• Un rapport sur la loi grecque, et la proposition de la Commission de règlement de filtrage des personnes migrantes aux frontières extérieures, et qui fait partie du #Pacte européen de migration et d’asile.

    EU’s proposed screening rules for migrants are based on « failed and violent » Greek law

    The EU’s proposed ’#Screening_Regulation' (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:612:FIN), published as part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, foresees “pre-entry screening that should be applicable to all third-country nationals who are present at the external border without fulfilling the entry conditions or after disembarkation, following a search and rescue operation.” Many of the provisions correspond to those introduced in Greek law in recent years, say a group of NGOs. They argue that understanding these similarities is essential for “preventing the entrenchment of failed and violent border policies in the ‘new‘ EU #Pact_on_Migration_and_Asylum” (https://eldh.eu/2020/11/05/eldh-statement-on-the-new-eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum/#:~:text=The%20Pact%20on%20Migration%20and,procedures%2C%20unlawful%20returns%2)

    “The European Commission proposal for a Screening Regulation is largely modelled on the “reception and identification procedure” (διαδικασία υποδοχής και ταυτοποίησης), which applies to everyone irregularly arriving in Greece. The majority of its provisions correspond to provisions of Greek legislation in relation to key elements of the process such as restrictions on liberty, identification, registration, medical check, vulnerability assessment, and referral to asylum or other procedures. An in-depth understanding of the existent Greek procedure is therefore essential to identifying pitfalls and concerns with the Screening Regulation proposal at an early stage of negotiations within the Council and the European Parliament, with a view to preventing the entrenchment of failed and violent border policies in the ‘new‘ EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.

    To this end, the correlation table presented in the document below provides a point-by-point comparison of the main provisions of the Screening Regulation proposal with relevant domestic legislation, namely L 4375/2016 and L 4636/2019 (IPA). It also offers a detailed analysis of the implementation of the reception and identification procedure in practice, drawing on up-to-date information complemented by observations from civil society organisations. The information provided in the correlation table has been collected through the collaborative effort of Refugee Support Aegean (RSA), HIAS Greece, Greek Council for Refugees, Danish Refugee Council, Legal Centre Lesvos, FENIX Humanitarian Legal Aid, ActionAid Hellas and Mobile Info Team, and legal practitioners.”

    See: The Workings of the Screening Regulation: Juxtaposing proposed EU rules with the Greek reception and identification procedure (Legal Centre Lesvos: https://legalcentrelesvos.org/2021/01/26/the-workings-of-the-screening-regulation-juxtaposing-proposed-eu-)

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/january/eu-s-proposed-screening-rules-for-migrants-are-based-on-failed-and-viole

    #pacte_européen #identification #frontières_extérieures #Grèce #EU #UE #tri #catégorisation #loi #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration #new_pact #nouveau_pacte #pacte_sur_la_migration_et_l'asile #union_européenne

    ping @isskein @karine4 @i_s_ @_kg_ @etraces

    –—

    voir aussi ce fil de discussion sur le nouveau pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/876752

    • RAPPORT sur la mise en œuvre de l’#article_43 de la directive 2013/32/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 26 juin 2013 relative à des procédures communes pour l’octroi et le retrait de la protection internationale

      Le présent rapport porte sur l’application des procédures à la frontière par les États membres. L’article 43 de la directive 2013/32/UE relative à des procédures communes pour l’octroi et le retrait de la protection internationale (directive sur les procédures d’asile) établit les procédures à la frontière comme une possibilité à laquelle les États membres peuvent avoir recours dans le cadre du fonctionnement du régime d’asile européen commun. Lorsqu’une demande d’asile est présentée à la frontière ou dans une zone de transit, les États membres peuvent, sous certaines conditions, examiner la demande dans ces lieux.

      Objet du rapport

      L’objectif principal du rapport est de permettre au Parlement de prendre des décisions éclairées et fondées sur des données probantes lors des négociations à venir sur le pacte sur la migration et l’asile, dans le cadre duquel les procédures à la frontière jouent un rôle crucial. Les procédures à la frontière jouent un rôle essentiel dans la proposition relative au pacte. Or, la Commission n’a jamais fait l’effort d’évaluer leur mise en œuvre, de déterminer si leurs objectifs sont atteints et d’établir les conclusions à tirer pour une nouvelle législation.

      Les rapports de mise en œuvre constituent un élément essentiel du programme de la Commission pour une meilleure réglementation, qui vise à concevoir et à évaluer les politiques de l’Union de manière à ce qu’elles atteignent leurs objectifs de la façon la plus efficace et efficiente possible. Toutefois, la Commission n’a pas publié à ce jour de rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile, manquant ainsi aux obligations d’information qui lui incombent en vertu de l’article 50 de ladite directive. De plus, en 2016, aucune analyse d’impact n’a été réalisée lorsque la Commission a proposé une réforme de cette directive pour la transformer en règlement. Il en va de même pour la proposition de modification récemment publiée (COM(2020) 611 final).

      Le présent rapport ne vise ni à remplacer le rapport complet sur la mise en œuvre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile que la Commission aurait dû réaliser, ni à évaluer les incidences des nouvelles propositions de cette dernière. Elle vise plutôt à apporter un éclairage sur la mise en œuvre par les États membres des procédures à la frontière au titre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile ainsi que sur les problèmes et les lacunes existants. Cet état des lieux devrait permettre au Parlement de prendre des décisions éclairées et fondées sur des données probantes lors des négociations à venir sur la proposition de modification de la directive.

      Le rapport repose sur l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre publiée par l’EPRS en novembre 2020, qui donne une analyse comparative de l’application de l’article 43 de la directive sur les procédures d’asile, ainsi qu’une appréciation juridique de la transposition et de l’application de cet article par les États membres. Le projet de rapport initial s’appuie sur les conclusions préliminaires de cette évaluation. Il se peut que le rapporteur dépose des amendements au projet de rapport afin d’adapter le rapport à l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre finale.

      Les procédures à la frontière sont mal définies

      Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS montre que le concept des procédures à la frontière est mal défini dans la législation de l’Union en matière d’asile. Cela soulève de vives inquiétudes quant à leur application, en particulier en ce qui concerne les droits fondamentaux et les garanties procédurales.

      Les procédures à la frontière constituent une exception à la règle juridiquement définie par la directive sur les procédures d’asile selon laquelle les demandeurs d’asile ont le droit de rester sur le territoire d’un État membre, y compris à la frontière ou dans une zone de transit. La directive sur les procédures d’asile limite donc strictement les procédures à la frontière à un nombre exhaustif de cas. Le législateur de l’Union a en outre souhaité une interprétation étroite puisqu’il souligne que, pour autant qu’un demandeur ait exposé des raisons reconnues valables, l’absence de documents à l’entrée ou l’utilisation de documents falsifiés ne devrait pas entraîner en soi un recours automatique à la procédure à la frontière ou à la procédure accélérée (considérant 21 de la directive). Néanmoins, dans la pratique, la directive donne une trop grande marge de manœuvre aux États membres pour un recours « à la carte » aux procédures à la frontière, souvent bien au-delà des limites fixées par la directive.

      Certains États membres examinent la recevabilité des demandes d’asile dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, tandis que d’autres en examinent également le fond. Certains États membres examinent les cas relevant du règlement de Dublin dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, tandis que d’autres ne le font pas. Certains États membres accordent une protection internationale dans le cadre d’une procédure à la frontière, tandis que d’autres autorisent l’entrée des demandeurs lorsqu’ils constatent qu’un demandeur d’asile est susceptible de remplir les conditions requises pour bénéficier d’une protection internationale. En outre, plusieurs États membres appliquent les procédures à la frontière d’une manière beaucoup plus large que ne le prescrit la directive sur les procédures d’asile ; certains dirigent même toutes les demandes d’asile introduites à la frontière vers les procédures à la frontière. De plus, certains États membres appliquent les procédures à la frontière sans les qualifier en tant que telles dans le droit national.

      La rétention comme règle dans les procédures à la frontière

      Les procédures à la frontière reposent souvent sur la fiction juridique de l’absence d’entrée, partant ainsi du principe que la procédure a lieu avant une décision sur le droit d’un demandeur d’entrer sur le territoire d’un État membre ou dans le cadre d’une telle décision. Cela a de graves conséquences pour les demandeurs d’asile. Dans tous les cas analysés par l’EPRS dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, les demandeurs d’asile soumis à des procédures à la frontière ont de facto été placés en rétention.

      La rétention et la privation de liberté ont de graves répercussions sur les droits fondamentaux d’une personne. C’est pourquoi le droit de l’Union et le droit international relatif aux droits de l’homme établissent des conditions strictes pour la rétention des demandeurs d’asile. L’article 26 de la directive sur les procédures d’asile interdit le placement en rétention de demandeurs au seul motif qu’ils sont des demandeurs. Une liste exhaustive des motifs de placement en rétention et des garanties pour les personnes placées en rétention figurent dans la directive 2013/33/UE (directive relative aux conditions d’accueil).

      Or, ces conditions et garanties ne sont généralement pas prises en compte dans les procédures à la frontière. En règle générale, les États membres placent de facto les demandeurs d’asile en rétention, souvent sans examiner le critère de nécessité ou sans fournir d’autres solutions que la rétention. Dans de nombreux cas, les demandeurs d’asile n’ont pas accès aux garanties applicables aux demandeurs d’asile qui sont placés en rétention dans le cadre de procédures menées à l’intérieur du pays. Plusieurs États membres placent de facto les demandeurs d’asile en rétention, sur la base de la fiction de l’absence d’entrée, sans reconnaître qu’il s’agit là d’une privation de liberté. En conséquence, les demandeurs d’asile placés en rétention dans le cadre d’une telle procédure à la frontière n’ont même pas accès aux garanties procédurales de base telles qu’un contrôle juridictionnel de leur rétention. Cette situation est d’autant plus préoccupante que les conditions de rétention aux frontières sont souvent inadaptées. En cas d’afflux massif, comme sur les îles grecques, les procédures à la frontière vouent les demandeurs à des conditions inhumaines.

      Si les demandeurs d’asile sont de facto placés en rétention aux frontières, la rétention devrait toujours être prescrite par la loi, et les mêmes garanties procédurales devraient être appliquées que pour les demandeurs d’asile placés en rétention dans le cadre de procédures menées à l’intérieur du pays. En tout état de cause, les demandeurs d’asile ne devraient pas être placés en rétention par défaut.

      Refus d’entrée

      Il y a lieu de donner aux intéressés la possibilité d’introduire une demande d’asile à la frontière. S’il existe des éléments donnant à penser qu’une personne aux frontières extérieures peut souhaiter présenter une demande de protection internationale, les États membres doivent l’informer de la possibilité de le faire et prendre des dispositions en matière d’interprétation afin de faciliter l’accès à la procédure d’asile.

      Toutefois, de nombreuses informations font état d’un refus d’entrée ou d’un renvoi forcé dans le cadre de procédures à la frontière, sans que les besoins de protection des intéressés ne soient évalués et sans que leurs demandes d’asile ne soient enregistrées. Cela constitue une violation grave du droit de l’Union et du droit international.

      Pour prévenir de telles pratiques illégales et veiller à ce que les États membres respectent le droit de l’Union et le droit international aux frontières extérieures, il convient de mettre en place des mécanismes de contrôle indépendants. Conformément aux orientations de l’Agence des droits fondamentaux (FRA) sur les contrôles aux frontières, les États membres devraient être tenus d’accorder aux organes de contrôle l’accès aux installations frontalières en vue de garantir la protection effective des droits fondamentaux et la notification systématique des violations. Les États membres devraient également faire en sorte que toutes les allégations donnent lieu à des enquêtes et des sanctions.

      Évaluation de la vulnérabilité

      Il est inquiétant que les États membres ne disposent pas de mécanismes adéquats permettant d’identifier les personnes ayant des besoins particuliers afin de les exempter de la procédure à la frontière. Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS montre que des mécanismes appropriés et efficaces d’identification des vulnérabilités font défaut dans tous les pays examinés et que plusieurs États membres ne disposent d’aucun mécanisme de ce type. Les personnes présentant des vulnérabilités invisibles, telles que les victimes de torture ou d’abus sexuels, ne sont pratiquement jamais identifiées lors d’une procédure à la frontière. Les garanties procédurales spéciales et le soutien adéquat sont souvent vains dans la pratique en l’absence de mécanismes d’identification appropriés. Cette situation est particulièrement préoccupante pour les enfants et soulève des questions quant au respect de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant consacré à l’article 24, paragraphe 2, de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. C’est pourquoi les enfants et leurs familles devraient généralement être exemptés des procédures à la frontière.

      Garanties procédurales et équité des procédures à la frontière

      Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS fait état de problèmes importants liés aux garanties procédurales dans tous les États membres examinés. Les demandeurs doivent être informés de leurs droits et de la procédure d’asile et ils doivent avoir un accès effectif aux organisations et personnes qui fournissent des conseils. Or, dans la pratique, cela n’est souvent pas le cas. De nombreux États membres prévoient dans leur législation le droit à une assistance juridique gratuite en première instance des procédures à la frontière, alors qu’ils ne sont pas tenus de le faire. Cependant, la brièveté des délais et la rétention (de facto) empêchent souvent l’accès effectif à l’assistance juridique. Les demandeurs d’asile ne sont pas en mesure de contacter un avocat en raison d’un manque d’outils de communication, les avocats manquent de temps pour préparer le recours ou une audition avec leur client ou les avocats qualifiés font complètement défaut. Les ONG ne peuvent souvent pas combler les lacunes en raison de leur accès limité ou total aux infrastructures aux frontières. L’interprétation est souvent indisponible, de mauvaise qualité ou difficile lorsqu’elle est effectuée par téléphone. De plus, les demandeurs ne sont souvent pas informés systématiquement de la procédure d’asile et de leurs droits.

      En raison de la nature même des procédures à la frontière, il est difficile de fournir des garanties procédurales complètes dans la pratique. Leur efficacité est compromise par la combinaison d’une rétention (de facto) et de délais plus courts appliqués dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière. Les États membres fixent généralement des délais très courts de quelques jours seulement pour la procédure de recours, ce qui porte atteinte au droit à un recours effectif, compte tenu de l’accès limité à l’assistance et au monde extérieur. Cette situation est d’autant plus préoccupante que la directive sur les procédures d’asile ne garantit pas que la procédure de recours aura un effet suspensif.

      En ce qui concerne la procédure rapide à la frontière sur les îles grecques, la FRA, le Haut-Commissaire des Nations unies pour les réfugiés et le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies sur les droits de l’homme des migrants ont tous fait part de graves préoccupations concernant les garanties procédurales et les problèmes relatifs aux droits fondamentaux qui semblent presque insurmontables.

      Les procédures à la frontière se caractérisent par le dilemme inévitable de la nécessité de garantir une procédure équitable, pour laquelle le temps manque, et de celle de réduire autant que possible la durée de la rétention des demandeurs, le cas échéant. Elles ne contribuent donc pas aux objectifs de la directive sur les procédures d’asile. Par conséquent, les États membres devraient généralement s’abstenir d’appliquer des procédures à la frontière et ne devraient en aucun cas être tenus de les appliquer. Les États membres qui recourent à de telles procédures soit ne peuvent pas garantir une procédure équitable soit enfreignent les droits fondamentaux des demandeurs en les plaçant en rétention pendant de longues périodes.

      Si elles sont néanmoins appliquées, ces procédures devraient être strictement limitées aux cas moins complexes, par exemple ceux où le demandeur a obtenu une protection internationale dans un autre État (membre) ou ne soulève que des questions non pertinentes pour l’examen d’une procédure d’asile.

      https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0005_FR.html

  • VACCIN ET COVID

    Depuis plusieurs mois, la seule issue de crise du covid possible serait la vaccination des 7 milliards d’êtres humains peuplant la planète. Aucune autre voie ne serait possible. Attention, comme l’a signalé Mike Ryan de l’OMS, « il y a pire qu’un mauvais virus, il y a un mauvais vaccin » [1].

    Lors d’une vaccination de masse, ce sont des personnes SAINES qui reçoivent le vaccin. La sécurité du produit doit donc être maximale afin de ne pas rendre malade une personne saine. Le « primum non nocere » de la médecine.

    Or dans cette crise, la précipitation inouïe dans sa gestion a déjà entrainé de nombreux morts : retards diagnostics et thérapeutiquesdans les cancers et de nombreuses maladies chroniques. Le massacre de l’économie a également conduit les plus fragiles vers une détresse psychologique pouvant aboutir ausuicide[2]. A ce jour, encore trop peu d’études portant sur l’évaluation des réels dommages collatéraux d’un confinement ont été menées. D’autant plus que le deuxième confinement apparait désormais comme parfaitement inutile puisque les charges virales mesurées dans les eaux usées de Marseille [3] (étude COMETE réalisée par les pompiers), ainsi que dans les eaux usées d’Ile de France (réseau OBEPINE [4]) montraient déjà une diminution du virus plusieurs jours avant le 2ème confinement [4] .

    Prenons donc garde à ne pas se précipiter vers une solution hypothétiquement idéale qui s’avèrerait une catastrophe sanitaire. Une bonne balance des bénéfices et des risques est nécessaire.
     
    QUE FAUT-IL POUR QU’UN VACCIN SOIT EFFICACE ET JUSTIFIÉ 

    Il faut tout d’abord que la maladie naturelle entraine une immunité protectrice qui perdure un certain temps. Concernant le SARS-COV2 et la maladie covid, il n’existe pas de données suffisantes pour l’affirmer.

    Il faut que le virus ne mute pas trop vite pour que le vaccin soit efficace au moins une saison. Or depuis mars, au moins 5 mutants ont déjà été décrits par Colson et al. [5] pour le SARS-COV2 . Cette découverte est en accord avec le comportement habituel des virus à ARN, qui sont connus pour être hautement mutables. Il n’y a aucune assurance à ce jour que le vaccin préparé avec une souche protège d’une autre souche.

    Il faut que la 2ème infection par le virus soit MOINS symptomatique que la première. A ce jour 15 cas de réinfections par le SARS-COV2 ont été décrits en Angleterre ou à Wuhan [5, 6, 7]. Tous les cas de figures se sont produits. Certains patients ont eu 2 infections peu ou pas- symptomatiques, d’autres deux infections sévères, d’autres une infection asymptomatique suivie d’une infection plus sévère ou le contraire. Cela implique que potentiellement, chez certaines personnes au moins, la vaccination pourrait favoriser une forme plus grave de la maladie que sans vaccination. C’est ce qui s’est produit avec le vaccin contre la dengue Dengvaxia qui a sensibilisé des populations naïves (en particulier des enfants) pour ce virus et a favorisé des formes de dengues hémorragiques aboutissant à plusieurs décès [8].

    Pour justifier une vaccination de masse, il faut que la maladie ait une létalité importante et qu’il n’existe pas de médicaments permettant de la traiter. Lorsqu’elle est traitée précocement, la létalité de la covid 19 est aux alentours de 0.5%, ce qui ne relève pas d’une très forte létalité dans le domaine des maladies infectieuses. Un grand débat est ouvert sur la question de l’hydroxychloroquineet l’azithromycine[9]. Si ces molécules s’avèrent finalement efficaces au moins en traitement voire en prophylaxie, la justification de la vaccination de masse s’écroule.

    D’autre part, la communication médiatique matraque la nécessité de se faire vacciner pour protéger les autres, même si l’on n’est pas un sujet à risque. A-t-on pour l’instant la moindre preuve de l’efficacité du vaccin contre le covid à empêcher la transmission du virus ? D’ailleurs le médecin en chef de Moderna nous a avertis que ce n’était pas certain que le vaccin empêche la transmission du virus [10]Si le vaccin n’empêche pas la transmission, il ne sert plus à rien de vacciner les sujets sans facteur de risque.
     
    VACCINS NOUVELLE TECHNOLOGIE DITS À ARNm

    A ce jour des communications des laboratoires Pfizer et Moderna ont déclaré que leurs vaccins à ARNm étaient efficaces à plus de 90%. Cependant aucune étude scientifique n’a pu être revue par les médecins et les scientifiques. D’autre part, aucune étude indépendante n’a pu être réalisée. Quel crédit peut–être accordé à de telles déclarations ? Surtout après la flambée de la bourse générée par ces annonces et la vente, dans la foulée, des actions possédées par les deux PDG. Ce qui est certain, c’est que ces déclarations ont d’ores et déjà enrichi les dirigeants de Pfizer et Moderna (efficacité 100%). Certains médecins s’étonnent que l’on puisse remettre en doute ces résultats. Doit-on rappeler le Lancetgate ? Doit-on rappeler l’histoire ubuesque du Remdésivir dont l’UE a acheté pour 1 milliard de doses juste avant que l’OMS le déconseille pour la covid 19 [11] ? Il sera intéressant de savoir si les doses de Remdésivir seront même fabriquées finalement puisque l’industrie a touché le pactole, pourquoi s’embêter ? Alors réelle efficacité ou coup de bluff médiatique et boursier ?

    Les vaccins à ARNm (dits ARN messagers) sont effectivement « en théorie » une astucieuse technique faisant produire à nos cellules les antigènes du virus (pour le SARS-COV-2, il s’agit de la protéine spike) au lieu de les faire produire de façon complexe par les industries. Cette technologie permet donc de produire plus facilement et plus vite un grand nombre de doses de vaccin. Ceci sous-entendrait que les vaccins soient donc moins chers que leurs homologues protéiques. Les vaccins à ARNm contre le covid 19 seront facturés entre 16 et 32 euros selon la firme pharmaceutique alors que le vaccin contre la grippe est facturé entre 6 et 7 euros. Ce fait laisse très pensif…

    Toutefois, l’ARNm est facilement dégradé par nos enzymes. Il faut donc trouver un moyen de le véhiculer intact dans nos cellules pour qu’il puisse commander à la cellule la production de la protéine spike (antigène). Pour cela, plusieurs technologies développées sont actuellement testées en phase 3. Le laboratoire Pfizer a choisi de fabriquer une enveloppe mimant les protéines et lipides, qui aura les caractéristiques d’un virus sans en être un [12]. Thomas Madden, fabricant des lipoparticules dans lesquelles seront intégrées les ARNm pour les délivrer annonce que les tests de stabilité n’ont pas été réalisés, ce qui apparait très inquiétant. Une autre technique consiste en l’utilisation de véritables virus modifiés afin d’y intégrer le code de la protéine spike. Le virus du rhume a été choisi pour le vaccin Russe Spoutnik V et celui de la rougeole par l’institut Pasteur ; quant au laboratoire AstraZeneca il travaille sur un adénovirus modifié de chimpanzé. En tous cas, le déploiement d’un vaccin à ARNm destiné à l’homme et diffusé à grande échelle sera une première. Seuls quelques vaccins à ADN ont déjà été utilisés chez le cheval, le poisson ou le chien [12].

    Habituellement la phase 3 des essais cliniques dédiés aux vaccins est généralement menée sur 50 000 personnes et demande une observation de plusieurs années. Les candidats vaccins bénéficieront, dans le cadre de la covid, d’un calendrier accéléré où l’OMS (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé) jugera le vaccin efficace à partir d’une réduction de 50% des infections [12]. On est en droit de se demander si tous les contrôles sécuritaires seront respectés.

    Dans de nombreux articles de la presse dominante, des journalistes clament à qui veut l’entendre que l’ARNm ne peut pas s’intégrer dans le génome humain. Même si la probabilité apparait comme faible, elle ne peut pas être exclue en l’état actuel des connaissances. Pour s’intégrer dans le génome, un fragment d’ARNm a besoin notamment de deux enzymes : une rétrotranscriptase et une intégrase. Que se passera-t-il chez des patients qui sont co-infectés par des virus possédant ces deux enzymes comme les patients VIH positifs ou HTLV1 positifs ? Le génome humain est composé de 8% de rétrovirus intégrées anciennement. D’ailleurs certains génomes viraux ont été intégrés par des rétrotransposons présents dans les cellules humaines [13]. Chez l’homme le virus HHV6 peut s’intégrer dans les télomères des chromosomes et être réactivé dans certaines conditions [13]. Signalons qu’aucun séquençage de génome des patients ayant reçu les vaccins n’a été réalisé. De plus, si des effets de mutagenèse insertionnelle surviennent, il est probable que ces effets ne soient visibles qu’à moyen ou long terme et donc échappent à la surveillance des effets indésirables dus aux vaccins, surveillance qui est très courte.

    Rappelons-nous que le vaccin Pandemrix, lui aussi réalisé à la va-vite dans l’urgence de la crise H1N1, a entrainé de la narcolepsie chez des personnes auparavant saines, qui n’ont toujours pas été indemnisées pour la plupart [14].
     
    RISQUE DUS AUX CONFLITS D’INTÉRÊTS

    La crise du covid -19 aura au moins permis de mettre en exergue les problèmes de conflits d’intérêts auprès du grand public, même s’ils ne sont pas nouveaux et connus par les représentants du peuple. Ces conflits d’intérêts interviennent à plusieurs niveaux. En premier lieu dans certaines instances supra nationales telles que l’OMS, dans l’évidence – based – medecine et dans les instances nationales.

    Le rapport du sénat sur la crise H1N1 de 2009 est riche d’enseignement sur les erreurs à ne pas commettre dans la gestion d’une crise sanitaire et sa lecture est vivement conseillée. Il s’inquiète, à plusieurs reprises dans le document, de « l’opacité de l’OMS et son incapacité – ou son manque de volonté – à gérer les conflits d’intérêts en son sein.” [15] Ce rapport souligne également « La façon dont la grippe pandémique H1N1 a été gérée non seulement par l’OMS mais aussi par les autorités de santé compétentes, tant au niveau de l’Union européenne qu’au niveau national, est alarmante. Certaines répercussions des décisions prises et des conseils prodigués sont particulièrement problématiques, dans la mesure où ils ont entraîné une distorsion des priorités au sein des services de santé publique à travers l’Europe, un gaspillage de fonds publics importants ainsi que des peurs injustifiées sur les risques de santé encourus par la population européenne en général ». D’ailleurs il semblerait que les peurs générées par une communication disproportionnée soit en rapport avec des conflits d’intérêt comme le suggère ce passage du rapport sénatorial : « les débats du groupe de travail réuni le 23 janvier 2009, souligne le lien entre la peur de la population et la commercialisation de vaccins prépandémiques. A la question « Quel serait l’intérêt d’un tel vaccin prépandémique ? » [15] , un des participants, M. Jonathan Van Tam, professeur en protection de la santé à l’Université de Nottingham, répond ainsi : « Cela dépend de quand vous le donnerez et combien la population aura peur au moment où vous l’administrerez ». Cette observation a été formulée quelques mois avant le déclenchement de la pandémie grippale. »

    Concernant les conflits d’intérêts dans l’élaboration de la science, rappelons-nous du Lancetgate et de cette étude frauduleuse aboutissant à l’interdiction de prescription de l’hydroxychloroquine malgré les alertes de médecins et scientifiques criant à la fraude. Accablant, Richard Horton, ancien éditorialiste du journal le Lancet témoigne ainsi qu’ « une grande partie de la littérature scientifique, sans doute la moitié, pourrait être tout simplement fausse. Affligée d’études avec des échantillons réduits, d’effets infimes, d’analyses préliminaires invalides, et de conflits d’intérêts flagrants, avec l’obsession de suivre les tendances d’importance douteuse à la mode, la science a pris le mauvais tournant vers les ténèbres. [16] ». Autre grande figure de la presse médicale internationale, Marcia Angel, médecin et ancienne rédactrice en chef au New EnglandMedical Journal annonce qu’ « Il n’est tout simplement plus possible de croire une grande partie des publications de la recherche clinique, ni de compter sur le jugement des médecins expérimentés ou les directives médicales faisant autorité. Je ne prends aucun plaisir à formuler cette conclusion, à laquelle je suis parvenu lentement et à contrecœur lors de mes deux décennies passées au poste de rédacteur en chef du New England Journal of Medicine. » [17]
     
    RISQUES DU CONTEXTE LÉGAL DE LA VACCINATION 

    PREP Act, adopté par le Congrès et signé par George Bush en décembre 2005, protège les firmes vaccinales de toutes poursuites judiciaires et les dédouane de toutes indemnités à payer pour les effets indésirables des vaccins. L’Union Européenne est en pourparlers avec les membres de la Fédération européenne des associations et industries pharmaceutiques (EFPIA) afin de définir qu’ils seront responsables juridiquement et pécuniairement des effets indésirables.

    Le transfert de responsabilité des firmes pharmaceutiques vers les états a deux effets pervers évidents : 1) les laboratoires ne sont plus incités à produire des vaccins sécuritaires puisqu’ils n’en assument plus les conséquences ; 2) les états seront réticents à soutenir la recherche de l’imputabilité d’un effet indésirable à un vaccin puisque ce même état devra indemniser les victimes.
    Les victimes risquent donc d’être fortement isolées (privées normalement de l’aide de l’état) pour faire reconnaitre les effets indésirables car ce n’est pas un citoyen seul qui peut démontrer une imputabilité scientifiquement.

    Toujours sur le volet législatif, des verrous de sécurité sanitaire sont en train de tomber afin d’accélérer la mise sur le marché des vaccins. Le 15 juillet 2020, le règlement 2020/1043 [18] a été adopté par le Parlement européen et stipule que « dans la situation d’urgence de santé publique sans précédent créée par la pandémie de [la] Covid-19, il est nécessaire que la protection de la santé publique prévale. Il est dès lors nécessaire d’accorder une dérogation temporaire aux exigences d’évaluation des risques pour l’environnement et d’autorisation ou de consentement préalable » autrefois nécessaires pour les produits considérés comme des OGM. Or les vaccins à ARN et ADN devraient normalement tomber sous le coup de la législation européenne concernant les OGM.

    SUR UNE OBLIGATION VACCINALE

    Rappelons qu’une obligation vaccinale irait à l’encontre du principe d’autonomie et du refus de soin des patients. En effet, la loi du 4 mars 2002, renforcée par la loi du 22 avril 2005, a consacré le droit pour tout patient de refuser des traitements, même au risque de sa vie. Corollaire du consentement libre et éclairé, vous pouvez refuser tout acte de prévention, de diagnostic ou toute intervention thérapeutique, ou en demander l’interruption à tout moment.
     « Aucun acte médical ni traitement ne peut être pratiqué sans le consentement libre et éclairé de la personne » (article L.1111-4 du code de la santé publique).

    Dr Louis Fouché, Médecin anesthésiste-réanimateur à Marseille, déc. 2020.
    https://reinfocovid.fr/science/vaccin-covid
     
    --

    [1] https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/20/who-officials-say-at-least-20-coronavirus-vaccines-are-in-development-in-globa

    [2] https://www.irdes.fr/recherche/questions-d-economie-de-la-sante/249-les-inegalites-face-au-risque-de-detresse-psychologique-pendant-le-confine

    [3] https://www.mediterranee-infection.com/epidemies-et-frontieres-covid-19-et-egouts

    [4] https://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/cid155363/surveillance-des-traces-du-virus-sars-cov-2-agent-de-

    [5] Philippe COLSON, Anthony LEVASSEUR, Jeremy DELERCE, Hervé CHAUDET, Vincent BOSSI, Mariem BEN KHEDHER, Pierre-Edouard FOURNIER, Jean-Christophe LAGIER, Didier RAOULT, Dramatic increase in the SARS-CoV-2 mutation rate and low mortality rate during the second epidemic in summer in Marseille, doi : https://doi.org/10.35088/68c3-ew82https://www.mediterranee-infection.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FD_Raoult_SARS-CoV-2_EID_Sep2020_vL2.pdf

    [6] Sara Tomassini, DeeviaKotecha, Paul W Bird, Andrew Folwell, Simon Biju, Julian W Tang, Setting the criteria for SARS-CoV-2 reinfection – six possible cases, Journal of Infection, 2020, https://www.journalofinfection.com/article/S0163-4453(20)30546-6/fulltext

    [7] Cao, S., Gan, Y., Wang, C. et al. Post-lockdown SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid screening in nearly ten million residents of Wuhan, China. Nat Commun 11, 5917 (2020). https://doi.org
    10.1038/s41467-020-19802-w https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19802-w

    [8] https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/274315/WER9336.pdf

    [9] M. Million, P. Gautret, P. Colson, Y. Roussel, G. Dubourg, E. Chabriere, S. Honore, J.-M. Rolain, F. Fenollar, P.-E. Fournier, J.-C. Lagier, P. Parola, P. Brouqui, D. Raoult, Clinical efficacy of chloroquine derivatives in COVID-19 infection : comparative meta-analysis between the big data and the real world, New Microbes and New Infections, Volume 38, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nmni.2020.100709

    [10] https://www.businessinsider.fr/le-medecin-en-chef-de-moderna-avertit-que-le-vaccin-nempechera-pas-l

    [11] https://youtu.be/FzYyoP6xBvU

    [12] https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/articles/quel-vaccin-contre-le-covid-19

    [13] Clément Gilbert, Cédric Feschotte. Virus et gènes viraux endogènes : évolution et impact. Virologie. 2016 ;20(3):158-173. doi:10.1684/vir.2016.0652 https://www.jle.com/fr/revues/vir/e-docs/virus_et_genes_viraux_endogenes_evolution_et_impact_307413/article.phtml?tab=citer

    [14] https://www.ouest-france.fr/sante/grippe/grippe-h1n1-victime-d-effets-secondaires-au-vaccin-elle-attend-toujours

    [15] https://www.senat.fr/rap/r09-685-1/r09-685-11.pdf

    [16] https://www.h2mw.eu/redactionmedicale/2015/04/personne-ne-veut-r%C3%A9ellement-nettoyer-le-syst%C3%A8me-a-lot-of-what-is-publ

    [17] https://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f3830/rr/652673

    [18] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020R1043
     
    ------

    PROJET DE LOI SUR LE PASSEPORT SANITAIRE

    Projet de loi n°3714 instituant un régime pérenne de gestion des urgences sanitaires, déposés en procédures accélérées.

    https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15b3714_projet-loi
     
    Noté à l’ordre du jour le 19 janvier à 15h à l’Assemblée Nationale lors de la Première séance publique "Discussion du projet de loi instituant un régime pérenne de gestion des urgences sanitaires" 
    https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/agendas/les-agendas/2021-01-19
     
    Noté à l’ordre du jour le 20 janvier à 21h à l’Assemblée Nationale lors de la Seconde séance publique "Suite de la discussion du projet de loi instituant un régime pérenne de gestion des urgences sanitaires"
     
    https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/agendas/les-agendas/2021-01-20

    Nous avons entendu Olivier Véran : « dans le contexte que nous connaissons, parce qu’il faut de la confiance pour que les Français se fassent vacciner librement, parce que nous sommes encore en état de crise sanitaire et parce qu’il y a un couvre-feu, le gouvernement ne proposera pas ce texte devant le Parlement avant plusieurs mois, avant d’être sorti de la crise. ». Cependant les agendas de l’Assemblée Nationale ne sont pas changés ce jour.
     
