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EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

#technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

State-of-play report

At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

The new standing corps

Recruitment

A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

Training

The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

Use of force

The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

“On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

Privileges and immunities

The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

“Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

Law enforcement

To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

Fundamental rights and data protection

The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

Returns

The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

“The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

EUROSUR

The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

Summary

Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

Jane Kilpatrick

Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

“the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
“The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
“if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

Endnotes

[1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

[2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[3] Section 1.1, state of play report

[4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

[5] Section 7.1, state of play report

[6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, ▻https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

[7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

[9] Chapter III, state of play report

[10] Section 2.5, state of play report

[11] Protocol (No 7), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

[12] Chapter III, state of play report

[13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

[14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, ▻https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

[15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

[16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

[18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[19] Section 8, state of play report

[20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

[21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, ▻https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

[22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

[23] Section 9, state of play report

[24] ERRIN, ▻https://returnnetwork.eu

[25] Section 3.2, state of play report

[26] Chapter III, state of play report

[27] Section 3.2, state of play report

[28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[29] State of play report, p. 19

[30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, ►http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

[31] Section 4, state of play report

[32] Section 7.2, state of play report
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Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

#EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

What is the standing corps?

The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
Long-term staff seconded from member states;
Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

The size of the standing corps

The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

–-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

What are the profiles?

The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

border checks and surveillance;
interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
verifying travel documents;
escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
operating data systems and platforms; and
offering cultural mediation

*Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

Recruitment for the profiles

Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

“Never touch yourself with gloves”

Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

Fit for service?

The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

Jane Kilpatrick

Endnotes

[1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

[5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

[8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

[9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

[11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

[12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

[13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

[14] Ibid.

[15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

[16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

[19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, ▻https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
#gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

Frontex seeks company for drone flights

The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

Aircraft from arms companies

Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

New interested parties for drone flights

At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

Information to non-EU countries

The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

Matthias Monroy

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

Endnotes

[1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, ►https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

[2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

[3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, ▻https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

[4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, ▻https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

[5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, ▻http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

[6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

[7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, ▻http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

[8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

[9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, ▻https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

[10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, ▻https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

[11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, ▻https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

[12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, ▻https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

[13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, ▻https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

[14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, ▻https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

[15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, ▻http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

[16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

[17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

[18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

[19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, ▻https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

[20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

[21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

[22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

#drones

Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

From external to internal surveillance

Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

Legal provisions

A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

“EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

“…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

“The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

“The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

Sources of data

The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

national border surveillance systems;
stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
local, regional and other coordination centres;
other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
border checks;
Frontex;
other member states’ national coordination centres;
third countries’ authorities;
ship reporting systems;
other relevant European and international organisations; and
other sources.[10]

For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

national coordination centres;
national situational pictures;
immigration liaison officers;
Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
third countries’ authorities.[11]

The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

“The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

Operational activities at the internal borders

Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

“When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

“there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

Chris Jones

Endnotes

[1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

[3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, ▻http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

[4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

[5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

[6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, ▻https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

[7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

[8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

[9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

[10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

[11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

[12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

[13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

[14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: ▻https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

[16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, ▻https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

[17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, ▻https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

[18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

[19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

#mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

voir aussi cette enquête de #ZDF : The #Frontex_files :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900554

Commentaire reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop, 11.09.2019 :

texte reprenant les orientations politiques de la Commission Ue de Ursula Von der Leyen ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_fr.pdf et les noms des commissaires désignés : ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/commissioners-designate-vdl_fr.pdf

Concernant les questions dites migratoires, les orientations de U. Von der Leyden sont :
– Plus de Frontex
– Plus de coopération avec pays dits d’origine ( >> en vue de fixer les personnes)
– Plus d’accueil au Sud (>> aide pr les camps accueil au Sud)
– Plus de lutte contre les trafiquants
– Plus de respect du Droit
– Plus de sauvetage et répartition solidaire (intra UE ?)
– Réformer Dublin
– Lien entre terrorisme, insécurité et migrations sont explicites !

Pour ceux qui se demanderaient, l’article 184 (l’avant-dernier du projet, juste avant celui qui traite de l’entrée en vigueur de l’accord).

▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreement_0.pdf

ARTICLE 184 - Negotiations on the future relationship
The Union and the United Kingdom shall use their best endeavours, in good faith and in full respect of their respective legal orders, to take the necessary steps to negotiate expeditiously the agreements governing their future relationship referred to in the political declaration of [DD/MM/2018] and to conduct the relevant procedures for the ratification or conclusion of those agreements, with a view to ensuring that those agreements apply, to the extent possible, as from the end of the transition period.

European Council meeting (28 J une 2018) – Draft conclusions

In order to establish a more predictable framework for dealing with those who nevertheless set out to sea and are rescued in Search And Rescue Operations, the European Council supports the development of the concept of regional disembarkation platforms in close cooperation with UNHCR and IOM. Such platforms should provide for rapid processing to distinguish between economic migrants and those in need of international protection , and reduce the incentive to embark on perilous journeys.

▻https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/draftEucoConclusionsJune.pdf
#HCR #OIM #IOM

Une idée qui vient de la Hongrie...

From protest to proposal : Eastern Europe tries new migration tactic

“Asylum procedures should be completed outside the EU in closed and protected hotspots before the first entry on the territory of the EU,” states Orbán’s plan. “Third countries should be supported in establishing a system of reception and management of migratory flows … which should foresee careful on-site screening of refugees and economic migrants,” reads Renzi’s.

▻https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-slovakia-from-protest-to-propose-eastern-europe-tries-

A mettre en lien avec, notamment... mais j’oublie certainement des choses :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/665069
►https://seenthis.net/messages/703288
►https://seenthis.net/messages/701836
►https://seenthis.net/messages/471340
►https://seenthis.net/messages/471637

Et lien aussi avec cette déclaration :
Migranti, #Toninelli : « Non è detto che il posto in cui debbano sbarcare sia un porto. Può essere una nave »
►https://video.repubblica.it/dossier/immigrati-2015/migranti-toninelli-non-e-detto-che-il-posto-in-cui-debbano-sbarcare-sia-un-porto-puo-essere-una-nave/307625/308254
cc @isskein

La UE estudia instalar centros de clasificación de inmigrantes en el norte de África

Un borrador de documento para la cumbre afirma que la idea podría facilitar «un procesamiento rápido que distinga entre migrantes económicos y refugiados»

La Unión Europea estudia la idea de construir centros para el procesamiento de inmigrantes en el norte de África en un intento por disuadir a la gente de emprender viajes a través del Mediterráneo que puedan poner en riesgo su vida, según indica un documento al que ha tenido acceso The Guardian.

El Consejo Europeo de líderes de la UE «apoya el desarrollo del concepto de plataformas de desembarque regional», según señala un borrador de conclusiones de la cumbre europea que se llevará a cabo la próxima semana.

La UE quiere estudiar la viabilidad de instalar estos centros en el norte de África, donde comienza la mayoría de los viajes de los inmigrantes que quieren llegar a suelo europeo. «Estas plataformas podrían facilitar un procesamiento rápido que distinga entre migrantes económicos y aquellos que necesitan protección internacional, y así reducir los incentivos a embarcarse en viajes peligrosos», sostiene el documento.

La inmigración es un tema prioritario en la agenda de la próxima cumbre de dos días que se iniciará el 28 de junio. Los líderes de la UE intentarán llegar a un consenso sobre cómo manejar la crisis de los miles de refugiados e inmigrantes que llegan a Europa cada mes.

Los líderes de Alemania y Francia, Angela Merkel y Emmanuel Macron, se han reunido este martes cerca de Berlín para fijar una posición común respecto a la inmigración y la eurozona, en medio de los temores sobre el desmoronamiento del proyecto europeo.

Antes de la reunión, el ministro de Hacienda francés, Bruno Le Maire, afirmó que Europa está «en proceso de desintegración». «Vemos Estados que se están cerrando, intentando encontrar soluciones nacionales a problemas que requieren soluciones europeas», señaló. Así, llamó a construir «un nuevo proyecto europeo sobre inmigración», así como sobre asuntos económicos y financieros «que consoliden a Europa en un mundo en el que Estados Unidos está a un lado, China al otro y nosotros quedamos atrapados en el medio».

El ministro de Interior alemán, Horst Seehofer, de línea dura, está presionando a la canciller Angela Merkel para que diseñe un plan europeo para finales de mes. Alemania sigue siendo el país europeo que más solicitudes de asilo recibe. Si no hay avance a nivel europeo, Seehofer quiere que la policía de las fronteras alemanas comience a negar la entrada a los inmigrantes.

No queda claro cómo se llevaría a la práctica la propuesta europea de «plataformas de desembarque regional», o dónde se instalarían.

En 2016, la UE llegó a un acuerdo con Turquía que redujo drásticamente el flujo migratorio, pero al bloque le ha resultado más difícil trabajar con los gobiernos del norte de África, especialmente con Libia, punto de partida de la mayoría de las embarcaciones que intentan llegar a Europa por el Mediterráneo.

La Comisión Europea ha rechazado la posibilidad de llegar a un acuerdo con Libia parecido al de Turquía, debido a la inestabilidad del país. Sin embargo, el anterior Gobierno de Italia pactó con las milicias y tribus libias y colaboró para reconstituir la guardia costera libia. Estas acciones han contribuido a reducir drásticamente el número de personas que intenta cruzar el Mediterráneo, pero los críticos han denunciado un aumento en las violaciones de los derechos humanos.

Según el documento filtrado, la UE prefiere construir los centros en colaboración con ACNUR, la agencia de la ONU para los refugiados, y con la Organización Internacional para la Migración, otro organismo relacionado con la ONU que con anterioridad ha criticado la escasez de rutas legales que tienen los inmigrantes y refugiados africanos para llegar a Europa.

