurs sur des lieux d’accostage. Ces humanitaires travaillent pour des organisations qui ont dénoncé avec le plus de véhémence les refoulements vers la Turquie par les gardes-côtes grecs.

      Frontex, qui a engagé en Grèce quelque six cents agents dotés de divers moyens de surveillance, a déjà fait l’objet d’autres accusations mais affirme à chaque fois respecter un code de conduite qui prohibe strictement les refoulements. La communication très cadenassée de l’agence ne détaille toutefois pas comment les contrôles sont vraiment exercés. L’action du service interne chargé de contrôler le respect des droits fondamentaux reste également nébuleuse. Une situation déplorée par le HCR, membre du forum consultatif chargé de conseiller l’agence européenne dans son action.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/11/05/frontex-sous-pression-apres-des-accusations-de-refoulement-de-migrants-aux-p

    • EU: Probe Frontex Complicity in Border Abuses. Ensure Independent and Effective Investigation

      The top governing body of the European Union Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) should urgently establish an independent inquiry into allegations of its involvement in unlawful operations to stop migrants from reaching the European Union (EU), Human Rights Watch said today.

      The agency’s board will hold an extraordinary meeting on November 10, 2020. Frontex should also address serious and persistent violations by border and law enforcement officers of the countries where it operates.

      “The fact that Frontex may have become complicit in abuses at Greece’s borders is extremely serious,” said Eva Cossé, Western Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Management Board of Frontex should quickly open an inquiry into Frontex involvement in – or actions to disregard or cover up – abuses against people seeking protection from conflicts and persecution.”

      On October 23, a group of media outlets published a detailed investigative report alleging Frontex involvement in pushback operations at the Greek-Turkish maritime border, in the Aegean Sea. The reports said that asylum seekers and migrants were prevented from reaching EU soil or were forced out of EU waters. Such pushbacks violate international law, Human Rights Watch said.

      EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson said on October 28 that she had asked, in coordination with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, “to convene an urgent extraordinary Frontex Management Board meeting on 10 November, to discuss alleged push-back incidents in Greece and fundamental rights protection.”

      Frontex’s mandate obliges officers and the officers of member states deployed to respect fundamental rights, but the agency has been under heavy criticism for the shortcomings of its internal monitoring and accountability mechanisms. On October 27, Frontex announced an internal inquiry into the incidents reported by the media.

      In recent years, nongovernmental groups and media outlets have consistently reported the unlawful return, including through pushbacks, of groups and individuals from Greece to Turkey, by Greek law enforcement officers or unidentified masked men who appear to be working in tandem with border enforcement officials.

      Since Frontex deployed officers along the full length of the Turkey-Greece land border in March, Human Rights Watch has documented that Greek law enforcement officers routinely summarily returned asylum seekers and migrants through the land border with Turkey. Human Rights Watch found that officers in some cases used violence and often confiscated and destroyed migrants’ belongings.

      Greek authorities have said that police officers wearing dark blue uniforms work at police stations. Border patrol police officers wear military camouflage uniforms. Frontex guards wear their national uniforms, with a blue armband with the EU flag.

      In July, Human Rights Watch documented collective expulsions, through the Evros river land border, of asylum seekers rounded up from deep inside Greece.

      In a June 19 response to questions posed by Human Rights Watch, Frontex wrote that no abuses against migrants by Greek border guards or by police or border guards of other EU member states deployed under Frontex had been reported to Frontex. It said that Frontex does not have the authority to investigate allegations of abuse by EU member states’ police or border guards deployed in Greece. It said that such investigations are conducted by the competent national authorities.

      In June, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) said it was deeply concerned about persistent reports of pushbacks and collective expulsions of migrants, in some cases violent, at Greece’s border with Turkey. In August, the UN Refugee Agency flagged concerns over the increasing number of credible reports of pushbacks at Greece’s land and sea borders.

      In May 2019, Frontex told Human Rights Watch that it had not detected any human rights violations or pushbacks during its operational presence at Croatia’s border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite consistent evidence of brutal pushbacks, reports from international and regional organizations, and the confirmation by Croatian officials that such abuses were taking place.

      Under the Frontex mandate, its executive director has the authority to, and should, withdraw financing, and suspend or terminate its activities if there are serious violations of fundamental rights related to its activities. The executive director is also expected to take into account information provided by relevant international organizations.

      On July 6, during a debate at the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on fundamental rights at the Greek border, Johansson said that pushbacks by Greek border guards should be investigated. In its new Pact on Migration and Asylum, presented on September 23, the European Commission recommended to member states to set up an independent monitoring mechanism, amid increased allegations of abuse at the EU’s external borders.

      Members of the Frontex Management Board should set up an independent, prompt, effective, transparent, and impartial investigation into allegations that officers deployed by Frontex were involved in unlawful operations of pushbacks of asylum seekers. Any officer found to have engaged in such illegal acts, as well as their commanding officers and officials who have command responsibility over such forces, should be subject to disciplinary and criminal sanctions, as applicable.

      The investigation should also identify whether Frontex failed to report or otherwise address allegations of serious fundamental rights violations committed by law enforcement or border officers of the member state hosting operations.

      “An EU agency with a clear mandate to act in compliance with fundamental rights has the responsibility to do everything possible to prevent such severe violations,” Cossé said. “If Frontex not only turned a blind eye to abuses committed under its sight, or worse, directly took part in them, it becomes every EU member state’s responsibility.”

      https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/09/eu-probe-frontex-complicity-border-abuses

    • Frontex calls for committee to consider questions related to sea surveillance

      Today, Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri has called for the creation of an evaluation committee to consider legal questions related to the Agency’s surveillance of external sea borders and accommodating the concerns raised by Member States about “hybrid threats” affecting their national security at external borders where the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will deploy its standing corps.

      Under the Frontex proposal, the committee would be coordinated by the European Commission with the participation of Member States on a volunteer basis. It would address various questions, in particular those related to Regulation 2014/656 in the light of the current operational situation.

      Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri also expressed the Agency’s continued commitment to highest standards of protection of fundamental rights.

      “Any allegation of misconduct or infringement of international treaties or fundamental rights in the framework of joint operations coordinated by Frontex is treated with grave concern and carefully investigated,” said Fabrice Leggeri.

      “I am committed to reinforce the office of the Fundamental Rights Officer and to gradually increase its budget,” he added.

      Leggeri also proposed that the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer to play a bigger role in raising awareness of the operational officers on the legal requirements that they need to apply on everyday basis in the field.

      “This could apply not only to the Frontex-deployed staff, but also to the staff of the International Coordination Centres, who often play an essential part in deciding to react to complicated events,” Leggeri said.

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-calls-for-committee-to-consider-questions-related-to-sea-surv

    • #Ombudsman opens inquiry to assess European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) ‘#Complaints_Mechanism’

      European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly has opened an inquiry to look into how the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) deals with alleged breaches of fundamental rights. In particular, the investigation will assess the effectiveness and transparency of Frontex’s Complaints Mechanism for those who believe their rights have been violated in the context of Frontex border operations, as well as the role and independence of Frontex’s ‘Fundamental Rights Officer’.

      In 2013, as part of a previous inquiry, the Ombudsman recommended that Frontex set up an individual complaints mechanism, and that its Fundamental Rights Officer be in charge of the mechanism. Since then, such a mechanism was put in place and further developed, with a view to providing safeguards for fundamental rights in the context of Frontex’s expanding mandate, as well as ensuring increased accountability and redress for those impacted by its actions.

      This inquiry focuses on whether the Complaints Mechanism and the Fundamental Rights Officer are truly empowered to deal with the issues faced by migrants and asylum seekers who feel their rights have been violated under Frontex operations.

      In opening the inquiry, the Ombudsman has sent a set of detailed questions to Frontex on the Complaints Mechanism and the Fundamental Rights Officer. She has also informed members of the European Network of Ombudsmen (ENO), with a view to their possible participation in the inquiry, as part of the ENO’s parallel work. This is important, given the role of national authorities in Frontex operations, and the fact that some national ombudsmen are responsible for following up on complaints related to this.

      Among other things, the questions set out by the Ombudsman look at: how and when Frontex will be updating the mechanism to reflect its expanded mandate; what happens to complainants who are faced with forced return while their complaint is still being processed; what appeal possibilities are open to complainants; how Frontex monitors complaints against national authorities; how those who have been affected by Frontex operations but are in non-EU countries can complain about alleged breaches of fundamental rights, including the issue of language; and the role of the Fundamental Rights Officer in this process.

      https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/news-document/en/134739

    • Frontex: Cover-Up and Diversion. Outcomes of and Responses to the Frontex Management Board meeting on 10th November

      An extraordinary meeting took place on Tuesday 10th November, between the EU Commission and Frontex, regarding alleged Frontex involvement in illegal pushbacks in Greece.

      Why did the meeting take place?

      This meeting was called due to an overwhelming amount of evidence suggesting the involvement or complicity of Frontex in pushbacks. Reports by Spiegel, Report Mainz, Bellingcat and other international media, including Josoor and other members of the BVMN, had led to this meeting taking place. These investigations show Frontex involvement in at least six pushbacks through, for example, blocking boats and making waves to deter boats from getting any closer to the shore. According to Frontex insiders, mission reports were routinely altered into something more positive, excluding explicit mentions of pushbacks, before being sent to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, Poland.

      We, at the Border Violence Monitoring Network, took advantage of the opportunity presented by the meeting on 10th November by sending a letter of concern to the Executive Director of Frontex and the FRO. This letter included evidence from testimonies, collected by BVMN partners, including Josoor, from people-on-the-move who claim that Frontex personnel were involved or complicit in pushbacks operations at the borders between Greek and Turkey, and Albania and Greece. The letter questioned Frontex’s knowledge and understanding of these allegations, and demanded an investigation into these claims. The letter was also addressed to the EU commissioner of Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, and her officer and we hoped this was presented as evidence at the management board meeting on 10th November

      What were the outcomes?

      Johansson remarked on twitter after the meeting:

      “Today’s @Frontex extraordinary management board was a good start to what I want to be a transparent process. The @EU_Commission has asked the Frontex Executive Director to reply to Qs ahead of the next scheduled board meeting (end November).”

      Leggeri, the Executive Director of Frontex, has been ordered by the EU Commission to answer questions concerning these accusations by the end of November. Frontex is yet to comment in detail on the allegations and reported incidents have been forwarded to the Greek coastguard, where also the Greek authorities have refused to comment and denied involvement. Both Frontex and the Greek authorities have launched internal investigations in response to these allegations. Unsurprisingly, after just 48 hours of their investigations, Frontex announced that they were innocent.

      The meeting also included a discussion on whether Frontex should withdraw from missions, such as the one in the Aegean Sea in the event of serious and persistent human rights violations. Such a directive can be found already in Frontex’s regulations. Officials of a few member states vetoed the application of this rule, and Greek representatives in particular were concerned that this could expose the Greek government.

      In the end, a compromise was met. A Frontex statement outlined that a ‘Commission of Inquiry’ will now be made to deal with legal questions concerning operations at sea borders. This will be coordinated by the EU Commission.

      “Any allegation of misconduct or violation of international agreements or fundamental rights within joint operations coordinated by Frontex will be treated with grave concern and investigated closely,” Leggeri said.

      Also, Frontex seeks to strengthen the role of the Fundamental Rights Officer, but experts agree that the internal mechanisms at Frontex are insufficient and therefore see this move as insufficient. As of yesterday, Frontex is advertising for the vacancy of the FRO.

      Members of EU Parliament reactions:

      Tineke Strik (from Netherlands, Green) commented, according to Spiegel, “The announcement did not mention the human rights violations at the border. A committee does not replace a truly independent and transparent investigation. Strik stated “Citizens need to know what has happened and how human rights violations are to be prevented in the future”

      Dietmar Köster (from Germany, SPD) stated, quoted from Tagesschau, "It is a unique cover-up attempt to divert attention from one’s own responsibility and failure to observe human rights”. Köster further stated that Leggeri’s statements showed the arrogance and ignorance of Frontex. “Basic and human rights apply to all. The European Border Management Agency is not exempt from their observance, it is not above the law.”

      An successful outcome: an independent inquiry:

      On the morning of Thursday 12th November, the European Ombudsman tweeted that they would open an inquiry into Frontex, assessing the effectiveness and transparency of their ‘Complaints Mechanism’ and the role and independence of the ‘Fundamental Rights Officer’ (FRO). The latter is especially important as the current ad interim FRO, Annegret Kohler, appointed in 2018, and re-appointed in September 2020, was selected from the Executive Director’s former cabinet, where she was an advisor to the Executive Director. This raises questions about independence and objectivity of the FRO and the FRO’s team to carry out their duties and avoid potential conflicts of interest. Josoor welcomes this investigation.

      https://www.josoor.net/post/frontex-cover-up-and-diversion

    • EU erhöht Druck auf Frontex-Chef

      Die EU-Grenzschutzagentur gerät durch Recherchen des ARD-Magazins Report Mainz und weiterer Medien in Bedrängnis. Heute musste die Frontex-Führung der EU-Kommission zum Thema illegale Pushbacks Rede und Antwort stehen.

      Die Europäische Kommission erwartet Antworten vom Frontex-Chef. Bis Ende November muss sich Fabrice Leggeri zur Verwicklung seiner Grenzschutzagentur in illegale Pushbacks von Flüchtlingen äußern. Das ist das Ergebnis einer Dringlichkeitssitzung des Frontex Management Boards. Das Treffen sei ein guter Anfang gewesen, sie wolle den Prozess transparent gestalten, twitterte die zuständige EU-Kommissarin Ylva Johansson. Leggeri solle bis zur nächsten Zusammenkunft des Management Boards auf die Fragen der Kommission antworten.
      Recherchen bringen Frontex in Bedrängnis

      Johansson hatte das Treffen einberufen, um über eine gemeinsame Recherche des ARD-Magazins Report Mainz, des „Spiegel“ und der Medienorganisationen Bellingcat, Lighthouse Reports und tv Asahi zu diskutieren. Die Medien hatten aufgedeckt, dass Frontex-Einheiten in der Ägäis in illegale Zurückweisungen von Flüchtlingen verwickelt sind.

      Seit April waren Frontex-Beamte nachweislich bei mindestens sechs sogenannten Pushbacks in der Nähe. Auf einem Video ist zu sehen, wie ein Frontex-Schiff ein überladenes Flüchtlingsboot zunächst blockiert, die Insassen aber nicht rettet. Stattdessen fahren die Frontex-Beamten mit hohem Tempo an dem Flüchtlingsboot vorbei und verlassen dann den Ort des Geschehens. Vertrauliche Gespräche mit Frontex-Beamten legten zudem nahe, dass diese ihre Berichte schönen, bevor sie an die Zentrale in Warschau geschickt werden.

      Keine Äußerung von Frontex und Griechenland

      Frontex ist auf die Vorwürfe bis heute nicht im Detail eingegangen. Alle gemeldeten Vorfälle seien an die griechische Küstenwache weitergeleitet worden, diese habe eine interne Untersuchung eingeleitet, teilte die Genzschutzagentur in einem Statement mit. Nach der Antwort der griechischen Behörden seien seine Zweifel ausgeräumt, sagte Leggeri zudem in einem Interview.

      Auch die griechischen Behörden hatten sich zu den Pushbacks nicht im Detail äußern wollen. Sie bestreiten die Vorwürfe pauschal, obwohl die ARD, der „Spiegel“ und andere Medien die Pushbacks mehrfach dokumentiert haben. Nach Angaben von Teilnehmern im „Spiegel“ sahen sich vor allem die griechischen Mitglieder des Management Boards bei dem Treffen Fragen ausgesetzt. Diskutiert wurde unter anderem ein Statement, welches betonen sollte, dass Frontex sich bei schwerwiegenden und anhaltenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen von Missionen wie der in der Ägäis zurückziehen muss.

      Griechen haben Angst vor Bloßstellung

      Ein solche Vorschrift findet sich schon jetzt in den Frontex-Regularien. Beamte einiger weniger Mitgliedsstaaten legten ihr Veto dagegen ein, dass die Anwendung dieser Regel nun in den Raum gestellt werden soll. Besonders die griechischen Teilnehmer fürchteten, dass das Statement die griechische Regierung bloßstellen könnte.

      Am Ende einigte man sich auf einen Kompromiss. Es soll ein Komitee geschaffen werden, das sich mit rechtlichen Fragen zu Einsätzen an der Seegrenzen beschäftigt, heißt es in einem Frontex-Statement. Die Kommission solle dem Vorschlag zufolge die Arbeit des Komitees koordinieren, Mitgliedsstaaten könnten sich auf freiwilliger Basis beteiligen. Im Komitee sollen auch die Sorgen einige Mitgliedsstaaten vor „hybriden Bedrohungen“ eine Rolle spielen. Vor allem Griechenland hatte immer wieder davor gewarnt, dass türkische Geheimdienste sich unter die Migranten auf den Inseln mischen könnten.

      Außerdem will Frontex nach eigener Aussage den sogenannten Fundamental Rights Officer stärken. Der Beamte ist bei Frontex dafür zuständig, dass die Grenzschützer die Grundrechte von Schutzsuchenden achten. Allerdings halten Beobachter alle bestehenden internen Überwachungsmechanismen bei Frontex für unzureichend.
      Kritik aus Europaparlament

      Nach den Enthüllungen der ARD und ihrer Recherchepartner hatten mehrere Europaparlamentarier von Leggeri eine vollständige Untersuchung der Vorwürfe gefordert. Die Grünen-EU-Abgeordnete Tineke Strik kritisierte das Frontex-Statement. Die Ankündigung erwähne die Menschenrechtsverletzungen an der Grenze nicht, sagte sie. Ein Komitee ersetze keine wirklich unabhängige und transparente Untersuchung. „Die Bürger müssen erfahren, was geschehen ist und wie Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Zukunft verhindert werden sollen“, so Strik.

      „Das Ganze ist eine große Nebelkerze“, sagte Europaparlamentarier Dietmar Köster von der SPD. „Es ist ein einzigartiger Vertuschungsversuch, von der eigenen Verantwortung und dem Versagen bei der Einhaltung von Menschenrechten abzulenken“,

      https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/report-mainz/frontex-pushbacks-103.html

    • EU-Grenzpolizei Frontex: Keine Untersuchung zu Verstößen gegen Menschenrechte

      Im März war die EU-Grenzpolizei Frontex in einen versuchten Verstoß gegen Menschenrechte verwickelt. Wie von uns veröffentlichte Akten zeigen, untersuchte Frontex den Vorfall aber nicht, sondern kehrte ihn unter den Teppich.

      Als ARD, Spiegel und Bellingcat vor drei Wochen aufdeckten, dass die Europäische Grenzpolizei Frontex an illegalen Pushbacks an EU-Grenzen beteiligt ist, versprach der Frontex-Direktor Fabrice Leggeri schnell Aufklärung. Die EU-Agentur werde die Vorwürfe untersuchen, nach denen Frontex Geflüchtete völkerrechtswidrig aus der EU abgeschoben hatte.

      „Jeder Vorwurf des Fehlverhaltens oder der Verletzung internationaler Verträge oder Grundrechte im Rahmen gemeinsamer Operationen, die von Frontex koordiniert werden, wird mit großer Besorgnis behandelt und sorgfältig untersucht.“

      Frontex-Direktor Fabrice Leggeri (Übersetzung von FragDenStaat)

      Ein interner E-Mail-Verlauf von Frontex, den wir per Informationsfreiheitsanfrage erhalten haben, zeigt jetzt jedoch, dass die EU-Agentur in vergleichbaren Fällen offenbar kein Interesse daran hat, Verstöße gegen Menschenrechte zu untersuchen. EU Observer hatte zunächst darüber berichtet.
      Dänemark widersetzt sich Frontex-Befehlen

      Bereits am 2. März diesen Jahres hatte Frontex in der Nähe der griechischen Insel Kos versucht, ein Boot mit 33 geflüchteten Menschen, die griechische Gewässer erreicht hatten, in die Türkei abzuschieben. Das griechische Frontex-Kommando befahl einem Schiff der Dänischen Marine mit dem Namen „Stela Polaris“, die Geflüchteten nicht an Land zu bringen, sondern wieder in ein Gummiboot zu setzen und aufs offene Meer Richtung Türkei zu schleppen. Der dänische Befehlshaber des Schiffes widersetzte sich dem rechtswidrigen Befehl jedoch und erreichte durch seine dänischen Vorgesetzten, dass er aufgehoben wurde.

      Frontex hatte den Vorgang bisher nie öffentlich zugegeben. Der dazugehörige E-Mail-Verkehr aus der Frontex-Zentrale in Warschau, den wir veröffentlichen, zeigt, dass Pushbacks die Entscheidungsträger um Direktor Fabrice Leggeri kaum interessierten. Erst aus der Presse erfuhr das Hauptquartier überhaupt davon, dass Frontex in einen versuchten Verstoß gegen die Menschenrechte verwickelt war.

      Einen Bericht – intern Serious Incident Report genannt – gab es trotz der Schwere des Vorfalls nicht. Die Frontex-Pressesprecherin forderte deswegen in Erwartung von Presseanfragen am Morgen des 6. März, vier Tage nach dem Vorfall, bei ihren Kolleg:innen einen Bericht zu den Vorfällen an. Am Nachmittag wurde sie informiert, dass es in der Tat einen versuchten Pushback gegeben hatte.

      Menschenrechte geprüft in vier Stunden

      Bemerkenswert ist, wie die Frontex-Zentrale anschließend mit den Informationen umging: Es schloss die Akten. Bereits vier Stunden nach der Meldung über Vorfall kamen die Frontex-Mitarbeiter:innen zu der Einschätzung, der versuchte Pushback sei ein „Einzelfall“. Er wurde noch nicht einmal beim täglichen Treffen der Befehlshabenden in der Frontex-Mission besprochen.

      Weitere Informationen zu dem Vorfall finden sich in den Akten laut Frontex nicht. Die Frontex-Mitarbeiter:innen überprüften nicht die Kommando-Strukturen und prüften nicht, warum es keinen internen Bericht zu dem rechtswidrigen Befehl gab. Sie unternahmen auch sonst keine Versuche, um sicherzustellen, dass Pushbacks durch das Frontex-Kommando nicht mehr vorkommen würden. Im Sommer schließlich gab Frontex-Direktor gegenüber dem Europäischen Parlament zu Protokoll, der versuchte Pushback sei ein „Missverständnis“ gewesen.

      Einige Monate später fanden Journalist:innen Beweise dafür, dass es sich offenbar nicht um einen Einzelfall handelt und Frontex mindestens im Juni an weiteren Pushbacks beteiligt war. Die EU-Agentur hatte offenbar kein Interesse daran, Verstöße gegen Menschenrechte zu unterbinden.

      https://fragdenstaat.de/blog/2020/11/18/frontex-pushbacks-denmark

    • Council of Europe’s anti-torture Committee calls on Greece to reform its immigration detention system and stop pushbacks

      In a report published today on a rapid reaction ad hoc visit to Greece in March 2020, the Council of Europe’s anti-torture committee (CPT) once again urges the Greek authorities to change their approach towards immigration detention and to ensure that migrants deprived of their liberty are treated both with dignity and humanity.

      The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has published today the report on its ad hoc visit to Greece, which took place from 13 to 17 March 2020, together with the response of the Greek authorities.

      In the report, the CPT acknowledges the significant challenges faced by the Greek authorities in dealing with large numbers of migrants entering the country and that it requires a coordinated European approach. However, this cannot absolve the the Hellenic Republic from their human rights obligations and the duty of care owed to all migrants that the Greek authorities detain.

      The CPT found that the conditions of detention in which migrants were held in certain facilities in the Evros region and on the island of Samos could amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. The report again underlines the structural deficiencies in Greece’s immigration detention policy. Migrants continue to be held in detention centres composed of large barred cells crammed with beds, with poor lighting and ventilation, dilapidated and broken toilets and washrooms, insufficient personal hygiene products and cleaning materials, inadequate food and no access to outdoor daily exercise. Extreme overcrowding in several of the facilities further aggravated the situation. In addition, migrants were not provided with clear information about their situation.

      The CPT once again found that families with children, unaccompanied and separated children and other vulnerable persons (with a physical or mental health illness, or pregnant women) were being detained in such appalling conditions with no appropriate support. The CPT calls upon the Greek authorities to end the detention of unaccompanied children and of children with their parents in police establishments. Instead, they should be transferred to suitable reception facilities catering to their specific needs.

      The report also highlights that the CPT again received consistent and credible allegations of migrants being pushed back across the Evros River border to Turkey. The Greek authorities should act to prevent such pushbacks. The CPT furthermore raises concerns over acts by the Greek Coast Guard to prevent boats carrying migrants from reaching any Greek island and it questions the role and engagement of FRONTEX in such operations.

      The CPT calls upon the Greek authorities to take vigorous steps to stamp out ill-treatment of detained migrants by the police. The report refers to a number of allegations by migrants that they had been ill treated by members of the Hellenic Police and/or Coast Guard either upon apprehension or after being brought to a place of detention. The ill treatment alleged consisted primarily of slaps to the head and kicks and truncheon blows to the body.

      In their response, the Hellenic Police provide information on the steps being taken to improve the conditions of detention for detained migrants. They also state that the alleged practice of pushbacks to the border is unsubstantiated and completely wrong. As regards unaccompanied minors, reference is made to a new strategy to end their detention and to their transfer from reception centres on the islands to safe accommodation facilities on the mainland.

      https://search.coe.int/directorate_of_communications/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680a06bcf

    • Annex to the reply of Fabrice Leggeri to the LIBE Committee

      https://www.tinekestrik.eu/sites/default/files/2020-11/Answers%20to%20the%20questions%20from%20the%20LIBE%20Commitee.pdf

      –---

      Thread sur twitter:

      It looks like Frontex are NOT denying that they may be involved in #pushbacks after all. FL partly evades (’...always committed...’) and partly seems to blame the ’uniqueness’ of operational areas & ’complex geography’ of the Greek and Turkish border for FX being involved in pushbacks.

      –---

      The earlier letter sent to the EP President might offer some clues. I’m not a legal expert, but FL seems to suggest that Art. 6 of Reg. 656/2014 (on interception at sea) needs to be clarified so as to define what constitutes a #pushback. Interesting.
      https://www.tinekestrik.eu/sites/default/files/2020-11/Letter%20to%20EP_Frontex%20maritime%20operations%20at%20EU%20external%20

      –—

      Yet not all pushbacks happen at sea. While the request for interpretation above might mean that FX is looking for a way out re: #pushbacks at the Aegean, what about those at the
      Greek-Turkish land border? I think there’s less concern with #pushbacks at #Evros, though. No videos...

      –---

      Back to the Annex: We know SIRs weren’t submitted as they should. The real question is why. It might be down to officers on the ground lacking in training (they shouldn’t, but...) or not wanting to get their colleagues in trouble (the spirit of camaraderie...).

      –---

      BUT: Today’s Spiegel article refers to a ’Frontex official in charge’ advising a Swedish officer not to submit a SIR. FX management were aware few SIRs being submitted for years. Is it a practice dictated from the top? To avoid having evidence of violations?

      https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/pushbacks-in-der-aegaeis-wie-frontex-menschenrechtsverletzungen-vertuscht-a-

      –—

      Suspension/non-launch of operations has never happened. The ED didn’t take into account reports by NGOs or human rights bodies when considering the 2016 recommendation to suspend operations in Hungary. He relied on the very low number of SIRs to reject it.
      https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog/fundamental-rights-accountability-transparency-european-governance

      –—

      Same with the 2019 & 2020 recommendations of the FRO to consider suspension of operations in #Evros. As for taking into account media reports ... well, I’d say the reply to the LIBE committee reads like the media accounts are being dismissed.

      https://twitter.com/lk2015r/status/1331662031095787521

    • E.U. Border Agency Accused of Covering Up Migrant Pushback in Greece

      Frontex is under fire for letting Greece illegally repel migrants as the agency expands to play a more central role at the bloc’s external borders.

      Mounting evidence indicates that the European Union’s border agency has been complicit in Greece’s illegal practice of pushing back migrants to Turkey, according to documents obtained by The New York Times and interviews with officials.

      In at least one case, Frontex, as the E.U. border agency is known, is accused of having helped cover up the violations, when a crew said it was discouraged by agency officials from reporting that they had seen the Greek authorities setting a boatload of migrants adrift in Turkish waters.

      The case is currently being investigated by Frontex. But it has fueled suspicions that the agency, newly boosted in its role as upholder of the rule of law at E.U. borders, is not just sporadically aware of such abuses, but that it plays a role in concealing them.

      “We are seeing an erosion of the rule of law at the E.U. borders which is willful,” said Gerald Knaus, a migration expert. “This is deeply worrying because it is eroding the refugee convention on the continent on which it was created.”

      Throughout this year, The New York Times and others have reported on growing operations by the Greek Coast Guard to repel migrants from Greek waters back to Turkey, reports the Greek authorities deny amount to breaches of international laws.

      But revelations that Frontex has witnessed pushbacks have thrown the agency into a governance crisis that threatens to further blight the European Union’s liberal values, once again calling into question the bloc’s commitment to upholding its own laws on refugees.

      The cases have also highlighted a conundrum at the core of E.U. ambitions to tighten external borders by pooling resources and involving the bloc in the sensitive, zealously shielded work of sovereign border guards.

      Frontex is the European Union’s best-funded agency, with a budget of over $500 million, and will soon deploy the first uniformed officers in the bloc’s history. It has been built up specifically to help in migrant-rescue operations as the burden of policing Europe’s borders has fallen most heavily on its peripheral states, like Greece.

      It was also intended as a deterrent to the kind of mass arrival of refugees that sowed political crises across Europe after 2015, and fanned nationalist and populist movements.

      Yet Frontex is not empowered to stop national border guards from committing violations, and it is not clear how it can play a role as standard-bearer of E.U. laws when informing on national forces risks the working relationships on which its operations depend.

      Refugee arrivals to the European Union peaked five years ago and have dropped drastically since, but thousands of asylum seekers, many fleeing the wars in Afghanistan and Syria, still attempt the crossing. Unlike in the past, Greeks and their government have turned hostile to the new arrivals, exhausted by years in which asylum seekers have been bottled up in overrun camps on Greek islands.

      There is also a growing belief in the Greek and several other European governments that aggression at the borders and poor conditions at migrant camps will make the attempt to reach Europe less attractive for asylum seekers.

      Earlier this year, an analysis by The Times showed that the Greek government had secretly expelled more than 1,000 asylum seekers, often by sailing them to the edge of Greek territorial waters and abandoning them in flimsy inflatable life rafts in violation of international laws.

      The Greek Coast Guard has rescued thousands of asylum seekers over the years but has become much more aggressive this year, especially as Turkey used migrants to provoke Greece by encouraging them to cross the border.