    Fidèles à notre éthique de souveraineté et d’individuation, nous vous invitons à lire les projets de lois et à vous faire votre idée avant d’en avoir les commentaires.

    Rien de bien surprenant. Nous attendions ce texte. Il n’est que tristement en cohérence avec le projet mené jusqu’ici. La seule violence innatendue est celle du non-respect de la trêve des fêtes de fin d’année.

    Il ne s’agit ni plus ni moins que ce que nous appelons depuis déjà des semaines un déferlement totalitaire paranoïaque de khmèrs blancs technosanitaristes fascinés par la vaccination et justifiant la disparition progressive des libertés sous des motifs fallacieux de gravité épidémique et d’absence d’alternatives thérapeutiques.

    L’accès aux droits et libertés dépendrait de votre soumission au test de dépistage, à un traitement, à un vaccin. Michel Foucault a prophétisé cet état de fait dans ce qu’il a appelé le biopouvoir et la biopolitique [1].

    C’est la grande question de fond : voulons-nous d’un monde où les décisions de santé sont prises par un gouvernement et un conseil scientifique au mépris du patient et des médecins ?

    REVENIR À L’ESSENTIEL ET CESSER D’AVOIR PEUR

    Il n’y a rien de plus important que ce qui se passe en ce moment. L’impératif est posé de s’occuper du monde dans lequel on veut vivre. Chaque jour, de nouveaux obstacles vont se dresser. Pas de Messie, pas de sauveur. Nous devons nous rassembler, nous regrouper...

    LE PRÉSENT EST LA PORTE, LA PRATIQUE EST LA CLÉ

    Accordons chaque action à ce que nous voulons voir advenir. Il s’agit de refaire société de manière plus libre, plus juste, plus fraternelle.
    Refaire la société que nous voulons. (...)

    Reinfo Covid, le 25 déc.2020 (extraits)
    www.reinfocovid.fr

    --

    [1] - https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/131
    [2] - https://www.francesoir.fr/politique-france/etat-de-crise-sanitaire-de-lexception-la-regle-un-projet-de-loi-bien-inqu
    [3] - https://childrenshealthdefense.org/ebook-sign-up-vaccine-mandates-an-erosion-of-civil-rights
    [4] - Maître Brusa : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4X0YN_4B3kw

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • #Frontex wants to disembark refugees in Senegal

    #Hera“ is the only Frontex maritime mission on the territory of a third country. A new agreement might extend this joint border #surveillance.

    The EU border agency Frontex wants to bring back refugees picked up in the Atlantic Ocean to Senegal. The EU Commission should therefore negotiate a so-called #Status_Agreement with the government in Dakar. The proposal can be found in the annual report (https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6294-2020-INIT/en/pdf) on the implementation of the Regulation for the surveillance of external sea borders (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0656). It regulates the maritime „operational cooperation“ of Frontex with third countries.

    It would be the first agreement of this kind with an African government. So far, Frontex has only concluded Status Agreements with a number of Western Balkan countries for the joint surveillance of land borders. The only operation to date in a third country (https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/25/frontex-expands-operations-in-eu-neighbouring-countries) was launched by the Border Agency in Albania a year ago.

    Frontex has been coordinating the joint operation „Hera“ in the Atlantic since 2006 (https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-hera-the-canary-islands-WpQlsc). The reason for the first and thus oldest EU border surveillance mission (http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-307-frontex-operation-hera.pdf) was the arrival of many thousands of refugees in boats on the Canary Islands via Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde and Senegal. For a short period of time, the German Federal Police had also participated in „Hera“ (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/16/098/1609888.pdf), in addition to Portugal, France, Italy, Finland and Luxembourg. Already in 2007 the arrivals decreased drastically. For the past year, Frontex’s „Migratory Map“ (https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map) records only 711 irregular arrivals (by December) on Gran Canaria, Tenerife and the other Spanish islands. According to media reports (https://www.laprovincia.es/canarias/2020/03/03/canarias-supera-1200-personas-llegadas/1260792.html), this number has been nearly doubled in the first two months of 2020 alone.

    „Hera“ is the only maritime mission in which Frontex coordinates an operation which, with Senegal, also takes place in the 12-mile zone, the exclusive economic zone and the airspace of a third country. In „Themis“, „Indalo“ and „Poseidon“, the operational plan only covers waters under the jurisdiction and monitoring of EU Member States.

    Currently, „Hera“ is operated by Spain as the „host state“ with support from Portugal. The two countries patrol with frigates and smaller ships and carry out aerial surveillance with a helicopter. They first transmit their information to a control centre in Las Palmas, to which Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal have sent liaison officers. Processed intelligence is then forwarded to the International Coordination Centre (ICC) in Madrid, which manages all operations of the Spanish border authorities and is also responsible for cooperation with Frontex.

    If suspicious boats are detected in the area of operations in „Hera“, a report is made to the competent Maritime Rescue Operations Centre (MRCC). All those picked up in the Spanish Search and Rescue zone have been able to disembark in the Canary Islands in recent years.

    If the refugees are still in the Senegalese #SAR zone, the national coast guard brings them back to the West African country. With a Status Agreement, Frontex assets could do the same. According to SAR Info, a Canadian information platform, the Senegalese national #MRCC (https://sarcontacts.info/countries/senegal) is also responsible for the rescue coordination off the coast of Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania.

    Before each operation, Frontex is required to assess the possible disembarkation of intercepted refugees in the third countries concerned. In the report for 2018, Leggeri writes that his agency, with the „host states“ of the missions „Themis“ (Italy) and „Indalo“ (Spain), considered such disembarkations to Libya and Tunisia as well as to Morocco to be incompatible with regulations to which Frontex is bound.

    From Frontex’s point of view, however, disembarkations would be possible for Turkey and Senegal, as the governments there do not violate basic fundamental and human rights and also adhere to the principle of non-refoulement, according to which refugees may not be returned to countries from which they have fled. So far, says Leggeri, Frontex and the EU Member States involved in „Poseidon“ and „Hera“ have not forced any persons to Turkey or Senegal.

    The report signed by Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri is as usual one year late, the paper published last week refers to 2018. That was the same year in which the European Union once again wanted to set up „regional disembarkation centres“ in North Africa (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4629). There, asylum applications of persons seeking protection would be examined even before they reach Europe. All the governments in question rejected the proposal, and the African Union also opposed it a year ago. Led by Egypt, the 55 member states criticise the planned EU facilities as „de facto detention centres“ (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/african-union-seeks-to-kill-eu-plan-to-process-migrants-in-africa).

    In the report, Leggeri complains that Frontex has too little competence in its four maritime missions. Bilateral agreements, such as those Italy has concluded with Libya (https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/12/italy-halt-abusive-migration-cooperation-libya) or Spain with Morocco (https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/21/inenglish/1550736538_089908.html), allow for much closer cooperation with North African coastguards.

    https://digit.site36.net/2020/03/01/frontex-wants-to-disembark-refugees-in-senegal
    #Sénégal #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #désembarquement #surveillance_frontalière #accord #accords #frontières

    Et pas mal de matériel sur seenthis autour de...
    #plateformes_de_désembarquement #disembarkation_paltforms #plateformes_de_débarquement #regional_disembarkation_platforms #Albanie #Océane_atlantique #Atlantique #Allemagne

    –-> voir notamment ici, dans la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765334

    ping @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

  • Info sur la refonte de la #Directive_Retour et les futurs projets de réforme du #régime_d'asile_européen_commun

    info sur la prochaine étape européenne en matière de politique migratoire. Plus précisément sur la refonte de la Directive Retour qui va passer au vote en #LIBE et aussi des infos sur l’évolution du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (#RAEC), histoire d’informer de ce vers quoi l’on tend probablement pour la prochaine législature (donc le prochain mandat).

    Dans un effort pour réformer le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (RAEC) et tendre vers une #uniformisation du droit d’asile au niveau européen, les directives sont revues une à une depuis quelques années (Directive Accueil, Procédure, Qualification et Retour + le règlement Dublin qui est au point mort depuis 2017 à cause du Conseil Européen).
    Ces #révisions rentrent dans le cadre de l’#agenda_européen_pour_les_migrations qui a été élaboré en 2015 par la Commission sous ordre du Conseil Européen.

    Le package est en état d’avancement prochain et l’étape la plus proche semble concerner la refonte de la Directive Retour.
    Néanmoins, il y a également un nombre assez important de dispositifs prévus dont il est peut-être pas inintéressant d’évoquer dans le sillage de l’analyse sur cette Directive.

    Il y a donc deux parties dans ce mail d’info : la première sur le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun (RAEC) et ce qu’il préfigure ; la seconde sur le texte de la Directive Retour plus précisément.

    Le Régime d’Asile Européen Commun :

    Il y a de nombreux discours actuellement autour de la mise en place d’un droit d’asile "harmonisé" au niveau européen.

    C’est une obsession de Macron depuis son élection. Il a réaffirmé, lors de la restitution du Grand Débat, sa volonté d’une Europe au régime d’asile commun : "c’est aussi une Europe qui tient ses frontières, qui les protège. C’est une Europe qui a un droit d’asile refondé et commun et où la #responsabilité va avec la #solidarité."
    https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/04/25/conference-de-presse-grand-debat-national

    La confusion est telle que les journalistes ne semblent pas toujours comprendre si ce régime d’asile commun existe ou non.

    Sur france inter par exemple :
    "Cela fait plusieurs années que l’on parle de la mise en place d’un régime d’asile européen commun. Nous en sommes encore très loin mais plusieurs textes sont actuellement en discussion, sur les procédures, sur l’accueil, les qualifications, les réinstallations, la création d’une agence européenne pour l’asile "
    https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/cafe-europe/cafe-europe-24-fevrier-2018

    Et non... ça ne fait pas plusieurs années qu’on en parle... ça fait plusieurs années qu’il existe !

    Historique :

    En vérité, cette tentative d’harmonisation des législations est ancienne et date à peu près du Conseil Européen de #Tampere en 1999 qui donna les premières impulsions pour la mise en place du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun avec tout ce que l’on connait maintenant à savoir par exemple, le #règlement_Dublin.
    Ici le résumé des orientations du Conseil sont claires :
    "il faut, pour les domaines distincts, mais étroitement liés, de l’#asile et des #migrations, élaborer une politique européenne commune (...) Il est convenu de travailler à la mise en place d’un régime d’asile européen commun, fondé sur l’application intégrale et globale de la Convention de Genève. (...) Ce régime devrait comporter, à court terme, une méthode claire et opérationnelle pour déterminer l’Etat responsable de l’examen d’une demande d’asile, des normes communes pour une procédure d’asile équitable et efficace, des conditions communes minimales d’#accueil des demandeurs d’asile, et le rapprochement des règles sur la reconnaissance et le contenu du statut de réfugié."
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_fr.htm#a

    Vous avez ici les bases du RAEC et notamment du règlement Dublin qui vise justement à la détermination de l’#Etat_responsable de l’asile afin de lutter contre le "#shopping_de_l'asile", un """"fléau""""" qui avait déjà touché l’Europe durant les années 90 avec la crise des Balkans (en 1992, 700 000 personnes environ ont demandé l’asile en Europe, ce qui signifie par ailleurs que non... 2015 n’est pas une situation si inédite. La situation s’est stabilisée après 1993 où 500 000 personnes ont demandé l’asile, puis 300 000 dans les années qui ont suivi, mais pas au point de ne pas "forcer" les pays à réagir au niveau européen).
    https://www.persee.fr/doc/homig_1142-852x_1996_num_1198_1_2686

    Cet acte fondateur du #Conseil_de_Tampere est corroboré par plusieurs documents et on peut en trouver aussi confirmation par exemple dans le rapport sur la #politique_européenne_de_Retour (rédigé tous les trois ans) qui commence par :
    "L’Union européenne s’efforce depuis 1999 de mettre au point une approche globale sur la question des migrations, qui couvre l’#harmonisation des conditions d’admission, les droits des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour régulier ainsi que l’élaboration de mesures juridiques et le renforcement d’une coopération pratique en matière de prévention des flux migratoires irréguliers."
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=celex:52014DC0199

    Bref, à partir de 1999 et donc du Conseil de Tampere, la direction est prise de mener une politique migratoire à l’échelle européenne pour renforcer le contrôle des frontières extérieures.

    Les Textes du RAEC, l’échec de l’harmonisation et les règlements qui nous attendent en conséquence :

    Le Conseil (donc les États) ordonné à Tampere et donc la Commission exécute en proposant plusieurs textes qui vont dessiner le paysage actuel du droit d’asile européen commun.

    Un ensemble de textes est donc créé et adopté :

    Le règlement Dublin succède donc à la convention de Dublin en 2003
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A8glement_Dublin_II
    Avec son frère le règlement #Eurodac qui permet la mise en oeuvre de #Dublin aussi en 2003 (logique) :
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurodac

    #Frontex est lancé en 2004 :
    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agence_europ%C3%A9enne_pour_la_gestion_de_la_coop%C3%A9ration_op%C3%A9

    Et les directives qui constituent le coeur du Régime d’Asile Européen Commun avec le règlement Dublin sont lancées dans la foulée :

    La #Directive_Accueil en 2003 (puis réformée en 2013)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033

    La #Directive_Procédure en 2005 (réformée aussi en 2013)
    https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/Procedures-FR.pdf

    La #Directive_Qualification en 2004 (réformée en 2011)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011L0095

    La Directive Retour en 2008 (qui va être réformée maintenant)
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ajl0014

    L’ensemble de ces textes avait pour but d’harmoniser les législations nationales européennes (pour le meilleur et pour le pire d’ailleurs).
    Le problème concerne donc, non pas l’absence de législations européennes communes, mais plutôt les marges de manoeuvres des Etats dans l’interprétation des Directives et leur transposition dans les législations nationales. Cette marge de manoeuvre est telle qu’elle permet aux Etats de retenir ce qui les arrange dans tel ou tel texte, de sorte que toute tentative d’harmonisation est impossible.

    Dès lors, la diversité des procédures est toujours la norme d’un pays à l’autre ; un pays comme les Pays-Bas donne 4 ans de protection subsidiaire, tandis que la France avant la loi Asile n’en donnait qu’une ; la liste des pays sûrs n’est pas la même selon les Etats .... etc etc etc

    Les Etats ont tellement la main que finalement, on peut assez facilement conclure à l’#échec total des tentatives d’harmonisation et donc du RAEC, tant les Etats ont, du début à la fin, fait un peu près ce qu’ils voulaient avec les textes.
    (voir également Sarah Lamort : https://www.amazon.fr/Europe-terre-dasile-Sarah-Lamort/dp/2130734669)

    La Commission a elle-même très bien compris ces faiblesses.

    Exaspérée elle déclare en 2016 que malgré ses efforts pour la mise en place effective du RAEC : " il existe encore des différences notables entre les États membres dans les types de procédures utilisés, les conditions d’accueil offertes aux demandeurs, les #taux_de_reconnaissance et le type de protection octroyé aux bénéficiaires d’une protection internationale. Ces #divergences contribuent à des #mouvements_secondaires et à une course à l’asile (« #asylum_shopping »), créent des facteurs d’attraction et conduisent en définitive à une répartition inégale entre les États membres de la responsabilité d’offrir une protection à ceux qui en ont besoin.(...) Ces #disparités résultent en partie des dispositions souvent discrétionnaires qui figurent dans la version actuelle de la directive relative aux procédures d’asile et de celle relative aux conditions d’accueil." et de toutes les autres en vérité pouvons-nous ajouter...
    L’objectif est donc de "renforcer et harmoniser davantage les règles du régime d’asile européen commun, de façon à assurer une plus grande égalité de traitement dans l’ensemble de l’Union et à réduire les facteurs d’attraction injustifiés qui encouragent les départs vers l’UE" (les facteurs d’attraction étant le "shopping de l’asile")

    Et pour cela la Commission propose de transformer quasiment toutes les Directives citées plus haut en Règlement... :
    " la Commission proposera un nouveau règlement instituant une procédure d’asile commune unique dans l’Union et remplaçant la directive relative aux procédures d’asile ; un nouveau règlement relatif aux conditions que doivent remplir les demandeurs d’asile remplaçant l’actuelle directive du même nom, et des modifications ciblées de la directive relative aux conditions d’accueil."
    https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/FR/1-2016-197-FR-F1-1.PDF

    La différence entre la Directive et le Règlement étant que justement la Directive est soumise à une interprétation des Etats dans la transposition au sein des législations nationales de la dite Directive (dont on voit qu’elle est large), tandis qu’un Règlement est contraignant et s’applique sans interprétation, ni marge de manoeuvre whatsoever à tous les Etats (comme le règlement Dublin).
    Ici par exemple, la Commission propose de changer la Directive Procédure en un Règlement, histoire par exemple, que tous les pays aient la même liste de pays d’origine sûrs une bonne fois pour toute : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0467

    Ce processus d’abrogation des #directives pour en faire des #règlements est en cours et il est très important puisque cela signifie qu’il va falloir surveiller de très près les dispositions qui vont apparaitre dans ces nouveaux textes qui vont TOUS s’appliquer stricto sensu.
    Ce n’est pas forcément une bonne nouvelle.

    Reste que les Etats pourraient s’opposer à l’imposition de textes aussi coercitifs et d’ailleurs, ils ont eux-mêmes bloqué la révision du règlement Dublin. Cela pose la question de l’Etat d’avancement.

    Etat d’avancement :
    Depuis l’annonce de la transformation des Directives en Règlements en 2016, les dossiers ne semblent pas avoir tant avancés que cela pour autant que je sache sauf concernant quelques dossiers majeurs, notamment la Directive Retour.

    Concernant la mise en place des règlements, la Commission est très vague dans sa dernière communication sur l’état d’avancement de l’agenda européen matière de migrations de mars 2019 : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2019:0126:FIN:FR:PDF
    En décembre 2017, elle disait :
    "Présentées il y a un an et demi, ces propositions en sont à des stades d’avancement différents dans le processus législatif. Certaines, comme la proposition concernant l’Agence de l’Union européenne pour l’asile et la réforme d’Eurodac, sont sur le point d’être adoptées. D’autres, à savoir le cadre de l’Union pour la réinstallation, le règlement relatif aux conditions que doivent remplir les demandeurs d’asile et la directive relative aux conditions d’accueil, progressent. En revanche, la proposition de règlement sur les procédures d’asile et, comme pierre angulaire, la proposition de révision du règlement de Dublin, nécessitent encore un travail considérable. Dans ce contexte, il convient aussi de progresser dans les travaux sur la notion de pays tiers sûr au sens de l’UE, en tenant compte des conclusions du Conseil européen de juin"
    https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/FR/COM-2017-820-F1-FR-MAIN-PART-1.PDF

    Il y a donc fort à parier qu’en à peine 1 an et demi, les choses n’aient pas beaucoup avancées concernant les règlements.
    Bref, comme il était assez attendu, ce qui ne contraint pas totalement les Etats avancent et le reste piétine pour le moment.

    Par contre, elles avancent concernant la politique des retours et donc la Directive Retour !

    Politique des retours et externalisation de l’asile :

    Après le Conseil de Tampere en 1999, vient la "crise des migrants" en 2015, qui ne fera qu’accélérer les constatations de l’échec du RAEC.

    Le Conseil européen lance donc une réunion spéciale en avril 2015 qui annonce un changement de stratégie vers l’extérieur avec notamment un renforcement de la coopération avec les pays tiers pour le "contrôle de l’immigration". Ordre est donné à la Commission de mobiliser tous les moyens nécessaires pour mettre cette nouvelle stratégie en oeuvre.
    Ce n’est pas le lancement officiel de l’externalisation de l’Asile puisque le processus de Khartoum et de Rabat sont antérieurs et déjà lancés.
    Néanmoins, il me parait assez évident personnellement qu’un coup d’accélérateur à la stratégie d’externalisation sera donné à partir de ce Conseil qui sera entièrement tourné vers la coopération internationale :
    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement

    Dans le prolongement logique des décisions prises lors du Conseil d’avril 2015 et de l’orientation stratégique vers l’extérieur, le Conseil Européen lancera le Sommet de la Valette en novembre où il invitera un nombre conséquent de pays africains.
    Ainsi le Sommet de la Valette, "fut l’occasion de reconnaître que la gestion des migrations relève de la responsabilité commune des pays d’origine, de transit et de destination. L’UE et l’Afrique ont travaillé dans un esprit de partenariat afin de trouver des solutions communes aux défis d’intérêt commun."
    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12

    C’est après ce Sommet que seront initiés le Fond Fiduciaire, les accords avec la Turquie, la Libye, les garde-côtes, la transformation de Frontex etc
    Bien que tout cela ait été préparé en amont.

    Après les ordres du Conseil, la Commission s’exécute avec l’Agenda Européen en Matière de Migrations et la focale sur les retours :
    Devant la stratégie d’orientation du Conseil qui demande des réformes fortes et des actions pour transformer la politique européenne d’asile, la Commission s’exécute en mai 2015 avec l’Agenda Européen des migrations :https://ec.europa.eu/france/node/859_fr

    Cet agenda met l’emphase sur un nombre impressionnant de points, mais une large part est également réservée aux retours page 11 et 12 (puisqu’il faudrait s’assurer que les retours soient efficaces et effectifs d’après la Commission).
    https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_fr.pdf

    Dans la foulée la Commission lance donc une réflexion sur la politique des retours qui culminera la même année en 2015 avec The Action Plan of Return.
    L’action plan partira d’un principe assez simple, si les migrants viennent, c’est parce qu’on ne les renvoie pas...
    "The European Agenda on Migration, adopted by the European Commission on 13 May 2015, highlighted that one of the incentives for irregular migration is the knowledge that the EU’s system to return irregular migrants is not sufficiently effective"
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0453

    Ce plan est censé résoudre ce problème.
    Mais il sera aussi un relatif échec, ce qui n’empêchera pas la Commission d’insister en lançant un nouveau plan en 2017, The Renewed Action Plan on return :
    "Despite this, the overall impact on the return track record across the European Union remained limited, showing that more resolute action is needed to bring measurable results in returning irregular migrants. "
    https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170302_a_more_effective_return_policy_in_the_european_union_-_a_renewed_

    Toujours dans la foulée d’une politique d’expulsion efficace, il sera discuté plus tard (en mars 2019 sur l’évaluation de l’application de l’agenda européen) de la meilleure façon d’exécuter les retours en Europe. C’est là où nous en sommes.
    Pour la mise en place d’une politique de retour efficace, il y a donc deux stratégies :

    1) renforcer les accords de réadmission avec des accords bilatéraux ou par le biais des accords de Cotonou (qui vont être révisés et qui ont beaucoup tourné autour des migrations justement...on en reparlera un jour).
    "Concernant donc "les retours et la réadmission, l’UE continue d’œuvrer à la conclusion d’accords et d’arrangements en matière de réadmission avec les pays partenaires, 23 accords et arrangements ayant été conclus jusqu’à présent. Les États membres doivent maintenant tirer pleinement parti des accords existants."
    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1496_fr.htm

    2) renforcer les procédures de retour depuis l’Europe.
    La Commission espère en conséquence que "le Parlement européen et le Conseil devraient adopter rapidement la proposition de la Commission en matière de retour, qui vise à limiter les abus et la fuite des personnes faisant l’objet d’un retour au sein de l’Union"
    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1496_fr.htm

    C’est pourquoi la Commission propose de revoir la Directive Retour.

    La Directive Retour :
    La directive retour est donc la prochaine directive sur la liste des refontes.
    Ce sera un gros sujet a priori puisque la prochaine étape c’est le vote en Commission LIBE avant donc le vote en plénière.
    L’échéance est donc proche et les discussions bien avancées.

    Un texte problématique :

    Article 6 et 16
    En gros, les problèmes qui se posent avec ce texte ont surtout à voir avec l’article 6 qui décrit une liste de 16 critères de "risque de fuites", les derniers étant particulièrement dangereux puisqu’il semblerait que "résister aux procédures de retour" ou "refuser de donner ses empreintes" peuvent représenter des risques de fuites....
    Cet élargissement des critères est à mettre en lien avec l’article 18 qui permet la détention de toutes les personnes qui représentent un risque de fuite. Avec un élargissement pareil des critères de "fuites", je crains que l’on ne se donne le droit d’enfermer tout le monde.

    Article 7
    L’article 7 oblige les Etats tiers à coopérer dans les procédures de retour.
    L’application de cet article me semblait complexe mais le Brief du Parlement sur la Directive au paragraphe "Council" (donc sur les discussions au Conseil) ajoute que les Etats réfléchissent à la possibilité de sanctions pour les pays tiers en cas de non-respect de cette obligation de coopération.
    Et à ce moment-là j’ai compris.... Ma théorie c’est qu’un chantage quelconque pourra être mis en place pour établir une pression forçant les Etats tiers à coopérer.
    Tout le problème tient sur l’amplitude des sanctions possibles. Je n’en vois pas beaucoup, sauf à menacer de rompre des accords commerciaux ou de développement.

    C’est déjà plus ou moins le cas via le Fond Fiduciaire ou les fonds d’aide au dvp puisque l’on voit parfois que l’aide au dvp dépend de la mise en place d’accords de réadmission.
    Par exemple : l’UE et l’Afghanistan ont signé un accord de réadmission en Octobre 2016 : https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf
    Et dans la foulée d’octobre, 5 milliards d’aide au dvp étaient débloqués pour la période 2016-2020 à la conférence de Bruxelles (https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-afghanistan_march_2019.pdf).

    Avec une opération pareille, des soupçons de chantage à l’aide au dvp me paraissent tout à fait légitime.
    Cependant, ils existaient une séparation dans la forme. C’est-à-dire que même si les liens peuvent sembler évidents, les accords de réadmission n’établissaient pas directement de chantage entre l’un et l’autre. Il n’était pas écrit que des "sanctions" étaient possibles (du moins pas dans l’exemple de l’Afghanistan ni même dans l’accord de Cotonou - exception faite de ce qui concerne l’article 96 et le respect des droits—et dans aucun autre texte à ma connaissance).
    Ici le Conseil veut faire un pas de plus dans la direction d’une politique assumée de pressions via des sanctions et donc, indirectement semble-t-il, de chantage.

    Les Pays Tiers-Sûrs
    Un autre élément dangereux dans ce paragraphe sur le Conseil dans le Brief du Parlement : c’est que les Etats de leur côté réfléchissent aussi à la possibilité de renvoyer une personne dans un pays tiers considéré comme sûr qui ne soit pas le pays d’origine.
    En d’autres termes, renvoyer les soudanais par exemple, en Egypte par exemple légalement.

    Cela rejoint a priori les discussions sur la notion de pays tiers sûrs que la Commission et le Conseil continuent de vouloir développer depuis très longtemps malgré les oppositions franches des ONG (http://www.forumrefugies.org/s-informer/actualites/le-concept-de-pays-tiers-sur-une-remise-en-cause-profonde-de-l-acces-) ou même l’avis défavorable de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme en 2017 (https://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/171219_avis_concept_pays_tiers_sur_5.pdf)
    On ferait ici un pas de plus au sein du creuset initié par la politique des "pays d’origine sûrs" et on s’offrirait le droit de renvoyer des personnes dans des pays qui n’auraient pas les conditions pour les accueillir dignement (tant matériellement que du point de vue du respect des droits...).

    Article 22
    L’article 22 est aussi très problématique puisque les dispositions aux frontières devraient changer :
    Les migrants en zone d’attente devraient recevoir une décision de retour simplifiée plutôt qu’une explication motivée.
    Il ne devrait plus y avoir aucune chance de départ volontaire, sauf si le migrant possède un document de voyage en cours de validité (remis aux autorités) et coopère pleinement (car s’il ne coopère pas, on l’a vu, il peut être déclaré en "tentative de fuite" ou en "fuite").
    Concernant les recours, les migrants ne disposeront que de 48 heures pour faire appel d’une décision de retour fondée sur un rejet de l’asile à la frontière, et l’effet suspensif ne s’appliquera qu’à la présentation de nouvelles conclusions importantes (type CNDA) ou qu’il n’y a pas déjà eu de contrôle juridictionnel effectif.

    Article 16
    D’ailleurs, les recours peuvent subir un changement relativement dramatique à cause de l’article 16. Selon le brief de la Commission :
    " Proposed Article 16(4) imposes a general obligation on Member States to establish ‘reasonable’ time limits. In relation to appeals lodged against return decisions adopted as a consequence of a decision rejecting an application for international protection, Member States would have to establish a time limit for lodging an appeal of a maximum of five days, but would be free to fix a shorter period."
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637901/EPRS_BRI(2019)637901_EN.pdf
    Une manière de réduire encore plus les possibilités de recours.

    Article 13
    L’article 13 apporte aussi des changements aux refus d’entrée : " the proposal would allow Member States to impose an isolated entry ban, not accompanied by a corresponding return decision, if the irregularity of a stay is detected when the third-country national is exiting the territory of a Member State"
    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637901/EPRS_BRI(2019)637901_EN.pdf

    Néanmoins, j’ai pour le moment du mal à évaluer l’étendue de cette proposition à l’article 13 et il faudrait peut-être en discuter avec l’anafé par exemple.

    #procédure_d'asile #réforme

    Reçu par email via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 06.06.2019

    • New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

      A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

      The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

      The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

      For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

      However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

      The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

      The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

      Quotes

      Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

      “The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

      Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

      “The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

    • New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

      A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

      The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

      The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

      For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

      However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

      The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

      The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

      Quotes

      Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

      “The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

      Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

      “The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

  • Big data, multiplication des antennes et des ondes : bienvenue dans le monde merveilleux de la 5G (Basta)
    https://www.crashdebug.fr/sciencess/15909-big-data-multiplication-des-antennes-et-des-ondes-bienvenue-dans-le

    C’est un nouvel eldorado pour les opérateurs de téléphonie et la Commission européenne. Celle-ci y voit la promesse d’une forte croissance et de centaines de milliers d’emplois d’ici 2025. La 5G fait fantasmer, avec son débit ultra-rapide, la possibilité de développer des millions d’objets connectés « intelligents », et les milliards de données qu’elle permettra de collecter. Au delà de la mise en scène marketing, son utilité et ses retombées économiques réelles n’ont rien d’une évidence. Pour déployer le réseau, les antennes-relais devront être bien plus nombreuses, avec toutes les interrogations que suscitent les effets sanitaires d’une densification des ondes. Le collectif de journalistes Investigate Europe, partenaire de Basta !, a mené l’enquête.

    Un véhicule blanc, futuriste, apparaît à l’écran. Madame (...)

    https://lavolte.net/livres/les-furtifs-alain-damasio
    https://www.anfr.fr/toutes-les-actualites/actualites/installation-du-comite-national-de-dialogue-relatif-aux-niveaux-dexposition-du-
    https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/Actus2018/Feuille_de_route_5G-DEF.pdf
    http://www.priartem.fr/http://www.priartem.fr/accueil.html
    https://www.iarc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/pr208_F.pdf
    https://www.investigate-europe.eu
    https://www.numerama.com/politique/466256-5g-et-espionnage-les-deputes-proposent-une-loi-taillee-contre-huawe
    https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2016:0588:FIN
    https://www.arcep.fr/cartes-et-donnees/nos-publications-chiffrees/experimentations-5g-en-france/tableau-deploiements-5g.html
    https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29459303
    https://journals.lww.com/health-physics/Abstract/2018/12000/Systematic_Derivation_of_Safety_Limits_for.17.aspx
    https://www.lecho.be/entreprises/telecom/celine-fremault-la-5g-les-bruxellois-ne-sont-pas-des-souris-de-laboratoire/10112569.html)

  • Règlement terroriste
    https://www.domainepublic.net/Reglement-terroriste.html

    Contactons nos parlementaires avant ce 21 mars ! Abelli asbl demande aux député.e.s belges du parlement européen de voter contre le Règlement européen relatif à la prévention de la diffusion en ligne de contenus à caractère terroriste Pourquoi ? Ce nouveau règlement imposera à tout acteur du Web (hébergeurs de blog ou de vidéos, sites de presse, petits forums ou grands réseaux sociaux) de : Bloquer en une heure n’importe quel contenu signalé comme « terroriste » par la police (sans l’autorisation (...)

    #Sécurité_et_vie_privée

    « https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0640&from=FR »
    « https://www.laquadrature.net/censureterro »
    « https://www.laquadrature.net/censureterro-details/#contre-arguments »
    « https://www.pledge2019.eu/fr »

    • Cauchemar total : la censure politique des contenus obligatoire, automatisée et déléguée aux GAFAM...
      Ou, comme d’habitude, sous couvert de lutte contre le terrorisme on rogne en toute impunité la liberté d’expression

      Dans sa version initiale, ce projet de règlement antiterroriste tient en quelques articles :
      L’article 4 prévoit une obligation pour tout fournisseur de service Internet (hébergeurs web, fournisseurs de messagerie, etc.), quelle que soit sa taille ou son fonctionnement (il ne s’agit pas seulement des grosses plateformes), de retirer dans un délai d’une heure les contenus signalés par les autorités, sous peine d’importantes sanctions financières.
      L’article 5 permet également à ces mêmes autorités d’imposer une telle censure non sur la base du droit national applicable (par exemple, en France, le décret Cazeneuve de février 2015 sur la censure administrative d’Internet), mais sur la base des conditions d’utilisation des plateformes. Les polices européennes pourront donc, comme le fait déjà le ministère de l’intérieur français ou Europol, signaler des contenus haineux ou terroristes pour exiger leur censure, sur la base du droit privé.
      L’article 6 impose enfin aux hébergeurs d’adopter des mesures « proactives » pour lutter contre la propagande terroriste (article 6). Comme dans la directive copyright, il s’agit en réalité de déployer des filtres informatiques scannant l’ensemble des contenus mis en ligne par les utilisateurs d’un service pour bloquer ceux correspondants à certains critères arrêtés par ces firmes. Une forme de censure préalable, mise en œuvre par des acteurs privés via des outils automatiques qui pourront être paramétrés en partenariat avec les États.