▻https://www.eldiario.es/theguardian/UE-instalar-procesamiento-inmigrantes-Africa_0_783922573.html

Commentaire d’Emmanuel Blanchard, via la mailing-list Migreurop :

Au contraire de ce que suggère le titre choisi par ce journaliste (article ci-dessous), la proposition de créer ces plateformes de débarquement n’est pas vraiment « étonnante » tant elle ressemble aux « #processings_centers » et autres « #centres_d'identification » dont les projets ressurgissent régulièrement depuis le début des années 2000. Il y a cependant des évolutions (ces centres étaient pensés pour cantonner les exilés avant qu’ils prennent la mer et pas pour débarquer les boat-people secourus en mer) et le danger se rapproche : maintenant que ces camps existent sous le nom de hotpsots dans les iles grecques, il apparaît possible de les étendre dans des pays extérieurs ayant besoin du soutien financier ou politique de l’UE.

#camps #cpa_camps

Le projet anglais : les « #zones_de_protection »

Le 25 janvier 2003, #Tony_Blair évoque, dans l’émission « BBC1’s breakfast with Frost », une possible révision de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

▻http://www.migreurop.org/article43.html
#Blair #cpa_camps

signalé par @isskein

A partir de la minute 1’30 de cette vidéo...
L’édito d’Yves Pascouau · L’aquarius et après
►https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSM_pqNi5Qk&feature=youtu.be

Europe Pushes to Outsource Asylum, Again

With Dublin reform stalled, European leaders began to cast around for new ideas to solve the ongoing political crisis on migration and settled on a recurring proposition: the creation of asylum processing centres beyond the (strengthened) borders of the European Union.

What exactly is up for discussion remains unclear. The plans championed by various EU leaders are diverse, yet the details remain fuzzy. What they have in common is a near-universal focus on shifting responsibility for dealing with refugees and migrants upstream. The idea of external processing looks good on paper, particularly in demonstrating to skeptical voters that governments have control over migration flows. But leaders also hope that by reducing inflows to the European Union, they will face less pressure to compromise on sharing responsibility for asylum within the bloc.

The devil is in the detail. Proposals to externalize the processing of asylum claims are not new, but have largely fallen flat. Previous leaders balked at the idea of such elaborate constructions, especially when confronted with their significant practical complications. But public pressure to further slow arrivals of refugee and migrant boats has mounted in many countries, and leaders feel compelled to find an agreement. The result is a debate on migration increasingly divorced from reality.

But before sitting down to the negotiating table, EU leaders may want to reflect on the exact model they wish to pursue, and the tradeoffs involved. Critically, does the concept of “regional disembarkation platforms” set out in the draft European Council conclusions offer a potential solution?

Key Design Questions

From Austria’s so-called Future European Protection System, to the “centres of international protection in transit countries” suggested by Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, to an outlier idea from the Danish Prime Minister to create centres to host failed asylum seekers in “undesirable” parts of Europe —a variety of models for externalization have been floated in recent weeks.

Several proposals also envisage the simultaneous creation of joint processing centres within the European Union, coupled with the use of reception centres that restrict residents’ freedom of movement. While it is still unclear how such a plan would unfold, this commentary focuses on the external dimension alone.

Where Would People Be Stopped and Processed?

The proposals differ regarding where in the journey they would stop migrants and potential asylum seekers. French President Emmanuel Macron has vaguely referred to centres in key transit countries, such as Niger, Libya, and Chad, as well as closer to regions of origin. Others have focused more squarely on the North African coast.

Centres operating far away from the European Union would likely function as a form of resettlement, stopping people en route (or even prior to the journey), and offering selected individuals an additional channel of EU entry in hopes that this would discourage the use of smugglers. Indeed, nascent EU efforts to resettle refugees evacuated from Libya to Niger (under the Evacuation Transit Mechanism, or ETM), demonstrate how this might work. At the other extreme, the model championed by Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz would see migrants and refugees returned to “safe zones” in Africa, where they would stay, even after arriving at the external EU border.

The latter concept is problematic under current EU and international law. By returning arrivals to third countries without giving them the opportunity to submit an asylum claim, governments would be likely to run afoul of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits signatories from the “collective expulsion of aliens.” European Court of Human Rights case law also precludes the pushback of migrants rescued by European boats while crossing the Mediterranean. Conversely, however, if migrants and potential asylum seekers are stopped before entering EU waters, and without the involvement of European-flagged vessels, then no EU Member State has formal legal responsibility.

A framework for regional cooperation on the disembarkation of migrant boats—being developed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) —may offer a middle ground. While details are scarce, it seems likely that the proposal would focus first on the development of a system for determining who would rescue migrants crossing the Mediterranean, and where they would be landed. Absent consensus within the European Union on responsibility sharing for asylum claims, UNHCR would attempt to create a new framework for responsibility sharing with both Northern and Southern Mediterranean states on search and rescue. However, to prove palatable to partners, such a scheme would require strong EU support, not least through the creation of regional disembarkation centres across North Africa where migrants and refugees “pulled back” from their journey would be sent. This approach would sidestep the application of EU law. To be viable, the European Union would likely need to offer North African partner states some assurance of support, including resettling some of those found in need of protection (as with the Niger ETM).

Who Would Do the Processing?

Once asylum seekers are pulled back, there is the question of who would make determinations regarding their protection. There are three options.

First, Member States’ own asylum agencies could adjudicate protection claims, as Macron has occasionally suggested. Aside from the logistical challenges of seconding officials outside Europe, the question quickly arises as to who would adjudicate which applications? Member States have very different asylum systems, which produce markedly different outcomes for applicants, and would need extensive coordination.

As a result, there is growing interest in developing an EU asylum agency capable of undertaking assessments on behalf of Member States. This appears a neat solution. However, governments would have to agree joint procedures and standards for processing claims and have confidence in the decisions made by through a joint processing arrangement. This is, if anything, an option only in the long term, as it would be years before any such agency is operational.

Should the regional disembarkation idea gain ground, the European Union would have no legal responsibility to undertake assessment. Most Member States would be likely to consider UNHCR a key partner to manage any external process. But doing so could require UNHCR to redeploy limited staff resources from existing resettlement operations or from pressing humanitarian situations elsewhere. Moreover, outsourcing to UNHCR could still raise the issue of trust and transferability of decisions. Many Member States remain reluctant to rely solely on UNHCR to select refugees for resettlement, preferring to send their own teams to do the final selection.

What Happens Next?

The issue of what happens to people after their protection claims are assessed remains at the crux of questions around the feasibility of external processing. Proposals here differ starkly.

On the one hand, some proposals would allow those recognized as in need of protection to subsequently enter the European Union. This is the option that—even if the European Union has circumvented any legal responsibility—would be deemed necessary to host countries as it would give them assurance that they are not overly burdened with providing protection. But doing so would require Member States to agree on some sort of distribution system or quotas for determining who would be settled where—crashing back into a responsibility-sharing problem that has plagued the European Union.

By contrast, proposals that would explicitly not allow entry to anyone who had attempted to travel to Europe via the Mediterranean, taking a page from Australia’s playbook, are meant to assuage fears that such centres would become magnets for new travellers. Those with protection needs brought to such centres would be settled in countries outside the bloc. The challenges with this model centre squarely on the difficulty finding a “safe” country that would allow the settlement of potentially unlimited number of protection beneficiaries. Neither is likely to be the case in any arrangements the European Union would seek to make with external countries.

Finally, there is the troubling question of what to do with those denied status or resettlement in the European Union. While the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or another agency might be able to help facilitate voluntary return, some might not be able to return home or may have been denied resettlement but nonetheless have protection needs. They are at risk of becoming a population in limbo, with long-term implications for their well-being and for the host country.

https://i.imgur.com/a5gYGpG.png

"L’UE devrait demander à la Tunisie ou l’Algérie d’accueillir des migrants"

Afin d’éviter toute complicité des ONG, #Stephen_Smith propose notamment une participation des pays du sud de la Méditerranée. « L’Europe se bat un peu la coulpe et a l’impression que tout est pour elle. Or, la Libye a beaucoup de pays voisins. Pourquoi n’a-t-on pas songé à demander le soutien de la Tunisie ou de l’Algérie ? Habituellement, en cas de naufrage, la règle veut que les voyageurs soient transportés vers la prochaine terre sûre. Et, à partir de la Libye, cette terre n’est pas l’Italie. »

▻http://www.rts.ch/info/monde/9678271--l-ue-devrait-demander-a-la-tunisie-ou-l-algerie-d-accueillir-des-migran
#Tunisie #Algérie

à l’Algérie ?
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/704649

Macron y Pedro Sánchez proponen «centros cerrados de desembarco» para los inmigrantes que lleguen a Europa

Con el apoyo de Pedro Sánchez, el presidente francés expone su apuesta para la gestión de las llegadas de migrantes a las costas del sur de Europa

En estos centros se tratarían los expedientes de los demandantes de asilo o se tramitaría su devolución a los países de origen

▻https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/Macron-propone-centros-desembarco-inmigrantes_0_785321746.html
#Espagne

EU admits no African country has agreed to host migration centre

The European Union’s most senior migration official has admitted that no north African country has yet agreed to host migrant screening centres to process refugee claims.

Details of an EU plan to prevent migrants drowning at sea emerged on Thursday after Italy criticised the agenda of an emergency summit for not offering enough to help it cope with arrivals.

Dimitris Avramopoulos, the European commissioner for migration, said the EU wanted to “intensify cooperation” with Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Niger and Morocco, as he announced the intention to create a “regional disembarkation scheme”.
Malta’s ’barbaric’ finch traps ruled illegal by EU court
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So far no African country had agreed to host screening centres, he confirmed. “It has to be discussed with these countries, he said. “An official proposal has not been put on the table.”

The idea for offshore migrant processing centres remains sketchy, with numerous political, practical and legal questions unanswered. It remains unclear, for example, whether migrants on a rescue ship in European waters could be returned to a north African country.

Tahar Cherif, the Tunisian ambassador to the EU said: “The proposal was put to the head of our government a few months ago during a visit to Germany, it was also asked by Italy, and the answer is clear: no!

“We have neither the capacity nor the means to organise these detention centres. We are already suffering a lot from what is happening in Libya, which has been the effect of European action.”