      The Greek government has denied it is doing anything illegal in repelling migrant boats from its national waters, characterizing the operations as robust border guarding. But Mr. Knaus said “the denials are not serious,” and the practices are effectively happening in the open — under the eyes of E.U. border patrols.

      The documents obtained by The Times describe, in Coast Guard vernacular littered with acronyms, codes, time-stamps and coordinates, a seemingly incessant Ping-Pong of migrant dinghies between Greek and Turkish waters, with Frontex crews on vessels or aircraft in observer status.

      Four officials with direct knowledge of Frontex operations said that agency officials have been discouraging crews from filing reports on pushback incidents, and, in some cases, have stopped initial alerts of violations from being filed as “serious incident reports,” at times after consulting with the Greek authorities.

      They all spoke on condition of anonymity because they were concerned about losing their jobs, or were not authorized to brief the press.

      The Frontex spokesman, Chris Borowski, said the agency took the reporting of violations very seriously. “Pushbacks are illegal under international law,” Mr. Borowski said.

      In the latest case to come to light, a Swedish Coast Guard crew on deployment under Frontex witnessed a pushback to Turkish waters of a boat full of migrants by the Greek authorities on Oct. 30 off the Greek island of Chios.

      The Swedish crew was later advised by a Frontex officer to not report it, documents reviewed by The Times show. The Swedish representative to the management board of Frontex described the incident, and the suppression of the attempt to report it, at a meeting on Nov. 10 — the first known case of an E.U. member state reporting active interference by Frontex officials.

      The Swedish government did not comment. A spokesman for Frontex said the agency wouldn’t comment because of an “ongoing procedure.”

      Frontex has been working in Greece for more than a decade, providing sea, land and aerial surveillance and rescue capabilities and deploying crews from other member states under its command.

      The details now emerging push the agency deeper into a governance crisis which began in October when a consortium of news organizations, including the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, reported a number of occasions when Frontex crews witnessed pushbacks in Greece.

      The European Commission, which is part of the Frontex oversight system but does not control the agency, pushed for a special inquiry into these allegations and, at an emergency agency board meeting on Nov. 10, asked its leadership to answer detailed questions in writing.

      The answers arrived with a four-day delay, just 15 hours before the start of another meeting to discuss the problems on Wednesday. Yet another emergency meeting has been called in December, mounting pressure on the agency.

      Frontex has promised internal investigations but also quickly dismissed allegations, saying for example, in a letter seen by The Times, that it would look into the Swedish case, but that it had so far found no evidence that it happened.

      How these investigations shake out will matter a great deal for the future of Frontex, which was once little more than a back-office operation in Warsaw but now finds itself on the front lines of the nettlesome issue of migration that has the potency to make or break governments.

      Apart from helping member states with asylum-seeker arrivals, Frontex’s role as an E.U. agency by law is to respect fundamental rights, and bring up human-rights standards across national E.U. border agencies, which often don’t have a strong culture of upholding them.

      But claims that Frontex does not take fundamental rights seriously enough are growing. This year, only one million euros in its budget of 460 million euros — about $548 million — was allocated to rights monitoring.

      The agency was supposed to hire 40 fundamental-rights officers by Dec. 5 but the jobs have not yet been advertised. The agency is currently hiring for their boss, after years of staffing issues around that position. A Frontex spokesman said the delays stemmed from the coronavirus pandemic.

      Documents seen by The Times laid out how in one episode the Greek authorities were consulted before a report was made, and were able to suppress it. On Aug. 10, a German crew deployed by Frontex reported that a Greek Coast Guard vessel “took up border control measures prohibiting the landing to Samos.”

      The expression refers to maneuvering and making waves around a dinghy to repel it. The event was not recorded as a “serious incident,” because, the document said, the Greek Coast Guard argued the activities “do not provide any ground” to initiate such a report.

      Another incident, which a Frontex aerial crew observed and reported in detail to its headquarters, took place on the evening of April 18 to 19 off the coast of Lesbos, and lasted more than five hours.

      A dinghy was detected by the Greek authorities and approximately 20 migrants were rescued and put on board a Greek Coast Guard vessel shortly after midnight, their empty dinghy towed by the Coast Guard toward the island.

      But instead of being taken to shore, at 2:45 a.m., the migrants were put back on their dinghy and tugged to Turkish waters by the Greek Coast Guard, the Frontex aerial crew reported.

      As events unfolded, the Greek command center twice asked the Frontex aircraft to change its flight path, directing it away from the incident.

      “At 03:21 Frontex Surveillance Aircraft communicates that the rubber boat has no engine and it is adrift. Greek assets are departing the area leaving the rubber boat adrift,” the document said.

      The internal Frontex report detailing this incident and categorizing it as a fundamental-rights violation was “dismissed,” the document shows.

      https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/26/world/europe/frontex-migrants-pushback-greece.html

    • La Grèce fortement soupçonnée de refouler les migrants

      L’agence européenne Frontex, potentiellement impliquée dans les refoulements, mène une enquête interne et doit fournir des explications à la Commission européenne fin novembre. Une plainte a été déposée le 17 novembre auprès du comité des droits de l’homme de l’ONU.

      L’étau se resserre autour de la Grèce, de plus en plus fréquemment accusée de refouler les migrants vers la Turquie, aussi bien en mer qu’à terre. Le soupçon n’est pas nouveau, comme l’atteste le terrible récit de Fadi Faj. Ce jeune Syrien de 25 ans est arrivé en 2015 avec l’immense vague de demandeurs d’asile en Allemagne. Berlin lui octroie alors le statut de réfugié et un permis de séjour avec lequel il se rend en Grèce en novembre 2016, à la recherche de son jeune frère de 11 ans dont il a perdu la trace lors de sa traversée de la frontière greco-turque à Evros.

      Fadi Faj est alors arrêté par la police grecque qui lui confisque ses papiers et l’expulse vers la Turquie avec une cinquantaine d’autres demandeurs d’asile. Devenu un sans-papier, il sera à treize reprises repoussé de part et d’autre de la frontière par les forces grecques ou turques. Ayant enfin mis un pied à terre en Grèce en décembre 2017, il y vivra encore deux ans dans le dénuement avant d’obtenir un visa pour regagner l’Allemagne qui lui délivrera un nouveau permis de séjour en mai 2020.

      Une plainte auprès du Comité des droits de l’homme de l’ONU

      Ce récit glaçant fait l’objet d’une plainte à l’encontre de la Grèce déposée le 17 novembre auprès du Comité des droits de l’homme de l’ONU, par le Global Legal Action Network (Réseau mondial d’action juridique) basé en Irlande et l’ONG grecque HumanRights 360.

      Entre-temps, les cas du même type se sont multipliés. Surtout depuis le printemps dernier, après que le président turc Erdogan a menacé d’ouvrir les frontières et incité les migrants à se diriger vers la Grèce. « J’ai vu de mes yeux vu deux refoulements en mer depuis ma maison sur la côte nord de Lesbos », dénonce ainsi Christina Chatzidaki, une habitante de l’île qui jouxte les côtes turques, et y dirige l’association Siniparxi (Coexistence).

      Alarm phone qui reçoit les appels de détresse des embarcations en mer se déclarait en mai dernier « très préoccupé par la récente augmentation des rapports d’attaques sur les bateaux de migrants ». L’ONG avait alors engrangé les témoignages de survivants de 18 bateaux. « Ils ont fait état d’actions dangereuses, telles que le fait de tourner autour de leurs bateaux et de provoquer des vagues, des menaces avec des armes à feu, le vol de leur essence, la destruction de moteurs et, également, le remorquage de bateaux vers les eaux turques où ils ont été laissés à la dérive », précise l’ONG.
      Intimer la Commission d’agir

      Les dénonciations de pratiques qui violent les droits humains, et contreviennent au droit de la mer et au droit européen n’ont pas cessé par la suite. Le porte-parole du Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR) déclarait le 12 juin dernier : « le HCR a continuellement fait état de ses préoccupations auprès du gouvernement grec et a demandé des enquêtes urgentes sur une série d’incidents présumés ». Il soulignait alors la corrélation entre la forte baisse du nombre d’arrivées de migrants en Grèce et l’augmentation du nombre de refoulements signalés. En 2019, 60 000 personnes avaient débarqué en Grèce par la mer et 15 000 par la terre. En 2020, jusqu’au 22 novembre, ils ne sont plus, respectivement, que 9 400 et 5 400.

      Jusqu’à présent la Grèce a nié ces allégations. « Nous protégeons nos frontières en accord avec les lois internationales et européennes » a encore affirmé le ministre grec de l’immigration Notis Mitarakis le 13 novembre dernier au site Infomigrants. Deux mois auparavant, le 22 septembre, les ONG Oxfam et WeMove adressaient une plainte auprès de la Commission européenne pour l’intimer de mener « une enquête sur les violations systématiques du droit européen concernant le traitement des demandeurs d’asile en Grèce ».
      La possible implication de Frontex

      Enfin, le site d’investigation Bellingcat et le magazine allemand Der Spiegel apportèrent en octobre un coup de grâce supplémentaire, en dénonçant, images à l’appui, le laisser-faire, voire l’implication, de l’agence européenne de surveillance aux frontières Frontex - qui a déployé plus de 600 agents en Grèce - dans six cas documentés de pratique illégale de refoulement.

      Un soupçon repris par le comité contre la torture du Conseil de l’Europe. Dans son rapport publié le 19 novembre, le comité a indiqué « avoir de nouveau reçu des allégations cohérentes et crédibles de migrants repoussés vers la Turquie ».

      Il s’est déclaré « inquiet des actes commis par les garde-côtes grecs pour empêcher les bateaux transportant des migrants d’atteindre les îles grecques » et « s’interroge sur le rôle et l’implication de Frontex dans de telles opérations ».

      Face à une telle avalanche, l’Union européenne pouvait difficilement continuer à se voiler la face. La suédoise Ylva Johansson, commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures a réclamé des explications pour fin novembre à l’agence Frontex, laquelle a indiqué avoir ouvert une enquête interne.

      https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Grece-fortement-soupconnee-refouler-migrants-2020-11-24-1201126401

    • Refoulements de demandeurs d’asile : le directeur de Frontex interrogé par les députés

      La supposée implication d’agents de Frontex dans les refoulements de demandeurs d’asile à la frontière grecque sera au cœur du débat en commission des libertés civiles mardi.

      Les députés seront en attente de réponses de la part du directeur exécutif de l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, Fabrice Leggeri, concernant les incidents révélés récemment par les médias au cours desquels des garde-côtes grecs (avec la connaissance présumée et même l’implication d’agents de Frontex) ont arrêté des migrants qui tentaient d’atteindre les côtes de l’UE et les ont renvoyés dans les eaux turques. Les députés devraient s’enquérir des résultats de l’enquête interne menée par l’Agence européenne de gestion des frontières et de la réunion du conseil d’administration convoquée à la demande de la Commission européenne.

      En octobre dernier, avant les révélations des médias, le forum consultatif de Frontex (qui réunit notamment des représentants du Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile (EASO), de l’Agence des droits fondamentaux de l’UE (FRA), du HCR, du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’OIM) avait exprimé son inquiétude dans son rapport annuel. Le forum pointait du doigt l’absence de véritable système de contrôle permettant de prévenir et de traiter les violations potentielles des droits fondamentaux dans les activités de l’Agence.

      Le 6 juillet, au cours d’une précédente réunion de la commission des libertés civiles, Fabrice Leggeri avait assuré aux eurodéputés que Frontex n’était pas impliquée dans les refoulements et avait qualifié l’incident avec l’équipe danoise à bord de l’un des navires de l’Agence de ‘‘malentendu’’.

      DATE : mardi 1er décembre de 13h50 à 14h45

      LIEU : Parlement européen à Bruxelles, bâtiment Antall, salle 4Q2 et à distance

      https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/fr/press-room/20201126IPR92509

    • EU border chief urged to quit over migrant pushback claims

      European Union lawmakers lashed out Tuesday at the head of Frontex over allegations that the border and coast guard agency helped illegally stop migrants or refugees entering Europe, calling for his resignation and demanding an independent inquiry.

      The lawmakers grilled Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri over an investigation in October by media outlets Bellingcat, Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, ARD and TV Asahi, which said that video and other publicly available data suggest Frontex “assets were actively involved in one pushback incident at the Greek-Turkish maritime border in the Aegean Sea.”

      The report said personnel from the agency, which monitors and polices migrant movements around Europe’s borders, were present at another incident and “have been in the vicinity of four more since March.” Frontex launched an internal probe after the news broke.

      “In his handling of these allegations, Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri has completely lost our trust and it is time for him to resign,” senior Socialist lawmaker Kati Piri said in a statement after the parliamentary civil liberties committee hearing. “There are still far too many unanswered questions on the involvement of Frontex in illegal practices.”

      Pushbacks are considered contrary to international refugee protection agreements, which say people shouldn’t be expelled or returned to a country where their life and safety might be in danger due to their race, religion, nationality or being members of a social or political group.

      Frontex’s board met to discuss the allegations late last month. The board said afterwards that the European Commission had ordered it to “hold a further extraordinary meeting within the next two weeks in order to consider in more detail the replies provided by the agency.” That meeting is scheduled to take place on Dec. 9.

      “Migrants and refugees are very vulnerable to pushbacks by border guards,” Greens lawmaker Tineke Strik said. “We must be able to rely on an EU agency which prevents human rights violations from happening and not inflict them. But Frontex seems to be a partner in crime of those who deliberately violate those human rights.”

      Strik raised doubts about whether the internal Frontex probe would produce results and urged the assembly’s political groups to consider launching their own inquiry.

      Leggeri said that no evidence of any Frontex involvement in pushbacks had been found so far. He said EU member countries have control over operations in their waters, not Frontex, and he called for the rules governing surveillance of Europe’s external borders to be clarified.

      “We have not found evidence that there were active, direct or indirect participation of Frontex staff or officers deployed by Frontex in pushbacks,” he told the lawmakers. When it comes to operations, Leggeri said, “only the host member state authorities can decide what has to be done.”

      Leggeri also said that Frontex staff were under extreme pressure around the time of the alleged incidents in March and April. He said that Turkish F-16 fighter jets had “surrounded” a Danish plane working for Frontex, while vessels were harassed by the Turkish coast guard and shots fired at personnel at land borders.

      He called for EU “guidance” on how to handle such situations.

      The allegations are extremely embarrassing for the European Commission. In September it unveiled sweeping new reforms to the EU’s asylum system, which proved dismally inadequate when over 1 million migrants arrived in 2015, many of them Syrian refugees entering the Greek islands via Turkey.

      Part of the EU’s migration reforms includes a system of independent monitoring involving rights experts to ensure that there are no pushbacks at Europe’s borders. Migrant entries have dropped to a relative trickle in recent years, although many migrants still languish on some Greek islands waiting for their asylum claims to be processed or to be sent back.

      EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson told The Associated Press on Tuesday that she still has confidence in Frontex’s managing board but remains deeply concerned about the allegations.

      During a visit to Morocco, Johansson said that the report “concerns me a lot. If it’s true, it’s totally unacceptable. A European agency has to comply to EU law and fundamental rights with no excuse.”

      Johansson said she has “full confidence in the process that (has) gone on in the management board and the sub-group they are setting up” to continue the investigation, but, she noted that “there were a lot of questions put to the director. And he has not answered these questions.”

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/259789/article/ekathimerini/news/eu-border-chief-urged-to-quit-over-migrant-pushback-claims

    • Frontex is taking us to court

      The EU border police Frontex is under fire for its involvement in human rights violations at the EU’s borders. Now, they want to silence those exposing their wrongdoing.

      For many years, we have been fighting to make Frontex, the EU’s border police, more transparent and accountable. We have made public over a thousand of their documents, including those that show the agency has been complicit in human rights violations and violence against migrants at the EU’s borders.

      Frontex is currently under fire for its involvement in illegal pushbacks in the Aegean and for having concealed evidence about these illegal acts. Confronted with such serious accusations, the EU border agency has now chosen to go after those who investigate them: they are taking us to court.

      Frontex has filed a case against us before the General Court of the European Union in order to force us to pay them a large amount of money. Last year, we lost our lawsuit for information about Frontex and now, the agency is demanding from us excessive legal fees. The message is clear: they want to make sure that we never take them to court again.
      Details must remain secret

      For the time being, we will not be able to disclose further details related to the case due to the court’s rules on keeping all information secret while proceedings are ongoing. Back in January, the agency justified their excessive legal fees on their decision to hire expensive private lawyers.

      Frontex, which has a billion-euro budget, making it the best resourced EU agency, employs a well-staffed internal legal department. Both the decision to hire private lawyers and to then claim these costs from civil society are highly unusual in court cases against the EU authorities.
      What happens if Frontex wins?

      If Frontex succeeds, in the future only corporations and the rich will be able to afford legal action against EU authorities. Activists, journalists, NGOs and individuals will not be able to defend human rights before the EU court. Frontex bringing a case like this directly against civil society, let alone winning, discourages others from holding them accountable in the future. It’s this chilling effect that we believe they’re hoping for.

      In the spring, more than 87,000 people petitioned Frontex to withdraw their legal bill. 44 civil society organizations also called on Frontex to retract its demand. Frontex has nonetheless chosen to ignore their voices.

      In recent years, Frontex has experienced an enormous increase of power and resources. Not only is it about to receive € 11 billion under the next EU budget, but it can also now hire its own border guards and buy its own equipment, including aircrafts, ships, drones and weapons.

      Investigating Frontex and holding it accountable is now more important than ever. As recent publications have revealed, the EU border force has been involved in numerous human rights violations at the EU borders.
      What you can do

      Our freedom of information work is financed by individual donations. We will fight in court for a judgement that gives Frontex as little money as possible. If you want to support us in this, we would be very happy to receive a donation. We will use every extra euro for new investigations and legal action against Frontex.

      https://fragdenstaat.de/en/blog/2020/12/02/frontex-costs-court-transparency

    • S&Ds call for Frontex Director to resign

      The S&D Group in the European Parliament today called for the Executive Director of Frontex to resign following months of allegations on the agency’s involvement in illegal practices and violations of fundamental rights.

      In today’s hearing of the civil liberties, justice and home affairs committee (LIBE), Director Fabrice Leggeri failed to answer questions relating to the agency’s involvement in pushbacks at the EU’s external borders aimed at preventing asylum-seekers from entering the EU.

      Following the hearing, S&D MEPs concluded Mr Leggeri’s position at the head of Frontex is not sustainable, especially in light of the important role for Frontex in the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      Kati Piri, S&D vice-president for migration and LIBE member taking part in the hearing, said

      “In his handling of these allegations, Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri has completely lost our trust and it is time for him to resign. After months of the S&D Group calling for explanations, Director Leggeri had the chance to set the record straight. But there are still far too many unanswered questions on the involvement of Frontex in illegal practices.

      “Pushbacks are a violation of international law and every single incident must be fully investigated. Do we have the confidence in Frontex to ensure alleged incidents are properly investigated? After today, the answer is no.

      “As long as allegations hang over Frontex, its reputation remains severely damaged and in desperate need of repair. In our view, Director Leggeri is not the right person to fix the damage.”

      Birgit Sippel, S&D LIBE coordinator, added:

      “We have to ask ourselves how we got to the point where we have to rely on journalists and whistle-blowers in Frontex to inform us of instances of fundamental and human rights violations at our borders. This is unacceptable and deeply disturbing, in particular when considering the potentially increased role of Frontex as part of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      “The series of alleged pushbacks and cover-ups from Frontex show that we need a strong and independent border monitoring mechanism to investigate any and all alleged violations of fundamental and human rights and international laws at European borders.

      “Under the 2019 Frontex mandate, the Agency was obliged to have recruited at least 40 Fundamental Rights Monitors by 5 December 2020. It is now clear that Frontex will not even have come close to fulfilling this task, and therefore will not comply with the new mandate. Blaming bureaucratic hurdles for the delay of such an important task is insufficient, while the Commission’s role in this delay requires further examination as well. Mr Leggeri has failed in many of his responsibilities and must bear the consequences of his actions.”

      https://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/newsroom/sds-call-frontex-director-resign

    • E.U. Border Agency Accused of Covering Up Migrant Pushback in Greece

      Frontex is under fire for letting Greece illegally repel migrants as the agency expands to play a more central role at the bloc’s external borders.

      Mounting evidence indicates that the European Union’s border agency has been complicit in Greece’s illegal practice of pushing back migrants to Turkey, according to documents obtained by The New York Times and interviews with officials.

      In at least one case, Frontex, as the E.U. border agency is known, is accused of having helped cover up the violations, when a crew said it was discouraged by agency officials from reporting that they had seen the Greek authorities setting a boatload of migrants adrift in Turkish waters.

      The case is currently being investigated by Frontex. But it has fueled suspicions that the agency, newly boosted in its role as upholder of the rule of law at E.U. borders, is not just sporadically aware of such abuses, but that it plays a role in concealing them.

      “We are seeing an erosion of the rule of law at the E.U. borders which is willful,” said Gerald Knaus, a migration expert. “This is deeply worrying because it is eroding the refugee convention on the continent on which it was created.”

      Throughout this year, The New York Times and others have reported on growing operations by the Greek Coast Guard to repel migrants from Greek waters back to Turkey, reports the Greek authorities deny amount to breaches of international laws.

      But revelations that Frontex has witnessed pushbacks have thrown the agency into a governance crisis that threatens to further blight the European Union’s liberal values, once again calling into question the bloc’s commitment to upholding its own laws on refugees.

      The cases have also highlighted a conundrum at the core of E.U. ambitions to tighten external borders by pooling resources and involving the bloc in the sensitive, zealously shielded work of sovereign border guards.

      Frontex is the European Union’s best-funded agency, with a budget of over $500 million, and will soon deploy the first uniformed officers in the bloc’s history. It has been built up specifically to help in migrant-rescue operations as the burden of policing Europe’s borders has fallen most heavily on its peripheral states, like Greece.

      It was also intended as a deterrent to the kind of mass arrival of refugees that sowed political crises across Europe after 2015, and fanned nationalist and populist movements.

      Yet Frontex is not empowered to stop national border guards from committing violations, and it is not clear how it can play a role as standard-bearer of E.U. laws when informing on national forces risks the working relationships on which its operations depend.

      Refugee arrivals to the European Union peaked five years ago and have dropped drastically since, but thousands of asylum seekers, many fleeing the wars in Afghanistan and Syria, still attempt the crossing. Unlike in the past, Greeks and their government have turned hostile to the new arrivals, exhausted by years in which asylum seekers have been bottled up in overrun camps on Greek islands.

      There is also a growing belief in the Greek and several other European governments that aggression at the borders and poor conditions at migrant camps will make the attempt to reach Europe less attractive for asylum seekers.

      Earlier this year, an analysis by The Times showed that the Greek government had secretly expelled more than 1,000 asylum seekers, often by sailing them to the edge of Greek territorial waters and abandoning them in flimsy inflatable life rafts in violation of international laws.

      The Greek Coast Guard has rescued thousands of asylum seekers over the years but has become much more aggressive this year, especially as Turkey used migrants to provoke Greece by encouraging them to cross the border.

      The Greek government has denied it is doing anything illegal in repelling migrant boats from its national waters, characterizing the operations as robust border guarding. But Mr. Knaus said “the denials are not serious,” and the practices are effectively happening in the open — under the eyes of E.U. border patrols.

      The documents obtained by The Times describe, in Coast Guard vernacular littered with acronyms, codes, time-stamps and coordinates, a seemingly incessant Ping-Pong of migrant dinghies between Greek and Turkish waters, with Frontex crews on vessels or aircraft in observer status.

      Four officials with direct knowledge of Frontex operations said that agency officials have been discouraging crews from filing reports on pushback incidents, and, in some cases, have stopped initial alerts of violations from being filed as “serious incident reports,” at times after consulting with the Greek authorities.

      They all spoke on condition of anonymity because they were concerned about losing their jobs, or were not authorized to brief the press.

      The Frontex spokesman, Chris Borowski, said the agency took the reporting of violations very seriously. “Pushbacks are illegal under international law,” Mr. Borowski said.

      In the latest case to come to light, a Swedish Coast Guard crew on deployment under Frontex witnessed a pushback to Turkish waters of a boat full of migrants by the Greek authorities on Oct. 30 off the Greek island of Chios.

      The Swedish crew was later advised by a Frontex officer to not report it, documents reviewed by The Times show. The Swedish representative to the management board of Frontex described the incident, and the suppression of the attempt to report it, at a meeting on Nov. 10 — the first known case of an E.U. member state reporting active interference by Frontex officials.

      The Swedish government did not comment. A spokesman for Frontex said the agency wouldn’t comment because of an “ongoing procedure.”

      Frontex has been working in Greece for more than a decade, providing sea, land and aerial surveillance and rescue capabilities and deploying crews from other member states under its command.

      The details now emerging push the agency deeper into a governance crisis which began in October when a consortium of news organizations, including the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, reported a number of occasions when Frontex crews witnessed pushbacks in Greece.

      The European Commission, which is part of the Frontex oversight system but does not control the agency, pushed for a special inquiry into these allegations and, at an emergency agency board meeting on Nov. 10, asked its leadership to answer detailed questions in writing.

      The answers arrived with a four-day delay, just 15 hours before the start of another meeting to discuss the problems on Wednesday. Yet another emergency meeting has been called in December, mounting pressure on the agency.

      Frontex has promised internal investigations but also quickly dismissed allegations, saying for example, in a letter seen by The Times, that it would look into the Swedish case, but that it had so far found no evidence that it happened.

      How these investigations shake out will matter a great deal for the future of Frontex, which was once little more than a back-office operation in Warsaw but now finds itself on the front lines of the nettlesome issue of migration that has the potency to make or break governments.

      Apart from helping member states with asylum-seeker arrivals, Frontex’s role as an E.U. agency by law is to respect fundamental rights, and bring up human-rights standards across national E.U. border agencies, which often don’t have a strong culture of upholding them.

      But claims that Frontex does not take fundamental rights seriously enough are growing. This year, only one million euros in its budget of 460 million euros — about $548 million — was allocated to rights monitoring.

      The agency was supposed to hire 40 fundamental-rights officers by Dec. 5 but the jobs have not yet been advertised. The agency is currently hiring for their boss, after years of staffing issues around that position. A Frontex spokesman said the delays stemmed from the coronavirus pandemic.

      Documents seen by The Times laid out how in one episode the Greek authorities were consulted before a report was made, and were able to suppress it. On Aug. 10, a German crew deployed by Frontex reported that a Greek Coast Guard vessel “took up border control measures prohibiting the landing to Samos.”

      The expression refers to maneuvering and making waves around a dinghy to repel it. The event was not recorded as a “serious incident,” because, the document said, the Greek Coast Guard argued the activities “do not provide any ground” to initiate such a report.

      Another incident, which a Frontex aerial crew observed and reported in detail to its headquarters, took place on the evening of April 18 to 19 off the coast of Lesbos, and lasted more than five hours.

      A dinghy was detected by the Greek authorities and approximately 20 migrants were rescued and put on board a Greek Coast Guard vessel shortly after midnight, their empty dinghy towed by the Coast Guard toward the island.

      But instead of being taken to shore, at 2:45 a.m., the migrants were put back on their dinghy and tugged to Turkish waters by the Greek Coast Guard, the Frontex aerial crew reported.

      As events unfolded, the Greek command center twice asked the Frontex aircraft to change its flight path, directing it away from the incident.

      “At 03:21 Frontex Surveillance Aircraft communicates that the rubber boat has no engine and it is adrift. Greek assets are departing the area leaving the rubber boat adrift,” the document said.

      The internal Frontex report detailing this incident and categorizing it as a fundamental-rights violation was “dismissed,” the document shows.

      https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/26/world/europe/frontex-migrants-pushback-greece.html?smid=tw-share

    • #Seehofer deckte offenbar griechische Verbrechen

      Griechische Grenzschützer setzen Flüchtlinge systematisch auf dem Meer aus. Ein internes Dokument legt nun nahe, dass Innenminister #Horst_Seehofer einen Rechtsbruch kaschierte. SPD-Vize Kühnert stellt ihm ein Ultimatum.

      Die Sprecherin von Bundesinnenminister Horst Seehofer war sichtlich nervös, als sie sich Ende November den Fragen der Journalisten stellen musste. Zwei Tage zuvor hatten der SPIEGEL und das ARD-Magazin »Report Mainz« berichtet, dass die Bundespolizei in der Ägäis in eine illegale Zurückweisung von Flüchtlingen verwickelt war. Wiederholt fragten die Journalisten nach. »Ich weiß nicht, wie Sie zu der Einschätzung kommen, dass es sich hierbei um einen illegalen Pushback gehandelt hat«, sagte die Sprecherin schließlich.

      Dabei lagen dem Bundesinnenministerium zu diesem Zeitpunkt längst Informationen vor, die genau darauf hindeuten.

      Im Auftrag der EU-Grenzschutzagentur Frontex patrouillierten die deutschen Einsatzkräfte am 10. August in der Ägäis, nur wenige Hundert Meter von der griechischen Insel Samos entfernt. Dabei entdeckten sie ein Schlauchboot mit 40 Flüchtlingen an Bord. Auftragsgemäß hielten sie es an, allerdings nahmen sie die Menschen auf dem völlig überfüllten Boot nicht an Bord. Stattdessen warteten sie mehr als eine halbe Stunde, bis die griechische Küstenwache das Schlauchboot übernahm.

      Wenig später fanden sich die Flüchtlinge plötzlich in türkischen Gewässern wieder. So beschreiben es interne Dokumente der EU-Grenzschutzagentur Frontex, die dem SPIEGEL vorliegen. Die türkische Küstenwache musste die 40 Migranten später retten. Fotos zeigen Männer, Frauen und kleine Kinder auf dem überfüllten Schlauchboot. Offensichtlich wurden die Menschen von den griechischen Grenzschützern illegal zurückgedrängt.

      Als die griechischen Beamten in den Hafen zurückkehrten, wunderten sich die deutschen Polizisten. Die Küstenwache hatte keine Migranten an Bord und auch kein Schlauchboot im Schlepptau. Die Deutschen meldeten im Anschluss zwar die Details des Einsatzes – aber keine mögliche Menschenrechtsverletzung.
      Was genau haben die Deutschen von diesem illegalen Pushback mitbekommen?

      Bis heute haben die Bundespolizei und das Innenministerium nicht auf die Fragen des SPIEGEL geantwortet. Dabei finden sich die Antworten auf diese Fragen seit Wochen im Intranet der Bundespolizei, also in einem nur für Mitarbeiter zugänglichen Netzwerk. Anhand der elf SPIEGEL-Fragen legte die Bundespolizei-Führung ihre Sicht der Dinge ausführlich dar – noch am Tag der Veröffentlichung des Berichts. Die Fragen waren also längst beantwortet, nur abgeschickt wurden sie nie. Das Innenministerium erklärt das inzwischen auf Anfrage mit einem »Büroversehen«.