      Le texte du projet : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0640:FIN

      #censure #liberté_expression #machine_learning

  • Dai dati biometrici alle motovedette : ecco il #business della frontiera

    La gestione delle frontiere europee è sempre di più un affare per le aziende private. Dai Fondi per la difesa a quelli per la cooperazione e la ricerca: l’Ue implementa le risorse per fermare i flussi.

    Sono 33 i miliardi che l’Europa ha intenzione di destinare dal 2021 al 2027 alla gestione del fenomeno migratorio e, in particolare, al controllo dei confini. La cifra, inserita nel #Mff, il #Multiannual_Financial_Framework (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A321%3AFIN), (ed ora in discussione tra Commissione, Parlamento e Consiglio) rappresenta il budget complessivo Ue per la gestione delle frontiere esterne, dei flussi migratori e dei flussi di rifugiati. E viene notevolmente rafforzata rispetto al periodo precedente (2016-2020) quando i miliardi stanziati erano 12,4. Meno della metà.

    A questo capitolo di spesa contribuiscono strumenti finanziari diversi: dal fondo sulla sicurezza interna (che passa da 3,4 a 4,8 miliardi) a tutto il settore della cooperazione militare, che coincide sempre più con quello dell’esternalizzazione, come accade già per le due missioni italiane in Libia e in Niger. Anche una parte dei 23 miliardi del Fondo Europeo alla Difesa e di quello per la Pace saranno devoluti allo sviluppo di nuove tecnologie militari per fermare i flussi in mare e nel deserto. Stessa logica per il più conosciuto Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa che, con fondi proveniente dal budget allo sviluppo, finanzia il progetto di blocco marittimo e terrestre nella rotta del Mediterraneo Centrale.

    Un grande business in cui rientrano anche i Fondi alla ricerca. La connessione tra gestione della migrazione, #lobby della sicurezza e il business delle imprese private è al centro di un’indagine di Arci nell’ambito del progetto #Externalisation_Policies_Watch, curato da Sara Prestianni. “Lo sforzo politico nella chiusura delle frontiere si traduce in un incremento del budget al capitolo della sicurezza, nella messa in produzione di sistemi biometrici di identificazione, nella moltiplicazione di forze di polizia europea ai nostri confini e nell’elaborazione di sistemi di sorveglianza - sottolinea Prestianni -. La dimensione europea della migrazione si allontana sempre più dal concetto di protezione in favore di un sistema volto esclusivamente alla sicurezza, che ha una logica repressiva. Chi ne fa le spese sono i migranti, obbligati a rotte sempre più pericolose e lunghe, a beneficio di imprese nazionali che del mercato della sicurezza hanno fatto un vero e propri o business”. Tra gli aspetti più interessanti c’è l’utilizzo del Fondo alla ricerca Orizon 20-20 per ideare strumenti di controllo. “Qui si entra nel campo della biometria: l’obiettivo è dotare i paesi africani di tutto un sistema di raccolta di dati biometrici per fermare i flussi ma anche per creare un’enorme banca dati che faciliti le politiche di espulsione - continua Prestianni -. Questo ha creato un mercato, ci sono diverse imprese che hanno iniziato ad occuparsi del tema. Tra le aziende europee leader in questi appalti c’è la francese #Civipol, che ha il monopolio in vari paesi di questo processo. Ma l’interconnessione tra politici e lobby della sicurezza è risultata ancor più evidente al #Sre, #Research_on_Security_event, un incontro che si è svolto a Bruxelles a dicembre, su proposta della presidenza austriaca: seduti negli stessi panel c’erano rappresentanti della commissione europea, dell’Agenzia #Frontex, dell’industria e della ricerca del biometrico e della sicurezza. Tutti annuivano sulla necessità di aprire un mercato europeo della frontiera, dove lotta alla sicurezza e controllo della migrazione si intrecciano pericolosamente”.

    In questo contesto, non è marginale il ruolo dell’Italia. “L’idea di combattere i traffici e tutelare i diritti nasce con #Tony_Blair, ma già allora l’obiettivo era impedire alle persone di arrivare in Europa - sottolinea Filippo Miraglia, vicepresidente di Arci -. Ed è quello a cui stiamo assistendo oggi in maniera sempre più sistematica. Un esempio è la vicenda delle #motovedette libiche, finanziate dall’Italia e su cui guadagnano aziende italianissime”. Il tema è anche al centro dell’inchiesta di Altreconomia di Gennaio (https://altreconomia.it/frontiera-buon-affare-inchiesta), curata da Duccio Facchini. “L’idea era dare un nome, un volto, una ragione sociale, al modo in cui il ministero degli Interni traduce le strategie di contrasto e di lotta ai flussi di persone” spiega il giornalista. E così si scopre che della rimessa in efficienza di sei pattugliatori, dati dall’Italia alla Tunisia, per il controllo della frontiera, si occupa in maniera esclusiva un’azienda di Rovigo, i #Cantieri_Navali_Vittoria: “Un soggetto senza concorrenti sul mercato, che riesce a vincere l’appalto anche per la rimessa in sicurezza delle motovedette fornite dal nostro paese alla Libia”, sottolinea Facchini.

    Motovedette fornite dall’Italia attraverso l’utilizzo del Fondo Africa: la questione è al centro di un ricorso al Tar presentato da Asgi (Associazione studi giuridici dell’immigrazione). “Il Fondo Africa di 200 milioni di euro viene istituito nel 2018 e il suo obiettivo è implementare le strategie di cooperazione con i maggiori paesi interessati dal fenomeno migratorio: dal #Niger alla LIbia, dalla Tunisia alla Costa d’Avorio - spiega l’avvocata Giulia Crescini -. Tra le attività finanziate con questo fondo c’è la dotazioni di strumentazioni per il controllo delle frontiere. Come Asgi abbiamo chiesto l’accesso agli atti del ministero degli Esteri per analizzare i provvedimenti e vedere come sono stati spesi questi soldi. In particolare, abbiamo notato l’utilizzo di due milioni di euro per la rimessa in efficienza delle motovedette fornite dall’Italia alla Libia - aggiunge -. Abbiamo quindi strutturato un ricorso, giuridicamente complicato, cercando di interloquire col giudice amministrativo, che deve verificare la legittimità dell’azione della Pubblica amministrazione. Qualche settimana fa abbiamo ricevuto la sentenza di rigetto in primo grado, e ora presenteremo l’appello. Ma studiando la sentenza ci siamo accorti che il giudice amministrativo è andato a verificare esattamente se fossero stati spesi bene o meno quei soldi - aggiunge Crescini -. Ed è andato così in profondità che ha scritto di fatto che non c’erano prove sufficienti che il soggetto destinatario stia facendo tortura e atti degradanti nei confronti dei migranti. Su questo punto lavoreremo per il ricorso. Per noi è chiaro che l’Italia oggi sta dando strumentazioni necessarie alla Libia per non sporcarsi le mani direttamente, ma c’è una responsabilità italiana anche se materialmente non è L’Italia a riportare indietro i migranti. Su questo punto stiamo agendo anche attraverso la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo”.

    http://www.redattoresociale.it/Notiziario/Articolo/620038/Dai-dati-biometrici-alle-motovedette-ecco-il-business-della-frontie

    #externalisation #frontières #UE #EU #Europe #Libye #Forteresse_européenne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #privatisation #argent #recherche #frontières_extérieures #coopération_militaire #sécurité_intérieure #fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l'Afrique #technologie #militarisation_des_frontières #fonds_fiduciaire #développement #Horizon_2020 #biométrie #données #données_biométriques #base_de_données #database #expulsions #renvois #marché #marché_européen_de_la_frontière #complexe_militaro-industriel #Tunisie #Côte_d'Ivoire #Italie
    ping @isskein @albertocampiphoto

    • Gli affari lungo le frontiere. Inchiesta sugli appalti pubblici per il contrasto all’immigrazione “clandestina”

      In Tunisia, Libia, Niger, Egitto e non solo. Così lo Stato italiano tramite il ministero dell’Interno finanzia imbarcazioni, veicoli, idranti per “ordine pubblico”, formazione delle polizie e sistemi automatizzati di identificazione. Ecco per chi la frontiera rappresenta un buon affare.

      Uno dei luoghi chiave del “contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina” che l’Italia conduce lungo le rotte africane non si trova a Tunisi, Niamey o Tripoli, ma è in un piccolo comune del Veneto, in provincia di Rovigo, affacciato sul Canal Bianco. È ad Adria, poco distante dal Po, che ha sede “Cantiere Navale Vittoria”, un’azienda nata nel 1927 per iniziativa della famiglia Duò -ancora oggi proprietaria- specializzata in cantieristica navale militare e paramilitare. Si tratta di uno dei partner strategici della Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il ministero dell’Interno, per una serie di commesse in Libia e Tunisia.

      La Direzione è il braccio del Viminale in tema di “gestione” dei flussi provenienti da quei Paesi ritenuti di “eccezionale rilevanza nella gestione della rotta del Mediterraneo centrale” (parole della Farnesina). Quella “rotta” conduce alle coste italiane: Libia e Tunisia, appunto, ma anche Niger e non solo. E quel “pezzo” del Viminale si occupa di tradurre in pratica le strategie governative. Come? Appaltando a imprese italiane attività diversissime tra loro per valore, fonti di finanziamento, tipologia e territori coinvolti. Un principio è comune: quello di dar forma al “contrasto”, sul nostro territorio o di frontiera. E per questi affidamenti ricorre più volte una formula: “Il fine che si intende perseguire è quello di collaborare con i Paesi terzi ai fini di contrastare il fenomeno dell’immigrazione clandestina”. Tra gli ultimi appalti aggiudicati a “Cantiere Navale Vittoria” (ottobre 2018) spicca la rimessa in efficienza di sei pattugliatori “P350” da 34 metri, di proprietà della Guardia nazionale della Tunisia. Tramite gli atti della procedura di affidamento si possono ricostruire filiera e calendario.

      Facciamo un salto indietro al giugno 2017, quando i ministeri degli Esteri e dell’Interno italiani sottoscrivono un’“intesa tecnica” per prevedere azioni di “supporto tecnico” del Viminale stesso alle “competenti autorità tunisine”. Obiettivo: “Migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”, inclusi la “lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. La spesa prevista -12 milioni di euro- dovrebbe essere coperta tramite il cosiddetto “Fondo Africa”, istituito sei mesi prima con legge di Stabilità e provvisto di una “dotazione finanziaria” di 200 milioni di euro. L’obiettivo dichiarato del Fondo è quello di “rilanciare il dialogo e la cooperazione con i Paesi africani d’importanza prioritaria per le rotte migratorie”. Le autorità di Tunisi hanno fretta, tanto che un mese dopo l’intesa tra i dicasteri chiedono all’Italia di provvedere subito alla “rimessa in efficienza” dei sei pattugliatori. Chi li ha costruiti, anni prima, è proprio l’azienda di Adria, e da Tunisi giunge la proposta di avvalersi proprio del suo “know how”. La richiesta è accolta. Trascorre poco più di un anno e nell’ottobre 2018 l’appalto viene aggiudicato al Cantiere per 6,3 milioni di euro. L’“attività di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”, scrive la Direzione immigrazione e frontiere, è di “primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale, anche alla luce dei recenti sbarchi sulle coste italiane di migranti provenienti dalle acque territoriali tunisine”. I pattugliatori da “consegnare” risistemati alla Tunisia servono quindi a impedire o limitare gli arrivi via mare nel nostro Paese, che da gennaio a metà dicembre di 2018 sono stati 23.122 (di cui 12.976 dalla Libia), in netto calo rispetto ai 118.019 (105.986 dalla Libia) dello stesso periodo del 2017.


      A quel Paese di frontiera l’Italia non fornisce (o rimette in sesto) solamente navi. Nel luglio 2018, infatti, la Direzione del Viminale ha stipulato un contratto con la #Totani Company Srl (sede a Roma) per la fornitura di 50 veicoli #Mitsubishi 4×4 Pajero da “consegnare presso il porto di Tunisi”. Il percorso è simile a quello dei sei pattugliatori: “Considerata” l’intesa del giugno 2017 tra i ministeri italiani, “visto” il Fondo Africa, “considerata” la richiesta dei 50 mezzi da parte delle autorità nordafricane formulata nel corso di una riunione del “Comitato Italo-Tunisino”, “vista” la necessità di “definire nel più breve tempo possibile le procedure di acquisizione” per “garantire un dispiegamento efficace dei servizi di prevenzione e di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”, eccetera. E così l’offerta economica di 1,6 milioni di euro della Totani è ritenuta congrua.

      Capita però che alcune gare vadano deserte. È successo per la fornitura di due “autoveicoli allestiti ‘idrante per ordine pubblico’” e per la relativa attività di formazione per 12 operatori della polizia tunisina (352mila euro la base d’asta). “Al fine di poter supportare il governo tunisino nell’ambito delle attività di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina” è il passe-partout utilizzato anche per gli idranti, anche se sfugge l’impiego concreto. Seppur deserta, gli atti di questa gara sono interessanti per i passaggi elencati. Il tutto è partito da un incontro a Roma del febbraio 2018 tra l’allora ministro dell’Interno Marco Minniti e l’omologo tunisino. “Sulla base” di questa riunione, la Direzione del Viminale “richiede” di provvedere alla commessa attraverso un “appunto” datato 27 aprile dello stesso anno che viene “decretato favorevolmente” dal “Sig. Capo della Polizia”, Franco Gabrielli. Alla gara (poi non aggiudicata) si presenta un solo concorrente, la “Brescia Antincendi International Srl”, che all’appuntamento con il ministero delega come “collaboratore” un ex militare in pensione, il tenente colonnello Virgilio D’Amata, cavaliere al merito della Repubblica Italiana. Ma è un nulla di fatto.

      A Tunisi vengono quindi consegnati navi, pick-up, (mancati) idranti ma anche motori fuoribordo per quasi 600mila euro. È del settembre 2018, infatti, un nuovo “avviso esplorativo” sottoscritto dal direttore centrale dell’Immigrazione -Massimo Bontempi- per la fornitura di “10 coppie di motori Yamaha 4 tempi da 300 CV di potenza” e altri 25 da 150 CV. Il tutto al dichiarato fine di “garantire un dispiegamento efficace dei servizi di prevenzione e di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”.

      Come per la Tunisia, anche in Libia il ritmo è scandito da “intese tecniche” tra ministeri “per l’uso dei finanziamenti” previsti nel Fondo Africa. Parlamento non pervenuto

      Poi c’è la Libia, l’altro fronte strategico del “contrasto”. Come per la Tunisia, anche in questo contesto il ritmo è scandito da “intese tecniche” tra ministeri di Esteri e Interno -Parlamento non pervenuto- “per l’uso dei finanziamenti” previsti nel citato Fondo Africa. Una di queste, datata 4 agosto 2017, riguarda il “supporto tecnico del ministero dell’Interno italiano alle competenti autorità libiche per migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione, inclusi la lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. L’“eventuale spesa prevista” è di 2,5 milioni di euro. Nel novembre 2017 se n’è aggiunta un’altra, rivolta a “programmi di formazione” dei libici del valore di 615mila euro circa (sempre tratti dal Fondo Africa). Quindi si parte dalle intese e poi si passa ai contratti.

      Scorrendo quelli firmati dalla Direzione immigrazione e polizia delle frontiere del Viminale tra 2017 e 2018, e che riguardano specificamente commesse a beneficio di Tripoli, il “fornitore” è sempre lo stesso: Cantiere Navale Vittoria. È l’azienda di Adria -che non ha risposto alle nostre domande- a occuparsi della rimessa in efficienza di svariate imbarcazioni (tre da 14 metri, due da 35 e una da 22) custodite a Biserta (in Tunisia) e “da restituire allo Stato della Libia”. Ma anche della formazione di 21 “operatori della polizia libica” per la loro “conduzione” o del trasporto di un’altra nave di 18 metri da Tripoli a Biserta. La somma degli appalti sfiora complessivamente i 3 milioni di euro. In alcuni casi, il Viminale dichiara di non avere alternative al cantiere veneto. Lo ha riconosciuto la Direzione in un decreto di affidamento urgente per la formazione di 22 “operatori di polizia libica” e la riconsegna di tre motovedette a fine 2017. Poiché Cantiere Navale Vittoria avrebbe un “patrimonio informativo peculiare”, qualunque ricerca di “soluzioni alternative” sarebbe “irragionevole”. Ecco perché in diverse “riunioni bilaterali di esperti” per la cooperazione tra Italia e Libia “in materia migratoria”, oltre alla delegazione libica (i vertici dell’Amministrazione generale per la sicurezza costiera del ministero dell’Interno) e quella italiana (tra cui l’allora direttore del Servizio immigrazione del Viminale, Vittorio Pisani), c’erano anche i rappresentanti di Cantiere Navale Vittoria.
      Se i concorrenti sono pochi, la fretta è tanta. In più di un appalto verso la Libia, infatti, la Direzione ha argomentato le procedure di “estrema urgenza” segnalando come “ulteriori indugi”, ad esempio “nella riconsegna delle imbarcazioni”, non solo “verrebbero a gravare ingiustificatamente sugli oneri di custodia […] ma potrebbero determinare difficoltà anche di tipo diplomatico con l’interlocutore libico”. È successo nell’estate 2018 anche per l’ultimo “avviso esplorativo” da quasi 1 milione di euro collegato a quattro training (di quattro settimane) destinati a cinque equipaggi “a bordo di due unità navali da 35 metri, un’unità navale da 22 metri e un’unità navale da 28 metri di proprietà libica”, “al fine di aumentare l’efficienza di quel Paese per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale”. Lo scopo è fornire una “preparazione adeguata su ogni aspetto delle unità navali”. Della materia “diritti umani” non c’è traccia.

