/EN

Turning the Exception into the Rule

Assessing Italy’s New Border Procedure

Having promised its electorate a strong stance towards immigration, in January 2023 Italy’s new government adopted a reform that heavily curtailed immigrant rights to speed up return procedures. However, between September and October, several judgments issued by the Catania Tribunal declared it in violation of EU law (►https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NON-CONVALIDA1.pdf). In particular, when requested to review the detention of asylum applicants, the judges found the new Italian asylum border procedure contrary to the Procedures Directive 2013/32 (►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032) and the Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33 (▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0033).

The judgments led to a backlash, with PM Meloni and other members of the government accusing them of being politically motivated. One minister even published a video on social media showing a judge of the Catania Tribunal taking part in a pro-migrant rights demonstration in 2018, thus accusing her of partiality.

Such political attacks (▻https://www.associazionemagistrati.it/doc/4037/lanm-sul-caso-catania.htm) must always be condemned, for they pose a significant threat to judicial independence and thus Italian democracy. Yet, they are particularly unwarranted given that the Catania Tribunal’s judges were correct in finding the new Italian border procedures incompatible with EU law.

Detention as the Rule for Asylum Seekers

The 2023 reform (▻https://www.normattiva.it/atto/caricaDettaglioAtto?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2023-03-10&atto.codice) of Italy’s asylum system included the introduction of an accelerated border procedure which allows for the detention (▻https://www.questionegiustizia.it/articolo/la-bestia-tentacolare) of asylum seekers „exclusively to determine the applicant’s right to enter the territory“ (Art. 6 bis, Law Decree 142/2015).

This new procedure is applied when an asylum application is made „at the border or in a transit zone“ by a person who either a) evaded or attempted to evade border controls, or b) hails from a safe country of origin, which were determined by a Ministerial Decree in 2019 (▻https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2019/10/decreto_paesi_sicuri.pdf), later updated in 2023 (►https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/03/25/23A01952/sg).

Another Ministerial Decree (►https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2019/09/07/19A05525/sg) identified the „border and transit zones“ where the border procedure can be used, without providing a clear definition of these concepts nor explaining the distinction between them. Instead, it lists 16 provinces where the procedure applies (Trieste, Gorizia, Cosenza, Matera, Taranto, Lecce, Brindisi, Caltanissetta, Ragusa, Syracuse, Catania, Messina, Trapani, Agrigento, Cagliari, and South Sardinia).

Finally, the law specifies that asylum seekers are to be detained unless they submit a passport (or equivalent document) or provide a financial guarantee of € 4,938.00 (▻https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/09/21/23A05308/sg). This amount was allegedly calculated with reference to the cost of suitable accommodation, repatriation, and minimum means of subsistence. The sum can be provided through a bank guarantee or an insurance policy, but solely by the asylum seekers themselves, not by third parties.

[voir aussi: ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1018093]

Following a recent increase in migrant flows from Tunisia, the Italian authorities extensively relied on the new border procedure to detain several Tunisian citizens on the ground that they come from a “safe country of origin” (▻https://www.questionegiustizia.it/rivista/articolo/la-protezione-dei-cittadini-stranieri-provenienti-da-cd-paesi-sic). However, on September 29 (►https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NON-CONVALIDA1.pdf) and October 8 (▻https://www.questionegiustizia.it/data/doc/3650/2023-tribunale-catania-8-10-2023-non-convalida-oscurato.pdf), the Catania Tribunal issued a series of similar rulings in which it annulled the detention orders because they were in conflict with EU law. In the following sections, we analyze and expand the three main arguments advanced by the Tribunal, showing that they were largely correct in their findings that the new Italian border procedure exceeds what is permissible under EU law.

The ‘Border’ under EU Law

The first argument made by the Catania Tribunal regards the correct initiation of a border procedure. According to the judge, the procedure was not applied „at the border“, as understood by EU law (Art. 43 Directive 2013/32). Indeed, the applicants arrived and made their asylum application in Lampedusa (province of Agrigento) but the detention was ordered several days later in Pozzallo (Ragusa province) when the applicants were no longer „at the border.“ Because the border procedure (involving detention) was utilized at a later stage and in a different place, it was not appropriately initiated.

In support of the Catania Tribunal’s conclusion, we should recall that Article 43 the Procedures Directive requires a spatial and temporal link between the border crossing and the activation of the border procedure (►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032). Although the Directive does not define the terms „border“ or „transit zone“, it clearly distinguishes these areas from other „locations in the proximity of the border or transit zone“ (Article 43(3)), where applicants can be exceptionally accommodated but never detained. The distinction between the border and other places in its vicinity suggests that the procedure provided for in Art. 43 can only be applied in narrow and well-defined areas or in pre-identified transit zones (such as the Hungarian transit zones examined by the Court in FMS and Commission v Hungary).

Other EU law instruments support this narrow interpretation of the “border” concept. Regulation 1931/2006 defines a „border area“ as a delimited space within 30 km from the Member State’s border. In the Affum case, the Court also called for a narrow interpretation of the spatial concept of „border.“ There, the Court clarified that the Return Directive allows Member States to apply a simplified return procedure at their external borders in order to „ensure that third-country nationals do not enter [their] territory“ (a purpose which resonates with that of Art. 8(3)(c) Reception Directive). However, such a procedure can only be applied if there is a „direct temporal and spatial link with the crossing of the border“, i.e. „at the time of the irregular crossing of the border or near that border after it has been crossed“ (par. 72).

By contrast, under the Italian accelerated procedure, the border has blurred contours. The new procedure, relying on the “#fiction_of_non-entry” (►https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/654201/EPRS_STU(2020)654201_EN.pdf), can be carried out not only „at“ the border and in transit zones or in areas territorially „close“ to the border, but in entire provinces in southern and northern Italy. This far exceeds the narrow definition of border or border area derived from EU law.

The Regulation of Detention under EU Law

The second argument of the Catania Tribunal turned on the lack of motivation for the detention orders. The applicants were detained solely because they were from Tunisia, did not submit a valid passport nor pay the bail. As such, the orders lacked any case-by-case assessment of the applicant’s individual circumstances, and they did not apply the proportionality and necessity principles, as prescribed by EU law under art. 8(2) Directive 2013/33 and art. 52 and 6 of the Charter.

Indeed, even if a border procedure is correctly initiated, Italy’s new provisions on the detention of asylum seekers do not meet the requirements of Article 8(2) of the Reception Directive. According to the CJEU, this authorizes asylum seekers‘ detention “only where, following an assessment carried out on a case-by-case basis, that is necessary” and where other less coercive measures cannot be applied effectively. (ex multis, FMS, par. 258; VL, par. 102; M.A., par. 82).

Italy’s norms contain no reference to the principles of necessity and proportionality nor to the need for a case-by-case assessment (Art. 6 bis D. Lgs. 142/2015). In so far as the Italian provisions allow for an automatic application of detention whenever the border procedure is activated, they are incompatible with Art. 8(2) of the Reception Directive. In light of the primacy and direct effect of EU law, Italian public authorities are required to give direct application to the principles of proportionality and necessity and to carry out an individual assessment, even if not directly foreseen by Italian law.
The Possibility of Bail

Finally, the Catania Tribunal argued that the financial guarantee to avoid detention is contrary to EU law. The Tribunal observed that the guarantee is not used as an alternative measure to detention, but rather as an ‚administrative requirement‘ that, if not complied with, leads to detention. According to the judge, this renders it incompatible with Articles 8 and 9 of the Reception Directive 2013/33 which “preclude[s] an applicant for international protection being placed in detention on the sole ground that he or she is unable to provide for his or her needs.”(at 256).

As rightly noted by Savino, EU law does not prohibit the use of financial guarantees; to the contrary, Article 8(4) mentions it as a legitimate alternative to detention. However, both scholars and the European Asylum Agency maintain that the guarantee shall be proportionate to the means of the applicant in order to avoid discriminatory effects. The EUAA Guidelines on asylum seeker detention further specify that:

“the amount should be tailored to individual circumstances, and therefore be reasonable given the particular situation of asylum seekers, and not so high as to lead to discrimination against persons with limited funds. Any failure to be able to do so resulting in detention (or its continuation), would suggest that the system is arbitrary.”

It is doubtful whether the financial guarantee in its current legal design can be considered an “effective” alternative to detention (Art.8(4)). Its high amount (€4,938.00) and procedural requirements make it practically impossible for asylum applicants to rely upon it. In particular, they are required to deposit the sum upon arrival, through a bank guarantee or an insurance policy, which are concretely impossible for them to obtain. Moreover, the financial guarantee is the only alternative to detention provided by the new Italian law, while migrants detained under other circumstances can rely upon more alternative measures.

Taken together, it means that the measure is designed in a discriminatory way and is neither effective nor proportionate.

Concluding Thoughts

Several aspects of the new law foresee a system in which the border procedure is systematically applied, rendering detention the rule, instead of the exception. This follows from the geographic expansion of the “borders areas and transit zones”, the automatic (indiscriminate) application of the safe country of origin concept, the lack of a proportionality assessment, and the practical impossibility of applying the only alternative measure foreseen.

More and more Italian courts are annulling detention orders, on the grounds that the Italian border procedure is in conflict with EU law. While the Italian government considers this an unacceptable form of judicial activism, this blog has shown that the judges’ concerns are well-founded.

Member States’ courts are “EU law judges”, they must give precedence to EU law and general principles and set aside any incompatible national law. The recent personal attacks against some of the judges show that the government struggles to come to terms with this thick form of judicial review which takes seriously European and human rights standards.

▻https://verfassungsblog.de/turning-the-exception-into-the-rule
#exception #justice #détention #rétention #détention_administrative #décret #procédure_accélérée #garantie_financière #5000_EUR #chantage #caution #decreto_Cutro #décret_Cutro #5000_euros #tribunal_de_Catane #procédure_frontière #directive_procédures #zone_de_transit #proximité #distance #zone_frontalière #directive_retour #frontière_extérieure #fiction_de_non-entrée

–-

La partie sur les frontières ajouté à cette métaliste autour de la Création de zones frontalières (au lieu de lignes de frontière) en vue de refoulements :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/795053

ECJ Ruling in case C-143/22 ADDE and others regarding rules governing the movement of persons across borders, the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders and the consequences for the applicability of the return directive: Q&A

►https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-246319

#légalité #illégalité #contrôles_frontaliers #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières #Slovénie #Autriche

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Border control, asylum and immigration – Regulation (EU) 2016/399 – Article 32 – Temporary reintroduction of border control by a Member State at its internal borders – Article 14 – Refusal of entry – Equation of internal borders with external borders – Directive 2008/115/EC – Scope – Article 2(2)(a))

In Case C‑143/22,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Conseil d’État (Council of State, France), made by decision of 24 February 2022, received at the Court on 1 March 2022, in the proceedings

Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE),

Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE),

Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT),

Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade),

Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI),

Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI),

Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH),

Le paria,

Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF),

SOS – Hépatites Fédération

v

Ministre de l’Intérieur,

intervening party :

Défenseur des droits,

THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, L.S. Rossi, J.-C. Bonichot, S. Rodin and O. Spineanu-Matei, Judges,

Advocate General : A. Rantos,

Registrar : M. Krausenböck, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 19 January 2023,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of :

– Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF) and SOS – Hépatites Fédération, by P. Spinosi, lawyer,

– the Défenseur des droits, by C. Hédon, Défenseure des droits, M. Cauvin and A. Guitton, acting as advisers, and by I. Zribi, lawyer,

– the French Government, by A.-L. Desjonquères and J. Illouz, acting as Agents,

– the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, E. Borawska-Kędzierska and A. Siwek-Ślusarek, acting as Agents,

– the European Commission, by A. Azéma, A. Katsimerou, T. Lilamand and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 30 March 2023,

gives the following

Judgment

1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2016 L 77, p. 1, ‘the Schengen Borders Code’), and of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

2 The request has been made in proceedings between Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le Paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF), SOS – Hépatites Fédération, and Ministre de l’Intérieur (Minister of the Interior, France) regarding the legality of the ordonnance no 2020-1733 du 16 décembre 2020 portant partie législative du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Order No 2020-1733 of 16 December 2020, laying down the legislative part of the Code on Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum) (JORF of 30 December 2020, Text No 41).

Legal context

European Union law

The Schengen Borders Code

3 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code :

‘For the purposes of this Regulation the following definitions apply :

1. “internal borders” means :

(a) the common land borders, including river and lake borders, of the Member States ;

(b) the airports of the Member States for internal flights ;

(c) sea, river and lake ports of the Member States for regular internal ferry connections ;

2. “external borders” means : the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders ;

…’

4 Title II of that code, which concerns ‘External Borders’, includes Articles 5 to 21.

5 Article 14 of the code, entitled ‘Refusal of entry’, states :

‘1. A third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States. This shall be without prejudice to the application of special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection or the issue of long-stay visas.

2. Entry may only be refused by a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal. The decision shall be taken by an authority empowered by national law. It shall take effect immediately.

The substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal shall be given by means of a standard form, as set out in Annex V, Part B, filled in by the authority empowered by national law to refuse entry. The completed standard form shall be handed to the third-country national concerned, who shall acknowledge receipt of the decision to refuse entry by means of that form.

Data on third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused shall be registered in the EES in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ 2017 L 327, p. 20)].

3. Persons refused entry shall have the right to appeal. Appeals shall be conducted in accordance with national law. A written indication of contact points able to provide information on representatives competent to act on behalf of the third-country national in accordance with national law shall also be given to the third-country national.

Lodging such an appeal shall not have suspensive effect on a decision to refuse entry.

Without prejudice to any compensation granted in accordance with national law, the third-country national concerned shall, where the appeal concludes that the decision to refuse entry was ill-founded, be entitled to the correction of the data entered in the EES or of the cancelled entry stamp, or both, and any other cancellations or additions which have been made, by the Member State which refused entry.

4. The border guards shall ensure that a third-country national refused entry does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned.

5. Member States shall collect statistics on the number of persons refused entry, the grounds for refusal, the nationality of the persons who were refused entry and the type of border (land, air or sea) at which they were refused entry and submit them yearly to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 23)].

6. Detailed rules governing refusal of entry are given in Part A of Annex V.’

6 Title III of the Schengen Borders Code, which concerns ‘Internal Borders’, includes Articles 22 to 35.

7 Article 25 of that code, entitled ‘General framework for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, provides :

‘Where, in the area without internal border control, there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State, that Member State may exceptionally reintroduce border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders for a limited period of up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds 30 days. The scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat.’

8 Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, entitled ‘Provisions to be applied where border control is reintroduced at internal borders’, provides :

‘Where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of Title II shall apply mutatis mutandis.’

9 Annex V, Part A, of the Schengen Borders Code provides :

‘1. When refusing entry, the competent border guard shall :

(a) fill in the standard form for refusing entry, as shown in Part B. The third-country national concerned shall sign the form and shall be given a copy of the signed form. Where the third-country national refuses to sign, the border guard shall indicate this refusal in the form under the section “comments” ;

(b) for third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused, register in the EES the data on refusal of entry in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 ;

(c) annul or revoke the visas, as appropriate, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 34 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1)] ;

(d) for third-country nationals whose refusals of entry are not to be registered into the EES, affix an entry stamp on the passport, cancelled by a cross in indelible black ink, and write opposite it on the right-hand side, also in indelible ink, the letter(s) corresponding to the reason(s) for refusing entry, the list of which is given on the standard form for refusing entry as shown in Part B of this Annex. In addition, for these categories of persons, the border guard shall record every refusal of entry in a register or on a list stating the identity and nationality of the third-country national concerned, the references of the document authorising the third-country national to cross the border and the reason for, and date of, refusal of entry.

The practical arrangements for stamping are set out in Annex IV.

2. If a third-country national who has been refused entry is brought to the border by a carrier, the authority responsible locally shall :

(a) order the carrier to take charge of the third-country national and transport him or her without delay to the third country from which he or she was brought, to the third country which issued the document authorising him or her to cross the border, or to any other third country where he or she is guaranteed admittance, or to find means of onward transportation in accordance with Article 26 of the Schengen Convention and Council Directive 2001/51/EC [of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 45)] ;

(b) pending onward transportation, take appropriate measures, in compliance with national law and having regard to local circumstances, to prevent third-country nationals who have been refused entry from entering illegally.

…’

10 Pursuant to Article 44 of that code, entitled ‘Repeal’ :

‘Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1)] is repealed.

References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex X.’

11 In accordance with that correlation table, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code corresponds to Article 13 of Regulation No 562/2006.

Directive 2008/115

12 Article 2(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/115 states :

‘1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State.

2. Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals who :

(a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of [Regulation No 562/2006], or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State ;

(b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.’