      Die Ausführungen im Intranet der Bundespolizei sind politisch heikel. Auf den ersten Blick entlasten sie die deutschen Einsatzkräfte. Wörtlich heißt es, die Bundespolizisten hätten beobachtet, »dass durch die (…) griechischen Einsatzkräfte Migranten physisch an Bord genommen wurden.« Die deutschen Frontex-Beamten konnten also davon ausgehen, dass die Flüchtlinge zunächst in Sicherheit waren. Schließlich wurden sie vor ihren Augen auf ein Schiff der griechischen Küstenwache geholt und trieben nicht mehr in ihrem überfüllten Schlauchboot.

      Warum hat das Innenministerium dieses Detail trotzdem bis heute verschwiegen? Will man im Ministerium die Griechen nicht als Lügner entlarven? Das Flüchtlingsboot, so hatten die griechischen Behörden erklärt, sei beim Anblick der Küstenwache umgekehrt und zurück in türkische Gewässer gefahren.
      Beobachtungen der Deutschen entlarven die Ausrede der Griechen

      Die Beobachtungen der Bundespolizisten widersprechen dieser Darstellung, die Bundespolizei stellt das in ihrem Bericht selbst fest. Wenn die Geflüchteten bereits an Bord des Schiffes der griechischen Küstenwache waren, können sie unmöglich freiwillig auf ihrem Schlauchboot umgekehrt sein. Sollten die Aussagen der Deutschen zutreffen, und davon ist auszugehen, bleibt keine andere vernünftige Erklärung als ein illegaler Pushback der griechischen Küstenwache.

      Horst Seehofer muss sich deshalb die Frage gefallen lassen, warum sein Haus die Verbrechen der griechischen Behörden deckt. Statt aufzuklären, führt er die Öffentlichkeit offenbar in die Irre. So fügt Seehofer sich in das System des Schweigens.

      Seit Juni hat SPIEGEL in gemeinsamen Recherchen mit der Medienorganisation Lighthouse Reports und »Report Mainz« genau dokumentiert, wie die griechischen Pushbacks ablaufen: Die Küstenwache fängt die Migrantinnen und Migranten meist noch auf dem Wasser ab. Manchmal zerstört sie den Außenbordmotor der Schlauchboote, um diese manövrierunfähig zu machen. Dann werden die Schutzsuchenden mit gefährlichen Manövern Richtung Türkei zurückgedrängt. Die Menschen werden auf den Booten oder auf aufblasbaren Rettungsflößen mit Seilen aufs offene Meer gezogen, vom SPIEGEL ausgewertete Videos belegen das.

      Griechische Grenzschützer bedrohen die Geflüchteten mit Waffen, nicht selten fallen Schüsse. Bisweilen schleppen die Beamten sogar Menschen aufs Meer, die es schon auf die griechischen Inseln geschafft haben.

      Auch Frontex-Einheiten stoppen immer wieder Flüchtlingsboote und übergeben sie anschließend an die griechische Küstenwache. Seit Anfang März wird das so gehandhabt. Die Frontex-Einheiten, darunter deutsche Bundespolizisten, unterstehen in der Ägäis der griechischen Küstenwache. Sie werden so zu Gehilfen der Griechen, die bei ihren illegalen Praktiken nicht mal besonders verdeckt vorgehen.

      »Das Innenministerium scheint sich zum Komplizen der Griechen zu machen«, sagt der menschenrechtspolitische Sprecher der Sozialdemokraten, Frank Schwabe. »Dazu müssen sowohl Frontex als auch Innenminister Seehofer dem Bundestag Rede und Antwort stehen.«

      Das Innenministerium teilte auf Anfrage mit, dass eine abschließende Bewertung des Sachverhaltes aufgrund der vorliegenden Informationen nicht möglich sei. Die Bundespolizei habe sich jedenfalls nicht an illegalen Pushbacks beteiligt. Eine vollständige Aufklärung bleibe abzuwarten und Berichte von griechischen Behörden würden nicht kommentiert.

      Die griechischen Behörden bleiben bei ihrer Version der Ereignisse. Das für die Küstenwache zuständige Ministerium teilte mit, der Fahrer der Schlauchbootes sei in Richtung Türkei zurückgefahren, nachdem er die griechische Küstenwache erblickt habe.
      »Wir müssen davon ausgehen, dass Seehofer die Regelverstöße der griechischen Küstenwache deckt, weil sie ihm politisch in den Kram passen«

      SPD-Vize Kevin Kühnert

      Doch in der Opposition und auch beim eigenen Koalitionspartner ist der Unmut groß. Selbst SPD-Vize Kevin Kühnert schaltet sich nun in die Debatte ein. Durch die schriftlich festgehaltenen Erkenntnisse der eigenen Beamten festige sich der Eindruck, dass es in der Ägäis in der Tat zu Pushbacks komme, sagt er. Deshalb müsse Seehofer nun politisch reagieren. »Frontex muss die mutmaßliche griechische Pushback-Praxis endlich effektiv verhindern und die Zugänge zum Asylverfahren sicherstellen«, so Kühnert. »Sollte dies durch die Bundesregierung kurzfristig nicht durchsetzbar sein, muss das deutsche Kontingent unverzüglich aus der Mission abgezogen werden.«

      Kühnert möchte nun von Seehofer »noch in diesem Jahr dargelegt bekommen, wie und bis wann er auf Frontex einwirken wolle, um die Zusammenarbeit mit der griechischen Küstenwache wieder auf eine rechtskonforme Grundlage zu stellen.« Mit seiner Salamitaktik bei der Preisgabe von Informationen werde der Innenminister auch der Fürsorgepflicht gegenüber seinen eigenen Beamten nicht gerecht, mahnt Kühnert. »Wir müssen davon ausgehen, dass Seehofer die Regelverstöße der griechischen Küstenwache deckt, weil sie ihm politisch in den Kram passen. Alles daran wäre inakzeptabel.«

      Neben Seehofer gerät auch Frontex-Chef Fabrice Leggeri durch die Beobachtungen der deutschen Polizisten in Erklärungsnot. Bis heute beteuert Leggeri, dass sich seine Grenzschützer nicht an Pushbacks beteiligen oder von ihnen wissen. Daran zweifelt aber inzwischen selbst die EU-Kommission.

      Auf deren Drängen schilderte Leggeri schriftlich die Details des Vorfalls vom 10. August. In seinen Antworten verschwieg aber auch Leggeri, dass die griechische Küstenwache laut den Deutschen die Flüchtlinge bereits an Bord geholt hatten – obwohl er wohl davon hätte wissen müssen. Die Bundespolizei jedenfalls hat auch dieses Detail des Einsatzes nach eigener Aussage an Frontex gemeldet.

      Frontex teilte auf Anfrage mit, wegen der laufenden Untersuchung keine Angaben zum Vorfall machen zu können.

      Für Leggeri ist die Angelegenheit besonders misslich, weil sich in seinen Aussagen ein Muster erkennen lässt: Der Frontex-Direktor täuscht die Öffentlichkeit, um die Pushbacks zu vertuschen. Vor den EU-Parlamentariern verteidigte er sich unlängst mit einer Falschaussage, indem er behauptete, dass der SPIEGEL und seine Recherchepartner sich bei ihren Recherchen zu einem Pushback im April geirrt hätten. Am fraglichen Tag habe es gar keinen Frontex-Aufklärungsflug gegeben, sagte Leggeri. Keine zwei Tage später musste er einräumen, dass das nicht stimmte. Weitere Vorfälle, die Experten als klare Pushbacks werten, erwähnte Leggeri entweder gar nicht oder nur auf Nachfrage in internen Schreiben.
      EU-Kommission rechnet mit Leggeri ab

      Inzwischen wirft auch die EU-Kommission Leggeri »irreführende« Aussagen vor. Das geht aus einem Brief der Kommission an ihn hervor. In dem Streit geht es um die Einstellung von Grundrechtsbeobachtern. Eigentlich hätte Frontex bis zum 5. Dezember 40 Mitarbeiter einstellen müssen, die darauf achten soll, dass die Rechte von Migranten an Europas Grenzen gewahrt werden. Bis heute hat Leggeri allerdings nicht einen solchen Mitarbeiter eingestellt.

      Der Frontex-Direktor macht die Kommission für die Verzögerung verantwortlich, die wiederum gibt Leggeri die Schuld. Leggeris Äußerungen zu dem Thema würden die Kommission »bestürzen« und »beunruhigen« heißt es in dem Brief. Das Schreiben liegt dem SPIEGEL vor, es liest sich wie eine Kampfansage.

      Die Verzögerungen bei den Grundrechtsbeobachtern seien skandalös, sagt die Grünenbundestagsabgeordnete Luise Amtsberg. Die Sache zeige, dass die Grenzschutzagentur den Menschenrechtsschutz schlicht nicht ernst genug nehme. »Die Bundesregierung muss endlich klare Konsequenzen aus den völkerrechtswidrigen Handlungen im Rahmen von Frontex-Missionen ziehen.«

      https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/frontex-skandal-horst-seehofer-deckte-offenbar-griechische-verbrechen-a-bd06

    • Push backs and violations of human rights at sea: a #timeline

      The following timeline provides a non-exhaustive compilation of main reports of push backs and other violations of human rights at the Greek-Turkish sea borders since March 2020, following Greece’s decision to impose a one-month suspension of its asylum procedure in response to declarations by Turkey that it would not prevent refugees from crossing its western borders. On 2 March, the Hellenic Armed Forces began live-fire military exercises along the Aegean, from Samothrace to Kastellorizo.

      Timeline dates refer to the date of publication of reports, separately indicating the date of alleged incidents, where available.

      This timeline solely purports to reproduce material made publicly available by media and civil society organisations and does not amount to an assessment by RSA or PRO ASYL of the allegations contained therein.

      https://rsaegean.org/en/push-backs-and-violations-of-human-rights-at-sea-a-timeline
      #chronologie

    • EU: Frontex director accused of misleading parliament over fundamental rights obligations

      Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri has been accused by a senior European Commission official of making statements “in a misleading manner” at a parliamentary hearing in December, when MEPs questioned him over the agency’s alleged role in pushbacks and the new fundamental rights monitoring framework included in 2019 legislation.

      Bang to rights

      In a letter obtained by Statewatch, Monique Pariat (the Director-General of the Commission’s migration and home affairs department), expresses “dismay” at Leggeri’s appearance before the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee (LIBE) on 1 December and rebukes, in no uncertain terms, the account he provided of the agency’s attempts to implement its new fundamental rights obligations.

      Those obligations include a fully functioning and independent fundamental rights office, an accessible complaints mechanism, and a credible serious incident reporting mechanism – the aim of which is to prevent, or at least ensure the reporting and investigation of, human rights abuses witnessed or committed by officials deployed on Frontex operations.

      A key role is foreseen in all this for the fundamental rights officer (FRO), who is supposed to head a team of at least 40 fundamental rights monitors – all of whom the agency was legally obliged to have recruited by 5 December 2020. However, it failed to do so.

      Blame game

      Leggeri told MEPs that although he personally prioritised the swift recruitment of fundamental rights staff, vacancy notices published by the agency in November 2019 were withdrawn on the request of the Commission, and subsequent delays in agreeing the seniority of the posts meant that vacancy notices were only published again in November 2020.

      Pariat does not dispute these points, but underlines that the Commission was obliged to request the withdrawal of the notices, because the Management Board had not approved them, as required by the 2019 Frontex Regulation. Without that approval, the letter says that “the publication of these vacancies was plain and simply unlawful” (emphasis in original).

      She adds that the Frontex Regulation requires the involvement of the FRO in the appointment of their deputy, but there was no such involvement prior to the 2019 vacancy notice publication. The Commission had to intervene to request removal of the vacancy notices, says Pariat, “to prevent serious irregularities which could jeopardise the well-functioning and the reputation of the Agency.”

      Bad reputation

      The agency’s reputation has nevertheless taken a battering in recent months. Frontex has faced numerous accusations that it either knew of or has been involved in pushbacks at Greece’s sea border with Turkey, leading the Socialists & Democrats – the second-largest group in the European Parliament – to call for Leggeri’s resignation. There are numerous other reports of similar violent incidents in the Balkans involving officials deployed on Frontex missions.

      The EU anti-fraud agency, OLAF, has also launched an investigation into the border agency, although the exact reasons for this remain unclear. OLAF’s remit allows it to carry out “administrative investigations for the purpose of fighting fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union.”

      Leggeri has said that the agency will be undertaking a thorough investigation into the allegations of pushbacks, although the working group set up to investigate the affair is made up representatives from the agency’s Management Board and does not include the Fundamental Rights Officer or the agency’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights.

      “Active resistance”

      A document cited by Greek newspaper Kathimerini suggests that fundamental rights are not one of Leggeri’s main interests. The document, provided to the paper by someone described as having “knowledge of the inner workings of Frontex,” says Leggeri told agency staff that “reporting pushbacks involving Frontex personnel is not a route to popularity or promotion,” and that the serous incident reporting (SIR) mechanism is “intentionally centralized to be slow, cumbersome and very discreet”.

      According to the paper, the document also says that Leggeri “actively resisted” hiring the 40 fundamental rights officers required by the Frontex Regulation, and told staff at the agency in early 2020 that “it is not a priority.”

      Pariat’s letter suggests that Leggeri himself delayed the procedure for recruiting new fundamental rights staff by five months, because of his “insistence on an arrangement which would not have been compatible with the EBCG [Frontex] Regulation”.

      There was a “surprising reluctance” from the agency to follow the Commission’s advice on implementing the new fundamental rights framework, says Pariat. She argues that “if the Agency had followed the Commission’s timely guidance and suggestions, the main milestones… could have been completed on time.”

      Even though the recruitment procedure is now going ahead, concerns remain. At the LIBE hearing in December, several MEPs questioned whether the staff grade applicable to the 40 posts will confer adequate authority and independence to the fundamental rights officers.

      At the time of publication, Frontex had not responded to a request for comment.

      Documentation

      - European Commission letter to Mr Leggeri, 18 December: Subject: Your letter of 4 December 2020 (ref: CAB/KARO/10563/2020) (pdf): https://www.statewatch.org/media/1708/eu-com-letter-to-frontex-18-12-20.pdf
      – Fabrice Leggeri, Answers to written questions following the LIBE Committee meeting 1 December (pdf) - annex to this letter (pdf): https://www.statewatch.org/media/1709/eu-frontex-written-questions-answers-libe-hearing-1-12-20.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/january/eu-frontex-director-accused-of-misleading-parliament-over-fundamental-ri

    • Refoulements et gestion contestée : la pression s’intensifie sur le patron de Frontex

      Fabrice Leggeri, directeur exécutif de l’agence européenne de protection des frontières, est sous la pression de la Commission et du Parlement.

      Ce n’est pas un appel à la démission de Fabrice Leggeri, directeur exécutif de Frontex, mais cela y ressemble fort. Rencontrant, lundi 18 janvier, plusieurs médias européens, dont Le Monde, Ylva Johansson, commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures et à la migration, a été interrogée sur un éventuel départ du patron français de ce qui est désormais l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes. « Je ne fais pas de commentaire là-dessus. Des procédures ont été lancées, elles ne sont pas terminées. Mais je pense qu’elles doivent l’être », indiquait la commissaire socialiste suédoise.

      Des propos prudents mais qui cachent mal le fait qu’entre la Commission et Frontex le torchon brûle. Pour preuve, une lettre envoyée au siège de l’agence en décembre 2020 par #Monique_Pariat, chef de la direction générale de la migration et des affaires intérieures à Bruxelles. Un long réquisitoire reprochant à M. Leggeri des retards, des carences dans la gestion et des « hésitations incompréhensibles » à suivre les instructions. Voire un #mensonge au sujet du recrutement des personnels qui devaient être chargés de veiller au respect des droits fondamentaux au sein de l’Agence.

      Les « procédures » visant M. Leggeri et évoquées par Mme Johansson sont multiples. Et elles visent essentiellement la possible implication de Frontex dans des « pushbacks », des refoulements illégaux de migrants aux frontières de l’Union, avant qu’ils aient pu introduire d’éventuelles demandes d’asile. En octobre 2020, plusieurs médias évoquaient, témoignages et images à l’appui, six cas de refoulements en mer Egée. Avec, notamment, les manœuvres dangereuses d’un navire de Frontex, qui aurait pu entraîner le #naufrage d’une embarcation. La direction de l’Agence démentait à l’époque toute infraction.

      Constitution d’un groupe de travail

      L’Office de lutte antifraude de l’Union a lancé une enquête et, le 7 décembre 2020, les bureaux de M. Leggeri et de son directeur de cabinet ont été perquisitionnés. L’investigation porterait, aussi, sur des faits de #harcèlement et des erreurs de gestion.

      Plusieurs groupes politiques du Parlement européen ont, eux, transmis une longue liste de questions au directeur exécutif après qu’il a été entendu, le 1er décembre 2020, par l’Assemblée. M. Leggeri avait indiqué qu’une #enquête_interne n’avait pas prouvé l’implication de membres de Frontex dans des refoulements illégaux. Peu convaincus, les eurodéputés du groupe socialiste ont exigé sa #démission, d’autres groupes ont réclamé des explications complémentaires.

      Au sein de Frontex même, un #groupe_de_travail avait été constitué en novembre, sur insistance de la Commission. Son rapport devrait être examiné lors d’une réunion du conseil d’administration, mercredi 20 et jeudi 21 janvier. Ce conseil est composé de représentants des pays membres de l’Union et de deux membres de la Commission.

      L’un des principaux reproches adressés à M. Leggeri est qu’il aurait tergiversé pour embaucher la quarantaine de personnes qui, en théorie, auraient dû être à pied d’œuvre dès décembre 2020 pour veiller au respect des droits des migrants et demandeurs d’asile. Dans la lettre de Mme Pariat qu’il a reçue en décembre, le directeur se voit reprocher d’avoir agi « de manière trompeuse » en ne livrant pas les explications correctes aux parlementaires quant à l’absence de ces employés. Mme Johansson pense également que certains des propos qu’il avait tenus n’étaient « pas vrais ».

      Action « illégale »

      La commissaire suédoise n’a, jusqu’ici, pas officiellement retiré sa confiance au directeur. Elle endosse cependant les critiques qui lui sont adressées par sa direction générale, qui évoque encore une action « illégale » de M. Leggeri en 2019, avec la publication de deux vacances de postes dirigeants qui n’avaient pas été approuvées par le conseil d’administration.

      Au Parlement, où la plénière débattait, mardi, du pacte migratoire proposé récemment par la Commission, la tension monte également. Mme Johansson a insisté sur la nécessité pour les pays de l’Union, les candidats à l’adhésion et « les agences européennes aussi » d’adhérer pleinement au respect des #droits_fondamentaux. Et plusieurs députés ont à nouveau mis en cause Frontex, l’élue socialiste bulgare #Elena_Yoncheva jugeant qu’en matière de « pushbacks » l’agence fait désormais « partie du problème, pas de la solution ».

      Une situation embarrassante pour toute l’Union : dotée maintenant d’uniformes, d’armes et d’un budget passé au total à 5,6 milliards d’euros pour la période 2021-2027, l’agence des garde-frontières peut difficilement voir la #légitimité de son principal dirigeant remise en question au plus haut niveau. A ce stade, celui-ci n’a pas réagi officiellement aux accusations qui le visent. Il pourrait le faire prochainement, selon un membre de son entourage.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/01/20/refoulements-et-gestion-contestee-la-pression-s-intensifie-sur-le-patron-de-

    • Le garde-frontière Frontex en pleine tourmente

      Les refoulements aux frontières européennes fragilisent la position du directeur de Frontex, l’agence européenne de garde-frontières. La Commission reproche à Fabrice Leggeri d’avoir ralenti l’embauche d’officiers de contrôle des droits fondamentaux. Son agence est soumise à plusieurs #enquêtes, dont une de l’#office_européen_anti-fraude. Des députés demandent sa #démission.

      Bruxelles (Belgique).– Fabrice Leggeri, le directeur de Frontex, est cerné de toutes parts. Sa position, à la tête de l’agence européenne de garde-côtes et de garde-frontières, est fragilisée suite à de récents scandales concernant des refoulements de demandeurs d’asile vers la Turquie, auxquels aurait participé Frontex. Des députés appellent à sa démission. La médiatrice européenne, #Emily_O’Reilly, a ouvert une #enquête le 11 novembre dernier pour évaluer le fonctionnement du mécanisme de #plainte_interne à Frontex. Même l’office européen de lutte anti-fraude investigue et scrute la gestion de l’agence.

      Le dernier coup de boutoir vient de la #Commission_européenne. Dans une lettre du 18 décembre, la directrice générale chargée des migrations et des affaires intérieures, Monique Pariat, adressait des mots durs à Fabrice Leggeri au sujet d’irrégularités et de retards dans les procédures de recrutement d’un officier des droits fondamentaux, de son adjoint et de 40 contrôleurs des droits fondamentaux, qui devaient faire partie de l’agence le 5 décembre 2020 au plus tard et qui ne sont toujours pas embauchés : « C’est la responsabilité de la Commission […] d’intervenir pour empêcher que des irrégularités sérieuses viennent compromettre le bon fonctionnement et la réputation de l’agence. »

      La réputation de Frontex a pourtant déjà été écornée à de multiples reprises dans le passé, sans que l’exécutif bruxellois s’en émeuve. « Pendant longtemps la Commission a protégé Fabrice Leggeri, commente #Birgit_Sippel, eurodéputée allemande du groupe des socialistes et démocrates. Il semble que le vent tourne, notamment sous la pression du #Parlement_européen. »

      C’est le 23 octobre 2020 que le vent a tourné. Une série de médias européens, dont Der Spiegel et Bellingcat, publiaient alors une enquête fouillée suggérant que l’agence européenne avait, entre mars et août 2020, soit assisté à des refoulements de demandeurs d’asile en mer Égée par des garde-côtes grecs, sans les avoir rapportés, soit participé activement au renvoi de canots vers les côtes turques, alors que les refoulements sont strictement prohibés par le droit international. Le 8 juin, un navire de l’opération « #Poséidon » de Frontex, battant pavillon roumain, aurait même bloqué un canot de migrants avant de contribuer à le repousser.

      Fabrice Leggeri est venu s’expliquer devant le Parlement européen le 1er décembre. Selon lui, l’enquête interne menée par ses services concluait à « l’absence de preuves » de refoulement dans les cas mentionnés par la presse. Il insistait sur le fait que les activités de contrôle aux frontières avaient toujours lieu « à la demande et sous le commandement des autorités nationales », Frontex intervenant en coordination des opérations maritimes, en mobilisant des avions, des navires et des garde-frontières originaires des 27 États membres.

      Ces déclarations élusives ont hérissé de nombreux députés européens. « La façon dont il a répondu à nos questions montre que Fabrice Leggeri ne prend pas vraiment au sérieux ces allégations. Frontex a besoin de changements structurels, et je pense qu’il n’est pas la bonne personne pour les mener », avance Tineke Strik, eurodéputée néerlandaise des Verts.

      De la #gauche_unitaire_européenne (#GUE) au groupe centriste de #Renew, les critiques pleuvent à l’encontre de Fabrice Leggeri, mais l’attitude à adopter crée des divisions. La centriste néerlandaise, #Sophie_In’t_Veld, du groupe Renew, milite pour qu’une commission d’enquête parlementaire soit mise sur pied, « car on parle d’actes criminels ». Avant de réclamer la démission du directeur – qui ne peut être décidée que par le conseil d’administration de Frontex composé des États membres et de la Commission – la députée pense « qu’il faut d’abord faire toute la lumière sur les faits ».

      Au sein du groupe des socialistes et démocrates, des députés veulent aller plus vite. « Pourquoi perdre un an avec une #commission_d’enquête ?, s’interroge #Birgit_Sippel. Les rapports décrivant les violations des droits humains aux frontières sont là. Pour l’instant, Fabrice Leggeri se cache et échappe à ses responsabilités. » Des députés de la GUE comme des #Verts réclament à la fois une commission d’enquête et la #démission du directeur. Quant à la droite, le Parti populaire européen n’a pas encore de position sur ces thèmes, mais voit d’un mauvais œil cette idée de commission d’enquête.

      Le mastodonte sans contrôle

      Pour Yves Pascouau, directeur du programme Europe à l’association Res-Publica, par ailleurs spécialiste des questions migratoires européenne (et élu de la majorité nantaise), « l’augmentation des moyens et des pouvoirs de Frontex ne peut pas se faire sans une augmentation de ses responsabilités ».

      Frontex, au fil des ans, est devenu un mastodonte. En 2012, son budget était de 89,5 millions d’euros. Il est en 2020 de 460 millions. 5,6 milliards d’euros ont été dégagés pour la période 2021-2027. Il s’agit de la plus grosse agence de l’UE qui sera dotée, d’ici 2027, de 10 000 garde-côtes véritablement européens, avec leurs propres uniformes. « Cela permettra d’augmenter la transparence et la responsabilité de Frontex », veut croire une source européenne.

      Aujourd’hui, Frontex se déploie sous commandement des autorités nationales. Mais les agents qui agissent en son nom ne sont pas exempts de responsabilités. Ils ont l’obligation d’envoyer un rapport aux dirigeants de Frontex à chaque incident sérieux auquel ils assistent, y compris lorsque des violations des droits humains sont observées.

      Le Forum consultatif de Frontex, qui réunit des institutions européennes, des organisations internationales et ONG, s’interroge inlassablement sur « l’effectivité » de ce système. En 2018, seuls 3 incidents sérieux relatifs à des violations de droits humains furent comptabilisés par l’agence, et 9 en 2019, sans que l’on sache quel a été le suivi de ces dossiers.

      Quant à l’embauche des milliers de garde-frontières, elle doit être contrebalancée par davantage de contrôles des activités de Frontex. L’officier des droits fondamentaux, son adjoint et sa petite équipe d’au minimum 40 contrôleurs sont considérés comme la clef de voûte de ce système de surveillance du respect des #droits_humains.

      Dans la lettre adressée à Fabrice Leggeri, Monique Pariat regrette qu’au 18 décembre, aucun de ces recrutements n’ait été effectué. Elle pointe la « réticence surprenante de Frontex » à suivre les lignes directrices de la Commission, « ce qui a encore davantage entravé et retardé cet important processus ». La directrice générale dénonce encore la démarche « illégale » du directeur général qui avait publié, en 2019, une première annonce pour le poste d’officier des droits fondamentaux, sans l’accord du conseil d’administration de Frontex qui sera pourtant le supérieur hiérarchique direct de ce futur employé.

      Elle l’accuse encore d’avoir présenté les faits aux eurodéputés « de manière trompeuse ». L’attaque est frontale. Au-delà de l’enjeu institutionnel, Giorgos Kosmopoulos, du bureau européen d’Amnesty International, estime que « l’embauche de contrôleurs des droits fondamentaux n’est pas une mauvaise chose à condition qu’ils aient véritablement les moyens de mener des enquêtes, d’aller sur le terrain ». Et sur le terrain, justement, les refoulements aux frontières de l’Europe sont documentés et très nombreux. En #Grèce, en #Croatie, en #Hongrie.

      En mars 2020, le comité européen pour la prévention de la torture rapportait des allégations « crédibles et consistantes » de refoulements et détentions arbitraires, souvent accompagnées de violences, à la frontière gréco-turque. « On ne parle pas de cas isolés, ajoute Giorgos Kosmopoulos. La pratique est si répandue et généralisée qu’il est impossible que Frontex ne soit pas au courant, vu son implication sur le terrain. »

      Le directeur de Frontex, s’il estime qu’il existe « des violations graves […] des droits fondamentaux » doit mettre un terme à l’activité litigieuse à laquelle participe son agence. « Le directeur doit vérifier la situation sur le terrain et le cas échéant il doit retirer ses équipes pour qu’elles ne soient pas liées à des violations de droits humains, mais ce n’est jamais arrivé », conclut Giorgos Kosmopoulos.

      Dans ce contexte, Tineke Strik pense qu’une démission de Fabrice Leggeri, certes bienvenue, « ne résoudra pas tout. Les problèmes sont structurels. Il faudra lancer une enquête approfondie sur le fonctionnement de Frontex ».

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/210121/le-garde-frontiere-frontex-en-pleine-tourmente?onglet=full

    • Validating Border Violence on the Aegean: Frontex’s Internal Records

      The Aegean Sea, separating Turkey from Greece’s ‘hotspot’ islands, is a site of longstanding and increasingly visible border violence: the systematic use of inflatable life rafts by the Hellenic Coast Guard to push people back to Turkey has been widely documented since March last year. This maritime borderzone also stages the operational theatre of Frontex Joint Operation Poseidon, under which patrol boats, helicopters and surveillance planes have been deployed to patrol the extensive breadth of water.

      Frontex repeatedly denied any involvement in these pushbacks (see here and here), stressing its commitment to the protection, promotion and fulfilment of fundamental rights. This ‘modus operandi’ in which fundamental rights become a rhetorical defence could no longer hold after investigative reporters showed visual evidence of Frontex’s complicit role in pushbacks, prompting further media scrutiny and pressure by the European Parliament and Commission.

      In November, Efsyn, a Greek media outlet, published an eighteen-page long Frontex internal document addressed to the agency’s Management Board. The document aimed at answering questions by Member States and the Commission about the on-going pushbacks in the Aegean. The document, which fuelled Frontex’s recent internal inquiry, lists a series of so-called ‘incidents’ and, at times, offers detailed accounts of the previously denied pushbacks. However, these were not recorded as such.

      A closer look at the document reveals numerous ‘#JORA_incidents’ classified as ‘prevention of departure’, as this transcript from August 19, 2020, illustrates:

      frontex

      The #Joint_Operations_Reporting_Application (#JORA) is the main information system that collects and stores all ‘border related incidents’ from Frontex joint operations. Such incidents range from Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, interceptions, Serious Incident Reports to, as the one above, so-called preventions of departure. The leaked document contains twenty of the latter, all following a similar pattern: Firstly, the location of the rubber boat is recorded in Turkish territorial waters; second, Frontex assets are “excused from the scene” after detection; and, finally, a rehearsed ending: the boat “altered course on her own initiative/will and headed towards the Turkish coasts” or, alternately, the Turkish Coast Guard “took over responsibility”.

      Importantly, these JORA incidents coexist with the regular documenting of border violence. Descriptions of boats of asylum-seekers returning to Turkey of their own volition jar with regular testimonies describing the coercive methods employed to push them back. Alarm Phone, Aegean Boat Report and Border Violence Monitoring Network document human rights violations occurring at the same border, on the same dates and, often, at the same time as the JORA incidents.

      On the same day as the JORA incident above:

      Logging the border

      JORA incidents, together with information collected via Eurosur, form the backbone of Europe’s external borders and migration situational picture, Frontex’s narrative of the border. Yet, what is and is not accounted for in JORA and how, has not received much attention. Contrary to the few Serious Incident Reports related to violations of fundamental rights, which are dealt with by the Fundamental Rights Officer and presented to the Management Board, other incidents recorded in JORA don’t reach the public domain. Once inserted and validated, they become a dot on a map at the Frontex Situation Centre in Warsaw. They are devised to feed into risk analyses, maps and weekly analytical overviews.

      This ‘business-as-usual’ mode of reporting is mostly done by a few officers from the host Member State— in Greece, by the Hellenic Coast Guard and Police—who insert incidents into a standardised template through a set of rigid, mandatory fields. Reporting is not done by the officers on the patrol boats but mostly those who sit at coordination centres. Once inserted in the system, incidents are sent to the International Coordination Centre and the Frontex Situation Centre where they are cross-checked with reports from both Hellenic Coast Guard and Frontex deployed officers for validation. This validation process does not statically move in one direction; incidents can go back and forth in the validation chain. The final validation is done by a “specialized team of experts” at Frontex headquarters as the leaked document explains. Yet, incidents can be re-initiated and modified even after finalisation (see work by Pollozek).

      The design of the system allows for the rehearsed recording of formulaic bordering practices that, if closely examined, resemble its coexistent violent forms. Shading into the routine, the JORA records circulate regularly from the islands to Piraeus and Warsaw. While the full JORA archive is inaccessible to the public, the reviewed incidents give us insight into how a particular doctrine of border enforcement is being sustained by the agency and to what effects.

      Normalising violence, eroding rights

      The effects of these records arguably extend beyond the tactical level of border policing. Through their production, a narrative arc is formed by the recorded incidents, generating a specific mode of understanding. Data must be made intelligible to the JORA system and officials along the chain before it can be validated. As a result, even acts of violence such as pushbacks can get translated into mundane logs and thus, brought within the remit of everyday border enforcement and legality.

      The leaked document asserts that the “the notion of ‘prevention of departure”, according to which these ‘incidents’ are classified, should be interpreted “in conjunction with the provisions of Regulation 656/2014, in particular Articles 6 and 7”. While the precise legal meaning of this category in this context remains unclear, its ramifications for the right to leave a country are concerning.

      Regulation 656/2014 indeed provides legal basis (in certain factual circumstances) for the interception of boats carrying asylum-seekers. Yet, it clearly stipulates that the actions that official entities may lawfully take to enforce the border must be compliant with their obligations under EU and international law, including, inter alia, international human rights and refugee law. Moreover, it states: “This Regulation should not affect the responsibilities of search and rescue authorities, including for ensuring that coordination and cooperation is conducted in such a way that the persons rescued can be delivered to a place of safety.”

      The records, however, present an account of border enforcement that exists in isolation from human rights and humanitarian commitments. The dangerous conditions in which border enforcement takes place and the vulnerability of asylum seekers to these conditions are rendered irrelevant and thereby, banalised. Rubber boats carrying illegalized migrants are generally considered seaworthy, not recognised as in distress, regardless of how many people they carry or the fluctuating weather conditions in the Aegean. In none of the incidents contained in the leaked document was a SAR triggered by the Hellenic Coast Guard or Frontex. In this sense, JORA acts as a mediator that transforms, translates, distorts and modifies the meaning of these ‘incidents’. Through the designation of bureaucratic categories (e.g. prevention of departure), JORA codifies and transforms situations that should trigger humanitarian and human rights obligations into legitimate practices of border control. In the process, the duty to render assistance at sea is distorted, and the obligation to facilitate access to asylum is obscured.

      In the context of on-going internal discussions about the legality of interceptions at sea, Frontex’s internal records reveal the practices deemed acceptable by the agency and their interpretation of international legal obligations. The records provide insight into a vision of border enforcement, crystallised at the boundaries of the global north, that perpetuates the violent securitisation of borders to the detriment of human mobility, dignity and safety. They carve out a space where border control activities are shielded from scrutiny, erasing human rights from the operational script.

      Any comments about this post? Get in touch with us! Send us an email, or post a comment here or on Facebook. You can also tweet us.

      https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2021/01/validating-border

    • Five migrant pushback claims under scrutiny

      The board of directors of the European border agency Frontex, which met on Wednesday and Thursday, has decided to further investigate five of 13 reported cases of illegal migrants pushbacks last year, with the alleged help of Frontex guards, from Greece into Turkish territorial waters in the eastern Aegean.

      The board deemed that Frontex did not provide the necessary information and clarifications for the five cases under investigation.

      In view of this, the team investigating the claims has been given additional time to complete its work and present its final conclusions to a new extraordinary board meeting scheduled for February 26.

      With regard to the other eight cases, the board said that there is no evidence to confirm any violations. It also accepted that some of these incidents unfolded in Turkish territorial waters, and in others the migrant boats turned back on their own accord.

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/261560/article/ekathimerini/news/five-migrant-pushback-claims-under-scrutiny

    • L’agence européenne Frontex fragilisée par les accusations d’expulsions illégales

      L’agence de surveillance des frontières de l’UE, qui a annoncé qu’elle suspendait ses opérations en Hongrie, est accusée d’avoir participé au « pushback », qui consiste à repousser les migrants sans leur laisser la possibilité de déposer une demande d’asile.
      Accusations d’implication dans des « pushbacks » – des refoulements illégaux de migrants et demandeurs d’asile aux frontières –, enquêtes de l’Office de lutte antifraude de l’Union européenne (UE) et de la Commission de Bruxelles, mise en cause de son directeur, Fabrice Leggeri : l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, Frontex, chargée de surveiller les frontières extérieures de l’UE, traverse de grosses turbulences. Mercredi 27 janvier, elle a même été contrainte d’annoncer qu’elle allait arrêter ses opérations en Hongrie, une première dans l’histoire de cette institution, fondée en 2004.
      « Nos efforts communs pour protéger les frontières extérieures ne peuvent réussir que si nous veillons à ce que notre coopération et nos activités soient pleinement conformes aux lois de l’UE », a expliqué un porte-parole, en critiquant implicitement les pratiques illégales de la police hongroise, auxquelles l’agence européenne participait pourtant depuis la crise des réfugiés de 2015.
      En cause, la pratique du « pushback », systématisée par le premier ministre ultranationaliste, Viktor Orban, et développée ailleurs dans l’Union. Le fait de repousser les migrants arrivés sur le sol européen sans leur laisser la possibilité de déposer une demande d’asile n’a pas été partout aussi clairement assumé qu’en Hongrie, mais la Grèce, la Croatie, l’Italie ou la Slovénie, notamment, ont été mises an cause pour s’être livrées, elles aussi, à cette pratique illégale. Un « Livre noir », épais de 1 500 pages et présenté récemment par un réseau d’ONG, a recensé pas moins de 900 cas de ce type, concernant près de 13 000 personnes.
      Expulsions inhumaines
      Depuis une loi adoptée en 2016, la Hongrie considère, elle, que tous les migrants arrivant sur son sol peuvent être immédiatement renvoyés vers la Serbie voisine. Lorsqu’ils sont arrêtés, après avoir réussi à franchir la clôture que M. Orban a fait construire tout le long de la frontière, ou même à Budapest, les migrants se voient systématiquement refuser de déposer une demande d’asile et sont expulsés sans autre forme de procès, dans des conditions parfois inhumaines.
      Présents à la frontière hongroise depuis 2015, les agents de Frontex ont participé à cette politique, malgré les critiques des organisations non gouvernementales. « La Hongrie est le seul pays à avoir légalisé les “pushbacks” et à les pratiquer aussi ouvertement. La police hongroise publie même des chiffres tous les jours sur le nombre de personnes renvoyées en Serbie », dénonce Andras Lederer, du Comité Helsinki hongrois, une ONG spécialisée dans l’aide aux migrants. Il estime que la Hongrie a pratiqué 50 000 refoulements depuis 2016. A l’issue d’une longue bataille juridique, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a estimé, le 17 décembre 2020, que les pratiques hongroises enfreignent les directives régissant le droit d’asile.
      Malgré cet arrêt, le gouvernement de Budapest a refusé de modifier sa législation et a continué ces pratiques. « La Hongrie ne va pas céder devant la pression des forces pro-immigration », affirmait encore le porte-parole du gouvernement, Zoltan Kovacs, jeudi 28 janvier. « Bruxelles veut nous prendre le peu d’aide qu’on avait », a-t-il ajouté en réaction au retrait de Frontex, devenu inéluctable après l’arrêt de la Cour de Luxembourg. Pour M. Lederer, ce retrait est en revanche « bienvenu » : « La Hongrie ne pourra plus se cacher derrière la présence de Frontex pour continuer cette pratique. »
      Violences aux frontières de l’Union
      Avec un contingent censé atteindre 10 000 hommes, un budget pluriannuel passé à 5,6 milliards d’euros et son rôle de gardienne stricte des frontières, en association avec les forces nationales, l’agence dirigée par M. Leggeri est l’une des pièces essentielles de la politique migratoire de l’UE et du « pacte » proposé en 2020 pour la Commission. Sa mise en cause, alors même qu’elle est loin de tourner à plein régime, est de mauvais augure.
      Jeudi 28 janvier, alors que les vingt-sept ministres de l’intérieur, réunis en visioconférence, évoquaient – en présence du directeur de Frontex – le dossier de la migration, l’Agence des Nations unies pour les réfugiés évoquait un droit d’asile « menacé » en Europe et disait recevoir « de nombreux rapports » sur les violences exercées aux frontières de l’Union.
      D’où l’attention toute particulière que porte la commissaire aux affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, au dossier des « pushbacks ». La responsable suédoise se satisfait-elle des explications de la direction de Frontex, dont le conseil d’administration affirmait, le 21 janvier, qu’il n’avait pas trouvé de preuves de violation des droits de l’homme dans les cas qu’il a examinés ? « Sur la base des informations fournies », il n’aurait « pu établir de preuves ». Il a toutefois précisé que ses conclusions ne concernaient que certains incidents en Grèce et que des clarifications étaient nécessaires. Cinq cas problématiques de possibles refoulements impliquant Frontex sont encore examinés.
      Jeudi, devant les ministres, Mme Johansson a réclamé « toutes les analyses nécessaires » pour, dit-elle, rétablir la confiance dans l’agence. Elle a aussi évoqué un projet de réforme, incluant la nomination de trois sous-directeurs et la mise en place – enfin – d’un système de surveillance des droits humains.
      Le débat « recule »
      Au-delà du sort de Frontex, la question est de savoir si une définition d’une véritable politique migratoire européenne, avec une refonte des règles de l’asile et une solidarité accrue entre les pays, a une chance de se réaliser. Confirmant que le débat sur le « pacte » élaboré par la Commission « n’a pas beaucoup avancé », le secrétaire d’Etat belge à la migration, Sammy Mahdi, déclarait, jeudi, au quotidien La Libre Belgique qu’il fallait le rendre « rationnel ». Pour sortir les discussions de l’ornière, pour vérifier que la proposition de la Commission est opérationnelle et, enfin, pour que chacun annonce vraiment ses intentions, M. Mahdi propose « une simulation » : sur la base des chiffres de l’année 2019, chaque pays préciserait ce qu’il pourrait accomplir concernant l’accueil, la solidarité, le financement des infrastructures d’accueil aux frontières, etc.
      Un communiqué du secrétaire d’Etat évoquait une possible évolution de la Hongrie et de ses partenaires du groupe de Visegrad, à condition que soit satisfaite leur revendication (très floue) d’une solidarité « flexible ». Un participant à la réunion de jeudi faisait preuve de moins de conviction : « Faire avancer le débat ? Mais il recule ! » Vétéran des conseils européens sur la migration, le ministre luxembourgeois Jean Asselborn n’est pas loin de confirmer : « Nous sommes sans doute tous d’accord sur les contrôles aux frontières extérieures ou sur les retours. Mais pas sur la manière de respecter les droits humains des demandeurs d’asile, sur les relocalisations obligatoires ou sur l’impératif de solidarité » entre les pays européens. Les Etats prêts à respecter ces principes se compteraient, en effet, désormais sur les doigts d’une main.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/01/29/l-agence-europeenne-frontex-fragilisee-par-les-accusations-d-expulsions-ille

    • Refoulement de migrants : « Frontex se retranche toujours derrière ses États hôtes » (Migreurop)

      L’agence de surveillance des frontières de l’UE, a annoncé qu’elle suspendait ses opérations en Hongrie après une décision de la Cour de justice européenne critiquant le système d’asile de ce pays. L’Office européen de lutte antifraude enquête de son côté sur la gouvernance de l’agence par son directeur exécutif, Fabrice Leggeri dont plusieurs eurodéputés demandent la démission. Frontex a-t-elle participé à des opérations de « pushback », initiées par la Hongrie, qui consistent à repousser des migrants arrivés sur le sol européen sans leur laisser la possibilité de déposer une demande d’asile ? Le décryptage de Brijitte Espuche, co-coordinatrice du réseau Migreurop.

      https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/invit%C3%A9-international/20210129-refoulement-de-migrants-frontex-se-retranche-toujours-derri%C3%A8re-ses

    • Frontex: Management Board pushes back against secrecy proposals in preliminary report

      Statewatch is publishing the preliminary report of the working group set up by the agency’s Management Board following allegations of involvement in pushbacks from Turkey to Greece. Amongst other things, the report indicates that Frontex has proposed labelling Serious Incident Reports as EU Classified Information, which would reduce transparency and, in turn, accountability.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/february/frontex-management-board-pushes-back-against-secrecy-proposals-in-prelim

    • Scandals Plunge Europe’s Border Agency into Turmoil

      Accusations of workplace harassment, mismanagement and financial irregularities have led to chaos at Europe’s border agency. The allegations weigh heavily on Frontex head Fabrice Leggeri.

      The men and women who are part of Europe’s new elite border force meet every morning at 9 a.m. for a video conference that is viewed on screens in countries like Greece, Croatia, Bulgaria and Albania. The Frontex officials usually discuss migration movements and human trafficking, But since the beginning of January, the internal meetings have focused primarily on low morale within the team.

      "Do something at last, or soon no one will work here anymore,” one border guard warned in one of the calls. The policemen and women who regularly complain about their woes are the European Union’s first dedicated border guards. They’re part of Frontex’s standing corps.

      For months now, Frontex, the EU’s border protection agency, and its head Fabrice Leggeri, have been embroiled in a series of scandals. Frontex has been accused of being involved in illegal repatriations of refugees at Europe’s external borders, workplace harassment and a possible case of fraud linked to the agency. Now the crisis has also reached the standing corps, the border management agency’s prestige project.

      Frontex plans to deploy up to 10,000 border guards to the EU’s external borders in the coming years. The civil servants were promised brand new equipment and EU jobs with lavish salaries and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen personally pushed for the creation of the standing corps. The stars of the EU flag sparkle on the sleeves of the new dark blue uniforms worn by the reserves.

      The job may sound glamorous on paper, but it is anything but in the countries where the reserve guards have been deployed, like Greece, Croatia and Albania. Several officers have told DER SPIEGEL of a shortage of agency vehicles, such that expensive SUVs must be rented instead — with officers allegedly even having to pay for gas themselves in some cases. They claim that expenses weren’t reimbursed for bureaucratic reasons, and that parts of the new uniforms were missing and had to be bought by the border guards themselves.

      The officers should be out hunting down criminals and catching smugglers, but Category 1 officers, who are directly employed by Frontex, so far haven’t been allowed to carry weapons because the agency failed to provide the legal basis for doing so in time. The result is that the border guards, supposedly members of an elite European force, have to be escorted on every one of their patrols by national security forces.

      When contacted by DER SPIEGEL, Frontex also said that the pandemic has created additional challenges for deploying the force, but things are back on track again. Yet the agency’s own officers don’t see it that way. It’s a "Potemkin reserve,” scoffs one. "It’s not worth it,” says another officer, who is thinking about quitting.

      The establishment of the standing corps is one of the EU’s most important migration policy projects. The purpose is to control irregular immigration. But now the European Commission and the member states must stand by and watch as it becomes the focus of ridicule.

      The fiasco over the standing corps has become emblematic of an agency that has been falling short of public expectations for years, and of an agency head who is accumulating more and more power but doesn’t seem to know how to use it correctly.

      Under Leggeri, Frontex has stumbled from one scandal to the next. Last autumn, DER SPIEGEL, together with international media partners, first reported that Frontex forces in the Aegean Sea were involved in illegal repatriations of refugees, which are called pushbacks. The Frontex Management Board is investigating the allegations and the EU Ombudsman has opened an inquiry. Leggeri himself is apparently obstructing the investigations.

      In January, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) announced it had launched an investigation into Frontex. Leggeri claims that the investigators are looking into the pushback reports and that he cannot provide any further comment. But DER SPIEGEL has found in its reporting that the accusations go much further. The investigation involves a possible case of fraud involving a service provider, allegations of workplace harassment and whether information was withheld from the agency’s fundamental rights officer, whose job is to monitor Frontex’s adherence to basic human rights laid out in EU charters, conventions and international law. Internal documents suggest that Leggeri’s entire leadership style is under scrutiny.

      What happened? How could the authority charged with protecting the EU’s external borders descend into such chaos? And what does it all mean for the EU’s migration policy?

      DER SPIEGEL, the media organization Lighthouse Reports and the French newspaper Libération interviewed nearly a dozen current and former Frontex officials in the reporting of this story. Most insisted that their names not be mentioned in the story for fear that they could lose their jobs. Leggeri, for his part, rejected an interview request.

      When combined with internal documents that DER SPIEGEL and its partners were able to view, the insiders’ reports paint a picture of an agency in turmoil.

      France Télécom: How Leggeri seized power at Frontex

      The headquarters of Frontex are located in an office complex in Warsaw’s Wola district, not far from the city center. For years, only a few officials worked here compiling reports on migration routes. Actual border guards were borrowed from national police forces.

      But the agency has grown from a budget of just over 6 million euros in 2005 to 460 million euros in 2020. By 2027, Europe’s taxpayers will have provided 5.6 billion euros in funding to the agency.

      Frontex now has its own border guards, called the standing corps, in addition to aircraft and drones that will soon be complemented by unmanned airships that will provide surveillance as they circle over the Aegean Sea. Frontex’s rise has had a lot to do with Leggeri, the man who has done more than anyone else to shape the agency.

      Leggeri, 52, was born in Mulhouse, in France’s Alsace region, and speaks fluent German. He studied at the École Nationale d’Administration in Strasbourg, a university that has long produced the French elite. Starting in 2013, he worked at the Interior Ministry in Paris in the department for irregular immigration. At the time, the government advocated for Frontex’s expansion, and two years later, Leggeri was named head of the agency.

      Colleagues describe Leggeri as a technocrat. At a Christmas party once, the team gathered around and he began talking with great pathos about the achievements of the "Frontex family.” But Leggeri was reading from his notepad. "It seemed like the whole things was out of his league,” recalled one audience member.

      During the course of Frontex’s expansion, Leggeri tailored the agency to precisely fit his needs. He expanded his cabinet, filling many important posts with fellow French compatriots.

      Frontex workers say Leggeri is on rarely seen in the hallways, and that all important decisions are made by a small inner circle. They describe him as being a control freak, with some former staffers even going so far as to call him a "dictator.” Leggeri "runs the agency like it’s a sub-prefecture,” says someone who has worked with him for a long time. "You may be able to run a French ministry that way, but not an international organization.”

      Frontex staffers have taken to calling Leggeri’s cabinet "France Télécom” when the bosses aren’t around. It’s a reference to the scandal at the French telecommunications authority, which involved systematic bullying and harassment so bad that it drove a number of employees to commit suicide.

      The resentment felt by many Frontex staffers is largely directed at one of Leggeri’s closest confidants: Thibauld de La Haye Jousselin. The Frenchman comes from an aristocratic family from southern France. He once worked for Bernard Carayon, a member of the French parliament, who used to be part of a far-right student union. De La Haye Jousselin is a reserve officer in the French army and has a thing for the military and uniforms. “De La Haye Jousselin is clearly on the right politically,” says someone who has known him for years. Now, he serves Leggeri as the head of his cabinet.

      Insiders say that de La Haye Jousselin leads with an iron fist, and that he is quick to lose his temper. Employees claim he insults people and engages in disrespectful behavior. The agency stated that Frontex has not received any official complaints about de La Haye Jousselin and also claimed that no cabinet member has been hired solely on the basis of their nationality. De La Haye Jousselin dismissed the accusations as "false and baseless.”

      But the behavior of Leggeri and his cabinet chief has consequences. Dissent seems to be frowned upon. And this is likely one of the reasons internal control mechanisms at the agency are becoming less effective.

      Inmaculada Arnáez has more than 20 years of experience in human rights issues. The Spanish lawyer has worked for the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and she has been with Frontex since 2012. As the fundamental rights officer, she is supposed to operate independently of the executive director in her job as the agency’s internal watchdog. But when Leggeri took the helm in 2015, she quickly became aware of how little concern the new leader apparently had for human rights.

      Former Frontex employees report that Arnáez was left out in the cold. "We felt like Leggeri just bypassed her.” They claim that human rights had never been his priority.

      The final break between Leggeri and Arnáez came when the European Parliament granted the fundamental rights commissioner more powers in 2019. Arnáez was to be assisted by 40 human rights observers, which would have enabled her office to conduct its own investigations at Europe’s external borders. Apparently that was unthinkable for Leggeri.

      On Nov. 19, 2019, just as Arnáez was returning from an extended illness, the Frontex chief publicly advertised her position. In doing so, Leggeri had also bypassed the Frontex Management Board, since such a job posting requires the board’s approval. He had informed Arnáez only a short time before. In a written assessment obtained by DER SPIEGEL, the European Commission states that Leggeri’s move had been "plain and simply unlawful” and "could be considered as an attempt to discredit or weaken” Arnáez.

      The Commission forced Leggeri to withdraw the job posting. But the Frontex chief didn’t give up. He claimed Arnáez had to be replaced because she doesn’t have enough management experience to lead 40 employees.

      It seems likely, though, that the Frontex chief was mainly bothered by Arnáez because of her advocacy for human rights. Arnáez has repeatedly warned Leggeri against breaking the law. Colleagues say that she believed in the power of her reports. She regularly informed Leggeri about human rights violations in the Aegean Sea and recommended that he abandon the mission in Hungary, where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán legalized pushbacks in 2016.

      Leggeri ignored the fundamental rights officer’s reports and continued the operation in the Aegean Sea. He only withdrew his officers from Hungary a few weeks ago after a ruling by the European Court of Justice forced him to do so. When contacted for comment, Leggeri stated that he had always valued working together with Arnáez. He added that management experience is needed in the post because of the sharp increase in the budget.

      Leggeri still hasn’t hired the 40 human rights monitors to this day. When grilled by the European Parliament, Leggeri blamed the European Commission for the delays. European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson, who is responsible for the portfolio that includes Frontex, then accused him of having misled parliament.

      Arnáez has been on medical leave again since last March. The Frontex Management Board replaced her on an interim basis with Annegret Kohler, a German national who had previously worked in Leggeri’s cabinet. "It’s a clear conflict of interest,” says a Frontex official.
      The Pushback Affair: How Frontex Covered Up Human Rights Violations

      The walls of the Frontex Situation Centre are covered in monitors, with surveillance planes and satellites transmitting real-time images from border regions. From their desks, Frontex officers can closely monitor events taking place on the edges of Europe. “You can see how many people are sitting in a refugee boat,” says someone who knows the room well.

      A collection of images that appeared on screens here on the night of April 18-19, 2020, continue to occupy members of European Parliament until today. They come from a Frontex surveillance plane flying over the Aegean, according to several internal Frontex reports that DER SPIEGEL has obtained.

      Shortly before midnight, Greek border patrol officers intercepted a rubber dinghy just north of the island of Lesbos and transferred the 20 to 30 refugees onboard their ship. According to prevailing law, they should have then brought the asylum-seekers to Lesbos, where they could apply for asylum. Instead, though, they put the refugees back into the dinghy and then towed them back toward Turkey.

      Greek officials in the coordination center in Piraeus ordered the Frontex pilots to change course away from the dinghy. The Frontex team leader asked if there was a particular reason for the change in course. “Negative,” came the response from the Greeks.

      At 3:15 a.m., the Frontex plane began running low on fuel. The pilot took one last image, which showed the refugees alone at sea, a few hundred meters from the Turkish coast. No Turkish units were in the area, the pilot reported. The dinghy, he reported, had no motor and the Greek Coast Guard had sailed off. The refugees, including four children, were only rescued the next morning at 6:52 a.m. by the Turkish Navy.

      The Greek Coast Guard has been systematically conducting pushbacks for several months. They stop refugee boats in Greek territorial waters and sometimes destroy their motors before then towing them back toward Turkey. “Aggressive surveillance,” is the official term the government in Athens has come up with to describe the practice. In fact, it is illegal.

      Frontex regulations require Leggeri to suspend missions when he learns of rights violations of a serious nature or that are likely to persist. His forces, after all, are supposed to protect human rights. But Leggeri insists that he has no reliable information about pushbacks in his possession – despite the fact that DER SPIEGEL and its reporting partners have exhaustively documented how Frontex units were nearby during at least seven illegal pushback operations.

      During their operations, Frontex personnel are under the command of Greek border officials. Already last March, a Greek liaison officer ordered a Danish Frontex unit to abandon a group of intercepted refugees at sea, according to internal emails that DER SPIEGEL has reviewed. Nevertheless, Frontex decided nothing was wrong and closed the matter within a day. Later, in testimony he delivered before the European Parliament, Leggeri claimed the incident had merely been a misunderstanding.

      The pushback that took place off Lesbos in the night of April 18-19 was exhaustively documented by Frontex officers themselves. There is a strong belief “that presented facts support an allegation of possible violation of Fundamental Rights or international protection obligations such as the principle of non-refoulement,” reads an internal Frontex report that DER SPIEGEL has obtained.

      The case was apparently so sensitive that Leggeri took personal control over the investigation and did not, as was standard procedure, delegate it to his Fundamental Rights Officer. On May 8, he wrote to Ioannis Plakiotakis, the Greek minister of maritime affairs, a letter that DER SPIEGEL has obtained. In it, Leggeri voiced his concern and requested an internal investigation. The observance of human rights, particularly the principle of non-refoulement, is an “ultimate requirement” of the Frontex mission, he wrote.

      The answer from the Greek government is a smorgasbord of attempts to explain it away. Migration flows in the Aegean represent a “hybrid nature threat,” the response reads. Because of the corona crisis, it continues, it is more important than ever to prevent illegal border crossings and none of the migrants had requested asylum. According to an initial assessment by Greek officials, the letter claims, none of those on board were in particular need of protection.

      Legal experts see the Greek response as worthless. “The Greek Coast Guard without a doubt committed a human rights violation in the case,” says Dana Schmalz, an international law expert with the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg. From her perspective, it is a clear case of an illegal pushback. It is impossible, she says, to determine if someone needs protection or if they are faced with danger back in Turkey on board a rickety dinghy. Individual proceedings conducted on land are necessary to make such a determination, she says. Furthermore, she continues, the Greek Coast Guard put the migrants’ lives in danger by abandoning them at sea in a dinghy without a motor.

      But Leggeri was satisfied with the report. The verdict: There was no pushback, there were no human rights violations. The head of Frontex silently buried the incident. “There have been several occasions when Leggeri has not provided us with adequate information,” says Tineke Strik, a member of European Parliament from the Netherlands.

      When reached for comment, Frontex said the Greek government had not ascertained any human rights violations. The agency has to rely on national authorities to investigate such incidents, Frontex insisted, since it is not authorized to undertake such investigations itself.

      Frontex officials are actually required to report incidents where they suspect that human rights violations may have occurred, so-called “Serious Incident Reports.” But such reports are hardly ever written. For years, Frontex officials have followed the example of their boss Leggeri: When in doubt, keep quiet.

      Insiders describe the rules as a kind of omertà, a code of silence. Hardly anyone is willing to risk their career or cause problems for their host country. In one case, an official even tried to prevent a Swedish colleague from submitting a Serious Incident Report, the head of Swedish border control told the Frontex Management Board.

      A German federal police officer is one of the few willing to dissent, though he has asked that we not publish his real name. On Nov. 28, 2020, his first day on a Frontex mission on the Greek island of Samos, an article from DER SPIEGEL popped up on his mobile phone. The story was about the Uckermark, the ship on which he was scheduled to serve that very evening. The article reported that the Germans had stopped a refugee boat on August 10 and handed it over to the Greek Coast Guard, which then proceeded to abandon the refugees at sea.

      The federal policeman went to his commanding officer and said he couldn’t participate in such operations and essentially said he didn’t want to be an accessory to any legal transgressions. Later, he sent an explanation around to his comrades via WhatsApp: “I have decided for me personally that I cannot tolerate the measures taken by the Greeks and certainly cannot support them.”

      His commanding officer responded a few minutes later: “The fact is that our actions are legal! Covered by the Frontex mandate.” He apparently was referring to the requirement to obey orders from the Greek Coast Guard.

      The German Federal Police does not contradict the man’s account, but when contacted, the force denied having taken part in any legal violations. The policeman himself, however, had a different view of the situation. He refused to take part in the mission, preferring instead to stay on land. He says he will never again volunteer to take part in a Frontex mission.

      Dodgy Business: How Leggeri Landed in the Sights of the European Anti-Fraud Office

      The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) always gets involved when there are suspicions that EU financial interests have been violated. And recently, OLAF opened an investigation into Frontex. On Dec. 7, OLAF officials searched Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, including the offices belonging to Leggeri and to Head of Cabinet Thibauld de La Haye Jousselin.

      Leggeri has yet to comment publicly on the investigation. According to members of the German parliament, the Bundestag, Leggeri testified before the Committee on Internal Affairs in January in Berlin and said that the inquiry had to do with the pushback accusations and that he couldn’t say any more. That, though, is at best only half true.

      DER SPIEGEL has learned that the investigation has a much broader scope than that. For weeks, OLAF officials have been summoning witnesses and interrogating Frontex staff members.

      One focus of the investigation is apparently a possible case of fraud. A Polish IT company sold the agency a business software solution that cost hundreds of thousands of euros, in part for the training of border guards. Frontex employees complained to their superiors, however, that the software didn’t work well. But the agency nevertheless paid most of the negotiated purchase price. According to documentation DER SPEIGEL has seen, employees informed management in 2018 that the inconsistencies in the case could amount to fraud.

      Leggeri, too, learned of the allegations, and an internal investigation was undertaken. “But according to EU regulations, the Frontex director is required to immediately report potential cases of fraud to OLAF,” says Valentina Azarova of the Manchester International Law Centre. Frontex declined to comment on the OLAF investigation. The Polish software company in question insisted that it has thus far correctly fulfilled all of its contractual obligations to Frontex. And the company is still getting contracts from the European border agency, some of them worth millions.

      The OLAF investigators are also apparently interested in suspicions of workplace harassment at Frontex. They hope to find out if Leggeri or his head of cabinet have yelled at or otherwise harassed agency employees. They are also investigating whether staff members were ordered to withhold information from Fundamental Rights Officer Arnáez and her successor – and if so, by whom.

      OLAF emphasizes that the presumption of innocence still applies, despite the inquiry, explaining that the existence of the investigation offers no proof that anything untoward took place. But there are apparently serious indications of personal misconduct on the part of Leggeri. The collection of questions being asked by investigators indicate significant doubts about his leadership style.

      In Brussels, some refer to Leggeri as “Fabrice Teflon,” with the Frontex boss having thus far survived despite accusations of mismanagement and allegations that his agency was involved in pushbacks. Now, though, the pressure has been cranked up.

      European Commissioner Johansson has more or less made it clear that she no longer considers Leggeri to be tenable in his position. “It has been difficult to keep track of the missteps,” says a high-ranking Commission official. “The priority must be on the long-term reputation of the agency. But it has been hard to reconcile recent actions with that aim.”

      It is not, however, up to the European Commission to decide Leggeri’s fate. That is a decision that must be made by the Frontex Management Board. The board is essentially made up of representatives from those countries that are part of the Schengen Area, with the Commission having just two deputies on the board. EU member states have always thrown their support behind Leggeri in the past. And many of them are likely pleased by the occasionally ruthless methods employed by Frontex to prevent asylum-seekers from crossing into the EU, believes Giulia Laganà, a migration expert with the Open Society European Policy Institute.

      The question is whether the Management Board will continue to back Leggeri once the accusations of workplace harassment and even potential fraud are made public. The European Parliament has already announced its intention to conduct a four-month inquiry into the agency, with the investigation’s mandate having been kept intentionally broad. Leggeri’s leadership style and the workplace atmosphere at Frontex are to be included in the inquiry.

      Even Leggeri’s own staff members in Warsaw have begun wondering how long their boss will continue to cling to his post. “OLAF is onto us, morale is down,” says one official. “I wonder why he doesn’t just leave.”

      https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/missteps-and-mismanagement-at-frontex-scandals-plunge-europe-s-border-agency

    • Frontex, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières, à nouveau mise en cause pour ses liens avec des lobbyistes

      Premier corps armé en uniforme de l’Union européenne, l’organisme n’aurait pas déclaré ses liens avec des lobbyistes de l’industrie de la surveillance et de l’armement.

      De nouvelles accusations contre Frontex ont été lancées, vendredi 5 février, par la chaîne publique allemande ZDF, laquelle a, avec la collaboration de l’ONG Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), mené une enquête sur les liens entre l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et l’industrie de la surveillance et de l’armement.

      Des dizaines de documents, auxquels Le Monde a également eu accès, démontrent des infractions aux règles des institutions européennes sur le lobbying, un défaut de transparence et une absence quasi complète de préoccupation pour le respect des droits humains. Ce dernier point était déjà au cœur d’un débat récent sur le rôle du corps européen dans des « pushbacks », des refoulements illégaux de migrants, en Grèce et en Hongrie notamment.

      Dotée d’un budget en forte hausse (6 millions d’euros lors de sa création en 2005, 460 millions en 2020, 5,6 milliards prévus pour 2021-2027) et d’un effectif qui devrait atteindre 10 000 personnes à terme, Frontex, premier corps armé en uniforme de l’Union européenne (UE), effectue actuellement des missions de sauvetage et de surveillance, en appui des forces nationales. Elle lutte aussi contre divers trafics et participe aux expulsions des migrants irréguliers.

      Mais l’agence est, en réalité, en train de devenir un véritable corps de police appelé à se doter de nombreux équipements : armes, radars, drones, systèmes de vérification des documents et de reconnaissance faciale, véhicules, avions, etc.
      Profiter des opportunités

      Devient-elle, du même coup, une sorte d’acteur du secteur de la sécurité et de l’armement ? Et échappe-t-elle au contrôle démocratique, celui du Parlement européen notamment, qui, en 2019, exigeait de l’institution dirigée par le Français Fabrice Leggeri la mise au point d’un « registre transparence », conforme aux pratiques des autres institutions de l’UE ? Ce sont les questions posées par les investigateurs de la ZDF et de CEO, qui ont examiné les dernières années de fonctionnement de l’institution installée à Varsovie.

      Le registre, qui était réclamé par les eurodéputés, devait notamment recenser l’ensemble des réunions tenues avec des représentants des entreprises. Il est « en préparation », dit-on chez Frontex. Et il ne devrait pas satisfaire les attentes : en 2018 et 2019, indiquent des documents de CEO, 91 des 125 lobbyistes reçus par Frontex (soit 72 %) n’étaient pas inscrits au registre européen de la transparence, comme le veulent pourtant les règles fixées pour les institutions de l’UE.

      Idem pour 58 % des entreprises consultées. Sur une application créée pour centraliser les demandes de contacts, aucune demande ne leur est d’ailleurs formulée quant à leur inscription dans ce registre. Etonnamment, le service de presse de Frontex affirme de son côté que l’agence « ne rencontre pas de lobbyistes ».

      Il semble évident, pourtant, que le secteur de la défense entend profiter des opportunités offertes par le développement des missions et des moyens de l’agence. Le programme Horizon 2020 avait déjà affecté 118 millions d’euros au développement de la recherche en lien avec le projet de « Sécurité aux frontières extérieures » de l’UE. Un fonds avait, lui, été doté de 2,8 milliards d’euros pour la période 2018-2020. Et la nécessité d’équiper Frontex a évidemment aiguisé un peu plus les appétits des acteurs du marché mondial du « border control », qui enfle de 8 % chaque année et frôle désormais les 20 milliards d’euros.
      « Surveillance agressive »

      L’agence dirigée par M. Leggeri est-elle sortie de son rôle en s’arrogeant un statut d’intermédiaire de fait entre l’industrie et des institutions européennes soucieuses de conjurer à tout prix le risque de nouveaux flux migratoires ? Serait-elle, même, devenue un acteur qui entend stimuler cette industrie, voire lui confier les rênes d’une politique à vocation essentiellement sécuritaire ?

      Avec son objectif de « faciliter la coopération entre les autorités de contrôle aux frontières, la recherche et l’industrie », Frontex a, en tout cas, multiplié les congrès, les rencontres et les « ateliers » où grands patrons, hauts fonctionnaires, mais aussi délégués des Etats membres échangent beaucoup. Sur des questions de technologie, de sécurité, de « surveillance agressive », mais rarement de droits humains.

      Déjà mise en cause pour avoir tardé à mettre en place un service interne chargé de la surveillance du respect des droits fondamentaux des migrants, l’agence n’aurait, en effet, presque jamais consulté le « Forum des droits fondamentaux » constitué à cette fin. Une organisation qui était membre du forum indique d’ailleurs n’avoir aucun souvenir d’un quelconque échange sur la question des droits et des libertés dans le cadre du lancement d’appels d’offres.

      « La protection des droits humains est un sujet trop important pour le sacrifier à la défense des intérêts de l’industrie », notent les responsables de l’ONG Corporate Europe Observatory

      Parmi les participants à des réunions, on a noté, en revanche, la présence de représentants de pays très critiqués pour leur politique à l’égard des migrants, comme la Bosnie-Herzégovine ou l’Australie. Des responsables du département américain de la Homeland Security ont été également conviés.

      « Les conclusions de tout cela sont extrêmement préoccupantes », notent les responsables de CEO. Ils déplorent une politique migratoire qui risque de reposer seulement sur une force de police armée et des techniques comme la surveillance biométrique. « La protection des droits humains est un sujet trop important pour le sacrifier à la défense des intérêts de l’industrie », relèvent-ils.

      « Nous vivons une métamorphose du rôle de Frontex. Il faut en prendre la mesure et s’y habituer », affirmait, vendredi, M. Leggeri, interrogé par Europe 1. On ne sait pas si Ylva Johansson, la commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, qui demande que la confiance en Frontex soit « entièrement rétablie », approuvera totalement ce propos.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/02/05/nouvelles-accusations-contre-frontex-l-agence-europeenne-des-gardes-frontier

    • PUSHBACK REPORT 2020

      VIOLENCE IS INCREASING – IN #2020 MARE LIBERUM COUNTED AT LEAST 9,000 PEOPLE ILLEGALLY PUSHED BACK

      #Mare_Liberum monitors the current human rights situation in the Aegean Sea using its own ships. As independent observers, we conduct research in order to document and publicise circumstances at the European border. Since March 2020, Mare Liberum has witnessed a dramatic increase in human rights violations in the Aegean, both at sea and on land. Illegal pushbacks, in which those fleeing and migrating people are pushed back across a national border, play an especially crucial role. Over the past year in particular, pushbacks have become an inhumane everyday reality for people on the move. Pushbacks happen almost daily at the Greek-Turkish border and in 2020 alone, we counted 321 pushbacks in the Aegean Sea, with some 9,798 people pushed back.

      Although pushbacks have demonstrably been carried out at the EU’s external border for years, media attention has now increased notably, especially in recent months. News magazines such as Der Spiegel and the research collective Bellingcat have been able to publicly demonstrate how the Hellenic Coast Guard forcibly pushes those seeking protection back to Turkey, thereby violating international, European and national law. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex, as has become all too clear, not only turns a blind eye to illegal repatriation operations, but rather actively and systematically participates.

      Within the framework of the annual report, we seek to adopt a perspective on pushbacks that looks at the long-term development of these practices at the EU’s external border. The comprehensive documentation of pushbacks forms the basis of the report and is an essential part of our monitoring work in the Aegean. Beyond the mere counting of pushbacks, our work also includes the collection of relevant information on the persons affected by pushbacks, practices by the responsible actors and related geographical data. We have gained deeper insights into these issues by conducting interviews with people who have themselves been pushed back at the Greek-Turkish border.

      https://mare-liberum.org/en/pushback-report

    • NEW REPORT ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE AEGEAN

      Since March 2020, collective expulsions in the Aegean Sea have been perpetrated with impunity.

      Legal Centre Lesvos’ new report contributes to the growing body of evidence, media coverage, civil society reports and other investigations which have documented how Greek authorities are deliberately and systematically abandoning hundreds of migrants in the middle of the Aegean sea, without means to call for rescue, on unseaworthy, motorless dinghies and liferafts. It is intended to serve as a resource for survivors of collective expulsions and solidarity actors.

      Following the Legal Centre Lesvos’ first report, the present report is based on evidence shared by over fifty survivors of collective expulsions, and underscores the widespread, systematic and violent nature of this attack against migrants. Beyond being egregious violations of international, European and national human rights law, this report argues that the constituent elements of the modus operandi of collective expulsions in the Aegean amount to crimes against humanity within the definition of Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

      Despite overwhelming evidence of collective expulsions in the Aegean, the national and European response has been to turn a blind eye: failing to even attempt to hold the responsible Greek authorities to account, let alone other public and private actors directly or indirectly involved. On the contrary, the European Commission has praised the violent “border and migration management” practices implemented in Greece and underwritten its support with substantial financial and material assistance. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic which prevented Greece carrying out “official” deportations to Turkey, collective expulsions have conveniently served as an unofficial implementation of the “EU-Turkey Deal” and other bilateral “readmission” agreements with Turkey, which form part of fortress Europe’s border externalisation drive.

      There are only so many times legal and civil society actors can list and table such human rights violations and be met with deafening silence and inaction before this itself becomes evidence of Greek and European liability for collective expulsions as an egregious attack on migrants’ lives. Such inaction also reveals how migrants’ lives are increasingly treated as disposable, in a manner that has historically accompanied the commission of atrocity crimes.

      While the systematic violence of pushbacks in the Aegean is scandalous, it is also the logical endpoint of a dehumanising and punitive European border regime that has systematically obstructed access to territory and the right to asylum by prioritising and funding the ‘hotspot’ containment system, accelerated procedures, detention, deportations, border militarisation and externalisation through deals of questionable legality with third countries; as well as by prosecuting migrants and solidarity actors in a manner that successfully obscures Europe’s own violent, imperialist role in many of the reasons people migrate.

      The absence of serious investigations, let alone practical steps to redress violations are a clear sign that collective expulsions form part of a Greek and European migration policy: instrumentalising human suffering in acts of spectacular state violence for the purpose of deterring migration, at any cost.

      In this context, it is important to ask what justice might look like for survivors of crimes against humanity in the Aegean, many of whom experience ongoing psychological trauma and distress as a result of these crimes. Survivors who have been in contact with the Legal Centre Lesvos have spoken about justice in terms of being able to safely reach Europe. Justice for collective expulsions as crimes against humanity must therefore include safe and legal routes to Europe, as well as defunding, demilitarising and dismantling Europe’s violent border regime.

      https://legalcentrelesvos.org/2021/02/01/crimesagainstumanityintheaegean

      #crimes_contre_l'humanité

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      legalcentrelesvos.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Collective-Expulsions-in-the-Aegean-LCL-01.02.2021-1.pdf

    • UE : Frontex accusée d’incarner l’« Europe forteresse »

      Soupçons de refoulements illégaux de migrants et de bafouement des droits fondamentaux, l’agence Frontex est dans la tourmente. Au point de diviser la Commission européenne.

      C’est potentiellement ce que les Anglo-Saxons appellent la « tempête parfaite », la « poly polémique » qui couve chez Frontex, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes.

      Entre les accusations de fermer les yeux ou de participer à des refoulements illégaux de migrants, l’enquête de l’Office anti-fraude sur des allégations de harcèlement et d’inconduite ayant poussé des responsables à quitter l’agence ou l’absence, à ce jour, de recrutement des quarante agents chargés de veiller au respect des droits fondamentaux, Frontex accumule les tuiles.

      Après l’enquête de la médiatrice européenne, qui s’est aussi penchée sur son cas, c’est le Parlement européen qui s’en mêle. Outre la mise en place d’un « groupe d’enquête permanent », les eurodéputés ont aussi refusé, fin de la semaine dernière, d’octroyer « la décharge budgétaire » à l’agence, nous explique l’élue belge Saskia Bricmont (Ecolo). « Chaque année, le Parlement a un pouvoir de contrôle budgétaire. Donner la décharge, cela signifie qu’on considère que Frontex a accompli ses missions, a respecté le cadre légal et a donc droit au budget suivant », explique-t-elle. En commission des libertés civiles, de la justice et des affaires intérieures, les eurodéputés ont donc décidé de reporter de six mois cette décharge, une décision qui doit être validée en plénière mais que « tous les groupes politiques » soutiennent, ajoute l’élue. D’ici là, il est principalement attendu de Frontex qu’elle recrute les agents chargés de défendre en interne les droits fondamentaux.
      Mandat et budget élargis

      Depuis cinq ans, le mandat de l’agence a été élargi considérablement. Ses effectifs multipliés. En 2016, Frontex se félicitait du fait qu’elle emploierait 1500 agents à l’horizon 2020. Elle devrait être à 10.000 d’ici 2027, pour un budget de plus de cinq milliards sur sept ans, contre une enveloppe annuelle de 19 millions il y a quinze ans.

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      Car pour Fabrice Leggeri, le patron de Frontex, les critiques trouvent bien leur source dans ce renforcement des pouvoirs de l’agence. « Pour la première fois, une agence cesse d’être un objet simplement administratif européen, mais a du personnel sur le terrain. C’est une responsabilité d’autant plus grande que nous avons l’usage de la force, sous l’autorité et le contrôle des Etats, et qu’il y a bien sûr des contrepoids, les droits fondamentaux. C’est tout à fait normal que cela suscite des réactions, parce que c’est inhabituel », a-t-il expliqué la semaine dernière lors d’un événement organisé par la Fondation Robert Schuman. « Il peut y avoir des retards de mise en œuvre de certaines choses, tout ne sera certainement pas parfait. Il faut utiliser cette période où il y a beaucoup de questionnements sur l’agence pour expliquer, faire de la pédagogie », a-t-il ajouté.

      A ses côtés, le vice-président de la commission en charge de la Promotion du mode de vie européen, Margaritis Schinas, a évoqué la tentative de « quelques milieux » de bâtir « un narratif qui affaiblit Frontex au moment où nous avons le plus besoin de l’agence. Ça, je ne l’accepterai jamais ». Un ton qui contraste avec celui de sa collègue aux Affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, qui a démenti fin janvier les explications données par Leggeri pour justifier le retard de l’embauche des 40 agents pour les droits fondamentaux.

      Selon le quotidien français Le Monde, François Xavier-Bellamy, chef de la délégation Les Républicains au sein du groupe du Parti populaire européen (PPE, conservateurs) du Parlement européen, a écrit à Ylva Johansson en évoquant de sa part une tentative de déstabilisation voire de procès politique envers Fabrice Leggeri.
      Pas en ligne sur le lobbying

      S’ajoutent à tout cela les accusations de relations troubles avec l’industrie de l’armement et de la biométrie (par exemple, la reconnaissance faciale), étudiées de long en large par l’ONG Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) le mois dernier. Cette dernière estime que l’élargissement des compétences de Frontex et son besoin d’équipement neuf (y compris en matière de défense) ont été une aubaine pour ces industries.

      Entre 2017 et 2019, Frontex a rencontré pas moins de 108 entreprises pour discuter d’armes à feu et de munitions, d’équipements de surveillance etc. Contre dix think tanks, 15 universités et seulement une ONG. Dans les procès-verbaux de ces réunions obtenus par CEO grâce à des demandes d’accès aux documents, elle a pu constater que les droits fondamentaux figuraient rarement à l’agenda. « Sans surprise, il y a des chevauchements significatifs entre les entreprises qui font du lobbying à Frontex et celles qui bénéficient le plus des marchés publics » de l’agence, explique l’ONG.

      En outre, l’agence ne publie pas toutes ses rencontres et voit majoritairement (72 %) des représentants du privé qui ne sont pas enregistrés dans le registre de transparence de l’UE. Frontex s’en est défendu en répondant qu’elle ne faisait pas l’objet de lobbying, compte tenu du fait qu’elle n’est pas impliquée dans le processus législatif européen. Alors, acharnement ou véritable scandale ? L’enquête des eurodéputés devrait permettre d’y voir clair. C’est aussi l’avis/l’espoir de Fabrice Leggeri, qui a jusqu’ici résisté aux appels à la démission.

      https://plus.lesoir.be/358143/article/2021-03-01/ue-frontex-accusee-dincarner-leurope-forteresse

    • La droite française au secours de Fabrice Leggeri, patron de Frontex

      Le groupe #LR au Parlement européen critique la « tentative de déstabilisation » à laquelle se livrerait la commissaire Ylva Johansson à l’égard du directeur de l’agence.

      Le torchon brûle entre la commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures et à la migration, #Ylva_Johansson, et la droite française. Dans une lettre au ton cinglant adressée vendredi 26 février à l’ancienne ministre sociale-démocrate suédoise et lue par Le Monde, #François_Xavier-Bellamy, chef de la délégation #Les_Républicains (LR) au sein du groupe du #Parti_populaire_européen (#PPE, conservateurs) interroge la commissaire. Et il parle de « tentative de déstabilisation », de « divergence de fond », voire de « procès politique » que la commissaire instruirait contre Fabrice Leggeri, le directeur exécutif de l’agence des gardes-frontières et gardes-côtes Frontex.

      Ce responsable français est sur la sellette depuis des mois. Pour des refoulements illégaux de migrants (pushbacks) qu’aurait favorisés l’agence. Pour des retards dans le recrutement d’une quarantaine d’officiers chargés précisément de veiller au respect des droits fondamentaux par les agents de Frontex. Pour d’apparentes réticences à se conformer à des règles administratives en matière budgétaire. Ou encore pour ne pas avoir souscrit à des obligations de transparence en ce qui concerne des réunions avec des lobbys et des responsables de l’industrie de la défense et de la surveillance.

      Le groupe socialiste du Parlement a demandé la démission du numéro un de Frontex

      Ce dernier point n’est pas mentionné dans la lettre de M. Bellamy et l’entourage de Mme Johansson semble, par ailleurs, considérer qu’il n’y a pas de quoi mettre en cause M. Leggeri pour ces contacts, dénoncés notamment par l’ONG #Corporate_Europe_Observatory. Sur les autres questions, en revanche, la commissaire a demandé des explications. Et le groupe socialiste du Parlement a demandé la démission du numéro un de Frontex. En décembre, la responsable de la direction générale des affaires intérieures de la Commission adressait, elle, une longue lettre à M. Leggeri, avec, à la clé, de nombreux griefs.

      Demande de preuves

      Les élus LR volent, eux, au secours du directeur et demandent très fermement des explications à la commissaire. Quelles preuves a-t-elle, interrogent-ils, quand elle accuse M. Leggeri de ne pas se conformer aux directives budgétaires, comme elle l’a fait le 22 février dans la commission de contrôle du Parlement ? Sans éléments incontestables, cela pourrait s’apparenter à une volonté de déstabiliser le patron de l’agence, estiment-ils.

      A propos des refoulements illégaux de migrants, les eurodéputés français endossent les explications livrées jusqu’ici par Frontex : sur treize épisodes douteux, huit ont été jugés conformes par un groupe de travail constitué par la Commission. Cinq autres cas sont encore à l’examen, sur lesquels Mme Johansson a exigé « toutes les explications nécessaires ».

      La Turquie est soupçonnée d’être à l’origine d’informations sur les refoulements illégaux de migrants

      M. Bellamy lui demande à son tour si elle a répondu à un courrier qui lui a été adressé en novembre par M. Leggeri, et dans lequel il réclamait des instructions claires quant à l’attitude à adopter à l’égard de la Turquie. Celle-ci, qui a orienté massivement des migrants vers la Grèce et la Bulgarie en mars 2020, est aussi soupçonnée par certaines sources d’être à l’origine d’informations sur les refoulements illégaux de migrants.
      « Reproches infondés »

      Le groupe LR, qui bénéficie du soutien tacite d’autres élus du PPE, exige, dès lors, de disposer de tous les échanges entre Frontex et la Commission. La lettre se termine par des questions sur l’éventuel désaccord entre la commissaire Johansson et Frontex au sujet des missions mêmes de l’agence.

      Relayant l’idée que la commissaire serait partisane des « frontières ouvertes » – ce qu’elle conteste – les eurodéputés lui demandent s’il y a, de sa part, « un désaccord de fond » sur la stratégie actuelle de la Commission von der Leyen, qui vise à garantir le « mode de vie européen » ? A savoir la maîtrise des frontières, la lutte contre l’immigration clandestine et la contribution à « la sécurité intérieure ».

      « En instruisant un procès politique au moyen de reproches infondés, vous prendriez le risque de violer les principes fondamentaux de l’Etat de droit, de salir des fonctionnaires intègres et loyaux, de fragiliser la cohérence de l’action européenne », conclut la lettre. Contacté dimanche, le cabinet de Mme Johansson a déclaré avoir reçu la lettre mais ne pas souhaiter réagir immédiatement.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/03/01/la-droite-francaise-au-secours-de-fabrice-leggeri-patron-de-frontex_6071549_

    • Un rapport d’enquête interne peu concluant sur le rôle de Frontex dans des refoulements illégaux de migrants

      Le document présenté lundi s’abstient d’impliquer des membres de l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et garde-côtes dans des incidents en mer Egée.

      Un long rapport, lu par Le Monde et présenté, le 1er mars, par un groupe de travail désigné par le conseil d’administration de Frontex, confirme qu’il ne sera décidément pas simple, voire pas possible, de démontrer que des membres de l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et garde-côtes ont été impliqués dans des « pushbacks » en mer Egée, des refoulements illégaux de migrants.

      Ce document final, pourtant très attendu, n’apporte aucune conclusion déterminante. D’autant que, sur quatre des cinq incidents encore jugés litigieux (huit ont été classés en janvier), l’enquête se poursuit.

      Sur la base des informations qui lui ont été livrées, le groupe de travail, composé de représentants de diverses institutions européennes et d’Etats membres, formule quelques recommandations qui peuvent être lues comme des critiques implicites du fonctionnement actuel de Frontex. Il prône ainsi une amélioration des rapports et de la surveillance des missions, une utilisation systématique de la vidéo, la recension de toute possible violation des droits humains et la suspension de l’aide apportée aux pays qui ne les respecteraient pas.
      Situations douteuses

      Pour le reste, la liste des « incidents » qui se seraient déroulés entre le 18 avril et le 21 octobre 2020 ne mentionne que les soupçons, parfois lourds mais jugés insuffisants, qui pèsent plutôt, en réalité, sur les gardes-côtes grecs et la marine turque, qui agissent aux limites des eaux territoriales des deux pays. Embarcations chassées, menacées, remorquées : dans certains cas, un navire suédois ou un avion danois mis à la disposition de l’agence ont recensé des situations douteuses, mais le groupe de travail conclut qu’il semble « impossible de les élucider entièrement ». D’autant que ce sont les autorités nationales qui assurent le commandement des opérations.

      Le rapport tient à souligner cependant l’importance de la mission de Frontex, présentée comme la « principale garantie de frontières solides et protégées ». Il y est rappelé aussi que, grâce aux interventions de Frontex, 28 000 personnes ont été sauvées en 2019 et près de 3 000 en 2020, tandis que 10 433 illégaux et 84 trafiquants étaient arrêtés. A propos des incidents considérés comme des « pushbacks » par des journalistes et des ONG, le document invite à considérer qu’aucun décès, aucune disparition et aucune blessure n’y seraient liés.

      Fabrice Leggeri, le directeur exécutif de l’agence, qui doit être entendu jeudi 4 mars par un comité spécial du Parlement européen, pourra se prévaloir de ces conclusions face aux diverses accusations dont il faitl’objet. L’Office de lutte antifraude (OLAF) et la médiatrice de l’Union européenne enquêtent aussi sur la gestion de l’agence, basée à Varsovie, tandis que la commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, a réclamé toutes les explications sur l’action en mer Egée.
      Action de la Turquie

      M. Leggeri soulignera sans doute, jeudi, qu’il espère obtenir de la Commission qu’elle lui indique les lignes directrices précises qu’il doit suivre en ce qui concerne, notamment, l’action de la Turquie. Dans les considérations qu’il a formulées à destination du groupe de travail de son conseil d’administration, il rappelle d’ailleurs que les autorités d’Ankara entendent utiliser la migration comme un « levier politique » et il souligne que la Grèce se dit soumise aux « menaces hybrides » du régime turc.

      Soutenu entre autres par la droite française au Parlement, le directeur de Frontex transforme ainsi le débat sur le rôle humanitaire de son agence en une question géostratégique, et il incite la Commission à se positionner par rapport à l’encombrant partenaire avec lequel elle a signé, en 2016, un accord visant à réduire les flux migratoires vers l’Europe.

      Pendant ce temps, la Ligue hellénique des droits de l’homme, l’ONG Legal Centre Lesvos et l’organisation juridique Front-Lex demandent à Frontex « de suspendre immédiatement ou de cesser » ses activités en mer Egée, sous peine d’une action devant la justice européenne. Legal Centre Lesvos aurait documenté, depuis mars 2020, 17 refoulements de plus de 50 migrants entre la Grèce et la Turquie. L’ONG estime aussi que l’agence a enfreint le droit européen et violé la convention de Genève de 1951 relative aux droits des réfugiés.

      Frontex est aussi taxée de complicité dans la « détention sommaire de migrants sur les îles de la mer Egée dans des ports, des bus, des navires, des plages où l’accès aux procédures d’asile leur a été refusé ». Le 12 février, l’ONG allemande Mare Liberum faisait état, pour sa part, d’une « escalade inédite » des refoulements de migrants en mer Egée impliquant Frontex en 2020.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2021/03/03/un-rapport-d-enquete-interne-peu-concluant-sur-le-role-de-frontex-dans-des-r

    • Le patron de Frontex se défend devant les eurodéputés, Bruxelles maintient la pression

      Le patron de Frontex a souligné jeudi devant des eurodéputés qu’aucune « preuve » d’une implication de l’agence de surveillance des frontières de l’UE dans des refoulements illégaux de migrants n’avait été établie par une enquête, mais Bruxelles a réitéré ses critiques.

      Le patron de Frontex a souligné jeudi devant des eurodéputés qu’aucune « preuve » d’une implication de l’agence de surveillance des frontières de l’UE dans des refoulements illégaux de migrants n’avait été établie par une enquête, mais Bruxelles a réitéré ses critiques.

      Ce rapport interne, qui doit être examiné vendredi par le conseil d’administration de Frontex et consulté mercredi par l’AFP, n’a pas permis de « clarifier complètement » les circonstances de plusieurs incidents au cours desquels des refoulements de migrants auraient eu lieu. Il préconise d’ailleurs d’améliorer le système de signalement et de surveillance des missions de l’agence.

      « Il n’y a pas eu de faits étayés ou prouvés pour aboutir à la conclusion que Frontex aurait participé ou se serait livrée à des violations des droits fondamentaux », a déclaré son directeur exécutif, Fabrice Leggeri, devant un groupe d’eurodéputés qui a ouvert sa propre enquête sur ces incidents.

      L’agence est montrée du doigt depuis la publication en octobre 2020 d’une enquête de plusieurs médias l’accusant d’être impliquée avec les garde-côtes grecs dans des incidents de refoulement de bateaux de migrants à la frontière entre la Grèce et la Turquie.

      Ces accusations ont également entraîné une enquête du gendarme européen antifraude, l’Olaf, ainsi que de la médiatrice de l’UE.

      La Commission européenne, membre du conseil d’administration de Frontex aux côtés des 27 Etats membres, s’est montrée critique sur la gestion de l’agence, fustigeant notamment la lenteur du recrutement des officiers chargés de surveiller le respect des droits fondamentaux et des agents devant constituer le nouveau contingent permanent.

      Créée en 2004, Frontex a vu son mandat renforcé en 2019. Elle doit se doter d’agents en uniforme et armés, employés directement par l’agence, et non plus mis à disposition provisoirement par les Etats membres.

      Le directeur exécutif a notamment dit qu’un officier et 40 « moniteurs » chargés de veiller au respect des droits fondamentaux étaient en cours de recrutement et que 300 officiers du contingent permanent étaient déployés sur le terrain ou allaient l’être la semaine prochaine.

      La commissaire européenne aux Affaires intérieures Ylva Johansson a toutefois souligné que 700 officiers auraient dû être déployés en janvier.

      Elle a aussi estimé que les « clarifications » sur les accusations de refoulements n’avaient que « trop tardé », et que ce délai n’était « pas bon pour la réputation et la confiance » dans Frontex.

      « Une agence de première classe a besoin d’une gouvernance de première classe », a-t-elle poursuivi, se réjouissant toutefois d’« entendre que beaucoup de choses sont en train d’être réglées ».

      Si des eurodéputés à gauche ont demandé la démission de Fabrice Leggeri, la droite française au Parlement européen a quant à elle pris la défense du patron de Frontex.

      Dans une lettre adressée le 26 février à la responsable suédoise, le président de la délégation française du groupe PPE (droite) François-Xavier Bellamy lui a demandé des « justifications solides et vérifiées » à ses « accusations », dénonçant une « tentative de déstabilisation » du chef de Frontex et « un procès politique ».

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/040321/le-patron-de-frontex-se-defend-devant-les-eurodeputes-bruxelles-maintient-

    • Greece accused of ‘shocking’ illegal pushback against refugees at sea

      Lawsuit filed at European court of human rights says group were abandoned in life rafts after some were beaten.

      A lawsuit filed against the Greek state at the European court of human rights accuses Athens of a shocking level of violence in sophisticated inter-agency operations that form part of an illegal pushback strategy to stop the arrival of refugees and migrants.

      The suit, filed by the NGO Legal Centre Lesvos, centres on an incident in October last year in which a fishing boat set off from Marmaris in Turkey for Italy carrying about 200 people, including 40 children and a pregnant woman. The boat ran into difficulty in a storm off the south coast of Crete, leading the captain to radio for assistance.

      The legal case claims that in an operation of unprecedented size and sophistication, instead of helping the stranded people onboard, a Greek search and rescue vessel and two small patrol boats stalled the smuggler’s boat for five hours until speedboats carrying masked commandos arrived. Several passengers claim they were beaten in the ensuing incident.

      Those onboard were separated into two groups and taken to two large coastguard boats, where armed crews of between 10 and 15 men, most wearing balaclavas, searched them and confiscated belongings including phones, passports and money.

      The passengers were then reportedly forced on to several small life rafts, towed back to Turkish waters and abandoned at sea without food, water, life jackets or any means to call for help. By the time they were picked up by the Turkish coastguard, their ordeal had lasted more than 24 hours.

      “It was like watching a movie. The men from the speedboats jumped onboard screaming and shouting, they all had guns and knives and were wearing black and masks,” said Mahmoud, a witness from Syria whose name has been changed.

      “They began beating people with batons, looking for the captain. They punched me in the face and broke my glasses … I understand they don’t want us, but you could send us back to Turkey without the need for violence. When they cut us loose on the rafts we all thought we were going to die,” he said.

      The lawsuit claims the practice of “pushbacks” has become standard for the Greek coastguard since March 2020, when Turkey, in an effort to pressure the EU, told its 4 million registered refugees that it would no longer stop them trying to reach Europe as per a 2016 deal between Ankara and Brussels.

      Athens reacted by temporarily halting all new asylum applications and allegedly employing increasingly brutal tactics to dissuade people in Turkey from making the journey.

      Exact figures are difficult to verify, but rights groups and journalists have recorded hundreds of alleged pushback incidents over the last 12 months. In most cases, people trying to cross the Aegean have been intercepted and towed back to Turkish waters. They are then cut loose either in their own boats, after the Greek coastguard has disabled their engines, or on overcrowded life rafts.

      On several occasions people claim to have been pushed back after landing on Greek soil, and passengers have been abandoned on an uninhabited Turkish islet at least twice, according to reporting by Der Spiegel, Lighthouse Reports and the New York Times.

      In at least one case, the EU border agency, Frontex, is accused of covering up evidence of a Greek pushback operation.

      These collective expulsions, as they are known, are illegal under international law but not under Greek national law. The Guardian’s requests for comment from Greek officials went unanswered. Greece has denied illegality in the past.

      The incident in October stands out because of the reported level of violence involved and the size and scope of the operation, which would have taken hours to coordinate and involved eight Greek vessels and two dozen crew from different agencies.

      “‘Pushback’ isn’t even really the right term. It’s a decision by the authorities to deliberately abandon people at sea putting their lives at risk, with no means to call for rescue and no chance at all to claim asylum,” said Natasha Ntailiani, a Legal Centre Lesvos lawyer representing some of the survivors before the ECHR.

      “It’s a new and disturbing trend characterised by planned and systematic violence, which has increased over the last year in the Aegean region. Even search and rescue vessels and materials are now being used against migrants, which is a remarkable insight into the lengths the Greek authorities are now willing to go to.”

      Testimony from 11 complainants and dozens of pages of collaborating evidence – including geo-located pictures and video, GPS coordinates, and phone and message logs from the ship’s radio, passengers, the Alarm Phone hotline and the Greek and Turkish coastguards – painted a complete and damning picture of the new tactics, the centre said.

      The suit is the fifth LCL has filed at the ECHR in recent years to allege violations of migrant and refugee rights in Greece. Progress is slow, but the applicants hope the latest case will persuade the court that pushbacks, despite the fact they are now reportedly a systemic and regular feature of Greek border policing, are illegal.

      A decision at the court last year that Spain did not breach the rights of two men it expelled from the Melilla enclave on the basis they had tried to enter illegally “as part of a large group” sets a worrying precedent.

      In light of the judgment, Frontex has since asked the European commission if it can refuse to process individual asylum claims if people are travelling in groups, as is often the case in the Aegean.

      “I didn’t even want to go to Greece. We knew that they were harming refugees when they arrive, but it was shocking to experience the reality, which is that Europe doesn’t care at all about human rights and dignity,” said Yara from Damascus, whose name has also been changed. She said she had been traumatised by her experiences on the day the storm hit the fishing boat.

      “Despite all of that, I will still try again. I can’t build a life in Syria or Turkey,” she said.

      Mahmoud echoed Yara’s thoughts. “I got kicked out of Qatar because of the pandemic. I would rather have stayed there,” he said. “If there was a legal way to get to Europe I would take it, but there isn’t. I don’t want to make that journey again, but I will, because I have to.”

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/26/greece-accused-of-shocking-pushback-against-refugees-at-sea

    • Grèce : refoulements illégaux en Mer Egée

      En Grèce, les « pushbacks » ou refoulements illégaux de potentiels demandeurs d’asile par les garde-côtes grecs vers les eaux turques, se sont systématisés depuis un an.

      Le gouvernement grec se félicite d’avoir réussi à tenir une de ses promesses électorales : réduire le flux de migrants.

      La pratique est en infraction avec le droit maritime et l’obligation de porter assistance aux personnes en détresse en mer, mais aussi au regard du droit européen et international dont l’article 3 de la Convention des Droits de l’Homme stipule l’interdiction du refoulement des réfugiés.

      Informés, le Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés de l’ONU et des commissaires européens se disent “alarmés” mais semblent jusqu’à présent bien impuissants à faire respecter le droit d’asile par Athènes. Documentés et dénoncés par des avocats et des ONG internationales, ces refoulements illégaux révèlent des pratiques cruelles et cyniques. Mais rares sont les voix en Grèce à s’élever la voix contre ces renvois aux frontières de l’Europe.

      https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/102791-000-A/grece-refoulements-illegaux-en-mer-egee
      #Samos

    • Message de Claire Rodier via la mailing-list Migreurop :

      Dans une interview au Guardian, Gil Arias Fernández, ancien directeur adjoint de Frontex a déclaré qu’il était profondément inquiet de l’atteinte à la réputation de l’agence, de sa décision d’armer les agents et de son incapacité à empêcher l’extrême droite d’infiltrer ses rangs, dans un contexte de mouvements anti-migrants en Europe.

      –—

      Frontex turning ‘blind eye’ to human rights violations, says former deputy

      The former deputy head of Europe’s border and coastguard agency has said the state of the beleaguered force “pains” him and that it is vulnerable to the “alarming” rise of populism across the continent.

      In his first interview since leaving office, #Gil_Arias_Fernández, former deputy director at Frontex and once tipped for the top post, said he was deeply worried about the agency’s damaged reputation, its decision to arm officers, and its inability to stop the far-right infiltrating its ranks, amid anti-migrant movements across Europe.

      “Weapons are not needed for Frontex operations,” he said. “They are more of a problem than a help.”

      Frontex is experiencing the most acute crisis in its 16-year history. The agency is being investigated by the European parliament over allegations of illegal pushbacks of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean and its head, Fabrice Leggeri, is facing calls to quit over allegations he misled the EU commission. Leggeri has strongly rejected allegations about the agency’s operations.

      Arias Fernández, 65, now retired, lost out on the top role to Leggeri in 2015. He admits he did not get on with Leggeri when they worked together for a year.

      “From the first moment I saw that he had a perhaps excessive eagerness to change things. Maybe it was to put his personal stamp on things,” said Arias Fernández.

      He said decisions made by one of the EU’s most powerful agencies had led to complicity in human rights violations.

      “Frontex pains me,” he said. “Especially for the staff, because they don’t deserve what they are going through. We saw the agency as an instrument to help the member states and the migrants. These events put a dent in all that effort.

      “I do not believe that the agency has proactively violated the rights of migrants, but there are reasons to believe that it has turned a blind eye.”
      Gil Arias Fernández. ‘Frontex pains me,’ he said. Photograph: Jose Bautista/Courtesy of Fundation for Causa

      In January 2015, after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, several European politicians suggested the presence of refugees among the terrorists.

      When the media asked Frontex about any link between refugees and the Paris attack, Arias Fernández, a former police commissioner in Spain, told them there was no evidence.

      Arias Fernández believes this cost him the director’s job.

      The political pressure made the job a tough one, Arias Fernández said. “There is a lot of pressure on the part of certain states to put their people in positions of responsibility. Whether the agency is headed by a Frenchman or a Finn may determine whether there is more or less sensitivity to migration problems. The agency is independent, but ‘independent’ should be put in quotation marks because without a fluid relationship with the [European] commission, you have a hard time.

      “Operations have always been conducted unarmed and there have never been any problems. In operations where Libyan tribal clans smuggling migrants shot in the air to frighten the patrols, even there it was not considered appropriate to carry weapons. In this case, weapons are more a problem than a help. The proposal of carrying weapons came from the European Commission, which I do not know to what extent is influenced by lobbyists in Brussels.

      “There is no filter in the recruitment system. You cannot prevent people with extremist ideas from entering, unless they clearly express their position in favour of hate crimes, xenophobia and racism.”

      Arias Fernández pointed to the dearth of human rights training for Frontex officers. “But lack of information should not be used to justify certain things,” he said. “The incidents under investigation were carried out by Greek units following the instructions of their commanders.

      “When there are irregularities like this in operations, it is usually because there are instructions from the authorities responsible for coordinating the operation. The decision to turn back a boat with migrants is not taken by an officer but is an order from above.”
      A rescue boat escorts a dinghy with migrants from Afghanistan as a Frontex ship patrols off Lesbos in Greece. Photograph: Costas Baltas/Reuters

      He said he appreciated borders needed a certain level of security to know who was entering but added that immigration was vitally important for the survival of all European states.

      “I come to this conclusion because there are studies that show that if we do not resort to immigration and other incentives, the EU will have serious problems and the welfare state will be a chimera. We should learn these lessons. In the first half of the pandemic, migrants saved our bacon.

      “In Europe, movements that use populism are growing at an alarming rate, and the fight against immigrants is one of those arguments. States are excessively prudent in not touching this issue. The commission presented the new pact on migration and asylum, which contains no proposals for channelling migration through legal channels. They tried to satisfy all the blocs, Visegrád [Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia], southern states, northern states, and I fear that in the end it satisfies no one.”

      Arias Fernández said the lack of migrants being allowed into Europe would have a severe economic impact amid an ageing workforce: “Who will pay the pensions of the growing number of pensioners?”

      A Frontex spokesman denied the agency ignored migrants’ rights. “The executive director of Frontex has written several letters to the Greek authorities to address incidents that raised his concerns. Two inquiries, including one that was conducted by representatives of national authorities and the European Commission, have found no evidence of violations of human rights in Frontex operations in Greece.”

      The spokesman also denied that officers had always conducted operations while unarmed, saying: “Before this year, Frontex relied exclusively on officers provided by national authorities, who brought their own weapons to the agency’s operational activities. Today, Frontex has its own operational arm, the standing corps, whose core is made up of officers directly employed by the agency who require weapons for self-defence and to protect others.

      “Since Mr Arias left more than half-a-decade ago, Frontex has undergone a massive transformation that included a much bigger focus on cross-border crime, which means a greater chance that our officers may encounter life-threatening situations while patrolling the borders or performing other duties.”

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jun/11/frontex-turning-blind-eye-to-human-rights-violations-says-former-deputy

      #extrême_droite

    • Human Rights in Europe are at a crossroads

      It is not a ‘one-off’. It did not take place six, twelve or eighteen months ago, and now things are better.

      It was just one of 491 incidents since March 2020, in which 14,720 men, women and children have been denied their fundamental human rights by a coastguard armed with assault rifles and behaving like a sea-militia ‘defending’ Greece against innocent, unarmed, and peaceful men, women and children attempting to find safe places to live.

      In the morning of 10 June, a boat carrying 31 people travelled towards Kos. Closing in on Ag. Fokas, on the south east side of the island, the boat was approached by several vessels from the Hellenic coast guard, and forced back towards Turkey.

      If anyone is wondering what a pushback at sea looks like, this is how it’s being carried out. And it is illegal.

      https://videopress.com/v/vPX3Vme3

      This shocking, immoral and illegal practice has become ‘normal’ in the Aegean Sea. Greece carries it out without let or hindrance, while the EU seems unable or unwilling to act.

      Human Rights in Europe are at a crossroads.

      According to the Greek government and Frontex, this isn’t a pushback, but a ‘prevention of entry’.

      There are two major problems with this assessment. First, under international law, no country is allowed to ‘prevent the entry’ of men, women and children not suspected of any crime (as these people are not) and who intend to apply for asylum. Even if the people in this boat had not entered Greek waters, the Greek coastguard would have broken international law, by forcibly preventing people who wish to apply for asylum, from entering Greece.

      But in fact, secondly, these people had in fact already entered Greek water. It cannot be a ‘prevention of entry’ if people have already ‘entered’: it is a pushback. And it is absolutely illegal.

      In the video we can hear one of the officers on the Hellenic coast guard vessel ΛΣ150, say “everyone abide by the rules, because he’s filming”. It’s disturbing that this even needed to be said. First, because what would have happened had this person not had the presence of mind, and technology, to film? What would have happened then? How would the heavily-armed coastguard have responded to these innocent, unarmed people trying to exercise their fundamental human rights? Why did this coastguard, who noticed a person filming, need to advise his colleagues to abide by the law? What did he fear they would do?

      Secondly, the disturbing images we can see in this video are in fact not ‘abiding by the rules’. It appears the coastguard does not understand – or perhaps accept – the rules. This is a video of the Greek coastguard breaking the law, even as one member of the coastguard warns his colleagues not to do something even worse.

      Nor is this an isolated incident.

      It’s how the Hellenic coastguard – and in some cases also Frontex – have been operating for the last 15 months.

      We must demand that Notis Mitarachis, and Fabrice Leggeri, are held to account for their continued, immoral, unacceptable, and illegal activity in the Aegean Sea. We must demand that the EU – or if, as increasingly seems to be the case, the EU is unwilling – the wider international community takes legal action, now, to prevent the Greek coastguard, the Greek government, Frontex and the EU, breaking international law, and shaming the whole of Europe in the process.

      None of this is acceptable. None of it is even beneficial to either Greece or the EU.

      The time to stop this is now. The time to act is now. The EU can and must act. If it refuses, it is time for the international court to prosecute Mitarachis, Nea Dimokratia, Leggeri, Frontex, and the European Commission. Anything else is to further damage, and indeed make a laughing stock of international law, and all our human rights.

      https://aegeanboatreport.com/2021/06/28/human-rights-in-europe-are-at-a-crossroads

    • Communiqué de presse : Frontex a besoin d’une #réorganisation radicale

      Les députés du groupe de travail sur le contrôle de Frontex, sous l’égide de l’eurodéputée écologiste Tineke Strik, ont présenté aujourd’hui en commission des libertés civiles (LIBE) du Parlement européen, le rapport sur le rôle de Frontex dans le #refoulement illégal des réfugiés. Un des principaux enseignements est la nécessité d’ une réorganisation radicale de l’agence pour qu’elle respecte les droits humains.

      L’enquête menée par les eurodéputés confirme que Frontex a manqué à ses responsabilités en matière de protection des droits humains aux frontières de l’UE. L’agence avait connaissance de violations des droits fondamentaux commises dans des pays de l’UE avec lesquels elle coopère, et n’a pas réagi face à ces allégations. La direction de Frontex a sciemment ignoré les rapports des journalistes d’investigation et d’ONG, les avertissements internes du personnel et même les séquences vidéo dans lesquelles ces violations étaient visibles.

      Saskia Bricmont, députée européenne Vert/ALE, membre de la commission LIBE et responsable du rapport sur la décharge budgétaire Frontex, déclare :

      “En ne faisant pas respecter les droits fondamentaux aux frontières de l’UE, Frontex a failli à son devoir. L’agence a besoin d’une réorganisation radicale. Je salue le travail d’enquête mené par mes collègues : il est essentiel d’identifier les lacunes et les fautes afin d’y remédier au plus vite.”

      “Le rapport dévoile que Frontex était non seulement conscient des violations des droits fondamentaux, mais n’a de surcroît pas réagi de manière appropriée face à son obligation de prévenir les violations des droits humains. En dépit des différents signaux d’alerte provenant d’acteurs internes et externes, l’agence a fait preuve d’inactivité manifeste, voire de réticence à agir. Nous sommes particulièrement préoccupés par le respect des normes en matière de droits humains dans les opérations menées en Grèce et en Hongrie. Nous demandons au directeur exécutif de suspendre immédiatement les opérations en Hongrie et d’évaluer les opérations en Grèce.”

      “Il existe des signes clairs de mauvaise gestion : les rapports internes faisant état de violations des droits fondamentaux ont été ignorés, le recrutement des agents spécialisés dans les droits fondamentaux a été retardé et reste incomplet. Nous ne croyons pas en la capacité de l’actuel directeur exécutif, Fabrice Leggeri, à résoudre les problèmes que nous avons exposés. M. Leggeri a induit le Parlement européen en erreur à plusieurs reprises et a encouragé une culture d’impunité, tout en continuant à nier l’existence des refoulements illégaux.”

      “Notre rapport exhorte le Conseil d’administration de Frontex à reconsidérer la position de M. Leggeri et de l’ensemble de la direction générale. Dans un tel contexte, la décharge budgétaire ne doit pas être octroyée à l’agence. Par ailleurs, il est temps que les États membres assument leur responsabilité commune dans la défense des valeurs européennes en matière de gestion des frontières et le respect des droits fondamentaux.”

      https://twitter.com/saskiabricmont/status/1415611092894724097

      Recommandations du #rapport :

      – Frontex ne doit effectuer des opérations conjointes qu’avec des pays qui agissent dans le plein respect des droits fondamentaux. Pour remplir cette obligation, Frontex devrait surveiller l’ensemble de la zone opérationnelle et enquêter sur tous les incidents ou autres indications de non-conformité.

      – Si un refoulement est signalé à Frontex, l’agence ne devrait pas seulement enquêter en s’appuyant sur les réponses des autorités gouvernementales, mais également vérifier les informations fournies.

      – La Commission européenne devrait conditionner le financement européen de la gestion des frontières au respect des droits fondamentaux par l’État membre concerné.

      https://saskiabricmont.eu/frontex-besoin-reorganisation-radicale
      #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés

      –—

      Réaction de Frontex :

      Frontex welcomes report by the Scrutiny Working Group

      Frontex welcomes the report by the Scrutiny Working Group and its conclusions which reaffirmed that there is no evidence of the Agency’s involvement in any violation of human rights.

      The agency has been working with the Parliament’s scrutiny group in an open and transparent manner, sharing information and receiving the MEPs during an online visit to Frontex. The agency remains committed to cooperating with the European Parliament.

      “I acknowledge the conclusion of Parliament’s fact-finding scrutiny and its recommendations. Frontex is a bigger, more complex organisation than a couple of years ago, so a system that was designed in the past needs to undergo further transformation. The report underlined the challenges of the Agency’s transformation in a more and more complex security environment,” said Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri.

      “We are determined to uphold the highest standards of border control within our operations. We will look into the recommendations and see how we can implement them to further strengthen the respect of fundamental rights in all our activities,” he added.

      Frontex has completed two stages of the inquiry into last autumn’s media allegations. Both an internal inquiry and the report by a special working group appointed by the Management Board (with Commission and Member states representatives) have found no evidence of any Frontex involvement in violation of human rights.

      The agency has already taken on board many of the recommendations issued by the working group, upgraded its reporting mechanism and reinforced its operational coordination centres to improve information exchange. It will continue working towards an effective and transparent management of EU external borders in full respect of fundamental rights.

      Recent events at the European Union’s external borders have shown that Frontex is an essential assistance for Member States and the whole EU in situations of increased migratory pressure. Our security environment is increasingly volatile and complex.

      Today, Frontex has officially launched its rapid border intervention at Lithuania’s border with Belarus and deployed standing corps officers and equipment to help secure EU’s common external border.

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-welcomes-report-by-the-scrutiny-working-group-0AQJWY
      https://twitter.com/Frontex/status/1415654854412877824

    • EU border agency ‘has failed to protect asylum seekers’ rights’

      Author of European parliament report says Frontex agency’s director should resign or be sacked

      The EU border agency has failed to protect the human rights of asylum seekers, according to a damning European parliament report on the organisation.

      After a four-month investigation by MEPs the report’s author, Tineke Strik, told the Guardian, that Frontex “did not fulfil its human rights obligations and therefore did not address and therefore did not prevent future violations”.

      Strik, a Dutch Green MEP, wants the agency’s director, Fabrice Leggeri, to resign or be fired, but the special cross-party group of eight MEPs, spanning rightwing nationalists to the radical left, that was convened to investigate Frontex has not made that call.

      Speaking before the report was released on Thursday, Strik continued: “We should consider in the end, can we have confidence in this executive director to really implement those recommendations [in her report] and really change it into a human rights sensitive agency? My group [Green MEPs], we don’t have confidence in him any more. We think it would be sound if the management board would draw the same conclusion and start the search for a new executive director.”

      Once an obscure EU agency, Frontex has become a central pillar of EU border management. After more than a 1.2 million people sought asylum in the EU in 2015, European leaders agreed to give the Warsaw-based organisation more staff and money, a point of consensus in the often fraught EU debate on how to manage migration. By 2027, Frontex will have 10,000 border and coastguards, while its budget has already increased more than 19-fold since its creation in 2006.

      But the agency has come under growing scrutiny over its role in alleged pushbacks in the Aegean Sea, with dozens of human rights organisations calling for it to be abolished.

      Last year Frontex was accused of complicity in forcing back asylum seekers in breach of international law, after video footage emerged of one of its ships creating waves that drove back a dingy in the Aegean Sea crammed with people. That footage came through a joint investigation by Lighthouse Reports, Bellingcat, Der Spiegel, ARD and TV Asahi, which said it had found six incidents where the agency was directly involved in a pushback in the Aegean or in close proximity to one.

      The committee said they had not found “conclusive evidence” that the agency was involved in pushbacks but concluded Frontex had failed to investigate such reports promptly. “As a result, Frontex did not prevent these violations, nor reduced the risk of future fundamental rights violations,” said the report.

      Strik said it was “pretty clear that [Frontex] were at least aware of what was going on” in the Aegean Sea. The agency’s investigations were “very superficial”, she said. “They asked for a response from the [Greek] government and when the government denied [pushbacks] the case was closed.”

      She said Frontex’s modus operandi was to rely on the word of the EU member state it was working with. “They end up asking the government, the host member state, and they almost always accept this response. Our conclusion is that Frontex did not fulfil its human rights obligations and therefore did not address and therefore did not prevent future violations.”

      The agency had repeatedly failed to respond to reports of rights violations from inside the organisation and external organisations, the MEPs said.

      The blame is placed largely on Leggeri, a former senior official in France’s interior ministry in charge of illegal migration, who has been the agency’s executive director since 2015. He has been singled out for criticism for shoring up his own power base within the agency, while failing to recruit all 40 fundamental rights monitors as required by EU law.

      MEPs found that Leggeri had appointed 63 staff to his private office, a number that far exceeds the average. By contrast, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, has 30 staff in her private office. “We contrast that in the way he acts with the monitors, only delaying and undermining, yet he provides for an amazing number of staff measures for his own cabinet,” Strik said.

      The MEPs concluded that Leggeri had delayed the recruitment of three executive directors required under EU law that might have checked his power.

      “That results in a complete lack of checks and balances within the organisation and of course we blame the executive director for that, but also the management board because the management board is overall responsible for good governance in the organisation,” Strik said.

      EU member states, she said, needed to make sure their representatives on the Frontex management board had the required expertise in fundamental rights and a direct line to ministers.

      “One of the problems,” she said, was that Frontex was conceived as a security rather than a rights organisation. EU member states found the agency reassuring: “[They] talk about threats at the border. They always call for Frontex. Maybe as reassurance for their own population, ‘we have secured your borders and we have made you safe’.”

      She said there was a perception inside and outside the agency that upholding human rights was in conflict with border control. “Some of the actors still perceive that when you start acting on fundamental rights, then you become less effective on border control … [Frontex] needs to do both and it’s possible to do both at the same time, so it’s a non-discussion actually.”

      The Guardian has contacted Frontex for a response to the European parliament’s report. The agency has always denied any involvement or knowledge of illegal pushbacks.

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/15/eu-border-agency-has-failed-to-protect-asylum-seekers-rights

    • Frontex wusste von Menschenrechtsverletzungen – und tat nichts

      Monatelang haben EU-Parlamentarierinnen und Parlamentarier SPIEGEL-Enthüllungen zu illegalen Pushbacks von Flüchtlingen in der Ägäis untersucht. Der Bericht ist eine Abrechnung mit Frontex-Direktor Leggeri – er soll belastendes Material vernichtet haben.

      Monatelang haben EU-Parlamentarierinnen und Parlamentarier SPIEGEL-Enthüllungen zu illegalen Pushbacks von Flüchtlingen in der Ägäis untersucht. Der Bericht ist eine Abrechnung mit Frontex-Direktor Leggeri – er soll belastendes Material vernichtet haben.

      Der europäischen Grenzschutzagentur Frontex lagen Beweise für mutmaßlich illegale Pushbacks durch griechische Grenzschützer vor, die Agentur hat es jedoch »versäumt, die Grundrechtsverletzungen anzusprechen und zu verhindern«. Das ist das Ergebnis einer monatelangen Untersuchung des Europaparlaments.

      Eine Prüfgruppe unter Beteiligung aller Fraktionen hat untersucht, was Frontex von den illegalen Pushbacks von Flüchtlingsbooten in der Ägäis wusste – und ob Frontex-Chef Fabrice Leggeri angemessen auf die Rechtsbrüche reagiert hat. Der Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe, den der SPIEGEL vorab einsehen konnte, liest sich wie eine Abrechnung mit Leggeri. Er zeichnet das Bild eines Direktors, der sich für die Einhaltung von Menschenrechten an den EU-Außengrenzen kaum interessiert und alles tut, um Verstöße zu vertuschen. Auf 17 Seiten listen die Abgeordneten seine Verfehlungen auf.

      Leggeri ignorierte sämtliche Hinweise

      Frontex habe öffentliche Berichte über Menschenrechtsverletzungen an den EU-Grenzen generell abgetan, heißt es im Report. Auch auf interne Informationen über mutmaßliche Rechtsbrüche habe die Agentur nicht angemessen reagiert. Leggeri ignoriere die Stellungnahmen und Anfragen seiner Grundrechtsbeauftragten und des sogenannten Konsultativforums. Diese sollen eigentlich dafür sorgen, dass die Agentur die Rechte von Asylsuchenden achtet.

      Trotz zahlreicher Berichte über mutmaßliche Rechtsbrüche in der Ägäis habe Leggeri nie umfassend erwogen, den Frontex-Einsatz zu beenden, oder überlegt, wie er die Menschenrechtsverletzungen verhindern könne. »Im Gegenteil, der Exekutivdirektor behauptet weiterhin, dass ihm keine Informationen über Grundrechtsverletzungen bekannt sind«, schreiben die Parlamentarierinnen und Parlamentarier.

      Darüber hinaus habe Leggeri das Parlament lange Zeit nicht angemessen informiert. Bei seinen Auftritten im Ausschuss habe der Frontex-Direktor Informationen über einzelne Pushbacks verschwiegen. In mehreren Fällen seien Grenzbeamte davon abgebracht worden, Rechtsbrüche mittels eines sogenannten »Serious Incident Reports« an die Frontex-Führung zu melden. Selbst die Einstellung von 40 Grundrechtsbeobachtern, die die Grenzbeamten kontrollieren sollen, habe Leggeri erheblich verzögert. Sie seien noch immer nicht vollständig rekrutiert.

      Frontex machte sich bei Menschenrechtsverletzungen zum Komplizen

      Die Untersuchung des Europaparlaments ist eine Reaktion auf Enthüllungen des SPIEGEL. Gemeinsame Recherchen mit den Medienorganisationen Lighthouse Reports, Bellingcat und dem ARD-Magazin »Report Mainz« zeigten, dass Frontex in der Ägäis in illegale Pushbacks verwickelt ist und sich bei griechischen Menschenrechtsverletzungen zum Komplizen gemacht hatte.

      Frontex-Beamte, darunter auch deutsche Bundespolizisten, stoppen in der Ägäis Flüchtlingsboote, bevor sie die griechischen Inseln erreichen, und übergeben sie an die griechische Küstenwache. Die Grenzschützer setzen die Geflüchteten anschließend systematisch auf dem Meer aus – entweder auf aufblasbaren Rettungsflößen oder auf Schlauchbooten, in denen sie den Motor entfernt haben. So stellen sie sicher, dass die Flüchtlinge nicht erneut griechische Gewässer erreichen können. Oft wenden die griechischen Beamten bei den Aktionen Gewalt an, stechen auf die Schlauchboote ein oder schießen ins Wasser. Bei mindestens sieben Fällen waren Frontex-Einheiten bei solchen Pushbacks in der Nähe oder in sie verstrickt.

      Pushbacks im Mittelmeer: Wie Frontex in Verbrechen verstrickt ist

      Griechische Grenzschützer schleppen Flüchtlinge systematisch aufs offene Meer zurück. Recherchen des SPIEGEL und seiner Partner zeigen, wie Frontex in die illegalen Operationen verwickelt ist. Sehen Sie hier den Film.

      In der Nacht vom 18. auf den 19. April zeichnete Frontex aus der Luft auf, wie die griechische Küstenwache Flüchtlinge auf ein Boot ohne Motor setzte und wegfuhr – ein klarer Rechtsverstoß, der die Menschen in Lebensgefahr brachte. Die Aufarbeitung des Pushbacks vom 18. April übernahm Leggeri persönlich. Dem Parlament verschwieg er den Pushback zunächst. Stattdessen stufte er den Vorfall nachträglich so ein, dass die Grundrechtsbeauftragte der Agentur fortan nicht mehr beteiligt war.

      Leggeri ließ offenbar belastendes Material vernichten

      Einer der brisantesten Vorwürfe im Bericht des Europaparlaments bezieht sich auf den Pushback in jener Nacht. Demnach wies Leggeri die Grundrechtsbeauftragte persönlich an, alle Informationen zu löschen, die sie zu dem Vorfall gesammelt hatte. Nach SPIEGEL-Informationen soll dies aus internen E-Mails hervorgehen, die die Abgeordneten einsehen konnten.

      https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/gefluechtete-in-griechenland-frontex-wusste-von-menschenrechtsverletzungen-u

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • FRA and Frontex to work together on developing fundamental rights monitors

    Today, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) signed an agreement on developing Frontex’s fundamental rights monitors. Under this agreement, FRA will provide advice and expertise to help set up effective fundamental rights monitoring during Frontex’s operations at EU borders.

    “It is essential that the EU, its Member States and agencies do their utmost to protect people’s fundamental rights. Fundamental rights monitoring of operations at the land and sea borders can help ensure that rights violations do not occur. The fundamental rights monitors are an important preventive tool and FRA will provide its fundamental rights expertise to help establish them. The vacancy notices should be published as soon as possible so the monitors can be deployed”, said FRA’s director Michael O’Flaherty.

    Under this agreement, the Fundamental Rights Agency will help develop a comprehensive manual for the future Fundamental Rights Monitors.

    To guarantee independence, the monitors should work under the overall supervision of the Frontex #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) and be able to monitor all Frontex activities.

    FRA and Frontex have already developed the terms of reference of the future monitors, after thoroughly assessing the qualifications needed for their profile. Frontex should publish the vacancy notices as soon as possible.

    https://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2020/fra-and-frontex-work-together-developing-fundamental-rights-monitors
    #Frontex #FRA #droits_humains #collaboration #frontières #asile #migrations #Agency_for_Fundamental_Rights #accord

    ping @isskein @karine4 @reka

    • Frontex and FRA agree to establish fundamental rights monitors

      Today, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) have agreed to work together to establish fundamental rights monitors, design their training programme and integrate them into Frontex activities.

      “The establishment of the new monitors is another step to make our activities even more transparent and promote fundamental rights throughout all our activities. We are committed to ensuring the highest standards in all that we do. And Fundamental rights are an essential component of effective border management.” said Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri. “The Fundamental Rights Agency is a key partner for us in this task,” he added.

      “It is essential that the EU, its Member States and agencies do their utmost to protect people’s fundamental rights. Fundamental rights monitoring of operations at the land and sea borders can help ensure that rights violations do not occur. The fundamental rights monitors are an important preventive tool and FRA will provide its fundamental rights expertise to help establish them. The vacancy notices should be published as soon as possible so the monitors can be deployed,” said FRA’s director Michael O’Flaherty.

      In a ceremony that took place online, the two directors signed a Service Level Agreement in the virtual presence of Didier Reynders, Commissioner for Justice, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, the Chair of LIBE Committee in the European Parliament and Georgios Koumoutsakos, Alternate Minister, Greek Ministry for Migration. Other participants included high-level representatives from Germany and the European Parliament, as well as the Chair of Frontex Consultative Forum on fundamental rights.

      The main tasks of the Frontex fundamental rights monitors will be to make sure all operational activities are in line with fundamental rights framework, monitor all types of operations and contribute to Frontex training activities.

      The monitors will be integrated with the agency’s Fundamental Rights Office. The Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer will oversee their work and assign them to particular operations.

      By the end of the year, Frontex and FRA plan to establish a team of as many as 40 fundamental rights monitors. They will undergo enhanced fundamental rights training before they take up their duties next year, when Frontex will deploy the first members of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps.

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-and-fra-agree-to-establish-fundamental-rights-monitors-OBabL6
      #monitoring

  • #COVID-19 Restrictions

    In response to COVID-19, national governments have introduced a series of restrictions to slow the spread of the virus. Below is a map showing various constraints implemented by countries across Europe.


    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/covid-19-restrictions-4IdY3J
    #mobilité #fermeture_des_frontières #Europe #migrations #frontières #coronavirus #cartographie #visualisation #état_d'urgence #liberté_de_circulation #liberté_de_mouvement #Schengen (fin de -)
    ping @karine4 @reka @thomas_lacroix @isskein

    • How COVID-19 is changing border control

      The pandemic is teaching border agencies in Europe important lessons about operational preparedness in times of crisis. This has implications for the future in terms of training, staffing, cross-border information sharing and the use of technologies.

      COVID-19 has triggered an unprecedented chain reaction of border closures around the world in an effort to stop the virus, including in the Schengen area. This has raised the question of whether border controls are effective in containing such outbreaks; how well prepared were border agencies for the emergency; and where next for border management in a post-pandemic world.

      Operational realities and preparedness

      After the creation of the Schengen area 25 years ago, many of Europe’s border guards were re-assigned to the EU’s external borders or given other responsibilities inside their own Member States. Hence, when the pandemic hit, governments were suddenly under pressure to re-apply border infrastructure that has not existed in any real operational sense for decades. Some states reacted by limiting the number of entry/exit points; others mobilised border reserve units or asked the army or civil protection for support.

      Furthermore, border guards did not initially have the right information or training in public health issues. It took almost two weeks for the role of border agencies to be clarified as an auxiliary/support to public health services. In practice, border officials were directing vehicles and passengers to the specialists responsible for medical checks on the spot, while strict internal checks as prescribed by the Schengen Border Code and relevant national legislation were relaxed.

      At first, the new internal travel restrictions resulted in major congestion, but after a period of adjustment by travellers, border traffic actually declined sharply due to the growing awareness of the new reality. Consequently, some staff were redeployed internally to assist law enforcement with enforcing behavioural restrictions such as social distancing.

      The operational realities facing border agencies in the first stages of the outbreak highlighted the need to step up capacities and technical assistance on health-related issues, including crisis management and contingency planning.

      Lessons from the pandemic

      The need for improvement in three other headline areas is also clear: First, base-level cooperation between border guards, customs services and sanitary agencies must improve. Although the Guidelines for Integrated Border Management (IBM) in EC External Cooperation define health agencies as key players in IBM, the part on sanitary inspections in border management has to date received less attention than aspects related to security and trade. Hitherto, in the northern hemisphere at least, this was more a nice thing to have for most national administrations rather than a necessity. COVID-19 is changing that, making clear the need for better involvement of health inspections in border management.

      Second, countries need to cooperate better on early warning and risk assessment. This should start with agreed mechanisms to trigger the adoption of safeguards against the spread between countries, regions and continents. The fact that infected persons may be asymptomatic adds to the seriousness and scale of the pandemic and highlights the need to share information across borders, including threat perception and risk analysis. In addition, staff at borders must have a minimum level of awareness about sanitary risks related to persons, but also to goods.

      Third, the existing trend towards modernisation needs to accelerate. The current mobility restrictions have changed communication and working methods. This will affect how services provide training, capacity building and technical assistance to staff and key partners through a combination of traditional face-to-face approaches with remote actions (e.g. e-learning, webinars). Modernisation also needs to happen downstream so that operational staff have better access to virtual platforms (including via smart devices) to improve the flow of real-time information and raise overall preparedness at the borders.

      Border technology after the coronavirus pandemic

      Travel to some countries in Africa has since long been preconditioned on the submission of an international vaccination certification prior passport control; a number of countries have required to present international certificate on vaccination against yellow fever, for instance. At the major airports, measuring body temperature by thermovision or contactless thermometers is a regular part of the entry processes, too. In the future, a medical certification and medical card containing information about the current health status and health history will probably be required when traveling to countries in other regions of the world, too. This may even be required as early as at the planning or booking stages.

      The current crisis might even fuel developments in the area of travel documents, with a move from the traditional paper passport to a smartphone-based one possibly being the next step. Such a digital passport (or ‘AppPassport’) would allow integrating sensitive and - for privacy and personal data protection reasons - highly secured medical records, including the vaccination history for example, in addition to the current biometric data already contained in passports or identity cards. Given the high numbers of smartphone users and the broad mobile coverage, this would be feasible.

      The use of artificial intelligence in border management could furthermore help avoid physical contacts in situations when physical distancing is required for the prevention of infections. Increased use of contactless equipment (fingerprint scanners, facial recognition cameras, etc.) and robotic voice commands would enhance the health security of both border guards and travellers.

      Finally, technology could help solve some of the conflicting objectives of border security agencies, which must reconcile secure but speedy border checks and ensure cost-effectiveness but also the convenience for travellers. Automated border controls, so-called e-gates, have improved border checks at several border crossing points worldwide, especially at air borders. Airport passengers have widely accepted the intuitive and user-friendly automatic controls. E-gates can read biometric data; there is no reason why they should not also be able to read medical data in a secured manner. There will be a need to add additional parameters, for example by equipping e-gates with body temperature measuring devices and expand their installation to arrival halls at land and maritime border crossing points. Such e-gates would provide an early warning system to take the necessary precautions in a timely manner. Installing automatic sanitiser dispensers at e-gates or in arrival hall areas is another feasible option and a strong preventive tool.

      The process of reverting to regular mobility across international borders will take time as states will gradually assess the extent to which the coronavirus is contained. In the long-term, border controls as we knew them are going to change. If we manage to learn the right lessons from the crisis, this does not mean things have to change for the worse.


      https://www.icmpd.org/news-centre/news-detail/expert-voice-how-covid-19-is-changing-border-control
      #contrôles_frontaliers #dessin

      Avec ce commentaire de Marie Martin, via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 21.04.2020 :

      j’attire votre attention sur un article d’ICMPD paru la semaine dernière (publication de Borut Eržen, Monika Weber et Sandra Sacchetti).

      On croirait lire du Frontex dans le texte sur « la gestion des risques » (la criminalisation des personnes migrantes en moins cependant), et donc un discours très consensuel sur l’importance des contrôles aux frontières.

      Comme souvent, le bureau d’étude parvient à se positionner en tant qu’expert sans avoir à aborder les sujets « qui fâchent », notamment toute la question des droits fondamentaux. On se situe davantage sur la protection des intérêts des Etats, comment « gérer au mieux leurs frontières », ce qui fait d’ICMPD le chouchou de la Commission européenne et un interlocuteur privilégié pour voir ses recommandations reprises par les institutions régionales et nationales (ICMPD conseille aussi les autorités afghanes ou turques sur la question par exemple, et est allocataire de pas mal de fonds issus du Fonds Fiduciaire).

  • #Frontex wants to disembark refugees in Senegal

    #Hera“ is the only Frontex maritime mission on the territory of a third country. A new agreement might extend this joint border #surveillance.

    The EU border agency Frontex wants to bring back refugees picked up in the Atlantic Ocean to Senegal. The EU Commission should therefore negotiate a so-called #Status_Agreement with the government in Dakar. The proposal can be found in the annual report (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6294-2020-INIT/en/pdf) on the implementation of the Regulation for the surveillance of external sea borders (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0656). It regulates the maritime „operational cooperation“ of Frontex with third countries.

    It would be the first agreement of this kind with an African government. So far, Frontex has only concluded Status Agreements with a number of Western Balkan countries for the joint surveillance of land borders. The only operation to date in a third country (https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/25/frontex-expands-operations-in-eu-neighbouring-countries) was launched by the Border Agency in Albania a year ago.

    Frontex has been coordinating the joint operation „Hera“ in the Atlantic since 2006 (https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-hera-the-canary-islands-WpQlsc). The reason for the first and thus oldest EU border surveillance mission (http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-307-frontex-operation-hera.pdf) was the arrival of many thousands of refugees in boats on the Canary Islands via Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Senegal. For a short period of time, the German Federal Police had also participated in „Hera“ (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/16/098/1609888.pdf), in addition to Portugal, France, Italy, Finland and Luxembourg. Already in 2007 the arrivals decreased drastically. For the past year, Frontex’s „Migratory Map“ (https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map) records only 711 irregular arrivals (by December) on Gran Canaria, Tenerife and the other Spanish islands. According to media reports (https://www.laprovincia.es/canarias/2020/03/03/canarias-supera-1200-personas-llegadas/1260792.html), this number has been nearly doubled in the first two months of 2020 alone.

    „Hera“ is the only maritime mission in which Frontex coordinates an operation which, with Senegal, also takes place in the 12-mile zone, the exclusive economic zone and the airspace of a third country. In „Themis“, „Indalo“ and „Poseidon“, the operational plan only covers waters under the jurisdiction and monitoring of EU Member States.

    Currently, „Hera“ is operated by Spain as the „host state“ with support from Portugal. The two countries patrol with frigates and smaller ships and carry out aerial surveillance with a helicopter. They first transmit their information to a control centre in Las Palmas, to which Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal have sent liaison officers. Processed intelligence is then forwarded to the International Coordination Centre (ICC) in Madrid, which manages all operations of the Spanish border authorities and is also responsible for cooperation with Frontex.

    If suspicious boats are detected in the area of operations in „Hera“, a report is made to the competent Maritime Rescue Operations Centre (MRCC). All those picked up in the Spanish Search and Rescue zone have been able to disembark in the Canary Islands in recent years.

    If the refugees are still in the Senegalese #SAR zone, the national coast guard brings them back to the West African country. With a Status Agreement, Frontex assets could do the same. According to SAR Info, a Canadian information platform, the Senegalese national #MRCC (https://sarcontacts.info/countries/senegal) is also responsible for the rescue coordination off the coast of Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania.

    Before each operation, Frontex is required to assess the possible disembarkation of intercepted refugees in the third countries concerned. In the report for 2018, Leggeri writes that his agency, with the „host states“ of the missions „Themis“ (Italy) and „Indalo“ (Spain), considered such disembarkations to Libya and Tunisia as well as to Morocco to be incompatible with regulations to which Frontex is bound.

    From Frontex’s point of view, however, disembarkations would be possible for Turkey and Senegal, as the governments there do not violate basic fundamental and human rights and also adhere to the principle of non-refoulement, according to which refugees may not be returned to countries from which they have fled. So far, says Leggeri, Frontex and the EU Member States involved in „Poseidon“ and „Hera“ have not forced any persons to Turkey or Senegal.

    The report signed by Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri is as usual one year late, the paper published last week refers to 2018. That was the same year in which the European Union once again wanted to set up „regional disembarkation centres“ in North Africa (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4629). There, asylum applications of persons seeking protection would be examined even before they reach Europe. All the governments in question rejected the proposal, and the African Union also opposed it a year ago. Led by Egypt, the 55 member states criticise the planned EU facilities as „de facto detention centres“ (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/african-union-seeks-to-kill-eu-plan-to-process-migrants-in-africa).

    In the report, Leggeri complains that Frontex has too little competence in its four maritime missions. Bilateral agreements, such as those Italy has concluded with Libya (https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/italy-halt-abusive-migration-cooperation-libya) or Spain with Morocco (https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/21/inenglish/1550736538_089908.html), allow for much closer cooperation with North African coastguards.

    https://digit.site36.net/2020/03/01/frontex-wants-to-disembark-refugees-in-senegal
    #Sénégal #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #désembarquement #surveillance_frontalière #accord #accords #frontières

    Et pas mal de matériel sur seenthis autour de...
    #plateformes_de_désembarquement #disembarkation_paltforms #plateformes_de_débarquement #regional_disembarkation_platforms #Albanie #Océane_atlantique #Atlantique #Allemagne

    –-> voir notamment ici, dans la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765334

    ping @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

  • Irregular migration into EU at lowest level since 2013

    The number of irregular border crossings detected on the European Union’s external borders last year fell to the lowest level since 2013 due to a drop in the number of people reaching European shores via the Central and Western Mediterranean routes.

    Preliminary 2019 data collected by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, showed a 6% fall in illegal border crossings along the EU’s external borders to just over 139 000. This is 92% below the record number set in 2015.

    The number of irregular migrants crossing the Central Mediterranean fell roughly 41% to around 14 000. Nationals of Tunisia and Sudan accounted for the largest share of detections on this route.

    The total number of irregular migrants detected in the Western Mediterranean dropped approximately 58% to around 24 000, with Moroccans and Algerians making up the largest percentage.

    Eeastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans

    Despite the general downward trend, the Eastern Mediterranean saw growing migratory pressure starting in the spring. It peaked in September and then started falling in accordance with the seasonal trend. In all of 2019, there were more than 82 000 irregular migrants detected on this route, roughly 46% more than in the previous year.

    In the second half of 2019, irregular arrivals in the region were at the highest since the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016, although still well below the figures recorded in 2015 and early 2016 with the situation before the Statement.

    Some persons transferred from the Greek islands to the mainland appear to have continued on the Western Balkan migratory route. There has been an increase in detections on the Greek-Albanian border after the start of the Frontex joint operation in May. In the second half of the year, a significant number of detections was reported on the EU borders with Serbia.

    In total, around 14 000 irregular crossings were detected at the EU’s borders on the Western Balkan route last year – more than double the 2018 figure.

    On the Eastern Mediterranean route and the related Western Balkan route, nationals of Afghanistan and Syria accounted for over half of all registered irregular arrivals.

    Top nationality

    Overall, Afghans were the main nationality of newly arrived irregular migrants in 2019, representing almost a quarter of all arrivals. The number of Afghan migrants was nearly three times (+167%) the figure from the previous year. Roughly four out of five were registered on the Eastern Mediterranean route, while nearly all the rest on the Western Balkan route.

    The most recent available data also suggest a higher percentage of women among the newly arrived migrants in 2019. In the first ten months of last year, around 23% of migrants were women compared with 19% in 2018. EU countries counted approximately 14 600 migrant children younger than 14 in the January-October period, almost one thousand more than in all of 2018.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/flash-report-irregular-migration-into-eu-at-lowest-level-since-2013-n

    ......

    Et comme dit Catherine Teule via la mailing-list Migreurop, qui a signalé cette info :

    Bravo Frontex !!!! ( et ses partenaires des pays tiers).
    Enfin, pas tout à fait puisque certaines « routes » ont enregistré des augmentations de flux à la fin de l’année 2019...

    #statistiques #chiffres #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Europe #2019 #frontières_extérieures #Frontex #Méditerranée #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #réfugiés_afghans

    • Parallèlement...
      Migrants : l’Europe va doubler ses opérations d’aide en matière d’asile

      Le bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile « va voir ses déploiements opérationnels doubler en 2020 » pour atteindre 2000 personnes sur le terrain.

      L’agence européenne de l’asile a annoncé ce mardi le doublement de ses opérations en 2020, en particulier pour renforcer sa présence en #Grèce, à #Chypre et à #Malte, où l’afflux de migrants a explosé en 2019.

      Le #bureau_européen_d'appui_en_matière_d'asile (#EASO) « va voir ses déploiements opérationnels doubler en 2020 » pour atteindre 2000 personnes sur le terrain, fruit d’un #accord signé en décembre avec ces pays ainsi que l’#Italie, a souligné l’agence dans un communiqué.

      « Chypre, la Grèce et Malte verront un doublement du #personnel_EASO tandis que les déploiements en Italie seront réduits à la lumière des changements de besoins de la part des autorités » de ce pays où, à l’inverse, les arrivées par la Méditerranée ont été divisées par deux entre 2018 et 2019.

      Très loin des flux migratoires au plus fort de la crise en 2015, 110 669 migrants et réfugiés ont rallié l’Europe après avoir traversé la mer en 2019 selon les chiffres publiés par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) de l’ONU. Soit dix fois moins que le million de personnes arrivées en 2015.

      L’an dernier, la Grèce a accueilli 62 445 de ces exilés, contre 32 742 l’année précédente. Le petit État insulaire de Malte a vu débarquer 3405 personnes, soit deux fois plus que les 1445 de 2018, tandis que 7647 migrants sont arrivés à Chypre (4307 en 2018).

      Avec quelque 550 agents en Grèce, EASO prévoit donc « trois fois plus d’assistants sociaux » et une aide plus ciblée « pour aider à la réception dans les #hotspots » comme celui de #Lesbos, où plus de 37 000 personnes s’entassent dans des conditions souvent indignes. À Chypre, les 120 personnels européens auront surtout pour mission d’aider les autorités à enregistrer et traiter les demandes d’asile.

      « Le corridor le plus meurtrier »

      La réduction du soutien européen en Italie s’explique par la chute des arrivées dans ce pays (11 471 en 2019, 23 370 en 2018, 181 000 en 2016) qui avait un temps fermé ses ports aux bateaux secourant les migrants en mer en 2019.

      Cette route de Méditerranée centrale entre l’Afrique du Nord et l’Italie « reste le corridor le plus meurtrier », a encore précisé l’OIM, qui a recensé 1283 décès connus en Méditerranée (centrale, orientale et occidentale) l’an dernier, contre près de 2.300 l’année précédente. « Comme pour Malte, EASO restera fortement impliqué dans (le processus de) #débarquement ad hoc » des bateaux portant secours aux migrants sur cette route, a ajouté le bureau européen.

      https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/migrants-l-europe-va-doubler-ses-operations-d-aide-en-matiere-d-asile_21136

  • #OSCE Secretariat and #Frontex strengthen co-operation to combat cross-border crime

    The OSCE Secretariat and Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, agreed to strengthen their co-operation in combating cross-border crime, trafficking in human beings and addressing migratory challenges in a Working Arrangement document last week.
    The document, signed by OSCE Secretary General #Thomas_Greminger and Frontex Executive Director #Fabrice_Leggeri, covers different areas of mutual interest, including promoting and enhancing #good_practices in #border_management, ensuring fundamental rights protection of people at the borders, and continuing to develop capacities to address emerging forms of cross-border crime.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/osce-secretariat-and-frontex-strengthen-co-operation-to-combat-cross-
    #coopération #migrations #frontières #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux

    –-----------

    Pour rappel... la page « migrations » de l’OCSE...

    Migrations

    Les grands flux migratoires, s’ils ne sont pas gérés de manière globale et coordonnée et dans le respect des droits de l’homme, sont susceptibles de constituer une menace pour la coopération, la stabilité et la sécurité. Comme le montrent les crises de réfugiés, les personnes en déplacement sont les premières et le plus directement touchées.

    L’OSCE est déterminée à aborder le phénomène migratoire dans toutes ses dimensions en capitalisant sur la valeur ajoutée qu’elle peut apporter aux solutions régionales et mondiales. Parmi les principaux atouts de l’Organisation figurent sa vaste couverture géographique, l’étendue et la diversité de sa composition, sa fonction normative et son engagement transdimensionnel, ses relations avec les partenaires méditerranéens et asiatiques pour la coopération, ainsi que sa présence étendue sur le terrain.

    L’OSCE fournit un appui au renforcement des capacités, donne des avis en matière de politique, sensibilise, mobilise et contribue au dialogue. Les principaux domaines d’action en matière de migrations sont les suivants :

    Régulation desmigrations : gestion des frontières, sécurité des documents de voyage et lutte contre les menaces transnationales, y compris la traite des êtres humains le long des itinéraires de migration ;
    Facilitation de la migration légale : gouvernance et recherche, collecte de données et harmonisation en matière de migration de main-d’œuvre ; et
    Octroi d’un soutien aux individus et aux communautés : liberté de circulation, tolérance et non-discrimination, intégration et orientation des réfugiés.

    L’OSCE est par ailleurs en mesure de soutenir les efforts internationaux relatifs aux questions de migration grâce à sa longue expérience dans le domaine de la dimension humaine et à son rôle reconnu en ce qui concerne le suivi des droits de l’homme. En outre, elle joue un rôle important dans la promotion de l’intégration, de la tolérance et de la non-discrimination ainsi que de l’éducation. Les activités menées dans ces domaines par les institutions de l’OSCE peuvent également s’appliquer aux problèmes de migration. Afin d’éviter les duplications et de renforcer les synergies sur les questions de migration, l’OSCE collabore avec d’autres organisations régionales et internationales au travers d’un dialogue et d’une coopération de haut niveau.

    https://www.osce.org/fr/migration

    Et aussi le passage sur les #contrôles_frontaliers dans le #manuel de l’OCSE : « Manuel pour l’établissement de politiques de migration de main-d’œuvre efficaces »

    VIII.4.2 Contrôles aux frontières et politique de #visas

    Lors de l’examen des mesures extérieures à prendre pour prévenir ou réduire la migration irrégulière, les dispositions les plus courantes mentionnées sont celles qui consistent à prévenir l’entrée des migrants irréguliers. Les contrôles aux frontières doivent être efficaces et justes, car la propension à tenter des méthodes irrégulières tend à augmenter parce que les migrants ne sont pas sûrs si ungarde-frontière corrompu demandera de verser un pot-de-vin ou leur rendra la vie difficile. L’efficacité aux frontières ne s’améliore que si la confiance repose sur la coopération entre les agents de la police des frontières de tous les pays concernés par le processus de migration, et en particulier entre pays voisins. Malheureusement, dans certaines régions, il n’est pas rare que les garde-frontières tentent de faire porter la responsabilité pour les travailleurs migrants irréguliers (en particulier ceux qui transitent par leur pays) aux agents de l’autre pays, plutôt que de coopérer pour trouver une solution au problème. L’UE a adopté des mesures globales pour s’assurer que desrègles communes sont appliquées aux frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, qui ont fait l’objet d’une refonte dans un Règlement établissant un code communautaire relatif au régime de franchissement des frontières par les personnes (code frontières Schengen) (UE, 2006b). Elle a également mis en place une agence européenne (FRONTEX) pour renforcer la coopération entre les États membres de l’UE à ses frontières (UE, 2004e), qui a récemment coordonné un certain nombre d’activités communes en vue de lutter contre la migration clandestine dans la Méditerranée et l’Atlantique Est (EUobserver.com 2007).Une politique de visas viable et équitablement appliquée qui permette au migrant d’entrer dans le pays pour y prendre un emploi, avec un minimum d’obstacles bureaucratiques, est également essentielle pour s’assurer que moins de migrants entrent dans le pays sans autorisation. Malheureusement, les visas délivrés pour l’admission dans un pays pour d’autres motifs (tourisme ou études) sont mis à profit dans de nombreux pays ainsi que dans les États membres de l’UE appliquant le visa UE/Schengen pour de courtes visites (séjour de maximum trois mois), même si cet abus est souvent exacerbé par l’absence de possibilités juridiques suffisantes pour prendre un emploi.

    (p.187)

    https://www.osce.org/fr/secretariat/29632?download=true
    #politique_migratoire

    ping @isskein @reka

  • L’Europe utilisera-t-elle les drones israéliens contre les réfugiés ?

    En matière de sécurité, #Israël en connait un rayon. Ses entreprises sont particulièrement actives sur ce marché lucratif et peuvent démontrer l’efficacité de leurs produits en prenant les Palestiniens comme cobayes. Pour contrôler l’arrivée de réfugiés, l’agence européenne #Frontex s’intéresse ainsi de près au drone #Heron. L’engin a fait ses “preuves au combat” durant l’#opération_Plomb durci. (IGA)

    En septembre, l’Agence de surveillance des frontières de l’Union européenne Frontex a annoncé le démarrage de vols d’essais de drones en #Italie, en #Grèce et au #Portugal. Il y avait une omission majeure dans la déclaration de Frontex : le type de drones testé avait été utilisé auparavant pour attaquer Gaza.

    Certains détails sur les compagnies impliquées dans ces essais ont été publiés plus tôt cette année. Un « avis d’attribution de marché » a révélé qu’#Israel_Aerospace_Industries était l’un des deux fournisseurs sélectionnés.

    Israel Aerospace Industries a reçu 5.,5 millions de dollars pour jusqu’à 600 heures de vols d’essais.

    Le drone qu’Israel Aerospace Industries offre pour la #surveillance maritime s’appelle le #Heron.

    Selon le propre site web de la compagnie, le Heron a « fait ses preuves au combat ». C’est une expression codée signifiant qu’il a été employé pendant trois attaques majeures d’Israël contre Gaza pendant la dernière décennie.

    Après l’opération Plomb durci, l’attaque israélienne sur Gaza de fin 2008 et début 2009, une enquête de Human Rights Watch a conclu que des dizaines de civils avaient été tués par des missiles lancés à partir de drones. Le Heron a été identifié comme l’un des principaux drones déployés dans cette offensive.

    Frontex – qui expulse fréquemment des réfugiés d’Europe – a étudié les #drones depuis un certain temps. Déjà en 2012, Israel Aerospace Industries avait présenté le Heron à un événement organisé par Frontex.

    Par ses vols d’essais, Frontex permet à l’industrie de guerre israélienne d’adapter la technologie testée sur les Palestiniens à des fins de surveillance. Alors que les dirigeants de l’Union européenne professent couramment leur souci des droits humains, l’implication de fabricants d’armes pour surveiller les frontières partage plus que quelques similitudes avec les politiques belliqueuses poursuivies par le gouvernement de Donald Trump aux USA.

    Des opportunités commerciales

    Les entreprises israéliennes bénéficient des décisions prises des deux côtés de l’Atlantique.

    L’année dernière, #Elta – une filiale d’Israel Aerospace Industries – a été engagée pour dessiner un prototype pour le mur controversé que Trump a proposé d’établir le long de la frontière USA- Mexique. Elbit, un autre fabricant israélien de drones, a gagné en 2014 un contrat pour construire des tours de surveillance entre l’Arizona et le Mexique.

    Les mêmes compagnies poursuivent les opportunités commerciales en Europe.

    Elta a été en contact avec divers gouvernements à propos de leur système « de #patrouille_virtuelle des #frontières » – qui est basé sur l’interception des communications téléphoniques des mobiles et l’#espionnage des usagers d’internet. Pour fournir un prétexte à une telle intrusion, la compagnie joue sur la politique de la #peur. Amnon Sofrin, un dirigeant d’Elta qui occupait auparavant une position de premier plan dans l’agence israélienne d’espionnage et d’assassinat du Mossad, a recommandé que l’Europe choisisse en priorité la « #sécurité » plutôt que les libertés civiles.

    L’entreprise israélienne #Magal_Systems cherche aussi des contrats en Europe. Magal a installé ce qu’elle appelle une barrière « intelligente » — livrée avec des capteurs et un équipement avancé de caméras – le long de la frontière d’Israël avec Gaza.

    Saar Koush, jusqu’à récemment le PDG de Magal, a argué que le rôle de l’entreprise dans la mise en place d’un siège des deux millions d’habitants de Gaza leur donnait un argument commercial unique – ou au moins rare. « Tout le monde peut vous donner un très joli Powerpoint, mais peu de gens peuvent vous montrer un projet aussi complexe que Gaza, qui est constamment testé en combat », a dit Koush.

    Apprendre d’Israël ?

    Frontex est en contact avec d’autres entreprises israéliennes.

    En juin de cette année, l’Union européenne a publié une notice montrant que la compagnie israélienne #Windward avait gagné un contrat de près d’ 1 million de dollars pour travailler à un projet d’« analyse maritime » organisé par Frontex. #Gabi_Ashkenazi, un ancien chef de l’armée israélienne, est conseiller à Windward ; #David_Petraeus, qui a commandé les troupes US occupant l’Irak et l’Afghanistan, est l’un de ses investisseurs.

    Dans son rapport annuel 2016, Frontex déclarait que « les premiers pas avaient été faits afin de développer des relations « stratégiques » avec Israël. Frontex a ultérieurement exprimé son intention d’accroître cette coopération d’ici 2020.

    Un point clé est « l’apprentissage mutuel ». Il est plus que probable qu’il s’agisse d’un euphémisme pour échanger des notes sur les tactiques qui devraient être utilisées contre les gens fuyant la pauvreté ou la persécution.

    Israël a une réputation effroyable en ce qui concerne le traitement des réfugiés. Des Africains vivant en Israël ont été sujets à des mauvais traitements racistes de la part des plus hauts niveaux du gouvernement. Benjamin Netanyahou, le Premier ministre, les a étiquetés comme des « infiltrés ».

    Un autre ministre du gouvernement a soutenu que les Africains ne peuvent être considérés comme des humains.

    Selon l’institut de sondage Gallup, Israël est l’un des pays les moins hospitaliers du monde pour les demandeurs d’asile. Malgré sa proximité géographique avec la Syrie, Israël a refusé l’entrée aux victimes de la guerre en cours.

    L’an dernier, Netanyahou a été entendu disant aux dirigeants du groupe de Visegrad (ou Visegrad 4) – la Hongrie, la Pologne, la République tchèque et la Slovaquie – qu’ils devraient fermer leurs frontières aux réfugiés. Il a aussi déclaré qu’Israël joue un rôle important dans la réduction de la migration vers l’Europe et suggéré qu’Israël devrait être récompensé pour cela.

    L’identification d’Israël comme partenaire pour une « coopération stratégique » avec Frontex est inquiétante en soi. Les préparatifs pour utiliser les outils de répression d’Israël contre les réfugiés faisant route vers l’Europe le sont encore plus.

    https://www.investigaction.net/fr/leurope-utilisera-t-elle-les-drones-israeliens-contre-les-refugies

    #surveillance_frontalière #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #migrations #réfugiés #sécurité #Méditerranée #Heron #Israeli_Aerospace_Industries #Gaza #business

    • #Leonardo deploys its #Falco_EVO_RPAS for drone-based maritime surveillance as part of the Frontex test programme

      Leonardo’s Falco EVO Remotely-Piloted Air System (RPAS), in a maritime patrol configuration, has been deployed from Lampedusa airport (Lampedusa Island) as part of the Frontex surveillance research programme to test its ability to monitor the European Union’s external borders.

      Frontex is exploring the surveillance capability of medium-altitude, long-endurance RPAS as well as evaluating cost efficiency and endurance. Leonardo was selected by the European agency under a service contract tender for drone operations for maritime surveillance across the Italian and Maltese civil airspace. The current agreement provides for 300 flight hours and may be extended into a longer-term agreement.

      Under the deployment, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities are organised by Guardia di Finanza under coordination of the Ministry of Interior and are undertaken by Leonardo from Lampedusa also thanks to the decisive support and collaboration of ENAC and ENAV. Leonardo’s flight crews and maintenance teams are present to support the operations with the Falco EVO, which is equipped with a complete on-board sensor suite including the Company’s Gabbiano TS Ultra Light radar. This configuration allows it to carry out extended-range day and night-time missions.

      “We are proud to be able to demonstrate the capabilities of our Falco EVO to Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, which is facing the on-going and evolving surveillance challenges posed by maritime borders. We are ready to leverage our years of experience in drone-based surveillance operations, working with the United Nations and many other international customers,” said Alessandro Profumo, CEO of Leonardo. “I wish to thank all the Italian stakeholders who contributed to this important achievement and I am convinced that this fruitful partnering approach will allow Frontex to define the best possible use for drone-based technologies.”

      The Falco EVO will operate under a “Permit to Fly” issued by the Italian Civil Aviation Authority (ENAC), which authorizes flights in the Italian and Maltese Flight Information Region (FIR)’s civil airspace. The innovative agreement reached with ENAC guarantees compliance with national and international regulations and coordination with relevant authorities. The agreement also provides for close involvement from the Guardia di Finanza as subject matter experts with operational experience in defining mission profiles and ensuring the best operational conditions in which to undertake the 300- hours test programme.

      The Falco EVO configuration being deployed includes a high-definition InfraRed (IR) electro-optical system, a Beyond-Line-Of-Sight (BLOS) satellite data-link system, a new propulsion system based on a heavy-fuel engine, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) and a complete communications relay suite.

      Leonardo is the only European company providing a comprehensive RPAS ISR capability, from the design of each system element all the way through to operations. Today the Company is an international pioneer in the operation of unmanned flights on behalf of civil organizations in “non-segregated”, transnational airspace.

      Under an innovative business model, Leonardo owns and operates its Falco family of RPAS and provides surveillance information and data directly to its customers. This ‘managed service’ model is expected to be an area of growth for Leonardo which is expanding its ‘drones as a service’ offering to customers such as the police and emergency responders in line with the growth path outlined in the Company’s industrial plan.


      https://www.edrmagazine.eu/leonardo-deploys-its-falco-evo-rpas-for-drone-based-maritime-surveillanc

    • Leonardo: il #Falco_Evo inizia i voli per il programma Frontex

      Il Falco Evo, il velivolo a pilotaggio remoto di Leonardo, ha iniziato la campagna di voli in una configurazione specifica per il monitoraggio marittimo, nell’ambito del programma Frontex, finalizzato alla sperimentazione di droni per il controllo delle frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea. Frontex, l’agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera e costiera, sta infatti analizzando la capacità di sorveglianza a media altitudine e lunga persistenza offerta dai velivoli pilotati a distanza, valutando efficienza economica ed efficacia operativa di tali sistemi. Leonardo è stata selezionata a seguito di una gara per un contratto di servizio per fornire attività di sorveglianza marittima attraverso l’uso di droni nello spazio aereo civile italiano e maltese. L’accordo attuale prevede un totale di 300 ore di volo con possibili ulteriori estensioni contrattuali. Le operazioni di sorveglianza e ricognizione effettuate da Leonardo con il Falco Evo vengono pianificate dalla Guardia di Finanza sotto il coordinamento del ministero dell’Interno, con il supporto di Enac, Enav e AST Aeroservizi Società di Gestione dell’aeroporto di Lampedusa, dove si svolgono i voli.
      “Siamo orgogliosi di dimostrare le capacità del Falco EVO all’agenzia europea Frontex e alle Forze di Sicurezza, che affrontano quotidianamente la sfida del controllo e della protezione dei confini marittimi – ha commentato Alessandro Profumo, amministratore delegato di Leonardo -. Leonardo mette a disposizione di questo programma la lunga esperienza acquisita anche grazie alle attività svolte per le Nazioni Unite e molti altri clienti internazionali con i propri sistemi pilotati da remoto”.
      Il Falco Evo opera grazie ad un “Permit to Fly” rilasciato dall’Enac, che autorizza i voli nello spazio aereo civile italiano e maltese. L’accordo innovativo raggiunto con Enac garantisce quindi la conformità alle normative nazionali e internazionali e il coordinamento con le relative autorità. L’attività prevede, inoltre, un forte coinvolgimento della Guardia di Finanza in virtù della significativa esperienza del Corpo nella definizione dei profili di missione, assicurando le migliori condizioni operative per lo svolgimento delle 300 ore di volo programmate. La configurazione del Falco Evo impiegato nel programma include un sistema ottico all’infrarosso ad alta definizione, un collegamento dati satellitari oltre la linea di vista (Beyond-Line-Data-Of-Sight - BLOS), un nuovo sistema di propulsione basato su un motore a combustibile pesante, un sistema di identificazione automatico (Automatic Identification System - AIS) e una suite completa per le comunicazioni. Leonardo è l’unica azienda europea in grado di fornire capacità complete RPAS e ISR, progettando e sviluppando tutti gli elementi che compongono un sistema pilotato da remoto, anche nell’ambito di contratti di servizio per operazioni “unmanned” e tra i pochi player al mondo a poter operare per conto di enti civili in spazi aerei non segregati trasnazionali.

      https://www.trasporti-italia.com/focus/leonardo-il-falco-evo-inizia-i-voli-per-il-programma-frontex/36521

    • Frontex Director meets with Portugal’s Minister of Internal Administration

      The Executive Director of Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, met with Portugal’s Minister of Internal Administration and with the National Director of Portuguese Immigration and Border Service (SEF) on Friday to introduce the agency’s liaison officer for Portugal and Spain.

      Frontex is deploying 11 liaison officers to enhance the cooperation between the agency and national authorities responsible for border management, returns and coast guard functions in 30 EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries.

      In Lisbon, Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri met with Eduardo Cabrita, Portugal’s Minister of Internal Administration and Cristina Gatões, the National Director of Portuguese Immigration and Border Service (#SEF).

      During his visit to Portugal, Fabrice Leggeri also visited the headquarters of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and met with its new Executive Director, Maja Markovčić Kostelac. Frontex and EMSA, along with the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), work together in in the maritime domain to support EU Member States and develop European coast guard functions.

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-director-meets-with-portugal-s-minister-of-internal-administr

    • Migranti:da inizio anno sbarcati 16.566,-79% rispetto a 2017

      Dall’inizio dell’anno ad oggi sono sbarcati in Italia 16.566 migranti, il 79,07% in meno rispetto allo stesso periodo dell’anno scorso, quando ne arrivarono 79.154. Dai dati del Viminale, aggiornati al 28 giugno, emerge dunque che per il dodicesimo mese consecutivo gli sbarchi nel nostro paese sono in calo: l’ultimo picco fu registrato proprio a giugno dell’anno scorso, quando sbarcarono 23.526 migranti (nel 2016 ne arrivarono 22.339 mentre quest’anno il numero è fermo a 3.136). Dal mese di luglio 2017, che ha coinciso con gli accordi siglati con la Libia dall’ex ministro dell’Interno Marco Minniti, si è sempre registrata una diminuzione. Dei 16.566 arrivati nei primi sei mesi del 2018 (la quasi totalità, 15.741, nei porti siciliani), 11.401 sono partiti dalla Libia: un calo nelle partenze dell’84,94% rispetto al 2017 e dell’83,18% rispetto al 2016. Quanto alle nazionalità di quelli che sono arrivati, la prima è la Tunisia, con 3.002 migranti, seguita da Eritrea (2.555), Sudan (1.488) e Nigeria (1.229).

      http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2018/06/30/migrantida-inizio-anno-sbarcati-16.566-79-rispetto-a-2017-_30327137-364e-44bf-8

    • En Méditerranée, les flux de migrants s’estompent et s’orientent vers l’ouest

      Pour la première fois depuis le début de la crise migratoire en 2014, l’Espagne est, avant l’Italie et la Grèce, le pays européen qui enregistre le plus d’arrivées de migrants par la mer et le plus de naufrages meurtriers au large de ses côtes.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/280618/en-mediterranee-les-flux-de-migrants-s-estompent-et-s-orientent-vers-l-oue
      #routes_migratoires

    • Migratory flows in April: Overall drop, but more detections in Greece and Spain

      Central Mediterranean
      The number of migrants arriving in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route in April fell to about 2 800, down 78% from April 2017. The total number of migrants detected on this route in the first four months of 2018 fell to roughly 9 400, down three-quarters from a year ago.
      So far this year, Tunisians and Eritreans were the two most represented nationalities on this route, together accounting for almost 40% of all the detected migrants.

      Eastern Mediterranean
      In April, the number of irregular migrants taking the Eastern Mediterranean route stood at some 6 700, two-thirds more than in the previous month. In the first four months of this year, more than 14 900 migrants entered the EU through the Eastern Mediterranean route, 92% more than in the same period of last year. The increase was mainly caused by the rise of irregular crossings on the land borders with Turkey. In April the number of migrants detected at the land borders on this route has exceeded the detections on the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea.
      The largest number of migrants on this route in the first four months of the year were nationals of Syria and Iraq.

      Western Mediterranean
      Last month, the number of irregular migrants reaching Spain stood at nearly 1100, a quarter more than in April 2017. In the first four months of 2018, there were some 4600 irregular border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route, 95 more than a year ago.
      Nationals of Morocco accounted for the highest number of arrivals in Spain this year, followed by those from Guinea and Mali.

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/migratory-flows-in-april-overall-drop-but-more-detections-in-greece-a
      #2018 #Espagne #Grèce

    • EU’s Frontex warns of new migrant route to Spain

      Frontex chief Fabrice Leggeri has warned that Spain could see a significant increase in migrant arrivals. The news comes ahead of the European Commission’s new proposal to strengthen EU external borders with more guards.

      Frontex chief Fabrice Leggeri said Friday that some 6,000 migrants had entered the European Union in June by crossing into Spain from Morocco, the so-called western Mediterranean route.

      https://m.dw.com/en/eus-frontex-warns-of-new-migrant-route-to-spain/a-44563058?xtref=http%253A%252F%252Fm.facebook.com

    • L’Espagne devient la principale voie d’accès des migrants à l’Europe

      La Commission a annoncé trois millions d’euros d’aide d’urgence pour les garde-frontières espagnols, confrontés à un triplement des arrivées de migrants, suite au verrouillage de la route italienne.

      –-> v. ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/683358

      L’aide supplémentaire que l’exécutif a décidé d’allouer à l’Espagne après l’augmentation des arrivées sur les côtes provient du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure et a pour but de financer le déploiement de personnel supplémentaire le long des frontières méridionales espagnoles.

      Le mois dernier, la Commission a déjà attribué 24,8 millions d’euros au ministère de l’Emploi et de la Sécurité sociale et à la Croix-Rouge espagnole, afin de renforcer les capacités d’accueil, de prise en charge sanitaire, de nourriture et de logement des migrants arrivants par la route de l’ouest méditerranéen.

      Une enveloppe supplémentaire de 720 000 euros a été allouée à l’organisation des rapatriements et des transferts depuis l’enclave de Ceuta et Melilla.

      Cette aide financière s’ajoute aux 691,7 millions que reçoit Madrid dans le cadre du Fonds pour l’asile, l’immigration et l’intégration et du fonds pour la sécurité intérieure pour la période budgétaire 2014-2020.

      https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/avramopoulos-in-spain-to-announce-further-eu-support-to-tackle-migration

    • En #Méditerranée, les flux de migrants s’orientent vers l’ouest

      Entre janvier et juillet, 62 177 migrants ont rejoint l’Europe par la Méditerranée, selon les données de l’Agence des Nations unies pour les réfugiés. Un chiffre en baisse par rapport à 2017 (172 301 sur l’ensemble des douze mois) et sans commune mesure avec le « pic » de 2015, où 1 015 078 arrivées avaient été enregistrées.

      Les flux déclinent et se déplacent géographiquement : entre 2014 et 2017, près de 98 % des migrants étaient entrés via la Grèce et l’Italie, empruntant les voies dites « orientales » et « centrales » de la Méditerranée ; en 2018, c’est pour l’instant l’Espagne qui enregistre le plus d’arrivées (23 785), devant l’Italie (18 348), la Grèce (16 142) et, de manière anecdotique, Chypre (73).


      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/030818/en-mediterranee-les-flux-de-migrants-s-orientent-vers-l-ouest
      #statistiques #chiffres #Méditerranée_centrale #itinéraires_migratoires #parcours_migratoires #routes_migratoires #asile #migrations #réfugiés #2018 #Espagne #Italie #Grèce #2017 #2016 #2015 #2014 #arrivées

      Et des statistiques sur les #morts et #disparus :


      #mourir_en_mer #décès #naufrages

    • The most common Mediterranean migration paths into Europe have changed since 2009

      Until 2018, the Morocco-to-Spain route – also known as the western route – had been the least-traveled Mediterranean migration path, with a total of 89,000 migrants arriving along Spain’s coastline since 2009. But between January and August 2018, this route has seen over 28,000 arrivals, more than the central Africa-to-Italy central route (20,000 arrivals) and the Turkey-to-Greece eastern route (20,000 arrivals). One reason for this is that Spain recently allowed rescue ships carrying migrants to dock after other European Union countries had denied them entry.

      Toute la Méditerranée:

      #Méditerranée_occidentale:

      #Méditerranée_centrale:

      #Méditerranée_orientale:

      http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/18/the-most-common-mediterranean-migration-paths-into-europe-have-changed-

    • The “Shift” to the Western Mediterranean Migration Route: Myth or Reality?

      How Spain Became the Top Arrival Country of Irregular Migration to the EU

      This article looks at the increase in arrivals[1] of refugees and migrants in Spain, analysing the nationalities of those arriving to better understand whether there has been a shift from the Central Mediterranean migration route (Italy) towards the Western Mediterranean route (Spain). The article explores how the political dynamics between North African countries and the European Union (EU) have impacted the number of arrivals in Spain.

      The Western Mediterranean route has recently become the most active route of irregular migration to Europe. As of mid-August 2018, a total of 26,350 refugees and migrants arrived in Spain by sea, three times the number of arrivals in the first seven months of 2017. In July alone 8,800 refugees and migrants reached Spain, four times the number of arrivals in July of last year.

      But this migration trend did not begin this year. The number of refugees and migrants arriving by sea in Spain grew by 55 per cent between 2015 and 2016, and by 172 per cent between 2016 and 2017.

      At the same time, there has been a decrease in the number of refugees and migrants entering the EU via the Central Mediterranean route. Between January and July 2018, a total of 18,510 persons arrived in Italy by sea compared to 95,213 arrivals in the same period in 2017, an 81 per cent decrease.

      This decrease is a result of new measures to restrict irregular migration adopted by EU Member States, including increased cooperation with Libya, which has been the main embarkation country for the Central Mediterranean migration route. So far this year, the Libyan Coast Guards have intercepted 12,152 refugees and migrants who were on smuggling boats (more than double the total number of interceptions in 2017). In the last two weeks of July, 99.5 per cent of the refugees and migrants who departed on smuggling boats were caught and returned to Libya, according to a data analysis conducted at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). The number of people being detained by the Libyan Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM) has continued growing (from 5,000 to 9,300 between May and July 2018), with thousands more held in unofficial detention facilities.

      So, was there a shift from the Central to the Western Mediterranean Migration route? In other words, has the decline of arrivals in Italy led to the increase of arrivals in Spain?

      First of all, while this article only analyses the changes in the use of these two sea routes and among those trying to go to Europe, for most West Africans, the intended destination is actually North Africa, including Libya and Algeria, where they hope to find jobs. A minority intends to move onwards to Europe and this is confirmed by MMC’s 4Mi data referred to below.

      The answer to the question on whether or not there has been a shift between the two routes can be found in the analysis of the origin countries of the refugees and migrants that were most commonly using the Central Mediterranean route before it became increasingly difficult to reach Europe. Only if a decrease of the main nationalities using the Central Mediterranean Route corresponds to an increase of the same group along the Western Mediterranean route we can speak of “a shift”.

      The two nationalities who were – by far – the most common origin countries of refugees and migrants arriving in Italy in 2015 and in 2016 were Nigeria and Eritrea. The total number of Nigerians and Eritreans arriving in Italy in 2015 was 50,018 and slightly lower (47,096) in the following year. Then, between 2016 and last year, the total number of Nigerian and Eritrean arrivals in Italy decreased by 66 per cent. The decrease has been even more significant in 2018; in the first half of this year only 2,812 Nigerians and Eritreans arrived in Italy.

      However, there has not been an increase in Nigerians and Eritreans arriving in Spain. Looking at the data, it is clear that refugees and migrants originating in these two countries have not shifted from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route.

      The same is true for refugees and migrants from Bangladesh, Sudan and Somalia – who were also on the list of most common countries of origin amongst arrivals in Italy during 2015 and 2016. While the numbers of Bangladeshis, Sudanese and Somalis arriving in Italy have been declining since 2017, there has not been an increase in arrivals of these nationals in Spain. Amongst refugees and migrants from these three countries, as with Nigerians and Eritreans, there has clearly not been a shift to the Western route. In fact, data shows that zero refugees and migrants from Eritrea, Bangladesh and Somalia arrived in Spain by sea since 2013.

      However, the data tells a different story when it comes to West African refugees and migrants. Between 2015 and 2017, the West African countries of Guinea, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia and Senegal were also on the list of most common origin countries amongst arrivals in Italy. During those years, about 91 per cent of all arrivals in the EU from these five countries used the Central Mediterranean route to Italy, while 9 per cent used the Western Mediterranean route to Spain.

      But in 2018 the data flipped: only 23 per cent of EU arrivals from these five West African countries used the Central Mediterranean route, while 76 per cent entered used the Western route. It appears that as the Central Mediterranean route is being restricted, a growing number of refugees and migrants from these countries are trying to reach the EU on the Western Mediterranean route.

      These finding are reinforced by 3,224 interviews conducted in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso between July 2017 and June 2018 by the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative (4Mi), which found a rise in the share of West African refugees and migrants stating their final destination is Spain and a fall in the share of West African refugees and migrants who say they are heading to Italy.[2]

      A second group who according to the data shifted from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route are the Moroccans. Between 2015 and 2017, at least 4,000 Moroccans per year entered the EU on the Central Mediterranean route. Then, in the first half of this year, only 319 Moroccan refugees and migrants arrived by sea to Italy. Meanwhile, an opposite process has happened in Spain, where the number of Moroccans arriving by sea spiked, increasing by 346 per cent between 2016 and last year. This increase has continued in the first six months of this year, in which 2,600 Moroccans reached Spain through the Western Mediterranean route.

      On-going Political Bargaining

      The fact that so many Moroccans are amongst the arrivals in Spain could be an indication that Morocco, the embarkation country for the Western Mediterranean route, has perhaps been relaxing its control on migration outflows, as recently suggested by several media outlets. A Euronews article questioned whether the Moroccan government is allowing refugees and migrants to make the dangerous sea journey towards Spain as part of its negotiations with the EU on the size of the support it will receive. Der Spiegel reported that Morocco is “trying to extort concessions from the EU by placing Spain under pressure” of increased migration.

      The dynamic in which a neighbouring country uses the threat of increased migration as a political bargaining tool is one the EU is quite familiar with, following its 2016 deal with Turkey and 2017 deal with Libya. In both occasions, whilst on a different scale, the response of the EU has been fundamentally the same: to offer its southern neighbours support and financial incentives to control migration.

      The EU had a similar response this time. On August 3, the European Commission committed 55 million euro for Morocco and Tunisia to help them improve their border management. Ten days later, the Moroccan Association for Human Rights reported that Moroccan authorities started removing would-be migrants away from departure points to Europe.

      Aside from Morocco and Libya, there is another North African country whose policies may be contributing to the increase of arrivals in Spain. Algeria, which has been a destination country for many African migrants during the past decade (and still is according to 4Mi interviews), is in the midst of a nationwide campaign to detain and deport migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

      The Associated Press reported “Algeria’s mass expulsions have picked up since October 2017, as the European Union renewed pressure on North African countries to discourage migrants going north to Europe…” More than 28,000 Africans have been expelled since the campaign started in August of last year, according to News Deeply. While Algeria prides itself on not taking EU money – “We are handling the situation with our own means,” an Algerian interior ministry official told Reuters – its current crackdown appears to be yet another element of the EU’s wider approach to migration in the region.
      Bargaining Games

      This article has demonstrated that – contrary to popular reporting – there is no blanket shift from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western Mediterranean route. A detailed analysis on the nationalities of arrivals in Italy and Spain and changes over time, shows that only for certain nationalities from West Africa a shift may be happening, while for other nationalities there is no correlation between the decrease of arrivals in Italy and the increase of arrivals in Spain. The article has also shown that the recent policies implemented by North African governments – from Libya to Morocco to Algeria – can only be understood in the context of these countries’ dialogue with the EU on irregular migration.

      So, while the idea of a shift from the Central Mediterranean route to the Western route up until now is more myth than reality, it is clear that the changes of activity levels on these migration routes are both rooted in the same source: the on-going political bargaining on migration between the EU and North African governments. And these bargaining games are likely to continue as the EU intensifies its efforts to prevent refugees and migrants from arriving at its shores.

      http://www.mixedmigration.org/articles/shift-to-the-western-mediterranean-migration-route
      #Méditerranée_centrale #Méditerranée_occidentale

    • IOM, the UN Migration Agency, reports that 80,602 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea in 2018 through 23 September, with 35,653 to Spain, the leading destination this year. In fact, with this week’s arrivals Spain in 2018 has now received via the Mediterranean more irregular migrants than it did throughout all the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 combined.

      The region’s total arrivals through the recent weekend compare with 133,465 arrivals across the region through the same period last year, and 302,175 at this point in 2016.

      Spain, with 44 per cent of all arrivals through the year, continues to receive seaborne migrants in September at a volume nearly twice that of Greece and more than six times that of Italy. Italy’s arrivals through late September are the lowest recorded at this point – the end of a normally busy summer sailing season – in almost five years. IOM Rome’s Flavio Di Giacomo on Monday reported that Italy’s 21,024 arrivals of irregular migrants by sea this year represent a decline of nearly 80 per cent from last year’s totals at this time. (see chart below).

      IOM’s Missing Migrants Project has documented the deaths of 1,730 people on the Mediterranean in 2018. Most recently, a woman drowned off the coast of Bodrum, Turkey on Sunday while attempting to reach Kos, Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean route. The Turkish Coast Guard reports that 16 migrants were rescued from this incident. On Saturday, a 5-year-old Syrian boy drowned off the coast of Lebanon’s Akkar province after a boat carrying 39 migrants to attempt to reach Cyprus capsized.

      IOM Spain’s Ana Dodevska reported Monday that total arrivals at sea in 2018 have reached 35,594 men, women and children who have been rescued in Western Mediterranean waters through 23 September (see chart below).

      IOM notes that over this year’s first five months, a total of 8,150 men, women and children were rescued in Spanish waters after leaving Africa – an average of 54 per day. In the 115 days since May 31, a total of 27,444 have arrived – or just under 240 migrants per day. The months of May-September this year have seen a total of 30,967 irregular migrants arriving by sea, the busiest four-month period for Spain since IOM began tallying arrival statistics, with just over one week left in September.

      With this week’s arrivals Spain in 2018 has now received via the Mediterranean more irregular migrants than it did throughout all the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 combined (see charts below).

      On Monday, IOM Athens’ Christine Nikolaidou reported that over four days (20-23 September) this week the Hellenic Coast Guard (HCG) units managed at least nine incidents requiring search and rescue operations off the islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Farmakonisi.

      The HCG rescued a total 312 migrants and transferred them to the respective islands. Additional arrivals of some 248 individuals to Kos and some of the aforementioned islands over these past four days brings to 22,821 the total number of arrivals by sea to Greece through 23 September (see chart below).

      Sea arrivals to Greece this year by irregular migrants appeared to have peaked in daily volume in April, when they averaged at around 100 per day. That volume dipped through the following three months then picked up again in August and again in September, already this year’s busiest month – 3,536 through 23 days, over 150 per day – with about a quarter of the month remaining. Land border crossing also surged in April (to nearly 4,000 arrivals) but have since fallen back, with fewer than 2,000 crossings in each of the past four months (see charts below).

      IOM’s Missing Migrants Project has recorded 2,735 deaths and disappearances during migration so far in 2018 (see chart below).

      In the Americas, several migrant deaths were recorded since last week’s update. In Mexico, a 30-year-old Salvadoran man was killed in a hit-and-run on a highway in Tapachula, Mexico on Friday. Another death on Mexico’s freight rail network (nicknamed “La Bestia”) was added after reports of an unidentified man found dead on tracks near San Francisco Ixhuatan on 15 September.

      In the United States, on 16 September, an unidentified person drowned in the All-American Canal east of Calexico, California – the 55th drowning recorded on the US-Mexico border this year. A few days later a car crash south of Florence, Arizona resulted in the deaths of eight people, including four Guatemalan migrants, on Wednesday. Two others killed included one of the vehicles’ driver and his partner, who authorities say had been involved with migrant smuggling in the past.

      https://reliefweb.int/report/spain/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-80602-2018-deaths-reach-1730

    • Analyse de Matteo Villa sur twitter :

      Irregular sea arrivals to Italy have not been this low since 2012. But how do the two “deterrence policies” (#Minniti's and #Salvini's) compare over time?


      Why start from July 15th each year? That’s when the drop in sea arrivals in 2017 kicked in, and this allows us to do away with the need to control for seasonality. Findings do not change much if we started on July 1st this year.
      Zooming in, in relative terms the drop in sea arrivals during Salvini’s term is almost as stark as last year’s drop.

      In the period 15 July - 8 October:

      Drop during #Salvini: -73%.
      Drop during #Minniti: -79%.

      But looking at actual numbers, the difference is clear. In less than 3 months’ time, the drop in #migrants and #refugees disembarking in #Italy under #Minniti had already reached 51,000. Under #Salvini in 2018, the further drop is less than 10,000.


      To put it another way: deterrence policies under #Salvini can at best aim for a drop of about 42,000 irregular arrivals in 12 months. Most likely, the drop will amount to about 30.000. Under #Minniti, sea arrivals the drop amounted to 150.000. Five times larger.

      BOTTOM LINE: the opportunity-cost of deterrence policies is shrinking fast. Meanwhile, the number of dead and missing along the Central Mediterranean route has not declined in tandem (in fact, in June-September it shot up). Is more deterrence worth it?

      https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1049978070734659584

      Le papier qui explique tout cela :
      Sea Arrivals to Italy : The Cost of Deterrence Policies


      https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/sea-arrivals-italy-cost-deterrence-policies-21367

    • Méditerranée : forte baisse des traversées en 2018 et l’#Espagne en tête des arrivées (HCR)

      Pas moins de 113.482 personnes ont traversé la #Méditerranée en 2018 pour rejoindre l’Europe, une baisse par rapport aux 172.301 qui sont arrivés en 2017, selon les derniers chiffres publiés par le Haut-Commissariat de l’ONU pour les réfugiés (HCR).
      L’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés rappelle d’ailleurs que le niveau des arrivées a également chuté par rapport au pic de 1,015 million enregistré en 2015 et à un moindre degré des 362.753 arrivées répertoriées en 2016.

      Toutefois pour l’année 2018, si l’on ajoute près de 7.000 migrants enregistrés dans les enclaves espagnoles de #Ceuta et #Melilla (arrivées par voie terrestre), on obtient un total de 120.205 arrivées en Europe.

      L’an dernier l’Espagne est redevenue la première porte d’entrée en Europe, avec 62.479 arrivées (dont 55.756 par la mer soit deux fois plus qu’en 2017, avec 22.103 arrivées).

      La péninsule ibérique est suivie par la #Grèce (32.497), l’Italie (23.371), #Malte (1.182) et #Chypre (676).

      https://news.un.org/fr/story/2019/01/1032962