He said his country was facing enough problems with unemployment, without wishing to add to them while Niger said its existing centres taking migrants out of detention camps in Libya are already full.

The idea for the centres was thrown into the mix of EU migration policy before a series of crucial summits on migration in the next week.

About 10 EU leaders will meet in Brussels on Sunday in a hastily convened emergency meeting aimed at preventing the collapse of the German coalition government.

But the Italian government has been angered by draft conclusions for the summit, which stress the need to counter “secondary movements” – an issue that affects Germany.

Under EU rules, a member state usually has responsibility for asylum seekers who have arrived in its territory, a regulation that has put frontline states Italy and Greece under huge pressure.

But claimants often move to a second EU state, seeking a faster decision or to unite with family members.

So-called “secondary movements” is the issue driving a wedge between Germany’s ruling coalition. The Bavarian CSU party has set the chancellor, Angela Merkel, a deadline of two weeks to find a solution. The interior minister, Horst Seehofer, has threatened to send away migrants at the border – a breach of EU rules that threatens to unravel the common asylum system.

Tensions are running high after Italy’s prime minister, Giuseppe Conte, said he was not ready to discuss secondary movements “without having first tackled the emergency of ‘primary movements’ that Italy has ended up dealing with alone”.

Italy’s far-right interior minister, Matteo Salvini, said: “If anyone in the EU thinks Italy should keep being a landing point and refugee camp, they have misunderstood.”

The election of a populist government in Italy, combined with tensions in Germany’s ruling coalition, has created a political storm over migration despite the sharp fall in arrivals. In the first six months of this year 15,570 people crossed into Italy, a 77% drop on last year.

The European commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, reluctantly agreed to host the weekend summit to help Merkel, after her governing coalition came close to breaking point.

Avramopoulos stressed that the summit would be about “consultations” to prepare the ground for decisions to be taken by all 28 EU leaders at a European council meeting next Thursday.

Warning that the future of the EU’s border-free travel area was at stake, Avramopoulos said: “The European leadership of today will be held accountable in the eyes of future generations if we allow all these forces of populism to blow up what has been achieved”.

▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/21/eu-admits-no-african-country-has-agreed-to-host-migration-centre
#cpa_camps

« Centres de débarquement » : le Maghreb dit « non » à l’Europe

#Algérie, #Maroc et #Tunisie ont fait savoir qu’ils refusaient d’accueillir les « plateformes régionales de débarquement » préconisées par les pays membres de l’Union européenne.

▻http://www.jeuneafrique.com/586246/societe/centres-de-debarquement-le-maghreb-dit-non-a-leurope

#cpa_camps

Au lieu des plateformes de « désembarquement », probablement ce sont des #centres_contrôlés qui seront mis sur pied :
▻http://seen.li/f3gv
#cpa_camps

IOM-UNHCR Proposal to the European Union for a Regional Cooperative Arrangement Ensuring Predictable Disembarkation and Subsequent Processing of Persons Rescued at Sea

Approximately 40,000 refugees and migrants have arrived in Europe via maritime routes in 2018 to date. This is almost six times less than over the same period in 2016, following a peak in arrivals by sea in 2015. According to EUROSTAT, approximately 30 per cent of those arriving on the European shores were in need of international protection; moreover, some have faced extreme hardship and abuse at the hands of unscrupulous traffickers during the journey.

Despite the reduced arrival rates, new challenges resulting from divergent EU Member State views have revealed a need to revisit regional arrangements to relieve front line states from having the sole responsibility for the disembarkation and further processing of people rescued at sea.

IOM and UNHCR stand ready to support a common approach, and call on all countries in the Mediterranean region to come together to implement a predictable and responsible disembarkation mechanism in a manner that prioritizes human rights and safety first, delinked from the subsequent processing of status and related follow-up responsibilities, post-disembarkation, for those rescued in international waters.

It is increasingly recognized that disembarkation cannot be the sole responsibility of one country or regional grouping. It should be a shared responsibility across the Mediterranean Basin, with due respect for the safety and dignity of all people on the move. A comprehensive approach is required to realize effective and sustainable responses.

People on the move to and through the Mediterranean have different migratory status, with the majority of them not qualifying for international or subsidiary protection. Addressing the drivers of forced displacement and irregular migration needs to be given renewed attention through effective conflict-prevention and crisis settlement processes, strengthening good governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights efforts, stabilization and recovery, as well as poverty reduction.

Priority efforts need to focus on strengthening protection capacities in regions of origin, including through developing sustainable asylum systems; providing sufficient needs-based support for humanitarian operations and adopting a development-oriented approach to assistance; as well as expanding opportunities for resettlement, family reunification and safe pathways for refugees which are currently well below existing needs and pledges being made. Efforts toward opening safe and regular pathways for migrants need also to be undertaken (family reunification, labour and education opportunities, humanitarian visas for vulnerable migrants).

Against this background, with a focus on the immediate disembarkation concerns at hand, the current proposal for a regional disembarkation mechanism aims to ensure that:

People rescued-at-sea in international waters are quickly disembarked in a predictable manner in line with international maritime law, in conditions that uphold respect for their rights including non-refoulement, and avoid serious harm or other risks;
Responsible post-disembarkation processing, supported – as appropriate- by IOM and UNHCR, leads to rapid and effective differentiated solutions and reduces onward movement through an effective cooperative arrangement.

Functioning of the mechanism is premised on a set of principles and common objectives:

The effective functioning of maritime commerce requires ships’ masters to have full confidence in prompt and predictable disembarkation;
Efforts to reduce loss of life at sea are maximized, in line with existing international obligations and frameworks, and saving lives remains the international community’s priority;
Strengthened efforts to build the capacity of Coast Guards in Mediterranean countries (not just in Libya) to perform effective rescue operations in their respective SAR;
National Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCC) are able to carry out their work effectively for the purposes of search and rescue operations based on long- standing and effective practices to save lives;
People rescued at sea in the Mediterranean are quickly disembarked in safe ports in a predictable manner in line with established rescue at sea arrangements and international maritime law, coordinated through the responsible MRCCs;
Measures for cooperative arrangements to support States providing for disembarkation are well-established;
The right to seek asylum is safeguarded, and the human rights of all individuals such as non-refoulement are respected, including the right not to be disembarked in or transferred to a place where there is a risk of persecution, torture, or other serious harm;
Efforts to address human smuggling and trafficking are reinvigorated, including measures to ensure protection and/or referrals for victims of trafficking and ensuring the effective prosecution of those involved in / or facilitating human trafficking or smuggling;
Rescue at sea capacity coordinated by effective MRCCs that operate in accordance with international law is reinforced.

As such, the proposal does not affect existing legal norms and responsibilities applicable under international law (Note 1) Rather it seeks to facilitate their application in accordance with a regional collaborative approach and the principle of international cooperation. This proposal relies on functional arrangements for intra-EU solidarity in managing all consequences of rescue, disembarkation and processing. It also relies on operational arrangements which would need to be sought and formalised through a set of understandings among all concerned States.

▻https://www.iom.int/news/iom-unhcr-proposal-european-union-regional-cooperative-arrangement-ensuring-pre

Question : c’est quoi la différence entre la proposition IOM/HCR et la proposition UE ?

THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY OF DISEMBARKATION OPTIONS

This note presents a first assessment of the legal and practical feasibility of the three different scenarios on disembarkation presented at the Informal Working Meeting of 24 June 2018. Under international maritime law, people rescued at sea must be disembarked at a place of safety. International law sets out elements of what a place of safety can be and how it can be designated, without excluding the possibility of having regional arrangements for disembarkation.

https://i.imgur.com/2fJLMDC.png https://i.imgur.com/QocDXDI.png https://i.imgur.com/3bv9OI7.png

Des « #centres_contrôlés » pour migrants pour ne pas dire #hotspots

L’idée de centres contrôlés pour migrants proposée dans les conclusions du Conseil européen rappelle singulièrement les hotspots de 2015.

▻https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/des-centres-controles-pour-migrants-pour-ne-pas-dire-hotspots
#cpa_camps

#Palerme :
❝La Commission régionale de l’Urbanisme a rejeté le projet de pré-faisabilité du « #hotspot » à Palerme, confirmant l’avis du Conseil municipal de Palerme. L’avis de la Commission régionale reste technique. Le maire de Palerme a rappelé que "la ville de Palerme et toute sa communauté sont opposés à la création de centres dans lesquels la dignité des personnes est violée (...). Palerme reste une ville qui croit dans les valeurs de l’accueil, de la solidarité et des rencontres entre les peuples et les cultures, les mettant en pratique au quotidien. En cela, notre « non » à l’hotspot n’est pas et ne sera pas seulement un choix technique, mais plutôt un choix relatif à des principes et des valeurs".
> Pour en savoir plus (IT) : ►http://www.palermotoday.it/politica/hotspot-zen-progetto-bocciato-regione.html

–-> Reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop

Ne dites pas que ce sont des #camps !

Les camps devraient être la solution. C’est en Afrique, peut-être en Libye ou au Niger, que les migrants seront arrêtés avant qu’ils puissent commencer leur dangereux voyage en mer vers l’Europe. Ainsi l’a décidé l’UE. Des camps attendront également les réfugiés qui réussiraient toutefois à arriver dans un pays de l’UE. Des camps sur le sol européen. Où seront-ils établis ? Cela n’est pas encore défini, mais ce seront des installations fermées et surveillées parce que les détenus devront être « enregistrés » et les personnes non autorisées seront expulsées. Ils ne pourront pas s’enfuir.

L’intérêt pour les camps concerne également les responsables politiques allemands. Le gouvernement allemand veut élargir le no man’s land à la frontière germano-autrichienne afin que les réfugiés puissent être arrêtés avant d’entrer officiellement en Allemagne et avoir ainsi droit à une procédure d’asile régulière. Une « fiction de non-entrée » est créée, comme le stipule précisément l’accord. Un État qui magouille. Pendant ce temps, la chancelière Angela Merkel a déclaré que personne ne sera détenu plus de quarante-huit heures, même dans le no man’s land. Il reste encore à voir si l’Autriche y accédera. Le plan est pour l’instant plus un fantasme qu’une politique réalisable, ce qui est bien pire. Bien sûr, tous ces centres fermés de rassemblement de migrants ne peuvent pas être appelés camps. Cela évoquerait des images effrayantes : les camps de concentration nazis, le système des goulags soviétiques, les camps de réfugiés palestiniens de plusieurs générations, le camp de détention de Guantánamo.

Non, en Allemagne, ces « non-prisons » devraient être appelées « centres de transit ». Un terme amical, efficace, pratique, comme la zone de transit d’un aéroport où les voyageurs changent d’avion. Un terme inventé par les mêmes personnes qui désignent le fait d’échapper à la guerre et à la pauvreté comme du « tourisme d’asile ». Les responsables politiques de l’UE sont encore indécis quant à la terminologie de leurs camps. On a pu lire le terme de « centres de protection » mais aussi celui de « plateformes d’atterrissage et de débarquement », ce qui fait penser à une aventure et à un voyage en mer.

Tout cela est du vernis linguistique. La réalité est que l’Europe en est maintenant à créer des camps fermés et surveillés pour des personnes qui n’ont pas commis de crime. Les camps vont devenir quelque chose qui s’inscrit dans le quotidien, quelque chose de normal. Si possible dans des endroits lointains et horribles, si nécessaire sur place. Enfermer, compter, enregistrer.

La facilité avec laquelle tout cela est mis en œuvre est déconcertante. Deux ans seulement après que le public européen a condamné l’Australie pour ses camps brutaux de prisonniers gérés par des sociétés privées sur les îles de Nauru et Manus, dans l’océan Pacifique, nous sommes prêts à abandonner nos inhibitions. Pourquoi ne pas payer les Libyens pour intercepter et stocker des personnes ?

Derrière le terme allemand « Lager » (« camp ») se cache un ancien mot correspondant à « liegen », qui signifie « être allongé ». Les camps sont ainsi faits pour se reposer. Aujourd’hui, le terme de « camp » implique quelque chose de temporaire : un camp n’est que pour une courte période, c’est pourquoi il peut aussi être rustique, comme un camp de vacances pour les enfants ou un dortoir. Des camps d’urgence sont mis en place après des catastrophes, des inondations, des glissements de terrain, des guerres. Ils sont là pour soulager les souffrances, mais ne doivent pas être permanents.

Si les responsables politiques participent activement à l’internement de personnes dans des camps en l’absence de catastrophe, alors il s’agit d’autre chose. Il s’agit de contrôle, d’#ordre, de #rééducation, de #domination. Les puissances coloniales tenaient des camps, depuis les camps de barbelés des Britanniques au Kenya jusqu’aux camps de Héréros dans le Sud-Ouest africain. C’est dans des camps que les États-Unis ont enfermé des Américains d’origine japonaise pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Les responsables de ces camps n’avaient pas pour préoccupation le logement, mais bien la garde et la gestion de « personnes problématiques ».

Dans de tels camps, la #violence extrême et la #déshumanisation des détenus allaient et vont généralement de pair avec une gestion froide. Exploiter un camp nécessite de l’#organisation. La technologie de #contrôle à distance aide le personnel à commettre des atrocités et transforme des gens ordinaires en criminels. Dans son essai controversé « Le siècle des camps », le regretté sociologue #Zygmunt_Bauman qualifie le camp de symptôme de #modernité. Pour lui, l’association d’une #exclusion_brutale et d’une #efficacité dans l’ordre semblable à celle d’un jardinier est une caractéristique de notre époque.

Que Bauman fasse des camps de concentration nazis un « distillat » d’un problème majeur et moderne pour sa thèse lui a justement valu des critiques. Il ignore la singularité de l’Holocauste. Contrairement aux camps coloniaux, les camps de concentration étaient en effet des camps d’extermination qui n’avaient plus pour fonction d’apprêter des groupes ou de les rééduquer, ni même de les dissuader. Il s’agissait de « violence pour elle-même », comme l’écrit le sociologue #Wolfgang_Sofsky, de folie de la #pureté et d’éradication des personnes #indésirables.

L’Europe croit être à l’abri de cette folie. Pour les gouvernants allemands, le slogan « Plus jamais de camps en Allemagne » est un slogan ridicule parce qu’il évoque des images qui n’ont rien à voir avec le présent. Dans les différents camps de migrants en Europe et à l’extérieur, il n’est certes pas question d’une extermination mais « seulement » de contrôle de l’accès et de #dissuasion. C’est ce dernier objectif qui est explicitement recherché : répandre dans le monde l’idée de camps de l’horreur au lieu du paradis européen.

Mais il n’y a pas de raison de maintenir la sérénité. L’analyse de Zygmunt Bauman parlait de la mince couche de #civilisation par-dessus la #barbarie. La leçon tirée de l’expérience des camps du XXe siècle est la suivante : « Il n’y a pas de société ordonnée sans #peur et sans #humiliation ». La #pensée_totalitaire peut à nouveau prospérer, même dans les sociétés apparemment démocratiques.

►https://www.tdg.ch/monde/europe/dites-camps/story/31177430
#totalitarisme

Et ce passage pour lequel je suis tentée d’utiliser le tag #frontières_mobiles (#Allemagne et #Autriche) :

L’intérêt pour les camps concerne également les responsables politiques allemands. Le gouvernement allemand veut élargir le no #man’s_land à la frontière germano-autrichienne afin que les réfugiés puissent être arrêtés avant d’entrer officiellement en Allemagne et avoir ainsi droit à une procédure d’asile régulière. Une « #fiction_de_non-entrée » est créée, comme le stipule précisément l’accord.

Et sur la question de la #terminologie (#mots #vocabulaire) :

Bien sûr, tous ces #centres_fermés de rassemblement de migrants ne peuvent pas être appelés camps. Cela évoquerait des images effrayantes : les camps de concentration nazis, le système des goulags soviétiques, les camps de réfugiés palestiniens de plusieurs générations, le camp de détention de Guantánamo.

Non, en Allemagne, ces « #non-prisons » devraient être appelées « #centres_de_transit ». Un terme amical, efficace, pratique, comme la zone de transit d’un aéroport où les voyageurs changent d’avion. Un terme inventé par les mêmes personnes qui désignent le fait d’échapper à la guerre et à la pauvreté comme du « #tourisme_d’asile ». Les responsables politiques de l’UE sont encore indécis quant à la terminologie de leurs camps. On a pu lire le terme de « #centres_de_protection » mais aussi celui de « #plateformes_d’atterrissage_et_de_débarquement », ce qui fait penser à une aventure et à un voyage en mer.

Tout cela est du #vernis_linguistique. La réalité est que l’Europe en est maintenant à créer des camps fermés et surveillés pour des personnes qui n’ont pas commis de crime. Les camps vont devenir quelque chose qui s’inscrit dans le quotidien, quelque chose de normal. Si possible dans des endroits lointains et horribles, si nécessaire sur place. Enfermer, compter, enregistrer.

#shopping_de_l'asile #normalisation
#cpa_camps

L’#Autriche veut proscrire toute demande d’asile sur le territoire de l’Union européenne

A la veille d’une réunion, jeudi, entre les ministres de l’intérieur de l’UE sur la question migratoire, Vienne déclare vouloir proposer un changement des règles d’asile pour que les demandes soient étudiées hors d’Europe.

▻https://mobile.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2018/07/10/l-autriche-veut-proscrire-toute-demande-d-asile-sur-le-territoire-de-

Record deaths at sea: will ‘regional disembarkation’ help save lives?
❝What is the aim of European policy on Mediterranean migration?

Europe’s strategic ambition is clear: reduce the number of people who embark on journeys across the Mediterranean by boat. The more European countries struggle to share responsibility for those who are rescued at sea and brought to Europe, the stronger the desire to dissuade migrants from getting on a boat in the first place. Moreover, stemming the departures is said to be the only way of reducing the death toll.

The challenge, as the European Council put it, is to ‘eliminate the incentive to embark’ on journeys across the Mediterranean. And the new migration agreement proposes a solution: setting up ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ outside the European Union. The logic is that if people rescued at sea are sent back to the coast they left, nobody will take the risk and pay the cost of getting on smugglers’ boats.
Would this even work?

Addressing the challenges of irregular migration is truly difficult. Still, it is baffling how the proposal for regional disembarkation platforms is embroiled in contradictions. The agreement itself is scant on specifics, but the challenges will surface as the policy makers have to make key decisions about how these platforms would work.

First, will they be entry points for seeking asylum in Europe? The agreement suggests that the platforms might play this role. But if the platforms are entry points to the European asylum procedure, they will attract thousands of refugees who currently have no other option to apply for asylum in Europe than paying smugglers to set out to sea.

This scenario raises a second question: what will be the possible ways of accessing the platforms? If they are reserved for refugees who have paid smugglers and are rescued at sea, access to protection will be just as reliant on smugglers as it is today. But if anyone can come knocking on the gate to the platforms, without having to be rescued first, the asylum caseload would swell. Such an outcome would be unacceptable to EU member states. As a recent EC note remarked, ‘to allow individuals to “apply” for asylum outside the EU […] is currently neither possible nor desirable.

These two questions lay out the basic scenarios for how the regional disembarkation platforms would operate. Thinking through these scenarios it’s not clear if these platforms can ever be workable. Moreover, putting these platforms in place directly contradicts the European Council’s stated objectives:

– dissuading smuggling journeys
– distinguishing individual cases in full respect of international law
– not creating a pull factor

How does this relate to broader EU policies on migration?

In some way, regional disembarkation platforms are a logical next step along the course the EU has been pursuing for years now. To stop refugees and other migrants from reaching its shores, the EU has been using a multi-pronged approach. On the one hand, the bloc has increased the use of aid to tackle the ‘root causes’ of migration – the logic being that if potential migrants are given other opportunities (e.g. skills training), they will be deterred from leaving. Similarly, information campaigns targeting aspiring migrants seek to deter people from setting out on dangerous journeys.

Another major focus has been that of externalisation of border management – basically shifting border management to countries outside the EU: a key component of the EU-Turkey Deal is Turkey agreeing to take back refugees who crossed into Greece. Externalisation serves two purposes: keeping migrants physically out of Europe, but also as a deterrence measure sending potential migrants the implicit message that it won’t be easy to come to Europe.

Regional disembarkation platforms are part of this process of externalisation. But there are key differences that make this proposal more extreme than policies pursued so far. Other externalization measures have aimed at preventing potential asylum seekers from reaching the point where they become eligible to launch a claim in Europe. The platforms will apparently serve a different role, by enabling the physical return of asylum seekers who have become Europe’s responsibility after being rescued by European ships in international waters.
What do we know about efforts to deter irregular migration?

The dim outlook for regional disembarkation platforms reflects more general limitations of deterrence measures in migration policy. Using decades worth of data, Michael Clemens and colleagues have shown that along the US-Mexico border greater deterrence and enforcement efforts have only reduced irregular migration when accompanied by greater legal migration pathways. Research by ODI has shown that information about deterrence measures and anti-migration messages rarely featured in migrant decision-making process. We will explore this further in our upcoming MIGNEX research project, which includes large-scale analyses of the drivers of migration in ten countries of origin and transit.
Blocking access to asylum is not a life-saving measure

The European Council presents regional disembarkation platforms as a strategy for ‘preventing tragic loss of life’. The irony of this argument is that these platforms will only deter sea crossings if they are dead ends where people who are rescued at sea are barred from seeking asylum in Europe. It is difficult to see how such a setup would be legally feasible, or indeed, ‘in line with our principles and values’, as the Council states.

If the legal obstacles were overcome, there may indeed be fewer deaths at sea. But some of the deaths would simply occur out of sight instead. Refugees flee danger. Blocking access to seeking asylum puts more lives at risk and cannot be justified as a measure to save lives at sea.

For now, the European Council glosses over the dilemmas that the regional disembarkation platforms will create. Facing the realities of the situation would not make perfect solutions appear, but it would enable an open debate in search of a defensible and effective migration policy.

https://i.imgur.com/PtWMa3G.png

Austrian Presidency document: “a new, better protection system under which no applications for asylum are filed on EU territory”

A crude paper authored by the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the EU and circulated to other Member States’s security officials refers disparagingly to “regions that are characterised by patriarchal, anti-freedom and/or backward-looking religious attitudes” and calls for “a halt to illegal migration to Europe” and the “development of a new, better protection system under which no applications for asylum are filed on EU territory,” with some minor exceptions.

See: Austrian Presidency: Informal Meeting of COSI, Vienna, Austria, 2-3 July 2018: Strengthening EU External Border Protection and a Crisis-Resistant EU Asylum System (pdf): ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/EU-austria-Informal-Meeting-%20COSI.pdf

The document was produced for an ’Informal Meeting of COSI’ (the Council of the EU’s Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security) which took place on 2 and 3 July in Vienna, and the proposals it contains were the subject of numerous subsequent press articles - with the Austrian President one of the many who criticised the government’s ultra-hardline approach.

See: Austrian president criticises government’s asylum proposals (The Local, link); Austrian proposal requires asylum seekers to apply outside EU: Profil (Reuters, link); Right of asylum: Austria’s unsettling proposals to member states (EurActiv, link)

Some of the proposals were also discussed at an informal meeting of the EU’s interior ministers on Friday 13 July, where the topic of “return centres” was also raised. The Luxembourg interior minister Jean Asselborn reportedly said that such an idea “shouldn’t be discussed by civilized Europeans.” See: No firm EU agreement on Austrian proposals for reducing migration (The Local, link)

The Austrian Presidency paper proposes:

"2.1. By 2020

By 2020 the following goals could be defined:

Saving as many human lives as possible;
Clear strengthening of the legal framework and the operational capabilities of FRONTEX with respect to its two main tasks: support in protecting the Union’s external border and in the field of return;
Increasing countering and destruction of people smugglers’ and human traffickers‘ business models;
Significant reduction in illegal migration;
More sustainable and more effective return measures as well as establishment of instruments that foster third countries’ willingness to cooperate on all relevant aspects, including the fight against people smuggling, providing protection and readmission;
Development of a holistic concept for a forward-looking migration policy (in the spirit of a “whole of government approach“) and a future European protection system in cooperation with third countries that is supported by all and does not overburden all those involved – neither in terms of resources nor with regard to the fundamental rights and freedoms they uphold.

2.2. By 2025

By 2025 the following goals could be realised:

Full control of the EU’s external borders and their comprehensive protection have been ensured.
The new, better European protection system has been implemented across the EU in cooperation with third countries; important goals could include:
no incentives anymore to get into boats, thus putting an end to smuggled persons dying in the Mediterranean;
smart help and assistance for those in real need of protection, i.e. provided primarily in the respective region;
asylum in Europe is granted only to those who respect European values and the fundamental rights and freedoms upheld in the EU;
no overburdening of the EU Member States’ capabilities;
lower long-term costs;
prevention of secondary migration.
Based on these principles, the EU Member States have returned to a consensual European border protection and asylum policy.”

And includes the following statements, amongst others:

“...more and more Member States are open to exploring a new approach. Under the working title “Future European Protection System” (FEPS) and based on an Austrian initiative, a complete paradigm shift in EU asylum policy has been under consideration at senior officials’ level for some time now. The findings are considered in the “Vienna Process” in the context of which the topic of external border protection is also dealt with. A number of EU Member States, the EU Commission and external experts contribute towards further reflections and deliberations on these two important topics.”

“...ultimately, there is no effective EU external border protection in place against illegal migration and the existing EU asylum system does not enable an early distinction between those who are in need of protection and those who are not.”

“Disembarkment following rescue at sea as a rule only takes place in EU Member States. This means that apprehensions at sea not only remain ineffective (non-refoulement, examination of applications for asylum), but are exploited in people smugglers’ business models.”

“Due to factors related to their background as well as their poor perspectives, they [smuggled migrants] repeatedly have considerable problems with living in free societies or even reject them. Among them are a large number of barely or poorly educated young men who have travelled to Europe alone. Many of these are particularly susceptible to ideologies that are hostile to freedom and/or are prone to turning to crime.

As a result of the prevailing weaknesses in the fields of external border protection and asylum, it is to be expected that the negative consequences of past and current policies will continue to be felt for many years to come. As experience with immigration from regions that are characterised by patriarchal, anti-freedom and/or backward-looking religious attitudes has shown, problems related to integration, safety and security may even increase significantly over several generations.”

See: Austrian Presidency: Informal Meeting of COSI, Vienna, Austria, 2-3 July 2018: Strengthening EU External Border Protection and a Crisis-Resistant EU Asylum System (pdf)

►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/jul/eu-austrian-pres-asylum-paper.htm

Libya rejects EU plan for refugee and migrant centres

Blow to Italy as Tripoli snubs proposal to set up processing centres in Africa

Libya has rejected a EU plan to establish refugee and migrant processing centres in the country, adding that it would not be swayed by any financial inducements to change its decision.

The formal rejection by the Libyan prime minister, Fayez al-Sarraj, is a blow to Italy, which is regarded as being close to his Tripoli administration.

In June, Italy proposed reception and identification centres in Africa as a means of resolving divisions among European governments.

The impasse came as the EU said it was willing to work as a temporary crisis centre to oversee the distribution of refugees and migrants from ships landing in Europe from Libya. Italy has said it is not willing to open its ports and may even reject those rescued by the EU Sophia search and rescue mission, a position that has infuriated other EU states.

Speaking to the German newspaper Bild, Serraj said: “We are absolutely opposed to Europe officially wanting us to accommodate illegal immigrants the EU does not want to take in.”

He dismissed accusations that Libya’s coastguard had shot at aid workers in ships trying to rescue people from the Mediterranean.

“We save hundreds of people off the coast of Libya every day – our ships are constantly on the move,” he said. In practice, Libya is already running detention camps, largely as holding pens, but they are not run as EU processing centres for asylum claims.

European foreign ministers agreed at a meeting on Monday to do more to train the Libyan coastguard by setting up the EU’s own training team inside Libya.

The European parliament president, Antonio Tajani, said after a trip to Niger, one of the chief funnels for people into Libya, that the EU needed to plough more money into the Sahel region to reduce the need to leave the area. He said the number of people reaching Libya from Niger was collapsing.

Tajani said: “Until 2016, 90% of irregular migrants travelled through the Niger to Libya and Europe. In just two years, Niger reduced migration flows by 95%, from over 300,000 to about 10,000 in 2018.”

He said he would host a European conference in Brussels in October to support democratic elections in Libya scheduled for December.

At the same time, Italy is to host a further conference in Rome in September seen as a follow-on to a conference held in May by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, that led to a commitment to hold elections this year.

▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/20/libya-rejects-eu-plan-for-migrant-centres?CMP=Share_iOSApp_OtherSpeakin

UNHCR ed OIM discutono con la Commissione europea sulle piattaforme di sbarco, ma gli stati dicono no.

Lunedì 30 luglio si svolgerà a Ginevra un incontro di rappresentanti dell’UNHCR e dell’OIM con la Commissione Europea per discutere sulle piattaforme di sbarco che Bruxelles vorrebbe imporre nei paesi di transito, come gli stati nordafricani, e negli stati di sbarco, soprattutto in Italia. Per selezionare rapidamente migranti economici e richiedenti asilo, e dunque procedere al respingimento immediato dei primi, senza alcuna garanzia di difesa, ed all’avvio delle procedure di asilo, per gli altri, senza alcuna garanzia di resettlement o di relocation ( ricollocazione) in un paese diverso da quello di primo ingresso. La Commissione dichiara che, soltanto dopo avere trovato un “approccio comune a livello europeo “, si rivolgeranno proposte ai paesi terzi. Gli stati nordafricani hanno però respinto in blocco questa proposta, e le autorità locali dei paesi di primo ingresso più interessati dagli sbarchi, confernano la loro opposizione a nuovi Hotspot. Le risorse previste per questa esternalizzazione delle frontiere sono ridicole. Per non parlare dei costi in termini di vite e di sfregio dei diritti umani.

Un progetto che si salda strettamente con l’incremeno degli aiuti alla sedicente Guardia costiera “libica”, alla quale si affida già adesso, nella prassi quotidiana, un numero sempre più elevato di intercettazioni in acque internazionali, di fatto respingimenti collettivi, perchè realizzati con il coordinamento e l’assistenza di unità militari della Marina italiana che ha una base a Tripoli, nell’ambito della missione Nauras. Intanto la accresciuta assistenza italiana alla Marina ed alla Guardia costiera di Tripoli rischia di contribuire all’inasprimento del conflitto tra le diverse milizie ed allontana le probabilità di una reale pacificazione, premessa indispensabile per lo svolgimento delle elezioni. Le stesse milizie che continuano a trattenere in Libia, in condizioni disumane, centinaia di migliaia di persone.

Dietro la realizzazione delle “piattaforme di sbarco” in Nordafrica, proposte anche dal Consiglio europeo del 28 giugno scorso, il ritiro dalle responsabilità di coordinamento dei soccorsi in acque internazionali da parte degli stati che fin qui ne sono stati responsabili in conformità al diritto internazionale generalmente riconosciuto. Per ragioni diverse, nè la Tunisia, ne la Libia, possono essere riconosciuti come “paesi terzi sicuri” con porti di sbarco che siano qualificabili come place of safety. Come avveniva fino a qualche mese fa, secondo il diritto internazionale, dopo i soccorsi in acque internazionali, i naufraghi vanno sbarcati non nel porto più vicino, na nel porto sicuro più vicino. Ma questa regola, a partire dal caso della nave Aquarius di SOS Mediterraneè, il 10 giugno scorso, è stata continuamente violata dal governo italiano e dalle autorità amministrative e militari che questo governo controlla. Molto grave, ma prevedibile, il comportamento di chiusura da parte di Malta, che continua a trattenere sotto sequstro due navi umanitarie, la Lifeline e la Seawatch. Sempre più spesso le dispute tra stati che negano a naufraghi un porto sicuro di sbarco rischiano di fare altre vittime

La soluzione che si prospetta adesso con la nave SAROST 5,dopo gli appelli delle ONG tunisine, lo sbarco a Zarzis dei migranti soccorsi il 15 luglio, un caso eccezionale ben diverso da altri soccorsi operati in precedenza in acque internazionali, non costituisce un precedente, perchè la SAROST 5 batte bandiera tunisina. Dunque i naufraghi a bordo della nave si trovavano già in territorio tunisino subito dopo il loro recupero in mare. In futuro, quando i soccorsi in acque internazionali saranno comunque operati da imbarcazioni miitari o private ( incluse le ONG) con diversa bandiera, il problema del porto sicuro di sbarco si proporrà in termini ancora più gravi, con un ulteriore incremento delle vittime e delle sofferenze inflitte ai sopravvissuti, a fronte dei dinieghi degli stati che non rispettano il diritto internazionale ed impediscono la individuazione, nei tempi più rapidi, di un vero “place of safety”.

Nel 2013 il caso del mercantile turco SALAMIS, che sotto cooordinamento della Centrale operativa (IMRCC) di Roma, aveva soccorso naufraghi a sud di Malta, in acque internazionali, si era concluso con lo sbarco in Italia, in conformità del diritto internazionale. Con lo sbarco dei migranti soccorsi dalla SAROST 5 nel porto di Zarzis,in Tunisia, per ragioni di emergenza sanitaria, si consuma invece una ennesima violazione del diritto internazionale, dopo i rifiuti frapposti dalle autorità italiane e maltesi. Stati che creano sofferenze, come strumento politico e di propaganda, fino al punto da costringere i comandanti delle navi a dichiarare lo stato di emergenza. Alla fine il governo tunisino, nel giorno della fiducia al governo e dell’insediamento del nuovo ministro dell’interno, ha ceduto alle pressioni internazionali, ed ha accettato per ragioni umanitarie lo sbarco di persone che da due settimane erano bloccate a bordo di un rimorchiatore di servizio ad una piattaforma petrolifera, in condizioni psico-fisiche sempre più gravi. Un trattamento inumano e degradante imposto da quelle autorità e di quegli stati che, immediatamente avvertiti dal comandante della SAROST 5 quando ancora si trovava in acque internazionali, hanno respinto la richiesta di garantire in tempi più rapidi ed umani un porto di sbarco sicuro.

Di fronte al probabile ripetersi di altri casi di abbandono in acque internazionali, con possibili pressioni ancora più forti sulla Tunisia, è importante che l’UNHCR e l’OIM impongano agli stati membri ed all’Unione Europea il rispetto del diritto internazionale e l’obbligo di soccorso in mare, nel modo più immediato. Le prassi amministraive di “chiusura dei porti” non sono sorrette ada alcuna base legale, e neppure sono concretizzate in provvedimenti amministrativi, motivati ed impugnabili davanti ad una qualsiasi autorità giurisdizionale. Non si può continuare a governare tratendo in inganno il corpo elettorale, distorcendo persino le posizioni delle grandi organizzazioni internazionali. Fino ad un mese fa sia l’UNHCR che l’OIM avevano respinto la proposta della Commissione che voleva creare piattaforme di sbarco al di fuori dei confini europei. Una proposta che adesso viene ripresentata con vigore ancora maggiore, sotto la presidenza UE affidata all’Austria di Kurz, con la spinta di Orban e di Salvini verso la “soluzione finale” verso migranti ed ONG.

Le Nazioni Unite conoscono bene la situazione in Libia. Occorre garantire a tutti i naufraghi soccorsi in acque internazionali un porto sicuro di sbarco, che non deve essere quello più vicino, se non offre la piena garanzia di una tutela effettiva dei diritti fondamentali e del diritto di chiedere asilo delle persone sbarcate. Non basta la presenza fisica di operatori dell’UNHCR e dell’OIM in alcuni punti di sbarco, come si sta verificando da mesi in Tripolitania, per riconoscere l’esistenza di un place of safety in paesi che anche secondo le grandi istituzioni internazionali, come per i tribunali italiani, non sono in grado di garantire place of safety in conformità alle Convenzioni internazionali.

Se si dovesse decidere di riportare i migranti intercettati in acque internazionali e sbarcati nei paesi nordafricani, ammesso che posa succedere( anche se i migranti considerati “illegali” in Nordafrica saranno costretti a firmare una richiesta di resettlement, se non di rimpatrio volontario), magari per essere riportati indietro in un campo profughi in Niger, sarebbero violati i principi base di protezione delle persone, in quanto eseri umani, ai quali si ispirano le Convenzioni internazionali e la Costituzione italiana. La Convenzione di Ginevra non esclude il diritto dei richeidenti asilo a rivolgersi ad paese piuttosto che ad un altro. L’evacuazione dalle aree di crisi non esclude il diritto di accesso alle frontiere di un paese europeo perchè la richiesta di asilo sua valutata con le garanzie sostanziali e procedurali previste dalla normativa interna e sovranazionale.

Se l’UNHCR e l’OIM cederanno alle pressioni dei governi, diventeranno complici degli abusi che i migranti continuano a subire nei paesi del nordafrica nei quali vengono respinti e detenuti.

Le Organizzazioni non governative che, insieme ai naufraghi che soccorrono, continuano ad essere bersaglio di una campagna di odio che non accenna ad attenuarsi, continueranno, nei limiti dei propri mezzi a denunciare quanto accade ed a soccorrere le persone che in acque internazionali potranno raggiungere prima che facciano naufragio. La loro attività di ricerca e salvataggio appare tuttavia fortemente ridotta, anche per la illegittima “chiusura dei porti” decisa dal governo italiano, in assenza di qualsiasi provvedimento che ne fornisca una base legale, tale almeno da potere essere impugnato. Una lesione forse irreversibile dello stato di diritto (rule of law) alle frontiere marittime.Una responsabilità ancora maggiore per le autorità militari alle quali sarebbe affidato il coordinamento delle attività di ricerca e soccorso in mare (SAR). La percentuale delle vittime calcolate sul numero dei migranti che ancora riescono a fuggire dalla Libia non è mai stata tanto alta. Non si deve ridurre il valore del rispetto della vita umana alla riduzione numerica degli arrivi o dei soccorsi in mare.

Dietro la conclamata esigenza di contrastare i trafficanti si cela una micidiale arma elettorale che sta permettendo il capovolgimento della narrazione dei fatti e la criminalizzazione della solidarietà. Il ruolo delle città dell’accoglienza e dei rappresentanti politici che ancora si oppongono a questa deriva disumana contro i migranti e le ONG, devono passare dalle parole ai fatti e dare concretezza alle dichiarazioni di solidarietà ed all’impegno di aprire i porti, ed aprire le città. Tutti i cittadini solidali sono chiamati ad esporsi in prima persona, saldando il ruolo delle autonomie locali con la capacità di autorganizzazione. Sarà una stagione lunga e dolorosa di conflitto, senza una rappresentanza polkitica capace di praticare una vera opposizione. Ma non ci sono possibilità di mediazione con chi dimostra di valutare una parte dell’umanità come “untermenschen” ( sottouomini), praticando l’abbandono in mare ed il respingimento collettivo verso luoghi di internamento e tortura, in modo da creare le premesse per una discriminazione istituzionale che nei territori si sta già traducendo in una violenza diffusa contro i più deboli. Oggi tocca ai migranti, dai naufraghi a quelli accolti nei centri in Italia, domani saranno nel mirino le componenti minoritarie dell’intera popolazione.

▻https://www.a-dif.org/2018/07/29/unhcr-ed-oim-discutono-con-la-commissione-europea-sulle-piattaforme-di-sbarco

Libya rejects establishment of reception centres for irregular migrants on its territory

Foreign Minister of the Presidential Council’s government Mohamed Sayala said Libya refuses the idea of setting up reception centres for irregular migrants on its territory, as did Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

“The country’s immigrant housing centres are sheltering around 30,000 immigrants, and Libya has cooperated with the European Union to return migrants to their countries of origin, but some countries refused to receive them,” Sayala said to the Austrian newspaper Die Presse.

“Libya has signed agreements with Chad, Niger and Sudan to enhance the security of the crossing borders in order to curb the flow of migrants,” the Foreign Minister added.

▻https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/libya-rejects-establishment-reception-centres-irregular-migrants-its-t

Juncker says N.Africa migrant “camps” not on EU agenda

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said on Friday that a suggestion that the European Union might try to set up migrant camps in North Africa was no longer on the agenda.

EU member states are in disagreement over how the bloc should deal with tens of thousands of migrants arriving every year in Europe, the bulk of them by sea from Turkey and North Africa.

In June, a summit of all EU leaders asked the Commission to study ways to set up “regional disembarkation platforms” in North African countries, including Tunisia, for migrants rescued by European vessels in the Mediterranean.

However, there has been little appetite in Africa and EU officials have long questioned the legality and practicality of such camps — a view underlined in Juncker’s blunt reply.

“This is no longer on the agenda and never should have been,” Juncker told a news conference in Tunis with Tunisian Prime Minister Youssef Chahed.

▻http://news.trust.org/item/20181026131801-1t7he
#cpa_camps

Juncker says North Africa migrant ’camps’ not on EU agenda

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said on Friday that a suggestion that the European Union might try to set up migrant camps in North Africa was no longer on the agenda.

EU member states are in disagreement over how the bloc should deal with tens of thousands of migrants arriving every year in Europe, the bulk of them by sea from Turkey and North Africa.

In June, a summit of all EU leaders asked the Commission to study ways to set up “regional disembarkation platforms” in North African countries, including Tunisia, for migrants rescued by European vessels in the Mediterranean.

However, there has been little appetite in Africa and EU officials have long questioned the legality and practicality of such camps — a view underlined in Juncker’s blunt reply.

“This is no longer on the agenda and never should have been,” Juncker told a news conference in Tunis with Tunisian Prime Minister Youssef Chahed.

▻https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-africa/juncker-says-north-africa-migrant-camps-not-on-eu-agenda-idUSKCN1N01TU

Refugee centers in Tunisia ’out of the question’, president says

The Tunisian President, Beji Caid Essebsi, has said his country will not host EU refugee reception centers. He also told DW that Tunisia was a safe country, despite a terrorist attack in the capital earlier this week.

President Essebsi made the statement in Berlin, where he attended Chancellor Angela Merkel’s African business summit. In an interview with DW’s Dima Tarhini, the 91-year-old leader said opening refugee reception centers in countries such as Tunisia was “out of the question.”

“Tunisia has much more experience with refugees than many European countries. After the Libyan revolution, more than 1.3 million refugees from various countries streamed into Tunisia. Fortunately, most of them returned to their home countries with our help. Europe has never experienced anything comparable. And we, unlike Europe, do not have the capacities to open reception centers. Every country needs to pull its own weight on this issue.”

The European Union wants greater cooperation on migration with North African nations Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Niger and Morocco. Earlier this year, the EU migration commissioner announced a plan for a “regional disembarkation scheme”. Under the proposed deal, African countries would host migrant screening centers to process refugee claims. The Tunisian government has already expressed opposition to the idea.

Despite terrorism, a ’safe country’

During President Essebsi’s visit to Berlin, a 30-year-old woman blew herself up with a homemade bomb in the Tunisian capital, injuring at least eight people.

“We thought we had eradicated terrorism, but it turns out that it still exists and that it can strike in the heart of the capital,” President Essebsi said in a statement to the press.

The suicide attack led to renewed questions about whether Tunisia should be considered a safe country of origin for asylum seekers.

Tarhini: In Germany, in the context of repatriating asylum-seekers, it has been questioned just how safe Tunisia really is. Tunisia is considered a safe North African country. What is your opinion on this?

Beji Caid Essebsi: "Tunisia is a safe country; that is the truth. It is much safer than many other countries. Regarding refugees and the problem that they pose for Europe and other regions: Tunisia guarantees the freedom of its citizens, no matter what their conduct. If Tunisians abroad do something wrong and are sent back, then we will take them in. But not citizens of other countries.

▻http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/13062/refugee-centers-in-tunisia-out-of-the-question-president-says?ref=tw
#Tunisie
ping @_kg_

Les plateformes de débarquement pour migrants enterrées ?

« Les Plateformes de débarquement en Afrique ne sont plus à l’ordre du jour et n’auraient jamais dû l’être », a déclaré le président de la Commission européenne Juncker, ce 26 octobre, lors d’une conférence de presse à Tunis avec le Premier ministre tunisien, Youssef Chahed .

Etonnant ? Rembobinons la bande-son 4 mois en arrière...

Les plateformes de débarquement sont une proposition de la Commission européenne faite, à Bruxelles, le 28 juin lors d’un Conseil européen. Son objectif était d’empêcher l’arrivée des personnes migrantes, dites irrégulières, sur le sol européen. Comment ? En les bloquant, en amont, dans des centres fermés, le temps d’examiner leur profil et demande. Et en y débarquant systématiquement les naufragés repêchés en Méditerranée. Ces plates-formes seraient situées sur les côtes africaines notamment en Tunisie et au Maroc. L’Egypte a été également évoquée.

Cette proposition s’inscrivait dans l’approche dominante de « l’externalisation » de la gestion des frontières prônée de façon croissante par les institutions européennes et ses membres depuis une vingtaine d’années. Depuis 2015, cette approche constitue l’une des orientations majeures des politiques migratoires européennes.

Pourquoi dès lors, la Commission fait-elle marche arrière quant à ce projet ? Plusieurs raisons peuvent être avancées.

La première réside dans le fait que cette approche n’atteint pas ses objectifs (endiguer les départs et augmenter les expulsions des personnes en situation irrégulière). Il suffit de voir la situation dans les hotspots d’Italie et de Grèce depuis 2015. A Moria, sur l’île de Lesbos, MSF parle de crise humanitaire due au surpeuplement, aux infrastructures et conditions d’accueil déplorables, ainsi qu’à l’insécurité mettant à mal l’ensemble des droits fondamentaux des personnes, notamment ceux des femmes et des mineurs. Les plus vulnérables se retrouvent dans un cul-de-sac.
« Moria est devenu pour beaucoup un lieu de transit prolongé le temps que leur demande d’asile soit étudiée », souligne Dimitris Vafeas, le directeur adjoint du camp de Moria. D’autres exemples sont ceux du Niger ou encore de la Libye qui laissent les personnes migrantes dans une situation « d’encampement » permanent ou d’errance circulaire sans fin, faute de voies légales de migrations.

La seconde explication trouve sa source dans le fait que cette approche ne respecte pas le droit international. En effet, d’une part, selon la Convention de Genève, chacun a le droit de quitter son pays et de demander l’asile dans un pays où sa sécurité sera assurée. Le droit international, s’il autorise un pays à refuser l’immigration, prohibe l’instauration du délit d’émigration : la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme stipule ainsi en son article 13 le droit de « quitter tout pays y compris le sien ». De plus, le droit maritime prévoit que tout naufragé sauvé en mer doit être conduit vers le port proche le plus sûr, ce qui implique que les personnes rescapées au large des côtes européennes doivent y être conduite. Enfin, plusieurs pays, à commencer par la Libye, ne représentent en aucun cas des « lieux sûrs », au regard des conditions auxquelles y font face les migrants. Même au Maroc, il y a quelques semaines, le GADEM, association marocaine de défense des droits de l’homme, sortait un rapport dramatique faisant état des violences multiples qu’encourent les personnes migrantes au Maroc.

La troisième raison est que la majorité des pays en développement ne veulent pas entendre parler de ces plates-formes. Ils accueillent déjà 85 % des personnes réfugiées alors que l’Europe n’en accueille que 6%. Les pays africains tentent donc de faire bloc afin d’installer un rapport de force face aux Européens. Ils savent qu’ils sont désormais des acteurs incontournables du dossier migratoire sur la scène internationale. Cependant, les sommes mises sur la table, tels que les budgets de l’APD, risquent à terme d’effriter ce bloc d’argile, même si ces montants doivent être mis en regard des transferts des diasporas (remittances), nettement plus importants et qui rendent donc les dirigeants des pays d’origine enclins à favoriser les migrations.

Il est donc temps, vu cet échec, que la Commission européenne change de cap et axe ses politiques non pas sur l’externalisation des questions de l’asile et de la migration, mais sur le renforcement de la solidarité intra-européenne dans l’accueil et sur la mise en œuvre de nouvelles voies sûre et légales de migration. Cela lui permettrait, enfin, de respecter le droit international et de consacrer son APD à la réalisation des Objectifs de développement plutôt qu’à la lutte contre les migrations, fussent-elles irrégulières.

▻https://www.cncd.be/Les-plateformes-de-debarquement

L’UE bat partiellement en retraite sur les hotspots en Afrique

Le Conseil voulait débarquer les migrants sauvés en Méditerranée sur les côtes africaines. Face à l’opposition des États africains, le projet a été abandonné, mais l’UE fait toujours pression sur les pays de transit.

Au sommet du Conseil de juin dernier, les dirigeants européens ont demandé à la Commission d’étudier la possibilité d’instaurer des « plateformes de débarquement régionales » en Afrique, afin d’y envoyer les migrants repêchés par des bateaux européens en Méditerranée.

L’initiative a tourné court. Dans les jours qui ont suivi le sommet, le Maroc et l’Union africaine se sont mobilisés pour assurer un rejet généralisé des « hotspots » sur les territoires africains.

Nasser Bourita, le ministre marocain aux Affaires étrangères, a accusé les dirigeants européens de réagir de manière excessive, et souligné que le nombre de migrants tentant d’entrer en Europe a largement chuté. À ce jour, ils sont 80 000 à être arrivés cette année, contre 300 000 en 2016.

La société civile s’est aussi opposée au projet, estimant que ces camps de migrants seraient contraires aux engagements de l’UE en termes de droits de l’Homme.

Lors d’une visite en Tunisie le 26 octobre, Jean-Claude Juncker, président de la Commission européenne, a assuré que l’UE ne tentait pas de mettre en place des camps de réfugiés dans le nord de l’Afrique. « Ce n’est plus au programme, et ça n’aurait jamais dû l’être », a-t-il indiqué lors d’une conférence de presse avec le Premier ministre tunisien, Youssef Chahed.

Une semaine après, la porte-parole de la Commission, Natasha Bertaud, a expliqué que l’exécutif européen préférait à présent parler d’« arrangements de débarquement régionaux ». L’UE a donc commencé à préparer des accords spécifiques avec chacun des pays concernés, dont un échange de financements contre un meilleur contrôle migratoire. Le but est ainsi d’empêcher les migrants d’arriver en Europe.

Accords en négociations

Depuis le mois de septembre, des discussions sont en cours entre Bruxelles et le gouvernement égyptien d’Abdel Fattah al-Sissi. Un accord « cash contre migrants » devrait être finalisé avant le sommet UE-Ligue arabe qui aura lieu en février au Caire.

S’il parait évident que l’Europe ne répétera pas son offre de 4 milliards à la Turquie, l’Égypte devrait demander une aide considérable et des prêts avantageux en échange d’un durcissement du contrôle migratoire. Des accords similaires devraient être conclus avec le Maroc, la Tunisie et la Libye.

Le timing n’est pas dû au hasard, puisque Abdel Fattah al-Sissi succédera en janvier au Rwandais Paul Kagame à la présidence de l’Union africaine, et que le sommet de février sera centré sur l’immigration.

Ce n’est pourtant pas parce que l’idée des « hotspots » a été abandonnée que les pays africains échappent aux pressions européennes.

Le 1er novembre, Reuters indiquait que le ministère marocain des Affaires étrangères avait mis en place une nouvelle obligation pour les ressortissants du Congo Brazzaville, de Guinée et du Mali, qui devront à présent demander un permis de voyage quatre jours avant leur arrivée au Maroc. La plupart des migrants espérant atteindre l’Europe via le Maroc sont guinéens ou maliens.

L’Espagne fait en effet pression sur Rabat pour réduire le nombre d’arrivées de migrants, notamment via ses enclaves de Ceuta et Melilla.

Redéfinitions à venir

Par ailleurs, les conditions de renvoi des migrants seront redéfinies dans le texte qui remplacera l’accord de Cotonou, mais il est clair que l’Europe ne voudra pas les rendre plus strictes. Les discussions entre l’UE et les pays d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique, viennent de commencer.

L’accord, qui expire en 2020, prévoit que les États africains réintègrent les migrants qui n’obtiennent pas l’autorisation de rester en Europe, une mesure qui n’a cependant pas été mise en pratique. « Les dirigeants africains ne respecteront jamais ces articles sur la migration », indique une source proche des négociations.

L’Union africaine n’est pas parvenue à unir ses membres pour négocier le successeur de l’accord de Cotonou sur la base d’une position commune face à l’UE, mais les avis sont plus convergents sur la question migratoire. Selon une représentante de la société civile, son plan d’action sur l’immigration est « l’un des meilleurs documents sur la migration ».

Contrairement à l’UE, divisée entre des pays plutôt accueillants et d’autres comme la Hongrie, la Pologne ou l’Italie, qui défendent des règles extrêmement strictes, les membres de l’Union africaine sont sur la même longueur d’onde sur le sujet. « L’UE n’est pas en position de négocier sur l’immigration, mais l’Union africaine l’est », conclut cette même source.

Pour montrer à ses citoyens qu’elle agit, l’UE pourrait donc finir par mettre en place des arrangements de contrôle migratoire fragmentés et chers.

▻https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/eu-lowers-its-ambitions-on-african-migration-control

EP lawyers back EU plans for migrant centres in Africa

Lawyers working at the European Parliament on Tuesday (27 November) struggled to provide a detailed analysis of whether stalled EU plans to offload rescued migrants in north Africa were legal - but ultimately backed the controversial concept.

“It was at least a brave attempt to piece together, sort of like bits of circumstantial evidence from a kind of a crime scene, to see what the hell this is,” British centre-left MEP Claude Moraes said of their efforts.

Speaking at the parliament’s civil liberties committee, a lawyer from the legal service was only able to provide an oral summary of their report, citing confidentiality issues.

But EUobserver has obtained a full copy of the 10-page confidential report, which attempted to provide a legal analysis of stalled EU plans to set up so-called ’regional disembarkation platforms’ in north Africa and controlled centres in Europe.

The report broadly rubber stamps the legality of both concepts, but with conditions.

It says “controlled centres and/or disembarkation platforms of a similar nature could be, in principle, lawfully established in the European Union territory.”

It states disembarkation platforms “could lawfully be established outside of the European Union, in order to receive migrants rescued outside the territory of the Union’s member states.”

It also says EU law does not apply to migrants rescued at high sea, even with a boat flying an EU-member state flag.

“We can’t consider a vessel flying a flag of a member state to be an extension of a member state,” the lawyer told the MEPs.

EU law is also not applied if the migrant is rescued in the territorial waters of an African coastal state, states the report.

It also notes that people rescued in EU territorial waters cannot then be sent to disembarkation platforms in an non-EU state.

Morocco and other bordering coastal states must apply the 1951 Geneva Convention and must be considered safe before allowing them to host any disembarkation platform.

Earlier this year, the European Commission tasked the EU’s asylum support office to analyse the safety of both Morocco and Tunisia.

But neither country has voiced any interest in hosting such platforms.

The two countries were then presented over the summer by EU heads of state and government as a possible solution to further stem boat migrants from taking to the seas in their efforts to reach Europe.

The concepts, initially hatched by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN refugee agency (UNHCR), were met with disdain by north African states, who viewed them as a veiled attempt by the EU to outsource its problem back onto them.

Furthermore, not a single EU state has expressed any interest to host a controlled centre.

Human rights defenders have also raised alarm given the poor treatment of thousands of refugees and migrants stuck in over-crowded camps on the Greek islands.

Attempting to replicate similar camps or centres elsewhere has only heightened those fears.

But the EU says it is pressing ahead anyway.

“The disembarkation arrangement, the discussion, is proceeding in the Council,” said Vincet Piket, a senior official in the EU’s foreign policy branch, the EEAS.

▻https://euobserver.com/migration/143513

Et il y a des personnes, qui travaillent pour le HCR, ici #Vincent_Cochetel, qui croient en les plateformes de désembarquement évidemment...

Good statement of search and rescue organisations, but I would like to see the same advocacy efforts with North African countries. A predictable regional disembarkation mechanism must be a shared responsibility on both sides of the Mediterranean.

https://i.imgur.com/2n7hNAB.png

▻https://twitter.com/cochetel/status/1073190725473484801?s=19

African Union seeks to kill EU plan to process migrants in Africa

Exclusive: Leaked paper shows determination to dissuade coastal states from cooperating.

The African Union is seeking to kill off the EU’s latest blueprint for stemming migration, claiming that it would breach international law by establishing “de facto detention centres” on African soil, trampling over the rights of those being held.

A “#common_African_position_paper” leaked to the Guardian reveals the determination of the 55-member state body, currently headed by Egypt, to dissuade any of its coastal states from cooperating with Brussels on the plan.

The EU set plans for “regional disembarkation platforms” in motion last summer to allow migrants found in European waters to have their asylum requests processed on African soil.

Brussels has a similar arrangement in place with Libya, where there are 800,000 migrants, 20,000 of whom are being held in government detention centres. The Libyan authorities have been accused of multiple and grave human rights abuses. A UN report recently stated that migrants in the country faced “unimaginable horrors”.

Some northern states, including Morocco, have already rejected the EU’s proposal over the new “platforms”, but there are concerns within the African Union (AU) that other member governments could be persuaded by the offer of development funds.

Italy’s far-right interior minister Matteo Salvini has called for the centres to be based around the Sahel region, in Niger, Chad, Mali and Sudan. An inaugural summit between the EU and the League of Arab States is being held in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt on Sunday and Monday, and migration is expected to be discussed.

“When the EU wants something, it usually gets it,” said a senior AU official. “African capitals worry that this plan will see the establishment of something like modern-day slave markets, with the ‘best’ Africans being allowed into Europe and the rest tossed back – and it is not far from the truth.”

They added: “The feelings are very, very raw about this. And it feels that this summit is about the EU trying to work on some countries to cooperate. Bilaterally, some countries will always look at the money.”

EU officials, in turn, have been coy about the purposes of the summit, insisting that it is merely an attempt to engage on issues of joint importance.

The leaked draft joint position of the AU notes that Brussels has yet to fully flesh out the concept of the “regional disembarkation platforms”. But it adds: “The establishment of disembarkation platforms on the African Continent for the processing of the asylum claims of Africans seeking international protection in Europe would contravene International Law, EU Law and the Legal instruments of the AU with regard to refugees and displaced persons.

“The setup of ‘disembarkation platforms’ would be tantamount to de facto ‘detention centres’ where the fundamental rights of African migrants will be violated and the principle of solitary among AU member states greatly undermined. The collection of biometric data of citizens of AU Members by international organisations violates the sovereignty of African Countries over their citizens.”

The AU also criticises Brussels for bypassing its structures and warns of wider repercussions. “The AU views the decision by the EU to support the concept of ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ in Africa and the ongoing bilateral consultation with AU member states, without the involvement of the AU and its relevant institutions, as undermining the significant progress achieved in the partnership frameworks and dialogues between our two unions,” the paper says.

Confidential legal advice commissioned by the European parliament also raises concerns about the legality of establishing processing centres on African soil for those found in European waters.

The paper, seen by the Guardian, warns that “migrants, after they have been rescued (or a fortiori after they have been brought back on to European Union territory), could not be sent to platforms outside of the European Union without being granted access to the EU asylum procedures and without being granted the possibility to wait for the complete examination of their request”.

►https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/24/african-union-seeks-to-kill-eu-plan-to-process-migrants-in-africa