13 Article 3 of that directive provides :

‘For the purpose of this Directive the following definitions shall apply :

…

2. “illegal stay” means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of [Regulation No 562/2006] or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State ;

3. “return” means the process of a third-country national going back – whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced – to :

– his or her country of origin, or

– a country of transit in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or

– another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he or she will be accepted ;

…’

14 Article 4(4) of the directive provides :

‘With regard to third-country nationals excluded from the scope of this Directive in accordance with Article 2(2)(a), Member States shall :

(a) ensure that their treatment and level of protection are no less favourable than as set out in Article 8(4) and (5) (limitations on use of coercive measures), Article 9(2)(a) (postponement of removal), Article 14(1)(b) and (d) (emergency health care and taking into account needs of vulnerable persons), and Articles 16 and 17 (detention conditions) and

(b) respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

15 Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 provides :

‘When implementing this Directive, Member States shall take due account of :

(a) the best interests of the child ;

(b) family life ;

(c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned,

and respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

16 Article 6 of that directive provides :

‘1. Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on their territory, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5.

2. Third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State and holding a valid residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member State shall be required to go to the territory of that other Member State immediately. In the event of non-compliance by the third-country national concerned with this requirement, or where the third-country national’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security, paragraph 1 shall apply.

3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is taken back by another Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive. In such a case the Member State which has taken back the third-country national concerned shall apply paragraph 1.

…’

17 The first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of that directive provides :

‘A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4. Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a period shall be granted only following an application by the third-country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall inform the third-country nationals concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application.’

18 Article 15(1) of that directive provides :

‘Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when :

(a) there is a risk of absconding or

(b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process.

Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence.’

French law

19 Article L. 213-3-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum), in the version resulting from the loi no 2018-778, du 10 septembre 2018, pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie (Law No 2018-778 of 10 September 2018 for controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum and successful integration) (JORF of 11 September 2018, Text No 1) (‘the former Ceseda’), stated :

‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders provided for in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code], the decisions referred to in Article L. 213-2 may be taken in respect of foreign nationals who have arrived directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention signed on 19 June 1990, who have entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and were checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres behind it. The procedures for these checks are defined by decree in the Conseil d’État [(Council of State, France)].’

20 Order No 2020-1733 recast the legislative part of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. Article L. 332-2 of that code, as amended (‘the amended Ceseda’) provides :

‘The decision refusing entry, which shall be in writing and substantiated, shall be taken by an officer belonging to a category prescribed by regulations.

The notification of the decision refusing entry shall state that the foreign national has the right to inform, or cause to be informed, the person he or she has indicated that he or she intended to visit, his or her consulate or the adviser of his or her choice. It shall state that the foreign national has the right to refuse to be repatriated before one clear day has passed, under the conditions laid down in Article L. 333-2.

The decision and the notification of rights which accompanies it shall be provided to him in a language he or she understands.

Particular attention shall be paid to vulnerable persons, especially minors whether accompanied by an adult or not.’

21 Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda provides :

‘The procedure laid down in Article L. 332-2 is applicable to the decision to refuse entry taken against the foreign national pursuant to Article 6 of the [Schengen Borders Code]. It shall also apply to checks carried out at an internal border in the event of the temporary reintroduction of checks at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code].’

The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

22 The associations referred to in paragraph 2 of the present judgment are challenging the validity of Order No 2020-1733 before the Conseil d’État (Council of State), in an action for annulment of that order, on the grounds, inter alia, that Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda resulting from it infringes Directive 2008/115 in that it allows decisions to refuse entry at internal borders where checks have been reintroduced.

23 The referring court observes that the Court held, in its judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others (C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220), that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, does not apply to the situation of an illegally staying third-country national who was apprehended in the immediate vicinity of an internal border of a Member State, even where that Member State has reintroduced border control at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or to internal security in that Member State.

24 The Conseil d’État (Council of State) points out that, in its Decision No 428175 of 27 November 2020, it held that the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda, which provided that in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, a foreign national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990 and which entered into force on 26 March 1995 (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19, ‘the Schengen Convention’), could be refused entry under the terms of Article L. 213-2 of the former Ceseda if he or entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and was checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres inside that border, were contrary to Directive 2008/115.

25 Admittedly, according to the Conseil d’État (Council of State), Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda does not repeat the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda. However, Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda again provides only for the adoption of a refusal of entry while carrying out border checks at internal borders in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the Schengen Borders Code.

26 That court therefore considers it necessary to determine whether, in such a case, a third-country national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention who presents themselves at an authorised stationary or mobile border crossing point, without being in possession of documents justifying an authorisation to enter or right to stay in France, may be refused entry on the basis of Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, without Directive 2008/115 being applicable.

27 In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling :

‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of [the Schengen Borders Code], can foreign nationals arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention … be refused entry, when entry checks are carried out at that border, on the basis of Article 14 of that [code], without [Directive 2008/115] being applicable ?’

Consideration of the question referred

28 By its question referred for a preliminary ruling, the national court asks, in essence, whether the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out, a decision refusing entry, within the meaning of Article 14 of that code, without being subject to compliance with that directive.

29 Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code allows, exceptionally and under certain conditions, a Member State to reintroduce temporarily border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in that Member State. Under Article 32 of the code, where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of the Title II of the code relating to external borders shall apply mutatis mutandis.

30 That is the case with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, which provides that a third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States.

31 However, it is important to remember that a third-country national who, after entering the territory of a Member State illegally is present on that territory without fulfilling the conditions for entry, stay or residence is, therefore, staying illegally, within the meaning of Directive 2008/115. Under Article 2(1) of that directive, and without prejudice to Article 2(2) of the directive, that third-country national falls within the scope of the directive, without his or her presence in the territory of the Member State concerned being subject to a condition as to minimum duration or intention to remain in that territory. He or she must therefore, in principle, be subject to the common standards and procedures laid down by the directive for the purpose of his or her removal, as long as his or her stay has not, as the case may be, been regularised (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 37 and 39 and the case-law cited).

32 This also applies where the third-country national has been apprehended at a border crossing point, provided that the border crossing point is on the territory of that Member State. In that respect, it should be noted that a person may have entered the territory of a Member State even before crossing a border crossing point (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 February 2020, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Signing-on of seamen in the port of Rotterdam), C‑341/18, EU:C:2020:76, paragraph 45).

33 It should also be specified, by way of example, that when checks are carried out on board a train between the time when the train leaves the last station located on the territory of a Member State sharing an internal border with a Member State that has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, and the moment when that train enters the first station situated on the territory of the latter Member State, the check on board that same train must, unless otherwise agreed between those two Member States, be regarded as a check carried out at a border crossing point situated on the territory of the Member State which has reintroduced such checks. A third-country national who has been checked on board this train will necessarily remain on the territory of the latter Member State following the check, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/115.

34 However, it should also be noted that Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States to exclude, exceptionally and under certain conditions, third-country nationals who are staying illegally on their territory from the scope of that directive.

35 Thus, on the one hand, Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States not to apply that directive, subject to the provisions of Article 4(4) thereof, in two specific situations, namely that of third-country nationals who are the subject to a refusal of entry at an external border of a Member State, in accordance with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, or that of third-country nationals who are apprehended or intercepted in connection with the irregular crossing of such an external border and who have not subsequently obtained authorisation or a right to reside in that Member State.

36 However, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that those two situations relate exclusively to the crossing of an external border of a Member State, as defined in Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code, and do not therefore concern the crossing of a border common to Member States forming part of the Schengen area, even where checks have been reintroduced at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or the internal security of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 45 and 67).

37 It follows, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 35 of his Opinion, that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 does not authorise a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders to derogate from the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive in order to remove a third-country national who has been intercepted, without a valid residence permit, at one of the border crossing points situated in the territory of that Member State where such checks are carried out.

38 On the other hand, although Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2008/115 authorises Member States not to apply that directive to third-country nationals who are subject to a criminal penalty providing for or resulting in their return, in accordance with national law, or who are subject to extradition proceedings, it must be noted that such a case is not the one referred to by the provision at issue in the main proceedings.

39 It follows from the foregoing, first, that a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders may apply, mutatis mutandis, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code and paragraph 1 of Part A of Annex V to that code in respect of a third-country national who is intercepted, without a legal residence permit, at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out.

40 On the other hand, where the border crossing point is located on the territory of the Member State concerned, the latter must ensure that the consequences of such application, mutatis mutandis, of the provisions referred to in the previous point do not result in disregard of the common standards and procedures laid down in Directive 2008/115. The fact that this obligation on the Member State concerned is likely to render ineffective to a large extent any decision to refuse entry to a third-country national arriving at one of its internal borders is not such as to alter that finding.

41 With regard to the relevant provisions of that directive, it should be recalled, in particular, that it follows from Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 that any third-country national staying illegally on the territory of a Member State must, without prejudice to the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of that article and in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Article 5 of that directive, be the subject of a return decision, which must identify, among the third countries referred to in Article 3(3) of that directive, the country to which he or she must return (judgment of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal – Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 53).

42 In addition, a third-country national who is the subject of such a return decision must still, in principle, be given, under Article 7 of Directive 2008/115, a certain period of time in which to leave the territory of the Member State concerned voluntarily. Forced removal is to take place only as a last resort, in accordance with Article 8 of that directive, and subject to Article 9 thereof, which requires Member States to postpone removal in the cases it sets out (judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection), C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 252).

43 Furthermore, it follows from Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 that the detention of an illegally staying third-country national may only be imposed in certain specific cases. However, as the Advocate General pointed out, in essence, in point 46 of his Opinion, that article does not preclude a national from being detained, pending his or her removal, where he or she represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or domestic security, provided that such detention complies with the conditions set out in Articles 15 to 18 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Stadt Frankfurt am Main, C‑18/19, EU:C:2020:511, paragraphs 41 to 48).

44 Furthermore, Directive 2008/115 does not rule out the possibility for Member States to impose a prison sentence for offences other than those relating solely to illegal entry, including in situations where the return procedure established by that directive has not yet been completed. Consequently, that directive also does not preclude the arrest or placing in police custody of an illegally staying third-country national where such measures are adopted on the ground that that national is suspected of having committed an offence other than simply entering the national territory illegally, and in particular an offence likely to threaten public policy or the internal security of the Member State concerned (judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraph 66).

45 It follows that, contrary to what the French Government maintains, the application, in a case such as that referred to in the reference for a preliminary ruling, of the common standards and procedures laid down by Directive 2008/115 is not such as to make it impossible to maintain public order and safeguard internal security within the meaning of Article 72 TFEU.

46 In light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling is that the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that code, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

Costs

47 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules :

Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals,

must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that regulation, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down in that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0143

Contrôle des frontières : le gouvernement contraint de sortir de l’illégalité

Communiqué commun signé par la LDH

Après 8 ans de pratiques illégales du gouvernement français en matière de contrôle et d’enfermement des personnes en migration aux frontières intérieures, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) confirme, dans un arrêt du 21 septembre, qu’elles sont contraires au droit.

La CJUE rappelle à la France qu’elle doit se conformer au droit de l’Union européenne, et il appartient au gouvernement français de prendre des mesures immédiates sans attendre que le Conseil d’État en tire toutes les conséquences.

Associations signataires : Avocats pour la Défense des Droits des Etrangers (ADDE), Alliance-DEDF, Amnesty International France, Anafé (association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les personnes étrangères), Bizi migrant.es, Emmaüs Roya, Federation Etorkinekin Diakité, Gisti, La Cimade, LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme), Médecins du Monde, Roya citoyenne, Syndicat des avocats de France (Saf), Syndicat de la magistrature (SM), Tous Migrants, Tous Migrants 73, Utopia 56 (antenne Toulouse)

Paris, le 21 septembre 2023

▻https://www.ldh-france.org/controle-des-frontieres-le-gouvernement-contraint-de-sortir-de-lillegali

Corte di giustizia UE: vietato il respingimento sistematico alle frontiere interne

La sentenza della Corte nella causa #C-143/22 promossa da diverse associazioni francesi

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Il 21 settembre 2023 una sentenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea (CGUE) ha dichiarato che, anche se un Paese UE ha introdotto controlli alle sue frontiere, non ha il diritto di effettuare respingimenti sistematici. Deve rispettare la direttiva europea «rimpatri» che prevede che a un cittadino extraeuropeo possa “essere concesso un certo periodo di tempo per lasciare volontariamente il territorio“.

Tutto era partito dal ricorso di varie associazioni francesi 1 che hanno contestato dinanzi al Consiglio di Stato francese la legittimità di un’ordinanza che ha modificato il codice sull’ingresso e sul soggiorno degli stranieri e sul diritto d’asilo (Ceseda).

Esse hanno sostenuto che, consentendo alle autorità francesi di rifiutare l’ingresso di cittadini di paesi terzi alle frontiere con altri Stati membri (ossia le «frontiere interne»), alle quali sia stato temporaneamente ripristinato un controllo di frontiera in forza del codice frontiere Schengen in ragione di una minaccia grave per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza interna della Francia, il Ceseda contravverrebbe alla direttiva «rimpatri». Secondo tale direttiva, qualsiasi cittadino di un paese terzo il cui soggiorno è irregolare deve, di norma, essere oggetto di una decisione di rimpatrio. Tuttavia, l’interessato deve, in linea di principio, beneficiare di un certo termine per lasciare volontariamente il territorio. L’allontanamento forzato avviene solo in ultima istanza.

Il Consiglio di Stato ha quindi interrogato la CGUE sulla questione dichiarando che «in una situazione del genere, un provvedimento di respingimento può essere adottato sulla base del codice frontiere #Schengen ma che, ai fini dell’allontanamento dell’interessato, devono comunque essere rispettate le norme e le procedure comuni previste dalla direttiva “rimpatri” (▻https://openmigration.org/glossary-term/direttiva-rimpatri), il che può condurre a privare di una larga parte della sua utilità l’adozione di un siffatto provvedimento di respingimento».

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«La sentenza della CGUE impone la giurisprudenza a tutti gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, ma in particolare è rivolta alla Francia, che dal 2015 ha reintrodotto i controlli alle frontiere interne.»

Negli ultimi otto anni, tutti i treni che passano per #Menton sono stati controllati, gli agenti di polizia hanno controllato i passaggi di frontiera e pattugliato i valichi alpini. Dal 1° giugno è ulteriormente stata dispiegata un militarizzazione delle frontiere con personale aggiuntivo, il supporto dell’esercito, droni con termocamere.

La Francia è stata accusata di respingere le persone migranti che cercano di entrare nel Paese, anche quelli che chiedono asilo e perfino i minorenni. Diversi rapporti di organizzazioni e collettivi hanno messo in luce queste pratiche violente e illegali, soprattutto nella zona di Ventimiglia. Secondo le testimonianze raccolte, si tratta di respingimenti “sistematici”.

«In poche parole, questa decisione dice che la Francia sta perseguendo una politica illegale di chiusura delle frontiere», riassume Flor Tercero, dell’Association pour le Droit des Etrangers (ADDE) intervistato da Infomigrants. Questa decisione «è chiaramente una vittoria» e «significa che il governo non può ignorare il diritto dell’Unione europea».

▻https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/09/corte-di-giustizia-ue-vietato-il-respingimento-sistematico-alle-frontier

#frontières_intérieures #directive_retour #illégalité

European Court of Justice rules systematic pushbacks are illegal

European countries do not have the right to refuse entry to irregular migrants even if they have border controls in place, the ECJ has ruled. Activists say the decision means that France has been violating EU law by pushing back migrants coming from Italy.

When a member state decides to reintroduce checks at its internal borders, can it systematically refuse entry to all irregular foreign nationals? No, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) ruled earlier this month. It must comply with the “Return Directive,” a law which says that a non-European national can “be granted a certain period of time to voluntarily leave the territory.”

“A decision to refuse entry may be decided but, when seeking the removal of the person concerned, the common standards and procedures provided for by the Return Directive must still be respected,” the Luxembourg court stated.

It also said that “excluding from the scope of this directive foreign nationals who are staying irregularly in the territory” can only be done “exceptionally.”

The ruling on September 21 is at odds with the policy pursued by France, which re-established controls at its internal EU borders in 2015. For the past eight years, all trains passing through the French coastal city of Menton have been checked, and police have monitored border posts and patrolled the Alps.

Activist groups say France has been taking advantage of the temporary border controls in order to turn back migrants who try to enter the territory — even those who come to ask for asylum. In an August report, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) teams in Ventimiglia documented practices of pushbacks at the border between Italy and France. “Systematic” pushbacks target unaccompanied minors, even sometimes separating families, according to the report.
’An illegal policy’

“In a nutshell, this decision means that France is pursuing an illegal policy of closing borders,” Flor Tercero, of the Association for Foreigners’ Rights (ADDE), told InfoMigrants. ADDE is one of the associations involved in bringing the lawsuit to court.

“Pushing back means, in a way, refusing these people the possibility of coming to France to apply for asylum or to cross France to go elsewhere in the EU. France for eight years has decided to carry out border checks. And as it re-established checks, it considered itself entitled to be able to push back migrants coming from Italy, in particular,” he added.

“After eight years of illegal practices by the French government controlling and detaining migrants at internal borders, the CJEU confirms (...) that [these practices] are contrary to the law,” a joint press release of twenty organizations added.

▻https://twitter.com/anafeasso/status/1704893792266969108

For Flor Tercero, this decision is a clear victory. “This means that the government cannot forego European law,” he said.
France ’will not welcome migrants’ from Lampedusa

The court decision came at a time when attention was focused on the French-Italian border. Following the recent arrival of a very large number of people on the Italian island of Lampedusa, the French interior minister, Gérald Darmanin, announced that 200 additional police officers would be sent to the border between the two countries, in the expectation that the migrants would eventually make their way from Italy to France.

France “will not welcome migrants” from the Italian island, the minister stated.

Meanwhile the departmental director of the border police, Emmanuelle Joubert, announced that more than 3,000 migrants had been arrested in Menton within a fortnight. This brings to 32,000 the number of arrests since the start of the year along the Franco-Italian border. Of those, 24,000 were rejected and handed over to the Italian authorities

Joubert said she had been informed about the judgment by the CJEU. “The State is carrying out an analysis, we will have instructions later,” she said, adding that migrants who had recently arrived in Lampedusa should not arrive at the French border for “several weeks.”

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/52117/european-court-of-justice-rules-systematic-pushbacks-are-illegal

RAPPORT sur la mise en œuvre de l’#article_43 de la directive 2013/32/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 26 juin 2013 relative à des procédures communes pour l’octroi et le retrait de la protection internationale

Le présent rapport porte sur l’application des procédures à la frontière par les États membres. L’article 43 de la directive 2013/32/UE relative à des procédures communes pour l’octroi et le retrait de la protection internationale (directive sur les procédures d’asile) établit les procédures à la frontière comme une possibilité à laquelle les États membres peuvent avoir recours dans le cadre du fonctionnement du régime d’asile européen commun. Lorsqu’une demande d’asile est présentée à la frontière ou dans une zone de transit, les États membres peuvent, sous certaines conditions, examiner la demande dans ces lieux.

Objet du rapport

L’objectif principal du rapport est de permettre au Parlement de prendre des décisions éclairées et fondées sur des données probantes lors des négociations à venir sur le pacte sur la migration et l’asile, dans le cadre duquel les procédures à la frontière jouent un rôle crucial. Les procédures à la frontière jouent un rôle essentiel dans la proposition relative au pacte. Or, la Commission n’a jamais fait l’effort d’évaluer leur mise en œuvre, de déterminer si leurs objectifs sont atteints et d’établir les conclusions à tirer pour une nouvelle législation.

Les rapports de mise en œuvre constituent un élément essentiel du programme de la Commission pour une meilleure réglementation, qui vise à concevoir et à évaluer les politiques de l’Union de manière à ce qu’elles atteignent leurs objectifs de la façon la plus efficace et efficiente possible. Toutefois, la Commission n’a pas publié à ce jour de rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile, manquant ainsi aux obligations d’information qui lui incombent en vertu de l’article 50 de ladite directive. De plus, en 2016, aucune analyse d’impact n’a été réalisée lorsque la Commission a proposé une réforme de cette directive pour la transformer en règlement. Il en va de même pour la proposition de modification récemment publiée (COM(2020) 611 final).

Le présent rapport ne vise ni à remplacer le rapport complet sur la mise en œuvre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile que la Commission aurait dû réaliser, ni à évaluer les incidences des nouvelles propositions de cette dernière. Elle vise plutôt à apporter un éclairage sur la mise en œuvre par les États membres des procédures à la frontière au titre de la directive sur les procédures d’asile ainsi que sur les problèmes et les lacunes existants. Cet état des lieux devrait permettre au Parlement de prendre des décisions éclairées et fondées sur des données probantes lors des négociations à venir sur la proposition de modification de la directive.

Le rapport repose sur l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre publiée par l’EPRS en novembre 2020, qui donne une analyse comparative de l’application de l’article 43 de la directive sur les procédures d’asile, ainsi qu’une appréciation juridique de la transposition et de l’application de cet article par les États membres. Le projet de rapport initial s’appuie sur les conclusions préliminaires de cette évaluation. Il se peut que le rapporteur dépose des amendements au projet de rapport afin d’adapter le rapport à l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre finale.

Les procédures à la frontière sont mal définies

Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS montre que le concept des procédures à la frontière est mal défini dans la législation de l’Union en matière d’asile. Cela soulève de vives inquiétudes quant à leur application, en particulier en ce qui concerne les droits fondamentaux et les garanties procédurales.

Les procédures à la frontière constituent une exception à la règle juridiquement définie par la directive sur les procédures d’asile selon laquelle les demandeurs d’asile ont le droit de rester sur le territoire d’un État membre, y compris à la frontière ou dans une zone de transit. La directive sur les procédures d’asile limite donc strictement les procédures à la frontière à un nombre exhaustif de cas. Le législateur de l’Union a en outre souhaité une interprétation étroite puisqu’il souligne que, pour autant qu’un demandeur ait exposé des raisons reconnues valables, l’absence de documents à l’entrée ou l’utilisation de documents falsifiés ne devrait pas entraîner en soi un recours automatique à la procédure à la frontière ou à la procédure accélérée (considérant 21 de la directive). Néanmoins, dans la pratique, la directive donne une trop grande marge de manœuvre aux États membres pour un recours « à la carte » aux procédures à la frontière, souvent bien au-delà des limites fixées par la directive.

Certains États membres examinent la recevabilité des demandes d’asile dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, tandis que d’autres en examinent également le fond. Certains États membres examinent les cas relevant du règlement de Dublin dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, tandis que d’autres ne le font pas. Certains États membres accordent une protection internationale dans le cadre d’une procédure à la frontière, tandis que d’autres autorisent l’entrée des demandeurs lorsqu’ils constatent qu’un demandeur d’asile est susceptible de remplir les conditions requises pour bénéficier d’une protection internationale. En outre, plusieurs États membres appliquent les procédures à la frontière d’une manière beaucoup plus large que ne le prescrit la directive sur les procédures d’asile ; certains dirigent même toutes les demandes d’asile introduites à la frontière vers les procédures à la frontière. De plus, certains États membres appliquent les procédures à la frontière sans les qualifier en tant que telles dans le droit national.

La rétention comme règle dans les procédures à la frontière

Les procédures à la frontière reposent souvent sur la fiction juridique de l’absence d’entrée, partant ainsi du principe que la procédure a lieu avant une décision sur le droit d’un demandeur d’entrer sur le territoire d’un État membre ou dans le cadre d’une telle décision. Cela a de graves conséquences pour les demandeurs d’asile. Dans tous les cas analysés par l’EPRS dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, les demandeurs d’asile soumis à des procédures à la frontière ont de facto été placés en rétention.

La rétention et la privation de liberté ont de graves répercussions sur les droits fondamentaux d’une personne. C’est pourquoi le droit de l’Union et le droit international relatif aux droits de l’homme établissent des conditions strictes pour la rétention des demandeurs d’asile. L’article 26 de la directive sur les procédures d’asile interdit le placement en rétention de demandeurs au seul motif qu’ils sont des demandeurs. Une liste exhaustive des motifs de placement en rétention et des garanties pour les personnes placées en rétention figurent dans la directive 2013/33/UE (directive relative aux conditions d’accueil).

Or, ces conditions et garanties ne sont généralement pas prises en compte dans les procédures à la frontière. En règle générale, les États membres placent de facto les demandeurs d’asile en rétention, souvent sans examiner le critère de nécessité ou sans fournir d’autres solutions que la rétention. Dans de nombreux cas, les demandeurs d’asile n’ont pas accès aux garanties applicables aux demandeurs d’asile qui sont placés en rétention dans le cadre de procédures menées à l’intérieur du pays. Plusieurs États membres placent de facto les demandeurs d’asile en rétention, sur la base de la fiction de l’absence d’entrée, sans reconnaître qu’il s’agit là d’une privation de liberté. En conséquence, les demandeurs d’asile placés en rétention dans le cadre d’une telle procédure à la frontière n’ont même pas accès aux garanties procédurales de base telles qu’un contrôle juridictionnel de leur rétention. Cette situation est d’autant plus préoccupante que les conditions de rétention aux frontières sont souvent inadaptées. En cas d’afflux massif, comme sur les îles grecques, les procédures à la frontière vouent les demandeurs à des conditions inhumaines.

Si les demandeurs d’asile sont de facto placés en rétention aux frontières, la rétention devrait toujours être prescrite par la loi, et les mêmes garanties procédurales devraient être appliquées que pour les demandeurs d’asile placés en rétention dans le cadre de procédures menées à l’intérieur du pays. En tout état de cause, les demandeurs d’asile ne devraient pas être placés en rétention par défaut.

Refus d’entrée

Il y a lieu de donner aux intéressés la possibilité d’introduire une demande d’asile à la frontière. S’il existe des éléments donnant à penser qu’une personne aux frontières extérieures peut souhaiter présenter une demande de protection internationale, les États membres doivent l’informer de la possibilité de le faire et prendre des dispositions en matière d’interprétation afin de faciliter l’accès à la procédure d’asile.

Toutefois, de nombreuses informations font état d’un refus d’entrée ou d’un renvoi forcé dans le cadre de procédures à la frontière, sans que les besoins de protection des intéressés ne soient évalués et sans que leurs demandes d’asile ne soient enregistrées. Cela constitue une violation grave du droit de l’Union et du droit international.

Pour prévenir de telles pratiques illégales et veiller à ce que les États membres respectent le droit de l’Union et le droit international aux frontières extérieures, il convient de mettre en place des mécanismes de contrôle indépendants. Conformément aux orientations de l’Agence des droits fondamentaux (FRA) sur les contrôles aux frontières, les États membres devraient être tenus d’accorder aux organes de contrôle l’accès aux installations frontalières en vue de garantir la protection effective des droits fondamentaux et la notification systématique des violations. Les États membres devraient également faire en sorte que toutes les allégations donnent lieu à des enquêtes et des sanctions.

Évaluation de la vulnérabilité

Il est inquiétant que les États membres ne disposent pas de mécanismes adéquats permettant d’identifier les personnes ayant des besoins particuliers afin de les exempter de la procédure à la frontière. Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS montre que des mécanismes appropriés et efficaces d’identification des vulnérabilités font défaut dans tous les pays examinés et que plusieurs États membres ne disposent d’aucun mécanisme de ce type. Les personnes présentant des vulnérabilités invisibles, telles que les victimes de torture ou d’abus sexuels, ne sont pratiquement jamais identifiées lors d’une procédure à la frontière. Les garanties procédurales spéciales et le soutien adéquat sont souvent vains dans la pratique en l’absence de mécanismes d’identification appropriés. Cette situation est particulièrement préoccupante pour les enfants et soulève des questions quant au respect de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant consacré à l’article 24, paragraphe 2, de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. C’est pourquoi les enfants et leurs familles devraient généralement être exemptés des procédures à la frontière.

Garanties procédurales et équité des procédures à la frontière

Dans son évaluation de la mise en œuvre, l’EPRS fait état de problèmes importants liés aux garanties procédurales dans tous les États membres examinés. Les demandeurs doivent être informés de leurs droits et de la procédure d’asile et ils doivent avoir un accès effectif aux organisations et personnes qui fournissent des conseils. Or, dans la pratique, cela n’est souvent pas le cas. De nombreux États membres prévoient dans leur législation le droit à une assistance juridique gratuite en première instance des procédures à la frontière, alors qu’ils ne sont pas tenus de le faire. Cependant, la brièveté des délais et la rétention (de facto) empêchent souvent l’accès effectif à l’assistance juridique. Les demandeurs d’asile ne sont pas en mesure de contacter un avocat en raison d’un manque d’outils de communication, les avocats manquent de temps pour préparer le recours ou une audition avec leur client ou les avocats qualifiés font complètement défaut. Les ONG ne peuvent souvent pas combler les lacunes en raison de leur accès limité ou total aux infrastructures aux frontières. L’interprétation est souvent indisponible, de mauvaise qualité ou difficile lorsqu’elle est effectuée par téléphone. De plus, les demandeurs ne sont souvent pas informés systématiquement de la procédure d’asile et de leurs droits.

En raison de la nature même des procédures à la frontière, il est difficile de fournir des garanties procédurales complètes dans la pratique. Leur efficacité est compromise par la combinaison d’une rétention (de facto) et de délais plus courts appliqués dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière. Les États membres fixent généralement des délais très courts de quelques jours seulement pour la procédure de recours, ce qui porte atteinte au droit à un recours effectif, compte tenu de l’accès limité à l’assistance et au monde extérieur. Cette situation est d’autant plus préoccupante que la directive sur les procédures d’asile ne garantit pas que la procédure de recours aura un effet suspensif.

En ce qui concerne la procédure rapide à la frontière sur les îles grecques, la FRA, le Haut-Commissaire des Nations unies pour les réfugiés et le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies sur les droits de l’homme des migrants ont tous fait part de graves préoccupations concernant les garanties procédurales et les problèmes relatifs aux droits fondamentaux qui semblent presque insurmontables.

Les procédures à la frontière se caractérisent par le dilemme inévitable de la nécessité de garantir une procédure équitable, pour laquelle le temps manque, et de celle de réduire autant que possible la durée de la rétention des demandeurs, le cas échéant. Elles ne contribuent donc pas aux objectifs de la directive sur les procédures d’asile. Par conséquent, les États membres devraient généralement s’abstenir d’appliquer des procédures à la frontière et ne devraient en aucun cas être tenus de les appliquer. Les États membres qui recourent à de telles procédures soit ne peuvent pas garantir une procédure équitable soit enfreignent les droits fondamentaux des demandeurs en les plaçant en rétention pendant de longues périodes.

Si elles sont néanmoins appliquées, ces procédures devraient être strictement limitées aux cas moins complexes, par exemple ceux où le demandeur a obtenu une protection internationale dans un autre État (membre) ou ne soulève que des questions non pertinentes pour l’examen d’une procédure d’asile.

▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0005_FR.html

EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

#technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

State-of-play report

At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

The new standing corps

Recruitment

A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

Training

The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

Use of force

The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

“On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

Privileges and immunities

The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

“Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

Law enforcement

To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

Fundamental rights and data protection

The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

Returns

The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

“The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

EUROSUR

The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

Summary

Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

Jane Kilpatrick

Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

“the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
“The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
“if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

Endnotes

[1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

[2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[3] Section 1.1, state of play report

[4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

[5] Section 7.1, state of play report

[6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, ▻https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

[7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

[9] Chapter III, state of play report

[10] Section 2.5, state of play report

[11] Protocol (No 7), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

[12] Chapter III, state of play report

[13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

[14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, ▻https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

[15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

[16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

[18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[19] Section 8, state of play report

[20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

[21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, ▻https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

[22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

[23] Section 9, state of play report

[24] ERRIN, ▻https://returnnetwork.eu

[25] Section 3.2, state of play report

[26] Chapter III, state of play report

[27] Section 3.2, state of play report

[28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[29] State of play report, p. 19

[30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, ►http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

[31] Section 4, state of play report

[32] Section 7.2, state of play report
Next article >

Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

#EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

What is the standing corps?

The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
Long-term staff seconded from member states;
Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

The size of the standing corps

The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

–-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

What are the profiles?

The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

border checks and surveillance;
interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
verifying travel documents;
escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
operating data systems and platforms; and
offering cultural mediation

*Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

Recruitment for the profiles

Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

“Never touch yourself with gloves”

Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

Fit for service?

The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

Jane Kilpatrick

Endnotes

[1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

[5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

[8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

[9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

[11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

[12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

[13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

[14] Ibid.

[15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

[16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

[19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, ▻https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
#gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

Frontex seeks company for drone flights

The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

Aircraft from arms companies

Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

New interested parties for drone flights

At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

Information to non-EU countries

The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

Matthias Monroy

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

Endnotes

[1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, ►https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

[2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

[3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, ▻https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

[4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, ▻https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

[5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, ▻http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

[6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

[7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, ▻http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

[8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

[9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, ▻https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

[10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, ▻https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

[11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, ▻https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

[12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, ▻https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

[13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, ▻https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

[14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, ▻https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

[15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, ▻http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

[16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

[17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

[18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

[19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, ▻https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

[20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

[21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

[22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

#drones

Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

From external to internal surveillance

Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

Legal provisions

A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

“EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

“…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

“The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

“The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

Sources of data

The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

national border surveillance systems;
stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
local, regional and other coordination centres;
other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
border checks;
Frontex;
other member states’ national coordination centres;
third countries’ authorities;
ship reporting systems;
other relevant European and international organisations; and
other sources.[10]

For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

national coordination centres;
national situational pictures;
immigration liaison officers;
Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
third countries’ authorities.[11]

The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

“The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

Operational activities at the internal borders

Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

“When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

“there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

Chris Jones

Endnotes

[1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

[3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, ▻http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

[4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

[5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

[6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, ▻https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

[7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

[8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

[9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

[10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

[11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

[12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

[13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

[14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: ▻https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

[16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, ▻https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

[17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, ▻https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

[18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

[19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

#mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

voir aussi cette enquête de #ZDF : The #Frontex_files :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900554

#Hongrie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/514774
►https://seenthis.net/messages/651786

#Ceuta et #Melilla, #devoluciones_en_caliente qui ont lieu dans la zone située entre les différentes barrières frontalières :
►https://asile.ch/chronique/espagne-zoom-sur-ceuta-et-melilla

La fameuse « #excision_territoriale » en #Australie :

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/7321b8e85-c3df53/sxlhklytTYcw/O8ywytBFYXCTOMH9oA9TY9fj3e4vaosin18BC2Sw.png

A la frontière entre franco-italienne :

Dans un amendement, l’élu a proposé « une zone limitée aux communes limitrophes ou une bande de 10 kms par rapport à la frontière. » Le gouvernement en a accepté le principe, mais « le délimitera de manière précise par décret pour coller à la réalité du terrain. »

►http://alpesdusud.alpes1.com/news/locales/67705/alpes-du-sud-refus-d-entree-pour-les-migrants-vers-une-evolution-
#France #Italie #frontière_sud-alpine

Enfant, je vivais en zone frontalière, une bande de 800 m de part et d’autre de la frontière qui avait pour principale caractéristique d’être totalement détaxée.

Les temps changent…

L’article 10 de la loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme modifie l’article 78-2 du Code de procédure pénale relatif aux contrôles d’identités. Il permet ainsi des contrôles aux frontières pour une durée de douze heures consécutives (contre six auparavant). Il les élargit « aux abords » de 373 gares et dans un rayon de dix kilomètres des ports et aéroports au nombre des points de passage frontaliers. Bien au-delà des simples frontières de l’Hexagone, c’est une partie importante du territoire français qui est ainsi couvert, dont des villes entières comme Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille, etc.

source, p.25 : ►https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf
#France

Frontière entre #Italie et #Slovénie :

This month saw the introduction of joint Slovenian and Italian police patrols on their mutual border, raising concerns about the retrenchment of national boundaries contra the Schengen Agreement. The collaboration between authorities, due to be implemented until the end of September, mobilises four joint operations per week, with respective police forces able to enter 10km into the territory of their neighboring state in order to apprehend migrants. Mixed operations by member states signifies a growing trend towards the securitization of the EU’s internal borders, and in this case a tightening of controls on the departure point from the West Balkan route.

The patrols aim at stemming the transit of migrants from the western Slovenian regions of #Goriška and #Obalno-kraška, into the eastern region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy. Given the extensive pushback apparatus being employed by Slovenian and Croatian officials, arrival in Italy has often been the first place where persons-in-transit can apply for international protection without the threat of summary removal. However, these developments in cross border patrols highlight a growing effort on the part of the Italian government to prevent people seeking sanctuary on its territory.

(p.15-16)

►https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/July-2019-Final-Report.pdf

–—

While the exact number of persons arriving via the Slovenian-Italian border is unknown, there has been a sharp rise since April (►http://www.regioni.it/dalleregioni/2020/11/09/friuli-venezia-giulia-immigrazione-fedriga-ripensare-politiche-di-controllo-) of people entering Italy from the Balkan route. Not only in Trieste, but also around the province of #Udine, arrivals have increased compared to last year. In Udine, around 100 people (►https://www.ansa.it/friuliveneziagiulia/notizie/2020/11/30/migranti-oltre-cento-persone-rintracciate-nelludinese_9fdae48d-8174-4ea1-b221-8) were identified in one day. This has been met with a huge rise in chain pushbacks, initiated by Italian authorities via readmissions to Slovenia. From January to October 2020, 1321 people (►https://www.rainews.it/tgr/fvg/articoli/2020/11/fvg-massimiliano-fedriga-migranti-arrivi-emergenza-98da1880-455e-4c59-9dc9-6) have been returned via the informal readmissions agreement , representing a fivefold increase when compared with the statistics from 2019.

But instead of dealing with this deficit in adherence to international asylum law, in recent months Italian authorities have only sought to adapt border controls to apprehend more people. Border checks are now focusing on trucks, cars and smaller border crossings (►https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fu4es3xXVc8&feature=youtu.be

), rather than focusing solely on the military patrols of the forested area. This fits into a strategy of heightened control, pioneered by the Governor of the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region Massimiliano Fedriga who hopes to deploy more detection equipment at the border. The aim is to choke off any onward transit beyond the first 10km of Italian territory, and therefore apply the fast tracked process of readmission to the maximum number of new arrivals.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/892914

#10_km

Kuster Backs Bill To Reduce 100-Mile Zone for Border Patrol Checkpoints

Congresswoman Ann McLane Kuster is cosponsoring legislation to reduce border zones from 100 to 25 miles from the border (▻https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3852?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22border+zone%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1), within which U.S. Customs and Border Patrol can set up immigration checkpoints.

Congressman Peter Welch of Vermont is the prime sponsor of the legislation.

Kuster was stopped at one such immigration checkpoint in June of this year. The checkpoint, on I-93 in Woodstock, around 90 miles from the border, resulted in 29 tickets for alleged immigration violations.

The violations were for legal visitors who did not have appropriate paperwork on them, according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

According to a map from CityLabs, the entire state of New Hampshire falls within a border zone (which includes coastal borders).

“I think it has a chilling effect,” says Kuster. “It’s not the free and open America that we know.”

Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a similar bill to the Senate.

▻https://www.nhpr.org/post/kuster-backs-bill-reduce-100-mile-zone-border-patrol-checkpoints#stream/0
#USA #Etats-Unis

Inside the Massive U.S. ’Border Zone’

All of Michigan, D.C., and a large chunk of Pennsylvania are part of the area where Border Patrol has expanded search and seizure rights. Here’s what it means to live or travel there.

▻https://cdn.citylab.com/media/img/citylab/2018/05/03_Esri_Map/940.png?mod=1548686763

►https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/who-lives-in-border-patrols-100-mile-zone-probably-you-mapped/558275
#cartographie #visualisation
#100-Mile_Zone

déjà signalé sur seenthis par @reka en 2018 :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/727225

En #Hongrie, les pushbacks, largement pratiqués depuis des années, ont été légalisés en mars 2017 par de nouvelles dispositions permettant aux forces de l’ordre de refouler automatiquement toute personne interpellée sur le territoire hongrois et considérée en situation irrégulière. Ces personnes sont ramenées jusqu’à la clôture et renvoyées de l’autre côté. Si elles manifestent leur volonté de demander l’asile, on leur signifie qu’elles doivent repartir en Serbie et passer par les zones de transit. Pourtant, se trouvant géographiquement et juridiquement en Hongrie (le mur étant situé à 1,5 mètre à l’intérieur du tracé officiel de la frontière), les autorités ont l’obligation de prendre en compte ces demandes d’asile en vertu des conventions européennes et des textes internationaux dont la Hongrie est signataire.

Tiré du rapport de La Cimade (2018), pp.37-38 :
►https://www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/La_Cimade_Schengen_Frontieres.pdf

Le zone di transito e di frontiera – commento dell’ASGI al decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 5 agosto 2019

Il 7 settembre 2009 sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 210 (►https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2019/09/07/19A05525/sg) è stato pubblicato il decreto del Ministero dell’Interno del 5 agosto 2019 che individua le zone di transito e di frontiera dove potrà trovare applicazione la procedura accelerata per l’esame nel merito delle domande di protezione internazionale e istituisce due nuove sezioni delle Commissioni territoriali , come previsto dall’art. 28 bis co. 1 quater del D.lgs. n. 25/2008, introdotto dal d.l. n. 113/2018.

Le zone di frontiera o di transito sono individuate in quelle esistenti nelle seguenti province:

–Trieste e Gorizia;

–Crotone, Cosenza, Matera, Taranto, Lecce e Brindisi;

–Caltanissetta, Ragusa, Siracusa, Catania, Messina;

–Trapani, Agrigento;

–Città metropolitana di Cagliari e Sud Sardegna.

Il decreto ministeriale istituisce altresì due nuove sezioni , Matera e Ragusa, le quali operano rispettivamente nella commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato di Bari, per la zona di frontiera di Matera, e nella commissione territoriale di Siracusa, per la zona di frontiera di Ragusa.

Nel commento qui pubblicato ASGI sottolinea come le nuove disposizioni paiono contrastare con le norme dell’Unione Europea perché si riferiscono in modo assolutamente generico alle “zone di transito o di frontiera individuate in quelle esistenti nelle province” e non ad aree delimitate, quali ad esempio i porti o le aree aeroportuali o altri luoghi coincidenti con frontiere fisiche con Paesi terzi non appartenenti all’Unione europea.

ASGI evidenzia come “l’applicazione delle procedure accelerate alle domande presentate nelle zone individuate nel decreto ministeriale comporta una restrizione dell’effettivo esercizio dei diritti di cui ogni straniero è titolare allorché manifesta la volontà di presentare la domanda di asilo e una conseguente contrazione del diritto di difesa, in ragione del dimezzamento dei termini di impugnazione e dell’assenza di un effetto sospensivo automatico derivante dalla proposizione del ricorso previsti, in modo differente per le varie ipotesi specifiche, dall’art. 35 bis D. Lgs. 25/08”.

A tal fine ASGI ricorda che:

– ai cittadini di Paesi terzi o apolidi tenuti in centri di trattenimento o presenti ai valichi di frontiera, comprese le zone di transito alla frontiere esterne, che desiderino presentare una domanda di protezione internazionale, gli Stati membri devono garantire l’informazione, anche sull’accesso procedura per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale, adeguati servizi di interpretariato,
nonché l’effettivo accesso a tali aree alle organizzazioni e alle persone che prestano consulenza e assistenza ai richiedenti asilo (art. 8 Direttiva 2013/32/UE);

– gli Stati membri devono provvedere affinché l’avvocato o altro consulente legale che assiste o rappresenta un richiedente possa accedere alle aree chiuse, quali i centri di trattenimento e le zone di transito (art. 23 par. 2) e analoga possibilità deve essere garantita all’UNHCR (art. 29, par. 1);

– ai sensi dell’art. 46 par. 1 il richiedente ha diritto a un ricorso effettivo dinanzi a un giudice anche nel caso in cui la decisione sulla domanda di protezione internazionale venga presa in frontiera o nelle zone di transito.

E’ evidente, conclude ASGI nel commento al Decreto, che vi sia il rischio che lo straniero espulso o respinto e che abbia presentato domanda di protezione internazionale dopo l’espulsione o il respingimento in una zona di frontiera tra quelle indicate nel nuovo decreto ministeriale si veda esaminata la sua domanda in modo sommario mentre è trattenuto in condizioni e luoghi imprecisati e inaccessibili di fatto a difensori e organizzazioni di tutela dei diritti.

Occorre invece ribadire che la presentazione della domanda di protezione internazionale in frontiera riguarderà spesso persone rese ulteriormente vulnerabili dalle condizioni traumatiche del viaggio ed alle quali andrà perciò in ogni caso garantito un esame adeguato della domanda di protezione internazionale e l’applicazione delle garanzie e dei diritti previsti a tutela dei richiedenti protezione internazionale dalle disposizioni nazionali e dell’Unione Europea.

▻https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/asilo-zone-transito-frontiera

La loi renforçant la lutte contre le terrorisme étend à nouveau les contrôles d’identités frontaliers

Avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi du 30 octobre 2017, les #contrôles_frontaliers étaient autorisés dans les espaces publics des #gares, #ports et #aéroports ouverts au trafic international (désignés par un arrêté ministériel) et dans une zone située entre la frontière terrestre et une ligne tracée de 20 kilomètres en deçà. Le législateur avait étendu les zones frontalières, notamment dans les territoires ultra-marins (où la convention de Schengen n’est pourtant pas applicable).

►https://www.editions-legislatives.fr/actualite/la-loi-renforcant-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-etend-a-nouvea
#France #20_km #20_kilomètres #espace_public #gares_internationales

The Grand Chamber Judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary: Immigration Detention and how the Ground beneath our Feet Continues to Erode

The ECtHR has been for a long time criticized for its approach to immigration detention that diverts from the generally applicable principles to deprivation of liberty in other contexts. As Cathryn Costello has observed in her article Immigration Detention: The Ground beneath our Feet, a major weakness in the Court’s approach has been the failure to scrutinize the necessity of immigration detention under Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR. The Grand Chamber judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary delivered on 21 November 2019 has further eroded the protection extended to asylum-seekers under the Convention to the point that restrictions imposed upon asylum-seekers might not even be qualified as deprivation of liberty worthy of the protection of Article 5. The Grand Chamber overruled on this point the unanimously adopted Chamber judgment that found that the holding of asylum-seekers in the ‘transit zone’ between Hungary and Serbia actually amounts to deprivation of liberty.

In this blog, I will briefly describe the facts of the case, the findings of the Grand Chamber under Article 3 ECHR that was also invoked by the applicants and then I will focus on the reasoning as to the applicability of Article 5.

The case concerned two Bangladeshi nationals who transited through Greece, the Republic of Northern Macedonia (as it is now known) and Serbia before reaching Hungary, where they immediately applied for asylum. They found themselves in the transit zone on the land border between Hungary and Serbia, where they were held for 23 days pending the examination of their asylum applications. The applications were rejected on the same day on the ground that the applicants had transited through Serbia that, according to Hungary, was a safe third country. The rejections were confirmed on appeal, an order for their expulsion was issued, the applicants were escorted out of the transit zone and they crossed back into Serbia.

Procedural Breach of Article 3 ECHR

The Grand Chamber established that Hungary ‘failed to discharge its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to assess the risks of treatment contrary to that provision before removing the applicants from Hungary’ to Serbia (para 163). No finding was made on the issue as to whether Hungary was substantively in breach of the right not to be subjected to refoulement given the conditions in Serbia and the deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedures that might lead to chain refoulement. This omission follows a trend in the Court’s reasoning that can be described as a procedural turn: focus on the quality of the national decision making processes rather than on the substantive accuracy of the decisions taken at national level.[1] This omission, however, had important consequences for the application of Article 5 to the applicants’ case, the most controversial aspect in the Grand Chamber’s reasoning.

The Chamber’s reasoning under Article 5 ECHR

On this aspect, the Grand Chamber departed from the Chamber’s conclusion that the applicants were deprived of their liberty. The fundamental question here is whether ‘the stay’ (Hungary used the term ‘accommodation’) of asylum-seekers in the ‘transit zone’ with an exit door open to Serbia, but closed to Hungary, amounts to deprivation of liberty (i.e. detention) in the sense of Article 5 ECHR. Asylum seekers in the transit zone were denied access to the Hungarian territory,[2] but they could leave to Serbia. This creates a complex intertwinement between deprivation of liberty (Article 5(1)(f)) normally understood as not allowing somebody to leave a place, on the one hand, and not allowing somebody to enter a place. Entering a State can be very relevant from the perspective of the obligation upon this State not to refoule, which necessitates a procedure for determining whether there is a risk of refoulement.

In its judgment from 14 March 2017 the Chamber unanimously answered in positive: by holding them in the transit zone, Hungary deprived the applicants from their liberty, which was in violation of Article 5(1)(f) since this measures had no legal basis in the national law. The Chamber clarified that‘[t]he mere fact that it was possible for them to leave voluntarily returning to Serbia which never consented to their readmission cannot rule out an infringement of the right to liberty.’ (para 55). In this way the Chamber reaffirmed the reasoning in Amuur v France where the Court observed ‘[…] this possibility [to leave voluntary the country] becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared to take them in.’ (para 48) It follows that although the transit zone at the French airport was, as France argued, “open to the outside”, the applicants were still considered as having been detained since this ‘outside’ did not offer a level of protection comparable to the one in France.

The Chamber followed this reasoning from Amuur v France in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, which led to the recognition that ‘[…] the applicants could not have left the transit zone in the direction of Serbia without unwanted and grave consequences, that is, without forfeiting their asylum claims and running the risk of refoulement’ (para 55). The Chamber also added that ‘To hold otherwise would void the protection afforded by Article 5 of the Convention by compelling the applicants to choose between liberty and the pursuit of a procedure ultimately aimed to shelter them from the risk of exposure to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.’ (para 56)

The ‘practical and realistic’ approach of the Grand Chamber under Article 5 ECHR

The Grand Chamber in its reasoning broke precisely this linkage between the applicability of Article 5 (the qualification of a treatment as deprivation of liberty) and Article 3 (protection from refoulement). The Grand Chamber performed the following important moves to achieve this. First, it stated that ‘its approach should be practical and realistic, having regard to the present-day conditions and challenges’, which implied that States were not only entitled to control their borders, but also ‘to take measures against foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration.’ (para 213). With Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary the Court has thus added another nuance to its well-established point of departure in cases dealing with migrants. This point of departure has been that States are entitled, subject to their treaty obligations, to control their borders. The new addition introduced with Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary and also repeated in Z.A. and Others v Russia, a Grand Chamber judgment issued on the same day, concerns States’ right to prevent ‘foreigners circumventing restrictions on immigration’. This addition, however, does not seem appropriate given that the applicants themselves in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary never circumvented any immigration control restrictions. They applied immediately for asylum.

This ‘practical and realistic approach’ also implied an endorsement of the representation of the situation as one of ‘crisis’:[3] ‘the Court observes that the Hungarian authorities were in conditions of a mass influx of asylum-seekers and migrants at the border, which necessitated rapidly putting in place measures to deal with what was clearly a crisis situation.’ (para 228) In the same paragraph, the Grand Chamber went on to almost praise Hungary for having processed the applicants’ claims so fast event though it was ‘a crisis’: ‘Despite the ensuring very significant difficulties, the applicants’ asylum claims and their judicial appeals were examined within three weeks and two days.’ It appears as if the Grand Chamber at this stage had already forgotten its findings made earlier in the judgment under Article 3 that the national procedure for examining the applicants’ claims was deficient. This ultimately gave the basis for the Grand Chamber to find a violation of Article 3.

The distinction based on how asylum-seekers arrive and the type of border they find themselves at

The second move performed by the Grand Chamber implied the introduction of a distinction between ‘staying at airport transit zones’ (para 214) and at reception centers located on islands (para 216), on the one hand, and a transit zone located on the land border between two Council of Europe Member States (para 219). This meant, as the Court reasoned, that the applicants did not have to take a plane to leave the zone, they could simply walk out of the zone. In other words, it was practically possible for them to do it on their own and they did not need anybody’s help. As the Court continued to reason in para 236, ‘Indeed, unlike the case of Amuur, where the French courts described the applicants’ confinement as an “arbitrary deprivation of liberty”, in the present case the Hungarian authorities were apparently convinced that the applicants could realistically leave in the direction of Serbia [emphasis added].’ This quotation also begs the comment as to why what the national authorities were or were not convinced about actually mattered. In addition, the reference in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary as to how the national authorities had qualified the situation is also bizarre given that ‘deprivation of liberty’ is an autonomous concept under the Convention. On this point, the two dissenting judges, Judge Bianku and Judge Vućinić criticized the majority by highlighting that ‘the Court has reiterated on many occasions that it does not consider itself bound by the domestic courts’ legal conclusions as to the existence of a deprivation of liberty.’

Narrowing down the importance of Amuur v France

The third move performed by the Court is playing down the importance of and narrowing the relevance of Amuur v France. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary the Grand Chamber reiterated (para 239) the most significant pronouncement from Amuur: the possibility to leave the zone ‘becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is included to take them in.’ It then noted that this reasoning ‘must be read in close relation to the factual and legal context in that case.’ This meant that in contrast to the situation in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, in Amuur the applicants could not leave ‘without authorization to board an airplane and without diplomatic assurance concerning their only possible destination, Syria, a country “not bound by the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.’ (para 240) On this point Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary can be also distinguished from Z.A. and Others v Russia, where the Grand Chamber observed that ‘[…] unlike in land border transit zones, in this particular case leaving the Sheremetyevo airport transit zone would have required planning, contacting aviation companies, purchasing tickets and possibly applying for a visa depending on the destination.’ (para 154) For the applicants in Ilias and Ahmed ‘it was practically possible […] to walk to the border and cross into Serbia, a country bound by the Geneva Convention.’ (para 241). The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the applicants feared of the deficiencies in the Serbian asylum procedure and the related risk of removal to the Republic of North Macedonia or Greece. (para 242) However, what seems to be crucial is that their fears were not related to ‘direct threat to their life or health’ (para 242). It follows that the possibility to leave for a place will not preclude the qualification of the situation as one of detention, only if this place poses a direct threat to life or health.

As noted by the two dissenting judges, it did not seem to matter for the majority that the applicants could not enter Serbia lawfully. In this way, the majority’s reasoning under Article 5 appears to endorse a situation where people are just pushed out of the border without some formal procedures with elementary guarantees.

Read as a whole the Grand Chamber judgment in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary is inconsistent: it contains two findings that are difficult to square together. The Court concluded that since the applicants would not be exposed to a direct risk in Serbia, they were not detained in Hungary. At the same time, Hungary violated Article 3 of the Convention since it did not conduct a proper assessment of the risks that the applicants could face if they were to return to Serbia.

Overall weakening of the protection of Article 5 ECHR

One final comment is due. In Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, the Grand Chamber summarized the following factors for determining whether ‘confinement of foreigners in airport transit zones and reception centers’ can be defined as deprivation of liberty: ‘i) the applicants’ individual situation and their choices, ii) the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose, iii) the relevant duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection enjoyed by applicants pending the events, and iv) the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants.’ (para 217) (see also Z.A. and Others v Russia, para 145) Among these criteria particular attention needs to be directed to the applicable legal regime and the availability of procedural protection. In principle, Article 5, if found applicable, offers certain guarantees (e.g. statutory basis for the deprivation of liberty, access to proceedings for challenging the lawfulness of the detention). The Court seems to have inserted such considerations at the definitional stage of its analysis. For example, in Z.A. and Others v Russia, the Grand Chamber when it examined whether the confinement of the applicants in the airport transit zone amounted to deprivation of liberty, noted that they were left ‘in a legal limbo without any possibility of challenging the measure restricting their liberty’ (para 146). This played a role for the Grand Chamber to conclude that the applicants in Z.A. and Others v Russia were indeed deprived of liberty and Article 5 was thus found applicable. In contrast, the Grand Chamber in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary observed that certain procedural guarantees applied to the applicants’ case (para 226), which also played a role for the final conclusion that Article 5 was not applicable. In sum, instead of scrutinizing the national legal regime and the access to procedural guarantees as part of the substantive analysis under Article 5, where a single deficiency leads to a finding of a violation (i.e. it is sufficient to find a violation of Article 5 if there is no strictly defined statutory basis for the applicants’ detention), the Court has muddled these criteria together with other factors and made them pertinent for the definitional analysis. This ultimately weakens the roles of these criteria and creates uncertainty.

[1] See V Stoyanova, ‘How Exception must “Very Exceptional” Be? Non-refoulement, Socio-Economic Deprivation and Paposhvili v Belgium’ (2017) International Journal of Refugee Law 29(4) 580.

[2] See B Nagy, ‘From Reluctance to Total Denial: Asylum Policy in Hungary 2015-2018’ in V Stoyanova and E Karageorgiou (eds) The New Asylum and Transit Countries in Europe during and in the Aftermath of the 2015/2016 Crisis (Brill 2019) 17.

[3] Boldizsar Nagy has argued that this representation made by the Hungarian government is a lie. See B Nagy, Restricting access to asylum and contempt of courts: illiberals at work in Hungary, ▻https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/restricting-access-to-asylum-and-contempt-of-courts-illiberals-at

▻https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/12/23/the-grand-chamber-judgment-in-ilias-and-ahmed-v-hungary-immigra
#justice #CEDH #Hongrie #CourEDH

Entre la #Pologne et la #Biélorussie:

Si cette famille a pu être aidée, c’est aussi parce qu’elle a réussi à dépasser la zone de l’état d’urgence : une bande de 3 km tracée par la Pologne tout du long de sa frontière avec la Biélorussie, formellement interdite d’accès aux organisations comme aux journalistes.
Le long de la frontière, les migrants se retrouvent donc seuls entre les gardes-frontières polonais et biélorusses. Côté polonais, ils sont ramenés manu militari en Biélorussie… En Biélorussie, ils sont également refoulés : depuis octobre, le pays refuse de laisser entrer les migrants déjà passés côté européen. « La seule chance de sortir de la Pologne, c’est d’entrer en Biélorussie. La seule chance de sortir de la Biélorussie, c’est d’entrer en Pologne. C’est comme un ping-pong », confie Nelson (pseudonyme), un migrant originaire de la République démocratique du Congo qui a contacté notre rédaction.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/948199
et plus précisément ici:
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/948199#message948201

–-

Et l’article de Médiapart:
Entre la Pologne et le Belarus, les migrants abandonnés dans une #zone_de_non-droit
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/948199#message948202

–-

Et ici:
Poland : Government pledges to do what is needed to end Belarus border problems
“On June 13, Poland instigated once again a special no-entry buffer zone along about 60 kilometers of its border with Belarus. The zone is 200 meters wide and is off-limits to all non-residents. That includes humanitarian groups and journalists.”
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1061817

–—

The law on the State Border of the Republic of Belarus of July 21, 2008 (No. 419-Z) establishes two types of border regimes along the country’s entire border: a border zone and a border strip, often referred to as #Sistiema. The border zone can extend up to an average depth of 30 km from the border, including cities, urban-type settlements, villages and other residential or business facilities. The border strip is narrower — up to 10 km deep — and solely intended for the construction of facilities needed to protect the state border. People in either of zones must comply with certain rules, which include carrying identification documents. They can only enter the border strip with a special permit issued by the border authorities.

(p.18)

▻https://en.ocalenie.org.pl/news/the-premiere-of-the-report-no-safe-passage-migrants-deaths-at-the-eu

« À titre de mesures compensatoires à l’entrée en vigueur de la convention de Schengen – qui, du reste, n’était pas encore applicable –, la loi du 10 août 1993 instaure les contrôles dits frontaliers : la police, la gendarmerie et la douane peuvent vérifier l’identité de toute personne, pour s’assurer qu’elle respecte les obligations liées à la détention d’un titre de circulation ou de séjour, dans la zone frontalière et dans les zones publiques des ports, aéroports et gares ouvertes au trafic international. La zone frontalière est une bande de terre, large de 20 km, longeant la frontière terrestre ; les ports, gares ou autres aérogares visés figurent sur une longue liste fixée par un arrêté ministériel. »

(Ferré 2018 : 16)

–-

« Il suffit de passer quelques heures à la gare de Menton pour le constater. Pour les personnes présumées étrangères, la liberté d’aller et de venir dans les espaces placés sous surveillance est restreinte. Elle a encore été réduite avec la loi du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme qui modifie, une fois de plus, le texte de loi sur les contrôles d’identité en étendant les zones frontalières autour de certains ports et aéroports qui constituent des points de passage frontaliers au sens du code frontières Schengen, soit « tout point de passage autorisé par les autorités compétentes pour le franchissement des frontières extérieures ». Dans ces nouvelles zones, la police pourra procéder à des opérations de contrôle sans avoir besoin de motiver son intervention. La loi de 2017 a également prévu que les contrôles frontaliers puissent s’effectuer « aux abords des gares » et non plus seulement dans les zones publiques de ces lieux. La formulation souffre, c’est peu de le dire, d’un manque de précision qui donne plus de latitude encore aux forces de l’ordre. »

(Ferré 2018 : 19)

source : Nathalie Ferré, « La France s’enferme à double tour », Plein Droit, 2018, n°116.

#20_km #20_kilomètres

#Pyrénées, frontière #Espagne-#France, témoignage d’une personne ayant acheté un terrain en zone frontalière :

« En ce moment, on croise plein de voitures de forces de l’ordre, ce qui est étonnant en plein hiver car il n’y a personne. Il y a aussi des barrages de police réguliers car ils savent que des gens se font prendre sur la route », raconte Camille Rosa, cofondatrice d’une cantine solidaire à Perpignan. « On a acheté avec des copains un petit terrain vers Cerbère. Un jour, des gendarmes sont venus fouiller notre camion alors que mes enfants faisaient la sieste à l’intérieur. J’ai tenté de m’interposer, mais ils m’ont dit que sur la #zone_frontalière, ils avaient une #commission_rogatoire_permanente », poursuit-elle.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/950934

Abus de pouvoir, je pense. Mais un camion est un véhicule…
▻https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/id/LEGIARTI000037399447/2022-02-27/?isSuggest=true

#France :

Le contrôle d’identité « Schengen » permet de vérifier le respect des obligations liées aux titres et documents d’identité et de voyage. Il peut avoir lieu dans une zone située à moins de #20_kilomètres de la frontière terrestre séparant la France d’un pays limitrophe (Allemagne, Belgique, Espagne, Italie, Luxembourg et Suisse). Si le contrôle a lieu sur l’autoroute ou dans un train, la zone s’étend jusqu’au 1er péage ou l’arrêt après les 20 kilomètres. Le contrôle peut être effectué dans un port, un aéroport ou une gare et ses abords accessible au public et ouverte au trafic international. Le contrôle ne peut pas être pratiqué plus de 12 heures consécutives dans un même lieu et ne peut pas être systématique.

Depuis la loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure, des contrôles d’identité peuvent également être effectués dans un rayon de #10_kilomètres autour de certains #ports et #aéroports sur le territoire.

C’est ce dernier contrôle qui concerne majoritairement les personnes se présentant à la frontière francoitalienne, mais certaines situations suivies par les militants locaux laissent penser que d’autres types de contrôles ont pu servir pour justifier les arrestations de personnes au-delà de la bande des 20 kilomètres ou des zones transfrontalières.

Rapport de l’Anafé, Persona non grata, 2019 : ►http://www.anafe.org/spip.php?article520

–—

Rapport CNCDH 2018, p.7 :

« la préfète des Hautes-Alpes a expliqué que la zone permettant de procéder à des refus d’entrée avait été définie par son prédécesseur mais qu’elle ne correspondait pas nécessairement à la bande des 20 kms14. Selon la PAF, les refus d’entrée peuvent être prononcés dès lors que l’étranger est contrôlé sur le territoire des communes de Montgenèvre et Nevache, et donc jusqu’à l’entrée de Briançon. »
Il convient de rappeler que des contrôles aléatoires, hors du cadre dérogatoire prévu en cas de rétablissement des frontières, peuvent être opérés, conformément à l’article 78-2 du code de procédure pénale, dans une zone comprise entre la frontière terrestre de la France avec les Etats de l’espace et une ligne tracée à 20 kilomètres en deçà, ainsi que dans les zones accessibles au public des ports, aéroports et gares ferroviaires ou routières ouverts au trafic international et désignés par arrêté et aux abords de ces gares. Ces contrôles sont toutefois strictement encadrés, notamment par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne. Les personnes interpellées sur ce fondement peuvent faire l’objet d’une procédure de réadmission. En revanche, lorsque les contrôles aux frontières intérieures sont rétablis, les autorités françaises peuvent refuser l’entrée aux étrangers ne remplissant pas les conditions d’entrée sur le territoire aux frontières terrestres et leur notifier une décision de non-admission. Ces étrangers sont considérés comme n’étant pas entrés sur le territoire

▻https://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/avis-sur-la-situation-des-migrants-la-frontiere-franco-italienne

#10_km #20_km

100-MILE BORDER ENFORCEMENT ZONE

https://i.imgur.com/w232VTW.png

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/963608

Et à qui appartiennent les #îlots dans la région de l’#Evros ?

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L477xH678/iPZn7yQpng-42ef2-b09a4.png

Dans ce fil de discussion :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/968374
et plus précisément ici :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/968374#message969971

#Thrace #Grèce #Turquie

No man’s land: three people seeking asylum stuck in Cyprus’s #buffer_zone

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH403/Od9vDm1png-11f9d-b0ee1.png

#Chypre #Chpre_du_Nord #Turquie

Novembre 2022 :
Le maintien en zone d’attente des rescapés de l’Ocean Viking dans la zone portuaire militaire de #Toulon et dans un #centre_de_vacances de la #presqu’île de #Giens à #Hyères :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/979556

Sur le #Bibby_Stockholm barge at #Portland Port :

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/c51ea9690-856390/O3svwnZiAyTQ/Q60HYouNPxgQwJejO4z6GXGM8DaTejBjJC1q8NXT.png

“Since the vessel is positioned below the mean low water mark, it did not require planning permission”

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1000870#message1011761

voir aussi :

“The circumstances at Portland Port are very different because where the barge is to be positioned is below the mean low water mark. This means that the barge is outside of our planning control and there is no requirement for planning permission from the council.”

►https://news.dorsetcouncil.gov.uk/2023/07/18/leaders-comments-on-the-home-office-barge

#UK #Angleterre

The ‘Border’ under EU Law

The first argument made by the Catania Tribunal regards the correct initiation of a border procedure. According to the judge, the procedure was not applied „at the border“, as understood by EU law (Art. 43 Directive 2013/32). Indeed, the applicants arrived and made their asylum application in Lampedusa (province of Agrigento) but the detention was ordered several days later in Pozzallo (Ragusa province) when the applicants were no longer „at the border.“ Because the border procedure (involving detention) was utilized at a later stage and in a different place, it was not appropriately initiated.

In support of the Catania Tribunal’s conclusion, we should recall that Article 43 the Procedures Directive requires a spatial and temporal link between the border crossing and the activation of the border procedure (►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013L0032). Although the Directive does not define the terms „border“ or „transit zone“, it clearly distinguishes these areas from other „locations in the proximity of the border or transit zone“ (Article 43(3)), where applicants can be exceptionally accommodated but never detained. The distinction between the border and other places in its vicinity suggests that the procedure provided for in Art. 43 can only be applied in narrow and well-defined areas or in pre-identified transit zones (such as the Hungarian transit zones examined by the Court in FMS and Commission v Hungary).

Other EU law instruments support this narrow interpretation of the “border” concept. Regulation 1931/2006 defines a „border area“ as a delimited space within 30 km from the Member State’s border. In the Affum case, the Court also called for a narrow interpretation of the spatial concept of „border.“ There, the Court clarified that the Return Directive allows Member States to apply a simplified return procedure at their external borders in order to „ensure that third-country nationals do not enter [their] territory“ (a purpose which resonates with that of Art. 8(3)(c) Reception Directive). However, such a procedure can only be applied if there is a „direct temporal and spatial link with the crossing of the border“, i.e. „at the time of the irregular crossing of the border or near that border after it has been crossed“ (par. 72).

By contrast, under the Italian accelerated procedure, the border has blurred contours. The new procedure, relying on the “#fiction_of_non-entry” (►https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/654201/EPRS_STU(2020)654201_EN.pdf), can be carried out not only „at“ the border and in transit zones or in areas territorially „close“ to the border, but in entire provinces in southern and northern Italy. This far exceeds the narrow definition of border or border area derived from EU law.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/1018938#message1023987
#fiction_de_non-entrée

–—

Ce terme est empruntée d’une vieille loi des Etats-Unis, The Immigration Act 1891 :

“The Immigration Act 1891 was the first to expressly mention detention, as it made provision for officers to ’inspect all such aliens’ or ’to orcier a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a de ignated time and place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection is made’. The Act alsa created the very important provision that came to be known as the ’entry fiction’. According to this, a removal to shore for examination ’shall not be considered a landing during the pendency of such examination’. This was a criticallegal (and constitutional) innovation because it meant that th ose incarcerated must be treated as if they were not there. This was both an attempt to treat the place of detention as if it were sim ply an extension ofbeing held on board ship, but also something more serious. The concept of being physically detained within the territorial land-mass of the United States but not being considered legally present was radical. It suggested a kind of limbo - with the detention centre constituting perhaps an extra-legal space- putting immigrants beyond the reach of constitutional norms, pending a final executive decision to land or deport them.”

source : Daniel Wilsher, Immigration detention : law, history, politics, 2012, p. 13

#Green_Border

Dans le film Green Border, on voit bien la mise en place d’une bande frontalière (#zone_interdite / #état_d'urgence) où les activistes n’ont pas le droit d’entrer et les réfugiés sont instrumentalisés par la #Pologne et la #Biélorussie :

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L515xH700/4070311jpg-995ae-fb73f.jpg

►https://seenthis.net/messages/1041323

#zone_d'exclusion

Autour du nouveau #pacte (#Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile)

3) Introduzione del concetto di “finzione del non ingresso”

Il patto introduce il concetto di “finzione giuridica di non ingresso”, secondo il quale le zone di frontiera sono considerate come non parte del territorio degli Stati membri. Questo interessa in particolare l’Italia, la Grecia e la Spagna per gli sbarchi della rotta mediterranea, mentre sono più articolati “i confini” per la rotta balcanica. Durante le 12 settimane di attesa per l’esito della richiesta di asilo, le persone sono considerate legalmente “non presenti nel territorio dell’UE”, nonostante esse fisicamente lo siano (in centri di detenzione ai confini), non avranno un patrocinio legale gratuito per la pratica amministrativa e tempi brevissimi per il ricorso in caso di un primo diniego (e in quel caso rischiano anche di essere espulse durante l’attesa della decisione che li riguarda). In assenza di accordi con i paesi di origine (come nella maggioranza dei casi), le espulsioni avverranno verso i paesi di partenza.

Tale concetto creadelle pericolose “zone grigie” in cui le persone in movimento, trattenute per la procedura accelerata di frontiera, non potranno muoversi sul territorio né tantomeno accedere a un supporto esterno. Tutto questo in spregio del diritto internazionale e della tutela della persona che, sulla carta, l’UE si propone(va) di difendere.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/1050383

Legal fiction of non-entry in EU asylum policy

The fiction of ’#non-entry' is a claim that states use in border management to deny the legal arrival of third-country nationals on their territory, regardless of their physical presence, until granted entry by a border or immigration officer. It is usually applied in transit zones at international airports between arrival gates and passport control, signifying that the persons who have arrived have not yet entered the territory of the destination country. Although physically present, they are not considered to have legally entered the country’s official territory until they have undergone the necessary clearance. In the EU, all Member States make use of the fiction of non-entry in transit zones at ports of entry, but usually in a non-asylum context. In 2018, Germany was one of the first Member States to extend this concept to include land crossings. Since the mass arrival of asylum-seekers in 2015-2016, other Member States too have increasingly looked into ways of using this claim to inhibit asylum-seekers’ entry to their territory and thereby avoid the obligation under international law to provide them with certain protection and aid. This, however, may lead to a risk of refoulement, as the fiction of non-entry limits asylum-seekers’ movement and access to rights and procedures, including the asylum procedure. This is a revised edition of a briefing published in March 2024.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/1050973
#fiction_légale #legal_fiction #non-entrée #aéroports #territoire #géographie #zones_frontalières #zones_de_transit #présence_physique

A la frontière franco-italienne, dans une décision-cadre de la Défenseure des droits (25.04.2024) :

La Défenseure a par exemple constaté que des refus d’entrée sont opposés à des personnes contrôlées en dehors des points de passage frontaliers formellement identifiés. Elles se trouvent donc déjà sur le territoire français et devraient en conséquence se voir appliquer d’autres procédures de contrôle.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1051274

« Enfermé·es nulle part », un documentaire sonore sur les #zones_d’attente
–-> parle de "#fiction_juridique" à la min. 12’06
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1051543

Evoluzione e funzionamento della frontiera verticale messicana

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH425/mappa-migrazedeb-315db.jpg

Après trois ans confinés sur une île de l’océan Indien, le « soulagement » d’exilés tamouls

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/9da63c77d-bc90ba/tBdagfnLd6Bd/ZaFPEAq0vrZTsxQ5Odsq2PyuV2TrxJPLYuppRWuO.png

#îles_Chagos #Diego_Garcia #océan_indien

Et un commentaire au message, toujours reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop :
En complément, un PDF très complet est disponible ici :
« Analyse juridique Le Régime d’Asile
Européen Commun - introduction à l’attention des juridictions »
▻https://www.easo.europa.eu/file/25988/ent.jsf

New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

Quotes

Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

“The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

“The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

New EU deportation law breaches fundamental rights standards and should be rejected

A proposed new EU law governing standards and procedures for deportations would breach fundamental rights standards, massively expand the use of detention, limit appeal rights and undermine ’voluntary’ return initiatives. It should be rejected by the European Parliament and the Council, argues a new analysis published today by Statewatch. [1]

The original Returns Directive was agreed in 2008, but a proposal for a ’recast’ version was published by the European Commission in September 2018 as one a number of measures aiming to crack down on “illegally staying third-country nationals” in the EU. [2]

The proposal aims to increase the number of deportations from the EU by reducing or eliminating existing safeguards for those facing deportation proceedings - but even if such a method could be considered legitimate, there is no evidence to suggest that the proposed measures will have the intended effect.

For example, the proposal introduces numerous new grounds for placing migrants in detention and would introduce a new ’minimum maximum’ period of detention of at least three months. [3]

However, in 2017, Spain (with a maximum detention period of 60 days) had a ’return rate’ of 37%, while the return rate from countries with a detention limit of 18 months (the maximum period permitted under the current Returns Directive) differed significantly: 11% in the Czech Republic, 18% in Belgium, 40% in Greece and 46% in Germany. [4]

The report urges EU lawmakers to discard the proposal and focus on alternative measures that would be less harmful to individuals. It includes an article-by-article analysis of the Commission’s proposal and the positions of the European Parliament and the Council, as they were prior to the EU institutions’ summer break.

The European Parliament and the Council of the EU will begin discussing the proposal again in the coming weeks.

Quotes

Statewatch researcher Jane Kilpatrick said:

“The proposed recast prioritises detention for more people and for longer durations - the physical and mental harms of which are well-known, especially for people with prior traumatic experiences - over any collaborative measures. The recast would remove the option for states to adopt measures more respectful of human rights and health. The fact that it hasn’t relied on any evidence that these will even work suggests it is a political exercise to appease anti-migrant rhetoric.”

Chris Jones, a researcher at Statewatch, added:

“The EU cannot claim to be a bastion of human rights at the same time as trying to undermine or eliminate existing safeguards for third-country nationals subject to deportation proceedings. Given that there is no evidence to suggest the proposed measures would actually work, it seems that lawmakers are dealing with a proposal that would be both harmful and ineffective. The previous MEP responsible for the proposal did a good job of trying to improve it - but it would be better to reject it altogether.”

►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-returns-directive.htm

Gli affari lungo le frontiere. Inchiesta sugli appalti pubblici per il contrasto all’immigrazione “clandestina”

In Tunisia, Libia, Niger, Egitto e non solo. Così lo Stato italiano tramite il ministero dell’Interno finanzia imbarcazioni, veicoli, idranti per “ordine pubblico”, formazione delle polizie e sistemi automatizzati di identificazione. Ecco per chi la frontiera rappresenta un buon affare.

Uno dei luoghi chiave del “contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina” che l’Italia conduce lungo le rotte africane non si trova a Tunisi, Niamey o Tripoli, ma è in un piccolo comune del Veneto, in provincia di Rovigo, affacciato sul Canal Bianco. È ad Adria, poco distante dal Po, che ha sede “Cantiere Navale Vittoria”, un’azienda nata nel 1927 per iniziativa della famiglia Duò -ancora oggi proprietaria- specializzata in cantieristica navale militare e paramilitare. Si tratta di uno dei partner strategici della Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il ministero dell’Interno, per una serie di commesse in Libia e Tunisia.

La Direzione è il braccio del Viminale in tema di “gestione” dei flussi provenienti da quei Paesi ritenuti di “eccezionale rilevanza nella gestione della rotta del Mediterraneo centrale” (parole della Farnesina). Quella “rotta” conduce alle coste italiane: Libia e Tunisia, appunto, ma anche Niger e non solo. E quel “pezzo” del Viminale si occupa di tradurre in pratica le strategie governative. Come? Appaltando a imprese italiane attività diversissime tra loro per valore, fonti di finanziamento, tipologia e territori coinvolti. Un principio è comune: quello di dar forma al “contrasto”, sul nostro territorio o di frontiera. E per questi affidamenti ricorre più volte una formula: “Il fine che si intende perseguire è quello di collaborare con i Paesi terzi ai fini di contrastare il fenomeno dell’immigrazione clandestina”. Tra gli ultimi appalti aggiudicati a “Cantiere Navale Vittoria” (ottobre 2018) spicca la rimessa in efficienza di sei pattugliatori “P350” da 34 metri, di proprietà della Guardia nazionale della Tunisia. Tramite gli atti della procedura di affidamento si possono ricostruire filiera e calendario.

https://altreconomia.it/app/uploads/2018/12/Appalti4.jpg

Facciamo un salto indietro al giugno 2017, quando i ministeri degli Esteri e dell’Interno italiani sottoscrivono un’“intesa tecnica” per prevedere azioni di “supporto tecnico” del Viminale stesso alle “competenti autorità tunisine”. Obiettivo: “Migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”, inclusi la “lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. La spesa prevista -12 milioni di euro- dovrebbe essere coperta tramite il cosiddetto “Fondo Africa”, istituito sei mesi prima con legge di Stabilità e provvisto di una “dotazione finanziaria” di 200 milioni di euro. L’obiettivo dichiarato del Fondo è quello di “rilanciare il dialogo e la cooperazione con i Paesi africani d’importanza prioritaria per le rotte migratorie”. Le autorità di Tunisi hanno fretta, tanto che un mese dopo l’intesa tra i dicasteri chiedono all’Italia di provvedere subito alla “rimessa in efficienza” dei sei pattugliatori. Chi li ha costruiti, anni prima, è proprio l’azienda di Adria, e da Tunisi giunge la proposta di avvalersi proprio del suo “know how”. La richiesta è accolta. Trascorre poco più di un anno e nell’ottobre 2018 l’appalto viene aggiudicato al Cantiere per 6,3 milioni di euro. L’“attività di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”, scrive la Direzione immigrazione e frontiere, è di “primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale, anche alla luce dei recenti sbarchi sulle coste italiane di migranti provenienti dalle acque territoriali tunisine”. I pattugliatori da “consegnare” risistemati alla Tunisia servono quindi a impedire o limitare gli arrivi via mare nel nostro Paese, che da gennaio a metà dicembre di 2018 sono stati 23.122 (di cui 12.976 dalla Libia), in netto calo rispetto ai 118.019 (105.986 dalla Libia) dello stesso periodo del 2017.

https://altreconomia.it/app/uploads/2018/12/Appalti_MappaAfrica.jpg

A quel Paese di frontiera l’Italia non fornisce (o rimette in sesto) solamente navi. Nel luglio 2018, infatti, la Direzione del Viminale ha stipulato un contratto con la #Totani Company Srl (sede a Roma) per la fornitura di 50 veicoli #Mitsubishi 4×4 Pajero da “consegnare presso il porto di Tunisi”. Il percorso è simile a quello dei sei pattugliatori: “Considerata” l’intesa del giugno 2017 tra i ministeri italiani, “visto” il Fondo Africa, “considerata” la richiesta dei 50 mezzi da parte delle autorità nordafricane formulata nel corso di una riunione del “Comitato Italo-Tunisino”, “vista” la necessità di “definire nel più breve tempo possibile le procedure di acquisizione” per “garantire un dispiegamento efficace dei servizi di prevenzione e di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”, eccetera. E così l’offerta economica di 1,6 milioni di euro della Totani è ritenuta congrua.

Capita però che alcune gare vadano deserte. È successo per la fornitura di due “autoveicoli allestiti ‘idrante per ordine pubblico’” e per la relativa attività di formazione per 12 operatori della polizia tunisina (352mila euro la base d’asta). “Al fine di poter supportare il governo tunisino nell’ambito delle attività di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina” è il passe-partout utilizzato anche per gli idranti, anche se sfugge l’impiego concreto. Seppur deserta, gli atti di questa gara sono interessanti per i passaggi elencati. Il tutto è partito da un incontro a Roma del febbraio 2018 tra l’allora ministro dell’Interno Marco Minniti e l’omologo tunisino. “Sulla base” di questa riunione, la Direzione del Viminale “richiede” di provvedere alla commessa attraverso un “appunto” datato 27 aprile dello stesso anno che viene “decretato favorevolmente” dal “Sig. Capo della Polizia”, Franco Gabrielli. Alla gara (poi non aggiudicata) si presenta un solo concorrente, la “Brescia Antincendi International Srl”, che all’appuntamento con il ministero delega come “collaboratore” un ex militare in pensione, il tenente colonnello Virgilio D’Amata, cavaliere al merito della Repubblica Italiana. Ma è un nulla di fatto.

A Tunisi vengono quindi consegnati navi, pick-up, (mancati) idranti ma anche motori fuoribordo per quasi 600mila euro. È del settembre 2018, infatti, un nuovo “avviso esplorativo” sottoscritto dal direttore centrale dell’Immigrazione -Massimo Bontempi- per la fornitura di “10 coppie di motori Yamaha 4 tempi da 300 CV di potenza” e altri 25 da 150 CV. Il tutto al dichiarato fine di “garantire un dispiegamento efficace dei servizi di prevenzione e di contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina”.

Come per la Tunisia, anche in Libia il ritmo è scandito da “intese tecniche” tra ministeri “per l’uso dei finanziamenti” previsti nel Fondo Africa. Parlamento non pervenuto

Poi c’è la Libia, l’altro fronte strategico del “contrasto”. Come per la Tunisia, anche in questo contesto il ritmo è scandito da “intese tecniche” tra ministeri di Esteri e Interno -Parlamento non pervenuto- “per l’uso dei finanziamenti” previsti nel citato Fondo Africa. Una di queste, datata 4 agosto 2017, riguarda il “supporto tecnico del ministero dell’Interno italiano alle competenti autorità libiche per migliorare la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione, inclusi la lotta al traffico di migranti e le attività di ricerca e soccorso”. L’“eventuale spesa prevista” è di 2,5 milioni di euro. Nel novembre 2017 se n’è aggiunta un’altra, rivolta a “programmi di formazione” dei libici del valore di 615mila euro circa (sempre tratti dal Fondo Africa). Quindi si parte dalle intese e poi si passa ai contratti.

Scorrendo quelli firmati dalla Direzione immigrazione e polizia delle frontiere del Viminale tra 2017 e 2018, e che riguardano specificamente commesse a beneficio di Tripoli, il “fornitore” è sempre lo stesso: Cantiere Navale Vittoria. È l’azienda di Adria -che non ha risposto alle nostre domande- a occuparsi della rimessa in efficienza di svariate imbarcazioni (tre da 14 metri, due da 35 e una da 22) custodite a Biserta (in Tunisia) e “da restituire allo Stato della Libia”. Ma anche della formazione di 21 “operatori della polizia libica” per la loro “conduzione” o del trasporto di un’altra nave di 18 metri da Tripoli a Biserta. La somma degli appalti sfiora complessivamente i 3 milioni di euro. In alcuni casi, il Viminale dichiara di non avere alternative al cantiere veneto. Lo ha riconosciuto la Direzione in un decreto di affidamento urgente per la formazione di 22 “operatori di polizia libica” e la riconsegna di tre motovedette a fine 2017. Poiché Cantiere Navale Vittoria avrebbe un “patrimonio informativo peculiare”, qualunque ricerca di “soluzioni alternative” sarebbe “irragionevole”. Ecco perché in diverse “riunioni bilaterali di esperti” per la cooperazione tra Italia e Libia “in materia migratoria”, oltre alla delegazione libica (i vertici dell’Amministrazione generale per la sicurezza costiera del ministero dell’Interno) e quella italiana (tra cui l’allora direttore del Servizio immigrazione del Viminale, Vittorio Pisani), c’erano anche i rappresentanti di Cantiere Navale Vittoria.
Se i concorrenti sono pochi, la fretta è tanta. In più di un appalto verso la Libia, infatti, la Direzione ha argomentato le procedure di “estrema urgenza” segnalando come “ulteriori indugi”, ad esempio “nella riconsegna delle imbarcazioni”, non solo “verrebbero a gravare ingiustificatamente sugli oneri di custodia […] ma potrebbero determinare difficoltà anche di tipo diplomatico con l’interlocutore libico”. È successo nell’estate 2018 anche per l’ultimo “avviso esplorativo” da quasi 1 milione di euro collegato a quattro training (di quattro settimane) destinati a cinque equipaggi “a bordo di due unità navali da 35 metri, un’unità navale da 22 metri e un’unità navale da 28 metri di proprietà libica”, “al fine di aumentare l’efficienza di quel Paese per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale”. Lo scopo è fornire una “preparazione adeguata su ogni aspetto delle unità navali”. Della materia “diritti umani” non c’è traccia.

Questa specifica iniziativa italiana deriva dal Memorandum d’Intesa con la Libia sottoscritto a Roma dal governo Gentiloni (Marco Minniti ministro dell’Interno), il 2 febbraio 2017. Il nostro Paese si era impegnato a “fornire supporto tecnico e tecnologico agli organismi libici incaricati della lotta contro l’immigrazione clandestina”. È da lì che i governi di Italia e Libia decidono di includere tra le attività di cooperazione anche l’erogazione dei corsi di addestramento sulle motovedette ancorate a Biserta.

Ai primi di maggio del 2018, il Viminale decide di accelerare. C’è l’“urgenza di potenziare, attraverso la rimessa in efficienza delle imbarcazioni e l’erogazione di corsi di conduzione operativa, il capacity building della Guardia Costiera libica, al fine di aumentare l’efficienza di quel Paese per il contrasto dell’immigrazione illegale”. Anche perché, aggiunge il ministero, “alla luce degli ultimi eventi di partenze di migranti dalle coste libiche”, “appare strettamente necessario ed urgente favorire il pieno ripristino dell’efficienza delle competenti Autorità dello Stato della Libia nell’erogazione dei servizi istituzionali”. E così a fine giugno 2018 viene pubblicato il bando: i destinatari sono “operatori della polizia libica” e non invece le guardie costiere. Il ministero ha dovuto però “rimodulare” in corsa l’imposto a base d’asta della gara (da 763mila a 993mila euro). Perché? Il capitolato degli oneri e il verbale di stima relativi al valore complessivo dell’intera procedura sarebbero risultati “non remunerativi” per l’unico operatore interessato: Cantiere Navale Vittoria Spa, che avrebbe comunicato “di non poter sottoscrivere un’offerta adeguata”.

Le risorse per quest’ultimo appalto non arrivano dal Fondo Africa ma da uno dei sei progetti finanziati in Libia dall’Unione europea tramite il “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa” (EU Trust Fund), istituito a fine 2015 con una dotazione di oltre 4 miliardi di euro. Quello che ci riguarda in particolare s’intitola “Support to integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya – First Phase”, del valore di oltre 46 milioni di euro. Mentre l’Ue è il principale finanziatore, chi deve implementarlo in loco, dal luglio 2017, è proprio il nostro ministero dell’Interno. Che è attivo in due aree della Libia: a Nord-Ovest, a Tripoli, a beneficio delle guardie costiere libiche (tramite la costituzione di un centro di coordinamento per le operazioni di ricerca e soccorso in mare e per la dichiarazione di un’area di ricerca e soccorso in mare autonoma), e una a Sud-Ovest, nella regione del Fezzan, nel distretto di Ghat, per incrementare la capacità di sorveglianza, “in particolare nelle aree di frontiera terrestre con il Niger, maggiormente colpita dall’attraversamento illegale”. È previsto inoltre un “progetto pilota” per istituire una sede operativa per circa 300 persone, ripristinando ed equipaggiando le esistenti strutture nella città di Talwawet, non lontano da Ghat, con tre avamposti da 20 persone l’uno.

A un passo da lì c’è il Niger, l’altra tessera del mosaico. Alla metà di dicembre 2018, non risultano appalti in capo alla Direzione frontiere del Viminale, ma ciò non significa che il nostro Paese non sia attivo per supportare (anche) la gestione dei suoi confini. A metà 2017, infatti, l’Italia ha destinato 50 milioni di euro all’EU Trust Fund per “far fronte alle cause profonde della migrazione in Africa/Finestra Sahel e Lago Ciad”, con un’attenzione particolare al Niger. Si punta alla “creazione di nuove unità specializzate necessarie al controllo delle frontiere, di nuovi posti di frontiera fissa, o all’ammodernamento di quelli esistenti, di un nuovo centro di accoglienza per i migranti a Dirkou, nonché per la riattivazione della locale pista di atterraggio”. In più, dal 2018 è scesa sul campo la “Missione bilaterale di supporto nella Repubblica del Niger” (MISIN) che fa capo al ministero della Difesa e ha tra i suoi obiettivi quello di “concorrere alle attività di sorveglianza delle frontiere”. Il primo corso “per istruttori di ordine pubblico a favore della gendarmeria nigerina” si è concluso a metà ottobre 2018. Pochi mesi prima, a luglio, era stata sottoscritta un’altra “intesa tecnica” tra Esteri e Difesa per rimettere in efficienza e cedere dieci ambulanze e tre autobotti. Finalità? “Il controllo del territorio volto alla prevenzione e al contrasto ai traffici di esseri umani e al traffico di migranti, e per l’assistenza ai migranti nell’ambito delle attività di ricerca e soccorso”: 880mila euro circa. Il Niger è centrale: stando all’ultima programmazione dei Paesi e dei settori in cui sono previsti finanziamenti tramite il “Fondo Africa” (agosto 2018, fonte ministero degli Esteri), il Paese è davanti alla Libia (6 milioni contro 5 di importo massimo preventivato).

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Inabissatosi in Niger, il ministero dell’Interno riemerge in Egitto. Anche lì vigono “accordi internazionali diretti al contrasto dell’immigrazione clandestina” sostenuti dall’Italia. La loro traduzione interessa da vicino la succursale italiana della Hewlett-Packard (HP). Risale infatti a fine 2006 un contratto stipulato tra la multinazionale e la Direzione del Viminale “per la realizzazione di un Sistema automatizzato di identificazione delle impronte (AFIS) per lo Stato dell’Egitto”, finalizzato alle “esigenze di identificazione personale correlate alla immigrazione illegale”: oltre 5,2 milioni di euro per il periodo 2007-2012, cui se ne sono aggiunti ulteriori 1,8 milioni per la manutenzione ininterrotta fino al 2017 e quasi 500mila per l’ultima tranche, 2018-2019. HP non ha avversari -come riporta il Viminale- in forza di un “accordo in esclusiva” tra la Hewlett Packard Enterprise e la multinazionale della sicurezza informatica Gemalto “in relazione ai prodotti AFIS per lo Stato dell’Egitto”. Affari che non si possono discutere: “L’interruzione del citato servizio -sostiene la Direzione- è suscettibile di creare gravi problemi nell’attività di identificazione dei migranti e nel contrasto all’immigrazione clandestina, in un momento in cui tale attività è di primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale”. Oltre alla partnership con HP, il ministero dell’Interno si spende direttamente in Egitto. Di fronte alle “esigenze scaturenti dalle gravissimi crisi internazionali in vaste aree dell’Africa e dell’Asia” che avrebbero provocato “massicci esodi di persone e crescenti pressioni migratorie verso l’Europa”, la Direzione centrale immigrazione (i virgolettati sono suoi) si è fatta promotrice di una “proposta progettuale” chiamata “International Training at Egyptian Police Academy” (ITEPA). Questa prevede l’istituzione di un “centro di formazione internazionale” sui temi migratori per 360 funzionari di polizia e ufficiali di frontiera di ben 22 Paesi africani presso l’Accademia della polizia egiziana de Il Cairo. Il “protocollo tecnico” è stato siglato nel settembre 2017 tra il direttore dell’Accademia di polizia egiziana ed il direttore centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere. Nel marzo 2018, il capo della Polizia Gabrielli è volato a Il Cairo per il lancio del progetto. “Il rispetto dei diritti umani -ha dichiarato in quella sede- è uno degli asset fondamentali”.

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“La legittimità, la finalità e la consistenza di una parte dei finanziamenti citati con le norme di diritto nazionale e internazionale sono stati studiati e in alcuni casi anche portati davanti alle autorità giudiziarie dai legali dell’Associazione studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi, asgi.it)”, spiega l’avvocato Giulia Crescini, parte del collegio dell’associazione che si è occupato della vicenda. “Quando abbiamo chiesto lo stato di implementazione dell’accordo internazionale Italia-Libia del febbraio 2017, il ministero dell’Interno ha opposto generiche motivazioni di pericolo alla sicurezza interna e alle relazioni internazionali, pertanto il ricorso dopo essere stato rigettato dal Tar Lazio è ora pendente davanti al Consiglio di Stato”. La trasparenza insegue la frontiera.

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“LEONARDO” (FINMECCANICA) E GLI INTERESSI SULLE FRONTIERE

In Tunisia, Libia, Egitto e Niger, l’azienda Leonardo (Finmeccanica) avrebbe in corso “attività promozionali per tecnologie di sicurezza e controllo del territorio”. Alla richiesta di dettagli, la società ha risposto di voler “rivitalizzare i progetti in sospeso e proporne altri, fornendo ai Governi sistemi e tecnologie all’avanguardia per la sicurezza dei Paesi”. Leonardo è già autorizzata a esportare materiale d’armamento in quei contesti, ma non a Tripoli. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, infatti, ha approvato la Risoluzione 2420 che estende l’embargo sulle armi nel Paese per un altro anno. “Nel prossimo futuro -fa sapere l’azienda di cui il ministero dell’Economia è principale azionista- il governo di accordo nazionale potrà richiedere delle esenzioni all’embargo ONU sulle armi, per combattere il terrorismo”. Alla domanda se Leonardo sia coinvolta o operativa nell’ambito di iniziative collegate al fondo fiduciario per l’Africa dell’Unione europea e in particolare al programma da 46 milioni di euro coordinato dal Viminale, in tema di frontiere libiche, l’azienda ha fatto sapere che “in passato” avrebbe “collaborato con le autorità libiche per lo sviluppo e implementazione di sistemi per il monitoraggio dei confini meridionali, nonché sistemi di sicurezza costiera per il controllo, la ricerca e il salvataggio in mare”. Attualmente la società starebbe “esplorando opportunità in ambito europeo volte allo sviluppo di un progetto per il controllo dei flussi migratori dall’Africa all’Europa, consistente in un sistema di sicurezza e sorveglianza costiero con centri di comando e controllo”.

Export in Libia. Il “caso” Prodit

Nei primi sei mesi del 2018, attraverso l’Autorità nazionale UAMA (Unità per le autorizzazioni dei materiali d’armamento), l’Italia ha autorizzato l’esportazione di “materiale d’armamento” verso la Libia per un valore di circa 4,8 milioni di euro. Nel 2017 questa cifra era zero. Si tratta, come impone la normativa in tema di embargo, di materiali “non letali”. L’ammontare è minimo se paragonato al totale delle licenze autorizzate a livello mondiale dall’Italia tra gennaio e giugno 2018 (3,2 miliardi di euro). Chi esporta è una singola azienda, l’unica iscritta al Registro Nazionale delle Imprese presso il Segretariato Generale del ministero della Difesa: Prodit Engineering Srl. In Libia non ha esportato armi ma un veicolo terrestre modificato come fuoristrada e materiali utilizzabili per sminamento.

►https://altreconomia.it/frontiera-buon-affare-inchiesta

#Leonardo #Finmeccanica #Egypte #Tunisie #identification #P350 #Brescia_Antincendi_International #Virgilio_D’Amata #Massimo_Bontempi #Yamaha #Minniti #Marco_Minniti #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_nella_Repubblica_del_Niger #MISIN #Hewlett-Packard #AFIS #International_Training_at_Egyptian_Police_Academy #ITEPA

v. la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/731749

"La frontiera è un buon affare": l’inchiesta sul contrasto del Viminale all’immigrazione «clandestina» a suon di appalti pubblici

Dalla Tunisia alla Libia, dal Niger all’Egitto: così lo Stato italiano finanzia imbarcazioni, veicoli, formazione a suon di appalti pubblici. I documenti presentati a Roma dall’Arci.

«Quando si parla di esternalizzazione della frontiera e di diritto di asilo bisogna innanzitutto individuare i Paesi maggiormente interessati da queste esternalizzazioni, capire quali sono i meccanismi che si vuole andare ad attaccare, creare un caso e prenderlo tempestivamente. Ma spesso per impugnare un atto ci vogliono 60 giorni, le tempistiche sono precise, e intraprendere azioni giudiziarie per tutelare i migranti diventa spesso molto difficile. Per questo ci appoggiamo all’Arci». A parlare è Giulia Crescini, avvocato dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione, che insieme a Filippo Miraglia, responsabile immigrazione di ARCI, Sara Prestianni, coordinatrice del progetto #externalisationpolicieswatch, e Duccio Facchini, giornalista di Altreconomia, ha fatto il punto sugli appalti della Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il ministero dell’Interno e più in generale dei fondi europei ed italiani stanzianti per implementare le politiche di esternalizzazione del controllo delle frontiere in Africa.

L’inchiesta. Duccio Facchini, presentando i dati dell’inchiesta di Altreconomia «La frontiera è un buon affare», ha illustrato i meccanismi di una vera e propria strategia che ha uno dei suoi punti d’origine in un piccolo comune del Veneto, in provincia di Rovigo, affacciato sul Canal Bianco - dove ha sede una delle principale aziende specializzate in cantieristica navale militare e paramilitare - e arriva a toccare Tripoli, Niamey o Il Cairo. Il filo rosso che lega gli affidamenti milionari è uno solo: fermare il flusso di persone dirette in Italia e in Europa. Anche utilizzando fondi destinati alla cooperazione e senza alcun vaglio parlamentare.

Il Fondo Africa, istituito con la legge di bilancio 2017, art. 1 comma 621 per l’anno 2018, è pari a 200 milioni di euro, cifra che serve per attivare forme di collaborazione e cooperazione con i Paesi maggiormente interessati dal fenomeno della migrazione, anche se l’espressione in sé significa tutto e niente. «Questo fondo - ha spiegato Facchini in conferenza nella sede Arci lo scorso 6 febbraio - viene dato al ministero degli Affari esteri internazionali che individua quali sono questi Paesi: nello specifico il ministero ha indicato una sfilza di Paesi africani, dal Niger alla Libia alla Tunisia, passando per l’Egitto la Costa d’Avorio, indicando anche una serie di attività che possono essere finanziate con questi soldi. Tra queste c’è la dotazione di strumentazioni utili per il controllo della frontiera». Gli autori dell’inchiesta hanno chiesto al ministero l’elenco dei provvedimenti che sono stati messi in campo e per attivare questa protezione alla frontiera. «Siamo alla fine del 2017 e notiamo che tra questi ce n’è uno che stanzia 2 milioni e mezzo per la messa in opera di quattro motovedette. Da lì cominciamo a domandarci se in base alla normativa italiana è legittimo dare una strumentazione così specifica a delle autorità così notoriamente coinvolte nella tortura e nella violenza dei migranti. Quindi abbiamo strutturato un ricorso giuridicamente molto complicato per cercare di interloquire con il giudice amministrativo». Notoriamente il giudice amministrativo non è mai coinvolto in questioni relative al diritto di asilo - per capire: è il giudice degli appalti - ed è insomma colui che va a verificare se la pubblica amministrazione ha adempiuto bene al suo compito.

l punto di partenza. «Il giudice amministrativo e la pubblica amministrazione – ha spiegato Giulia Crescini dell’Asgi - stanno sempre in un rapporto molto delicato fra loro perché la pubblica amministrazione ha un ambito di discrezionalità all’interno del quale il giudice non può mai entrare, quindi la PA ha dei limiti che vengono messi dalla legge e all’interno di quei limiti il ministero può decidere come spendere quei soldi. Secondo noi quei limiti sono superati, perché la legge non autorizza a rafforzare delle autorità che poi commettono crimini contro i migranti, riportando queste persone sulla terra ferma in una condizione di tortura, soprattutto nei centri di detenzione». I legati hanno dunque avviato questo ricorso, ricevendo, qualche settimana fa, la sentenza di rigetto di primo grado. La sentenza è stata pubblicata il 7 gennaio e da quel giorno a oggi i quattro avvocati hanno studiato le parole del giudice, chiedendo alle altre organizzazioni che avevano presentato insieme a loro il ricorso se avessero intenzione o meno di fare appello. «Studiando la sentenza - continua Crescini - ci siamo accorti di come. pur essendo un rigetto, non avesse poi un contenuto così negativo: il giudice amministrativo in realtà è andato a verificare effettivamente se la pubblica amministrazione avesse speso bene o meno questo soldi, cioè se avesse esercitato in modo corretto o scorretto la discrezionalità di cui sopra. Un fatto che non è affatto scontato. Il giudice amministrativo è andato in profondità, segnalando il fatto che non ci sono sufficienti prove di tortura nei confronti dei migranti da parte delle autorità. Dal punto di vista giuridico questo rappresenta una vittoria. Perché il giudice ha ristretto un ambito molto specifico su cui potremo lavorare davanti al Consiglio di Stato».

La frontiera è un buon affare. L’inchiesta «La frontiera è un buon affare» rivela che lo sforzo politico che vede impegnate Italia e istituzioni europee nella chiusura delle frontiere si traduce direttamente in un incremento del budget al capitolo della sicurezza, nella messa in produzione di sistemi biometrici di identificazione, nella moltiplicazione di forze di polizia europea ai nostri confini e nell’elaborazione di sistemi di sorveglianza.

La dimensione europea della migrazione - si legge in un comunicato diffuso da Arci - si allontana sempre più dal concetto di protezione a favore di un sistema volto esclusivamente alla sicurezza e alla repressione del fenomeno migratorio. La logica dell’esternalizzazione, diventata pilastro della strategia tanto europea quanto italiana di gestione delle frontiere, assume in questo modo, sempre più, una dimensione tecnologica e militare, assecondando le pressioni della lobby dell’industria della sicurezza per l’implementazione di questo mercato. L’uso dei fondi è guidato da una tendenza alla flessibilità con un conseguente e evidente rischio di opacità, conveniente per il rafforzamento di una politica securitaria della migrazione.

Nel MFF - Multiannual Financial Framework - che definisce il budget europeo per un periodo di 7 anni e ora in discussione tripartita tra Commissione, Parlamento e Consiglio - si evidenzia l’intento strategico al netto dei proclami e dei comizi della politica: la migrazione è affrontata principalmente dal punto di vista della gestione del fenomeno e del controllo delle frontiere con un incremento di fondi fino a 34 miliardi di euro per questo settore.

A questo capitolo di spesa - si legge ancora nel comunicato - contribuiscono strumenti finanziari diversi, dal fondo sulla sicurezza interna - che passa dai 3,4 del 2014/20120 ai 4,8 miliardi del 2021/2027 e che può essere speso anche per la gestione esterna delle frontiere - a tutto il settore della cooperazione militare che coincide sempre più con quello dell’esternalizzazione, una tendenza che si palesa con evidenza nelle due missioni militari nostrane in Libia e Niger.

Dei 23 miliardi del Fondo Europeo alla Difesa e quello per la Pace, una buona parte saranno devoluti allo sviluppo di nuova tecnologia militare, utilizzabili anche per la creazione di muri nel mare e nel deserto. Stessa logica anche per il più conosciuto Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa che, con fondi provenienti dal budget allo sviluppo, finanzia il progetto di blocco marittimo e terrestre nella rotta del Mediterraneo centrale.

Sulla pelle dei migranti. Chi ne fa le spese, spiegano gli autori dell’inchiesta, sono i migranti, obbligati a rotte sempre più pericolose e lunghe, a beneficio di imprese nazionali che del mercato della sicurezza hanno fatto un vero e proprio business. Questa connessione e interdipendenza tra politici e lobby della sicurezza, che sfiora a tutto gli effetti il conflitto di interessi, è risultata evidente nel corso del SRE «Research on security event» tenutosi a Bruxelles a fine dicembre su proposta della presidenza austriaca. Seduti negli stessi panel rappresentanti della commissione dell’Agenzia Frontex, dell’industria e della ricerca del biometrico e della sicurezza, manifestavano interesse per un obbiettivo comune: la creazione di un mercato europeo della sicurezza dove lotta al terrorismo e controllo della migrazione si intrecciano pericolosamente

«Il Governo Italiano si iscrive perfettamente nella logica europea, dalle missioni militari con una chiara missione di controllo delle frontiere in Niger e Libia al rinnovo del Fondo Africa, rifinanziato con 80 milioni per il 2018/2019, che condiziona le politiche di sviluppo a quelle d’immigrazione», dichiara ancora Arci. «Molti i dubbi che solleva questa deriva politica direttamente tradotta nell’uso dei fondi europei e nazionali: dalle tragiche conseguenze sulla sistematica violazione delle convenzione internazionali a una riflessione più ampia sull’opacità dell’uso dei fondi e del ruolo sempre più centrale dell’industria della sicurezza per cui la politica repressiva di chiusura sistematica delle frontiere non è altro che l’ennesimo mercato su cui investire, dimenticandosi del costo in termine di vite umane di questa logica».

▻https://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2019/02/07/news/la_frontiera_e_un_buon_affare-218538251
#complexe_militaro-industriel

Appalti sulle frontiere: 30 mezzi di terra alla Libia dall’Italia per fermare i migranti

Il ministero dell’Interno italiano si appresta a fornire alle autorità di Tripoli nuovi veicoli fuoristrada per il “contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. Un appalto da 2,1 milioni di euro finanziato tramite il “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa”, nell’ambito del quale l’Italia accresce il proprio ruolo. Il tutto mentre l’immagine ostentata di una “Libia sicura” è offuscata dagli stessi atti di gara del Viminale

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Il ministero dell’Interno italiano si appresta a fornire alle autorità della Libia trenta nuovi veicoli fuoristrada per le “esigenze istituzionali legate al contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. L’avviso esplorativo pubblicato dalla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere, insediata presso il Viminale, risale al 5 marzo 2019 (scadenza per la presentazione della manifestazione d’interesse all’8 aprile di quest’anno).

La fornitura riguarda 30 mezzi “Toyota Land Cruiser” (15 del modello GRJ76 Petrol e 15 del GRJ79 DC Petrol), in “versione tropicalizzata”, relativamente ai quali le autorità libiche, il 24 dicembre 2018, avrebbero esplicitato alla Direzione di Roma precise “specifiche tecniche”. Il Viminale la definisce una “richiesta di assistenza tecnica” proveniente da Tripoli per le “esigenze istituzionali legate al contrasto del fenomeno dell’immigrazione irregolare”. In forza di questa “strategia”, dunque, il governo italiano -in linea con i precedenti, come abbiamo raccontato a gennaio nell’inchiesta sugli “affari lungo le frontiere”– continua a equipaggiare le autorità del Paese Nord-africano per contrastare i flussi migratori. L’ammontare “massimo” degli ultimi due lotti (da 15 mezzi l’uno) è stimato in 2,1 milioni di euro.

E così come è stato per la gara d’appalto da oltre 9,3 milioni di euro per la fornitura di 20 imbarcazioni destinate alla polizia libica, indetta dal Viminale a fine dicembre 2018, anche nel caso dei 30 mezzi Toyota le risorse arriveranno dal “Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa” (EU Trust Fund), istituito dalla Commissione europea a fine 2015 con una dotazione di oltre 4 miliardi di euro. In particolare, dal progetto implementato dal Viminale e intitolato “Support to integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya – First Phase”, dal valore di oltre 46 milioni di euro e il cui “delegation agreement” risale a metà dicembre 2017 (governo Gentiloni, ministro competente Marco Minniti).

Questo non è l’unico progetto finanziato tramite l’EU Trust Fund che vede il ministero dell’Interno italiano attivo nel continente africano. Alla citata “First Phase”, infatti, se ne sono affiancati nel tempo altri due. Uno è di stanza in Tunisia e Marocco (“Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region”), datato luglio 2018 e dal valore di 55 milioni di euro. L’altro progetto, di nuovo, ricade in Libia. Si tratta del “Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya – Second Phase”, risalente al 13 dicembre 2018, per un ammontare di altri 45 milioni di euro. Le finalità dichiarate nell’”Action Document” della seconda fase in Libia sono -tra le altre- quelle di “intensificare gli sforzi fatti”, “sviluppare nuove aree d’intervento”, “rafforzare le capacità delle autorità competenti che sorvegliano i confini marittimi e terrestri”, “l’acquisto di altre navi”, “l’implementazione della rete di comunicazione del Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre” di Tripoli, “la progettazione specifica di programmi per la neocostituita polizia del deserto”.

La strategia di contrasto paga, sostiene la Commissione europea. “Gli sforzi dell’Ue e dell’Italia nel sostenere la Guardia costiera libica per migliorare la sua capacità operativa hanno raggiunto risultati significativi e tangibili nel 2018”, afferma nel lancio della “seconda fase”. Di “significativo e tangibile” c’è il crollo degli sbarchi sulle coste italiane, in particolare dalla Libia. Dati del Viminale alla mano, infatti, nel periodo compreso tra l’1 gennaio e il 7 marzo 2017 giunsero 15.843 persone, scese a 5.457 lo scorso anno e arrivate a 335 quest’anno. La frontiera è praticamente sigillata. Un “successo” che nasconde la tragedia dei campi di detenzione e sequestro libici dove migliaia di persone sono costrette a rimanere.

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È in questa cornice che giunge il nuovo “avviso” del Viminale dei 30 veicoli, pubblicato come detto il 5 marzo. Quello stesso giorno il vice-presidente del Consiglio e ministro dell’Interno, Matteo Salvini, ha incontrato a Roma il vicepremier libico Ahmed Maiteeq. Un “cordiale colloquio”, come recita il comunicato ministeriale, che avrebbe visto sul tavolo “i rapporti tra i due Paesi, in particolare su sicurezza, lotta al terrorismo, immigrazione e stabilizzazione politica della Libia”.

https://altreconomia.it/app/uploads/2019/03/salvini_vicepremier_libico_04-768x480.jpg

Ma l’immagine ostentata dal governo Conte di una “Libia sicura” è offuscata dagli stessi atti di gara del ministero dell’Interno. Tra i quesiti presentati al Viminale da parte dei potenziali concorrenti al bando dei 20 battelli da destinare alla polizia libica, infatti, si trovano richieste esplicite di “misure atte a garantire la sicurezza dei propri operatori”. “Laddove si rendesse strettamente necessario effettuare interventi di garanzia richiesti in loco (Libia)”, gli operatori di mercato hanno chiesto alla Direzione centrale dell’immigrazione e della Polizia delle frontiere “che tali prestazioni potranno essere organizzate a patto che le imbarcazioni si trovino in città (Tripoli, ndr) per garantire la sicurezza degli operatori inviati per tali prestazioni”. Il ministero dell’Interno conferma il quadro di instabilità del Paese: “Le condizioni di sicurezza in Libia devono essere attentamente valutate in ragione della contingenza al momento dell’esecuzione del contratto”, è la replica al quesito. “Appare di tutto evidenza che la sicurezza degli operatori non dovrà essere compromessa in relazione ai rischi antropici presenti all’interno dello Stato beneficiario della commessa”. Per gli operatori, non per i migranti in fuga.

►https://altreconomia.it/appalti-libia-frontiere-terra
#Libye

c’est juste béta que la revue s’appelle « revue des droits de l’homme » #il_faudrait_faire_des_progrès

#Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations

Frontex, the EU’s border agency, has been heavily criticised for failing to provide adequate staff and resources to its own Fundamental Rights Office, a problem that “seriously hinders the Agency’s ability to deliver on its fundamental rights obligations.”

The criticisms come in a report from the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, an independent advisory body made up of experts from other EU agencies, international organisations and NGOs.

As well as noting an ongoing “reluctance” to provide the Fundamental Rights Office with “sufficiently qualified staff,” the Consultative Forum report raises concerns over Frontex’s role at the Serbian-Hungarian border, a failure to update and effectively implement codes of conduct and a complaints mechanism, and the lack of independent monitoring of forced return operations coordinated by the agency.

See: Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights - Fifth Annual Report (pdf): ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-consultative-forum-on-fundamental-rights-report-2017.pdf

Fundamental rights sidelined

While the Consultative Forum exists to provide “independent advice” to Frontex’s executive director and management board and is staffed voluntarily, the Fundamental Rights Officer is a Frontex official tasked with “contributing to the Agency’s fundamental rights strategy… monitoring its compliance with fundamental rights and… promoting its respect of fundamental rights.”

The Officer has to oversee a large organisation - Frontex foresaw (pdf: ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/Programming_Document/2018/Programming_Document_2018-2020.pdf) having 352 staff at the end of 2017, and 418 by the end of this year - yet “lacks the minimum capacity to carry outs its role,” according to the Consultative Forum, with just four staff working alongside the officer and one member of secretarial staff.

The report states that “the lack of adequate staffing seriously hinders the Agency’s ability to deliver on its fundamental rights obligations including on key areas such as Frontex operational activities, the newly established complaints mechanism or the protection of children.”

The Consultative Forum has come up against its own problems in attempting to carry out its tasks. According to Article 70(5) of the Frontex Regulation adopted in 2016, “the consultative forum shall have effective access to all information concerning the respect for fundamental rights.”

Yet the report complains that the Forum “continues to face serious and further limitations” on access to information, “particularly in relation to relevant operational reference and guiding documents.” Despite “repeatedly raising this concern with Frontex management,” it is yet to receive a “final response or constructive proposal.”

Given that Frontex operational documents have included (►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm) instructions for border guards to target “migrants from minority ethnic groups, and individuals who may have been isolated or mistreated during their journey,” the need for access to such information by fundamental rights monitoring bodies is clear.

In this regard, the Consultative Forum highlights that “external oversight” - for example by the European and national parliaments and civil society groups - “remains of particular importance”.

The Hungarian-Serbian border

In November 2016 the Consultative Forum recommended that Frontex teams be withdrawn from the Hungarian-Serbian border due to fundamental rights concerns, but the Executive Director rebuffed the proposal, arguing that Frontex’s presence can “minimise potential risks related to the use of force” and can assist in documenting “circumstances on the ground.”

Indeed, the positive effect of Frontex presence on national border guards has been noted elsewhere - following a trip to the Bulgarian-Turkish border, French MEP Marie-Christine Vergiat reported NGOs as saying that “whenever a Frontex officer was involved in a [Bulgarian border guard] patrolling group, there were no abuses.” (▻http://bulgarianpresidency.eu/marie-christine-vergiat-teaming-bulgarian-turkish-border-guards-)

However, given the European Commission’s decision to launch an infringement procedure against Hungary for new asylum legislation that includes automatic detention, limitations on legal assistance and measures for automatic expulsion, the Forum reasserted its recommendation.

The agency has apparently “significantly reduced the number of deployed officers and assets in Hungary,” according to the report, but a number remain in place and the Consultative Forum warns that the developments in Hungarian law and practice “have further exacerbated the risks of Frontex being involved in serious fundamental rights violations.”

Complaints mechanism and codes of conduct

The need for Frontex to establish a complaints mechanism so that individuals can seek redress for potential fundamental rights violations that they may have suffered during operations coordinated by the agency is a long-standing issue (▻https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/speech.faces/en/73745/html.bookmark), and the 2016 Regulation (▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R1624) introduced such a mechanism (in Article 72), to be overseen by the agency in cooperation with the Fundamental Rights Officer.

There is now, however, a need to implement this mechanism and the Consultative Forum’s report notes that:

“The rules should, among other points, provide further details on the respective roles of the different actors involved in the procedure, specify the timeframe for the processing of complaints, and provide for the possibility of anonymous complaints. In this context the Consultative Forum reiterates its calls for the allocation of more technical staff and means to the Fundamental Rights Officer.”

The Forum also highlights the agency’s decision to discard its recommendations on the ’Code of Conduct for all persons participating in Frontex activities’, which would have seen the inclusion of “specific references to omissions or failures to act or to the prohibition to obey or obligation not to comply with and report instructions that are illicit or against international, EU or national legislation, the Code of Conduct or the legal framework of the activity.”

The agency is also redrafting its ’Code of Conduct for Return Operations and Return Interventions’, which is expected to be adopted this year. The Forum notes that it is “essential to strengthen the wording relating to the legal framework and, in particular, fundamental rights obligations such as the right to an effective remedy,” and makes a number of specific proposals.

Monitoring of forced return operations

In 2017 the agency coordinated and/or co-financed 341 forced return operations - 150 national return operations (involving just one Member State), 153 joint return operations (involving one or more Member State) and 38 collecting return operations, in which the authorities of non-EU states are involved in the “collection” of their own nationals.

Of these 341 operations, a human rights monitor accompanied 188 of them, just 41% of the total, but nevertheless an increase on the previous year. However, the report indicates that a particularly low number of national return operations - 20 of 150 - were monitored.

The report also notes 50 “readmission” operations from Greece to Turkey conducted by Frontex, in the framework of the EU-Turkey deal. Only 22 of these were monitored. The Forum recommends treating readmission operations in the same way as return operations, “in order to make use of the already existing standards for return operations (code, monitoring, escorts training, etc.).”

The list goes on

Other problems for the Consultative Forum in 2017 include a failure to prioritise the revision of Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy (now foreseen for adoption sometime this year), the need to “mainstream” gender perspectives and issues into Frontex activities, and some issues with the terminology deployed in the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community reports, such as references to “illegal” migrants and referring to operations by the Libyan Coast Guard as “rescues”.

Elsewhere, the Consultative Forum notes good progress made on updating measures to try to ensure the protection of children and migration and the identification of minors at risk of abuse. Nevertheless, for an agency whose “mission” is “to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter,” it seems that the former is being given priority over the latter.

▻http://statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

#droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #condamnation #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés