Three Types of Non-Transformative “Change”

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  • Three Types of Non-Transformative “Change”
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/blogs/labyrinth/three-types-non-transformative-%E2%80%9Cchange%E2%80%9D

    Early last year, the notion of change was in itself good, a departure from an era marked with cross-sector stagnation. But now, as Egyptians have learnt under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and then the budding reign of the Muslim Brotherhood, change in itself doesn’t bring forth a bright future.

    These past few months in particular revealed three types of non-transformative “change.”

    The first, which was adopted by SCAF over the past year and half, depended on changing figureheads but is in essence superficial. The new names were from the old order and the failed policies were left intact.
    The Muslim Brotherhood, which briefly pitted itself as an opponent of the generals and their rule, is following in their footsteps, but after its own fashion.

    It started with a new cabinet of ministers that largely reflected continuity rather than change. The implications of this approach are best observed in the appointment of chief-editors for state-run papers by the MB-dominated Shura Council. The new editors were seen as under-qualified by some of their peers as — the type that won’t mind bending media coverage to suit MB policies. This approach, which prioritized loyalty over qualification — with an especially maddening rate over the last 10 years of Mubarak’s rule —crushed the intellectual weight of many state publishing houses.

    The pro-reform journalists inside these institutions were hoping for a fundamental change that would guarantee editorial independence, a reverse of tack towards professional standards, and a purge of corruption.

    The second type of so called change pours into the most popular concern: the Islamization of the state and the Brotherhood domination of its institutions and arms. This is most evident in the latest appointment of 10 governors, six of which are affiliated with the MB.

    The third kind of change is directly aimed at keeping allies — and some opposition — happy. Like in the previous types, qualification isn’t a priority, but is rather completely sacrificed here. As with the case of the Supreme Press Council and the National Council for Human Rights, the new appointments saw big and famous names, some of who are not remotely related to these fields. The young spokesperson of the Salafi al-Nour Party turned down a seat on the press council following a wave of criticism. Notorious Islamic preacher Safwat Hegazy remains on the new Human Rights Council, even though activists have voiced even more scathing criticisms of his appointment.