      Questa specifica iniziativa italiana deriva dal Memorandum d’Intesa con la Libia sottoscritto a Roma dal governo Gentiloni (Marco Minniti ministro dell’Interno), il 2 febbraio 2017. Il nostro Paese si era impegnato a “fornire supporto tecnico e tecnologico agli organismi libici incaricati della lotta contro l’immigrazione clandestina”. È da lì che i governi di Italia e Libia decidono di includere tra le attività di cooperazione anche l’erogazione dei corsi di addestramento sulle motovedette ancorate a Biserta.

      Ai primi di maggio del 2018, il Viminale decide di accelerare. C’è l’“urgenza di potenziare, attraverso la rimessa in efficienza delle imbarcazioni e l’erogazione di corsi di conduzione operativa, il capacity building della Guardia Costiera libica, al fine di aumentare l’efficienza di quel Paese per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale”. Anche perché, aggiunge il ministero, “alla luce degli ultimi eventi di partenze di migranti dalle coste libiche”, “appare strettamente necessario ed urgente favorire il pieno ripristino dell’efficienza delle competenti Autorità dello Stato della Libia nell’erogazione dei servizi istituzionali”. E così a fine giugno 2018 viene pubblicato il bando: i destinatari sono “operatori della polizia libica” e non invece le guardie costiere. Il ministero ha dovuto però “rimodulare” in corsa l’imposto a base d’asta della gara (da 763mila a 993mila euro). Perché? Il capitolato degli oneri e il verbale di stima relativi al valore complessivo dell’intera procedura sarebbero risultati “non remunerativi” per l’unico operatore interessato: Cantiere Navale Vittoria Spa, che avrebbe comunicato “di non poter sottoscrivere un’offerta adeguata”.

      Le risorse per quest’ultimo appalto non arrivano dal Fondo Africa ma da uno dei sei progetti finanziati in Libia dall’Unione europea tramite il “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa” (EU Trust Fund), istituito a fine 2015 con una dotazione di oltre 4 miliardi di euro. Quello che ci riguarda in particolare s’intitola “Support to integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya – First Phase”, del valore di oltre 46 milioni di euro. Mentre l’Ue è il principale finanziatore, chi deve implementarlo in loco, dal luglio 2017, è proprio il nostro ministero dell’Interno. Che è attivo in due aree della Libia: a Nord-Ovest, a Tripoli, a beneficio delle guardie costiere libiche (tramite la costituzione di un centro di coordinamento per le operazioni di ricerca e soccorso in mare e per la dichiarazione di un’area di ricerca e soccorso in mare autonoma), e una a Sud-Ovest, nella regione del Fezzan, nel distretto di Ghat, per incrementare la capacità di sorveglianza, “in particolare nelle aree di frontiera terrestre con il Niger, maggiormente colpita dall’attraversamento illegale”. È previsto inoltre un “progetto pilota” per istituire una sede operativa per circa 300 persone, ripristinando ed equipaggiando le esistenti strutture nella città di Talwawet, non lontano da Ghat, con tre avamposti da 20 persone l’uno.

      A un passo da lì c’è il Niger, l’altra tessera del mosaico. Alla metà di dicembre 2018, non risultano appalti in capo alla Direzione frontiere del Viminale, ma ciò non significa che il nostro Paese non sia attivo per supportare (anche) la gestione dei suoi confini. A metà 2017, infatti, l’Italia ha destinato 50 milioni di euro all’EU Trust Fund per “far fronte alle cause profonde della migrazione in Africa/Finestra Sahel e Lago Ciad”, con un’attenzione particolare al Niger. Si punta alla “creazione di nuove unità specializzate necessarie al controllo delle frontiere, di nuovi posti di frontiera fissa, o all’ammodernamento di quelli esistenti, di un nuovo centro di accoglienza per i migranti a Dirkou, nonché per la riattivazione della locale pista di atterraggio”. In più, dal 2018 è scesa sul campo la “Missione bilaterale di supporto nella Repubblica del Niger” (MISIN) che fa capo al ministero della Difesa e ha tra i suoi obiettivi quello di “concorrere alle attività di sorveglianza delle frontiere”. Il primo corso “per istruttori di ordine pubblico a favore della gendarmeria nigerina” si è concluso a metà ottobre 2018. Pochi mesi prima, a luglio, era stata sottoscritta un’altra “intesa tecnica” tra Esteri e Difesa per rimettere in efficienza e cedere dieci ambulanze e tre autobotti. Finalità? “Il controllo del territorio volto alla prevenzione e al contrasto ai traffici di esseri umani e al traffico di migranti, e per l’assistenza ai migranti nell’ambito delle attività di ricerca e soccorso”: 880mila euro circa. Il Niger è centrale: stando all’ultima programmazione dei Paesi e dei settori in cui sono previsti finanziamenti tramite il “Fondo Africa” (agosto 2018, fonte ministero degli Esteri), il Paese è davanti alla Libia (6 milioni contro 5 di importo massimo preventivato).

      Inabissatosi in Niger, il ministero dell’Interno riemerge in Egitto. Anche lì vigono “accordi internazionali diretti al contrasto dell’immigrazione clandestina” sostenuti dall’Italia. La loro traduzione interessa da vicino la succursale italiana della Hewlett-Packard (HP). Risale infatti a fine 2006 un contratto stipulato tra la multinazionale e la Direzione del Viminale “per la realizzazione di un Sistema automatizzato di identificazione delle impronte (AFIS) per lo Stato dell’Egitto”, finalizzato alle “esigenze di identificazione personale correlate alla immigrazione illegale”: oltre 5,2 milioni di euro per il periodo 2007-2012, cui se ne sono aggiunti ulteriori 1,8 milioni per la manutenzione ininterrotta fino al 2017 e quasi 500mila per l’ultima tranche, 2018-2019. HP non ha avversari -come riporta il Viminale- in forza di un “accordo in esclusiva” tra la Hewlett Packard Enterprise e la multinazionale della sicurezza informatica Gemalto “in relazione ai prodotti AFIS per lo Stato dell’Egitto”. Affari che non si possono discutere: “L’interruzione del citato servizio -sostiene la Direzione- è suscettibile di creare gravi problemi nell’attività di identificazione dei migranti e nel contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina, in un momento in cui tale attività è di primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale”. Oltre alla partnership con HP, il ministero dell’Interno si spende direttamente in Egitto. Di fronte alle “esigenze scaturenti dalle gravissimi crisi internazionali in vaste aree dell’Africa e dell’Asia” che avrebbero provocato “massicci esodi di persone e crescenti pressioni migratorie verso l’Europa”, la Direzione centrale immigrazione (i virgolettati sono suoi) si è fatta promotrice di una “proposta progettuale” chiamata “International Training at Egyptian Police Academy” (ITEPA). Questa prevede l’istituzione di un “centro di formazione internazionale” sui temi migratori per 360 funzionari di polizia e ufficiali di frontiera di ben 22 Paesi africani presso l’Accademia della polizia egiziana de Il Cairo. Il “protocollo tecnico” è stato siglato nel settembre 2017 tra il direttore dell’Accademia di polizia egiziana ed il direttore centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere. Nel marzo 2018, il capo della Polizia Gabrielli è volato a Il Cairo per il lancio del progetto. “Il rispetto dei diritti umani -ha dichiarato in quella sede- è uno degli asset fondamentali”.

      “La legittimità, la finalità e la consistenza di una parte dei finanziamenti citati con le norme di diritto nazionale e internazionale sono stati studiati e in alcuni casi anche portati davanti alle autorità giudiziarie dai legali dell’Associazione studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi, asgi.it)”, spiega l’avvocato Giulia Crescini, parte del collegio dell’associazione che si è occupato della vicenda. “Quando abbiamo chiesto lo stato di implementazione dell’accordo internazionale Italia-Libia del febbraio 2017, il ministero dell’Interno ha opposto generiche motivazioni di pericolo alla sicurezza interna e alle relazioni internazionali, pertanto il ricorso dopo essere stato rigettato dal Tar Lazio è ora pendente davanti al Consiglio di Stato”. La trasparenza insegue la frontiera.

      –-----------------------------

      “LEONARDO” (FINMECCANICA) E GLI INTERESSI SULLE FRONTIERE

      In Tunisia, Libia, Egitto e Niger, l’azienda Leonardo (Finmeccanica) avrebbe in corso “attività promozionali per tecnologie di sicurezza e controllo del territorio”. Alla richiesta di dettagli, la società ha risposto di voler “rivitalizzare i progetti in sospeso e proporne altri, fornendo ai Governi sistemi e tecnologie all’avanguardia per la sicurezza dei Paesi”. Leonardo è già autorizzata a esportare materiale d’armamento in quei contesti, ma non a Tripoli. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, infatti, ha approvato la Risoluzione 2420 che estende l’embargo sulle armi nel Paese per un altro anno. “Nel prossimo futuro -fa sapere l’azienda di cui il ministero dell’Economia è principale azionista- il governo di accordo nazionale potrà richiedere delle esenzioni all’embargo ONU sulle armi, per combattere il terrorismo”. Alla domanda se Leonardo sia coinvolta o operativa nell’ambito di iniziative collegate al fondo fiduciario per l’Africa dell’Unione europea e in particolare al programma da 46 milioni di euro coordinato dal Viminale, in tema di frontiere libiche, l’azienda ha fatto sapere che “in passato” avrebbe “collaborato con le autorità libiche per lo sviluppo e implementazione di sistemi per il monitoraggio dei confini meridionali, nonché sistemi di sicurezza costiera per il controllo, la ricerca e il salvataggio in mare”. Attualmente la società starebbe “esplorando opportunità in ambito europeo volte allo sviluppo di un progetto per il controllo dei flussi migratori dall’Africa all’Europa, consistente in un sistema di sicurezza e sorveglianza costiero con centri di comando e controllo”.

      Export in Libia. Il “caso” Prodit

      Nei primi sei mesi del 2018, attraverso l’Autorità nazionale UAMA (Unità per le autorizzazioni dei materiali d’armamento), l’Italia ha autorizzato l’esportazione di “materiale d’armamento” verso la Libia per un valore di circa 4,8 milioni di euro. Nel 2017 questa cifra era zero. Si tratta, come impone la normativa in tema di embargo, di materiali “non letali”. L’ammontare è minimo se paragonato al totale delle licenze autorizzate a livello mondiale dall’Italia tra gennaio e giugno 2018 (3,2 miliardi di euro). Chi esporta è una singola azienda, l’unica iscritta al Registro Nazionale delle Imprese presso il Segretariato Generale del ministero della Difesa: Prodit Engineering Srl. In Libia non ha esportato armi ma un veicolo terrestre modificato come fuoristrada e materiali utilizzabili per sminamento.

      https://altreconomia.it/frontiera-buon-affare-inchiesta

      #Leonardo #Finmeccanica #Egypte #Tunisie #identification #P350 #Brescia_Antincendi_International #Virgilio_D’Amata #Massimo_Bontempi #Yamaha #Minniti #Marco_Minniti #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_nella_Repubblica_del_Niger #MISIN #Hewlett-Packard #AFIS #International_Training_at_Egyptian_Police_Academy #ITEPA

    • "La frontiera è un buon affare": l’inchiesta sul contrasto del Viminale all’immigrazione «clandestina» a suon di appalti pubblici

      Dalla Tunisia alla Libia, dal Niger all’Egitto: così lo Stato italiano finanzia imbarcazioni, veicoli, formazione a suon di appalti pubblici. I documenti presentati a Roma dall’Arci.

      «Quando si parla di esternalizzazione della frontiera e di diritto di asilo bisogna innanzitutto individuare i Paesi maggiormente interessati da queste esternalizzazioni, capire quali sono i meccanismi che si vuole andare ad attaccare, creare un caso e prenderlo tempestivamente. Ma spesso per impugnare un atto ci vogliono 60 giorni, le tempistiche sono precise, e intraprendere azioni giudiziarie per tutelare i migranti diventa spesso molto difficile. Per questo ci appoggiamo all’Arci». A parlare è Giulia Crescini, avvocato dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione, che insieme a Filippo Miraglia, responsabile immigrazione di ARCI, Sara Prestianni, coordinatrice del progetto #externalisationpolicieswatch, e Duccio Facchini, giornalista di Altreconomia, ha fatto il punto sugli appalti della Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il ministero dell’Interno e più in generale dei fondi europei ed italiani stanzianti per implementare le politiche di esternalizzazione del controllo delle frontiere in Africa.

      L’inchiesta. Duccio Facchini, presentando i dati dell’inchiesta di Altreconomia «La frontiera è un buon affare», ha illustrato i meccanismi di una vera e propria strategia che ha uno dei suoi punti d’origine in un piccolo comune del Veneto, in provincia di Rovigo, affacciato sul Canal Bianco - dove ha sede una delle principale aziende specializzate in cantieristica navale militare e paramilitare - e arriva a toccare Tripoli, Niamey o Il Cairo. Il filo rosso che lega gli affidamenti milionari è uno solo: fermare il flusso di persone dirette in Italia e in Europa. Anche utilizzando fondi destinati alla cooperazione e senza alcun vaglio parlamentare.

      Il Fondo Africa, istituito con la legge di bilancio 2017, art. 1 comma 621 per l’anno 2018, è pari a 200 milioni di euro, cifra che serve per attivare forme di collaborazione e cooperazione con i Paesi maggiormente interessati dal fenomeno della migrazione, anche se l’espressione in sé significa tutto e niente. «Questo fondo - ha spiegato Facchini in conferenza nella sede Arci lo scorso 6 febbraio - viene dato al ministero degli Affari esteri internazionali che individua quali sono questi Paesi: nello specifico il ministero ha indicato una sfilza di Paesi africani, dal Niger alla Libia alla Tunisia, passando per l’Egitto la Costa d’Avorio, indicando anche una serie di attività che possono essere finanziate con questi soldi. Tra queste c’è la dotazione di strumentazioni utili per il controllo della frontiera». Gli autori dell’inchiesta hanno chiesto al ministero l’elenco dei provvedimenti che sono stati messi in campo e per attivare questa protezione alla frontiera. «Siamo alla fine del 2017 e notiamo che tra questi ce n’è uno che stanzia 2 milioni e mezzo per la messa in opera di quattro motovedette. Da lì cominciamo a domandarci se in base alla normativa italiana è legittimo dare una strumentazione così specifica a delle autorità così notoriamente coinvolte nella tortura e nella violenza dei migranti. Quindi abbiamo strutturato un ricorso giuridicamente molto complicato per cercare di interloquire con il giudice amministrativo». Notoriamente il giudice amministrativo non è mai coinvolto in questioni relative al diritto di asilo - per capire: è il giudice degli appalti - ed è insomma colui che va a verificare se la pubblica amministrazione ha adempiuto bene al suo compito.

      l punto di partenza. «Il giudice amministrativo e la pubblica amministrazione – ha spiegato Giulia Crescini dell’Asgi - stanno sempre in un rapporto molto delicato fra loro perché la pubblica amministrazione ha un ambito di discrezionalità all’interno del quale il giudice non può mai entrare, quindi la PA ha dei limiti che vengono messi dalla legge e all’interno di quei limiti il ministero può decidere come spendere quei soldi. Secondo noi quei limiti sono superati, perché la legge non autorizza a rafforzare delle autorità che poi commettono crimini contro i migranti, riportando queste persone sulla terra ferma in una condizione di tortura, soprattutto nei centri di detenzione». I legati hanno dunque avviato questo ricorso, ricevendo, qualche settimana fa, la sentenza di rigetto di primo grado. La sentenza è stata pubblicata il 7 gennaio e da quel giorno a oggi i quattro avvocati hanno studiato le parole del giudice, chiedendo alle altre organizzazioni che avevano presentato insieme a loro il ricorso se avessero intenzione o meno di fare appello. «Studiando la sentenza - continua Crescini - ci siamo accorti di come. pur essendo un rigetto, non avesse poi un contenuto così negativo: il giudice amministrativo in realtà è andato a verificare effettivamente se la pubblica amministrazione avesse speso bene o meno questo soldi, cioè se avesse esercitato in modo corretto o scorretto la discrezionalità di cui sopra. Un fatto che non è affatto scontato. Il giudice amministrativo è andato in profondità, segnalando il fatto che non ci sono sufficienti prove di tortura nei confronti dei migranti da parte delle autorità. Dal punto di vista giuridico questo rappresenta una vittoria. Perché il giudice ha ristretto un ambito molto specifico su cui potremo lavorare davanti al Consiglio di Stato».

      La frontiera è un buon affare. L’inchiesta «La frontiera è un buon affare» rivela che lo sforzo politico che vede impegnate Italia e istituzioni europee nella chiusura delle frontiere si traduce direttamente in un incremento del budget al capitolo della sicurezza, nella messa in produzione di sistemi biometrici di identificazione, nella moltiplicazione di forze di polizia europea ai nostri confini e nell’elaborazione di sistemi di sorveglianza.

      La dimensione europea della migrazione - si legge in un comunicato diffuso da Arci - si allontana sempre più dal concetto di protezione a favore di un sistema volto esclusivamente alla sicurezza e alla repressione del fenomeno migratorio. La logica dell’esternalizzazione, diventata pilastro della strategia tanto europea quanto italiana di gestione delle frontiere, assume in questo modo, sempre più, una dimensione tecnologica e militare, assecondando le pressioni della lobby dell’industria della sicurezza per l’implementazione di questo mercato. L’uso dei fondi è guidato da una tendenza alla flessibilità con un conseguente e evidente rischio di opacità, conveniente per il rafforzamento di una politica securitaria della migrazione.

      Nel MFF - Multiannual Financial Framework - che definisce il budget europeo per un periodo di 7 anni e ora in discussione tripartita tra Commissione, Parlamento e Consiglio - si evidenzia l’intento strategico al netto dei proclami e dei comizi della politica: la migrazione è affrontata principalmente dal punto di vista della gestione del fenomeno e del controllo delle frontiere con un incremento di fondi fino a 34 miliardi di euro per questo settore.

      A questo capitolo di spesa - si legge ancora nel comunicato - contribuiscono strumenti finanziari diversi, dal fondo sulla sicurezza interna - che passa dai 3,4 del 2014/20120 ai 4,8 miliardi del 2021/2027 e che può essere speso anche per la gestione esterna delle frontiere - a tutto il settore della cooperazione militare che coincide sempre più con quello dell’esternalizzazione, una tendenza che si palesa con evidenza nelle due missioni militari nostrane in Libia e Niger.

      Dei 23 miliardi del Fondo Europeo alla Difesa e quello per la Pace, una buona parte saranno devoluti allo sviluppo di nuova tecnologia militare, utilizzabili anche per la creazione di muri nel mare e nel deserto. Stessa logica anche per il più conosciuto Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa che, con fondi provenienti dal budget allo sviluppo, finanzia il progetto di blocco marittimo e terrestre nella rotta del Mediterraneo centrale.

      Sulla pelle dei migranti. Chi ne fa le spese, spiegano gli autori dell’inchiesta, sono i migranti, obbligati a rotte sempre più pericolose e lunghe, a beneficio di imprese nazionali che del mercato della sicurezza hanno fatto un vero e proprio business. Questa connessione e interdipendenza tra politici e lobby della sicurezza, che sfiora a tutto gli effetti il conflitto di interessi, è risultata evidente nel corso del SRE «Research on security event» tenutosi a Bruxelles a fine dicembre su proposta della presidenza austriaca. Seduti negli stessi panel rappresentanti della commissione dell’Agenzia Frontex, dell’industria e della ricerca del biometrico e della sicurezza, manifestavano interesse per un obbiettivo comune: la creazione di un mercato europeo della sicurezza dove lotta al terrorismo e controllo della migrazione si intrecciano pericolosamente

      «Il Governo Italiano si iscrive perfettamente nella logica europea, dalle missioni militari con una chiara missione di controllo delle frontiere in Niger e Libia al rinnovo del Fondo Africa, rifinanziato con 80 milioni per il 2018/2019, che condiziona le politiche di sviluppo a quelle d’immigrazione», dichiara ancora Arci. «Molti i dubbi che solleva questa deriva politica direttamente tradotta nell’uso dei fondi europei e nazionali: dalle tragiche conseguenze sulla sistematica violazione delle convenzione internazionali a una riflessione più ampia sull’opacità dell’uso dei fondi e del ruolo sempre più centrale dell’industria della sicurezza per cui la politica repressiva di chiusura sistematica delle frontiere non è altro che l’ennesimo mercato su cui investire, dimenticandosi del costo in termine di vite umane di questa logica».

      https://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2019/02/07/news/la_frontiera_e_un_buon_affare-218538251

    • Appalti sulle frontiere: 30 mezzi di terra alla Libia dall’Italia per fermare i migranti

      Il ministero dell’Interno italiano si appresta a fornire alle autorità di Tripoli nuovi veicoli fuoristrada per il “contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. Un appalto da 2,1 milioni di euro finanziato tramite il “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa”, nell’ambito del quale l’Italia accresce il proprio ruolo. Il tutto mentre l’immagine ostentata di una “Libia sicura” è offuscata dagli stessi atti di gara del Viminale

      Il ministero dell’Interno italiano si appresta a fornire alle autorità della Libia trenta nuovi veicoli fuoristrada per le “esigenze istituzionali legate al contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. L’avviso esplorativo pubblicato dalla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il Viminale, risale al 5 marzo 2019 (scadenza per la presentazione della manifestazione d’interesse all’8 aprile di quest’anno).

      La fornitura riguarda 30 mezzi “Toyota Land Cruiser” (15 del modello GRJ76 Petrol e 15 del GRJ79 DC Petrol), in “versione tropicalizzata”, relativamente ai quali le autorità libiche, il 24 dicembre 2018, avrebbero esplicitato alla Direzione di Roma precise “specifiche tecniche”. Il Viminale la definisce una “richiesta di assistenza tecnica” proveniente da Tripoli per le “esigenze istituzionali legate al contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. In forza di questa “strategia”, dunque, il governo italiano -in linea con i precedenti, come abbiamo raccontato a gennaio nell’inchiesta sugli “affari lungo le frontiere”– continua a equipaggiare le autorità del Paese Nord-africano per contrastare i flussi migratori. L’ammontare “massimo” degli ultimi due lotti (da 15 mezzi l’uno) è stimato in 2,1 milioni di euro.

      E così come è stato per la gara d’appalto da oltre 9,3 milioni di euro per la fornitura di 20 imbarcazioni destinate alla polizia libica, indetta dal Viminale a fine dicembre 2018, anche nel caso dei 30 mezzi Toyota le risorse arriveranno dal “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa” (EU Trust Fund), istituito dalla Commissione europea a fine 2015 con una dotazione di oltre 4 miliardi di euro. In particolare, dal progetto implementato dal Viminale e intitolato “Support to integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya – First Phase”, dal valore di oltre 46 milioni di euro e il cui “delegation agreement” risale a metà dicembre 2017 (governo Gentiloni, ministro competente Marco Minniti).

      Questo non è l’unico progetto finanziato tramite l’EU Trust Fund che vede il ministero dell’Interno italiano attivo nel continente africano. Alla citata “First Phase”, infatti, se ne sono affiancati nel tempo altri due. Uno è di stanza in Tunisia e Marocco (“Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region”), datato luglio 2018 e dal valore di 55 milioni di euro. L’altro progetto, di nuovo, ricade in Libia. Si tratta del “Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya – Second Phase”, risalente al 13 dicembre 2018, per un ammontare di altri 45 milioni di euro. Le finalità dichiarate nell’”Action Document” della seconda fase in Libia sono -tra le altre- quelle di “intensificare gli sforzi fatti”, “sviluppare nuove aree d’intervento”, “rafforzare le capacità delle autorità competenti che sorvegliano i confini marittimi e terrestri”, “l’acquisto di altre navi”, “l’implementazione della rete di comunicazione del Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre” di Tripoli, “la progettazione specifica di programmi per la neocostituita polizia del deserto”.

      La strategia di contrasto paga, sostiene la Commissione europea. “Gli sforzi dell’Ue e dell’Italia nel sostenere la Guardia costiera libica per migliorare la sua capacità operativa hanno raggiunto risultati significativi e tangibili nel 2018”, afferma nel lancio della “seconda fase”. Di “significativo e tangibile” c’è il crollo degli sbarchi sulle coste italiane, in particolare dalla Libia. Dati del Viminale alla mano, infatti, nel periodo compreso tra l’1 gennaio e il 7 marzo 2017 giunsero 15.843 persone, scese a 5.457 lo scorso anno e arrivate a 335 quest’anno. La frontiera è praticamente sigillata. Un “successo” che nasconde la tragedia dei campi di detenzione e sequestro libici dove migliaia di persone sono costrette a rimanere.

      È in questa cornice che giunge il nuovo “avviso” del Viminale dei 30 veicoli, pubblicato come detto il 5 marzo. Quello stesso giorno il vice-presidente del Consiglio e ministro dell’Interno, Matteo Salvini, ha incontrato a Roma il vicepremier libico Ahmed Maiteeq. Un “cordiale colloquio”, come recita il comunicato ministeriale, che avrebbe visto sul tavolo “i rapporti tra i due Paesi, in particolare su sicurezza, lotta al terrorismo, immigrazione e stabilizzazione politica della Libia”.

      Ma l’immagine ostentata dal governo Conte di una “Libia sicura” è offuscata dagli stessi atti di gara del ministero dell’Interno. Tra i quesiti presentati al Viminale da parte dei potenziali concorrenti al bando dei 20 battelli da destinare alla polizia libica, infatti, si trovano richieste esplicite di “misure atte a garantire la sicurezza dei propri operatori”. “Laddove si rendesse strettamente necessario effettuare interventi di garanzia richiesti in loco (Libia)”, gli operatori di mercato hanno chiesto alla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere “che tali prestazioni potranno essere organizzate a patto che le imbarcazioni si trovino in città (Tripoli, ndr) per garantire la sicurezza degli operatori inviati per tali prestazioni”. Il ministero dell’Interno conferma il quadro di instabilità del Paese: “Le condizioni di sicurezza in Libia devono essere attentamente valutate in ragione della contingenza al momento dell’esecuzione del contratto”, è la replica al quesito. “Appare di tutto evidenza che la sicurezza degli operatori non dovrà essere compromessa in relazione ai rischi antropici presenti all’interno dello Stato beneficiario della commessa”. Per gli operatori, non per i migranti in fuga.

      https://altreconomia.it/appalti-libia-frontiere-terra
      #Libye

  • 21.11.2018 – UE - Tunisie - Conseil d’association - Priorités stratégiques

    Décision n° 1/2018 du Conseil d’association UE-Tunisie du 9 novembre 2018 adoptant les priorités stratégiques UE-Tunisie pour la période 2018-2020

    (...)

    Consolider le partenariat privilégié UE-Tunisie : priorités stratégiques pour la période 2018-2020

    (...)

    2.3. Rapprochement entre les peuples, mobilité et migration

    Le rapprochement entre les sociétés tunisiennes et européennes constitue un pilier essentiel du partenariat privilégié, à travers le renforcement des échanges entre peuples, sociétés et cultures. Cette dimension mobilité revêt une importance particulière dans la mise en œuvre du partenariat pour la Jeunesse. La mise en œuvre effective de l’association de la Tunisie à Horizon 2020 et sa participation à Europe Créative et Erasmus+ seront les pierres angulaires de ces efforts.

    La gestion concertée de la migration est une priorité politique, tant pour la Tunisie que pour l’Union européenne. Les deux parties s’engagent à intensifier le dialogue et la coopération, notamment par la mise en œuvre du partenariat pour la mobilité, le renforcement de la lutte contre les causes profondes de la migration irrégulière, ainsi qu’une disponibilité européenne pour soutenir la mise en place d’un système d’asile tunisien. Cette coopération, qui reflétera aussi la dimension régionale de ces problématiques, inclura :

    -- la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale tunisienne en matière de migration, couvrant également l’asile et la protection internationale, y inclus la mise en œuvre d’un cadre législatif approprié,

    -- la conclusion des négociations d’accords de réadmission et de facilitation des visas,

    -- la bonne gouvernance de la migration légale, par une meilleure coordination avec les États membres de l’Union européenne dans le respect de leurs compétences, y compris à travers la mise en place de schémas pilotes de mobilité et une meilleure intégration des migrants dans les pays hôtes,

    --

    le soutien à la mobilisation des Tunisiens de l’étranger pour les investissements dans les secteurs innovants en Tunisie,

    -- le soutien à la prévention de la migration irrégulière, en particulier par une meilleure prise en compte des questions migratoires dans les stratégies de développement ; ceci passe également par une gestion des frontières renforcée et par des campagnes de sensibilisation sur les risques de la migration irrégulière,

    -- le soutien aux activités de prévention, et de lutte contre le trafic des migrants et la traite des êtres humains, y compris à travers la détection et la poursuite des réseaux criminels, et

    -- la consolidation de la coopération en matière de retour et réadmission, y compris à travers le soutien à la réinsertion durables des Tunisiens de retour.

    –-> https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.293.01.0039.01.FRA&toc=OJ:L:2018:293:TOC

    http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/ue-tunisie-conseil-d-association-priorites-strategiques.html
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #EU #UE #Europe

    Commentaire de Claudia Charles sur la mailing-list Migreurop :

    En complément du message envoyé par Alizée, voici un article sur la décision n° 1/2018 du conseil d’association (en vertu de l’#accord_d'association UE - Tunisie) "adoptant les priorités stratégiques UE - Tunisie pour la période 2018 - 2020

    Le point sur « rapprochement entre les peuples, mobilité et migration » se résume (rien de nouveau) à l’adoption, par la Tunisie, d’une réglementation en matière de migration et d’asile, des mesurettes concernant la mobilité (ce qui était déjà dit à multiples occasions et enceintes (processus de Rabat, Sommet de Malte, FFU, partenariat pour la mobilité), et les #accords_de_réadmission / facilitation de #visa.

    L’#OIM aura sa part du gâteau : « la consolidation de la coopération en matière de retour et #réadmission, y compris à travers le soutien à la #réinsertion durables des Tunisiens de retour. »

    #IOM #retours #renvois #expulsions

    ping @_kg_

    • L’émigration irrégulière : Conception de l’opération et parade

      L’émigration vers l’Europe n’est pas un phénomène nouveau en Tunisie car elle date depuis 1970. Par contre, l’émigration irrégulière (la #Harga) entre les côtes tunisiennes et italiennes a commencé en 1990 lorsque l’#Italie a ratifié les accords #Schengen imposant ainsi des #visas d’entrée pour les ressortissants tunisiens.

      Une étude élaborée par le Forum tunisien des droits économiques et sociaux (FTDES) montre qu’avant la révolution de 2011, 30% des Tunisiens de moins de 35 ans exprimaient le désir de migrer vers l’Europe. En raison de la #crise_économique qui ne cesse de frapper le pays durant la période de transition démocratique, ce chiffre a grimpé à 54% en 2017.

      La recrudescence de l’#émigration clandestine à partir de 2015 s’est traduite par des chiffres très alarmants. En effet, 119.369 migrants sont arrivés en Italie en 2017 alors que le nombre de victimes en 2016 est de 5000 selon un rapport publié par les Nations Unies.

      Face à cette situation préoccupante, l’Europe cherche à coordonner avec les #pays_de_transit en vue de trouver une solution à ce quelle considère une menace asymétrique qui pèse sur la sécurité de l’Occident.

      Aujourd’hui, les causes de l’émigration irrégulière sont connues et toute solution au problème doit passer par une combinaison de mesures politiques, économiques, sociales et sécuritaires.
      Sachant que les mesures politiques et socio-économiques ont fait l’objet de plusieurs études, le présent article est consacré à l’explication du volet opérationnel de l’émigration irrégulière. Une explication sans laquelle toute mesure sécuritaire reste incomplète et non concluante.

      Ainsi, après une présentation succincte de l’importance géographique de la Tunisie qui fait du pays un tremplin pour l’Europe, je prendrai en détails la conception de l’opération d’émigration clandestine avant de proposer les actions à entreprendre pour interdire ou contrer cette opération.

      1. Importance géographique de la Tunisie

      Selon une carte tracée par l’Union Européenne, les flux de l’émigration clandestine à destination de l’Europe suivent trois routes en mer méditerranéenne : La route occidentale qui passe par Gibraltar, la route centrale qui passe par la Tunisie et la Libye (carte nr1) et la route orientale qui passe par la Turquie et la mer Egée.

      Sur cette route centrale, la Tunisie occupe une place privilégiée. En effet, située sur le canal de Sicile qui constitue un pont entre l’Afrique et l’Europe et marquée par des conditions météorologiques clémentes sur la quasi-totalité de l’année, elle offre plusieurs possibilités pour rallier l’Italie (carte nr2) :

      Au nord, on trouve deux routes : La Galite-La Sardaigne (130 km) et Bizerte-Mazzara (175km).
      le nord-est présente trois options : Kélébia-Pantelleria (70km), Al Hawaria-Mazzara (160km) et Béni Khiar-Lampedusa (195km).
      au sud, trois autres itinéraires vers Lampedusa : à partir de Chebba (135km), de Kerkennah (140km) et de Zarzis (250km).

      En outre, la Tunisie est devenue le seul pays de transit après la fermeture des routes partant de la Libye. En effet, le flux d’émigrés à partir de ce pays a significativement tari suite à la signature d’un mémorandum d’entente le 2 février 2017 entre Rome et Tripoli (appuyé par les dirigeants européens dans la déclaration de Malte). Aux termes de cet accord, l’Italie doit coopérer avec les forces armées et les garde-frontières libyennes afin de juguler l’afflux de migrants illégaux. Un dispositif a été alors mis en place et 20.000 émigrants ont été interceptés en 2017 et reconduits en Libye, dans des centres de détention. Ainsi, le flux venant essentiellement des pays du Sahel africain a basculé sur le territoire tunisien.
      2. Déroulement d’une opération d’émigration clandestine

      De prime abord, il est à signaler que Les voyages clandestins sont organisés par des réseaux criminels. Le trafic est devenu transnational et apporte beaucoup d’argent. Une étude publiée par le journal d’actualités américain « The Christian Science Monitor » souligne « l’apparition de groupes mafieux d’envergure internationale italiens, albanais, libyens et autres » qui se livrent à ce trafic et gagnent 400 milliards de dollars à travers leurs actions qui englobent toute la région. Selon la même étude, Le candidat à l’émigration clandestine à partir de la Tunisie doit dépenser entre 3000 et 8000 dinars.
      L’organisation d’une opération d’émigration irrégulière passe par trois phases :
      2.1. La phase de recrutement

      Il s’agit de se servir d’agents et intermédiaires pour chercher et d’identifier les postulants à l’émigration sur le territoire national. Les quartiers pauvres et les zones grises du pays sont visés en priorité. Le contact se fait soit directement de bouche à l’oreille dans les cafés et les lieux publics soit par internet et notamment à travers les réseaux sociaux. Ceux qui viennent des pays étrangers sont recrutés et regroupés dans les pays limitrophes avant de les transférer par des passeurs en Tunisie.
      2.2. La phase de préparation logistique

      Tout d’abord, il faut trouver des caches (locaux) où regrouper les postulants au voyage et stocker des vivres pour subvenir à leur besoin durant la période d’attente. Ensuite, on prévoit le moyen de transport. Il est généralement un moyen vétuste acheté à moindre coût pour effectuer un aller sans retour (canot pneumatique, embarcation ou un vieux chalutier). Ce moyen est dépourvu de tout équipement de sécurité, de navigation et de communication. Enfin, le chef de réseau doit coordonner avec ses agents locaux et ses pairs à l’étranger pour fixer les moyens et les procédures nécessaires pour passer et/ou diriger les émigrés sur le lieu du regroupement. Cette phase englobe aussi une collecte de renseignement sur les dispositifs de sécurité déployés sur le théâtre de l’opération.
      2.3. Phase de préparation du transit

      C’est la phase la plus importante car elle fait appel à une bonne expérience pour choisir l’itinéraire, la période propice au voyage et le passeur (patron) qui sera chargé de la traversée.

      2.3.1. Choix de l’itinéraire : Le choix de la route doit prendre en compte la caractéristique physique du milieu marin, la sûreté du transit et le temps mis pour la traversée :

      La route La Galite-La Sardaigne est relativement longue (130km). Elle traverse une zone connue par la faible densité du trafic maritime et le mauvais temps. Elle est donc favorable à la détection radar (difficulté de dissimulation) et défavorable à la navigation des petites embarcations.
      Les deux routes à destination de Mazzara à partir de Bizerte (175km) et de Hawaria (160km) sont similaires. Elles sont longues et traversent une zone de séparation de trafic par laquelle passe plusieurs centaines de navires par jour. La zone est caractérisée par des courants giratoires relativement forts. Elle est donc favorable à la dissimulation mais défavorable à la navigation des petites embarcations.
      La route Kélébia-Pantellaria est la plus courte (70km). Cependant, elle est risquée en raison des patrouilles, de la couverture radar et du dispositif de sécurité mis en place par les autorités italiennes.
      La route Béni Khiar-Lampedusa (195km) est longue et traverse une zone peu fréquentée sur une grande partie de l’année. Elle est donc très défavorable à l’emploi des embarcations pneumatiques qui sont handicapées par le manque d’autonomie et le mode de propulsion.
      Les deux routes à destination de Lampedusa à parir de Chebba (135km) et de Kerkenah (140km) sont très similaires. Elles ont la même distance et traversent la zone de pêche réservée délimitée par l’isobathe de 50m (la zone verte sur la carte nr3). C’est une zone de haut fond qui s’étend jusqu’aux approches de Lampedusa. Cette zone est très hospitalière pour les petits navires. Elle est fréquentée par plusieurs milliers de chalutiers et embarcations. L’environnement est donc très favorable à la navigation et la dissimulation.

      La route Zarzis-Lampedusa est la plus longue (250km). L’emploi de petites embarcations sur cette route est très risqué à moins qu’elles soient utilisées comme relais pour rallier une plate-forme plus grande stationnée au large (navire ou chalutier).

      2.3.2. Le critère de compétence : Les iles Kerkennah se distinguent par le nombre de compétences (des anciens pêcheurs) qui coopèrent avec les réseaux criminels. Ces pêcheurs reconvertis en passeurs sont chargés de la traversée. Cette reconversion s’explique par une pollution maritime qui a mis ces gens de mer au chômage. En effet, les déchets chimiques provenant des industriels dont notamment Thyna Petroleum Services (TPS) et Petrofac ont dégradé l’environnement marin détruisant ainsi la faune marine (poissons, poulpes et éponges). victime de cette pollution et de la pêche illicite, la mer n’est plus généreuse comme au bon vieux temps. D’après The Christian Science Monitor, “les pêcheurs gagnaient jusqu’à 40$ - 100$ par jour (entre 100 et 250 dinars tunisiens). Maintenant, ils ont du mal à gagner 4 à 7$ (entre 10 et 17 dinars) par jour”. Ils ce sont alors livrés aux contrebondiers et leurs embarcations sont vendues aux réseaux criminels à un coût qui fait trois fois le prix réel.

      C’est cette qualité de pêcheur qui explique l’enrôlement des Kerkéniens dans les réseaux de trafic de migrants. Les statistiques du ministère de l’intérieur montrent que la majorité des patrons d’embarcations arrêtés lors des opérations avortées sont originaires de l’archipel.

      2.3.3. Le choix de la période et lieu d’embarquement :

      C’est le critère le plus important pour décider de l’exécution de l’opération. Tout s’explique par la force et la direction du vent. Une étude élaborée par l’Institut Tunisien des Etudes Stratégiques ( ITES) montre des chiffres très significatifs tirés à partir des opérations avortées en 2017 :

      le gouvernorat de Sfax est classé premier sur la liste avec 62 opérations suivi par Nabeul (34 opérations), Bizerte (24 opérations) et Zarzis (11 opérations). En outre, les statistiques montrent que 60% de ces opérations sont effectuées pendant les mois de septembre et d’octobre, 14% pendant juin et juillet. Le reste (26%) est réparti sur toute l’année. Ceci s’explique par la force et la direction (moyenne sur toute l’année) du vent dans ces régions (voir tableau).
      En effet, dans la région de Sfax, le vent atteint sa force la plus faible durant septembre et octobre (inférieur à 10 km/h). Il souffle du secteur Est engendrant de petites vagues qui ne gênent pas le mouvement des embarcations qui naviguent bout au vent (face au vent). Les accidents qui surviennent durant cette période sont causés essentiellement par un manque de stabilité en raison d’un excès de chargement. Ces caractéristiques du vent qui s’ajoutent aux caractéristiques physiques de l’environnement et aux compétences des pêcheurs font de Kerkénah le port préféré pour l’embarquement.
      Le fait que Nabeul et Bizerte occupent respectivement la deuxième et la troisième place s’explique par le vent du secteur Ouest qui souffle sur ces régions et qui pousse les embarcations (vent arrière) sur les côtes de Pantellaria et Mazzara. Les itinéraires partant de la Galite vers la Sardaigne et de Béni Khiar vers Lampeduza, qui sont déjà discriminés par le facteur physique, sont écartés en raison du vent très défavorable (vent de travers).
      La place occupée par Zarzis (4ème place) s’explique uniquement par sa proximité des frontières libyennes et par le vent modéré qui domine la région.

      3. Comment lutter contre le fléau ?

      Tout d’abord, il faut signaler que nos voisins européens déploient leur force (Opération Sofia) sur nos frontières et cherchent à s’ingérer dans nos affaires intérieures sous prétexte de lutter contre l’immigration clandestine. Plusieurs déclarations de responsables européens rentrent dans ce sens :

      Le 15 février 2011, le ministre de l’intérieur italien Roberto Maroni propose de déployer des policiers italiens en Tunisie. Le 9 avril de la même année, il parle de « débarquement » de 22.000 Tunisiens sur les côtes italiennes.
      Le 26 mai 2011, le député maire de Nice, Christian Estrosi, déclare “On constate aussi qu’une partie d’entre eux (les imigrés) – et cela est plus grave – appartiennent aux 10 000 délinquants condamnés et évadés des prisons.”
      Le 3 juin 2018, le nouveau ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini déclare « Il y a de plus en plus de migrants clandestins qui arrivent de Tunisie ici. Ce ne sont pas des réfugiés de guerre mais bien souvent des délinquants et ex-détenus. »
      Dans son projet de rapport 2018/2044(INI), la commission spéciale sur le terrorisme demande au parlement européen « que le mandat de l’opération #EUNAVFOR_MED Sophia soit étendu et que sa portée territoriale soit élargie afin de mieux répondre à l’évolution des schémas migratoires tels que les débarquements fantômes en provenance de la Tunisie, et que la lutte contre le terrorisme soit spécifiquement couverte par son mandat ». Elle propose aussi de « saisir Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU en vue d’adopter une résolution permettant à Sophia d’accéder aux eaux territoriales des États côtiers afin d’effectuer des contrôles sur les navires suspects ».
      Ensuite, il faut appliquer les textes juridiques propres à la matière :
      le Protocole contre le trafic illicite de migrants par terre, air et mer, additionnel à la Convention des Nations unies contre la criminalité transnationale organisée en 2000.
      notre réglementation intérieure en matière de lutte contre l’émigration clandestine et notamment la loi du 3 février 2004 relative à la traite des personnes et au trafic des migrants.
      Les accords bilatéraux (avec la France et l’Italie) concernant les migrants.

      Sur le plan opérationnel, la lutte doit se baser sur deux volets ; le renseignement et l’intervention. Le renseignement est la seule solution pour compenser le manque de moyens matériels dont souffrent nos unités.

      Aujourd’hui, l’intervention est handicapée par le manque d’unités navales et la diversité des intervenants en mer qui appartiennent aux différents ministères (marine nationale, garde maritime nationale et douane). Pour assurer notre souveraineté sur les espaces maritimes qui nous reviennent de droit et remplir nos missions en mer (dont la lutte contre l’émigration clandestine), il faut agir en deux directions :

      Adopter le concept de la sauvegarde maritime pour assurer la synergie des efforts entre tous les intervenants en mer,
      Déployer nos unités en fonction des impératifs du moment. A titre d’exemple, basculer des unités sur le port de Sfax, durant les mois de septembre et d’octobre pour couper la route à l’émigration clandestine entre Kerkennah et Lampedusa.

      Ainsi, ce sont quelques idées proposées aux décideurs pour les éclairer sur le coté opérationnel de l’émigration irrégulière. La guerre contre ce fléau ne peut être gagnée qu’avec la combinaison de mesures d’ordre économique et social.

      http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/25601-l-immigration-irreguliere-conception-de-l-operation-et-parade
      #émigration_irrégulière #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Tunisie #statistiques #chiffres #histoire #opération_sophia #externalisation
      ping @_kg_

    • #Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations

      Frontex, the EU’s border agency, has been heavily criticised for failing to provide adequate staff and resources to its own Fundamental Rights Office, a problem that “seriously hinders the Agency’s ability to deliver on its fundamental rights obligations.”

      The criticisms come in a report from the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, an independent advisory body made up of experts from other EU agencies, international organisations and NGOs.

      As well as noting an ongoing “reluctance” to provide the Fundamental Rights Office with “sufficiently qualified staff,” the Consultative Forum report raises concerns over Frontex’s role at the Serbian-Hungarian border, a failure to update and effectively implement codes of conduct and a complaints mechanism, and the lack of independent monitoring of forced return operations coordinated by the agency.

      See: Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights - Fifth Annual Report (pdf): http://statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-consultative-forum-on-fundamental-rights-report-2017.pdf

      Fundamental rights sidelined

      While the Consultative Forum exists to provide “independent advice” to Frontex’s executive director and management board and is staffed voluntarily, the Fundamental Rights Officer is a Frontex official tasked with “contributing to the Agency’s fundamental rights strategy… monitoring its compliance with fundamental rights and… promoting its respect of fundamental rights.”

      The Officer has to oversee a large organisation - Frontex foresaw (pdf: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Programming_Document/2018/Programming_Document_2018-2020.pdf) having 352 staff at the end of 2017, and 418 by the end of this year - yet “lacks the minimum capacity to carry outs its role,” according to the Consultative Forum, with just four staff working alongside the officer and one member of secretarial staff.

      The report states that “the lack of adequate staffing seriously hinders the Agency’s ability to deliver on its fundamental rights obligations including on key areas such as Frontex operational activities, the newly established complaints mechanism or the protection of children.”

      The Consultative Forum has come up against its own problems in attempting to carry out its tasks. According to Article 70(5) of the Frontex Regulation adopted in 2016, “the consultative forum shall have effective access to all information concerning the respect for fundamental rights.”

      Yet the report complains that the Forum “continues to face serious and further limitations” on access to information, “particularly in relation to relevant operational reference and guiding documents.” Despite “repeatedly raising this concern with Frontex management,” it is yet to receive a “final response or constructive proposal.”

      Given that Frontex operational documents have included (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm) instructions for border guards to target “migrants from minority ethnic groups, and individuals who may have been isolated or mistreated during their journey,” the need for access to such information by fundamental rights monitoring bodies is clear.

      In this regard, the Consultative Forum highlights that “external oversight” - for example by the European and national parliaments and civil society groups - “remains of particular importance”.

      The Hungarian-Serbian border

      In November 2016 the Consultative Forum recommended that Frontex teams be withdrawn from the Hungarian-Serbian border due to fundamental rights concerns, but the Executive Director rebuffed the proposal, arguing that Frontex’s presence can “minimise potential risks related to the use of force” and can assist in documenting “circumstances on the ground.”

      Indeed, the positive effect of Frontex presence on national border guards has been noted elsewhere - following a trip to the Bulgarian-Turkish border, French MEP Marie-Christine Vergiat reported NGOs as saying that “whenever a Frontex officer was involved in a [Bulgarian border guard] patrolling group, there were no abuses.” (http://bulgarianpresidency.eu/marie-christine-vergiat-teaming-bulgarian-turkish-border-guards-)

      However, given the European Commission’s decision to launch an infringement procedure against Hungary for new asylum legislation that includes automatic detention, limitations on legal assistance and measures for automatic expulsion, the Forum reasserted its recommendation.

      The agency has apparently “significantly reduced the number of deployed officers and assets in Hungary,” according to the report, but a number remain in place and the Consultative Forum warns that the developments in Hungarian law and practice “have further exacerbated the risks of Frontex being involved in serious fundamental rights violations.”

      Complaints mechanism and codes of conduct

      The need for Frontex to establish a complaints mechanism so that individuals can seek redress for potential fundamental rights violations that they may have suffered during operations coordinated by the agency is a long-standing issue (https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/speech.faces/en/73745/html.bookmark), and the 2016 Regulation (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R1624) introduced such a mechanism (in Article 72), to be overseen by the agency in cooperation with the Fundamental Rights Officer.

      There is now, however, a need to implement this mechanism and the Consultative Forum’s report notes that:

      “The rules should, among other points, provide further details on the respective roles of the different actors involved in the procedure, specify the timeframe for the processing of complaints, and provide for the possibility of anonymous complaints. In this context the Consultative Forum reiterates its calls for the allocation of more technical staff and means to the Fundamental Rights Officer.”

      The Forum also highlights the agency’s decision to discard its recommendations on the ’Code of Conduct for all persons participating in Frontex activities’, which would have seen the inclusion of “specific references to omissions or failures to act or to the prohibition to obey or obligation not to comply with and report instructions that are illicit or against international, EU or national legislation, the Code of Conduct or the legal framework of the activity.”

      The agency is also redrafting its ’Code of Conduct for Return Operations and Return Interventions’, which is expected to be adopted this year. The Forum notes that it is “essential to strengthen the wording relating to the legal framework and, in particular, fundamental rights obligations such as the right to an effective remedy,” and makes a number of specific proposals.

      Monitoring of forced return operations

      In 2017 the agency coordinated and/or co-financed 341 forced return operations - 150 national return operations (involving just one Member State), 153 joint return operations (involving one or more Member State) and 38 collecting return operations, in which the authorities of non-EU states are involved in the “collection” of their own nationals.

      Of these 341 operations, a human rights monitor accompanied 188 of them, just 41% of the total, but nevertheless an increase on the previous year. However, the report indicates that a particularly low number of national return operations - 20 of 150 - were monitored.

      The report also notes 50 “readmission” operations from Greece to Turkey conducted by Frontex, in the framework of the EU-Turkey deal. Only 22 of these were monitored. The Forum recommends treating readmission operations in the same way as return operations, “in order to make use of the already existing standards for return operations (code, monitoring, escorts training, etc.).”

      The list goes on

      Other problems for the Consultative Forum in 2017 include a failure to prioritise the revision of Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy (now foreseen for adoption sometime this year), the need to “mainstream” gender perspectives and issues into Frontex activities, and some issues with the terminology deployed in the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community reports, such as references to “illegal” migrants and referring to operations by the Libyan Coast Guard as “rescues”.

      Elsewhere, the Consultative Forum notes good progress made on updating measures to try to ensure the protection of children and migration and the identification of minors at risk of abuse. Nevertheless, for an agency whose “mission” is “to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter,” it seems that the former is being given priority over the latter.

      http://statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #condamnation #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés