« Important analysis of why rebels failed. Primary conclusion : They didn’t have as much support as activist & reporters claimed. Silent majority in countryside did not like the fighting & lost confidence in militias, despite initially wanting reform or joining protests.… https://t.co/wwBPtfdekW »

/1016737271830142976

  • The Breaking of Syria’s Rebellion
    http://www.regthink.org/en/articles/the-breaking-of-syrias-rebellion

    Throughout the war, rebels have engaged in looting, notably in eastern Aleppo city in 2012, Idlib city in 2015, Naseeb crossing in Daraa in 2015, al-Bab in northern Aleppo in late 2016 and Efrin in March 2018. While the phenomenon of looting by regime forces is much more systematic, this conduct by the rebels has angered many civilians who remained under the rule of the forces who looted their homes, businesses and factories.

    […]

    In areas where regime and Russian jets are (temporarily) not bombing, the main threats to civilians’ safety and livelihood stem from criminal gangs and rebel themselves. Phenomena of exorbitant transit fees, robbery, assassinations, carjackings, kidnappings for ransom, and murder are incredibly common across rebel-held Syria. In some cases the perpetrators are clearly rebels: for example in the collection of “taxes” in the rebel checkpoints, attacks on and robbing of NGOs, confiscation of private and public property, armed confrontation over minor issues, kidnappings and torture of suspected opponents and random unlucky civilians. Foreign donors invested heavily in setting up civilian-managed courts and “Free Police” departments, but civilians abused by rebels or criminal elements usually can not find recourse with the local courts or police, due to their ineptness, corruption, and dependence and subservience to the rebels, who are oftentimes the aggressors. One manifestation of rebels’ impunity is the habit of some rebel factions, and in particular Hayat Tahrir a-Sham, to wear balaclavas when interacting with the population under their control, enabling them to avoid identification, public opprobrium and justice. Rebels further undermine the civilian courts by operating a parallel “justice” system, in which the rebels serve as judges and executioners without proper proceedings.

    Hossam, a medical worker in Daraa told me “most civilians here hate the rebels”, due to abuses against civilians, in particular kidnappings for ransom and of people who voice opposition to them. Raed, an activist in western Aleppo said that rebels kidnap “anyone who disagrees with them or says anything bad about them, civilian or rebel.”

    Je l’ai écrit en 2012 : si on lance une guerre civile milicienne, qui plus est à forte composante sectaire, on se retrouve avec le modèle libanais, c’est-à-dire que rapidement, une fois les lignes de front stabilisées, les milices deviennent les bourreaux des populations qu’elles prétendaient initialement représenter et/ou défendre.