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  • Lesbos: A mental health crisis beneath the surface

    A mental health crisis among asylum seekers from the former Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos is worsening. In the new ’Kara Tepe’ tent facility, even more young children are receiving psychiatric treatment, including medication, to deal with ongoing trauma.

    Before it burned to the ground, the #Moria camp on the Greek #hotspot island of Lesbos was described as “hell on earth”. The terrible conditions and overcrowding in the migrant camp had led to daily incidents of violence, abuse, and suicide attempts, even among children.

    According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which provides mental health support to refugees on Lesbos, between December 2019 and August 2020, more than 40% of migrants they counselled in Moria had suicidal thoughts and a quarter had actually tried to commit suicide.

    On the night of September 8, 2020, the camp was destroyed. For thousands of asylum seekers, the fire was a traumatic experience, yet it allowed them to hope that they would never again have to suffer in such conditions.

    However, worse was to come. In the days after the disaster, they would sleep in the streets and face violence and intimidation from anti-migrant groups as well as Greek police, before being moved to a new a tent camp with no showers, no areas insulated against cold and, it turned out, subject to major flooding.
    Mental health worsening

    According to Martha Roussou, senior advocacy officer with the IRC, almost all of the migrants attending counselling on Lesbos say their mental health problems are caused by poor living conditions and long waiting times for their asylum claims to be heard. For those at the new camp, these problems that had reached crisis proportions in Moria have not gone away, instead they have worsened with the loss of hope.

    Greg Kavarnos, a psychologist with the medical charity Doctors Without Borders (MSF) working with asylum seekers on Lesbos, says conditions in the Kara Tepe camp would cause any mentally healthy person to become anxious and depressed. The effect is catastrophic for those seeking his help, who are already deeply traumatized.

    “I have had patients who were incapable of talking when they were brought to me. Or they were so mentally unwell that they couldn’t even go to the toilet by themselves,” says Kavarnos.

    For those who have been incarcerated in the past, the experience of being in the camp, which is heavily policed and surrounded barbed wire, can also trigger memories of traumatic experiences, he adds.

    Some also experience disillusionment and a loss of hope because they have not reached a safe place, according to Kavarnos. “Imagine what it would be like if you’re in a region controlled by the Taliban in Afghanistan, or you’re a political prisoner in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or you’re a victim of the regime in Syria, and you escape this danger expecting to come somewhere where it’s safe and you’ll be treated as a human being. Imagine that instead of having this, you’re treated worse than an animal.”

    Long-term effects on children

    In the weeks following the Moria fire, almost all of the unaccompanied minors – children traveling without a parent or guardian – were transferred off the island. But many children were also left on Lesbos, as well as the other hotspot islands.

    And according to Kavarnos, these remaining children are among those most at risk of suffering long-term mental health effects.

    “Even though children are resilient and can bounce back from things, they’re at a stage when they’re developing their character and their personality,” he says. “If they have to go through traumatic experiences at this age, these will then shape their personality or their character in the future, leading to long-term problems.”

    Children in the camp are increasingly feeling a sense of resignation. Seeing their parents trapped and unable to make decisions or take action, they become hopeless, according to Kavarnos.

    “If at eight years old a child has already resigned itself, what does that mean when this child becomes 12 years old or 16 years old? If at 8 years old or 10 years old a child has to take psychiatric medication in order for the symptoms to be held at bay, what’s this going to mean later?”

    In the new Lesbos facility, 17-year-old Nour from Syria tells us that when the Moria camp went up in flames in September, she had asked her mother to leave her there to die.

    Like a growing number of children and young people in the migrant camps, Nour is taking antidepressants.

    “Generally, if a psychiatric problem arises as a result of trauma, if you don’t deal successfully with the trauma, the psychiatric problem then becomes chronic,” Kavarnos explains.

    “So, what are we doing? We’re creating a generation of children that are going to be reliant on psychiatric medication for the rest of their lives.”
    ‘We all have mental problems because of Lesbos’

    Karima, from Afghanistan, is also on antidepressants and has trouble sleeping. Most of her family, including her granddaughters, aged two and three, were in a boat from Turkey that sank in the Aegean. They were rescued and brought to Lesbos. For about two years, they lived in the Moria camp.

    Karima’s son; Rahullah tells us: “It was a very bad situation. ... People died, they drank, they killed each other. We didn’t sleep. So now we have mental problems, all of us, just because of Lesbos.”

    Rahullah’s sister F., the mother of the two little girls, became so unwell that she cut herself, says another of her brothers, a softly-spoken law graduate. F.’s husband was murdered in Afghanistan.

    Another young asylum seeker in the camp, Ahmad*, is 25. He travelled alone from Afghanistan to Greece. He says that he has twice attempted suicide, and if it hadn’t been for his friends, he would have gone through with it and succeeded in killing himself.
    Removal the only solution

    The IRC’s Martha Roussou says the organization tries to help migrants with counseling and medication, but while some people do improve, “the only durable solution is to remove them from the traumatic space they are living in.”

    Until this happens, she continues, the migrants cannot escape the trauma they have already experienced, “despite the best efforts of psychologists to focus on positivity and hopeful thoughts.”

    According to MSF’S Greg Kavarnos, no matter how much medication or psychotherapy you give a person, “if they’re constantly being traumatized by their experiences, you’re always one step behind.

    “I can’t do anything for the ongoing trauma, the threats of violence, the inability to access simple facilities,” he continues. “I can’t say to the person, ‘it’s okay, things will get better,’ because I don’t know if things will get better for them.”

    *Ahmad is an assumed name

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/28086/lesbos-a-mental-health-crisis-beneath-the-surface
    #santé_mentale #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Lesbos #Grèce

  • Croatia stopped 16,000 migrant border crossings since January

    Croatia claims to have stopped just over 16,000 attempts by migrants without visas to cross the border with Bosnia since the beginning of the year. Meanwhile, Bosnia says it has halted close to 9,000 illegal migrant entrances so far this year.
    Since the beginning of the year, Croatian border police have halted just over 16,000 attempts to enter the country by migrants without proper papers arriving from Bosnia, Interior Minister Davor Bozinovic said Wednesday.

    Some 374 people were arrested on human trafficking charges in police operations, the minister said, most of whom were allegedly members of criminal organizations.

    Bosnian border crossings

    Meanwhile, Bosnian border police stopped almost 9,000 illegal attempts to cross into Bosnia and Herzegovina since the beginning of the year, border police director Zoran Galic said on September 12.

    There were 8,463 attempted entrances in total. In 7,376 of these cases, the migrants reportedly had been previously stopped and identified in Bosnia and had documents with them in which they declared their intention to request asylum in the country.

    Galic said that in the past eight months, some 11 migrant trafficking crimes had been discovered in the Zvornik area along the border with Serbia alone.

    Migrants still on Balkan Route

    Countries along the so-called Balkan Route have fortified their borders and increased border patrols in recent years. But there are still tens of thousands of migrants who are trying to cross through eastern European countries such as Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia to Western Europe.

    In recent weeks, border authorities discovered numerous migrants trying to clandestinely cross borders in the Balkan region.

    In Slovenia, in the 24 hours between Tuesday and Wednesday, police from the Capodistria district reportedly stopped 35 migrants from entering Croatia. According to a police statement, most of them were from Afghanistan (23) or Morocco (6).

    Migrants hiding on trucks

    On September 15, Serbian customs officials stationed along the border between Hungary and Croatia discovered 14 migrants hiding in various trucks. They were allegedly trying to reach EU countries in Western Europe. Serbian media report that six migrants had been discovered at the Horgos crossing on the Hungarian border on a Macedonian truck carrying tires from Turkey to the Czech Republic.

    Four migrants were discovered on two Serbian trucks that were carrying women’s hosiery and headed for Italy. The migrants, two on each truck, were discovered during a customs check on the border with Croatia. Also on the Serbian-Croatian border, four migrants were found on a truck carrying olives from Greece to the Netherlands.

    In another incident along the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on Tuesday morning, three migrants were reportedly rescued in #Zvornik while they were trying to cross the #Drina river. The three had been stuck at the point where the river is deepest for hours, grasping large stone blocks to not be swept away from the current. Passers-by saw the migrants, who were then rescued by the border police and firefighters.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27384/croatia-stopped-16-000-migrant-border-crossings-since-january
    #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Croatie #statistiques #chiffres #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine

  • Greece says first migrant dies of COVID-19 since the pandemic

    A male migrant died of COVID-19 on Sunday, the first reported death of an asylum seeker since the pandemic broke out in Greece in late February, a government official told Reuters.

    The 61-year-old Afghan, a father of two children, who lived at the migrant camp of #Malakasa north of Athens, was treated and died at a hospital in Athens, the official said, adding that authorities were tracing his contacts.

    It was not immediately clear how long he had been at the hospital.

    The Malakasa camp, which hosts about 3,000 migrants, has been quarantined since Sept. 7 after positive tests for the new coronavirus.

    Many other migrant facilities in Greece have been sealed off or movement has been restricted to stem the spread of the virus.

    Greece has been the main gateway into the European Union for people fleeing conflict in the Middle East and beyond. More than a million people reached its shores from Turkey in 2015-16.

    At least 110,000 people currently live in migrant facilities - 40,000 of them in overcrowded camps on five islands.

    A fire burnt to the ground a migrant camp on Greece’s biggest, on island of Lesbos this month, leaving about 12,000 people stranded. Most of them have now moved to a temporary tent camp on the island.

    Greece reported 218 COVID-19 cases on Sunday and three deaths, bringing the total number of infections to 17,444 since the first case surfaced late February.

    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-greece-migrants/greece-says-first-migrant-dies-of-covid-19-since-the-pandemic-idUSKBN26I0YM
    #décès #mort #covid-19 #coronavirus #grèce #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Athènes #camps_de_réfugiés

    –---

    Sur les cas de covid dans les camps de réfugiés :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/874186
    #contaminations #contamination

    ping @veronique_petit @luciebacon @karine4 @isskein

    • Greece: Tensions at migrant camp after first Covid death

      Tensions and protests among migrants at Greece’s Malakasa migrant camp on the outskirts of Athens occurred after officials reported the first death of a migrant in the country due to COVID-19.

      Groups of migrants staying at Greece’s Malakasa migrant camp facility blocked one side of the national highway leading to central Greece on Sunday afternoon after it was reported that a 61-year-old Afghan father of two had died in hospital after contracting COVID-19.

      The camp is in the outskirts of Athens: https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/26627/life-at-a-standstill-in-malakasa-migrant-camp-in-greece

      Despite being on lockdown since September 7, the overcrowded facility has made life difficult for the refugees and migrants staying there to maintain social distancing and follow recommended health protocols.

      The 61-year-old man was being treated at the Evangelismos hospital in central Athens.
      ’Severe overcrowding’

      According to the latest figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Malakasa facility, which has a capacity for 1,589 people, has been operating at 132.4% of that capacity.

      In recent months, another 1,036 undocumented migrants have been added to the 1,068 registered people staying there.

      The new arrivals are mostly made up of people who have come from the North East Aegean islands and with nowhere to stay have ended up sleeping rough on Victoria Square in Athens’ city center, from where they were transferred by police to several facilities in the greater Attica area.
      More camps placed under lockdown

      In related developments, in the wake of an increase in COVID-19 cases and deaths throughout Greece in recent weeks, migrant reception centers in Thiva, central Greece, and Serres in the north have been put under lockdown.

      The latest lockdowns were announced on Saturday in a joint decision by the ministries of Migration, Citizens’ Protection and Health, and are set to remain in place until October 9 when the situation will be re-evaluated.

      Other migrant facilities already under lockdown are: Elaionas, Malakasa, Oinofyta, Ritsona, Schistos, Koutsohero and Fylakio - all of which are on the mainland. Camps on the islands of Samos and Leros are also under lockdown.

      Meanwhile on Lesvos, the new, temporary ’tent city’ camp at Kara Tepe, which was erected after the Moria camp was destroyed by fires earlier this month, is segregating migrants who have tested positive for COVID-19.

      A total of 243 positive COVID-19 cases had been recorded at the new temporary facility by the end of last week.

      The camp was hastily set up following a series of fires which ripped through and completely destroyed the overcrowded Moria camp.

      Over 9,200 people have been transferred to the new facility and the process of examining their asylum applications is underway.
      ’Living conditions getting worse’

      Meanwhile, there has been large-scale criticism of Greece’s initiative in the creation of the new site at Moria, as well as the government’s handling of the refugee issue relating to the spread of COVID-19.

      Humanitarian organization Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) have been the most scathing in the criticism. Christina Psarra, director general of MSF, said last week: “The creation of a new camp and a system that will trap people indefinitely exposes the persistence in the same mistakes that led to this catastrophe.”

      She added: “The immediate evacuation of people is the only way to avoid chaos and not be repeated. Living conditions did not meet public health protocols before, so now it’s worse, and they do not allow for the prevention of the transmission of COVID-19. We are clear: there should not be another Moria, and nothing like it should be built on its ashes.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27642/greece-tensions-at-migrant-camp-after-first-covid-death

  • 20 refugees arrive in Italy with university scholarships

    Twenty refugees from Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo arrived in Italy on September 11 thanks to the project University Corridors for Refugees. They will be able to continue their studies at 10 Italian universities through a scholarship.

    Twenty refugees who arrived at Rome’s Fiumicino airport on September 11 will soon be able to continue their studies. They will attend one of 10 Italian universities that have joined the project #University_Corridors_for_Refugees (#UNICORE).
    According to a statement released by the UN refugee agency UNHCR, the students, including a woman, come from Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. They were selected according to their academic accomplishments and motivation by a commission appointed by all the universities participating in the project through a public competition.

    Once they have completed a mandatory quarantine period due to the COVID-19 emergency, the students will start attending courses at the universities of Cagliari, Florence, L’Aquila, Milan (Statale), Padua, Perugia, Pisa, Rome (Luiss), Sassari and Venice (Iuav).

    ’Extraordinary result’, UNHCR

    The project University Corridors for Refugees is promoted with the cooperation of the Italian foreign ministry, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Italian charity Caritas, the Diaconia Valdese. It was also organized thanks to the support of the University of Bologna (promoter of the first edition in 2019) and a wide network of partners in Ethiopia (Gandhi Charity) and in Italy, which will provide the necessary support to students for the entire duration of the specialization course.

    “We are extremely happy for this extraordinary result,” said Chiara Cardoletti, UNHCR representative for Italy, the Holy See and San Marino.

    “With this initiative Italy proves it is ahead in finding innovative solutions for the protection of refugees.”

    UN goals for the education of refugees

    According to the UNHCR report ’Coming Together for Refugee Education’ published two weeks ago, only 3% of refugees at a global level have access to higher education.

    By 2030, the UN agency has the goal of reaching a 15% enrolment rate in higher education programs for refugees in host countries and third countries also by increasing safe pathways that take into account specific needs and the legitimate aspirations of refugees.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27244/20-refugees-arrive-in-italy-with-university-scholarships

    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #université #universités-refuge #villes-refuge #Italie #bourses_d'étude

    –—

    Ajouté à la métaliste des villes-refuge:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/759145

    ping @isskein @karine4

    • Le site web du projet #University_Corridors_for_Refugees (#UNICORE)

      The project University Corridors for Refugees UNICORE 2.0 is promoted by 10 Italian universities with the support of UNHCR, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Caritas Italiana, Diaconia Valdese, and other partners. It aims to increase opportunities for refugees currently residing in Ethiopia to continue their higher education in Italy.

      https://universitycorridors.unhcr.it

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNri937Rn5w&feature=emb_logo

    • Università dell’Aquila: primo corridoio umanitario per studenti rifugiati

      La realizzazione di un “corridoio universitario” per rifugiati quale dimostrazione di sensibilità ed estrema apertura da parte dell’Università dell’Aquila verso studenti meno fortunati e sicuramente più vulnerabili che, diversamente, non avrebbero altre possibilità di realizzare studi universitari.
      Il progetto si è materializzato con l’arrivo all’Aquila, lo scorso martedì 29 settembre, dopo un periodo di quarantena trascorso in strutture protette, del primo studente vincitore del programma “University Corridors for Refugees Unicore 2.0” promosso da dieci atenei italiani con il supporto di Unhcr, Maeci, Caritas italiana, Diaconia valdese e con il contributo di diversi partner locali per L’Aquila quali Adsu, Caritas diocesana, Servizio migrantes della Caritas di Avezzano, Arci, Abruzzo crocevia e Ricostruire insieme.

      In totale sono venti, tra ragazze e ragazzi di diverse nazionalità, titolari di protezione internazionale come rifugiati, coloro che hanno avuto l’opportunità di vincere una borsa di studio, che gli ha permesso di arrivare in Italia in condizioni di sicurezza, con i cosiddetti corridoi universitari, e iscriversi a un corso di Laurea magistrale in una delle università aderenti.

      «Siamo davvero felici di accogliere questo nuovo studente, perseguendo concretamente quegli obiettivi di uguaglianza, pari accesso alle opportunità e di attenzione per la realtà dell’immigrazione che da anni sono al centro delle politiche del nostro ateneo» spiegano i coordinatori del progetto per l’Università dell’Aquila, i docenti Francesca Caroccia e Luigi Gaffuri, referenti del Rettore rispettivamente, per le politiche di uguaglianza e pari opportunità e per la cooperazione internazionale allo sviluppo, evidenziando, inoltre, l’importanza sulle modalità di selezione degli studenti, avvenuti «in base al merito accademico- proseguono i due- e alla motivazione; nel nostro caso, si tratta di un ragazzo che presentava un curriculum davvero degno di nota e che aveva già conseguito una laurea nel suo paese con il massimo dei voti, prima che le vicende politiche stravolgessero la sua esistenza».

      La politica dell’accoglienza è ampiamente attuata dall’Università dell’Aquila, e numerosi sono gli studenti stranieri provenienti da paesi e territori che non garantiscono la tutela dei diritti fondamentali. Integrazione e valorizzazione delle competenze è «divenuta preciso obiettivo programmatico nel 2019, con la sottoscrizione del “Manifesto dell’Università Inclusiva”, una iniziativa promossa dall’Unhcr con cui l’ateneo aquilano, insieme ad altri trentotto atenei italiani, si è impegnato a facilitare l’accesso dei rifugiati al sistema educativo con risorse e competenze adeguate e, si legge in un comunicato stampa, «l’attivazione dei corridoi universitari costituisce dunque la prima linea di attuazione concreta del Manifesto; un risultato straordinario, non scontato anche a causa delle difficoltà dovute all’emergenza da Covid-19 e per la riuscita del quale è stato fondamentale il lavoro di squadra e il coordinamento con i partner e le istituzioni territoriali».

      La prof.ssa Caroccia esprime un particolare ringraziamento al vicesindaco dell’Aquila, Raffaele Daniele, per essersi «impegnato personalmente in alcuni delicati passaggi amministrativi».

      https://www.ilmessaggero.it/abruzzo/universita_aquila_primo_corridoio_umanitario_studenti_rifugiati-5494877

    • La Tavola rotonda di Asai su Università e rifugiati

      Asai – l’Associazione per gli studi africani in Italia – ha organizzato in autunno una serie di tavole rotonde tematiche. Il 2 ottobre si è tenuto l’incontro avente come titolo: Le università italiane e l’accoglienza ai rifugiati: esperienze a confronto.

      Le università italiane si sono aperte ai rifugiati ormai da anni, le esperienze di inclusione e partecipazione si stanno diffondendo sempre più. Sono nati progammi specifici in cui viene garantita la gratuità di accesso agli studi universitari e borse di studio. Ma a fronte di questa situazione generale le domande sono molte e la tavola rotonda organizzata da Asai è stata il luogo (virtuale) in cui proporle a studiosi e ricercatori coinvolti in questi progetti: “esistono mappature di questi programmi e come si può diffonderne la conoscenza? Quali bilanci si possono trarre da queste esperienze? Come possono le associazioni di studiosi d’area e i gruppi di ricerca rafforzarle?”

      Ciò che è emerso è che rimane problematico il riconoscimento dei titoli di studio (anche se non dovrebbe essere obbligatorio per i titolari di asilo politico) ma si prospetta per il futuro l’appoggio di CIMEA e CNVQR – il Coordinamento Nazionale sulla Valutazione delle Qualifiche dei Rifugiati – che dovrebbe risolvere molte situazioni o aiutare a dipanarle.

      Inoltre risulta chiaro che gli studenti rifugiati necessitano di un sostegno nel percorso universitario, perché si trovano di fronte a nuove sfide: come “il doversi abituare ad un sistema universitario e di formazione ben diverso rispetto a quello conosciuto [oppure] la necessità di colmare lacune specifiche, di tipo linguistico o legate a determinate materie e discipline; [o ancora] la necessità di riprendere l’abitudine a studio sistematico, dopo periodi di interruzione e frammentazione dei percorsi biografici, familiari etc e in una persistente situazione, in molti casi, di precarietà”.

      Gli obiettivi primari, sentiti come urgenti dai relatori, sono stati quello di costruire inclusività all’interno dell’università, “con forme di interazione con docenti e studenti e l’individuazione di figure di riferimento responsabili per specifici aspetti del percorso” e quello di produrre una rete sociale di supporto attorno ai percorsi di studio al fine di generare un senso di serenità e tranquillità negli studenti rifugiati.

      Per chi volesse approfondire Asai pubblicherà nel suo sito (sezione tavoli di coordinamento) verbale sintetico e registrazione dell’evento del 9 ottobre 2020:
      https://www.asaiafrica.org/tavoli-tematici-di-coordinamento

      https://viedifuga.org/la-tavola-rotonda-di-asai-su-universita-e-rifugiati

  • Fil de discussion sur le nouveau #pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile

    –—

    Migrants : le règlement de Dublin va être supprimé

    La Commission européenne doit présenter le 23 septembre sa proposition de réforme de sa politique migratoire, très attendue et plusieurs fois repoussée.

    Cinq ans après le début de la crise migratoire, l’Union européenne veut changer de stratégie. La Commission européenne veut “abolir” le règlement de Dublin qui fracture les Etats-membres et qui confie la responsabilité du traitement des demandes d’asile au pays de première entrée des migrants dans l’UE, a annoncé ce mercredi 16 septembre la cheffe de l’exécutif européen Ursula von der Leyen dans son discours sur l’Etat de l’Union.

    La Commission doit présenter le 23 septembre sa proposition de réforme de la politique migratoire européenne, très attendue et plusieurs fois repoussée, alors que le débat sur le manque de solidarité entre pays Européens a été relancé par l’incendie du camp de Moria sur lîle grecque de Lesbos.

    “Au coeur (de la réforme) il y a un engagement pour un système plus européen”, a déclaré Ursula von der Leyen devant le Parlement européen. “Je peux annoncer que nous allons abolir le règlement de Dublin et le remplacer par un nouveau système européen de gouvernance de la migration”, a-t-elle poursuivi.
    Nouveau mécanisme de solidarité

    “Il y aura des structures communes pour l’asile et le retour. Et il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité”, a-t-elle dit, alors que les pays qui sont en première ligne d’arrivée des migrants (Grèce, Malte, Italie notamment) se plaignent de devoir faire face à une charge disproportionnée.

    La proposition de réforme de la Commission devra encore être acceptée par les Etats. Ce qui n’est pas gagné d’avance. Cinq ans après la crise migratoire de 2015, la question de l’accueil des migrants est un sujet qui reste source de profondes divisions en Europe, certains pays de l’Est refusant d’accueillir des demandeurs d’asile.

    Sous la pression, le système d’asile européen organisé par le règlement de Dublin a explosé après avoir pesé lourdement sur la Grèce ou l’Italie.

    Le nouveau plan pourrait notamment prévoir davantage de sélection des demandeurs d’asile aux frontières extérieures et un retour des déboutés dans leur pays assuré par Frontex. Egalement à l’étude pour les Etats volontaires : un mécanisme de relocalisation des migrants sauvés en Méditerranée, parfois contraints d’errer en mer pendant des semaines en attente d’un pays d’accueil.

    Ce plan ne résoudrait toutefois pas toutes les failles. Pour le patron de l’Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration, Didier Leschi, “il ne peut pas y avoir de politique européenne commune sans critères communs pour accepter les demandes d’asile.”

    https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/migrants-le-reglement-de-dublin-tres-controverse-va-etre-supprime_fr_

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Dublin #règlement_dublin #fin #fin_de_Dublin #suppression #pacte #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration #new_pact #nouveau_pacte #pacte_sur_la_migration_et_l'asile

    –---

    Documents officiels en lien avec le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/879881

    –-

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1019088

    ping @reka @karine4 @_kg_ @isskein

    • Immigration : le règlement de Dublin, l’impossible #réforme ?

      En voulant abroger le règlement de Dublin, qui impose la responsabilité des demandeurs d’asile au premier pays d’entrée dans l’Union européenne, Bruxelles reconnaît des dysfonctionnements dans l’accueil des migrants. Mais les Vingt-Sept, plus que jamais divisés sur cette question, sont-ils prêts à une refonte du texte ? Éléments de réponses.

      Ursula Von der Leyen en a fait une des priorités de son mandat : réformer le règlement de Dublin, qui impose au premier pays de l’UE dans lequel le migrant est arrivé de traiter sa demande d’asile. « Je peux annoncer que nous allons [l’]abolir et le remplacer par un nouveau système européen de gouvernance de la migration », a déclaré la présidente de la Commission européenne mercredi 16 septembre, devant le Parlement.

      Les États dotés de frontières extérieures comme la Grèce, l’Italie ou Malte se sont réjouis de cette annonce. Ils s’estiment lésés par ce règlement en raison de leur situation géographique qui les place en première ligne.

      La présidente de la Commission européenne doit présenter, le 23 septembre, une nouvelle version de la politique migratoire, jusqu’ici maintes fois repoussée. « Il y aura des structures communes pour l’asile et le retour. Et il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité », a-t-elle poursuivi. Un terme fort à l’heure où l’incendie du camp de Moria sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, plus de 8 000 adultes et 4 000 enfants à la rue, a révélé le manque d’entraide entre pays européens.

      Pour mieux comprendre l’enjeu de cette nouvelle réforme européenne de la politique migratoire, France 24 décrypte le règlement de Dublin qui divise tant les Vingt-Sept, en particulier depuis la crise migratoire de 2015.

      Pourquoi le règlement de Dublin dysfonctionne ?

      Les failles ont toujours existé mais ont été révélées par la crise migratoire de 2015, estiment les experts de politique migratoire. Ce texte signé en 2013 et qu’on appelle « Dublin III » repose sur un accord entre les membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que la Suisse, l’Islande, la Norvège et le Liechtenstein. Il prévoit que l’examen de la demande d’asile d’un exilé incombe au premier pays d’entrée en Europe. Si un migrant passé par l’Italie arrive par exemple en France, les autorités françaises ne sont, en théorie, pas tenu d’enregistrer la demande du Dubliné.
      © Union européenne | Les pays signataires du règlement de Dublin.

      Face à l’afflux de réfugiés ces dernières années, les pays dotés de frontières extérieures, comme la Grèce et l’Italie, se sont estimés abandonnés par le reste de l’Europe. « La charge est trop importante pour ce bloc méditerranéen », estime Matthieu Tardis, chercheur au Centre migrations et citoyennetés de l’Ifri (Institut français des relations internationales). Le texte est pensé « comme un mécanisme de responsabilité des États et non de solidarité », estime-t-il.

      Sa mise en application est aussi difficile à mettre en place. La France et l’Allemagne, qui concentrent la majorité des demandes d’asile depuis le début des années 2000, peinent à renvoyer les Dublinés. Dans l’Hexagone, seulement 11,5 % ont été transférés dans le pays d’entrée. Outre-Rhin, le taux ne dépasse pas les 15 %. Conséquence : nombre d’entre eux restent « bloqués » dans les camps de migrants à Calais ou dans le nord de Paris.

      Le délai d’attente pour les demandeurs d’asile est aussi jugé trop long. Un réfugié passé par l’Italie, qui vient déposer une demande d’asile en France, peut attendre jusqu’à 18 mois avant d’avoir un retour. « Durant cette période, il se retrouve dans une situation d’incertitude très dommageable pour lui mais aussi pour l’Union européenne. C’est un système perdant-perdant », commente Matthieu Tardis.

      Ce règlement n’est pas adapté aux demandeurs d’asile, surenchérit-on à la Cimade (Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués). Dans un rapport, l’organisation qualifie ce système de « machine infernale de l’asile européen ». « Il ne tient pas compte des liens familiaux ni des langues parlées par les réfugiés », précise le responsable asile de l’association, Gérard Sadik.

      Sept ans après avoir vu le jour, le règlement s’est vu porter le coup de grâce par le confinement lié aux conditions sanitaires pour lutter contre le Covid-19. « Durant cette période, aucun transfert n’a eu lieu », assure-t-on à la Cimade.

      Le mécanisme de solidarité peut-il le remplacer ?

      « Il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité », a promis Ursula von der Leyen, sans donné plus de précision. Sur ce point, on sait déjà que les positions divergent, voire s’opposent, entre les Vingt-Sept.

      Le bloc du nord-ouest (Allemagne, France, Autriche, Benelux) reste ancré sur le principe actuel de responsabilité, mais accepte de l’accompagner d’un mécanisme de solidarité. Sur quels critères se base la répartition du nombre de demandeurs d’asile ? Comment les sélectionner ? Aucune décision n’est encore actée. « Ils sont prêts à des compromis car ils veulent montrer que l’Union européenne peut avancer et agir sur la question migratoire », assure Matthieu Tardis.

      En revanche, le groupe dit de Visegrad (Hongrie, Pologne, République tchèque, Slovaquie), peu enclin à l’accueil, rejette catégoriquement tout principe de solidarité. « Ils se disent prêts à envoyer des moyens financiers, du personnel pour le contrôle aux frontières mais refusent de recevoir les demandeurs d’asile », détaille le chercheur de l’Ifri.

      Quant au bloc Méditerranée (Grèce, Italie, Malte , Chypre, Espagne), des questions subsistent sur la proposition du bloc nord-ouest : le mécanisme de solidarité sera-t-il activé de façon permanente ou exceptionnelle ? Quelles populations sont éligibles au droit d’asile ? Et qui est responsable du retour ? « Depuis le retrait de la Ligue du Nord de la coalition dans le gouvernement italien, le dialogue est à nouveau possible », avance Matthieu Tardis.

      Un accord semble toutefois indispensable pour montrer que l’Union européenne n’est pas totalement en faillite sur ce dossier. « Mais le bloc de Visegrad n’a pas forcément en tête cet enjeu », nuance-t-il. Seule la situation sanitaire liée au Covid-19, qui place les pays de l’Est dans une situation économique fragile, pourrait faire évoluer leur position, note le chercheur.

      Et le mécanisme par répartition ?

      Le mécanisme par répartition, dans les tuyaux depuis 2016, revient régulièrement sur la table des négociations. Son principe : la capacité d’accueil du pays dépend de ses poids démographique et économique. Elle serait de 30 % pour l’Allemagne, contre un tiers des demandes aujourd’hui, et 20 % pour la France, qui en recense 18 %. « Ce serait une option gagnante pour ces deux pays, mais pas pour le bloc du Visegrad qui s’y oppose », décrypte Gérard Sadik, le responsable asile de la Cimade.

      Cette doctrine reposerait sur un système informatisé, qui recenserait dans une seule base toutes les données des demandeurs d’asile. Mais l’usage de l’intelligence artificielle au profit de la procédure administrative ne présente pas que des avantages, aux yeux de la Cimade : « L’algorithme ne sera pas en mesure de tenir compte des liens familiaux des demandeurs d’asile », juge Gérard Sadik.

      Quelles chances pour une refonte ?

      L’Union européenne a déjà tenté plusieurs fois de réformer ce serpent de mer. Un texte dit « Dublin IV » était déjà dans les tuyaux depuis 2016, en proposant par exemple que la responsabilité du premier État d’accueil soit définitive, mais il a été enterré face aux dissensions internes.

      Reste à savoir quel est le contenu exact de la nouvelle version qui sera présentée le 23 septembre par Ursula Van der Leyen. À la Cimade, on craint un durcissement de la politique migratoire, et notamment un renforcement du contrôle aux frontières.

      Quoi qu’il en soit, les négociations s’annoncent « compliquées et difficiles » car « les intérêts des pays membres ne sont pas les mêmes », a rappelé le ministre grec adjoint des Migrations, Giorgos Koumoutsakos, jeudi 17 septembre. Et surtout, la nouvelle mouture devra obtenir l’accord du Parlement, mais aussi celui des États. La refonte est encore loin.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/27376/immigration-le-reglement-de-dublin-l-impossible-reforme

      #gouvernance #Ursula_Von_der_Leyen #mécanisme_de_solidarité #responsabilité #groupe_de_Visegrad #solidarité #répartition #mécanisme_par_répartition #capacité_d'accueil #intelligence_artificielle #algorithme #Dublin_IV

    • Germany’s #Seehofer cautiously optimistic on EU asylum reform

      For the first time during the German Presidency, EU interior ministers exchanged views on reforms of the EU asylum system. German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) expressed “justified confidence” that a deal can be found. EURACTIV Germany reports.

      The focus of Tuesday’s (7 July) informal video conference of interior ministers was on the expansion of police cooperation and sea rescue, which, according to Seehofer, is one of the “Big Four” topics of the German Council Presidency, integrated into a reform of the #Common_European_Asylum_System (#CEAS).

      Following the meeting, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, spoke of an “excellent start to the Presidency,” and Seehofer also praised the “constructive discussions.” In the field of asylum policy, she said that it had become clear that all member states were “highly interested in positive solutions.”

      The interior ministers were unanimous in their desire to further strengthen police cooperation and expand both the mandates and the financial resources of Europol and Frontex.

      Regarding the question of the distribution of refugees, Seehofer said that he had “heard statements that [he] had not heard in years prior.” He said that almost all member states were “prepared to show solidarity in different ways.”

      While about a dozen member states would like to participate in the distribution of those rescued from distress at the EU’s external borders in the event of a “disproportionate burden” on the states, other states signalled that they wanted to make control vessels, financial means or personnel available to prevent smuggling activities and stem migration across the Mediterranean.

      Seehofer’s final act

      It will probably be Seehofer’s last attempt to initiate CEAS reform. He announced in May that he would withdraw completely from politics after the end of the legislative period in autumn 2021.

      Now it seems that he considers CEAS reform as his last great mission, Seehofer said that he intends to address the migration issue from late summer onwards “with all I have at my disposal.” adding that Tuesday’s (7 July) talks had “once again kindled a real fire” in him. To this end, he plans to leave the official business of the Interior Ministry “in day-to-day matters” largely to the State Secretaries.

      Seehofer’s shift of priorities to the European stage comes at a time when he is being sharply criticised in Germany.

      While his initial handling of a controversial newspaper column about the police published in Berlin’s tageszeitung prompted criticism, Seehofer now faces accusations of concealing structural racism in the police. Seehofer had announced over the weekend that, contrary to the recommendation of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), he would not commission a study on racial profiling in the police force after all.

      Seehofer: “One step is not enough”

      In recent months, Seehofer has made several attempts to set up a distribution mechanism for rescued persons in distress. On several occasions he accused the Commission of letting member states down by not solving the asylum question.

      “I have the ambition to make a great leap. One step would be too little in our presidency,” said Seehofer during Tuesday’s press conference. However, much depends on when the Commission will present its long-awaited migration pact, as its proposals are intended to serve as a basis for negotiations on CEAS reform.

      As Johansson said on Tuesday, this is planned for September. Seehofer thus only has just under four months to get the first Council conclusions through. “There will not be enough time for legislation,” he said.

      Until a permanent solution is found, ad hoc solutions will continue. A “sustainable solution” should include better cooperation with the countries of origin and transit, as the member states agreed on Tuesday.

      To this end, “agreements on the repatriation of refugees” are now to be reached with North African countries. A first step towards this will be taken next Monday (13 July), at a joint conference with North African leaders.

      https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/germany-eyes-breakthrough-in-eu-migration-dispute-this-year

      #Europol #Frontex

    • Relocation, solidarity mandatory for EU migration policy: #Johansson

      In an interview with ANSA and other European media outlets, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs #Ylva_Johansson explained the new migration and asylum pact due to be unveiled on September 23, stressing that nobody will find ideal solutions but rather a well-balanced compromise that will ’’improve the situation’’.

      European Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson has explained in an interview with a group of European journalists, including ANSA, a new pact on asylum and migration to be presented on September 23. She touched on rules for countries of first entry, a new mechanism of mandatory solidarity, fast repatriations and refugee relocation.

      The Swedish commissioner said that no one will find ideal solutions in the European Commission’s new asylum and migration proposal but rather a good compromise that “will improve the situation”.

      She said the debate to change the asylum regulation known as Dublin needs to be played down in order to find an agreement. Johansson said an earlier 2016 reform plan would be withdrawn as it ’’caused the majority’’ of conflicts among countries.

      A new proposal that will replace the current one and amend the existing Dublin regulation will be presented, she explained.

      The current regulation will not be completely abolished but rules regarding frontline countries will change. Under the new proposal, migrants can still be sent back to the country responsible for their asylum request, explained the commissioner, adding that amendments will be made but the country of first entry will ’’remain important’’.

      ’’Voluntary solidarity is not enough," there has to be a “mandatory solidarity mechanism,” Johansson noted.

      Countries will need to help according to their size and possibilities. A member state needs to show solidarity ’’in accordance with the capacity and size’’ of its economy. There will be no easy way out with the possibility of ’’just sending some blankets’’ - efforts must be proportional to the size and capabilities of member states, she said.
      Relocations are a divisive theme

      Relocations will be made in a way that ’’can be possible to accept for all member states’’, the commissioner explained. The issue of mandatory quotas is extremely divisive, she went on to say. ’’The sentence of the European Court of Justice has established that they can be made’’.

      However, the theme is extremely divisive. Many of those who arrive in Europe are not eligible for international protection and must be repatriated, she said, wondering if it is a good idea to relocate those who need to be repatriated.

      “We are looking for a way to bring the necessary aid to countries under pressure.”

      “Relocation is an important part, but also” it must be done “in a way that can be possible to accept for all member states,” she noted.

      Moreover, Johansson said the system will not be too rigid as the union should prepare for different scenarios.
      Faster repatriations

      Repatriations will be a key part of the plan, with faster bureaucratic procedures, she said. The 2016 reform proposal was made following the 2015 migration crisis, when two million people, 90% of whom were refugees, reached the EU irregularly. For this reason, the plan focused on relocations, she explained.

      Now the situation is completely different: last year 2.4 million stay permits were issued, the majority for reasons connected to family, work or education. Just 140,000 people migrated irregularly and only one-third were refugees while two-thirds will need to be repatriated.

      For this reason, stressed the commissioner, the new plan will focus on repatriation. Faster procedures are necessary, she noted. When people stay in a country for years it is very hard to organize repatriations, especially voluntary ones. So the objective is for a negative asylum decision “to come together with a return decision.”

      Also, the permanence in hosting centers should be of short duration. Speaking about a fire at the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos where more than 12,000 asylum seekers have been stranded for years, the commissioner said the situation was the ’’result of lack of European policy on asylum and migration."

      “We shall have no more Morias’’, she noted, calling for well-managed hosting centers along with limits to permanence.

      A win-win collaboration will instead be planned with third countries, she said. ’’The external aspect is very important. We have to work on good partnerships with third countries, supporting them and finding win-win solutions for readmissions and for the fight against traffickers. We have to develop legal pathways to come to the EU, in particular with resettlements, a policy that needs to be strengthened.”

      The commissioner then rejected the idea of opening hosting centers in third countries, an idea for example proposed by Denmark.

      “It is not the direction I intend to take. We will not export the right to asylum.”

      The commissioner said she was very concerned by reports of refoulements. Her objective, she concluded, is to “include in the pact a monitoring mechanism. The right to asylum must be defended.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27447/relocation-solidarity-mandatory-for-eu-migration-policy-johansson

      #relocalisation #solidarité_obligatoire #solidarité_volontaire #pays_de_première_entrée #renvois #expulsions #réinstallations #voies_légales

    • Droit d’asile : Bruxelles rate son « #pacte »

      La Commission européenne, assurant vouloir « abolir » le règlement de Dublin et son principe du premier pays d’entrée, doit présenter ce mercredi un « pacte sur l’immigration et l’asile ». Qui ne bouleverserait rien.

      C’est une belle victoire pour Viktor Orbán, le Premier ministre hongrois, et ses partenaires d’Europe centrale et orientale aussi peu enclins que lui à accueillir des étrangers sur leur sol. La Commission européenne renonce définitivement à leur imposer d’accueillir des demandeurs d’asile en cas d’afflux dans un pays de la « ligne de front » (Grèce, Italie, Malte, Espagne). Certes, le volumineux paquet de textes qu’elle propose ce mercredi (10 projets de règlements et trois recommandations, soit plusieurs centaines de pages), pompeusement baptisé « pacte sur l’immigration et l’asile », prévoit qu’ils devront, par « solidarité », assurer les refoulements vers les pays d’origine des déboutés du droit d’asile, mais cela ne devrait pas les gêner outre mesure. Car, sur le fond, la Commission prend acte de la volonté des Vingt-Sept de transformer l’Europe en forteresse.
      Sale boulot

      La crise de 2015 les a durablement traumatisés. A l’époque, la Turquie, par lassitude d’accueillir sur son sol plusieurs millions de réfugiés syriens et des centaines de milliers de migrants économiques dans l’indifférence de la communauté internationale, ouvre ses frontières. La Grèce est vite submergée et plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes traversent les Balkans afin de trouver refuge, notamment en Allemagne et en Suède, parmi les pays les plus généreux en matière d’asile.

      Passé les premiers moments de panique, les Européens réagissent de plusieurs manières. La Hongrie fait le sale boulot en fermant brutalement sa frontière. L’Allemagne, elle, accepte d’accueillir un million de demandeurs d’asile, mais négocie avec Ankara un accord pour qu’il referme ses frontières, accord ensuite endossé par l’UE qui lui verse en échange 6 milliards d’euros destinés aux camps de réfugiés. Enfin, l’Union adopte un règlement destiné à relocaliser sur une base obligatoire une partie des migrants dans les autres pays européens afin qu’ils instruisent les demandes d’asile, dans le but de soulager la Grèce et l’Italie, pays de premier accueil. Ce dernier volet est un échec, les pays d’Europe de l’Est, qui ont voté contre, refusent d’accueillir le moindre migrant, et leurs partenaires de l’Ouest ne font guère mieux : sur 160 000 personnes qui auraient dû être relocalisées, un objectif rapidement revu à 98 000, moins de 35 000 l’ont été à la fin 2017, date de la fin de ce dispositif.

      Depuis, l’Union a considérablement durci les contrôles, notamment en créant un corps de 10 000 gardes-frontières européens et en renforçant les moyens de Frontex, l’agence chargée de gérer ses frontières extérieures. En février-mars, la tentative d’Ankara de faire pression sur les Européens dans le conflit syrien en rouvrant partiellement ses frontières a fait long feu : la Grèce a employé les grands moyens, y compris violents, pour stopper ce flux sous les applaudissements de ses partenaires… Autant dire que l’ambiance n’est pas à l’ouverture des frontières et à l’accueil des persécutés.
      « Usine à gaz »

      Mais la crise migratoire de 2015 a laissé des « divisions nombreuses et profondes entre les Etats membres - certaines des cicatrices qu’elle a laissées sont toujours visibles aujourd’hui », comme l’a reconnu Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission, dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union du 16 septembre. Afin de tourner la page, la Commission propose donc de laisser tomber la réforme de 2016 (dite de Dublin IV) prévoyant de pérenniser la relocalisation autoritaire des migrants, désormais jugée par une haute fonctionnaire de l’exécutif « totalement irréaliste ».

      Mais la réforme qu’elle propose, une véritable « usine à gaz », n’est qu’un « rapiéçage » de l’existant, comme l’explique Yves Pascouau, spécialiste de l’immigration et responsable des programmes européens de l’association Res Publica. Ainsi, alors que Von der Leyen a annoncé sa volonté « d’abolir » le règlement de Dublin III, il n’en est rien : le pays responsable du traitement d’une demande d’asile reste, par principe, comme c’est le cas depuis 1990, le pays de première entrée.

      S’il y a une crise, la Commission pourra déclencher un « mécanisme de solidarité » afin de soulager un pays de la ligne de front : dans ce cas, les Vingt-Sept devront accueillir un certain nombre de migrants (en fonction de leur richesse et de leur population), sauf s’ils préfèrent « parrainer un retour ». En clair, prendre en charge le refoulement des déboutés de l’asile (avec l’aide financière et logistique de l’Union) en sachant que ces personnes resteront à leur charge jusqu’à ce qu’ils y parviennent. Ça, c’est pour faire simple, car il y a plusieurs niveaux de crise, des exceptions, des sanctions, des délais et l’on en passe…

      Autre nouveauté : les demandes d’asile devront être traitées par principe à la frontière, dans des camps de rétention, pour les nationalités dont le taux de reconnaissance du statut de réfugié est inférieur à 20% dans l’Union, et ce, en moins de trois mois, avec refoulement à la clé en cas de refus. « Cette réforme pose un principe clair, explique un eurocrate. Personne ne sera obligé d’accueillir un étranger dont il ne veut pas. »

      Dans cet ensemble très sévère, une bonne nouvelle : les sauvetages en mer ne devraient plus être criminalisés. On peut craindre qu’une fois passés à la moulinette des Etats, qui doivent adopter ce paquet à la majorité qualifiée (55% des Etats représentant 65% de la population), il ne reste que les aspects les plus répressifs. On ne se refait pas.


      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/09/22/droit-d-asile-bruxelles-rate-son-pacte_1800264

      –—

      Graphique ajouté au fil de discussion sur les statistiques de la #relocalisation :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/605713

    • Le pacte européen sur l’asile et les migrations ne tire aucune leçon de la « crise migratoire »

      Ce 23 septembre 2020, la nouvelle Commission européenne a présenté les grandes lignes d’orientation de sa politique migratoire à venir. Alors que cinq ans plutôt, en 2015, se déroulait la mal nommée « crise migratoire » aux frontières européennes, le nouveau Pacte Asile et Migration de l’UE ne tire aucune leçon du passé. Le nouveau pacte de l’Union Européenne nous propose inlassablement les mêmes recettes alors que les preuves de leur inefficacité, leur coût et des violences qu’elles procurent sont nombreuses et irréfutables. Le CNCD-11.11.11, son homologue néerlandophone et les membres du groupe de travail pour la justice migratoire appellent le parlement européen et le gouvernement belge à un changement de cap.

      Le nouveau Pacte repose sur des propositions législatives et des recommandations non contraignantes. Ses priorités sont claires mais pas neuves. Freiner les arrivées, limiter l’accueil par le « tri » des personnes et augmenter les retours. Cette stratégie pourtant maintes fois décriée par les ONG et le milieu académique a certes réussi à diminuer les arrivées en Europe, mais n’a offert aucune solution durable pour les personnes migrantes. Depuis les années 2000, l’externalisation de la gestion des questions migratoires a montré son inefficacité (situation humanitaires dans les hotspots, plus de 20.000 décès en Méditerranée depuis 2014 et processus d’encampement aux frontières de l’UE) et son coût exponentiel (coût élevé du contrôle, de la détention-expulsion et de l’aide au développement détournée). Elle a augmenté le taux de violences sur les routes de l’exil et a enfreint le droit international en toute impunité (non accès au droit d’asile notamment via les refoulements).

      "ll est important que tous les États membres développent des systèmes d’accueil de qualité et que l’UE s’oriente vers une protection plus unifiée"

      La proposition de mettre en place un mécanisme solidaire européen contraignant est à saluer, mais celui-ci doit être au service de l’accueil et non couplé au retour. La possibilité pour les États européens de choisir à la carte soit la relocalisation, le « parrainage » du retour des déboutés ou autre contribution financière n’est pas équitable. La répartition solidaire de l’accueil doit être permanente et ne pas être actionnée uniquement en cas « d’afflux massif » aux frontières d’un État membre comme le recommande la Commission. Il est important que tous les États membres développent des systèmes d’accueil de qualité et que l’UE s’oriente vers une protection plus unifiée. Le changement annoncé du Règlement de Dublin l’est juste de nom, car les premiers pays d’entrée resteront responsables des nouveaux arrivés.

      Le focus doit être mis sur les alternatives à la détention et non sur l’usage systématique de l’enfermement aux frontières, comme le veut la Commission. Le droit de demander l’asile et d’avoir accès à une procédure de qualité doit être accessible à tous et toutes et rester un droit individuel. Or, la proposition de la Commission de détenir (12 semaines maximum) en vue de screener (5 jours de tests divers et de recoupement de données via EURODAC) puis trier les personnes migrantes à la frontière en fonction du taux de reconnaissance de protection accordé en moyenne à leur pays d’origine (en dessous de 20%) ou de leur niveau de vulnérabilité est contraire à la Convention de Genève.

      "La priorité pour les personnes migrantes en situation irrégulière doit être la recherche de solutions durables (comme l’est la régularisation) plutôt que le retour forcé, à tous prix."

      La priorité pour les personnes migrantes en situation irrégulière doit être la recherche de solutions durables (comme l’est la régularisation) plutôt que le retour forcé, à tous prix, comme le préconise la Commission.

      La meilleure façon de lutter contre les violences sur les routes de l’exil reste la mise en place de plus de voies légales et sûres de migration (réinstallation, visas de travail, d’études, le regroupement familial…). Les ONG regrettent que la Commission reporte à 2021 les propositions sur la migration légale. Le pacte s’intéresse à juste titre à la criminalisation des ONG de sauvetage et des citoyens qui fournissent une aide humanitaire aux migrants. Toutefois, les propositions visant à y mettre fin sont insuffisantes. Les ONG se réjouissent de l’annonce par la Commission d’un mécanisme de surveillance des droits humains aux frontières extérieures. Au cours de l’année écoulée, on a signalé de plus en plus souvent des retours violents par la Croatie, la Grèce, Malte et Chypre. Toutefois, il n’est pas encore suffisamment clair si les propositions de la Commission peuvent effectivement traiter et sanctionner les refoulements.

      Au lendemain de l’incendie du hotspot à Moria, symbole par excellence de l’échec des politiques migratoires européennes, l’UE s’enfonce dans un déni total, meurtrier, en vue de concilier les divergences entre ses États membres. Les futures discussions autour du Pacte au sein du parlement UE et du Conseil UE seront cruciales. Les ONG membres du groupe de travail pour la justice migratoire appellent le Parlement européen et le gouvernement belge à promouvoir des ajustements fermes allant vers plus de justice migratoire.

      https://www.cncd.be/Le-pacte-europeen-sur-l-asile-et

    • The New Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Critical ‘First Look’ Analysis

      Where does it come from?

      The New Migration Pact was built on the ashes of the mandatory relocation scheme that the Commission tried to push in 2016. And the least that one can say, is that it shows! The whole migration plan has been decisively shaped by this initial failure. Though the Pact has some merits, the very fact that it takes as its starting point the radical demands made by the most nationalist governments in Europe leads to sacrificing migrants’ rights on the altar of a cohesive and integrated European migration policy.

      Back in 2016, the vigorous manoeuvring of the Commission to find a way out of the European asylum dead-end resulted in a bittersweet victory for the European institution. Though the Commission was able to find a qualified majority of member states willing to support a fair distribution of the asylum seekers among member states through a relocation scheme, this new regulation remained dead letter. Several eastern European states flatly refused to implement the plan, other member states seized this opportunity to defect on their obligations and the whole migration policy quickly unravelled. Since then, Europe is left with a dysfunctional Dublin agreement exacerbating the tensions between member states and 27 loosely connected national asylum regimes. On the latter point, at least, there is a consensus. Everyone agrees that the EU’s migration regime is broken and urgently needs to be fixed.

      Obviously, the Commission was not keen to go through a new round of political humiliation. Having been accused of “bureaucratic hubris” the first time around, the commissioners Schinas and Johansson decided not to repeat the same mistake. They toured the European capitals and listened to every side of the entrenched migration debate before drafting their Migration Pact. The intention is in the right place and it reflects the complexity of having to accommodate 27 distinct democratic debates in one single political space. Nevertheless, if one peers a bit more extensively through the content of the New Plan, it is complicated not to get the feelings that the Visegrad countries are currently the key players shaping the European migration and asylum policies. After all, their staunch opposition to a collective reception scheme sparked the political process and provided the starting point to the general discussion. As a result, it is no surprise that the New Pact tilts firmly towards an ever more restrictive approach to migration, beefs up the coercive powers of both member states and European agencies and raises many concerns with regards to the respect of the migrants’ fundamental rights.
      What is in this New Pact on Migration and Asylum?

      Does the Pact concede too much ground to the demands of the most xenophobic European governments? To answer that question, let us go back to the bizarre metaphor used by the commissioner Schinas. During his press conference, he insisted on comparing the New Pact on Migration and Asylum to a house built on solid foundations (i.e. the lengthy and inclusive consultation process) and made of 3 floors: first, some renewed partnerships with the sending and transit states, second, some more effective border procedures, and third, a revamped mandatory – but flexible ! – solidarity scheme. It is tempting to carry on with the metaphor and to say that this house may appear comfortable from the inside but that it remains tightly shut to anyone knocking on its door from the outside. For, a careful examination reveals that each of the three “floors” (policy packages, actually) lays the emphasis on a repressive approach to migration aimed at deterring would-be asylum seekers from attempting to reach the European shores.
      The “new partnerships” with sending and transit countries, a “change in paradigm”?

      Let us add that there is little that is actually “new” in this New Migration Pact. For instance, the first policy package, that is, the suggestion that the EU should renew its partnerships with sending and transit countries is, as a matter of fact, an old tune in the Brussels bubble. The Commission may boast that it marks a “change of paradigm”, one fails to see how this would be any different from the previous European diplomatic efforts. Since migration and asylum are increasingly considered as toxic topics (for, they would be the main factors behind the rise of nationalism and its corollary, Euroscepticism), the European Union is willing to externalize this issue, seemingly at all costs. The results, however, have been mixed in the past. To the Commission’s own admission, only a third of the migrants whose asylum claims have been rejected are effectively returned. Besides the facts that returns are costly, extremely coercive, and administratively complicated to organize, the main reason for this low rate of successful returns is that sending countries refuse to cooperate in the readmission procedures. Neighbouring countries have excellent reasons not to respond positively to the Union’s demands. For some, remittances sent by their diaspora are an economic lifeline. Others just do not want to appear complicit of repressive European practices on their domestic political scene. Furthermore, many African countries are growing discontent with the forceful way the European Union uses its asymmetrical relation of power in bilateral negotiations to dictate to those sovereign states the migration policies they should adopt, making for instance its development aid conditional on the implementation of stricter border controls. The Commission may rhetorically claim to foster “mutually beneficial” international relation with its neighbouring countries, the emphasis on the externalization of migration control in the EU’s diplomatic agenda nevertheless bears some of the hallmarks of neo-colonialism. As such, it is a source of deep resentment in sending and transit states. It would therefore be a grave mistake for the EU to overlook the fact that some short-term gains in terms of migration management may result in long-term losses with regards to Europe’s image across the world.

      Furthermore, considering the current political situation, one should not primarily be worried about the failed partnerships with neighbouring countries, it is rather the successful ones that ought to give us pause and raise concerns. For, based on the existing evidence, the EU will sign a deal with any state as long as it effectively restrains and contains migration flows towards the European shores. Being an authoritarian state with a documented history of human right violations (Turkey) or an embattled government fighting a civil war (Lybia) does not disqualify you as a partner of the European Union in its effort to manage migration flows. It is not only morally debatable for the EU to delegate its asylum responsibilities to unreliable third countries, it is also doubtful that an increase in diplomatic pressure on neighbouring countries will bring major political results. It will further damage the perception of the EU in neighbouring countries without bringing significant restriction to migration flows.
      Streamlining border procedures? Or eroding migrants’ rights?

      The second policy package is no more inviting. It tackles the issue of the migrants who, in spite of those partnerships and the hurdles thrown their way by sending and transit countries, would nevertheless reach Europe irregularly. On this issue, the Commission faced the daunting task of having to square a political circle, since it had to find some common ground in a debate bitterly divided between conflicting worldviews (roughly, between liberal and nationalist perspectives on the individual freedom of movement) and competing interests (between overburdened Mediterranean member states and Eastern member states adamant that asylum seekers would endanger their national cohesion). The Commission thus looked for the lowest common denominator in terms of migration management preferences amongst the distinct member states. The result is a two-tier border procedure aiming to fast-track and streamline the processing of asylum claims, allowing for more expeditious returns of irregular migrants. The goal is to prevent any bottleneck in the processing of the claims and to avoid the (currently near constant) overcrowding of reception facilities in the frontline states. Once again, there is little that is actually new in this proposal. It amounts to a generalization of the process currently in place in the infamous hotspots scattered on the Greek isles. According to the Pact, screening procedures would be carried out in reception centres created across Europe. A far cry from the slogan “no more Moria” since one may legitimately suspect that those reception centres will, at the first hiccup in the procedure, turn into tomorrow’s asylum camps.

      According to this procedure, newly arrived migrants would be submitted within 5 days to a pre-screening procedure and subsequently triaged into two categories. Migrants with a low chance of seeing their asylum claim recognized (because they would come from a country with a low recognition rate or a country belonging to the list of the safe third countries, for instance) would be redirected towards an accelerated procedure. The end goal would be to return them, if applicable, within twelve weeks. The other migrants would be subjected to the standard assessment of their asylum claim. It goes without saying that this proposal has been swiftly and unanimously condemned by all human rights organizations. It does not take a specialized lawyer to see that this two-tiered procedure could have devastating consequences for the “fast-tracked” asylum seekers left with no legal recourse against the initial decision to submit them to this sped up procedure (rather than the standard one) as well as reduced opportunities to defend their asylum claim or, if need be, to contest their return. No matter how often the Commission repeats that it will preserve all the legal safeguards required to protect migrants’ rights, it remains wildly unconvincing. Furthermore, the Pact may confuse speed and haste. The schedule is tight on paper (five days for the pre-screening, twelve weeks for the assessment of the asylum claim), it may well prove unrealistic to meet those deadlines in real-life conditions. The Commission also overlooks the fact that accelerated procedures tend to be sloppy, thus leading to juridical appeals and further legal wrangling and eventually amounting to processes far longer than expected.
      Integrating the returns, not the reception

      The Commission talked up the new Pact as being “balanced” and “humane”. Since the two first policy packages focus, first, on preventing would-be migrants from leaving their countries and, second, on facilitating and accelerating their returns, one would expect the third policy package to move away from the restriction of movement and to complement those measures with a reception plan tailored to the needs of refugees. And here comes the major disappointment with the New Pact and, perhaps, the clearest indication that the Pact is first and foremost designed to please the migration hardliners. It does include a solidarity scheme meant to alleviate the burden of frontline countries, to distribute more fairly the responsibilities amongst member states and to ensure that refugees are properly hosted. But this solidarity scheme is far from being robust enough to deliver on those promises. Let us unpack it briefly to understand why it is likely to fail. The solidarity scheme is mandatory. All member states will be under the obligation to take part. But there is a catch! Member states’ contribution to this collective effort can take many shapes and forms and it will be up to the member states to decide how they want to participate. They get to choose whether they want to relocate some refugees on their national soil, to provide some financial and/or logistical assistance, or to “sponsor” (it is the actual term used by the Commission) some returns.

      No one expected the Commission to reintroduce a compulsory relocation scheme in its Pact. Eastern European countries had drawn an obvious red line and it would have been either naïve or foolish to taunt them with that kind of policy proposal. But this so-called “flexible mandatory solidarity” relies on such a watered-down understanding of the solidarity principle that it results in a weak and misguided political instrument unsuited to solve the problem at hand. First, the flexible solidarity mechanism is too indeterminate to prove efficient. According to the current proposal, member states would have to shoulder a fair share of the reception burden (calculated on their respective population and GDP) but would be left to decide for themselves which form this contribution would take. The obvious flaw with the policy proposal is that, if all member states decline to relocate some refugees (which is a plausible scenario), Mediterranean states would still be left alone when it comes to dealing with the most immediate consequences of migration flows. They would receive much more financial, operational, and logistical support than it currently is the case – but they would be managing on their own the overcrowded reception centres. The Commission suggests that it would oversee the national pledges in terms of relocation and that it would impose some corrections if the collective pledges fall short of a predefined target. But it remains to be seen whether the Commission will have the political clout to impose some relocations to member states refusing them. One could not be blamed for being highly sceptical.

      Second, it is noteworthy that the Commission fails to integrate the reception of refugees since member states are de facto granted an opt-out on hosting refugees. What is integrated is rather the return policy, once more a repressive instrument. And it is the member states with the worst record in terms of migrants’ rights violations that are the most likely to be tasked with the delicate mission of returning them home. As a commentator was quipping on Twitter, it would be like asking a bully to walk his victim home (what could possibly go wrong?). The attempt to build an intra-European consensus is obviously pursued at the expense of the refugees. The incentive structure built into the flexible solidarity scheme offers an excellent illustration of this. If a member state declines to relocate any refugee and offers instead to ‘sponsor’ some returns, it has to honour that pledge within a limited period of time (the Pact suggests a six month timeframe). If it fails to do so, it becomes responsible for the relocation and the return of those migrants, leading to a situation in which some migrants may end up in a country where they do not want to be and that does not want them to be there. Hardly an optimal outcome…
      Conclusion

      The Pact represents a genuine attempt to design a multi-faceted and comprehensive migration policy, covering most aspects of a complex issue. The dysfunctions of the Schengen area and the question of the legal pathways to Europe have been relegated to a later discussion and one may wonder whether they should not have been included in the Pact to balance out its restrictive inclination. And, in all fairness, the Pact does throw a few bones to the more cosmopolitan-minded European citizens. For instance, it reminds the member states that maritime search and rescue operations are legal and should not be impeded, or it shortens (from five to three years) the waiting period for refugees to benefit from the freedom of movement. But those few welcome additions are vastly outweighed by the fact that migration hardliners dominated the agenda-setting in the early stage of the policy-making exercise and have thus been able to frame decisively the political discussion. The end result is a policy package leaning heavily towards some repressive instruments and particularly careless when it comes to safeguarding migrants’ rights.

      The New Pact was first drafted on the ashes of the mandatory relocation scheme. Back then, the Commission publicly made amends and revised its approach to the issue. Sadly, the New Pact was presented to the European public when the ashes of the Moria camp were still lukewarm. One can only hope that the member states will learn from that mistake too.

      https://blog.novamigra.eu/2020/09/24/the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-a-critical-first-look-analysis

    • #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration : un “nouveau départ” pour violer les droits humains

      La Commission européenne a publié aujourd’hui son « Nouveau Pacte sur l’Asile et la Migration » qui propose un nouveau cadre règlementaire et législatif. Avec ce plan, l’UE devient de facto un « leader du voyage retour » pour les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s en Méditerranée. EuroMed Droits craint que ce pacte ne détériore encore davantage la situation actuelle pour au moins trois raisons.

      Le pacte se concentre de manière obsessionnelle sur la politique de retours à travers un système de « sponsoring » : des pays européens tels que l’Autriche, la Pologne, la Hongrie ou la République tchèque – qui refusent d’accueillir des réfugié.e.s – pourront « sponsoriser » et organiser la déportation vers les pays de départ de ces réfugié.e.s. Au lieu de favoriser l’intégration, le pacte adopte une politique de retour à tout prix, même lorsque les demandeurs.ses d’asile peuvent être victimes de discrimination, persécution ou torture dans leur pays de retour. A ce jour, il n’existe aucun mécanisme permettant de surveiller ce qui arrive aux migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s une fois déporté.e.s.

      Le pacte proposé renforce la sous-traitance de la gestion des frontières. En termes concrets, l’UE renforce la coopération avec les pays non-européens afin qu’ils ferment leurs frontières et empêchent les personnes de partir. Cette coopération est sujette à l’imposition de conditions par l’UE. Une telle décision européenne se traduit par une hausse du nombre de refoulements dans la région méditerranéenne et une coopération renforcée avec des pays qui ont un piètre bilan en matière de droits humains et qui ne possèdent pas de cadre efficace pour la protection des droits des personnes migrantes et réfugiées.

      Le pacte vise enfin à étendre les mécanismes de tri des demandeurs.ses d’asile et des migrant.e.s dans les pays d’arrivée. Ce modèle de tri – similaire à celui utilisé dans les zones de transit aéroportuaires – accentue les difficultés de pays tels que l’Espagne, l’Italie, Malte, la Grèce ou Chypre qui accueillent déjà la majorité des migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s. Placer ces personnes dans des camps revient à mettre en place un système illégal d’incarcération automatique dès l’arrivée. Cela accroîtra la violence psychologique à laquelle les migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s sont déjà soumis. Selon ce nouveau système, ces personnes seront identifié.e.s sous cinq jours et toute demande d’asile devra être traitée en douze semaines. Cette accélération de la procédure risque d’intensifier la détention et de diviser les arrivant.e.s entre demandeurs.ses d’asile et migrant.e.s économiques. Cela s’effectuerait de manière discriminatoire, sans analyse détaillée de chaque demande d’asile ni possibilité réelle de faire appel. Celles et ceux qui seront éligibles à la protection internationale seront relocalisé.e.s au sein des États membres qui acceptent de les recevoir. Les autres risqueront d’être déportés immédiatement.

      « En choisissant de sous-traiter davantage encore la gestion des frontières et d’accentuer la politique de retours, ce nouveau pacte conclut la transformation de la politique européenne en une approche pleinement sécuritaire. Pire encore, le pacte assimile la politique de “retour sponsorisé” à une forme de solidarité. Au-delà des déclarations officielles, cela démontre la volonté de l’Union européenne de criminaliser et de déshumaniser les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s », a déclaré Wadih Al-Asmar, Président d’EuroMed Droits.

      https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-nouveau-depart-pour-violer-les-droits

    • Whose Pact? The Cognitive Dimensions of the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum

      This Policy Insight examines the new Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the principles and commitments enshrined in the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees (UN GCR) and the EU Treaties. It finds that from a legal viewpoint the ‘Pact’ is not really a Pact at all, if understood as an agreement concluded between relevant EU institutional parties. Rather, it is the European Commission’s policy guide for the duration of the current 9th legislature.

      The analysis shows that the Pact has intergovernmental aspects, in both name and fundamentals. It does not pursue a genuine Migration and Asylum Union. The Pact encourages an artificial need for consensus building or de facto unanimity among all EU member states’ governments in fields where the EU Treaties call for qualified majority voting (QMV) with the European Parliament as co-legislator. The Pact does not abolish the first irregular entry rule characterising the EU Dublin Regulation. It adopts a notion of interstate solidarity that leads to asymmetric responsibilities, where member states are given the flexibility to evade participating in the relocation of asylum seekers. The Pact also runs the risk of catapulting some contested member states practices’ and priorities about localisation, speed and de-territorialisation into EU policy.

      This Policy Insight argues that the Pact’s priority of setting up an independent monitoring mechanism of border procedures’ compliance with fundamental rights is a welcome step towards the better safeguarding of the rule of law. The EU inter-institutional negotiations on the Pact’s initiatives should be timely and robust in enforcing member states’ obligations under the current EU legal standards relating to asylum and borders, namely the prevention of detention and expedited expulsions, and the effective access by all individuals to dignified treatment and effective remedies. Trust and legitimacy of EU asylum and migration policy can only follow if international (human rights and refugee protection) commitments and EU Treaty principles are put first.

      https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/whose-pact

    • First analysis of the EU’s new asylum proposals

      This week the EU Commission published its new package of proposals on asylum and (non-EU) migration – consisting of proposals for legislation, some ‘soft law’, attempts to relaunch talks on stalled proposals and plans for future measures. The following is an explanation of the new proposals (not attempting to cover every detail) with some first thoughts. Overall, while it is possible that the new package will lead to agreement on revised asylum laws, this will come at the cost of risking reduced human rights standards.

      Background

      Since 1999, the EU has aimed to create a ‘Common European Asylum System’. A first phase of legislation was passed between 2003 and 2005, followed by a second phase between 2010 and 2013. Currently the legislation consists of: a) the Qualification Directive, which defines when people are entitled to refugee status (based on the UN Refugee Convention) or subsidiary protection status, and what rights they have; b) the Dublin III Regulation, which allocates responsibility for an asylum seeker between Member States; c) the Eurodac Regulation, which facilitates the Dublin system by setting up a database of fingerprints of asylum seekers and people who cross the external border without authorisation; d) the Asylum Procedures Directive, which sets out the procedural rules governing asylum applications, such as personal interviews and appeals; e) the Reception Conditions Directive, which sets out standards on the living conditions of asylum-seekers, such as rules on housing and welfare; and f) the Asylum Agency Regulation, which set up an EU agency (EASO) to support Member States’ processing of asylum applications.

      The EU also has legislation on other aspects of migration: (short-term) visas, border controls, irregular migration, and legal migration – much of which has connections with the asylum legislation, and all of which is covered by this week’s package. For visas, the main legislation is the visa list Regulation (setting out which non-EU countries’ citizens are subject to a short-term visa requirement, or exempt from it) and the visa code (defining the criteria to obtain a short-term Schengen visa, allowing travel between all Schengen states). The visa code was amended last year, as discussed here.

      For border controls, the main legislation is the Schengen Borders Code, setting out the rules on crossing external borders and the circumstances in which Schengen states can reinstate controls on internal borders, along with the Frontex Regulation, setting up an EU border agency to assist Member States. On the most recent version of the Frontex Regulation, see discussion here and here.

      For irregular migration, the main legislation is the Return Directive. The Commission proposed to amend it in 2018 – on which, see analysis here and here.

      For legal migration, the main legislation on admission of non-EU workers is the single permit Directive (setting out a common process and rights for workers, but not regulating admission); the Blue Card Directive (on highly paid migrants, discussed here); the seasonal workers’ Directive (discussed here); and the Directive on intra-corporate transferees (discussed here). The EU also has legislation on: non-EU students, researchers and trainees (overview here); non-EU family reunion (see summary of the legislation and case law here) and on long-term resident non-EU citizens (overview – in the context of UK citizens after Brexit – here). In 2016, the Commission proposed to revise the Blue Card Directive (see discussion here).

      The UK, Ireland and Denmark have opted out of most of these laws, except some asylum law applies to the UK and Ireland, and Denmark is covered by the Schengen and Dublin rules. So are the non-EU countries associated with Schengen and Dublin (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). There are also a number of further databases of non-EU citizens as well as Eurodac: the EU has never met a non-EU migrant who personal data it didn’t want to store and process.

      The Refugee ‘Crisis’

      The EU’s response to the perceived refugee ‘crisis’ was both short-term and long-term. In the short term, in 2015 the EU adopted temporary laws (discussed here) relocating some asylum seekers in principle from Italy and Greece to other Member States. A legal challenge to one of these laws failed (as discussed here), but in practice Member States accepted few relocations anyway. Earlier this year, the CJEU ruled that several Member States had breached their obligations under the laws (discussed here), but by then it was a moot point.

      Longer term, the Commission proposed overhauls of the law in 2016: a) a Qualification Regulation further harmonising the law on refugee and subsidiary protection status; b) a revised Dublin Regulation, which would have set up a system of relocation of asylum seekers for future crises; c) a revised Eurodac Regulation, to take much more data from asylum seekers and other migrants; d) an Asylum Procedures Regulation, further harmonising the procedural law on asylum applications; e) a revised Reception Conditions Directive; f) a revised Asylum Agency Regulation, giving the agency more powers; and g) a new Resettlement Regulation, setting out a framework of admitting refugees directly from non-EU countries. (See my comments on some of these proposals, from back in 2016)

      However, these proposals proved unsuccessful – which is the main reason for this week’s attempt to relaunch the process. In particular, an EU Council note from February 2019 summarises the diverse problems that befell each proposal. While the EU Council Presidency and the European Parliament reached agreement on the proposals on qualification, reception conditions and resettlement in June 2018, Member States refused to support the Presidency’s deal and the European Parliament refused to renegotiate (see, for instance, the Council documents on the proposals on qualification and resettlement; see also my comments on an earlier stage of the talks, when the Council had agreed its negotiation position on the qualification regulation).

      On the asylum agency, the EP and Council agreed on the revised law in 2017, but the Commission proposed an amendment in 2018 to give the agency more powers; the Council could not agree on this. On Eurodac, the EP and Council only partly agreed on a text. On the procedures Regulation, the Council largely agreed its position, except on border procedures; on Dublin there was never much prospect of agreement because of the controversy over relocating asylum seekers. (For either proposal, a difficult negotiation with the European Parliament lay ahead).

      In other areas too, the legislative process was difficult: the Council and EP gave up negotiating amendments to the Blue Card Directive (see the last attempt at a compromise here, and the Council negotiation mandate here), and the EP has not yet agreed a position on the Returns Directive (the Council has a negotiating position, but again it leaves out the difficult issue of border procedures; there is a draft EP position from February). Having said that, the EU has been able to agree legislation giving more powers to Frontex, as well as new laws on EU migration databases, in the last few years.

      The attempted relaunch

      The Commission’s new Pact on asylum and immigration (see also the roadmap on its implementation, the Q and As, and the staff working paper) does not restart the whole process from scratch. On qualification, reception conditions, resettlement, the asylum agency, the returns Directive and the Blue Card Directive, it invites the Council and Parliament to resume negotiations. But it tries to unblock the talks as a whole by tabling two amended legislative proposals and three new legislative proposals, focussing on the issues of border procedures and relocation of asylum seekers.

      Screening at the border

      This revised proposals start with a new proposal for screening asylum seekers at the border, which would apply to all non-EU citizens who cross an external border without authorisation, who apply for asylum while being checked at the border (without meeting the conditions for legal entry), or who are disembarked after a search and rescue operation. During the screening, these non-EU citizens are not allowed to enter the territory of a Member State, unless it becomes clear that they meet the criteria for entry. The screening at the border should take no longer than 5 days, with an extra 5 days in the event of a huge influx. (It would also be possible to apply the proposed law to those on the territory who evaded border checks; for them the deadline to complete the screening is 3 days).

      Screening has six elements, as further detailed in the proposal: a health check, an identity check, registration in a database, a security check, filling out a debriefing form, and deciding on what happens next. At the end of the screening, the migrant is channelled either into the expulsion process (if no asylum claim has been made, and if the migrant does not meet the conditions for entry) or, if an asylum claim is made, into the asylum process – with an indication of whether the claim should be fast-tracked or not. It’s also possible that an asylum seeker would be relocated to another Member State. The screening is carried out by national officials, possibly with support from EU agencies.

      To ensure human rights protection, there must be independent monitoring to address allegations of non-compliance with human rights. These allegations might concern breaches of EU or international law, national law on detention, access to the asylum procedure, or non-refoulement (the ban on sending people to an unsafe country). Migrants must be informed about the process and relevant EU immigration and data protection law. There is no provision for judicial review of the outcome of the screening process, although there would be review as part of the next step (asylum or return).

      Asylum procedures

      The revised proposal for an asylum procedures Regulation would leave in place most of the Commission’s 2016 proposal to amend the law, adding some specific further proposed amendments, which either link back to the screening proposal or aim to fast-track decisions and expulsions more generally.

      On the first point, the usual rules on informing asylum applicants and registering their application would not apply until after the end of the screening. A border procedure may apply following the screening process, but Member States must apply the border procedure in cases where an asylum seeker used false documents, is a perceived national security threat, or falls within the new ground for fast-tracking cases (on which, see below). The latter obligation is subject to exceptions where a Member State has reported that a non-EU country is not cooperating on readmission; the process for dealing with that issue set out under the 2019 amendments to the visa code will then apply. Also, the border process cannot apply to unaccompanied minors or children under 12, unless they are a supposed national security risk. Further exceptions apply where the asylum seeker is vulnerable or has medical needs, the application is not inadmissible or cannot be fast-tracked, or detention conditions cannot be guaranteed. A Member State might apply the Dublin process to determine which Member State is responsible for the asylum claim during the border process. The whole border process (including any appeal) must last no more than 12 weeks, and can only be used to declare applications inadmissible or apply the new ground for fast-tracking them.

      There would also be a new border expulsion procedure, where an asylum application covered by the border procedure was rejected. This is subject to its own 12-week deadline, starting from the point when the migrant is no longer allowed to remain. Much of the Return Directive would apply – but not the provisions on the time period for voluntary departure, remedies and the grounds for detention. Instead, the border expulsion procedure would have its own stricter rules on these issues.

      As regards general fast-tracking, in order to speed up the expulsion process for unsuccessful applications, a rejection of an asylum application would have to either incorporate an expulsion decision or entail a simultaneous separate expulsion decision. Appeals against expulsion decisions would then be subject to the same rules as appeals against asylum decisions. If the asylum seeker comes from a country with a refugee recognition rate below 20%, his or her application must be fast-tracked (this would even apply to unaccompanied minors) – unless circumstances in that country have changed, or the asylum seeker comes from a group for whom the low recognition rate is not representative (for instance, the recognition rate might be higher for LGBT asylum-seekers from that country). Many more appeals would be subject to a one-week time limit for the rejected asylum seeker to appeal, and there could be only one level of appeal against decisions taken within a border procedure.

      Eurodac

      The revised proposal for Eurodac would build upon the 2016 proposal, which was already far-reaching: extending Eurodac to include not only fingerprints, but also photos and other personal data; reducing the age of those covered by Eurodac from 14 to 6; removing the time limits and the limits on use of the fingerprints taken from persons who had crossed the border irregularly; and creating a new obligation to collect data of all irregular migrants over age 6 (currently fingerprint data for this group cannot be stored, but can simply be checked, as an option, against the data on asylum seekers and irregular border crossers). The 2020 proposal additionally provides for interoperability with other EU migration databases, taking of personal data during the screening process, including more data on the migration status of each person, and expressly applying the law to those disembarked after a search and rescue operation.

      Dublin rules on asylum responsibility

      A new proposal for asylum management would replace the Dublin regulation (meaning that the Commission has withdrawn its 2016 proposal to replace that Regulation). The 2016 proposal would have created a ‘bottleneck’ in the Member State of entry, requiring that State to examine first whether many of the grounds for removing an asylum-seeker to a non-EU country apply before considering whether another Member State might be responsible for the application (because the asylum seeker’s family live there, for instance). It would also have imposed obligations directly on asylum-seekers to cooperate with the process, rather than only regulate relations between Member States. These obligations would have been enforced by punishing asylum seekers who disobeyed: removing their reception conditions (apart from emergency health care); fast-tracking their substantive asylum applications; refusing to consider new evidence from them; and continuing the asylum application process in their absence.

      It would no longer be possible for asylum seekers to provide additional evidence of family links, with a view to being in the same country as a family member. Overturning a CJEU judgment (see further discussion here), unaccompanied minors would no longer have been able to make applications in multiple Member States (in the absence of a family member in any of them). However, the definition of family members would have been widened, to include siblings and families formed in a transit country. Responsibility for an asylum seeker based on the first Member State of irregular entry (a commonly applied criterion) would have applied indefinitely, rather than expire one year after entry as it does under the current rules. The ‘Sangatte clause’ (responsibility after five months of living in a second Member State, if the ‘irregular entry’ criterion no longer applies) would be dropped. The ‘sovereignty clause’, which played a key part in the 2015-16 refugee ‘crisis’ (it lets a Member State take responsibility for any application even if the Dublin rules do not require it, cf Germany accepting responsibility for Syrian asylum seekers) would have been sharply curtailed. Time limits for detention during the transfer process would be reduced. Remedies for asylum seekers would have been curtailed: they would only have seven days to appeal against a transfer; courts would have fifteen days to decide (although they could have stayed on the territory throughout); and the grounds of review would have been curtailed.

      Finally, the 2016 proposal would have tackled the vexed issue of disproportionate allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers by setting up an automated system determining how many asylum seekers each Member State ‘should’ have based on their size and GDP. If a Member State were responsible for excessive numbers of applicants, Member States which were receiving fewer numbers would have to take more to help out. If they refused, they would have to pay €250,000 per applicant.

      The 2020 proposal drops some of the controversial proposals from 2016, including the ‘bottleneck’ in the Member State of entry (the current rule, giving Member States an option to decide if a non-EU country is responsible for the application on narrower grounds than in the 2016 proposal, would still apply). Also, the sovereignty clause would now remain unchanged.

      However, the 2020 proposal also retains parts of the 2016 proposal: the redefinition of ‘family member’ (which could be more significant now that the bottleneck is removed, unless Member States choose to apply the relevant rules on non-EU countries’ responsibility during the border procedure already); obligations for asylum seekers (redrafted slightly); some of the punishments for non-compliant asylum-seekers (the cut-off for considering evidence would stay, as would the loss of benefits except for those necessary to ensure a basic standard of living: see the CJEU case law in CIMADE and Haqbin); dropping the provision on evidence of family links; changing the rules on responsibility for unaccompanied minors; retaining part of the changes to the irregular entry criterion (it would now cease to apply after three years; the Sangatte clause would still be dropped; it would apply after search and rescue but not apply in the event of relocation); curtailing judicial review (the grounds would still be limited; the time limit to appeal would be 14 days; courts would not have a strict deadline to decide; suspensive effect would not apply in all cases); and the reduced time limits for detention.

      The wholly new features of the 2020 proposal are: some vague provisions about crisis management; responsibility for an asylum application for the Member State which issued a visa or residence document which expired in the last three years (the current rule is responsibility if the visa expired less than six months ago, and the residence permit expired less than a year ago); responsibility for an asylum application for a Member State in which a non-EU citizen obtained a diploma; and the possibility for refugees or persons with subsidiary protection status to obtain EU long-term resident status after three years, rather than five.

      However, the most significant feature of the new proposal is likely to be its attempt to solve the underlying issue of disproportionate allocation of asylum seekers. Rather than a mechanical approach to reallocating responsibility, the 2020 proposal now provides for a menu of ‘solidarity contributions’: relocation of asylum seekers; relocation of refugees; ‘return sponsorship’; or support for ‘capacity building’ in the Member State (or a non-EU country) facing migratory pressure. There are separate rules for search and rescue disembarkations, on the one hand, and more general migratory pressures on the other. Once the Commission determines that the latter situation exists, other Member States have to choose from the menu to offer some assistance. Ultimately the Commission will adopt a decision deciding what the contributions will be. Note that ‘return sponsorship’ comes with a ticking clock: if the persons concerned are not expelled within eight months, the sponsoring Member State must accept them on its territory.

      Crisis management

      The issue of managing asylum issues in a crisis has been carved out of the Dublin proposal into a separate proposal, which would repeal an EU law from 2001 that set up a framework for offering ‘temporary protection’ in a crisis. Note that Member States have never used the 2001 law in practice.

      Compared to the 2001 law, the new proposal is integrated into the EU asylum legislation that has been adopted or proposed in the meantime. It similarly applies in the event of a ‘mass influx’ that prevents the effective functioning of the asylum system. It would apply the ‘solidarity’ process set out in the proposal to replace the Dublin rules (ie relocation of asylum seekers and other measures), with certain exceptions and shorter time limits to apply that process.

      The proposal focusses on providing for possible exceptions to the usual asylum rules. In particular, during a crisis, the Commission could authorise a Member State to apply temporary derogations from the rules on border asylum procedures (extending the time limit, using the procedure to fast-track more cases), border return procedures (again extending the time limit, more easily justifying detention), or the time limit to register asylum applicants. Member States could also determine that due to force majeure, it was not possible to observe the normal time limits for registering asylum applications, applying the Dublin process for responsibility for asylum applications, or offering ‘solidarity’ to other Member States.

      Finally, the new proposal, like the 2001 law, would create a potential for a form of separate ‘temporary protection’ status for the persons concerned. A Member State could suspend the consideration of asylum applications from people coming from the country facing a crisis for up to a year, in the meantime giving them status equivalent to ‘subsidiary protection’ status in the EU qualification law. After that point it would have to resume consideration of the applications. It would need the Commission’s approval, whereas the 2001 law left it to the Council to determine a situation of ‘mass influx’ and provided for the possible extension of the special rules for up to three years.

      Other measures

      The Commission has also adopted four soft law measures. These comprise: a Recommendation on asylum crisis management; a Recommendation on resettlement and humanitarian admission; a Recommendation on cooperation between Member States on private search and rescue operations; and guidance on the applicability of EU law on smuggling of migrants – notably concluding that it cannot apply where (as in the case of law of the sea) there is an obligation to rescue.

      On other issues, the Commission plan is to use current legislation – in particular the recent amendment to the visa code, which provides for sticks to make visas more difficult to get for citizens of countries which don’t cooperate on readmission of people, and carrots to make visas easier to get for citizens of countries which do cooperate on readmission. In some areas, such as the Schengen system, there will be further strategies and plans in the near future; it is not clear if this will lead to more proposed legislation.

      However, on legal migration, the plan is to go further than relaunching the amendment of the Blue Card Directive, as the Commission is also planning to propose amendments to the single permit and long-term residence laws referred to above – leading respectively to more harmonisation of the law on admission of non-EU workers and enhanced possibilities for long-term resident non-EU citizens to move between Member States (nb the latter plan is separate from this week’s proposal to amend this law as regards refugees and people with subsidiary protection already). Both these plans are relevant to British citizens moving to the EU after the post-Brexit transition period – and the latter is also relevant to British citizens covered by the withdrawal agreement.

      Comments

      This week’s plan is less a complete restart of EU law in this area than an attempt to relaunch discussions on a blocked set of amendments to that law, which moreover focusses on a limited set of issues. Will it ‘work’? There are two different ways to answer that question.

      First, will it unlock the institutional blockage? Here it should be kept in mind that the European Parliament and the Council had largely agreed on several of the 2016 proposals already; they would have been adopted in 2018 already had not the Council treated all the proposals as a package, and not gone back on agreements which the Council Presidency reached with the European Parliament. It is always open to the Council to get at least some of these proposals adopted quickly by reversing these approaches.

      On the blocked proposals, the Commission has targeted the key issues of border procedures and allocation of asylum-seekers. If the former leads to more quick removals of unsuccessful applicants, the latter issue is no longer so pressing. But it is not clear if the Member States will agree to anything on border procedures, or whether such an agreement will result in more expulsions anyway – because the latter depends on the willingness of non-EU countries, which the EU cannot legislate for (and does not even address in this most recent package). And because it is uncertain whether they will result in more expulsions, Member States will be wary of agreeing to anything which either results in more obligations to accept asylum-seekers on their territory, or leaves them with the same number as before.

      The idea of ‘return sponsorship’ – which reads like a grotesque parody of individuals sponsoring children in developing countries via charities – may not be appealing except to those countries like France, which have the capacity to twist arms in developing countries to accept returns. Member States might be able to agree on a replacement for the temporary protection Directive on the basis that they will never use that replacement either. And Commission threats to use infringement proceedings to enforce the law might not worry Member States who recall that the CJEU ruled on their failure to relocate asylum-seekers after the relocation law had already expired, and that the Court will soon rule on Hungary’s expulsion of the Central European University after it has already left.

      As to whether the proposals will ‘work’ in terms of managing asylum flows fairly and compatibly with human rights, it is striking how much they depend upon curtailing appeal rights, even though appeals are often successful. The proposed limitation of appeal rights will also be maintained in the Dublin system; and while the proposed ‘bottleneck’ of deciding on removals to non-EU countries before applying the Dublin system has been removed, a variation on this process may well apply in the border procedures process instead. There is no new review of the assessment of the safety of non-EU countries – which is questionable in light of the many reports of abuse in Libya. While the EU is not proposing, as the wildest headbangers would want, to turn people back or refuse applications without consideration, the question is whether the fast-track consideration of applications and then appeals will constitute merely a Potemkin village of procedural rights that mean nothing in practice.

      Increased detention is already a feature of the amendments proposed earlier: the reception conditions proposal would add a new ground for detention; the return Directive proposal would inevitably increase detention due to curtailing voluntary departure (as discussed here). Unfortunately the Commission’s claim in its new communication that its 2018 proposal is ‘promoting’ voluntary return is therefore simply false. Trump-style falsehoods have no place in the discussion of EU immigration or asylum law.

      The latest Eurodac proposal would not do much compared to the 2016 proposal – but then, the 2016 proposal would already constitute an enormous increase in the amount of data collected and shared by that system.

      Some elements of the package are more positive. The possibility for refugees and people with subsidiary protection to get EU long-term residence status earlier would be an important step toward making asylum ‘valid throughout the Union’, as referred to in the Treaties. The wider definition of family members, and the retention of the full sovereignty clause, may lead to some fairer results under the Dublin system. Future plans to improve the long-term residents’ Directive are long overdue. The Commission’s sound legal assessment that no one should be prosecuted for acting on their obligations to rescue people in distress at sea is welcome. The quasi-agreed text of the reception conditions Directive explicitly rules out Trump-style separate detention of children.

      No proposals from the EU can solve the underlying political issue: a chunk of public opinion is hostile to more migration, whether in frontline Member States, other Member States, or transit countries outside the EU. The politics is bound to affect what Member States and non-EU countries alike are willing to agree to. And for the same reason, even if a set of amendments to the system is ultimately agreed, there will likely be continuing issues of implementation, especially illegal pushbacks and refusals to accept relocation.

      https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/09/first-analysis-of-eus-new-asylum.html?spref=fb

    • Pacte européen sur les migrations et l’asile : Le rendez-vous manqué de l’UE

      Le nouveau pacte européen migrations et asile présenté par la Commission ce 23 septembre, loin de tirer les leçons de l’échec et du coût humain intolérable des politiques menées depuis 30 ans, s’inscrit dans la continuité des logiques déjà largement éprouvées, fondées sur une approche répressive et sécuritaire au service de l’endiguement et des expulsions et au détriment d’une politique d’accueil qui s’attache à garantir et à protéger la dignité et les droits fondamentaux.

      Des « nouveaux » camps européens aux frontières pour filtrer les personnes arrivées sur le territoire européen et expulser le plus grand nombre

      En réaction au drame des incendies qui ont ravagé le camp de Moria sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, la commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, affirmait le 17 septembre devant les députés européens qu’« il n’y aurait pas d’autres Moria » mais de « véritables centres d’accueil » aux frontières européennes.

      Si le nouveau pacte prévoie effectivement la création de « nouveaux » camps conjuguée à une « nouvelle » procédure accélérée aux frontières, ces derniers s’apparentent largement à l’approche hotspot mise en œuvre par l’Union européenne (UE) depuis 2015 afin d’organiser la sélection des personnes qu’elle souhaite accueillir et l’expulsion, depuis la frontière, de tous celles qu’elle considère « indésirables ».

      Le pacte prévoie ainsi la mise en place « d’un contrôle préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire pour toutes les personnes qui se présentent aux frontières extérieures ou après un débarquement, à la suite d’une opération de recherche et de sauvetage ». Il s’agira, pour les pays situés à la frontière extérieure de l’UE, de procéder – dans un délai de 5 jours et avec l’appui des agences européennes (l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes – Frontex et le Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile – EASO) – à des contrôles d’identité (prise d’empreintes et enregistrement dans les bases de données européennes) doublés de contrôles sécuritaires et sanitaires afin de procéder à un tri préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire, permettant d’orienter ensuite les personne vers :

      Une procédure d’asile accélérée à la frontière pour celles possédant une nationalité pour laquelle le taux de reconnaissance d’une protection internationale, à l’échelle de l’UE, est inférieure à 20%
      Une procédure d’asile normale pour celles considérées comme éligibles à une protection.
      Une procédure d’expulsion immédiate, depuis la frontière, pour toute celles qui auront été rejetées par ce dispositif de tri, dans un délai de 12 semaines.

      Pendant cette procédure de filtrage à la frontière, les personnes seraient considérées comme n’étant pas encore entrées sur le territoire européen ce qui permettrait aux Etats de déroger aux conventions de droit international qui s’y appliquent.

      Un premier projet pilote est notamment prévu à Lesbos, conjointement avec les autorités grecques, pour installer un nouveau camp sur l’île avec l’appui d’une Task Force européenne, directement placée sous le contrôle de la direction générale des affaires intérieure de la Commission européenne (DG HOME).

      Difficile de voir où se trouve l’innovation dans la proposition présentée par la Commission. Si ce n’est que les États européens souhaitent pousser encore plus loin à la fois la logique de filtrage à ces frontières ainsi que la sous-traitance de leur contrôle. Depuis l’été 2018, l’Union européenne défend la création de « centres contrôlés au sein de l’UE » d’une part et de « plateformes de débarquement dans les pays tiers » d’autre part. L’UE, à travers ce nouveau mécanisme, vise à organiser l’expulsion rapide des migrants qui sont parvenus, souvent au péril de leur vie, à pénétrer sur son territoire. Pour ce faire, la coopération accrue avec les gardes-frontières des États non européens et l’appui opérationnel de l’agence Frontex sont encore et toujours privilégiés.
      Un « nouvel écosystème en matière de retour »

      L’obsession européenne pour l’amélioration du « taux de retour » se retrouve au cœur de ce nouveau pacte, en repoussant toujours plus les limites en matière de coopération extérieure et d’enfermement des personnes étrangères jugées indésirables et en augmentant de façon inédite ses moyens opérationnels.

      Selon l’expression de Margaritis Schinas, commissaire grec en charge de la « promotion du mode de vie européen », la nouvelle procédure accélérée aux frontières s’accompagnera d’« un nouvel écosystème européen en matière de retour ». Il sera piloté par un « nouveau coordinateur de l’UE chargé des retours » ainsi qu’un « réseau de haut niveau coordonnant les actions nationales » avec le soutien de l’agence Frontex, qui devrait devenir « le bras opérationnel de la politique de retour européenne ».

      Rappelons que Frontex a vu ses moyens décuplés ces dernières années, notamment en vue d’expulser plus de personnes migrantes. Celle-ci a encore vu ses moyens renforcés depuis l’entrée en vigueur de son nouveau règlement le 4 décembre 2019 dont la Commission souhaite accélérer la mise en œuvre effective. Au-delà d’une augmentation de ses effectifs et de la possibilité d’acquérir son propre matériel, l’agence bénéficie désormais de pouvoirs étendus pour identifier les personnes « expulsables » du territoire européen, obtenir les documents de voyage nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de leurs expulsions ainsi que pour coordonner des opérations d’expulsion au service des Etats membres.

      La Commission souhaite également faire aboutir, d’ici le second trimestre 2021, le projet de révision de la directive européenne « Retour », qui constitue un recul sans précédent du cadre de protection des droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes. Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : L’expulsion au cœur des politiques migratoires européennes, 22 mai 2019
      Des « partenariats sur-mesure » avec les pays d’origine et de transit

      La Commission étend encore redoubler d’efforts afin d’inciter les Etats non européens à participer activement à empêcher les départs vers l’Europe ainsi qu’à collaborer davantage en matière de retour et de réadmission en utilisant l’ensemble des instruments politiques à sa disposition. Ces dernières années ont vu se multiplier les instruments européens de coopération formelle (à travers la signature, entre autres, d’accords de réadmission bilatéraux ou multilatéraux) et informelle (à l’instar de la tristement célèbre déclaration entre l’UE et la Turquie de mars 2016) à tel point qu’il est devenu impossible, pour les États ciblés, de coopérer avec l’UE dans un domaine spécifique sans que les objectifs européens en matière migratoire ne soient aussi imposés.

      L’exécutif européen a enfin souligné sa volonté de d’exploiter les possibilités offertes par le nouveau règlement sur les visas Schengen, entré en vigueur en février 2020. Celui-ci prévoie d’évaluer, chaque année, le degré de coopération des Etats non européens en matière de réadmission. Le résultat de cette évaluation permettra d’adopter une décision de facilitation de visa pour les « bon élèves » ou à l’inverse, d’imposer des mesures de restrictions de visas aux « mauvais élèves ». Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : Expulsions contre visas : le droit à la mobilité marchandé, 2 février 2020.

      Conduite au seul prisme des intérêts européens, cette politique renforce le caractère historiquement déséquilibré des relations de « coopération » et entraîne en outre des conséquences désastreuses sur les droits des personnes migrantes, notamment celui de quitter tout pays, y compris le leur. Sous couvert d’aider ces pays à « se développer », les mesures « incitatives » européennes ne restent qu’un moyen de poursuivre ses objectifs et d’imposer sa vision des migrations. En coopérant davantage avec les pays d’origine et de transit, parmi lesquelles des dictatures et autres régimes autoritaires, l’UE renforce l’externalisation de ses politiques migratoires, sous-traitant la gestion des exilées aux Etats extérieurs à l’UE, tout en se déresponsabilisant des violations des droits perpétrées hors de ses frontières.
      Solidarité à la carte, entre relocalisation et expulsion

      Le constat d’échec du système Dublin – machine infernale de l’asile européen – conjugué à la volonté de parvenir à trouver un consensus suite aux profonds désaccords qui avaient mené les négociations sur Dublin IV dans l’impasse, la Commission souhaite remplacer l’actuel règlement de Dublin par un nouveau règlement sur la gestion de l’asile et de l’immigration, liant étroitement les procédures d’asile aux procédures d’expulsion.

      Les quotas de relocalisation contraignants utilisés par le passé, à l’instar du mécanisme de relocalisation mis en place entre 2015 et 2017 qui fut un échec tant du point de vue du nombre de relocalisations (seulement 25 000 relocalisations sur les 160 000 prévues) que du refus de plusieurs Etats d’y participer, semblent être abandonnés.

      Le nouveau pacte propose donc un nouveau mécanisme de solidarité, certes obligatoire mais flexible dans ses modalités. Ainsi les Etats membres devront choisir, selon une clé de répartition définie :

      Soit de participer à l’effort de relocalisation des personnes identifiées comme éligibles à la protection internationale depuis les frontières extérieures pour prendre en charge l’examen de leur demande d’asile.
      Soit de participer au nouveau concept de « parrainage des retours » inventé par la Commission européenne. Concrètement, il s’agit d’être « solidaire autrement », en s’engageant activement dans la politique de retour européenne par la mise en œuvre des expulsions des personnes que l’UE et ses Etats membres souhaitent éloigner du territoire, avec la possibilité de concentrer leurs efforts sur les nationalités pour lesquelles leurs perspectives de faire aboutir l’expulsion est la plus élevée.

      De nouvelles règles pour les « situations de crise et de force majeure »

      Le pacte prévoie d’abroger la directive européenne relative à des normes minimales pour l’octroi d’une protection temporaire en cas d’afflux massif de personnes déplacées, au profit d’un nouveau règlement européen relatif aux « situations de crise et de force majeure ». L’UE et ses Etats membres ont régulièrement essuyé les critiques des acteurs de la société civile pour n’avoir jamais activé la procédure prévue par la directive de 2001, notamment dans le cadre de situation exceptionnelle telle que la crise de l’accueil des personnes arrivées aux frontières sud de l’UE en 2015.

      Le nouveau règlement prévoie notamment qu’en cas de « situation de crise ou de force majeure » les Etats membres pourraient déroger aux règles qui s’appliquent en matière d’asile, en suspendant notamment l’enregistrement des demandes d’asile pendant un durée d’un mois maximum. Cette mesure entérine des pratiques contraires au droit international et européen, à l’instar de ce qu’a fait la Grèce début mars 2020 afin de refouler toutes les personnes qui tenteraient de pénétrer le territoire européen depuis la Turquie voisine. Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : Frontière Grèce-Turquie : de l’approche hotspot au scandale de la guerre aux migrant·e ·s, 3 mars 2020

      Cette proposition représente un recul sans précédent du droit d’asile aux frontières et fait craindre de multiples violations du principe de non refoulement consacré par la Convention de Genève.

      Bien loin d’engager un changement de cap des politiques migratoires européennes, le nouveau pacte européen migrations et asile ne semble n’être qu’un nouveau cadre de plus pour poursuivre une approche des mouvements migratoires qui, de longue date, s’est construite autour de la volonté d’empêcher les arrivées aux frontières et d’organiser un tri parmi les personnes qui auraient réussi à braver les obstacles pour atteindre le territoire européen, entre celles considérées éligibles à la demande d’asile et toutes les autres qui devraient être expulsées.

      De notre point de vue, cela signifie surtout que des milliers de personnes continueront à être privées de liberté et à subir les dispositifs répressifs des Etats membres de l’Union européenne. Les conséquences néfastes sur la dignité humaine et les droits fondamentaux de cette approche sont flagrantes, les personnes exilées et leurs soutiens y sont confrontées tous les jours.

      Encore une fois, des moyens très importants sont consacrés à financer l’érection de barrières physiques, juridiques et technologiques ainsi que la construction de camps sur les routes migratoires tandis qu’ils pourraient utilement être redéployés pour accueillir dignement et permettre un accès inconditionnel au territoire européen pour les personnes bloquées à ses frontières extérieures afin d’examiner avec attention et impartialité leurs situations et assurer le respect effectif des droits de tou∙te∙s.

      Nous appelons à un changement radical des politiques migratoires, pour une Europe qui encourage les solidarités, fondée sur la protection des droits humains et la dignité humaine afin d’assurer la protection des personnes et non pas leur exclusion.

      https://www.lacimade.org/pacte-europeen-sur-les-migrations-et-lasile-le-rendez-vous-manque-de-lue

    • EU’s new migrant ‘pact’ is as squalid as its refugee camps

      Governments need to share responsibility for asylum seekers, beyond merely ejecting the unwanted

      One month after fires swept through Europe’s largest, most squalid refugee camp, the EU’s migration policies present a picture as desolate as the blackened ruins of Moria on the Greek island of Lesbos. The latest effort at overhauling these policies is a European Commission “pact on asylum and migration”, which is not a pact at all. Its proposals sharply divide the EU’s 27 governments.

      In an attempt to appease central and eastern European countries hostile to admitting asylum-seekers, the commission suggests, in an Orwellian turn of phrase, that they should operate “relocation and return sponsorships”, dispatching people refused entry to their places of origin. This sort of task is normally reserved for nightclub bouncers.

      The grim irony is that Hungary and Poland, two countries that would presumably be asked to take charge of such expulsions, are the subject of EU disciplinary proceedings due to alleged violations of the rule of law. It remains a mystery how, if the commission proposal moves forward, the EU will succeed in binding Hungary and Poland into a common asylum policy and bend them into accepting EU definitions of the rule of law.

      Perhaps the best thing to be said of the commission’s plan is that, unlike the UK government, EU policymakers are not toying with hare-brained schemes of sending asylum-seekers to Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. Such options are the imagined privilege of a former imperial power not divested of all its far-flung possessions.

      Yet the commission’s initiative still reeks of wishful thinking. It foresees a process in which authorities swiftly check the identities, security status and health of irregular migrants, before returning them home, placing them in the asylum system or putting them in temporary facilities. This will supposedly decongest EU border zones, as governments will agree how to relocate new arrivals. But it is precisely the lack of such agreement since 2015 that led to Moria’s disgraceful conditions.

      The commission should not be held responsible for governments failing to shoulder their responsibilities. It is also justified in emphasising the need for a strong EU frontier. This is a precondition for free movement inside the bloc, vital for a flourishing single market.

      True, the Schengen system of border-free internal travel is curtailed at present because of the pandemic, not to mention restrictions introduced in some countries after the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis. But no government wants to abandon Schengen. Where they fall out with each other is over the housing of refugees and migrants.

      Europe’s overcrowded, unhygienic refugee camps, and the paralysis that grips EU policies, are all the more shameful in that governments no longer face a border emergency. Some 60,800 irregular migrants crossed into the EU between January and August, 14 per cent less than the same period in 2019, according to the EU border agency.

      By contrast, there were 1.8m illegal border crossings in 2015, a different order of magnitude. Refugees from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria made desperate voyages across the Mediterranean, with thousands drowning in ramshackle boats. Some countries, led by Germany and Sweden, were extremely generous in opening their doors to refugees. Others were not.

      The roots of today’s problems lie in the measures devised to address that crisis, above all a 2016 accord with Turkey. Irregular migrants were kept on Moria and other Greek islands, designated “hotspots”, in the expectation that failed asylum applicants would be smoothly returned to Turkey, its coffers replenished by billions of euros in EU assistance. In practice, few went back to Turkey and the understaffed, underfunded “hotspots” became places of tension between refugees and locals.

      Unable to agree on a relocation scheme among themselves, EU governments lapsed into a de facto policy of deterrence of irregular migrants. The pandemic provided an excuse for Italy and Malta to close their ports to people rescued at sea. Visiting the Greek-Turkish border in March, Ursula von der Leyen, the commission president, declared: “I thank Greece for being our European aspida [shield].”

      The legitimacy of EU refugee policies depends on adherence to international law, as well the bloc’s own rules. Its practical success requires all governments to share a responsibility for asylum-seekers that goes beyond ejecting unwanted individuals. Otherwise the EU will fall into the familiar trap of cobbling together unsatisfactory half-measures that guarantee more trouble in the future.

      https://www.ft.com/content/c50c6b9c-75a8-40b1-900d-a228faa382dc?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754

    • The EU’s pact against migration, Part One

      The EU Commission’s proposal for a ‘New Pact for Migration and Asylum’ offers no prospect of ending the enduring mobility conflict, opposing the movements of illegalised migrants to the EU’s restrictive migration policies.

      The ’New Pact for Migration and Asylum’, announced by the European Commission in July 2019, was finally presented on September 23, 2020. The Pact was eagerly anticipated as it was described as a “fresh start on migration in Europe”, acknowledging not only that Dublin had failed, but also that the negotiations between European member states as to what system might replace it had reached a standstill.

      The fire in Moria that left more than 13.000 people stranded in the streets of Lesvos island offered a glaring symbol of the failure of the current EU policy. The public outcry it caused and expressions of solidarity it crystallised across Europe pressured the Commission to respond through the publication of its Pact.

      Considering the trajectory of EU migration policies over the last decades, the particular position of the Commission within the European power structure and the current political conjuncture of strong anti-migration positions in Europe, we did not expect the Commission’s proposal to address the mobility conflict underlying its migration policy crisis in a constructive way. And indeed, the Pact’s main promise is to manage the diverging positions of member states through a new mechanism of “flexible solidarity” between member states in sharing the “burden” of migrants who have arrived on European territory. Perpetuating the trajectory of the last decades, it however remains premised on keeping most migrants from the global South out at all cost. The “New Pact” then is effectively a pact between European states against migrants. The Pact, which will be examined and possibly adopted by the European Parliament and Council in the coming months, confirms the impasse to which three decades of European migration and asylum policy have led, and an absence of any political imagination worthy of the name.
      The EU’s migration regime’s failed architecture

      The current architecture of the European border regime is based on two main and intertwined pillars: the Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC, or Schengen II) and the Dublin Convention, both signed in 1990, and gradually enforced in the following years.[1]

      Created outside the EC/EU context, they became the central rationalities of the emerging European border and migration regime after their incorporation into EU law through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/99). Schengen instituted the EU’s territory as an area of free movement for its citizens and, as a direct consequence, reinforced the exclusion of citizens of the global South and pushed control towards its external borders.

      However this profound transformation of European borders left unchanged the unbalanced systemic relations between Europe and the Global South, within which migrants’ movements are embedded. As a result, this policy shift did not stop migrants from reaching the EU but rather illegalised their mobility, forcing them to resort to precarious migration strategies and generating an easily exploitable labour force that has become a large-scale and permanent feature of EU economies.

      The more than 40,000 migrant deaths recorded at the EU’s borders by NGOs since the end of the 1980s are the lethal outcomes of this enduring mobility conflict opposing the movements of illegalised migrants to the EU’s restrictive migration policies.

      The second pillar of the EU’s migration architecture, the Dublin Convention, addressed asylum seekers and their allocation between member-states. To prevent them from filing applications in several EU countries – derogatively referred to as “asylum shopping” – the 2003 Dublin regulation states that the asylum seekers’ first country of entry into the EU is responsible for processing their claims. Dublin thus created an uneven European geography of (ir)responsibility that allowed the member states not directly situated at the intersection of European borders and routes of migration to abnegate their responsibility to provide shelter and protection, and placed a heavier “burden” on the shoulders of states located at the EU’s external borders.

      This unbalanced architecture, around which the entire Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was constructed, would begin to wobble as soon as the number of people arriving on the EU’s shores rose, leading to crisis-driven policy responses to prevent the migration regime from collapsing under the pressure of migrants’ refusal to be assigned to a country that was not of their choosing, and conflicts between member states.

      As a result, the development of a European border, migration and asylum policy has been driven by crisis and is inherently reactive. This pattern particularly holds for the last decade, when the large-scale movements of migrants to Europe in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 put the EU migration regime into permanent crisis mode and prompted hasty reforms. As of 2011, Italy allowed Tunisians to move on, leading to the re-introduction of border controls by states such as France, while the same year the 2011 European Court of Human Rights’ judgement brought Dublin deportations to Greece to a halt because of the appalling reception and living conditions there. The increasing refusal by asylum seekers to surrender their fingerprints – the core means of implementing Dublin – as of 2013 further destabilized the migration regime.

      The instability only grew when in April 2015, more then 1,200 people died in two consecutive shipwrecks, forcing the Commission to publish its ‘European Agenda for Migration’ in May 2015. The 2015 agenda announced the creation of the hotspot system in the hope of re-stabilising the European migration regime through a targeted intervention of European agencies at Europe’s borders. Essentially, the hotspot approach offered a deal to EU member states: comprehensive registration in Europeanised structures (the hotspots) by so-called “front-line states” – thus re-imposing Dublin – in exchange for relocation of part of the registered migrants to other EU countries – thereby alleviating front-line states of part of their “burden”.

      This plan however collapsed before it could ever work, as it was immediately followed by the large-scale summer arrivals of 2015 as migrants trekked across Europe’s borders. It was simultaneously boycotted by several member states who refused relocations and continue to lead the charge in fomenting an explicit anti-migration agenda in the EU. While border controls were soon reintroduced, relocations never materialised in a meaningful manner in the years that followed.

      With the Dublin regime effectively paralysed and the EU unable to agree on a new mechanism for the distribution of asylum seekers within Europe, the EU resorted to the decades-old policies that had shaped the European border and migration regime since its inception: keeping migrants out at all cost through border control implemented by member states, European agencies or outsourced to third countries.

      Considering the profound crisis the turbulent movements of migrants had plunged the EU into in the summer of 2015, no measure was deemed excessive in achieving this exclusionary end: neither the tacit acceptance of violent expulsions and push-backs by Spain and Greece, nor the outsourcing of border control to Libyan torturers, nor the shameless collaboration with dictatorial regimes such as Turkey.

      Under the guise of “tackling the root causes of migration”, development aid was diverted and used to impose border externalisation and deportation agreements. But the external dimension of the EU’s migration regime has proven just as unstable as its internal one – as the re-opening of borders by Turkey in March 2020 demonstrates. The movements of illegalised migrants towards the EU could never be entirely contained and those who reached the shores of Europe were increasingly relegated to infrastructures of detention. Even if keeping thousands of migrants stranded in the hell of Moria may not have been part of the initial hotspot plan, it certainly has been the outcome of the EU’s internal blockages and ultimately effective in shoring up the EU’s strategy of deterrence.

      The “New Pact” perpetuating the EU’s failed policy of closure

      Today the “New Pact”, promised for Spring 2020 and apparently forgotten at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, has been revived in a hurry to address the destruction of Moria hotspot. While detailed analysis of the regulations that it proposes are beyond the scope of this article,[2] the broad intentions of the Pact’s rationale are clear.

      Despite all its humane and humanitarian rhetoric and some language critically addressing the manifest absence of the rule of law at the border of Europe, the Commission’s pact is a pact against migration. Taking stock of the continued impasse in terms of internal distribution of migrants, it re-affirms the EU’s central objective of reducing, massively the number of asylum seekers to be admitted to Europe. It promises to do so by continuing to erect chains of externalised border control along migrants’ entire trajectories (what it refers to as the “whole-of-route approach”).

      Those who do arrive should be swiftly screened and sorted in an infrastructure of detention along the borders of Europe. The lucky few who will succeed in fitting their lives into the shrinking boxes of asylum law are to be relocated to other EU countries in function of a mechanism of distribution based on population size and wealth of member states.

      Whether this will indeed undo the imbalances of the Dublin regime remains an open question[3], nevertheless, this relocation key is one of the few positive steps offered by the Pact since it comes closer to migrants’ own “relocation key” but still falls short of granting asylum seekers the freedom to choose their country of protection and residence.[4] The majority of rejected asylum seekers – which may be determined on the basis of an extended understanding of the “safe third country” notion – is to be funnelled towards deportations operated by the EU states refusing relocation. The Commission hopes deportations will be made smoother after a newly appointed “EU Return Coordinator” will have bullied countries of origin into accepting their nationals using the carrot of development aid and the stick of visa sanctions. The Commission seems to believe that with fewer expected arrivals and fewer migrants ending up staying in Europe, and with its mechanism of “flexible solidarity” allowing for a selective participation in relocations or returns depending on the taste of its member states, it can both bridge the gap between member states’ interests and push for a deeper Europeanisation of the policy field in which its own role will become more central.

      Thus, the EU Commission’s attempt to square the circle of member states’ conflicting interests has resulted in a European pact against migration, which perpetuates the promises of the EU’s (anti-)migration policy over the last three decades: externalisation, enhanced borders, accelerated asylum procedures, detention and deportations to prevent and deter migrants from the global South. It seeks to strike yet another deal between European member states, without consulting – and at the expense of – migrants themselves. Because most of the policy means contained in the pact are not new, and have always failed to durably end illegalised migration – instead they have created a large precaritised population at the heart of Europe – we do not see how they would work today. Migrants will continue to arrive, and many will remain stranded in front-line states or other EU states as they await deportation. As such, the outcome of the pact (if it is agreed upon) is likely a perpetuation and generalisation of the hotspot system, the very system whose untenability – glaringly demonstrated by Moria’s fire – prompted the presentation of the New Pact in the first place. Even if the Commission’s “no more Morias” rhetoric would like to persuade us of the opposite,[5] the ruins of Moria point to the past as well as the potential future of the CEAS if the Commission has its way.

      We are dismayed at the loss of yet another opportunity for Europe to fundamentally re-orient its policy of closure, one which is profoundly at odds with the reality of large-scale displacement in an unequal and interconnected world. We are dismayed at the prospect of more suffering and more political crises that can only be the outcome of this continued policy failure. Clearly, an entirely different approach to how Europe engages with the movements of migration is called for. One which actually aims to de-escalate and transform the enduring mobility conflict. One which starts from the reality of the movements of migrants and offers a frame for it to unfold rather than seeks to suppress and deny it.

      Notes and references

      [1] We have offered an extensive analysis of the following argument in previous articles. See in particular : Bernd Kasparek. 2016. “Complementing Schengen: The Dublin System and the European Border and Migration Regime”. In Migration Policy and Practice, edited by Harald Bauder and Christian Matheis, 59–78. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani. 2016. “Ebbing and Flowing: The EU’s Shifting Practices of (Non-)Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis”. Near Futures Online. No 1. Available here.

      [2] For first analyses see Steve Peers. 2020. “First analysis of the EU’s new asylum proposals”, EU Law Analysis, 25 September 2020; Sergio Carrera. 2020. “Whose Pact? The Cognitive Dimensions of the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum”, CEPS, September 2020.

      [3] Carrera, ibid.

      [4] For a discussion of migration of migrants’ own relocation key, see Philipp Lutz, David Kaufmann and Anna Stütz. 2020. “Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good: The Strategic Role of States and Refugees”, Journal of Common Market Studies 2020 Volume 58. Number 3. pp. 757–775. To compare the actual asylum applications across Europe over the last years with different relocations keys, see the tool developed by Etienne Piguet.

      https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/the-eus-pact-against-migration-part-one

      #whole-of-route_approach #relocalisation #clé_de_relocalisation #relocation_key #pays-tiers_sûrs #EU_Return_Coordinator #solidarité_flexible #externalisation #new_pact

    • Towards a European pact with migrants, Part Two

      We call for a new Pact that addresses the reality of migrants’ movements, the systemic conditions leading people to flee their homes as well as the root causes of Europe’s racism.

      In Part One, we analysed the EU’s new Pact against migration. Here, we call for an entirely different approach to how Europe engages with migration, one which offers a legal frame for migration to unfold, and addresses the systemic conditions leading people to flee their homes as well as the root causes of Europe’s racism.Let us imagine for a moment that the EU Commission truly wanted, and was in a position, to reorient the EU’s migration policy in a direction that might actually de-escalate and transform the enduring mobility conflict: what might its pact with migrants look like?

      The EU’s pact with migrants might start from three fundamental premises. First, it would recognize that any policy that is entirely at odds with social practices is bound to generate conflict, and ultimately fail. A migration policy must start from the social reality of migration and provide a frame for it to unfold. Second, the pact would acknowledge that no conflict can be brought to an end unilaterally. Any process of conflict transformation must bring together the conflicting parties, and seek to address their needs, interests and values so that they no longer clash with each other. In particular, migrants from the global South must be included in the definition of the policies that concern them. Third, it would recognise, as Tendayi Achiume has put it, that migrants from the global South are no strangers to Europe.[1] They have long been included in the expansive webs of empire. Migration and borders are embedded in these unequal relations, and no end to the mobility conflict can be achieved without fundamentally transforming them. Based on these premises, the EU’s pact with migrants might contain the following four core measures:
      Global justice and conflict prevention

      Instead of claiming to tackle the “root causes” of migration by diverting and instrumentalising development aid towards border control, the EU’s pact with migrants would end all European political and economic relations that contribute to the crises leading to mass displacement. The EU would end all support to dictatorial regimes, would ban all weapon exports, terminate all destabilising military interventions. It would cancel unfair trade agreements and the debts of countries of the global South. It would end its massive carbon emissions that contribute to the climate crisis. Through these means, the EU would not claim to end migration perceived as a “problem” for Europe, but it would contribute to allowing more people to live a dignified life wherever they are and decrease forced migration, which certainly is a problem for migrants. A true commitment to global justice and conflict prevention and resolution is necessary if Europe wishes to limit the factors that lead too many people onto the harsh paths of exile in their countries and regions, a small proportion of whom reach European shores.
      Tackling the “root causes” of European racism

      While the EU’s so-called “global approach” to migration has in fact been one-sided, focused exclusively on migration as “the problem” rather then the processes that drive the EU’s policies of exclusion, the EU’s pact with migrants would boldly tackle the “root causes” of racism and xenophobia in Europe. Bold policies designed to address the EU’s colonial past and present and the racial imaginaries it has unleashed would be proposed, a positive vision for living in common in diverse societies affirmed, and a more inclusive and fair economic system would be established in Europe to decrease the resentment of European populations which has been skilfully channelled against migrants and racialised people.
      Universal freedom of movement

      By tackling the causes of large-scale displacement and of exclusionary migration policies, the EU would be able to de-escalate the mobility conflict, and could thus propose a policy granting all migrants legal pathways to access and stay in Europe. As an immediate outcome of the institution of right to international mobility, migrants would no longer resort to smugglers and risk their lives crossing the sea – and thus no longer be in need of being rescued. Using safe and legal means of travel would also, in the time of Covid-19 pandemic, allow migrants to adopt all sanitary measures that are necessary to protect migrants and those they encounter. No longer policed through military means, migration could appear as a normal process that does not generate fear. Frontex, the European border agency, would be defunded, and concentrate its limited activities on detecting actual threats to the EU rather then constructing vulnerable populations as “risks”. In a world that would be less unequal and in which people would have the possibly to lead a dignified life wherever they are, universal freedom of movement would not lead to an “invasion” of Europe. Circulatory movement rather then permanent settlement would be frequent. Migrants’ legal status would no longer allow employers to push working conditions down. A European asylum system would continue to exist, to grant protection and support to those in need. The vestiges of the EU’s hotspots and detention centres might be turned into ministries of welcome, which would register and redirect people to the place of their choice. Registration would thus be a mere certification of having taken the first step towards European citizenship, transforming the latter into a truly post-national institution, a far horizon which current EU treaties only hint at.
      Democratizing borders

      Considering that all European migration policies to date have been fundamentally undemocratic – in that they were imposed on a group of people – migrants – who had no say in the legislative and political process defining the laws that govern their movement – the pact would instead be the outcome of considerable consultative process with migrants and the organisations that support them, as well the states of the global South. The pact, following from Étienne Balibar’s suggestion, would in turn propose to permanently democratise borders by instituting “a multilateral, negotiated control of their working by the populations themselves (including, of course, migrant populations),” within “new representative institutions” that “are not merely ‘territorial’ and certainly not purely national.”[2] In such a pact, the original promise of Europe as a post-national project would finally be revived.

      Such a policy orientation may of course appear as nothing more then a fantasy. And yet it appears evident to us that the direction we suggest is the only realistic one. European citizens and policy makers alike must realise that the question is not whether migrants will exercise their freedom to cross borders, but at what human and political cost. As a result, it is far more realistic to address the processes within which the mobility conflict is embedded, than seeking to ban human mobility. As the Black Lives Matter’s slogan “No justice no peace!” resonating in the streets of the world over recent months reminds us, without mobility justice, [3] their can be no end to mobility conflict.
      The challenges ahead for migrant solidarity movements

      Our policy proposals are perfectly realistic in relation to migrants’ movements and the processes shaping them, yet we are well aware that they are not on the agenda of neoliberal and nationalist Europe. If the EU Commission has squandered yet another opportunity to reorient the EU’s migration policy, it is simply that this Europe, governed by these member states and politicians, has lost the capacity to offer bold visions of democracy, freedom and justice for itself and the world. As such, we have little hope for a fundamental reorientation of the EU’s policies. The bleak prospect is of the perpetuation of the mobility conflict, and the human suffering and political crises it generates.

      What are those who seek to support migrants to do in this context?

      We must start by a sobering note addressed to the movement we are part of: the fire of Moria is not only a symptom and symbol of the failures of the EU’s migration policies and member states, but also of our own strategies. After all, since the hotspots were proposed in 2015 we have tirelessly denounced them, and documented the horrendous living conditions they have created. NGOs have litigated against them, but efforts have been turned down by a European Court of Human Rights that appears increasingly reluctant to position itself on migration-related issues and is thereby contributing to the perpetuation of grave violations by states.

      And despite the extraordinary mobilisation of civil society in alliance with municipalities across Europe who have declared themselves ready to welcome migrants, relocations never materialised on any significant scale. After five years of tireless mobilization, the hotspots still stand, with thousands of asylum seekers trapped in them.

      While the conditions leading to the fire are still being clarified, it appears that the migrants held hostage in Moria took it into their own hands to try to get rid of the camp through the desperate act of burning it to the ground. As such, while we denounce the EU’s policies, our movements are urgently in need of re-evaluating their own modes of action, and re-imagining them more effectively.

      We have no lessons to give, as we share these shortcomings. But we believe that some of the directions we have suggested in our utopian Pact with migrants can guide migrant solidarity movements as well , as they may be implemented from the bottom-up in the present and help reopen our political imagination.

      The freedom to move is not, or not only, a distant utopia, that may be instituted by states in some distant future. It can also be seen as a right and freedom that illegalised migrants seize on a day-to-day basis as they cross borders without authorisation, and persist in living where they choose.

      Freedom of movement can serve as a useful compass to direct and evaluate our practices of contestation and support. Litigation remains an important tool to counter the multiple forms of violence and violations that migrants face along their trajectories, even as we acknowledge that national and international courts are far from immune to the anti-migrant atmosphere within states. Forging infrastructures of support for migrants in the course of their mobility (such as the WatchTheMed Alarm Phone and the civilian rescue fleet) – and their stay (such as the many citizen platforms for housing )– is and will continue to be essential.

      While states seek to implement what they call an “integrated border management” that seeks to manage migrants’ unruly mobilities before, at, and after borders, we can think of our own networks as forming a fragmented yet interconnected “integrated border solidarity” along the migrants’ entire trajectory. The criminalisation of our acts of solidarity by states is proof that we are effective in disrupting the violence of borders.

      Solidarity cities have formed important nodes in these chains, as municipalities do have the capacity to enable migrants to live in dignity in urban spaces, and limit the reach of their security forces for example. Their dissonant voices of welcome have been important in demonstrating that segments of the European population, which are far from negligible, refuse to be complicit with the EU’s policies of closure and are ready to embody an open relation of solidarity with migrants and beyond. However we must also acknowledge that the prerogative of granting access to European states remains in the hands of central administrations, not in those of municipalities, and thus the readiness to welcome migrants has not allowed the latter to actually seek sanctuary.

      While humanitarian and humanist calls for welcome are important, we too need to locate migration and borders in a broader political and economic context – that of the past and present of empire – so that they can be understood as questions of (in)justice. Echoing the words of the late Edouard Glissant, as activists focusing on illegalised migration we should never forget that “to have to force one’s way across borders as a result of one’s misery is as scandalous as what founds that misery”.[4] As a result of this framing, many more alliances can be forged today between migrant solidarity movements and the global justice and climate justice movements, as well as anti-racist, anti-fascist, feminist and decolonial movements. Through such alliances, we may be better equipped to support migrants throughout their entire trajectories, and transform the conditions that constrain them today.

      Ultimately, to navigate its way out of its own impasses, it seems to us that migrant solidarity movements must address four major questions.

      First, what migration policy do we want? The predictable limits of the EU’s pact against migration may be an opportunity to forge our own alternative agenda.

      Second, how can we not only oppose the implementation of restrictive policies but shape the policy process itself so as to transform the field on which we struggle? Opposing the EU’s anti-migrant pact over the coming months may allow us to conduct new experiments.

      Third, as long as policies that deny basic principles of equality, freedom, justice, and our very common humanity, are still in place, how can we lead actions that disrupt them effectively? For example, what are the forms of nongovernmental evacuations that might support migrants in accessing Europe, and moving across its internal borders?

      Fourth, how can struggles around migration and borders be part of the forging of a more equal, free, just and sustainable world for all?

      The next months during which the EU’s Pact against migration will be discussed in front of the European Parliament and Council will see an uphill battle for all those who still believe in the possibility of a Europe of openness and solidarity. While we have no illusions as to the policy outcome, this is an opportunity we must seize, not only to claim that another Europe and another world is possible, but to start building them from below.

      Notes and references

      [1] Tendayi Achiume. 2019, “The Postcolonial Case for Rethinking Borders.” Dissent 66.3: pp.27-32.

      [2] Etienne Balibar. 2004. We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton: University Press, p. 108 and 117.

      [3] Mimi Sheller. 2018. Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes. London: Verso.

      [4] Edouard Glissant. 2006. “Il n’est frontière qu’on n’outrepasse”. Le Monde diplomatique, October 2006.

      https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/towards-pact-migrants-part-two

    • Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile : Afin de garantir un nouveau départ et d’éviter de reproduire les erreurs passées, certains éléments à risque doivent être reconsidérés et les aspects positifs étendus.

      L’engagement en faveur d’une approche plus humaine de la protection et l’accent mis sur les aspects positifs et bénéfiques de la migration avec lesquels la Commission européenne a lancé le Pacte sur la migration et l’asile sont les bienvenus. Cependant, les propositions formulées reflètent très peu cette rhétorique et ces ambitions. Au lieu de rompre avec les erreurs de la précédente approche de l’Union européenne (UE) et d’offrir un nouveau départ, le Pacte continue de se focaliser sur l’externalisation, la dissuasion, la rétention et le retour.

      Cette première analyse des propositions, réalisée par la société civile, a été guidée par les questions suivantes :

      Les propositions formulées sont-elles en mesure de garantir, en droit et en pratique, le respect des normes internationales et européennes ?
      Participeront-elles à un partage plus juste des responsabilités en matière d’asile au niveau de l’UE et de l’international ?
      Seront-elles susceptibles de fonctionner en pratique ?

      Au lieu d’un partage automatique des responsabilités, le Pacte introduit un système de Dublin, qui n’en porte pas le nom, plus complexe et un mécanisme de « parrainage au retour »

      Le Pacte sur la migration et l’asile a manqué l’occasion de réformer en profondeur le système de Dublin : le principe de responsabilité du premier pays d’arrivée pour examiner les demandes d’asile est, en pratique, maintenu. De plus, le Pacte propose un système complexe introduisant diverses formes de solidarité.

      Certains ajouts positifs dans les critères de détermination de l’Etat membre responsable de la demande d’asile sont à relever, par exemple, l’élargissement de la définition des membres de famille afin d’inclure les frères et sœurs, ainsi qu’un large éventail de membres de famille dans le cas des mineurs non accompagnés et la délivrance d’un diplôme ou d’une autre qualification par un Etat membre. Cependant, au regard de la pratique actuelle des Etats membres, il sera difficile de s’éloigner du principe du premier pays d’entrée comme l’option de départ en faveur des nouvelles considérations prioritaires, notamment le regroupement familial.

      Dans le cas d’un nombre élevé de personnes arrivées sur le territoire (« pression migratoire ») ou débarquées suite à des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, la solidarité entre Etats membres est requise. Les processus qui en découlent comprennent une série d’évaluations, d’engagements et de rapports devant être rédigés par les États membres. Si la réponse collective est insuffisante, la Commission européenne peut prendre des mesures correctives. Au lieu de promouvoir un mécanisme de soutien pour un partage prévisible des responsabilités, ces dispositions tendent plutôt à créer des formes de négociations entre États membres qui nous sont toutes devenues trop familières. La complexité des propositions soulève des doutes quant à leur application réelle en pratique.

      Les États membres sont autorisés à choisir le « parrainage de retour » à la place de la relocalisation de personnes sur leur territoire, ce qui indique une attention égale portée au retour et à la protection. Au lieu d’apporter un soutien aux Etats membres en charge d’un plus grand nombre de demandes de protection, cette proposition soulève de nombreuses préoccupations juridiques et relatives au respect des droits de l’homme, en particulier si le transfert vers l’Etat dit « parrain » se fait après l’expiration du délai de 8 mois. Qui sera en charge de veiller au traitement des demandeurs d’asile déboutés à leur arrivée dans des Etats qui n’acceptent pas la relocalisation ?

      Le Pacte propose d’étendre l’utilisation de la procédure à la frontière, y compris un recours accru à la rétention

      A défaut de rééquilibrer la responsabilité entre les États membres de l’UE, la proposition de règlement sur les procédures communes exacerbe la pression sur les États situés aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et sur les pays des Balkans occidentaux. La Commission propose de rendre, dans certains cas, les procédures d’asile et de retour à la frontière obligatoires. Cela s’appliquerait notamment aux ressortissants de pays dont le taux moyen de protection de l’UE est inférieur à 20%. Ces procédures seraient facultatives lorsque les Etats membres appliquent les concepts de pays tiers sûr ou pays d’origine sûr. Toutefois, la Commission a précédemment proposé que ceux-ci deviennent obligatoires pour l’ensemble des Etats membres. Les associations réitèrent leurs inquiétudes quant à l’utilisation de ces deux concepts qui ont été largement débattus entre 2016 et 2019. Leur application obligatoire ne doit plus être proposée.

      La proposition de procédure à la frontière repose sur deux hypothèses erronées – notamment sur le fait que la majorité des personnes arrivant en Europe n’est pas éligible à un statut de protection et que l’examen des demandes de protection peut être effectué facilement et rapidement. Ni l’une ni l’autre ne sont correctes. En effet, en prenant en considération à la fois les décisions de première et de seconde instance dans toute l’UE il apparaît que la plupart des demandeurs d’asile dans l’UE au cours des trois dernières années ont obtenu un statut de protection. En outre, le Pacte ne doit pas persévérer dans cette approche erronée selon laquelle les procédures d’asile peuvent être conduites rapidement à travers la réduction de garanties et l’introduction d’un système de tri. La durée moyenne de la procédure d’asile aux Pays-Bas, souvent qualifiée d’ « élève modèle » pour cette pratique, dépasse un an et peut atteindre deux années jusqu’à ce qu’une décision soit prise.

      La proposition engendrerait deux niveaux de standards dans les procédures d’asile, largement déterminés par le pays d’origine de la personne concernée. Cela porte atteinte au droit individuel à l’asile et signifierait qu’un nombre accru de personnes seront soumises à une procédure de deuxième catégorie. Proposer aux Etats membres d’émettre une décision d’asile et d’éloignement de manière simultanée, sans introduire de garanties visant à ce que les principes de non-refoulement, d’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, et de protection de la vie privée et familiale ne soient examinés, porte atteinte aux obligations qui découlent du droit international. La proposition formulée par la Commission supprime également l’effet suspensif automatique du recours, c’est-à-dire le droit de rester sur le territoire dans l’attente d’une décision finale rendue dans le cadre d’une procédure à la frontière.

      L’idée selon laquelle les personnes soumises à des procédures à la frontière sont considérées comme n’étant pas formellement entrées sur le territoire de l’État membre est trompeuse et contredit la récente jurisprudence de l’UE, sans pour autant modifier les droits de l’individu en vertu du droit européen et international.

      La proposition prive également les personnes de la possibilité d’accéder à des permis de séjour pour des motifs autres que l’asile et impliquera très probablement une privation de liberté pouvant atteindre jusqu’à 6 mois aux frontières de l’UE, c’est-à-dire un maximum de douze semaines dans le cadre de la procédure d’asile à la frontière et douze semaines supplémentaires en cas de procédure de retour à la frontière. En outre, les réformes suppriment le principe selon lequel la rétention ne doit être appliquée qu’en dernier recours dans le cadre des procédures aux frontières. En s’appuyant sur des restrictions plus systématiques des mouvements dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, la proposition restreindra l’accès de l’individu aux services de base fournis par des acteurs qui ne pourront peut-être pas opérer à la frontière, y compris pour l’assistance et la représentation juridiques. Avec cette approche, on peut s’attendre aux mêmes échecs rencontrés dans la mise en œuvre des « hotspot » sur les îles grecques.

      La reconnaissance de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant comme élément primordial dans toutes les procédures pour les États membres est positive. Cependant, la Commission diminue les garanties de protection des enfants en n’exemptant que les mineurs non accompagnés ou âgés de moins de douze ans des procédures aux frontières. Ceci est en contradiction avec la définition internationale de l’enfant qui concerne toutes les personnes jusqu’à l’âge de dix-huit ans, telle qu’inscrite dans la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant ratifiée par tous les États membres de l’UE.

      Dans les situations de crise, les États membres sont autorisés à déroger à d’importantes garanties qui soumettront davantage de personnes à des procédures d’asile de qualité inférieure

      La crainte d’iniquité procédurale est d’autant plus visible dans les situations où un État membre peut prétendre être confronté à une « situation exceptionnelle d’afflux massif » ou au risque d’une telle situation.

      Dans ces cas, le champ d’application de la procédure obligatoire aux frontières est considérablement étendu à toutes les personnes en provenance de pays dont le taux moyen de protection de l’UE est inférieur à 75%. La procédure d’asile à la frontière et la procédure de retour à la frontière peuvent être prolongées de huit semaines supplémentaires, soit cinq mois chacune, ce qui porte à dix mois la durée maximale de privation de liberté. En outre, les États membres peuvent suspendre l’enregistrement des demandes d’asile pendant quatre semaines et jusqu’à un maximum de trois mois. Par conséquent, si aucune demande n’est enregistrée pendant plusieurs semaines, les personnes sont susceptibles d’être exposées à un risque accru de rétention et de refoulement, et leurs droits relatifs à un accueil digne et à des services de base peuvent être gravement affectés.

      Cette mesure permet aux États membres de déroger à leur responsabilité de garantir un accès à l’asile et un examen efficace et équitable de l’ensemble des demandes d’asile, ce qui augmente ainsi le risque de refoulement. Dans certains cas extrêmes, notamment lorsque les États membres agissent en violation flagrante et persistante des obligations du droit de l’UE, le processus de demande d’autorisation à la Commission européenne pourrait être considéré comme une amélioration, étant donné qu’actuellement la loi est ignorée, sans consultation et ce malgré les critiques de la Commission européenne. Toutefois, cela ne peut être le point de départ de l’évaluation de cette proposition de la législation européenne. L’impact à grande échelle de cette dérogation offre la possibilité à ce qu’une grande majorité des personnes arrivant dans l’UE soient soumises à une procédure de second ordre.

      Pré-filtrage à la frontière : risques et opportunités

      La Commission propose un processus de « pré-filtrage à l’entrée » pour toutes les personnes qui arrivent de manière irrégulière aux frontières de l’UE, y compris à la suite d’un débarquement dans le cadre des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage. Le processus de pré-filtrage comprend des contrôles de sécurité, de santé et de vulnérabilité, ainsi que l’enregistrement des empreintes digitales, mais il conduit également à des décisions impactant l’accès à l’asile, notamment en déterminant si une personne doit être sujette à une procédure d’asile accélérée à la frontière, de relocalisation ou de retour. Ce processus peut durer jusqu’à 10 jours et doit être effectué au plus près possible de la frontière. Le lieu où les personnes seront placées et l’accès aux conditions matérielles d’accueil demeurent flous. Le filtrage peut également être appliqué aux personnes se trouvant sur le territoire d’un État membre, ce qui pourrait conduire à une augmentation de pratiques discriminatoires. Des questions se posent également concernant les droits des personnes soumises au filtrage, tels que l’accès à l’information, , l’accès à un avocat et au droit de contester la décision prise dans ce contexte ; les motifs de refus d’entrée ; la confidentialité et la protection des données collectées. Etant donné que les États membres peuvent facilement se décharger de leurs responsabilités en matière de dépistage médical et de vulnérabilité, il n’est pas certain que certains besoins seront effectivement détectés et pris en considération.

      Une initiative à saluer est la proposition d’instaurer un mécanisme indépendant des droits fondamentaux à la frontière. Afin qu’il garantisse une véritable responsabilité face aux violations des droits à la frontière, y compris contre les éloignements et les refoulements récurrents dans un grand nombre d’États membres, ce mécanisme doit être étendu au-delà de la procédure de pré-filtrage, être indépendant des autorités nationales et impliquer des organisations telles que les associations non gouvernementales.

      La proposition fait de la question du retour et de l’expulsion une priorité

      L’objectif principal du Pacte est clair : augmenter de façon significative le nombre de personnes renvoyées ou expulsées de l’UE. La création du poste de Coordinateur en charge des retours au sein de la Commission européenne et d’un directeur exécutif adjoint aux retours au sein de Frontex en sont la preuve, tandis qu’aucune nomination n’est prévue au sujet de la protection de garanties ou de la relocalisation. Le retour est considéré comme un élément admis dans la politique migratoire et le soutien pour des retours dignes, en privilégiant les retours volontaires, l’accès à une assistance au retour et l’aide à la réintégration, sont essentiels. Cependant, l’investissement dans le retour n’est pas une réponse adaptée au non-respect systématique des normes d’asile dans les États membres de l’UE.

      Rien de nouveau sur l’action extérieure : des propositions irréalistes qui risquent de continuer d’affaiblir les droits de l’homme

      La tension entre l’engagement rhétorique pour des partenariats mutuellement bénéfiques et la focalisation visant à placer la migration au cœur des relations entre l’UE et les pays tiers se poursuit. Les tentatives d’externaliser la responsabilité de l’asile et de détourner l’aide au développement, les mécanismes de visa et d’autres outils pour inciter les pays tiers à coopérer sur la gestion migratoire et les accords de réadmission sont maintenues. Cela ne représente pas seulement un risque allant à l’encontre de l’engagement de l’UE pour ses principes de développement, mais cela affaiblit également sa posture internationale en générant de la méfiance et de l’hostilité depuis et à l’encontre des pays tiers. De plus, l’usage d’accords informels et la coopération sécuritaire sur la gestion migratoire avec des pays tels que la Libye ou la Turquie risquent de favoriser les violations des droits de l’homme, d’encourager les gouvernements répressifs et de créer une plus grande instabilité.

      Un manque d’ambition pour des voies légales et sûres vers l’Europe

      L’opportunité pour l’UE d’indiquer qu’elle est prête à contribuer au partage des responsabilités pour la protection au niveau international dans un esprit de partenariat avec les pays qui accueillent la plus grande majorité des réfugiés est manquée. Au lieu de proposer un objectif ambitieux de réinstallation de réfugiés, la Commission européenne a seulement invité les Etats membres à faire plus et a converti les engagements de 2020 en un mécanisme biennal, ce qui résulte en la perte d’une année de réinstallation européenne.

      La reconnaissance du besoin de faciliter la migration de main-d’œuvre à travers différents niveaux de compétences est à saluer, mais l’importance de cette migration dans les économies et les sociétés européennes ne se reflète pas dans les ressources, les propositions et les actions allouées.

      Le soutien aux activités de recherche et de sauvetage et aux actions de solidarité doit être renforcé

      La tragédie humanitaire dans la mer Méditerranée nécessite encore une réponse y compris à travers un soutien financier et des capacités de recherches et de sauvetage. Cet enjeu ainsi que celui du débarquement sont pris en compte dans toutes les propositions, reconnaissant ainsi la crise humanitaire actuelle. Cependant, au lieu de répondre aux comportements et aux dispositions règlementaires des gouvernements qui obstruent les activités de secours et le travail des défendeurs des droits, la Commission européenne suggère que les standards de sécurité sur les navires et les niveaux de communication avec les acteurs privés doivent être surveillés. Les acteurs privés sont également requis d’adhérer non seulement aux régimes légaux, mais aussi aux politiques et pratiques relatives à « la gestion migratoire » qui peuvent potentiellement interférer avec les obligations de recherches et de sauvetage.

      Bien que la publication de lignes directrices pour prévenir la criminalisation de l’action humanitaire soit la bienvenue, celles-ci se limitent aux actes mandatés par la loi avec une attention spécifique aux opérations de sauvetage et de secours. Cette approche risque d’omettre les activités humanitaires telles que la distribution de nourriture, d’abris, ou d’information sur le territoire ou assurés par des organisations non mandatées par le cadre légal qui sont également sujettes à ladite criminalisation et à des restrictions.

      Des signes encourageants pour l’inclusion

      Les changements proposés pour permettre aux réfugiés d’accéder à une résidence de long-terme après trois ans et le renforcement du droit de se déplacer et de travailler dans d’autres Etats membres sont positifs. De plus, la révision du Plan d’action pour l’inclusion et l’intégration et la mise en place d’un groupe d’experts pour collecter l’avis des migrants afin de façonner la politique européenne sont les bienvenues.

      La voie à suivre

      La présentation des propositions de la Commission est le commencement de ce qui promet d’être une autre longue période conflictuelle de négociations sur les politiques européennes d’asile et de migration. Alors que ces négociations sont en cours, il est important de rappeler qu’il existe déjà un régime d’asile européen et que les Etats membres ont des obligations dans le cadre du droit européen et international.

      Cela requiert une action immédiate de la part des décideurs politiques européens, y compris de la part des Etats membres, de :

      Mettre en œuvre les standards existants en lien avec les conditions matérielles d’accueil et les procédures d’asile, d’enquêter sur leur non-respect et de prendre les mesures disciplinaires nécessaires ;
      Sauver des vies en mer, et de garantir des capacités de sauvetage et de secours, permettant un débarquement et une relocalisation rapide ;
      Continuer de s’accorder sur des arrangements ad-hoc de solidarité pour alléger la pression sur les Etats membres aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et encourager les Etats membres à avoir recours à la relocalisation.

      Concernant les prochaines négociations sur le Pacte, nous recommandons aux co-législateurs de :

      Rejeter l’application obligatoire de la procédure d’asile ou de retour à la frontière : ces procédures aux standards abaissés réduisent les garanties des demandeurs d’asile et augmentent le recours à la rétention. Elles exacerbent le manque de solidarité actuel sur l’asile dans l’UE en plaçant plus de responsabilité sur les Etats membres aux frontières extérieures. L’expérience des hotspots et d’autres initiatives similaires démontrent que l’ajout de procédures ou d’étapes dans l’asile peut créer des charges administratives et des coûts significatifs, et entraîner une plus grande inefficacité ;
      Se diriger vers la fin de la privation de liberté de migrants, et interdire la rétention de mineurs conformément à la Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant, et de dédier suffisamment de ressources pour des solutions non privatives de libertés appropriées pour les mineurs et leurs familles ;
      Réajuster les propositions de réforme afin de se concentrer sur le maintien et l’amélioration des standards des droits de l’homme et de l’asile en Europe, plutôt que sur le retour ;
      Œuvrer à ce que les propositions réforment fondamentalement la façon dont la responsabilité des demandeurs d’asile en UE est organisée, en adressant les problèmes liés au principe de pays de première entrée, afin de créer un véritable mécanisme de solidarité ;
      Limiter les possibilités pour les Etats membres de déroger à leurs responsabilités d’enregistrer les demandes d’asile ou d’examiner les demandes, afin d’éviter de créer des incitations à opérer en mode gestion de crise et à diminuer les standards de l’asile ;
      Augmenter les garanties pendant la procédure de pré-filtrage pour assurer le droit à l’information, l’accès à une aide et une représentation juridique, la détection et la prise en charge des vulnérabilités et des besoins de santé, et une réponse aux préoccupations liées à l’enregistrement et à la protection des données ;
      Garantir que le mécanisme de suivi des droits fondamentaux aux frontières dispose d’une portée large afin de couvrir toutes les violations des droits fondamentaux à la frontière, qu’il soit véritablement indépendant des autorités nationales et dispose de ressources adéquates et qu’il contribue à la responsabilisation ;
      S’opposer aux tentatives d’utiliser l’aide au développement, au commerce, aux investissements, aux mécanismes de visas, à la coopération sécuritaire et autres politiques et financements pour faire pression sur les pays tiers dans leur coopération étroitement définie par des objectifs européens de contrôle migratoire ;
      Evaluer l’impact à long-terme des politiques migratoires d’externalisation sur la paix, le respect des droits et le développement durable et garantir que la politique extérieure migratoire ne contribue pas à la violation de droits de l’homme et prenne en compte les enjeux de conflits ;
      Développer significativement les voies légales et sûres vers l’UE en mettant en œuvre rapidement les engagements actuels de réinstallation, en proposant de nouveaux objectifs ambitieux et en augmentant les opportunités de voies d’accès à la protection ainsi qu’à la migration de main-d’œuvre et universitaire en UE ;
      Renforcer les exceptions à la criminalisation lorsqu’il s’agit d’actions humanitaires et autres activités indépendantes de la société civile et enlever les obstacles auxquels font face les acteurs de la société civile fournissant une assistance vitale et humanitaire sur terre et en mer ;
      Mettre en place une opération de recherche et de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée financée et coordonnée par l’UE ;
      S’appuyer sur les propositions prometteuses pour soutenir l’inclusion à travers l’accès à la résidence à long-terme et les droits associés et la mise en œuvre du Plan d’action sur l’intégration et l’inclusion au niveau européen, national et local.

      https://www.forumrefugies.org/s-informer/positions/europe/774-pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et-l-asile-afin-de-garantir-un-no

    • Nouveau Pacte européen  : les migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s traité.e.s comme des « # colis à trier  »

      Le jour même de la Conférence des Ministres européens de l’Intérieur, EuroMed Droits présente son analyse détaillée du nouveau Pacte européen sur l’asile et la migration, publié le 23 septembre dernier (https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Analysis-of-Asylum-and-Migration-Pact_Final_Clickable.pdf).

      On peut résumer les plus de 500 pages de documents comme suit  : le nouveau Pacte européen sur l’asile et la migration déshumanise les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s, les traitant comme des «  #colis à trier  » et les empêchant de se déplacer en Europe. Ce Pacte soulève de nombreuses questions en matière de respect des droits humains, dont certaines sont à souligner en particulier  :

      L’UE détourne le concept de solidarité. Le Pacte vise clairement à «  rétablir la confiance mutuelle entre les États membres  », donnant ainsi la priorité à la #cohésion:interne de l’UE au détriment des droits des migrant.e.s et des réfugié.e.s. La proposition laisse le choix aux États membres de contribuer – en les mettant sur un pied d’égalité – à la #réinstallation, au #rapatriement, au soutien à l’accueil ou à l’#externalisation des frontières. La #solidarité envers les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s et leurs droits fondamentaux sont totalement ignorés.

      Le pacte promeut une gestion «  sécuritaire  » de la migration. Selon la nouvelle proposition, les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s seront placé.e.s en #détention et privé.e.s de liberté à leur arrivée. La procédure envisagée pour accélérer la procédure de demande d’asile ne pourra se faire qu’au détriment des lois sur l’asile et des droits des demandeur.se.s. Il est fort probable que la #procédure se déroulera de manière arbitraire et discriminatoire, en fonction de la nationalité du/de la demandeur.se, de son taux de reconnaissance et du fait que le pays dont il/elle provient est «  sûr  », ce qui est un concept douteux.

      L’idée clé qui sous-tend cette vision est simple  : externaliser autant que possible la gestion des frontières en coopérant avec des pays tiers. L’objectif est de faciliter le retour et la réadmission des migrant.e.s dans le pays d’où ils/elles sont parti.es. Pour ce faire, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex) verrait ses pouvoirs renforcés et un poste de coordinateur.trice européen.ne pour les retours serait créé. Le pacte risque de facto de fournir un cadre juridique aux pratiques illégales telles que les refoulements, les détentions arbitraires et les mesures visant à réduire davantage la capacité en matière d’asile. Des pratiques déjà en place dans certains États membres.

      Le Pacte présente quelques aspects «  positifs  », par exemple en matière de protection des enfants ou de regroupement familial, qui serait facilité. Mais ces bonnes intentions, qui doivent être mises en pratique, sont noyées dans un océan de mesures répressives et sécuritaires.

      EuroMed Droits appelle les Etats membres de l’UE à réfléchir en termes de mise en œuvre pratique (ou non) de ces mesures. Non seulement elles violent les droits humains, mais elles sont impraticables sur le terrain  : la responsabilité de l’évaluation des demandes d’asile reste au premier pays d’arrivée, sans vraiment remettre en cause le Règlement de Dublin. Cela signifie que des pays comme l’Italie, Malte, l’Espagne, la Grèce et Chypre continueront à subir une «  pression  » excessive, ce qui les encouragera à poursuivre leurs politiques de refoulement et d’expulsion. Enfin, le Pacte ne répond pas à la problématique urgente des «  hotspots  » et des camps de réfugié.e.s comme en Italie ou en Grèce et dans les zones de transit à l’instar de la Hongrie. Au contraire, cela renforce ce modèle dangereux en le présentant comme un exemple à exporter dans toute l’Europe, alors que des exemples récents ont démontré l’impossibilité de gérer ces camps de manière humaine.

      https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/nouveau-pacte-europeen%e2%80%af-les-migrant-e-s-et-refugie-e-s-traite

      #paquets_de_la_poste #paquets #poste #tri #pays_sûrs

    • A “Fresh Start” or One More Clunker? Dublin and Solidarity in the New Pact

      In ongoing discussions on the reform of the CEAS, solidarity is a key theme. It stands front and center in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum: after reassuring us of the “human and humane approach” taken, the opening quote stresses that Member States must be able to “rely on the solidarity of our whole European Union”.

      In describing the need for reform, the Commission does not mince its words: “[t]here is currently no effective solidarity mechanism in place, and no efficient rule on responsibility”. It’s a remarkable statement: barely one year ago, the Commission maintained that “[t]he EU [had] shown tangible and rapid support to Member States under most pressure” throughout the crisis. Be that as it may, we are promised a “fresh start”. Thus, President Von der Leyen has announced on the occasion of the 2020 State of the Union Address that “we will abolish the Dublin Regulation”, the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal (examined here) has been withdrawn, and the Pact proposes a “new solidarity mechanism” connected to “robust and fair management of the external borders” and capped by a new “governance framework”.

      Before you buy the shiny new package, you are advised to consult the fine print however. Yes, the Commission proposes to abolish the Dublin III Regulation and withdraws the Dublin IV Proposal. But the Proposal for an Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (hereafter “the Migration Management Proposal”) reproduces word-for-word the Dublin III Regulation, subject to amendments drawn … from the Dublin IV Proposal! As for the “governance framework” outlined in Articles 3-7 of the Migration Management Proposal, it’s a hodgepodge of purely declamatory provisions (e.g. Art. 3-4), of restatements of pre-existing obligations (Art. 5), of legal bases authorizing procedures that require none (Art. 7). The one new item is a yearly monitoring exercise centered on an “European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy” (Art. 6), which seems as likely to make a difference as the “Mechanism for Early Warning, Preparedness and Crisis Management”, introduced with much fanfare with the Dublin III Regulation and then left in the drawer before, during and after the 2015/16 crisis.

      Leaving the provisions just mentioned for future commentaries – fearless interpreters might still find legal substance in there – this contribution focuses on four points: the proposed amendments to Dublin, the interface between Dublin and procedures at the border, the new solidarity mechanism, and proposals concerning force majeure. Caveat emptor! It is a jungle of extremely detailed and sometimes obscure provisions. While this post is longer than usual – warm thanks to the lenient editors! – do not expect an exhaustive summary, nor firm conclusions on every point.
      Dublin, the Undying

      To borrow from Mark Twain, reports of the death of the Dublin system have been once more greatly exaggerated. As noted, Part III of the Migration Management Proposal (Articles 8-44) is for all intents and purposes an amended version of the Dublin III Regulation, and most of the amendments are lifted from the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal.

      A first group of amendments concerns the responsibility criteria. Some expand the possibilities to allocate applicants based on their “meaningful links” with Member States: Article 2(g) expands the family definition to include siblings, opening new possibilities for reunification; Article 19(4) enlarges the criterion based on previous legal abode (i.e. expired residence documents); in a tip of the hat to the Wikstroem Report, commented here, Article 20 introduces a new criterion based on prior education in a Member State.

      These are welcome changes, but all that glitters is not gold. The Commission advertises “streamlined” evidentiary requirements to facilitate family reunification. These would be necessary indeed: evidentiary issues have long undermined the application of the family criteria. Unfortunately, the Commission is not proposing anything new: Article 30(6) of the Migration Management Proposal corresponds in essence to Article 22(5) of the Dublin III Regulation.

      Besides, while the Commission proposes to expand the general definition of family, the opposite is true of the specific definition of family applicable to “dependent persons”. Under Article 16 of the Dublin III Regulation, applicants who e.g. suffer from severe disabilities are to be kept or brought together with a care-giving parent, child or sibling residing in a Member State. Due to fears of sham marriages, spouses have been excluded and this is legally untenable and inhumane, but instead of tackling the problem the Commission proposes in Article 24 to worsen it by excluding siblings. The end result is paradoxical: persons needing family support the most will be deprived – for no apparent reason other than imaginary fears of “abuses” – of the benefits of enlarged reunification possibilities. “[H]uman and humane”, indeed.

      The fight against secondary movements inspires most of the other amendments to the criteria. In particular, Article 21 of the Proposal maintains and extends the much-contested criterion of irregular entry while clarifying that it applies also to persons disembarked after a search and rescue (SAR) operation. The Commission also proposes that unaccompanied children be transferred to the first Member State where they applied if no family criterion is applicable (Article 15(5)). This would overturn the MA judgment of the ECJ whereby in such cases the asylum claim must be examined in the State where the child last applied and is present. It’s not a technical fine point: while the case-law of the ECJ is calculated to spare children the trauma of a transfer, the proposed amendment would subject them again to the rigours of Dublin.

      Again to discourage secondary movements, the Commission proposes – as in 2016 – a second group of amendments: new obligations for the applicants (Articles 9-10). Applicants must in principle apply in the Member State of first entry, remain in that State for the duration of the Dublin procedure and, post-transfer, remain in the State responsible. Moving to the “wrong” State entails losing the benefits of the Reception Conditions Directive, subject to “the need to ensure a standard of living in accordance with” the Charter. It is debatable whether this is a much lesser standard of reception. More importantly: as reception conditions in line with the Directive are seldom guaranteed in several frontline Member States, the prospect of being treated “in accordance with the Charter” elsewhere will hardly dissuade applicants from moving on.

      The 2016 Proposal foresaw, as further punishment, the mandatory application of accelerated procedures to “secondary movers”. This rule disappears from the Migration Management Proposal, but as Daniel Thym points out in his forthcoming contribution on secondary movements, it remains in Article 40(1)(g) of the 2016 Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation. Furthermore, the Commission proposes deleting Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, i.e. the guarantee that persons transferred back to a State that has meanwhile discontinued or rejected their application will have their case reopened, or a remedy available. This is a dangerous invitation to Member States to reintroduce “discontinuation” practices that the Commission itself once condemned as incompatible with effective access to status determination.

      To facilitate responsibility-determination, the Proposal further obliges applicants to submit relevant information before or at the Dublin interview. Late submissions are not to be considered. Fairness would demand that justified delays be excused. Besides, it is also proposed to repeal Article 7(3) of the Dublin III Regulation, whereby authorities must take into account evidence of family ties even if produced late in the process. All in all, then, the Proposal would make proof of family ties harder, not easier as the Commission claims.

      A final group of amendments concern the details of the Dublin procedure, and might prove the most important in practice.

      Some “streamline” the process, e.g. with shorter deadlines (e.g. Article 29(1)) and a simplified take back procedure (Article 31). Controversially, the Commission proposes again to reduce the scope of appeals against transfers to issues of ill-treatment and misapplication of the family criteria (Article 33). This may perhaps prove acceptable to the ECJ in light of its old Abdullahi case-law. However, it contravenes Article 13 ECHR, which demands an effective remedy for the violation of any Convention right.
      Other procedural amendments aim to make it harder for applicants to evade transfers. At present, if a transferee absconds for 18 months, the transfer is cancelled and the transferring State becomes responsible. Article 35(2) of the Proposal allows the transferring State to “stop the clock” if the applicant absconds, and to resume the transfer as soon as he reappears.
      A number of amendments make responsibility more “stable” once assigned, although not as “permanent” as the 2016 Proposal would have made it. Under Article 27 of the Proposal, the responsibility of a State will only cease if the applicant has left the Dublin area in compliance with a return decision. More importantly, under Article 26 the responsible State will have to take back even persons to whom it has granted protection. This would be a significant extension of the scope of the Dublin system, and would “lock” applicants in the responsible State even more firmly and more durably. Perhaps by way of compensation, the Commission proposes that beneficiaries of international protection obtain “long-term status” – and thus mobility rights – after three years of residence instead of five. However, given that it is “very difficult in practice” to exercise such rights, the compensation seems more theoretical than effective and a far cry from a system of free movement capable of offsetting the rigidities of Dublin.

      These are, in short, the key amendments foreseen. While it’s easy enough to comment on each individually, it is more difficult to forecast their aggregate impact. Will they – to paraphrase the Commission – “improv[e] the chances of integration” and reduce “unauthorised movements” (recital 13), and help closing “the existing implementation gap”? Probably not, as none of them is a game-changer.

      Taken together, however, they might well aggravate current distributive imbalances. Dublin “locks in” the responsibilities of the States that receive most applications – traditional destinations such as Germany or border States such as Italy – leaving the other Member States undisturbed. Apart from possible distributive impacts of the revised criteria and of the now obligations imposed on applicants, first application States will certainly be disadvantaged combination by shortened deadlines, security screenings (see below), streamlined take backs, and “stable” responsibility extending to beneficiaries of protection. Under the “new Dublin rules” – sorry for the oxymoron! – effective solidarity will become more necessary than ever.
      Border procedures and Dublin

      Building on the current hotspot approach, the Proposals for a Screening Regulation and for an Asylum Procedures Regulation outline a new(ish) “pre-entry” phase. This will be examined in a forthcoming post by Lyra Jakuleviciene, but the interface with infra-EU allocation deserves mention here.

      In a nutshell, persons irregularly crossing the border will be screened for the purpose of identification, health and security checks, and registration in Eurodac. Protection applicants may then be channelled to “border procedures” in a broad range of situations. This will be mandatory if the applicant: (a) attempts to mislead the authorities; (b) can be considered, based on “serious reasons”, “a danger to the national security or public order of the Member States”; (c) comes from a State whose nationals have a low Union-wide recognition rate (Article 41(3) of the Asylum Procedure Proposal).

      The purpose of the border procedure is to assess applications “without authorising the applicant’s entry into the Member State’s territory” (here, p.4). Therefore, it might have seemed logical that applicants subjected to it be excluded from the Dublin system – as is the case, ordinarily, for relocations (see below). Not so: under Article 41(7) of the Proposal, Member States may apply Dublin in the context of border procedures. This weakens the idea of “seamless procedures at the border” somewhat but – from the standpoint of both applicants and border States – it is better than a watertight exclusion: applicants may still benefit from “meaningful link” criteria, and border States are not “stuck with the caseload”. I would normally have qualms about giving Member States discretion in choosing whether Dublin rules apply. But as it happens, Member States who receive an asylum application already enjoy that discretion under the so-called “sovereignty clause”. Nota bene: in exercising that discretion, Member States apply EU Law and must observe the Charter, and the same principle must certainly apply under the proposed Article 41(7).

      The only true exclusion from the Dublin system is set out in Article 8(4) of the Migration Management Proposal. Under this provision, Member States must carry out a security check of all applicants as part of the pre-entry screening and/or after the application is filed. If “there are reasonable grounds to consider the applicant a danger to national security or public order” of the determining State, the other criteria are bypassed and that State becomes responsible. Attentive readers will note that the wording of Article 8(4) differs from that of Article 41(3) of the Asylum Procedure Proposal (e.g. “serious grounds” vs “reasonable grounds”). It is therefore unclear whether the security grounds to “screen out” an applicant from Dublin are coextensive with the security grounds making a border procedure mandatory. Be that as it may, a broad application of Article 8(4) would be undesirable, as it would entail a large-scale exclusion from the guarantees that applicants derive from the Dublin system. The risk is moderate however: by applying Article 8(4) widely, Member States would be increasing their own share of responsibilities under the system. As twenty-five years of Dublin practice indicate, this is unlikely to happen.
      “Mandatory” and “flexible” solidarity under the new mechanism

      So far, the Migration Management Proposal does not look significantly different from the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal, which did not itself fundamentally alter existing rules, and which went down in flames in inter- and intra-institutional negotiations. Any hopes of a “fresh start”, then, are left for the new solidarity mechanism.

      Unfortunately, solidarity is a difficult subject for the EU: financial support has hitherto been a mere fraction of Member State expenditure in the field; operational cooperation has proved useful but cannot tackle all the relevant aspects of the unequal distribution of responsibilities among Member States; relocations have proved extremely beneficial for thousands of applicants, but are intrinsically complex operations and have also proven politically divisive – an aspect which has severely undermined their application and further condemned them to be small scale affairs relative to the needs on the ground. The same goes a fortiori for ad hoc initiatives – such as those that followed SAR operations over the last two years– which furthermore lack the predictability that is necessary for sharing responsibilities effectively. To reiterate what the Commission stated, there is currently “no effective solidarity mechanism in place”.

      Perhaps most importantly, the EU has hitherto been incapable of accurately gauging the distributive asymmetries on the ground, to articulate a clear doctrine guiding the key determinations of “how much solidarity” and “what kind(s) of solidarity”, and to define commensurate redistributive targets on this basis (see here, p.34 and 116).

      Alas, the opportunity to elaborate a solidarity doctrine for the EU has been completely missed. Conceptually, the New Pact does not go much farther than platitudes such as “[s]olidarity implies that all Member States should contribute”. As Daniel Thym aptly observed, “pragmatism” is the driving force behind the Proposal: the Commission starts from a familiar basis – relocations – and tweaks it in ways designed to convince stakeholders that solidarity becomes both “compulsory” and “flexible”. It’s a complicated arrangement and I will only describe it in broad strokes, leaving the crucial dimensions of financial solidarity and operational cooperation to forthcoming posts by Iris Goldner Lang and Lilian Tsourdi.

      The mechanism operates according to three “modes”. In its basic mode, it is to replace ad hoc solidarity initiatives following SAR disembarkations (Articles 47-49 of the Migration Management Proposal):

      The Commission determines, in its yearly Migration Management Report, whether a State is faced with “recurring arrivals” following SAR operations and determines the needs in terms of relocations and other contributions (capacity building, operational support proper, cooperation with third States).
      The Member States are “invited” to notify the “contributions they intend to make”. If offers are sufficient, the Commission combines them and formally adopts a “solidarity pool”. If not, it adopts an implementing act summarizing relocation targets for each Member State and other contributions as offered by them. Member States may react by offering other contributions instead of relocations, provided that this is “proportional” – one wonders how the Commission will tally e.g. training programs for Libyan coastguards with relocation places.
      If the relocations offered fall 30% short of the target indicated by the Commission, a “critical mass correction mechanism” will apply: each Member States will be obliged to meet at least 50% of the quota of relocations indicated by the Commission. However, and this is the new idea offered by the Commission to bring relocation-skeptics onboard, Member States may discharge their duties by offering “return sponsorships” instead of relocations: the “sponsor” Member State commits to support the benefitting Member State to return a person and, if the return is not carried out within eight months, to accept her on its territory.

      If I understand correctly the fuzzy provision I have just summarized – Article 48(2) – it all boils down to “half-compulsory” solidarity: Member States are obliged to cover at least 50% of the relocation needs set by the Commission through relocations or sponsorships, and the rest with other contributions.

      After the “solidarity pool” is established and the benefitting Member State requests its activation, relocations can start:

      The eligible persons are those who applied for protection in the benefitting State, with the exclusion of those that are subject to border procedures (Article 45(1)(a)).Also excluded are those whom Dublin criteria based on “meaningful links” – family, abode, diplomas – assign to the benefitting State (Article 57(3)). These rules suggest that the benefitting State must carry out identification, screening for border procedures and a first (reduced?) Dublin procedure before it can declare an applicant eligible for relocation.
      Persons eligible for return sponsorship are “illegally staying third-country nationals” (Article 45(1)(b)).
      The eligible persons are identified, placed on a list, and matched to Member States based on “meaningful links”. The transfer can only be refused by the State of relocation on security grounds (Article 57(2)(6) and (7)), and otherwise follows the modalities of Dublin transfers in almost all respects (e.g. deadlines, notification, appeals). However, contrary to what happens under Dublin, missing the deadline for transfer does not entail that the relocation is cancelled it (see Article 57(10)).
      After the transfer, applicants will be directly admitted to the asylum procedure in the State of relocation only if it has been previously established that the benefitting State would have been responsible under criteria other than those based on “meaningful links” (Article 58(3)). In all the other cases, the State of relocation will run a Dublin procedure and, if necessary, transfer again the applicant to the State responsible (see Article 58(2)). As for persons subjected to return sponsorship, the State of relocation will pick up the application of the Return Directive where the benefitting State left off (or so I read Article 58(5)!).

      If the Commission concludes that a Member State is under “migratory pressure”, at the request of the concerned State or of its own motion (Article 50), the mechanism operates as described above except for one main point: beneficiaries of protection also become eligible for relocation (Article 51(3)). Thankfully, they must consent thereto and are automatically granted the same status in the relocation State (see Articles 57(3) and 58(4)).

      If the Commission concludes that a Member State is confronted to a “crisis”, rules change further (see Article 2 of the Proposal for a Migration and Asylum Crisis Regulation):

      Applicants subject to the border procedure and persons “having entered irregularly” also become eligible for relocation. These persons may then undergo a border procedure post-relocation (see Article 41(1) and (8) of the Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation).
      Persons subject to return sponsorship are transferred to the sponsor State if their removal does not occur within four – instead of eight – months.
      Other contributions are excluded from the palette of contributions available to the other Member States (Article 2(1)): it has to be relocation or return sponsorship.
      The procedure is faster, with shorter deadlines.

      It is an understatement to say that the mechanism is complex, and your faithful scribe still has much to digest. For the time being, I would make four general comments.

      First, it is not self-evident that this is a good “insurance scheme” for its intended beneficiaries. As noted, the system only guarantees that 50% of the relocation needs of a State will be met. Furthermore, there are hidden costs: in “SAR” and “pressure” modes, the benefitting State has to screen the applicant, register the application, and assess whether border procedures or (some) Dublin criteria apply before it can channel the applicant to relocation. It is unclear whether a 500 lump sum is enough to offset the costs (see Article 79 of the Migration Management Proposal). Besides, in a crisis situation, these preliminary steps might make relocation impractical – think of the Greek registration backlog in 2015/6. Perhaps, extending relocation to persons “having entered irregularly” when the mechanism is in “crisis mode” is meant precisely to take care of this. Similar observations apply to return sponsorship. Under Article 55(4) of the Migration Management Proposal, the support offered by the sponsor to the benefitting State can be rather low key (e.g. “counselling”) and there seems to be no guarantee that the benefitting State will be effectively relieved of the political, administrative and financial costs associated to return. Moving from costs to risks, it is clear that the benefitting State bears all the risks of non implementation – in other words, if the system grinds to a halt or breaks down, it will be Moria all over again. In light of past experience, one can only agree with Thomas Gammelthoft-Hansen that it’s a “big gamble”. Other aspects examined below – the vast margins of discretion left to the Commission, and the easy backdoor opened by the force majeure provisions – do not help either to create predictability.
      Second, as just noted the mechanism gives the Commission practically unlimited discretion at all critical junctures. The Commission will determine whether a Member States is confronted to “recurring arrivals”, “pressure” or a “crisis”. It will do so under definitions so open-textured, and criteria so numerous, that it will be basically the master of its determinations (Article 50 of the Migration Management Proposal). The Commission will determine unilaterally relocation and operational solidarity needs. Finally, the Commission will determine – we do not know how – if “other contributions” are proportional to relocation needs. Other than in the most clear-cut situations, there is no way that anyone can predict how the system will be applied.
      Third: the mechanism reflects a powerful fixation with and unshakable faith in heavy bureaucracy. Protection applicants may undergo up to three “responsibility determination” procedures and two transfers before finally landing in an asylum procedure: Dublin “screening” in the first State, matching, relocation, full Dublin procedure in the relocation State, then transfer. And this is a system that should not “compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications”(recital 34)! Decidedly, the idea that in order to improve the CEAS it is above all necessary to suppress unnecessary delays and coercion (see here, p.9) has not made a strong impression on the minds of the drafters. The same remark applies mutatis mutandis to return sponsorships: whatever the benefits in terms of solidarity, one wonders if it is very cost-effective or humane to drag a person from State to State so that they can each try their hand at expelling her.
      Lastly and relatedly, applicants and other persons otherwise concerned by the relocation system are given no voice. They can be “matched”, transferred, re-transferred, but subject to few exceptions their aspirations and intentions remain legally irrelevant. In this regard, the “New Pact” is as old school as it gets: it sticks strictly to the “no choice” taboo on which Dublin is built. What little recognition of applicants’ actorness had been made in the Wikstroem Report is gone. Objectifying migrants is not only incompatible with the claim that the approach taken is “human and humane”. It might prove fatal to the administrative efficiency so cherished by the Commission. Indeed, failure to engage applicants is arguably the key factor in the dismal performance of the Dublin system (here, p.112). Why should it be any different under this solidarity mechanism?

      Framing Force Majeure (or inviting defection?)

      In addition to addressing “crisis” situations, the Proposal for a Migration and Asylum Crisis Regulation includes separate provisions on force majeure.

      Thereunder, any Member State may unilaterally declare that it is faced with a situation making it “impossible” to comply with selected CEAS rules, and thus obtain the right – subject to a mere notification – to derogate from them. Member States may obtain in this way longer Dublin deadlines, or even be exempted from the obligation to accept transfers and be liberated from responsibilities if the suspension goes on more than a year (Article 8). Furthermore, States may obtain a six-months suspension of their duties under the solidarity mechanism (Article 9).

      The inclusion of this proposal in the Pact – possibly an attempt to further placate Member States averse to European solidarity? – beggars belief. Legally speaking, the whole idea is redundant: under the case-law of the ECJ, Member States may derogate from any rule of EU Law if confronted to force majeure. However, putting this black on white amounts to inviting (and legalizing) defection. The only conceivable object of rules of this kind would have been to subject force majeure derogations to prior authorization by the Commission – but there is nothing of the kind in the Proposal. The end result is paradoxical: while Member States are (in theory!) subject to Commission supervision when they conclude arrangements facilitating the implementation of Dublin rules, a mere notification will be enough to authorize them to unilaterally tear a hole in the fabric of “solidarity” and “responsibility” so painstakingly – if not felicitously – woven in the Pact.
      Concluding comments

      We should have taken Commissioner Ylva Johansson at her word when she said that there would be no “Hoorays” for the new proposals. Past the avalanche of adjectives, promises and fancy administrative monikers hurled at the reader – “faster, seamless migration processes”; “prevent the recurrence of events such as those seen in Moria”; “critical mass correction mechanism” – one cannot fail to see that the “fresh start” is essentially an exercise in repackaging.

      On responsibility-allocation and solidarity, the basic idea is one that the Commission incessantly returns to since 2007 (here, p. 10): keep Dublin and “correct” it through solidarity schemes. I do sympathize to an extent: realizing a fair balance of responsibilities by “sharing people” has always seemed to me impracticable and undesirable. Still, one would have expected that the abject failure of the Dublin system, the collapse of mutual trust in the CEAS, the meagre results obtained in the field of solidarity – per the Commission’s own appraisal – would have pushed it to bring something new to the table.

      Instead, what we have is a slightly milder version of the Dublin IV Proposal – the ultimate “clunker” in the history of Commission proposals – and an ultra-bureaucratic mechanism for relocation, with the dubious addition of return sponsorships and force majeure provisions. The basic tenets of infra-EU allocation remain the same – “no choice”, first entry – and none of the structural flaws that doomed current schemes to failure is fundamentally tackled (here, p.107): solidarity is beefed-up but appears too unreliable and fuzzy to generate trust; there are interesting steps on “genuine links”, but otherwise no sustained attempt to positively engage applicants; administrative complexity and coercive transfers reign on.

      Pragmatism, to quote again Daniel Thym’s excellent introductory post, is no sin. It is even expected of the Commission. This, however, is a study in path-dependency. By defending the status quo, wrapping it in shiny new paper, and making limited concessions to key policy actors, the Commission may perhaps carry its proposals through. However, without substantial corrections, the “new” Pact is unlikely to save the CEAS or even to prevent new Morias.

      http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-fresh-start-or-one-more-clunker-dublin-and-solidarity-in-the-ne

      #Francesco_Maiani

      #force_majeure

    • European Refugee Policy: What’s Gone Wrong and How to Make It Better

      In 2015 and 2016, more than 1 million refugees made their way to the European Union, the largest number of them originating from Syria. Since that time, refugee arrivals have continued, although at a much slower pace and involving people from a wider range of countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

      The EU’s response to these developments has had five main characteristics.

      First, a serious lack of preparedness and long-term planning. Despite the massive material and intelligence resources at its disposal, the EU was caught completely unaware by the mass influx of refugees five years ago and has been playing catch-up ever since. While the emergency is now well and truly over, EU member states continue to talk as if still in the grip of an unmanageable “refugee crisis.”

      Second, the EU’s refugee policy has become progressively based on a strategy known as “externalization,” whereby responsibility for migration control is shifted to unstable states outside Europe. This has been epitomized by the deals that the EU has done with countries such as Libya, Niger, Sudan, and Turkey, all of which have agreed to halt the onward movement of refugees in exchange for aid and other rewards, including support to the security services.

      Third, asylum has become increasingly criminalized, as demonstrated by the growing number of EU citizens and civil society groups that have been prosecuted for their roles in aiding refugees. At the same time, some frontline member states have engaged in a systematic attempt to delegitimize the NGO search-and-rescue organizations operating in the Mediterranean and to obstruct their life-saving activities.

      The fourth characteristic of EU countries’ recent policies has been a readiness to inflict or be complicit in a range of abuses that challenge the principles of both human rights and international refugee law. This can be seen in the violence perpetrated against asylum seekers by the military and militia groups in Croatia and Hungary, the terrible conditions found in Greek refugee camps such as Moria on the island of Lesvos, and, most egregiously of all, EU support to the Libyan Coastguard that enables it to intercept refugees at sea and to return them to abusive detention centers on land.

      Fifth and finally, the past five years have witnessed a serious absence of solidarity within the EU. Frontline states such as Greece and Italy have been left to bear a disproportionate share of the responsibility for new refugee arrivals. Efforts to relocate asylum seekers and resettle refugees throughout the EU have had disappointing results. And countries in the eastern part of the EU have consistently fought against the European Commission in its efforts to forge a more cooperative and coordinated approach to the refugee issue.

      The most recent attempt to formulate such an approach is to be found in the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which the Commission proposed in September 2020.

      It would be wrong to entirely dismiss the Pact, as it contains some positive elements. These include, for example, a commitment to establish legal pathways to asylum in Europe for people who are in need of protection, and EU support for member states that wish to establish community-sponsored refugee resettlement programs.

      In other respects, however, the Pact has a number of important, serious flaws. It has already been questioned by those countries that are least willing to admit refugees and continue to resist the role of Brussels in this policy domain. The Pact also makes hardly any reference to the Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration—a strange omission given the enormous amount of time and effort that the UN has devoted to those initiatives, both of which were triggered by the European emergency of 2015-16.

      At an operational level, the Pact endorses and reinforces the EU’s externalization agenda and envisages a much more aggressive role for Frontex, the EU’s border control agency. At the same time, it empowers member states to refuse entry to asylum seekers on the basis of very vague criteria. As a result, individuals may be more vulnerable to human smugglers and traffickers. There is also a strong likelihood that new refugee camps will spring up on the fringes of Europe, with their residents living in substandard conditions.

      Finally, the Pact places enormous emphasis on the involuntary return of asylum seekers to their countries of origin. It even envisages that a hardline state such as Hungary could contribute to the implementation of the Pact by organizing and funding such deportations. This constitutes an extremely dangerous new twist on the notions of solidarity and responsibility sharing, which form the basis of the international refugee regime.

      If the proposed Pact is not fit for purpose, then what might a more constructive EU refugee policy look like?

      It would in the first instance focus on the restoration of both EU and NGO search-and-rescue efforts in the Mediterranean and establish more predictable disembarkation and refugee distribution mechanisms. It would also mean the withdrawal of EU support for the Libyan Coastguard, the closure of that country’s detention centers, and a substantial improvement of the living conditions experienced by refugees in Europe’s frontline states—changes that should take place with or without a Pact.

      Indeed, the EU should redeploy the massive amount of resources that it currently devotes to the externalization process, so as to strengthen the protection capacity of asylum and transit countries on the periphery of Europe. A progressive approach on the part of the EU would involve the establishment of not only faster but also fair asylum procedures, with appropriate long-term solutions being found for new arrivals, whether or not they qualify for refugee status.

      These changes would help to ensure that those searching for safety have timely and adequate opportunities to access their most basic rights.

      https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/11/5/european-refugee-policy-whats-gone-wrong-and-how-to-make-it-b

    • The New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Turning European Union Territory into a non-Territory

      Externalization policies in 2020: where is the European Union territory?

      In spite of the Commission’s rhetoric stressing the novel elements of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (hereinafter: the Pact – summarized and discussed in general here), there are good reasons to argue that the Pact develops and consolidates, among others, the existing trends on externalization policies of migration control (see Guild et al). Furthermore, it tries to create new avenues for a ‘smarter’ system of management of immigration, by additionally controlling access to the European Union territory for third country nationals (TCNs), and by creating different categories of migrants, which are then subject to different legal regimes which find application in the European Union territory.

      The consolidation of existing trends concerns the externalization of migration management practices, resort to technologies in developing migration control systems (further development of Eurodac, completion of the path toward full interoperability between IT systems), and also the strengthening of the role of the European Union executive level, via increased joint management involving European Union agencies: these are all policies that find in the Pact’s consolidation.

      This brief will focus on externalization (practices), a concept which is finding a new declination in the Pact: indeed, the Pact and several of the measures proposed, read together, are aiming at ‘disentangling’ the territory of the EU, from a set of rights which are related with the presence of the migrant or of the asylum seeker on the territory of a Member State of the EU, and from the relation between territory and access to a jurisdiction, which is necessary to enforce rights which otherwise remain on paper.

      Interestingly, this process of separation, of splitting between territory-law/rights-jurisdiction takes place not outside, but within the EU, and this is the new declination of externalization which one can find in the measures proposed in the Pact, namely with the proposal for a Screening Regulation and the amended proposal for a Procedure Regulation. It is no accident that other commentators have interpreted it as a consolidation of ‘fortress Europe’. In other words, this externalization process takes place within the EU and aims at making the external borders more effective also for the TCNs who are already in the territory of the EU.

      The proposal for a pre-entry screening regulation

      A first instrument which has a pivotal role in the consolidation of the externalization trend is the proposed Regulation for a screening of third country nationals (hereinafter: Proposal Screening Regulation), which will be applicable to migrants crossing the external borders without authorization. The aim of the screening, according to the Commission, is to ‘accelerate the process of determining the status of a person and what type of procedure should apply’. More precisely, the screening ‘should help ensure that the third country nationals concerned are referred to the appropriate procedures at the earliest stage possible’ and also to avoid absconding after entrance in the territory in order to reach a different state than the one of arrival (recital 8, preamble of proposal). The screening should contribute as well to curb secondary movements, which is a policy target highly relevant for many northern and central European Union states.

      In the new design, the screening procedure becomes the ‘standard’ for all TCNs who crossed the border in irregular manner, and also for persons who are disembarked following a search and rescue (SAR) operation, and for those who apply for international protection at the external border crossing points or in transit zones. With the screening Regulation, all these categories of persons shall not be allowed to enter the territory of the State during the screening (Arts 3 and 4 of the proposal).

      Consequently, different categories of migrants, including asylum seekers which are by definition vulnerable persons, are to be kept in locations situated at or in proximity to the external borders, for a time (up to 5 days, which can become 10 at maximum), defined in the Regulation, but which must be respected by national administrations. There is here an implicit equation between all these categories, and the common denominator of this operation is that all these persons have crossed the border in an unauthorized manner.

      It is yet unclear how the situation of migrants during the screening is to be organized in practical terms, transit zones, hotspot or others, and if this can qualify as detention, in legal terms. The Court of Justice has ruled recently on Hungarian transit zones (see analysis by Luisa Marin), by deciding that Röszke transit zone qualified as ‘detention’, and it can be argued that the parameters clarified in that decision could find application also to the case of migrants during the screening phase. If the situation of TCNs during the screening can be considered detention, which is then the legal basis? The Reception Conditions Directive or the Return Directive? If the national administrations struggle to meet the tight deadlines provided for the screening system, these questions will become more urgent, next to the very practical issue of the actual accommodation for this procedure, which in general does not allow for access to the territory.

      On the one side, Article 14(7) of the proposal provides a guarantee, indicating that the screening should end also if the checks are not completed within the deadlines; on the other side, the remaining question is: to which procedure is the applicant sent and how is the next phase then determined? The relevant procedure following the screening here seems to be determined in a very approximate way, and this begs the question on the extent to which rights can be protected in this context. Furthermore, the right to have access to a lawyer is not provided for in the screening phase. Given the relevance of this screening phase, also fundamental rights should be monitored, and the mechanism put in place at Article 7, leaves much to the discretion of the Member States, and the involvement of the Fundamental Rights Agency, with guidance and support upon request of the MS can be too little to ensure fundamental rights are not jeopardized by national administrations.

      This screening phase, which has the purpose to make sure, among other things, that states ‘do their job’ as to collecting information and consequently feeding the EU information systems, might therefore have important effects on the merits of the individual case, since border procedures are to be seen as fast-track, time is limited and procedural guarantees are also sacrificed in this context. In the case the screening ends with a refusal of entry, there is a substantive effect of the screening, which is conducted without legal assistance and without access to a legal remedy. And if this is not a decision in itself, but it ends up in a de-briefing form, this form might give substance to the next stage of the procedure, which, in the case of asylum, should be an individualized and accurate assessment of one’s individual circumstances.

      Overall, it should be stressed that the screening itself does not end up in a formal decision, it nevertheless represents an important phase since it defines what comes after, i.e., the type of procedure following the screening. It must be observed therefore, that the respect of some procedural rights is of paramount importance. At the same time, it is important that communication in a language TCNs can understand is effective, since the screening might end in a de-briefing form, where one or more nationalities are indicated. Considering that one of the options is the refusal of entry (Art. 14(1) screening proposal; confirmed by the recital 40 of the Proposal Procedure Regulation, as amended in 2020), and the others are either access to asylum or expulsion, one should require that the screening provides for procedural guarantees.

      Furthermore, the screening should point to any element which might be relevant to refer the TCNs into the accelerated examination procedure or the border procedure. In other words, the screening must indicate in the de-briefing form the options that protect asylum applicants less than others (Article 14(3) of the proposal). It does not operate in the other way: a TCN who has applied for asylum and comes from a country with a high recognition rate is not excluded from the screening (see blog post by Jakuleviciene).

      The legislation creates therefore avenues for disentangling, splitting the relation between physical presence of an asylum applicant on a territory and the set of laws and fundamental rights associated to it, namely a protective legal order, access to rights and to a jurisdiction enforcing those rights. It creates a sort of ‘lighter’ legal order, a lower density system, which facilitates the exit of the applicant from the territory of the EU, creating a sort of shift from a Europe of rights to the Europe of borders, confinement and expulsions.

      The proposal for new border procedures: an attempt to create a lower density territory?

      Another crucial piece in this process of establishing a stronger border fence and streamline procedures at the border, creating a ‘seamless link between asylum and return’, in the words of the Commission, is constituted by the reform of the border procedures, with an amendment of the 2016 proposal for the Regulation procedure (hereinafter: Amended Proposal Procedure Regulation).

      Though border procedures are already present in the current Regulation of 2013, they are now developed into a “border procedure for asylum and return”, and a more developed accelerated procedure, which, next to the normal asylum procedure, comes after the screening phase.

      The new border procedure becomes obligatory (according to Art. 41(3) of the Amended Proposal Procedure Regulation) for applicants who arrive irregularly at the external border or after disembarkation and another of these grounds apply:

      – they represent a risk to national security or public order;

      – the applicant has provided false information or documents or by withholding relevant information or document;

      – the applicant comes from a non-EU country for which the share of positive decisions in the total number of asylum decisions is below 20 percent.

      This last criterion is especially problematic, since it transcends the criterion of the safe third country and it undermines the principle that every asylum application requires a complex and individualized assessment of the particular personal circumstances of the applicant, by introducing presumptive elements in a procedure which gives fewer guarantees.

      During the border procedure, the TCN is not granted access to the EU. The expansion of the new border procedures poses also the problem of the organization of the facilities necessary for the new procedures, which must be a location at or close to the external borders, in other words, where migrants are apprehended or disembarked.

      Tellingly enough, the Commission’s explanatory memorandum describes as guarantees in the asylum border procedure all the situations in which the border procedure shall not be applied, for example, because the necessary support cannot be provided or for medical reasons, or where the ‘conditions for detention (…) cannot be met and the border procedure cannot be applied without detention’.

      Also here the question remains on how to qualify their stay during the procedure, because the Commission aims at limiting resort to detention. The situation could be considered de facto a detention, and its compatibility with the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in the Hungarian transit zones case is questionable.

      Another aspect which must be analyzed is the system of guarantees after the decision in a border procedure. If an application is rejected in an asylum border procedure, the “return procedure” applies immediately. Member States must limit to one instance the right to effective remedy against the decision, as posited in Article 53(9). The right to an effective remedy is therefore limited, according to Art. 53 of the Proposed Regulation, and the right to remain, a ‘light’ right to remain one could say, is also narrowly constructed, in the case of border procedures, to the first remedy against the negative decision (Art. 54(3) read together with Art. 54(4) and 54(5)). Furthermore, EU law allows Member States to limit the right to remain in case of subsequent applications and provides that there is no right to remain in the case of subsequent appeals (Art. 54(6) and (7)). More in general, this proposal extends the circumstances where the applicant does not have an automatic right to remain and this represents an aspect which affects significantly and in a factual manner the capacity to challenge a negative decision in a border procedure.

      Overall, it can be argued that the asylum border procedure is a procedure where guarantees are limited, because the access to the jurisdiction is taking place in fast-track procedures, access to legal remedies is also reduced to the very minimum. Access to the territory of the Member State is therefore deprived of its typical meaning, in the sense that it does not imply access to a system which is protecting rights with procedures which offer guarantees and are therefore also time-consuming. Here, efficiency should govern a process where the access to a jurisdiction is lighter, is ‘less dense’ than otherwise. To conclude, this externalization of migration control policies takes place ‘inside’ the European Union territory, and it aims at prolonging the effects of containment policies because they make access to the EU territory less meaningful, in legal terms: the presence of the person in the territory of the EU does not entail full access to the rights related to the presence on the territory.

      Solidarity in cooperating with third countries? The “return sponsorship” and its territorial puzzle

      Chapter 6 of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum proposes, among other things, to create a conditionality between cooperation on readmission with third countries and the issuance of visas to their nationals. This conditionality was legally established in the 2019 revision of the Visa Code Regulation. The revision (discussed here) states that, given their “politically sensitive nature and their horizontal implications for the Member States and the Union”, such provisions will be triggered once implementing powers are conferred to the Council (following a proposal from the Commission).

      What do these measures entail? We know that they can be applied in bulk or separately. Firstly, EU consulates in third countries will not have the usual leeway to waive some documents required to apply for visas (Art. 14(6), visa code). Secondly, visa applicants from uncooperative third countries will pay higher visa fees (Art. 16(1) visa code). Thirdly, visa fees to diplomatic and service passports will not be waived (Art. 16(5)b visa code). Fourthly, time to take a decision on the visa application will be longer than 15 days (Art. 23(1) visa code). Fifthly, the issuance of multi-entry visas (MEVs) from 6 months to 5 years is suspended (Art. 24(2) visa code). In other words, these coercive measures are not aimed at suspending visas. They are designed to make the procedure for obtaining a visa more lengthy, more costly, and limited in terms of access to MEVs.

      Moreover, it is important to stress that the revision of the Visa Code Regulation mentions that the Union will strike a balance between “migration and security concerns, economic considerations and general external relations”. Consequently, measures (be they restrictive or not) will result from an assessment that goes well beyond migration management issues. The assessment will not be based exclusively on the so-called “return rate” that has been presented as a compass used to reward or blame third countries’ cooperation on readmission. Other indicators or criteria, based on data provided by the Member States, will be equally examined by the Commission. These other indicators pertain to “the overall relations” between the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and a given third country, on the other. This broad category is not defined in the 2019 revision of the Visa Code, nor do we know what it precisely refers to.

      What do we know about this linkage? The idea of linking cooperation on readmission with visa policy is not new. It was first introduced at a bilateral level by some member states. For example, fifteen years ago, cooperation on redocumentation, including the swift delivery of laissez-passers by the consular authorities of countries of origin, was at the centre of bilateral talks between France and North African countries. In September 2005, the French Ministry of the Interior proposed to “sanction uncooperative countries [especially Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria] by limiting the number of short-term visas that France delivers to their nationals.” Sanctions turned out to be unsuccessful not only because of the diplomatic tensions they generated – they were met with strong criticisms and reaction on the part of North African countries – but also because the ratio between the number of laissez-passers requested by the French authorities and the number of laissez-passers delivered by North African countries’ authorities remained unchanged.

      At the EU level, the idea to link readmission with visa policy has been in the pipeline for many years. Let’s remember that, in October 2002, in its Community Return Policy, the European Commission reflected on the positive incentives that could be used in order to ensure third countries’ constant cooperation on readmission. The Commission observed in its communication that, actually, “there is little that can be offered in return. In particular visa concessions or the lifting of visa requirements can be a realistic option in exceptional cases only; in most cases it is not.” Therefore, the Commission set out to propose additional incentives (e.g. trade expansion, technical/financial assistance, additional development aid).

      In a similar vein, in September 2015, after years of negotiations and failed attempt to cooperate on readmission with Southern countries, the Commission remarked that the possibility to use Visa Facilitation Agreements as an incentive to cooperate on readmission is limited in the South “as the EU is unlikely to offer visa facilitation to certain third countries which generate many irregular migrants and thus pose a migratory risk. And even when the EU does offer the parallel negotiation of a visa facilitation agreement, this may not be sufficient if the facilitations offered are not sufficiently attractive.”

      More recently, in March 2018, in its Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for an amendment of the Common Visa Code, the Commission itself recognised that “better cooperation on readmission with reluctant third countries cannot be obtained through visa policy measures alone.” It also added that “there is no hard evidence on how visa leverage can translate into better cooperation of third countries on readmission.”

      Against this backdrop, why has so much emphasis been put on the link between cooperation on readmission and visa policy in the revised Visa Code Regulation and later in the New Pact? The Commission itself recognised that this conditionality might not constitute a sufficient incentive to ensure the cooperation on readmission.

      To reply to this question, we need first to question the oft-cited reference to third countries’ “reluctance”[n1] to cooperate on readmission in order to understand that, cooperation on readmission is inextricably based on unbalanced reciprocities. Moreover, migration, be it regular or irregular, continues to be viewed as a safety valve to relieve pressure on unemployment and poverty in countries of origin. Readmission has asymmetric costs and benefits having economic social and political implications for countries of origin. Apart from being unpopular in Southern countries, readmission is humiliating, stigmatizing, violent and traumatic for migrants,[n2] making their process of reintegration extremely difficult, if not impossible, especially when countries of origin have often no interest in promoting reintegration programmes addressed to their nationals expelled from Europe.

      Importantly, the conclusion of a bilateral agreement does not automatically lead to its full implementation in the field of readmission, for the latter is contingent on an array of factors that codify the bilateral interactions between two contracting parties. Today, more than 320 bilateral agreements linked to readmission have been concluded between the 27 EU Member States and third countries at a global level. Using an oxymoron, it is possible to argue that, over the past decades, various EU member states have learned that, if bilateral cooperation on readmission constitutes a central priority in their external relations (this is the official rhetoric), readmission remains peripheral to other strategic issue-areas which are detailed below. Finally, unlike some third countries in the Balkans or Eastern Europe, Southern third countries have no prospect of acceding to the EU bloc, let alone having a visa-free regime, at least in the foreseeable future. This basic difference makes any attempt to compare the responsiveness of the Balkan countries to cooperation on readmission with Southern non-EU countries’ impossible, if not spurious.

      Today, patterns of interdependence between the North and the South of the Mediterranean are very much consolidated. Over the last decades, Member States, especially Spain, France, Italy and Greece, have learned that bringing pressure to bear on uncooperative third countries needs to be evaluated cautiously lest other issues of high politics be jeopardized. Readmission cannot be isolated from a broader framework of interactions including other strategic, if not more crucial, issue-areas, such as police cooperation on the fight against international terrorism, border control, energy security and other diplomatic and geopolitical concerns. Nor can bilateral cooperation on readmission be viewed as an end in itself, for it has often been grafted onto a broader framework of interactions.

      This point leads to a final remark regarding “return sponsorship” which is detailed in Art. 55 of the proposal for a regulation on asylum and migration management. In a nutshell, the idea of the European Commission consists in a commitment from a “sponsoring Member State” to assist another Member State (the benefitting Member State) in the readmission of a third-country national. This mechanism foresees that each Member State is expected to indicate the nationalities for which they are willing to provide support in the field of readmission. The sponsoring Member State offers an assistance by mobilizing its network of bilateral cooperation on readmission, or by opening a dialogue with the authorities of a given third country where the third-country national will be deported. If, after eight months, attempts are unsuccessful, the third-country national is transferred to the sponsoring Member State. Note that, in application of Council Directive 2001/40 on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions, the sponsoring Member State may or may not recognize the expulsion decision of the benefitting Member State, just because Member States continue to interpret the Geneva Convention in different ways and also because they have different grounds for subsidiary protection.

      Viewed from a non-EU perspective, namely from the point of view of third countries, this mechanism might raise some questions of competence and relevance. Which consular authorities will undertake the identification process of the third country national with a view to eventually delivering a travel document? Are we talking about the third country’s consular authorities located in the territory of the benefitting Member State or in the sponsoring Member State’s? In a similar vein, why would a bilateral agreement linked to readmission – concluded with a given ‘sponsoring’ Member State – be applicable to a ‘benefitting’ Member State (with which no bilateral agreement or arrangement has been signed)? Such territorially bounded contingencies will invariably be problematic, at a certain stage, from the viewpoint of third countries. Additionally, in acting as a sponsoring Member State, one is entitled to wonder why an EU Member State might decide to expose itself to increased tensions with a given third country while putting at risk a broader framework of interactions.

      As the graph shows, not all the EU Member States are equally engaged in bilateral cooperation on readmission with third countries. Moreover, a geographical distribution of available data demonstrates that more than 70 per cent of the total number of bilateral agreements linked to readmission (be they formal or informal[n3]) concluded with African countries are covered by France, Italy and Spain. Over the last decades, these three Member States have developed their respective networks of cooperation on readmission with a number of countries in Africa and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

      Given the existence of these consolidated networks, the extent to which the “return sponsorship” proposed in the Pact will add value to their current undertakings is objectively questionable. Rather, if the “return sponsorship” mechanism is adopted, these three Member States might be deemed to act as sponsoring Member States when it comes to the expulsion of irregular migrants (located in other EU Member States) to Africa and the MENA region. More concretely, the propensity of, for example, Austria to sponsor Italy in expelling from Italy a foreign national coming from the MENA region or from Africa is predictably low. Austria’s current networks of cooperation on readmission with MENA and African countries would never add value to Italy’s consolidated networks of cooperation on readmission with these third countries. Moreover, it is unlikely that Italy will be proactively “sponsoring” other Member States’ expulsion decisions, without jeopardising its bilateral relations with other strategic third countries located in the MENA region or in Africa, to use the same example. These considerations concretely demonstrate that the European Commission’s call for “solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility”, on which its “return sponsorship” mechanism is premised, is contingent on the existence of a federative Union able to act as a unitary supranational body in domestic and foreign affairs. This federation does not exist in political terms.

      Beyond these practical aspects, it is important to realise that the cobweb of bilateral agreements linked to readmission has expanded as a result of tremendously complex bilateral dynamics that go well beyond the mere management of international migration. These remarks are crucial to understanding that we need to reflect properly on the conditionality pattern that has driven the external action of the EU, especially in a regional context where patterns of interdependence among state actors have gained so much relevance over the last two decades. Moreover, given the clear consensus on the weak correlation between cooperation on readmission and visa policy (the European Commission being no exception to this consensus), linking the two might not be the adequate response to ensure third countries’ cooperation on readmission, especially when the latter are in position to capitalize on their strategic position with regard to some EU Member States.

      Conclusions

      This brief reflection has highlighted a trend which is taking shape in the Pact and in some of the measures proposed by the Commission in its 2020 package of reforms. It has been shown that the proposals for a pre-entry screening and the 2020 amended proposal for enhanced border procedures are creating something we could label as a ‘lower density’ European Union territory, because the new procedures and arrangements have the purpose of restricting and limiting access to rights and to jurisdiction. This would happen on the territory of a Member State, but in a place at or close to the external borders, with a view to confining migration and third country nationals to an area where the territory of a state, and therefore, the European territory, is less … ‘territorial’ than it should be: legally speaking, it is a ‘lower density’ territory.

      The “seamless link between asylum and return” the Commission aims to create with the new border procedures can be described as sliding doors through which the third country national can enter or leave immediately, depending on how the established fast-track system qualifies her situation.

      However, the paradox highlighted with the “return sponsorship” mechanism shows that readmission agreements or arrangements are no panacea, for the vested interests of third countries must also be taken into consideration when it comes to cooperation on readmission. In this respect, it is telling that the Commission never consulted third states on the new return sponsorship mechanism, as if their territories were not concerned by this mechanism, which is far from being the case. For this reason, it is legitimate to imagine that the main rationale for the return sponsorship mechanism may be another one, and it may be merely domestic. In other words, the return sponsorship, which transforms itself into a form of relocation after eight months if the third country national is not expelled from the EU territory, subtly takes non-frontline European Union states out of their comfort-zone and engage them in cooperating on expulsions. If they fail to do so, namely if the third-country national is not expelled after eight months, non-frontline European Union states are as it were ‘forcibly’ engaged in a ‘solidarity practice’ that is conducive to relocation.

      Given the disappointing past experience of the 2015 relocations, it is impossible to predict whether this mechanism will work or not. However, once one enters sliding doors, the danger is to remain stuck in uncertainty, in a European Union ‘no man’s land’ which is nothing but another by-product of the fortress Europe machinery.

      http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum.html

    • Le nouveau Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile

      Ce 23 septembre 2020, la Commission européenne a présenté son très attendu nouveau Pacte sur la migration et l’asile.

      Alors que l’Union européenne (UE) traverse une crise politique majeure depuis 2015 et que les solutions apportées ont démontré leur insuffisance en matière de solidarité entre États membres, leur violence à l’égard des exilés et leur coût exorbitant, la Commission européenne ne semble pas tirer les leçons du passé.

      Au menu du Pacte : un renforcement toujours accru des contrôles aux frontières, des procédures expéditives aux frontières de l’UE avec, à la clé, la détention généralisée pour les nouveaux arrivants, la poursuite de l’externalisation et un focus sur les expulsions. Il n’y a donc pas de changement de stratégie.

      Le Règlement Dublin, injuste et inefficace, est loin d’être aboli. Le nouveau système mis en place changera certes de nom, mais reprendra le critère tant décrié du “premier pays d’entrée” dans l’UE pour déterminer le pays responsable du traitement de la demande d’asile. Quant à un mécanisme permanent de solidarité pour les États davantage confrontés à l’arrivée des exilés, à l’instar des quotas de relocalisations de 2015-2017 – relocalisations qui furent un échec complet -, la Commission propose une solidarité permanente et obligatoire mais… à la carte, où les États qui ne veulent pas accueillir de migrants peuvent choisir à la place de “parrainer” leur retour, ou de fournir un soutien opérationnel aux États en difficulté. La solidarité n’est donc cyniquement pas envisagée pour l’accueil, mais bien pour le renvoi des migrants.

      Pourtant, l’UE fait face à beaucoup moins d’arrivées de migrants sur son territoire qu’en 2015 (1,5 million d’arrivées en 2015, 140.00 en 2019)

      Fin 2019, l’UE accueillait 2,6 millions de réfugiés, soit l’équivalent de 0,6% de sa population. À défaut de voies légales et sûres, les personnes exilées continuent de fuir la guerre, la violence, ou de rechercher une vie meilleure et doivent emprunter des routes périlleuses pour rejoindre le territoire de l’UE : on dénombre plus de 20.000 décès depuis 2014. Une fois arrivées ici, elles peuvent encore être détenues et subir des mauvais traitements, comme c’était le cas dans le camp qui a brûlé à Moria. Lorsqu’elles poursuivent leur route migratoire au sein de l’UE, elles ne peuvent choisir le pays où elles demanderont l’asile et elles font face à la loterie de l’asile…

      Loin d’un “nouveau départ” avec ce nouveau Pacte, la Commission propose les mêmes recettes et rate une opportunité de mettre en œuvre une tout autre politique, qui soit réellement solidaire, équitable pour les États membres et respectueuse des droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes, avec l’établissement de voies légales et sûres, des procédures d’asile harmonisées et un accueil de qualité, ou encore la recherche de solutions durables pour les personnes en situation irrégulière.

      Dans cette brève analyse, nous revenons sur certaines des mesures phares telles qu’elles ont été présentées par la Commission européenne et qui feront l’objet de discussions dans les prochains mois avec le Parlement européen et le Conseil européen. Nous expliquerons également en quoi ces mesures n’ont rien d’innovant, sont un échec de la politique migratoire européenne, et pourquoi elles sont dangereuses pour les personnes migrantes.

      https://www.cire.be/publication/le-nouveau-pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et-lasile

      Pour télécharger l’analyse :
      https://www.cire.be/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?juwpfisadmin=false&action=wpfd&task=file.download&wpfd_category_

    • New pact on migration and asylum. Perspective on the ’other side’ of the EU border

      At the end of September 2020, and after camp Moria on Lesvos burned down leaving over 13,000 people in an even more precarious situation than they were before, the European Commission (EC) introduced a proposal for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. So far, the proposal has not been met with enthusiasm by neither member states or human rights organisations.

      Based on first-hand field research interviews with civil society and other experts in the Balkan region, this report provides a unique perspective of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum from ‘the other side’ of the EU’s borders.

      #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #rapport #Refugee_rights #militarisation

    • Impakter | Un « nouveau » pacte sur l’asile et les migrations ?

      Le média en ligne Impakter propose un article d’analyse du Pacte sur l’asile et les migrations de l’Union européenne. Publié le 23 septembre 2020, le pacte a été annoncé comme un “nouveau départ”. En réalité, le pacte n’est pas du tout un nouveau départ, mais la même politique avec un ensemble de nouvelles propositions. L’article pointe l’aspect critique du projet, et notamment des concepts clés tels que : « processus de pré-selection », « le processus accélérée » et le « pacte de retour ». L’article donne la parole à plusieurs expertises et offre ainsi une meilleure compréhension de ce que concrètement ce pacte implique pour les personnes migrantes.

      L’article de #Charlie_Westbrook “A “New” Pact on Migration and Asylum ?” a été publié le 11 février dans le magazine en ligne Impakter (sous licence Creative Commons). Nous vous en proposons un court résumé traduisant les lignes directrices de l’argumentaire, en français ci-dessous. Pour lire l’intégralité du texte en anglais, vous pouvez vous rendre sur le site de Impakter.

      –---

      Le “Nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile”, a été publié le 23 septembre, faisant suite à l’incendie du camp surpeuplé de Moria. Le pacte a été annoncé comme un “nouveau départ”. En réalité, le pacte n’est pas du tout un nouveau départ, mais la même politique avec un ensemble de nouvelles propositions sur lesquelles les États membres de l’UE devront maintenant se mettre d’accord – une entreprise qui a déjà connu des difficultés.

      Les universitaires, les militants et les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme de l’UE soulignent les préoccupations éthiques et pratiques que suscitent nombre des propositions suggérées par la Commission, ainsi que la rhétorique axée sur le retour qui les anime. Charlie Westbrook la journaliste, a contacté Kirsty Evans, coordinatrice de terrain et des campagnes pour Europe Must Act, qui m’a fait part de ses réactions au nouveau Pacte.

      Cet essai vise à présenter le plus clairement possible les problèmes liés à ce nouveau pacte, en mettant en évidence les principales préoccupations des experts et des ONG. Ces préoccupations concernent les problèmes potentiels liés au processus de présélection, au processus accéléré (ou “fast-track”) et au mécanisme de parrainage des retours.

      Le processus de présélection

      La nouvelle proposition est d’instaurer une procédure de contrôle préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire européen. L’ONG Human Rights Watch, dénonce la suggestion trompeuse du pacte selon laquelle les personnes soumises à la procédure frontalière ne sont pas considérées comme ayant formellement pénétré sur le territoire. Ce processus concerne toute personne extra-européenne qui franchirait la frontière de manière irrégulière. Ce manque de différenciation du type de besoin inquiète l’affirme l’avocate et professeur Lyra Jakulevičienė, car cela signifie que la politique d’externalisation sera plus forte que jamais. Ce nouveau règlement brouille la distinction entre les personnes demandant une protection internationale et les autres migrants “en plaçant les deux groupes de personnes sous le même régime juridique au lieu de les différencier clairement, car leurs chances de rester dans l’UE sont très différentes”. Ce processus d’externalisation, cependant, “se déroule “à l’intérieur” du territoire de l’Union européenne, et vise à prolonger les effets des politiques d’endiguement parce qu’elles rendent l’accès au territoire de l’UE moins significatif”, comme l’expliquent Jean-Pierre Cassarino, chercheur principal à la chaire de la politique européenne de voisinage du Collège d’Europe, et Luisa Marin, professeur adjoint de droit européen. En d’autres termes, les personnes en quête de protection n’auront pas pleinement accès aux droits européens en arrivant sur le territoire de l’UE. Il faudra d’abord déterminer ce qu’elles “sont”. En outre, les recherches universitaires montrent que les processus d’externalisation “entraînent le contournement des normes fondamentales, vont à l’encontre de la bonne gouvernance, créent l’immobilité et contribuent à la crise du régime mondial des réfugiés, qui ne parvient pas à assurer la protection”. Les principales inquiétudes de ces deux expert·es sont les suivantes : la rapidité de prise de décision (pas plus de 5 jours), l’absence d’assistance juridique, Etat membre est le seul garant du respect des droits fondamentaux et si cette période de pré-sélection sera mise en œuvre comme une détention.

      Selon Jakulevičienė, la proposition apporte “un grand potentiel” pour créer davantage de camps de style “Moria”. Il est difficile de voir en quoi cela profiterait à qui que ce soit.

      Procédure accélérée

      Si un demandeur est orienté vers le système accéléré, une décision sera prise dans un délai de 12 semaines – une durée qui fait craindre que le système accéléré n’aboutisse à un retour injuste des demandeurs. En 2010, Human Rights Watch a publié un rapport de fond détaillant comment les procédures d’asile accélérées étaient inadaptées aux demandes complexes et comment elles affectaient négativement les femmes demandeurs d’asile en particulier.
      Les personnes seront dirigées vers la procédure accélérée si : l’identité a été cachée ou que de faux documents ont été utilisés, si elle représente un danger pour la sécurité nationale, ou si elle est ressortissante d’un pays pour lesquels moins de 20% des demandes ont abouti à l’octroi d’une protection internationale.

      Comme l’exprime le rapport de Human Rights Watch (HRW), “la procédure à la frontière proposée repose sur deux hypothèses erronées – que la majorité des personnes arrivant en Europe n’ont pas besoin de protection et que l’évaluation des demandes d’asile peut être faite facilement et rapidement”.

      Essentiellement, comme l’écrivent Cassarino et Marin, “elle porte atteinte au principe selon lequel toute demande d’asile nécessite une évaluation complexe et individualisée de la situation personnelle particulière du demandeur”.

      Tout comme Jakulevičienė, Kirsty Evans s’inquiète de la manière dont le pacte va alimenter une rhétorique préjudiciable, en faisant valoir que “le langage de l’accélération fait appel à la “protection” de la rhétorique nationale évidente dans la politique et les médias en se concentrant sur le retour des personnes sur leur propre territoire”.

      Un pacte pour le retour

      Désormais, lorsqu’une demande d’asile est rejetée, la décision de retour sera rendue en même temps.

      Le raisonnement présenté par la Commission pour proposer des procédures plus rapides et plus intégrées est que des procédures inefficaces causent des difficultés excessives – y compris pour ceux qui ont obtenu le droit de rester.

      Les procédures restructurées peuvent en effet profiter à certains. Cependant, il existe un risque sérieux qu’elles aient un impact négatif sur le droit d’asile des personnes soumises à la procédure accélérée – sachant qu’en cas de rejet, il n’existe qu’un seul droit de recours.

      La proposition selon laquelle l’UE traitera désormais les retours dans leur ensemble, et non plus seulement dans un seul État membre, illustre bien l’importance que l’UE accorde aux retours. À cette fin, l’UE propose la création d’un nouveau poste de coordinateur européen des retours qui s’occupera des retours et des réadmissions.

      Décrite comme “la plus sinistre des nouvelles propositions”, et assimilée à “une grotesque parodie de personnes parrainant des enfants dans les pays en développement par l’intermédiaire d’organisations caritatives”, l’option du parrainage de retour est également un signe fort de l’approche par concession de la Commission.

      Pour M. Evans, le fait d’autoriser les pays à opter pour le “retour” comme moyen de “gérer la migration” semble être une validation du comportement illégal des États membres, comme les récentes expulsions massives en Grèce. Alors, qu’est-ce que le parrainage de retour ? Eh bien, selon les termes de l’UE, le parrainage du retour est une option de solidarité dans laquelle l’État membre “s’engage à renvoyer les migrants en situation irrégulière sans droit de séjour au nom d’un autre État membre, en le faisant directement à partir du territoire de l’État membre bénéficiaire”.

      Les États membres préciseront les nationalités qu’ils “parraineront” en fonction, vraisemblablement, des relations préexistantes de l’État membre de l’UE avec un État non membre de l’UE. Lorsque la demande d’un individu est rejetée, l’État membre qui en est responsable s’appuiera sur ses relations avec le pays tiers pour négocier le retour du demandeur.

      En outre, en supposant que les réadmissions soient réussies, le parrainage des retours fonctionne sur la base de l’hypothèse qu’il existe un pays tiers sûr. C’est sur cette base que les demandes sont rejetées. La manière dont cela affectera le principe de non-refoulement est la principale préoccupation des organisations des droits de l’homme et des experts politiques, et c’est une préoccupation qui découle d’expériences antérieures. Après tout, la coopération avec des pays tiers jusqu’à présent – à savoir l’accord Turquie-UE et l’accord Espagne-Maroc – a suscité de nombreuses critiques sur le coût des droits de l’homme.

      Mais en plus des préoccupations relatives aux droits de l’homme, des questions sont soulevées sur les implications ou même les aspects pratiques de l’”incitation” des pays tiers à se conformer, l’image de l’UE en tant que champion des droits de l’homme étant déjà corrodée aux yeux de la communauté internationale.

      Il s’agira notamment d’utiliser la délivrance du code des visas comme méthode d’incitation. Pour les pays qui ne coopèrent pas à la réadmission, les visas seront plus difficiles à obtenir. La proposition visant à pénaliser les pays qui appliquent des restrictions en matière de visas n’est pas nouvelle et n’a pas conduit à une amélioration des relations diplomatiques. Guild fait valoir que cette approche est injuste pour les demandeurs de visa des pays “non coopérants” et qu’elle risque également de susciter des sentiments d’injustice chez les voisins du pays tiers.

      L’analyse de Guild est que le nouveau pacte est diplomatiquement faible. Au-delà du financement, il offre “peu d’attention aux intérêts des pays tiers”. Il faut reconnaître, après tout, que la réadmission a des coûts et des avantages asymétriques pour les pays qui les acceptent, surtout si l’on considère que la migration, comme le soulignent Cassarino et Marin, “continue d’être considérée comme une soupape de sécurité pour soulager la pression sur le chômage et la pauvreté dans les pays d’origine”.

      https://asile.ch/2021/03/02/impakter-un-nouveau-pacte-sur-lasile-et-les-migrations

      L’article original :
      A “New” Pact on Migration and Asylum ?
      https://impakter.com/a-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum

    • The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees. International Experiences on Containment and Mobility and their Impacts on Trust and Rights

      In September 2020, the European Commission published what it described as a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (emphasis added) that lays down a multi-annual policy agenda on issues that have been central to debate about the future of European integration. This book critically examines the new Pact as part of a Forum organized by the Horizon 2020 project ASILE – Global Asylum Governance and the EU’s Role.

      ASILE studies interactions between emerging international protection systems and the United Nations Global Compact for Refugees (UN GCR), with particular focus on the European Union’s role and the UN GCR’s implementation dynamics. It brings together a new international network of scholars from 13 institutions examining the characteristics of international and country specific asylum governance instruments and arrangements applicable to people seeking international protection. It studies the compatibility of these governance instruments’ with international protection and human rights, and the UN GCR’s call for global solidarity and responsibility sharing.

      https://www.asileproject.eu/the-eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-in-light-of-the-united-nations-glob

  • Transmis à @isskein par des « ami·es berlinois·es » (#septembre_2020) :

    #Berlin ce soir : sans doute 10 000 personnes dans la rue (et des manifs prévues ce soir, demain et après-demain dans une cinquantaine de villes allemandes) pour demander l’accueil des réfugiés du camp de Moria. Slogan scandé « #wir_haben_Platz » (nous avons de la place), et demande de démission du ministre fédéral de l’intérieur Horst Seehofer (CSU).

    #solidarité #manifestation #Allemagne
    #incendie #Lesbos #feu #Grèce #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Moria

    –—

    sur l’incendie à Lesbos, voir le fil de discussion :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/875743

    • Indignation en Allemagne après les incendies du camp de migrants en Grèce

      La classe politique affiche son indignation après les incendies qui ont ravagé le camp de Moria et aggravé encore plus les conditions de vie de 12 000 migrants sur l’Île de Lesbos en Grèce.

      Si l’Allemagne propose de répartir au sein de l’Union européenne les réfugiés, nombre de voix s’élèvent pour agir dans l’urgence et accueillir le plus rapidement ces personnes en immense détresse. Mais, si certains Länder sont déjà prêts à aider, il en va autrement du gouvernement fédéral.

      « Une catastrophe pour les gens, un désastre pour la politique », dit le journal du soir de la ZDF, la seconde grande chaîne de télévision publique allemande. Dans le viseur, le gouvernement d’Angela Merkel qui par la voix de son ministre de l’intérieur, Horst Seehofer, a répété ces derniers mois, son refus d’accueillir desréfugiés de Moria, malgré la volonté affichée de certains Länder de prendre en charge ces personnes. Joachim Stamp, ministre de l’intégration du Land de Rhénanie-du-Nord-Westphalie, a pris les devants, mercredi, face à l’urgence. Nous avons touché le fond, la situation est dramatique et nous devons aider tout de suite ces personnes à se loger et à se nourrir. En tant que Land, nous avons confirmé au gouvernement grec notre volonté d’apporter une aide financière. Mais, si la solution ne peut se trouver qu’au niveau européen, nous sommes prêts de notre côté, à accueillir 1000 personnes en grand danger", dit Joachim Stamp.

      https://twitter.com/ZDFnrw/status/1303663535222915075

      Toute l’Allemagne mobilisée

      La Basse-Saxe a également fait part de ses capacités à accueillir 500 réfugiés, en plusieurs étapes. Et l’opposition met la pression sur Berlin, notamment les Verts, par la voix de Claudia Roth, vice-présidente du Bundestag. « C’est du ressort du pays qui a, en charge, la présidence du Conseil de l’Union européenne, de mettre enfin un terme à cette course à la mesquinerie qui se fait sur le dos de celles et ceux qui ont tout perdu », s’indigne Claudia Roth.

      Membre du groupe des chrétiens-démocrates au parlement européen, Elmar Brock appelle, lui à une solution européenne :

      « Bien sûr, on peut toujours dire que l’Europe ne fait pas assez. Mais il y a des mesures qui sont sur la table en matière de demandes d’asile et il est urgent de les appliquer. Nous devons enfin trouver un compromis pour répartir les réfugiés parmi les états membres de l’Union. Quitte à les aider financièrement. »

      La balle est désormais dans le camp d’Angela Merkel et de son ministre de l’intérieur. Et pour le secrétaire général du SPD, le partenaire de coalition de la CDU," il n’y a plus d’excuses".

      Plusieurs milliers de personnes ont manifesté spontanément dans plusieurs villes pour exiger des autorités de prendre en charge des migrants. « Droit de séjour, partout, personne n’est illégal » ou encore « nous avons de la place » ont scandé des manifestants à Berlin, Hambourg, Hanovre ou encore Münster.

      Ces dernières années, le camp de Moria a été décrié pour son manque d’hygiène et son surpeuplement par les ONG qui appellent régulièrement les autorités grecques à transférer les demandeurs d’asile les plus vulnérables vers le continent.

      L’île de Lesbos, d’une population de 85.000 personnes, a été déclarée en état d’urgence mercredi matin.

      https://www.dw.com/fr/indignation-en-allemagne-apr%C3%A8s-les-incendies-du-camp-de-migrants-en-gr%C3%A8ce/a-54877738

    • #Appel pour une évacuation immédiate du camp de Moria

      Ce camp, l’un des plus importants en Méditerranée, a été détruit mercredi par un incendie, laissant près de 13 000 réfugiés dans le dénuement le plus total. Des intellectuels de plusieurs pays lancent un appel pour qu’ils soient accueillis dignement.

      Au moment où 12 500 réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile errent sans abri sur les routes et les collines de Lesbos, où les intoxiqués et les blessés de l’incendie de Moria sont empêchés par la police de rejoindre l’hôpital de Mytilène, où des collectifs solidaires apportant des produits de première nécessité sont bloqués par les forces de l’ordre ou pris à partie par de groupuscules d’extrême droite, où la seule réponse apportée par le gouvernement grec à cette urgence est national-sécuritaire, nous, citoyen·ne·s européen·ne·s ne pouvons plus nous taire.

      L’incendie qui a ravagé le camp de Moria ne peut être considéré ni comme un accident ni comme le fait d’une action désespérée. Il est le résultat inévitable et prévisible de la politique européenne qui impose l’enfermement dans les îles grecques, dans des conditions inhumaines, de dizaines de milliers de réfugiés. C’est le résultat de la stratégie du gouvernement grec qui, en lieu et place de mesures effectives contre la propagation du Covid-19 dans des « hot-spots », a imposé à ses habitants, depuis six mois déjà, des restrictions de circulation extrêmement contraignantes. A cet enfermement prolongé, est venu s’ajouter depuis une semaine un confinement total dont l’efficacité sanitaire est plus que problématique, tandis que les personnes porteuses du virus ont été sommées de rester enfermées vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre dans un hangar. Ces conditions menaient tout droit au désastre.

      Cette situation intolérable qui fait la honte de l’Europe ne saurait durer un jour de plus.

      L’évacuation immédiate de Moria, dont les habitants peuvent être accueillis par les différentes villes de l’Europe prêtes à les recevoir, est plus qu’urgente. Il en va de même pour tous les autres camps dans les îles grecques et sur le continent. Faut-il rappeler ici que le gouvernement grec a déjà entrepris de travaux pour transformer non seulement les hot-spots, mais toute autre structure d’accueil sur le continent, en centres fermés entourés de double clôture et dotés de portiques de sécurité ? Que serait-il arrivé si l’incendie de Moria s’était déclaré dans un camp entouré d’une double série de barbelés avec des sorties bloquées ? Combien de milliers de morts aurions-nous à déplorer aujourd’hui ?

      Ne laissons pas des dizaines de milliers de personnes, dont le seul crime est de demander la protection internationale, livrées à une politique ultra-sécuritaire extrêmement dangereuse pour leur sécurité voire leur vie. Le gouvernement grec, au nom de la défense des frontières européennes et de la sécurité nationale, non seulement se croit autorisé à violer le droit international avec les refoulements systématiques en mer Egée et à la frontière d’Evros, mais interdit tout transfert sur le continent des victimes de l’incendie de Moria. Car, mis à part le transfert de 406 mineurs isolés au nord de la Grèce, le gouvernement Mitsotakis compte « punir » pour l’incendie les résidents du camp en les bloquant à Lesbos ! Actuellement, 12 500 réfugié·e·s sont actuellement en danger, privé·e·s de tout accès à des infrastructures sanitaires et exposé·e·s aux attaques de groupes d’extrême droite.

      Nous ne saurions tolérer que les requérants d’asile soient privés de tout droit, qu’ils soient réduits à des non-personnes. Joignons nos voix pour exiger des instances européennes et de nos gouvernements l’évacuation immédiate de Moria et la fermeture de tous les camps en Grèce, ainsi que le transfert urgent de leurs résidentes et résidents vers les villes et communes européennes qui se sont déclarées prêtes à les accueillir. Maintenant et non pas demain.

      Il y va de la dignité et de la vie de dizaines de milliers de personnes, mais aussi de notre dignité à nous, toutes et tous.

      Contre les politiques d’exclusion et de criminalisations des réfugié·e·s, il est plus qu’urgent de construire un monde « un », commun à toutes et à tous. Sinon, chacun de nous risque, à n’importe quel moment, de se retrouver du mauvais côté de la frontière.

      Evacuation immédiate de Moria !

      Transfert de tous ses habitants vers les villes européennes prêtes à les accueillir !

      Giorgio Agamben, philosophe. Michel Agier, directeur d’études à l’Ehess. Athena Athanasiou, professeure d’anthropologie sociale, université Panteion, Grèce. Alain Badiou, philosophe. Etienne Balibar, professeur émérite de philosophie, université de Paris-Ouest. Wendy Brown, université de Californie, Berkeley. Judith Butler, université de Californie, Berkeley. Claude Calame, directeur d’études à l’Ehess. Patrick Chamoiseau, écrivain. Zeineb Ben Said Cherni, professeure émérite à l’université de Tunis. Costas Douzinas, université de Londres. Natacha Godrèche, psychanalyste. Virginie Guirodon, directrice de recherches, CNRS. Sabine Hess, directrice des Centers for Global Migration Studies de Göttingen. Rada Iveković, professeur de philosophie, Paris. Leonie Jegen, chercheuse à l’université Albert-Ludwigs de Fribourg. Chloe Kolyri, psychiatre-psychanalyste. Konstantína Koúneva, députée européenne de 2014 à 2019, Gauche unitaire européenne/Gauche verte nordique. Michael Löwy, directeur de recherches émérite, CNRS. Eirini Markidi, psychologue. Gustave Massiah, membre du Conseil international du Forum social mondial. Katerina Matsa, psychiatre. Sandro Mezzadra,université de Bologne. Savas Matsas, écrivain. Warren Montag, Occidental College, Los Angeles. Adi Ophir, professeur invite des humanités, université de Brown, professeur émérite, université de Tel-Aviv. Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, professeur de philosophie, université Paris-8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis. Didier Sicard, ancien président du Comité consultatif national d’éthique de France. Nikos Sigalas, historien. Athéna Skoulariki, professeure assistante, université de Crète. Vicky Skoumbi, directrice de programme au Collège international de philosophie. Barbara Spinelli, journaliste, Italie. Eleni Varikas, professeure émérite, université Paris-8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis. Dimitris Vergetis, psychanalyste, directeur de la revue grecque αληthεια (Aletheia). Frieder Otto Wolf, université libre de Berlin. Thodoris Zeis, avocat.

      https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2020/09/11/appel-pour-une-evacuation-immediate-du-camp-de-moria_1799245

    • Greece and EU Must Take Action Now

      A Civil Society Action Committee statement calling for an immediate humanitarian and human rights response to the Moria camp tragedy

      The Civil Society Action Committee expresses grave concern over the lives and health of all who were residing in the Reception and Identification Facility in Moria, on the Greek island of Lesvos, which was ravaged by fire this week. We call upon the Greek government and the European Union (EU) to provide immediate and needed support, including safe shelter, to all who have been affected, and with special emphasis to those at risk.

      For many years, civil society has provided support and assistance to people suffering inhumane conditions in the Moria camp. At the same time, civil society has been continuously calling for much-needed sustainable solutions, and a reversal of failed European policies rooted in xenophobia.

      For a Europe that positions itself as a champion of human rights and human dignity, the very existence and overall situation of a camp like that in Moria, is appalling.

      For a Europe that positions itself as a champion of human rights and human dignity, the very existence and overall situation of a camp like that in Moria, is appalling. Other solutions have always been available and possible, and these must now be urgently implemented. A humanitarian and human rights approach must be at the heart of the Greek government’s and EU’s responses.

      As the Civil Society Action Committee, we call for:

      A coherent plan that maximises all available resources for all those who have had to flee the fire in the Moria camp. They should be provided with safe housing, access to healthcare, and sufficient protection from possible violence. National support and consideration should also be given to cities across Europe who have expressed willingness to receive and accommodate those who have had to flee the Moria camp.
      Planning of alternative sustainable solutions for all those that suffer similar conditions in other sites in Greece and elsewhere;
      Lessons learnt and accountability on the failure to act so far.

      As civil society, we stand ready to support such actions to assist and protect all migrants and asylum-seekers suffering in the Moria camp aftermath and elsewhere.

      https://csactioncommittee.org/greece-and-eu-must-take-action-now

    • Migrants : cette fois, Berlin ne veut pas faire cavalier seul

      Malgré la mobilisation des ONG et des partis en faveur d’une prise en charge massive, et faute d’accord européen, l’Allemagne n’accueillera pas plus de 150 migrants mineurs.

      Les Allemands ont accueilli plus de 1,7 million de demandeurs d’asile au cours des cinq dernières années. Malgré toutes les difficultés liées à l’intégration, le manque de solidarité européenne et les tentatives de l’extrême droite de saper le moral de la population, ils sont disposés à rouvrir leurs portes aux enfants et aux familles du camp de Moria. Pour l’instant, les Allemands proréfugiés ont fait plus de bruit que l’extrême droite.

      Des manifestations ont eu lieu dans tout le pays aux cris de « Nous avons de la place ! » Un collectif d’ONG a fait installer, lundi dernier, 13 000 chaises vides devant le Reichstag, le siège de l’Assemblée fédérale (Bundestag), pour symboliser l’absurdité de la situation, alors que 180 communes se sont déclarées prêtes à accueillir des réfugiés. Hambourg, Cologne, Brême, Berlin ou Munich réclament depuis des mois la prise en charge des personnes sauvées en mer Méditerranée. Dix maires de grandes villes, dont Düsseldorf, Fribourg ou Göttingen, ont de nouveau protesté auprès de la chancellerie. « Nous sommes prêts à accueillir des gens pour éviter une catastrophe humanitaire à Moria », ont-ils insisté auprès d’Angela Merkel. Selon l’union des syndicats des services publics (DBB), les places se sont libérées dans les centres d’accueil. Les trois quarts des réfugiés arrivés en 2015 ont trouvé un logement ou ont quitté l’Allemagne. Les capacités sont actuellement de 25 000 places dans le pays, avec la possibilité de monter rapidement jusqu’à 65 000.

      « Détresse »

      A part l’extrême droite (AfD), qui refuse d’accueillir « des gens qui mettent le feu la nuit et qui attaquent les services de secours », tous les partis politiques allemands sont favorables au retour d’une « politique de l’accueil », y compris l’Union chrétienne démocrate (CDU). « Nos valeurs chrétiennes et démocratiques nous obligent à les aider », a insisté Norbert Röttgen, l’un des trois candidats à la présidence de la CDU, successeur potentiel de Merkel à la chancellerie. « Ce n’est pas le moment de trouver une solution européenne mais de répondre à une détresse humaine. L’Allemagne doit accueillir immédiatement 5 000 réfugiés, […] toute seule si nécessaire », estime-t-il dans une lettre signée par 16 autres députés conservateurs.

      Ces 5 000 réfugiés de Grèce seraient déjà en Allemagne si le ministre de l’Intérieur n’avait pas bloqué toutes les procédures. Le Bavarois conservateur Horst Seehofer (CSU), qui fut le grand détracteur de Merkel pendant la « crise des réfugiés », craint un appel d’air et une nouvelle « vague » incontrôlée, comme à l’été 2015, où des centaines de milliers de réfugiés s’étaient mis en route vers l’Allemagne après que la chancelière avait accepté d’en accueillir quelques milliers bloqués en Hongrie.
      « Complice »

      « Cela ne doit pas se reproduire », a prévenu Horst Seehofer, qui est sorti de son silence en fin de semaine. Sachant que l’objectif de la majorité des migrants est l’Allemagne, le ministre a refusé que son pays fasse cette fois cavalier seul. Sans solution européenne, Berlin ne bougera pas. « Nous avons été agréablement surpris d’apprendre que les Néerlandais ont accepté 50 personnes. Jusqu’ici, la position [des Pays-Bas] était différente », s’est félicité le ministre, qui a interprété cette concession néerlandaise comme un premier signe favorable à la mise en place d’un système de répartition en Europe.

      Pour sa part, l’Allemagne se contentera d’accueillir « 100 à 150 mineurs non accompagnés ». Un chiffre jugé scandaleux par les partis de la majorité et par l’opposition, alors que tant de communes sont prêtes à accueillir des réfugiés. « Monsieur Seehofer, vous vous faites le complice de la souffrance endurée par ces gens aux portes de l’Europe », a critiqué Claudia Roth, la vice-présidente des écologistes au Bundestag. « Votre façon de faire n’est pas chrétienne, elle est inhumaine », a accusé Dietmar Bartsch, président du groupe parlementaire de la gauche radicale (Die Linke). « Il a fallu attendre une catastrophe pour qu’on accueille des enfants », a déploré Dietlind Grabe-Bolz, maire sociale-démocrate (SPD) de Giessen, en Hesse, une ville qui fait partie des communes « volontaires » pour l’accueil.

      Une position jugée courageuse par les Allemands, car les élus risquent désormais leur vie pour leur engagement. Dans cette région où se trouve la capitale financière (Francfort-sur-le-Main), le conservateur proréfugiés Walter Lübcke a été abattu d’une balle dans la tête dans son jardin en juin 2019 par un néonazi qui voulait le « punir ». Un assassinat politique sans précédent depuis la fin de la guerre.
      Paris pusillanime

      Une « centaine ». C’est le nombre de migrants que Paris est prêt à accueillir après l’incendie de Moria. Il s’agira « notamment des mineurs isolés », précise au Parisien le secrétaire d’Etat aux Affaires européennes, Clément Beaune. Soit peu ou prou l’engagement d’autres pays de l’UE, comme l’Allemagne ou les Pays-Bas. « Il y a la réponse d’urgence et d’humanité », fait valoir Beaune, qui réclame une solution européenne « pérenne ». Selon lui, la France a participé aux efforts de répartition des réfugiés « à chaque fois qu’il y a eu des urgences humanitaires douloureuses » depuis 2018. Il cite le cas de l’Aquarius en septembre 2018. Sauf qu’à l’époque, Paris n’avaient pas accepté que le navire de secours aux migrants accoste en France et n’avait accueilli 18 des 58 réfugiés sauvés qu’une fois que Malte avait ouvert ses ports au navire humanitaire.

      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/09/13/cette-fois-berlin-ne-veut-pas-faire-cavalier-seul_1799396

    • Bild: Germany could take thousands from Greek refugee camp

      Germany is considering taking in thousands of refugees from the destroyed Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos as a one-off gesture and hopes the camp can be rebuilt and run by the European Union, Bild newspaper reported on Monday.

      Berlin has been facing growing calls from regional and local politicians who have said they would take in people from the camp, which burned down last week, if the federal government allowed them to.

      Officials, led by federal Interior Minister Horst Seehofer, have been reluctant to move unilaterally, saying a European agreement is needed to disperse the camp’s more than 12,000 former residents across the European Union.

      Citing government and EU sources, Bild said conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel was now leaning towards taking in more refugees, ahead of a meeting with her Social Democrat coalition partners due to take place on Monday.

      She, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen aim to build a new refugee camp on Lesbos that would be run by the European Union, Bild reported. Currently, Greece runs the camp.

      There was no immediate comment from the government.

      The newspaper said the government was likely to agree to take in at least hundreds of children from the camp along with their parents, with thousands also a possibility.

      Earlier, Social Democrat Finance Minister Olaf Scholz, told a news conference Germany had to be ready to play a role in taking in refugees, though this could only be a stepping stone to finding a Europe-wide way of housing refugees arriving at Europe’s borders.

      “It can’t stand as it is now, where each time we decide on a case-by-case basis,” he said.

      Bild said Merkel hoped the coalition partners could agree by Wednesday on how many refugees Germany will take.

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/256934/article/ekathimerini/news/bild-germany-could-take-thousands-from-greek-refugee-camp

    • Thousands of protesters call on Germany to take in Moria refugees

      Thousands of people took to the streets of cities across Germany on Wednesday to show their solidarity and to call on the German government and the EU to take in more than 12,000 migrants left homeless by fires at Moria camp on Lesbos.

      The protesters in cities across Germany including Berlin, Frankfurt and Hamburg appealed to the government to evacuate all camps on the Greek islands and to bring to Germany migrants and refugees left homeless by the fires in Moria.

      An estimated 3,000 people demonstrated in Berlin on Wednesday evening, some 1,200 took to the streets in Hamburg, and another 300 in Frankfurt, according to police. There were also rallies in Leipzig and other cities across the country.

      Protesters chanted the motto of the demonstration, “We have room,” (Wir haben Platz), as can be heard in a video posted on Twitter by a member of the Sea-Watch charity. They also held up banners that said. “Evacuate Moria” and “Shame on you EU”. Speakers at the rallies said European leaders should have acted even before the fire happened.

      https://twitter.com/J_Pahlke/status/1303735477971935234

      They also called for the resignation of the interior minister, Horst Seehofer, who has so far blocked the arrival of refugees through federal reception initiatives.

      Refugee policy a sticking point

      Districts and states in Germany in the past months have offered to take in refugees from Greece to ease the overcrowding in camps – a move that Seehofer opposes.

      According to German law, refugee policy is decided on the federal level and states and districts may only accept refugees if they receive the green light from the federal government.

      Seehofer has also argued that regional efforts would undermine attempts at agreeing a long-overdue European mechanism for the distribution of refugees across the bloc.

      ’Ready to help’

      Although Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has said Germany was ready to help the residents of Moria, he called for the support of all EU member states. “What happened in Moria is a humanitarian catastrophe. With the European Commission and other EU member states that are ready to help, we need to quickly clarify how we can help Greece,” Maas said on Twitter. “That includes the distribution of refugees among those in the EU who are willing to take them in,” he added.

      https://twitter.com/HeikoMaas/status/1303617869897445376

      The fires at Moria this week have burnt down nearly the entire camp, leaving nearly 13,000 people in need of emergency housing. Many spent the first night after the fire on Tuesday evening sleeping in the fields, by the side of the road or in a small graveyard, AP reported.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27190/thousands-of-protesters-call-on-germany-to-take-in-moria-refugees

  • Le #nouveau_camp de #Lesbos, #Grèce (#septembre_2020) :


    –-> photo : #Giorgos_Moutafis
    https://twitter.com/AneIrazabal/status/1305225485769740288
    #Kara_Tepe

    –----

    Un nouveau camp pour réfugiés sur l’île de Lesbos après les incendies

    Environ 500 demandeurs d’asile ont été installés dans un nouveau camp sur l’île grecque de Lesbos qui doit accueillir des milliers de #sans-abri après la destruction du grand centre de Moria. De nombreux migrants manifestent toutefois pour quitter l’île.

    « Dans cinq jours l’opération sera achevée. Tout le monde sera installé dans le nouveau camp », a assuré le ministre des Migrations, Notis Mitarachi, en visite à Lesbos depuis deux jours pour coordonner les travaux du nouveau camp. Situé à trois kilomètres du port de Mytilène, chef-lieu de l’île, ce camp « sera fermé pendant la nuit pour des raisons de sécurité », selon un communiqué ministériel.

    « Tout est parti en fumée à Moria. On ne peut plus rester dans la rue, dans le camp ce sera mieux », a indiqué à l’AFP une Somalienne qui attendait son tour devant l’entrée du camp pour être enregistrée.
    Migrants contaminés

    Notis Mitarachi a estimé que « 200 personnes » parmi les demandeurs d’asile pourraient être contaminées par le Covid-19 et que des restrictions strictes sont prévues pour les sorties des migrants du nouveau camp.

    Des milliers de familles vivent sur le bitume, sur les trottoirs ou dans les champs à Lesbos depuis les gigantesques incendies de mardi et mercredi qui ont détruit le centre d’enregistrement et d’identification de Moria, sans faire de victimes.

    Mis en place en 2015 pour limiter le nombre de migrants venant de la Turquie voisine à destination de l’Europe, ce centre abritait plus de 12’000 personnes dont 4000 enfants, soit quatre fois plus que sa capacité initiale.

    Refus d’entrer

    Des migrants ont à nouveau manifesté dans le calme dimanche en fin matinée, réclamant leur transfert vers la Grèce continentale, selon des journalistes de l’AFP. De nombreux demandeurs d’asile refusent d’entrer dans le nouveau camp, disant leur ras-le-bol après avoir attendu dans celui de Moria durant des mois, certains des années, d’être transférés dans des structures en Grèce continentale.

    Mais le ministre des Migrations, Notis Mitarachi, a souligné que « toute personne qui est dans la rue sera transférée dans le nouveau camp ». « Ceux qui rêvent quitter l’île, il faut qu’ils l’oublient », a-t-il affirmé.

    https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/11600300-un-nouveau-camp-pour-refugies-sur-lile-de-lesbos-apres-les-incendies.ht

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #camps_de_réfugiés #tentes #HCR #SDF

    Sur l’incendie du mois de septembre 2020 :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/875743

    #comme_en_Afrique...

    –----

    Fil de discussion sur le dernier incendie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/875743

    ping @isskein @karine4

    • Just 800 of Greek island’s 12,500 homeless migrants rehoused

      Just over 6% of the 12,500 people left homeless last week by the fire that destroyed Greece’s biggest camp for refugees and migrants have been rehoused in a new temporary facility under construction on the island of Lesvos, authorities said Monday.

      By Monday afternoon, about 800 people had entered the new tent city, hastily set up by the sea a few kilometers from the gutted Moria camp, migration ministry officials said.

      Thousands remained camped out for a sixth day along a road leading from Moria to the island capital of Mytilene, with police blocking the way into town to prevent asylum-seekers trying to board ferries for the Greek mainland instead of entering the new camp.

      Authorities say the blazes last Tuesday and Wednesday in Moria, where thousands of people arrive every year after crossing illegally from nearby Turkey, were started by camp residents angry at quarantine orders imposed after 35 people in the facility tested positive for Covid-19.

      Migration Minister Notis Mitarakis said there’s space for about 5,000 people so far in the new camp, on a former military firing range at Kara Tepe near Mytilene. He also said everyone left homeless by the Moria fire will be able to relocate to Kara Tepe within the next few days.

      Officials said the gap between available spaces and residents in the new camp is largely due to the unwillingness of many asylum-seekers to settle in. Many had hoped that with Moria destroyed they would be allowed to head for the Greek mainland, or even other European Union countries.

      Several hundred women and children held a protest march along the Moria-to-Mytilene road Monday, chanting: “No camp, freedom.”

      But government officials said the only way for former Moria camp residents to leave Lesbos would be to move to the new facility and successfully apply there for asylum.

      “Moving to the new camp is not optional, it’s obligatory,” Mitarakis said in an interview with Parapolitika Radio.

      Under EU rules, people reaching Greece’s eastern Aegean islands from Turkey must stay in camps at their points of arrival pending examination of their asylum bids. This led to overcrowding and squalid living conditions for camp residents that were repeatedly criticised by human rights organizations. It also triggered resentment among Lesbos’ Greek population.

      Asylum-seekers entering Kara Tepe are tested for Covid-19 as part of the registration process, and 15 infected people have been recorded so far. All were moved to isolation facilities.

      Greece’s minister responsible for public order, Michalis Chryssohoidis, said Monday he hoped a continued reduction in migration flows from nearby Turkey and a speedy processing of asylum applications should mean the last of the refugees and migrants currently on Lesbos would have left by spring.

      Greek authorities plan to build a new facility for future arrivals that will replace Moria.

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/256958/article/ekathimerini/news/just-800-of-greek-islands-12500-homeless-migrants-rehoused

    • 2,9 εκατομμύρια για νοίκια στον Καρά Τεπέ μέχρι το… 2025, στην κατά τα άλλα προσωρινή δομή !
      142.051 για τους τέσσερις μήνες του 2020 και από 550.000 το χρόνο, για τα έτη 2021 έως 2025, προκειμένου να νοικιαστούν οι εκτάσεις του Καρά Τεπέ από το Υπουργείο Μετανάστευσης και Ασύλου

      « Λεφτά με το τσουβάλι » αλλά και απόδειξη ότι η προσωρινή δομή του Καρά Τεπέ κάθε άλλο παρά προσωρινή είναι. Το « Ν » αποκαλύπτει σήμερα, δημοσιοποιώντας τα σχετικά έγγραφα, ότι για την περίοδο Σεπτέμβριος 2020 έως 31 Δεκεμβρίου 2025, το Υπουργείο μετανάστευσης και ασύλου δίνει το αστρονομικό ποσό των 2.9 εκατομμυρίων ευρώ μόνο για την ενοικίαση εκτάσεων ξερής και εγκαταλειμμένης γης στον Καρά Τεπέ. Προκειμένου να δημιουργήσει ένα νέο μόνιμο ΚΥΤ.

      Συγκεκριμένα με δυο χθεσινές (14.9.2020) αποφάσεις του Υπουργείου Μετανάστευσης και Ασύλου που αναρτήθηκαν στο « Διαύγεια » δεσμεύονται τα παρακάτω ποσά :

      – 142.051 ευρώ για την ενοικίαση γεωτεμαχίων για τη λειτουργία προσωρινής δομής φιλοξενίας προσφύγων και μεταναστών έως τις 31.12.2020.

      – Επίσης δεσμεύονται άλλα 2.750.000 ευρώ (550.000 ευρώ το χρόνο) για τη μίσθωση των ίδιων γεωτεμαχίων στην περιοχή Καρά Τεπέ !

      Ας σημειώσουμε ότι στις εκτάσεις αυτές που ανήκουν εξ αδιαιρέτως σε απογόνους γνωστής οικογένειας της παλιάς Μυτιλήνης, έχουν αρχίσει ήδη να πραγματοποιούνται χωματουργικές εργασίες, σε κάποια δε τμήματα στήνονται και σκηνές. Εκτείνονται δε πέραν του οικοπέδου του πεδίου βολής ιδιοκτησίας του υπουργείου Εθνικής Άμυνας και φτάνει μέχρι και πίσω από το σούπερ μάρκετ Lidl, Σε επαφή δηλαδή από τη μια μεριά με επιχειρήσεις κατά μήκος του δρόμου από την παλιά ΕΦΑΜ μέχρι και το πεδίο βολής και από την άλλη μεριά, μέχρι τη θάλασσα.

      Η ενοικίαση του συγκεκριμένου χώρου αποδεικνύει προφανώς ότι η νέα, κατ’ ευφημισμό αποκαλούμενη « προσωρινή », δομή στον Καρά Τεπέ είναι ο χώρος όπου θα αναπτυχθεί το μόνιμο ΚΥΤ που εξήγγειλε ο Πρωθυπουργός Κυριάκος Μητσοτάκης από τη Θεσσαλονίκη.

      Το μέγεθος δε της όλης έκτασης, πολλές εκατοντάδες στρέμματα, συμπεριλαμβανομένης και της έκτασης του υπουργείου Εθνικής Άμυνας, δείχνει ότι θα είναι ένα τεράστιο ΚΥΤ πολύ μεγαλύτερο αυτό της Μόριας, το μεγαλύτερο στην Ελλάδα αλλά και σε όλη την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, σε άμεση επαφή με κατοικημένες περιοχές και πολλές δεκάδες επιχειρήσεις, λίγες εκατοντάδες μέτρα από το χωριό Παναγιύδα.

      Ας σημειωθεί ότι όπως λέχθηκε από ανθρώπους της κτηματαγοράς στη Μυτιλήνη, το ύψος του ενοικίου είναι ίσως μεγαλύτερο και από το ύψος του ποσού που απαιτείτο μέχρι πρότινος για την αγορά της έκτασης.
      https://www.stonisi.gr/post/11449/29-ekatommyria-gia-noikia-ston-kara-tepe-mexri-to-2025-sthn-kata-ta-alla-pro

      –—

      Commentaire et traduction de quelques extraits par Vicky Skoumbi :

      Voici quelques extraits de l’article du média locale sto nisi qui révèle les véritables intentions du gouvernement, qui loin de programmer l’évacuation des îles d’ici Pâques, prévoit la création du plus grand hot-spot de l’Europe à Kara-Tepe à Lesbos, beaucoup plus grand que Moria !
      Si en plus, on tient compte les intentions affichés du gouvernement de créer non pas un RIC fonctionnant comme avant, mais un centre de réception et d’identification fermé sous surveillance policière 24h sur 24h, on voit que le pire est devant nous et les déclaration sur le départ de tout réfugié d’ici Päques n’est que poudre aux yeux de la population locale et de la communauté internationale

      2,9 millions prévus pour la location de terrains à Kara Tepe jusqu’en… 2025, tout ça pour une structure censément provisoire !

      142051 pour les quatre mois de 2020 et de 550000 par an, de 2021 à 2025, afin de louer les terrains de Kara Tepe par le ministère de l’Immigration et de l’Asile.

      La location de ces terrains prouve évidemment que la nouvelle structure à Kara Tepe appelée par euphémisme « temporaire » est l’endroit où sera installé le RIC (Reception Identification Center), le hot-spot permanent annoncé par le Premier ministre Kyriakos Mitsotakis à Thessalonique.

      L’étendue de l’ensemble de la zone, plusieurs centaines d’hectares, y compris la zone du ministère de la Défense nationale, montre qu’il s’agira d’un hot-spot énorme, beaucoup plus grand que celui de Moria, le plus grand de Grèce et de toute l’Union européenne, en contact direct avec des zones résidentielles et de très nombreuses d’entreprises, à quelques centaines de mètres du village de Panagouda.

      Il est à noter que comme l’ont dit les gens du marché immobilier à Mytilène, le montant du loyer est probablement supérieur du montant requis pour l’achat même du terrain.

    • Lesbos : les migrants à la rue évacués par la police vers un nouveau camp « provisoire »

      La police grecque a commencé jeudi à évacuer une partie des milliers de réfugiés jetés à la rue par l’incendie de Moria vers un nouveau camp, « provisoire » selon l’ONU et les autorités grecques. Ces dernières ont évoqué Pâques comme date butoir pour transférer les exilés de l’île de Lesbos.

      La police grecque a commencé jeudi 17 septembre à évacuer une partie des milliers de réfugiés jetés à la rue par l’incendie de Moria vers un nouveau camp.

      Vers 7h locales (4h GMT), la police faisait le tour des tentes, dans le calme. Progressivement ils ont entrepris de vider le secteur de ses sans-abri et les emmener vers le nouveau camp érigé à la hâte après l’incendie, il y a une semaine.

      https://twitter.com/rspaegean/status/1306301897368797187?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E13

      Sous un soleil déjà chaud, et sur fond de pleurs d’enfants, plusieurs réfugiés, dont des femmes et des enfants, pliaient leurs couvertures, apportaient des sacs contenant leurs affaires sauvées des flammes la semaine dernière, ou se mettaient à démonter les tentes de bric et de broc installées sur l’asphalte, selon des informations de l’AFP. Ces transferts s’ajoutent aux plusieurs centaines de migrants, déjà arrivés dans le camp mardi et mercredi, selon des humanitaires. D’après les derniers chiffres des autorités grecques, mardi, 1 200 personnes y étaient logées.

      Mercredi soir, 1 000 tentes, pouvant chacune accueillir 8 à 10 personnes, y étaient érigées. Des tentes médicales doivent encore être dressées, et deux zones de quarantaine sont prévues alors que quelque dizaines de cas de coronavirus ont été détectés - mais pour l’heure sans gravité.

      « L’objectif est de protéger la santé publique »

      Depuis l’incendie du camp de Moria, le plus grand d’Europe où vivaient près de 13 000 réfugiés dans des conditions dramatiques, les migrants se sont entassés sous des abris de fortune sur un coin de route et des parkings de supermarché fermés, dans une précarité extrême.

      Dans ce contexte, toute distanciation sociale pour se protéger du Covid-19 semble impossible et, surtout, l’urgence est ailleurs, ont observé des journalistes d’InfoMigrants sur place. « La plus grande préoccupation de ces personnes actuellement, c’est d’avoir accès à de la nourriture et de l’eau », a expliqué Dimitra Chasioti, psychologue pour Médecins sans frontières (MSF) présente sur les lieux.

      « L’objectif est de protéger la santé publique », a déclaré à l’AFP Theodoros Chronopoulos, porte-parole de la police. Il a confirmé une « opération en cours » qui « répond à des fins humanitaires ».

      MSF, qui a ouvert une clinique d’urgence dans cette zone, s’est vu interdire l’accès dans la nuit, alors que des rumeurs d’évacuation couraient, a indiqué l’ONG à l’AFP. À 7h30 (4h30 GMT), ses membres ne pouvaient toujours pas rejoindre leur clinique.

      https://twitter.com/MSF_Sea/status/1306455464071356416?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E13

      « Une opération de police est en cours pour emmener les réfugiés vers le nouveau camp. Cela ne devrait pas empêcher l’aide médicale », a twitté l’ONG. La zone a également été restreinte aux médias.

      https://twitter.com/MortazaBehboudi/status/1306468926830903296?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E13

      Objectif : « quitter l’île pour Athènes »

      Ce nouveau camp, qui crée de nombreuses réticences parmi la population migrante angoissée à l’idée de se retrouver à nouveau enfermée, sera seulement « provisoire » ont promis l’ONU et les autorités grecques.

      Construit depuis samedi, il a pour objectif que les réfugiés « puissent progressivement, et dans le calme, quitter l’île pour Athènes » ou « être réinstallés ailleurs », a indiqué mercredi le représentant en Grèce du Haut commissariat de l’ONU aux réfugiés (HCR) en Grèce, Philippe Leclerc. « Le HCR pousse les autorités (grecques) à accélérer le processus (de demande d’asile) pour que les gens ne restent pas trop longtemps » ici, a-t-il ajouté.

      Le ministre grec de la Protection civile Michalis Chrysochoidis a pour sa part estimé que « la moitié » des exilés pourrait quitter Lesbos « d’ici Noël » et « les autres d’ici Pâques ».

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/27338/lesbos-les-migrants-a-la-rue-evacues-par-la-police-vers-un-nouveau-cam

    • "It is a terrible, inhuman situation". #Marisa_Matias visits Kara Tepe refugee camp

      Marisa Matias says that more than three thousand people have arrived in Kara Tepe and another six thousand are yet to arrive. In this refugee camp, people who test positive for Covid-6 are placed “in spaces surrounded by barbed wire where they have no water,” said the MEP.

      Presidential candidate Marisa Matias visited Kara Tepe in Greece this Friday, who is receiving refugees from the Moria camp, which suffered from a fire on the night of September XNUMX.

      “It is a terrible, inhuman situation”, guaranteed Marisa Matias in a video published on her Facebook page. “It is welcoming the people of Moria, after the fire, it is an immense extension”, said the MEP, pointing out the high number of people passing by around her.

      https://jornaleconomico.sapo.pt/en/news/It-is-a-terrible-inhumane-situation-Marisa-Matias-visits-the-re
      #paywall

    • After Moria, EU to try closed asylum camps on Greek islands

      A “closed camp” for displaced people is being set up on Samos as part of the EU’s strategy for fortifying its external borders. Neither residents of the island nor the people who will be held there want the camp.

      The site of what is to be one of the first new EU camps for displaced people is surrounded by a 6-meter (20-foot) barbed-wire fence. The heat of the day gathers in the valley, which is served so far only by a gravel road. The location of the future camp is over 5 kilometers (4 miles) from Samos, the main town on the island of the same name. When the camp is built, residents will be able to enter it through turnstiles at the gates by means of microchipped armbands. At night, the gates will remain locked.

      By the end of 2020, Samos is meant to be the first Greek island to host a “closed camp.” The announcement was made by the Greek migration minister, Notis Mitarachi, when he visited the island at the end of August. The European Commission has given Greece almost €130 million ($152 million) to build multipurpose reception-and-identification centers, which are meant to provide a higher standard of accommodation than previous camps had, with portable cabins, running water, separated areas and, above all, more security.

      The concept of the closed camps is part of a new strategy to better fortify regions at the European Union’s external borders. Overfilled camps in such regions have become a chronic problem since large numbers of displaced people began arriving in Europe from 2015 on. At the start of the year, the Greek islands near the border to Turkey were hosting more than 40,000 asylum applicants. In the town of Samos, the number of asylum applicants exceeded the number of people who lived there permanently. Almost 5,000 people are currently living in the existing camp on the island — although it was first meant to house only 650.

      Residents have built tents made from sleeping bags, sticks and tarpaulins. Water pipes stick out from the ground. The doors of the portable toilet cabins are banging open and shut with the wind. There is a smell of fried fish and urine.
      ’Send us back’

      Omar, who asked that his real name not be used, was sitting on a pallet, drinking tea with his wife and children near the tent that the family — eight members in all — shares. At night, the rats are so loud that they can’t sleep, the 58-year-old Omar said. After seven months of waiting since the family came from Idlib, Syria, he has had enough. “It’s better to send us back to our country,” he said: It would be better to be in danger in a civil war than to be provided indefinite refuge at this camp.

      Skin infections are proliferating, Omar said, and most people are without showers. Each person receives one bottle of water and two meals a day — which the members of the family take turns standing in line for up to three hours to get.

      A son, Mohammed, who had studied in university back in Syria, fanned out the meal vouchers for the following days. Whereas at the start each person had received about €90 per month, this lump sum has now been reduced to €75. Omar had heard that the money saved was being used to improve the general living conditions. But, he said, nothing has changed for him. On the contrary: Since restrictions were placed on movement, he said, the situation has become even more tense. He said the situation often got worse at night — when there is neither electricity nor light.
      Are NGOs permitted?

      After the first two cases of coronavirus infection were discovered in the camp earlier in September, the Greek authorities imposed a lockdown that is to last until the end of the month. Over the past week — including as recently as Sunday evening — fires broke out in the camp. It remains unclear what caused the fires. But Greek politicians are warning of copycat effects following fires at the Moria camp on Lesbos, and even excusing the camp residents of engaging in arson to escape the miserable conditions.

      In the future, 2,100 will be held at the camp — 900 of them in a closed-off area where they will wait for decisions on their cases, according to Jonathan Vigneron, project coordinator for Doctors Without Borders (MSF) on Samos. The numbers are taken from a map that the migration minister handed out during his visit. Vigneron said the whole thing reminded him of a prison.

      “It’s a very scary thing to see,” Vigneron said. He added that issues that international organizations had asked for clarity on included whether NGOs such as MSF would even be permitted to work in the new camp. The registration procedure for NGOs makes access almost impossible, he said. In an open letter, 68 organizations wrote that conditions in the camp could create “a worrying situation with regard to human dignity.”

      Displaced people might have a better standard of accommodation and more security at the closed camp, Vigneron said, but they would have nothing to do and no freedom of movement. “The camp is 5 kilometers away from any place,” Vigneron said. “It’s not marginalizing people: This is segregation by definition.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27510/after-moria-eu-to-try-closed-asylum-camps-on-greek-islands

    • #Moria_2.0': refugees who escaped fire now living in ’worse’ conditions

      More than 7,500 people living in tents on squalid settlement, with two other camps on Lesbos set to close

      Thousands of people who fled the fire that destroyed the infamous Moria refugee camp in Lesbos, Greece, last month are living in dire and unsanitary conditions in a temporary settlement with little access to water or basic sanitation.

      Just over 7,500 people are now living in tents among the rubble and dust of a former shooting range in an informal settlement that has become known as “Moria 2.0”.

      The camp, located at the edge of the sea, is exposed to the elements. Residents are allowed to leave the camp between 8am–8pm every day apart from Sunday. People wash their clothes and bodies in the sea because there is not enough running water. In the past week more than 1,600 recognised refugees have been moved to less crowded camps and hotels on the mainland, where they have said conditions are better.

      Semin, a 23-year-old economics graduate from a Kabul university, said she cried when she found out she wouldn’t be moving to the mainland.

      “My mother tries not to eat a lot of food because she doesn’t want to go to the toilet,” she said, and explained that some people were walking to a nearby town to use toilets in cafes instead of using camp toilets.

      “This camp is not good for children or old people,” she added. She said that the electricity, which is powered by generators, didn’t always work.

      A spokesperson for the Greek ministry of migration said that there were 400 toilets in the camp and that these were cleaned every day.

      Shad Mohammed, a refugee from Afghanistan, said he was having to find ways to cook his own food using salvaged pots and pans from Moria because his children could not eat the food in the new camp.

      Two other remaining camps on the island, Pikpa and Kara Tepe, which are both for vulnerable people, are now facing closure. Kara Tepe, which has a capacity for around 1,000 people, will be closed by the end of the year. Pikpa, a small brightly-coloured camp with notably good conditions, faces closure by authorities next week.

      Carmen Dupont from Lesvos Solidarity, an NGO operating in Pikpa, said she had been shocked to hear news of the closures. “At a time when we hear from the European Union: ‘no more Moria’, a new Moria has been built and the conditions – as far as we hear from the people inside – are worse than at the previous camp.”

      Dupont said the situation for those stuck on Lesbos and other Greek islands seemed to be deteriorating. “There seems to be a very clear agenda linked to the migration pact and the European Union’s direction, which is of containment. Keeping people trapped and locked in inhumane camps in hellish conditions and at the same time, erasing and closing the dignified shelters that exist.

      “It is a very clear agenda that we are resisting because Pikpa is much more than a place. We are defending the idea and values of solidarity, equality, dignity and connection.”

      Médecins Sans Frontières have also expressed concerns about the new camp. “We know that the camp has very minimal services,” said Marco Sandrone, the MSF project coordinator on Lesbos. “[The closure of Kara Tepe and Pikpa] is extremely concerning, because the lack of appropriate accommodation for vulnerable categories has always been an issue.”

      Meanwhile, as residents at “Moria 2.0” tried to make the best of the situation, the community at Pikpa were planning to spend their final days lobbying to save the space. Last week a group of children from the camp spent the day painting a mural reading: “Save Pikpa. Love you Pikpa.”

      A spokesperson for the ministry of migration said residents of Pikpa and Kara Tepe would have their asylum claims “accelerated”. A successful asylum claim would mean they would be moved to the mainland while a rejection would result in them being detained and – pending appeal – deported.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/oct/07/moria-20-refugees-who-escaped-fire-now-living-in-worse-conditions?CMP=s

    • Un mois après les incendies à Moria, le HCR lance une mise en garde contre une dégradation des conditions à l’arrivée de l’hiver

      Quatre semaines après les incendies qui ont détruit le centre d’accueil et d’identification de Moria à Lesbos, le HCR, l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, réitère son appel pour que des mesures et des améliorations urgentes soient prises afin d’éviter une nouvelle détérioration des conditions de vie d’environ 7800 réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile actuellement hébergés dans le site d’urgence de Kara Tepe.

      Le froid et l’arrivée de l’hiver ne feront qu’aggraver les difficultés endurées par cette population. Il existe des lacunes critiques en matière de drainage, d’eau, d’installations d’assainissement et d’hygiène, et de services de santé, auxquelles il faut remédier sans délai.

      Les fortes pluies du 8 octobre dernier ont aggravé la situation des résidents du site d’urgence. Des tentes ont été inondées. Le HCR a effectué des visites de suivi en matière de protection pour évaluer la situation sur ce site suite aux fortes pluies et a donné la priorité aux bâches pour les personnes dont les tentes ont été affectées par les fortes pluies. Les réfugiés eux-mêmes ont également trouvé d’autres solutions provisoires, comme le creusement de canaux et de tranchées pour évacuer l’eau autour de leurs tentes et éviter les inondations, car le drainage fait défaut à travers tout le site.

      Le centre d’accueil et d’identification de Moria a été dévasté par des incendies le 9 septembre dernier, forçant quelque 12 000 hommes, femmes et enfants à vivre dans la rue. Les autorités grecques avaient rapidement mobilisé l’armée grecque et les partenaires humanitaires pour ouvrir un centre d’accueil d’urgence. Des efforts importants ont été déployés par les autorités nationales et les organismes d’aide travaillant à Lesbos. Toutefois, les conditions de vie dans le site d’urgence doivent encore être améliorées de toute urgence.

      Le HCR et d’autres partenaires humanitaires ont alerté les autorités grecques sur les dangers et les risques liés à la sécurité sur le site d’urgence, exigeant une action immédiate de leur part. La zone est sujette aux inondations et le site actuel sous tente n’est pas équipé pour fournir la protection nécessaire contre les éléments et les basses températures.

      A la demande des autorités grecques et en soutien aux efforts d’aide humanitaire menés par le gouvernement, le HCR fournit du gravier pour aider à réduire le risque d’inondation dans les zones de tentes et les parties communes. Comme le temps se refroidit et devient plus humide, nous fournissons des kits d’isolation et des planchers composés de palettes et de plaques de contreplaqué pour les tentes familiales.

      Toutefois, il ne s’agit là que d’interventions à court terme qui ne peuvent être considérées comme adéquates ou suffisantes pour résister à l’hiver. Nous avons souligné auprès des autorités que des efforts à grande échelle sont nécessaires, notamment pour assurer rapidement un drainage efficace sur l’ensemble du site et garantir de meilleures solutions d’hébergement pour les personnes les plus vulnérables et leurs familles. Parallèlement, nous continuons à demander davantage de transferts vers le continent dans des logements décents.

      Avec l’arrivée de nouvelles précipitations et d’autres conditions climatiques difficiles, le HCR exhorte à une action immédiate sur toutes les îles grecques de la mer Égée. A Samos, où près de 4500 personnes continuent de séjourner dans des conditions précaires et surpeuplées, la plupart d’entre elles dorment dans des tentes d’été ou des abris de fortune dans les bois, en périphérie du centre d’accueil prévu pour accueillir seulement 650 personnes. La souffrance de ces personnes peut être évitée, grâce à des préparatifs contre les conditions hivernales et à des transferts plus nombreux vers des logements décents.

      Parallèlement, le HCR est encouragé par les efforts menés durant le dernier mois pour décongestionner les sites surpeuplés à travers les îles de la mer Égée, par le biais de transferts vers le continent des demandeurs d’asile les plus vulnérables et des personnes ayant obtenu le statut de réfugié de la part des autorités grecques. Nous continuons à apporter notre appui et à encourager l’accélération de ces efforts.

      A un moment où les besoins en termes de logements appropriés pour les demandeurs d’asile en Grèce sont accrus, le HCR est particulièrement préoccupé par la fermeture annoncée des installations sur l’île de Lesbos, qui avaient été consacrées à l’hébergement de centaines de familles, de femmes et d’enfants parmi les plus vulnérables.

      Il s’agit notamment du centre d’hébergement communautaire de Kara Tepe et de PIKPA, un espace de solidarité autogéré. L’un des fondateurs de cet espace avait reçu la distinction Nansen du HCR pour les réfugiés en 2016. L’activiste grecque Efi Latsoudi a travaillé sans relâche pour aider des milliers de réfugiés arrivant sur les côtes grecques, en offrant un refuge aux plus vulnérables après leur arrivée.

      En attendant des solutions plus complètes et plus dignes, le HCR appelle les autorités grecques à veiller à ce que de telles initiatives continuent d’exister pour assurer la protection et répondre aux besoins spécifiques des réfugiés particulièrement vulnérables.

      https://www.unhcr.org/fr/news/briefing/2020/10/5f8057a5a/mois-apres-incendies-moria-hcr-lance-mise-garde-contre-degradation-conditions

    • “No more Moria”? Rainfall floods dozens of tents in Kara Tepe camp

      Dozens of tents were flooded and large parts of Kara Tepe refugee camp on the island of Lesvos came under water after a strong rainfall on Thursday, an expected development as many people warned about from the very first moment the camp was set up.

      the European Commission slogan “No More Moria” turned into “flooded Kara Tepe” instead.

      The rainfall destroyed 80 out of 1,100 tents and left families with children and elderly again without a roof over their heads.


      https://twitter.com/InfoMigrants/status/1314500743685189632

      3 out of 15 demarcated areas in the camp stand under water.

      For the Migration and Asylum Ministry reason for the floods is the heavy rainfall and the hastily way the camp was set up due to the fire in Moria hotspot.


      https://twitter.com/Malichudis/status/1314242613675995137

      “It is obvious that a temporary structure that was built in a few days will face problems, however, the problems have been addressed immediately,” Ministry sources said according to local media.

      The sources said that the services of the Migration Ministry that operate in the field, in collaboration with Civil Society volunteers, have already proceeded to:

      Transfer of residents to flooded tents, to common areas (rub halls) , where they will remain until further notice.
      Restoration or removal of the approximately 80 tents affected, as 2,500 residents have already left the temporary structure in Kara Tepe and additional 1,300 will leave for relocation abroad.
      Distribution of waterproof covers in order to strengthen the roofs of the tents.

      Drainage works are expected to be concluded in a week.

      “After all, winterization projects are in progress from the first moment,” the sources said..

      They added “the effectiveness of the first infrastructure and protection projects is proven by the fact that the overwhelming percentage of the structure was not affected by the rainfall.”

      The Migration Ministry submitted a relevant Technical Bulletin totaling 5,580,000 euros to the Ministry of Development and Investment, which has already been approved and the projects will be implemented immediately. The projects are funded by the European Union “.

      The sources stressed that the damages in Kara Tepe demonstrate the need for the immediate implementation of the project of the new closed / controlled structure, a structure that will offer better living conditions, modern facilities and more security.”

      PS all in all the Greek Migration Ministry is satisfied with its accomplishments then “only 80 tents were flooded.” Thank goodness, the rain did not come from the other side flooding another 80.

      And it is still autumn…

      The United Nations High Commissioner for Refuges warns of worsening conditions ahead of the winter.

      https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/10/09/kara-tepe-camp-lesvos-flooded
      #inondations

    • UNHCR calls for action after migrant camp floods

      A month after fire razed the sprawling Moria reception center on the Aegean island of Lesvos, the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, has called for “urgent action” after heavy rain flooded tents at a new facility set up to replace the camp.

      “Urgent action and improvements are needed to avoid further deterioration of living conditions for some 7,800 refugees and asylum-seekers currently sheltered in the emergency site in Kara Tepe,” the UNHCR said in a statement on Friday.

      It said some “interim solutions” were found in the wake of the flooding caused by Thursday’s rainfall but warned that, “colder weather and the onset of winter will only bring more hardship for the people there.”

      Migration Minister Notis Mitarakis said that the majority of the facility had not been affected by the flooding and that those migrants whose tents were flooded were temporarily moved to “common areas.”

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/257929/article/ekathimerini/news/unhcr-calls-for-action-after-migrant-camp-floods

    • Moria 2.0: The new Lesbos refugee camp

      A month ago, on September 12, the Greek government opened a new migrant camp on Lesbos, after Moria was destroyed by fire. The new camp is home to about 10,000. InfoMigrants went to meet some of them last week.

      The last warmth of autumn is fading on Lesbos, the Greek island that will be remembered as the site of Europe’s largest migrant camp, Moria, which burned to the ground a month ago.

      After the fire, some of the most vulnerable migrants were taken to facilities on the Greek mainland or to other European countries. Those remaining, around 10,000 people including babies, the elderly and ill, moved into the new temporary tent facility on a former military site. Before moving there, they had spent up to ten days sleeping by the roadside in the open.

      Access to the camp is restricted and the Greek authorities do not welcome visitors. There is a large police presence in and around the camp to ensure that the violence of Moria is not repeated. Asylum seekers are searched for drugs and weapons every time they re-enter the facility. This also means waiting in line to receive a rapid antigen test for COVID-19 .

      The Greek Ministry of Migration and Asylum promised that people would have decent living conditions, medical treatment and supplies including running water, electricity and wifi. Once a day, the residents receive a food package containing three meals, but many supplement these rations by cooking their own food over small fires along the sea shore.

      As there are no showers in the camp, people have to wash with a hose-pipe or in the sea. Many people InfoMigrants spoke to said this was causing serious problems for women who needed privacy.

      Children and adults wait in line to fill their containers with cold water from a hose. There is no physical distancing or any other protection against virus transmission.

      Camp residents who are ill with coronavirus are in a fenced-off area.

      Without insulation the tents can become too hot to stay inside even when the outside temperature is less than 28 degrees Celsius. In winter, when it drops to around six degrees, they will offer little protection against cold.

      The camp went up quickly before drains were dug, and the first rain a day after this photo was taken on October 7, flooded the tents. A number of migrants complained that they were living “worse than animals.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27851/moria-2-0-the-new-lesbos-refugee-camp

    • Lesbos: Is another Moria in the making?

      Rains have flooded a camp set up to replace the burned-down Moria camp for displaced people and migrants on the Greek island of Lesbos. People seeking to make a new life for themselves are instead mired in mud.

      There are huge puddles in front of the tents at the Kara Tepe camp on the Greek island of Lesbos. A woman holding a newborn baby in a thick pink blanket watches children splash through the water, barefoot or in flip-flops. People are using shovels in often vain efforts to remove the murky water from inside the tents. The rainwater has even seeped underneath the plastic groundsheets, causing them to bulge in places.

      The videos and photos circulating on Twitter and other internet platforms give the world an idea of how helpless the people on Lesbos must have felt after the massive rains this week. “The water came into our tent and everything was flooded,” Ahmad Shuaib Abawi told DW. The 26-year-old Afghan and his family of nine live in one of the approximately 1,100 tents in what the Greek authorities refer to as a “temporary camp.”

      Conditions were supposed to be different there — more orderly, safer — after the controversial and completely overcrowded Moria refugee camp burned down about a month ago.

      80 tents destroyed by water

      Even before the heavy rainfalls, critics called the new camp, which is being called Moria 2 by some, “inhumane.” The rains have now destroyed about 80 of the 1,100 tents. According to the Greek Immigration Ministry, the authorities immediately started to fix the problem, arguing that it is normal for “temporary accommodation built within just a few days” to face challenges.

      The ministry said only a small part of the camp was affected by the floods and that some of the refugees had been temporarily relocated. According to the Greek government, almost 10,000 people currently live at the Kara Tepe camp.

      Waiting all day long

      “It’s really horrible,” said Marion MacGregor, who has been on the ground in Lesbos for the InfoMigrants online portal for the past few days. The refugees are not doing well and the psychological strain, in particular, is enormous, she said. “They do not want to lose years of their lives waiting around in these conditions; they just want to have their asylum application interviews and get on with it” she said. Instead, many face a long wait in the camp, knowing that winter is coming, there are no showers and there is not enough food.

      In good weather, the location of the camp could even be described as idyllic. It is situated right on the coast and the morning sun occasionally bathes the tents in soft orange light. But in reality, Kara Tepe has little of the idyll about it.

      “People wash in the ocean,” MacGregor said, adding that this is a problem in particular for the women, as they have no privacy. Portable toilets have been set up — altogether 345 of them, camp residents have told workers from the aid organization Doctors Without Borders (MSF).

      Food packages are not enough

      “Once a day, they are handed a packet of food, but that’s not enough,” MacGregor said — which is why some refugees try to sell bottles or handkerchiefs in the city to buy extra food. But thanks to solar panels, many people in the camp at least have electricity.

      Is the situation in the new camp better than in Moria, despite the many privations? Residents of the camp are divided in their opinion. MacGregor has heard that there is less violence, at least, thanks to the enormous police presence in front of and inside the camp.

      Ahmad Shuaib Abawi also had a relatively positive view — of the camp, at least. “We are not doing badly here, but we are wasting time; the children could go to school and we could study,” he said, adding that he wants to get on with his life rather than get stuck.

      Seven square meters for two families

      “The conditions in the new camp remind us a lot of Moria, while we hear from our patients that in reality, the situation is even worse,” said Marco Sandrone, director of operations for MSF on Lesbos, adding it appears that some tents have no groundsheet at all. “Before the rains, people slept on rocky or dusty ground, which has since become muddy,” he said. Many families have to share tents; they cook, eat and sleep on about 7 square meters (75 square feet), he added.

      https://twitter.com/MSF_Sea/status/1314245456189415424

      The local aid organizations agree the living conditions are not humane despite promises by the Greek Immigration Ministry to provide “decent conditions,” medical care and sufficient food. “Enough is enough!” several aid organizations, including MSF, say in a joint statement. “We reaffirm our call to move these people to safe and decent housing. Other European countries must also accept those seeking protection in order to relieve the situation on the Greek islands.”

      Appeal to EU

      About 2,500 refugees housed at the Kara Tepe camp have been transferred to other accommodation within the EU since September, and 1,300 are expected to leave the camp soon, according to the Greek Migration Ministry. Germany agreed to take in 1,500 refugees from Greece; France expects 900.

      The aid organizations argue that is not enough. They call on EU leaders and member state to stop sealing off the Greek islands and reinforcing the bloc’s external borders. For the time being, however, nothing is likely to change at the Kara Tepe camp. The waiting continues, along with hopes that the next rain will not flood everything again.

      https://www.dw.com/en/lesbos-is-another-moria-in-the-making/a-55249863

    • Deutsche Welle publie un article sur les dénonciations de la situation inhumaine au camp de Kara Tepe à Lesbos et sur l’appel dit ‘Appel de Noël’ de 240 parlementaires du Bundestag de tout bord qui demandent d’accueillir plus de réfugiés venant des îles grecques

      Γερμανική κριτική για την κατάσταση στο Καρά Τεπέ
      https://www.dw.com/el/%CE%B3%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%BC%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE-%CE%BA%CF%81%CE%B9%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AE-%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%AC%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%83%CE%B7-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%AC-%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%80%CE%AD/a-55973267

      17.12.2020

      La situation à Kara Tepe vivement critiquée en Allemagne

      La situation est pire que dans les camps en Afrique, dit le ministre Gerd Müller. Fin décembre, tous les mineurs isolés ou malades seront transférés des îles grecques. Appel de 240 parlementaires allemands.

      Le ministre allemand du Développement économique, Gerd Müller, a vivement critiqué la situation dans le camp de réfugiés de Kara Tepe. S’exprimant sur RTL / ntv ce matin, il a souligné que « c’est en effet un grand scandale pour l’UE que jusqu’à présent nous n’ayons pas pu, malgré l’incendie de Moria il y a quelques mois, créer une situation qui serait vraiment humaine ». M. Müller, le ministre chargé de la coopération avec les pays en développement, a déclaré que la situation à Lesbos était pire que dans les camps de réfugiés en Afrique.

      Gerd Müller : L’UE est coresponsable de la situation à Kara Tepe

      Le politicien de l’Union chrétienne-sociale (CSU) a évoqué à plusieurs reprises la situation dans les camps des îles grecques et a exhorté le gouvernement allemand à accepter des réfugiés de Grèce. Plusieurs fois il s’est opposé au ministre de l’Intérieur Horst Seehofer, qui appartient également à la CSU. Contrairement à Gerd Müller, Seehofer rejette les initiatives uniquement allemandes sur la question migratoire et insiste sur une ligne européenne unique. Mais un porte-parole du ministère allemand de l’Intérieur a déclaré ces dernières semaines que les efforts de la présidence allemande de l’UE au cours des six derniers mois pour réformer la politique d’asile européenne avaient échoué.

      L’Allemagne continue d’accepter des réfugiés de Grèce

      S’exprimant hier après-midi au parlement allemand sur la question de l’accueil des réfugiés de Grèce, le vice-ministre de l’Intérieur Volkmar Vogel a annoncé que le 3 décembre, les derniers mineurs isolés que l’Allemagne avait promis d’accepter sont arrivés des îles grecques. Quant aux 243 autres enfants réfugiés malades, ainsi que leurs familles, que le gouvernement allemand s’est également engagé à accueillir, M. Vogel a exprimé l’espoir que d’ici la fin du mois, ils seraient tous arrivés. Cependant, en raison de la pandémie de coronavirus, les procédures d’accueil des 1553 réfugiés des îles grecques, que l’Allemagne avait annoncé vouloir accueillir après l’incendie de Moria, elles vont s’étaler sur plusieurs mois.

      M. Vogel a clairement indiqué qu’à l’heure actuelle, l’Allemagne n’avait pas l’intention d’accepter d’autres réfugiés de Grèce et que la question concernait l’UE dans son ensemble. Le principal objectif du gouvernement allemand est d’améliorer la situation des réfugiés en Grèce. Evoquant les camps de réfugiés sur les îles grecques et en particulier à Lesbos, Volkmar Vogel a déclaré que le gouvernement allemand « regrette la situation » là-bas et qu’il tente « dans la mesure de ses capacités » d’aider sur le terrain.

      Appel de plus de 240 députés

      Les législateurs allemands demandent au gouvernement allemand d’accepter plus de réfugiés de Grèce

      Selon l’agence de presse epd [Evangelischer Pressedienst, epd], plus de 240 députés allemands signent un « appel de Noël », demandant au gouvernement allemand d’ accepter davantage de réfugiés de Grèce et de redoubler d’efforts pour trouver une solution au niveau de l’UE. L’appel est signé par les députés de tous des partis autres que l’AfD, Alternative nationaliste et xénophobe pour l’Allemagne. Parmi eux se trouvent les présidents des sociaux-démocrates, Saskia Esken et des Verts, Annalena Baerbock, la vice-présidente de la Chambre, le libéral, Wolfgang Kubicki, l’ancien président des chrétiens-démocrates, Volker Kauder et la parlementaire Ulla Jelpke du Die Linke.

      Panagiotis Kouparanis, Berlin

      –—

      Voir l’article de SDZ (en allemand)

      Migration und Asyl:Abgeordnete verlangen mehr Hilfe für Flüchtlinge
      https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/migration-und-asyl-abgeordnete-verlangen-mehr-hilfe-fuer-fluechtlinge-1

      17. Dezember 2020, 18:50 Uhr

      In einem « Weihnachtsappell » fordern 240 Parlamentarier fast aller Fraktionen fordern die Bundesregierung auf, mehr für Schutzsuchende in Griechenland zu tun.

      Von Constanze von Bullion, Berlin, dit le ministre Gerd Müller. Fin décembre, tous les mineurs isolés ou malades seront transférés des îles grecques. Appel de 240 membres allemands.

      Le ministre allemand du Développement économique, Gerd Müller, a vivement critiqué la situation dans le camp de réfugiés de Kara Tepe. S’exprimant sur RTL / ntv ce matin, il a souligné que « c’est en effet un grand scandale pour l’UE que jusqu’à présent nous n’ayons pas pu, malgré l’incendie de Moria il y a quelques mois, créer une situation qui serait vraiment humaine ». M. Müller, le ministre chargé de la coopération avec les pays en développement, a déclaré que la situation à Lesbos était pire que dans les camps de réfugiés en Afrique.

      Gerd Müller : L’UE est coresponsable de la situation à Kara Tepe

      Le politicien de l’Union chrétienne-sociale (CSU) a évoqué à plusieurs reprises la situation dans les camps des îles grecques et a exhorté le gouvernement allemand à accepter des réfugiés de Grèce. Plusieurs fois il s’est opposé au ministre de l’Intérieur Horst Seehofer, qui appartient également à la CSU. Contrairement à Gerd Müller, Seehofer rejette les initiatives uniquement allemandes sur la question migratoire et insiste sur une ligne européenne unique. Mais un porte-parole du ministère allemand de l’Intérieur a déclaré ces dernières semaines que les efforts de la présidence allemande de l’UE au cours des six derniers mois pour réformer la politique d’asile européenne avaient échoué.

      L’Allemagne continue d’accepter des réfugiés de Grèce

      S’exprimant hier après-midi au parlement allemand sur la question de l’accueil des réfugiés de Grèce, le vice-ministre de l’Intérieur Volkmar Vogel a annoncé que le 3 décembre, les derniers mineurs isolés que l’Allemagne avait promis d’accepter sont arrivés des îles grecques. Quant aux 243 autres enfants réfugiés malades, ainsi que leurs familles, que le gouvernement allemand s’est également engagé à accueillir, M. Vogel a exprimé l’espoir que d’ici la fin du mois, ils seraient tous arrivés. Cependant, en raison de la pandémie de coronavirus, les procédures d’accueil des 1553 réfugiés des îles grecques, que l’Allemagne avait annoncé vouloir accueillir après l’incendie de Moria, elles vont s’étaler sur plusieurs mois.

      M. Vogel a clairement indiqué qu’à l’heure actuelle, l’Allemagne n’avait pas l’intention d’accepter d’autres réfugiés de Grèce et que la question concernait l’UE dans son ensemble. Le principal objectif du gouvernement allemand est d’améliorer la situation des réfugiés en Grèce. Evoquant les camps de réfugiés sur les îles grecques et en particulier à Lesbos, Volkmar Vogel a déclaré que le gouvernement allemand « regrette la situation » là-bas et qu’il tente « dans la mesure de ses capacités » d’aider sur le terrain.

      Appel de plus de 240 députés

      Les législateurs allemands demandent au gouvernement allemand d’accepter plus de réfugiés de Grèce

      Selon l’agence de presse epd [Evangelischer Pressedienst, epd], plus de 240 députés allemands signent un « appel de Noël », appelant le gouvernement allemand à accepter davantage de réfugiés de Grèce et à redoubler d’efforts pour trouver une solution au niveau de l’UE. L’appel est signé par les députés de tous des partis autres que l’AfD, Alternative nationaliste et xénophobe pour l’Allemagne. Parmi eux se trouvent les présidents des sociaux-démocrates, Saskia Esken et des Verts, Annalena Baerbock, la vice-présidente de la Chambre, le libéral, Wolfgang Kubicki, l’ancien président des chrétiens-démocrates, Volker Kauder et la parlementaire Ulla Jelpke du Die Linke.

      Panagiotis Kouparanis, Berlin

      Voir l’article de SDZ (en allemand)

      https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/migration-und-asyl-abgeordnete-verlangen-mehr-hilfe-fuer-fluechtlinge-1

      17. Dezember 2020, 18:50 Uhr

      Migration und Asyl:Abgeordnete verlangen mehr Hilfe für Flüchtlinge

      In einem « Weihnachtsappell » fordern 240 Parlamentarier fast aller Fraktionen fordern die Bundesregierung auf, mehr für Schutzsuchende in Griechenland zu tun.

      Von Constanze von Bullion, Berlin dit le ministre Gerd Müller. Fin décembre, tous les mineurs isolés ou malades seront transférés des îles grecques. Appel de 240 membres allemands.

      Le ministre allemand du Développement économique, Gerd Müller, a vivement critiqué la situation dans le camp de réfugiés de Kara Tepe. S’exprimant sur RTL / ntv ce matin, il a souligné que « c’est en effet un grand scandale pour l’UE que jusqu’à présent nous n’ayons pas pu, malgré l’incendie de Moria il y a quelques mois, créer une situation qui serait vraiment humaine ». M. Müller, le ministre chargé de la coopération avec les pays en développement, a déclaré que la situation à Lesbos était pire que dans les camps de réfugiés en Afrique.

      Gerd Müller : L’UE est coresponsable de la situation à Kara Tepe

      Le politicien de l’Union chrétienne-sociale (CSU) a évoqué à plusieurs reprises la situation dans les camps des îles grecques et a exhorté le gouvernement allemand à accepter des réfugiés de Grèce. Plusieurs fois il s’est opposé au ministre de l’Intérieur Horst Seehofer, qui appartient également à la CSU. Contrairement à Gerd Müller, Seehofer rejette les initiatives uniquement allemandes sur la question migratoire et insiste sur une ligne européenne unique. Mais un porte-parole du ministère allemand de l’Intérieur a déclaré ces dernières semaines que les efforts de la présidence allemande de l’UE au cours des six derniers mois pour réformer la politique d’asile européenne avaient échoué.

      L’Allemagne continue d’accepter des réfugiés de Grèce

      S’exprimant hier après-midi au parlement allemand sur la question de l’accueil des réfugiés de Grèce, le vice-ministre de l’Intérieur Volkmar Vogel a annoncé que le 3 décembre, les derniers mineurs isolés que l’Allemagne avait promis d’accepter sont arrivés des îles grecques. Quant aux 243 autres enfants réfugiés malades, ainsi que leurs familles, que le gouvernement allemand s’est également engagé à accueillir, M. Vogel a exprimé l’espoir que d’ici la fin du mois, ils seraient tous arrivés. Cependant, en raison de la pandémie de coronavirus, les procédures d’accueil des 1553 réfugiés des îles grecques, que l’Allemagne avait annoncé vouloir accueillir après l’incendie de Moria, elles vont s’étaler sur plusieurs mois.

      M. Vogel a clairement indiqué qu’à l’heure actuelle, l’Allemagne n’avait pas l’intention d’accepter d’autres réfugiés de Grèce et que la question concernait l’UE dans son ensemble. Le principal objectif du gouvernement allemand est d’améliorer la situation des réfugiés en Grèce. Evoquant les camps de réfugiés sur les îles grecques et en particulier à Lesbos, Volkmar Vogel a déclaré que le gouvernement allemand « regrette la situation » là-bas et qu’il tente « dans la mesure de ses capacités » d’aider sur le terrain.

      Appel de plus de 240 députés

      Les législateurs allemands demandent au gouvernement allemand d’accepter plus de réfugiés de Grèce

      Selon l’agence de presse epd [Evangelischer Pressedienst, epd], plus de 240 députés allemands signent un « appel de Noël », appelant le gouvernement allemand à accepter davantage de réfugiés de Grèce et à redoubler d’efforts pour trouver une solution au niveau de l’UE. L’appel est signé par les députés de tous des partis autres que l’AfD, Alternative nationaliste et xénophobe pour l’Allemagne. Parmi eux se trouvent les présidents des sociaux-démocrates, Saskia Esken et des Verts, Annalena Baerbock, la vice-présidente de la Chambre, le libéral, Wolfgang Kubicki, l’ancien président des chrétiens-démocrates, Volker Kauder et la parlementaire Ulla Jelpke du Die Linke.

      Panagiotis Kouparanis, Berlin

      Voir l’article de SDZ (en allemand)

      https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/migration-und-asyl-abgeordnete-verlangen-mehr-hilfe-fuer-fluechtlinge-1

      17. Dezember 2020, 18:50 Uhr

      Migration und Asyl:Abgeordnete verlangen mehr Hilfe für Flüchtlinge

      In einem « Weihnachtsappell » fordern 240 Parlamentarier fast aller Fraktionen fordern die Bundesregierung auf, mehr für Schutzsuchende in Griechenland zu tun.

      Von Constanze von Bullion, Berlin

    • Après le froid glacial le camp de Kara Tepe sous la neige
      Μετά το τσουχτερό κρύο ήρθε και το χιόνι στο καταυλισμό του Καρά Τεπέ

      Σήμερα το πρωί και αργότερα το μεσημέρι, ο χιονιάς έφτασε και στη πόλη της Μυτιλήνης καλύπτοντας τα πάντα και ασφαλώς τον καταυλισμό με τους 7.500 ανθρώπους που εξακολουθούν να διαμένουν σε σκηνές, πολλές από αυτές χωρίς να διαθέτουν πάτωμα.

      Επιπλέον, ο καταυλισμός εξακολουθεί να λειτουργεί με ανεπαρκή ρευματοδότηση με αποτέλεσμα πλέον εκεί να κινδυνεύουν ζωές.
      Συγκεκριμένα, η παροχή ρεύματος γίνεται ανά πτέρυγα και μόνο για μισή ώρα προκειμένου σταδιακά να πάρουν ολες οι σκηνές. Αποτέλεσμα όμως είναι υπό αυτές τις συνθήκες οι πρόσφυγες να περνούν δραματικές ώρες και άνθρωποι που είναι σε θέση να γνωρίζουν εκφράζουν φόβους για μεγάλο αριθμό ασθενών που θα χρειαστούν νοσηλεία το επόμενο διάστημα.

      Αντί όμως οι υπεύθυνοι όλο το προηγούμενο διάστημα να προετοιμαστούν κατάλληλα, άφησαν τον καταυλισμό με την ελάχιστη δυνατότητα ρευματοδότησης.
      Χαρακτηριστικό είναι ότι και ορισμένες γεννήτριες που είχε δωρίσει γνωστή ΜΚΟ και γλίτωσαν από την καταστροφή της Μόριας, σταμάτησαν να λειτουργούν το προηγούμενο διάστημα, αφού καταστράφηκαν από τις πλημμύρες που είχαν προηγηθεί.

      Από την πλευρά του ο διοικητής του καμπ Νίκος Μπαμπάκος, σε τηλεφωνική επικοινωνία με την ΕΦ.ΣΥΝ., δήλωσε ότι « οι γεννήτριες που υπάρχουν τώρα μπορούν να καλύψουν τις ανάγκες του καταυλισμού για 16 ώρες την ημέρα. Είμαστε όμως υποχρεωμένοι να τις κλείνουμε το πρωί, ενώ μία από αυτές δυστυχώς έπαθε βλάβη.

      Προχωράμε στη διαδικασία της αντικατάστασης της και αναμένουμε μία εφεδρική από την Αθήνα » σημείωσε.

      Όπως μάλιστα τόνισε το πρόβλημα ξεκινά από το γεγονός ότι ο καταυλισμός δεν έχει ακόμη σύνδεση με το κεντρικό δίκτυο της ΔΕΗ, παρά το γεγονός ότι βρίσκεται πολύ κοντά στο εργοστάσιο.

      « Δυστυχώς η γραφειοκρατία ακόμα δεν μας έχει επιτρέψει τη σύνδεση » είπε, χαρακτηριζοντας την κατάσταση δύσκολη αλλά αντιμετωπίσημη.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/node/277445

      #neige #froid

  • Outbreak reported at Athens children’s home

    Teams of health workers were dispatched on Monday to a home for unaccompanied refugee children in Athens in a bid to contain an outbreak of #Covid-19.

    According to the General Secretariat for Civil Protection, the outbreak at the shelter in the eastern suburb of #Vyronas was detected on Monday after an unnamed individual presented symptoms of the highly contagious novel coronavirus, the Athens-Macedonian News Agency (ANA-MPA) reported.

    By Monday night, 20 children and eight workers at the facility had tested positive for the virus and just five tested negative, while more results were expected, indicating that the outbreak is quite severe.

    The shelter has been put under strict quarantine and tracing has commenced to identify any other people its workers and residents come into contact with.

    https://www.ekathimerini.com/256423/article/ekathimerini/news/outbreak-reported-at-athens-childrens-home
    #coronavirus #contamination #asile #migrations #réfugiés #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés #hébergement #Athènes #Grèce #contaminations #covid-19

    –—

    Contaminations dans 2 autres centres d’accueil pour migrant·es :
    – Lesbos : https://seenthis.net/messages/872979
    – Chios (#Vial) : https://seenthis.net/messages/871934

    • IRC calls for urgent evacuation of the most vulnerable refugees, as first Coronavirus case confirmed in Moria

      The first case of COVID-19 has been confirmed in Moria camp, on the Greek island of Lesvos, where over 12,000 refugees remain crammed inside and around the camp, despite numerous demands for evacuation.

      Overcrowding and limited access to clean water and washing facilities have left tens of thousands of people across the Greek islands vulnerable and exposed to the virus. COVID-19 could spread rapidly and those at risk, including the elderly, pregnant women and those with underlying health conditions, must be urgently evacuated to safety before it is too late. In the meantime, they should be ensured access to all measures of protection and medical assistance that Greek people have.

      The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is working to provide hygiene materials and sanitation facilities to asylum seekers on Lesvos, and has installed a COVID-19 triage centre outside Moria. Our teams also provide mental health support to asylum seekers living in reception facilities across three Aegean islands, where clients have reported a sense of abandonment as a result of the continuous lockdown measures since March, and the undignified conditions they live in.

      Dimitra Kalogeropoulou, IRC Greece Director, said:

      “By now, we know the devastating impact this virus can have on individuals, families and whole communities. People across the globe have been urged to distance themselves from each other in order to prevent its spread, but social distancing and basic hygiene measures like handwashing are simply impossible to adhere to in Moria, where thousands of people live in close proximity to each other with inadequate access to running water and soap.

      “As many people can be carrying the virus but not show any symptoms, it is possible there are more cases of coronavirus that have not been diagnosed. An urgent increase of healthcare and sanitation services is required, including sufficient space for isolation and quarantine.

      “For too long people have been forced to live in camps with severe overcrowding and poor sanitation, waiting for months for the decision on their asylum claims. The ultimate answer to preventing the spread of COVID-19 is through the immediate evacuation of the most vulnerable cases from the camps to safe accommodation. It is untenable that even now, people are forced to live on top of each other.”

      Our experience has shown that the COVID-19 outbreak has amplified the vulnerabilities of people seeking protection. Their dire situation during this public health crisis highlights the need to move away from ‘business as usual’, in order to promote long-term and humane solutions. European leadership is required more than ever before, whether when cooperating on health issues or to ensure those in need are protected and empowered in these difficult times.

      The IRC has provided mental health support to asylum seekers living in Lesvos, Samos and Chios since 2018. Since the outbreak of Covid-19, the IRC has scaled up its presence in Lesvos in direct response to the coronavirus outbreak, and a team of new staff members now responsible for key hygiene and health initiatives in Moria, including regular garbage collection and the installation of 24 portable toilets and water points.

      https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/irc-calls-urgent-evacuation-most-vulnerable-refugees-first-coronavirus-ca

    • #Moria camp placed under quarantine after Covid-19 case

      Moria camp on the eastern Aegean island of Lesvos was placed under quarantine on Wednesday after officials confirmed the first coronavirus case in the notoriously overcrowded facility.

      The patient, a 40-year old refugee from Somalia, has been put in isolation, officials said.

      Meanwhile, a team of experts from Greece’s National Organization of Public Health (EODY) were trying to trace the people he had contacted.

      Greece’s total number of confirmed coronavirus cases on Tuesday stood at 10,524, with 271 dead.

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/256484/article/ekathimerini/news/moria-camp-placed-under-quarantine-after-covid-19-case
      #Lesbos

    • Les premiers résultats de tests Covid-19 effectués sur les personnes vivant aux alentours de la tente du réfugié somalien hospitalisé montrent deux autres cas infectés sur les 500. 1500 tests supplémentaires ont été effectués et sont actuellement en cours d’analyse. Voir (en grec) https://www.stonisi.gr/post/11161/alla-dyo-kroysmata-koronoioy-sto-kyt-ths-morias-realtime

      Au même moment les résidents du camp de #Moria ont refusé pendant deux jours de prendre les plateaux repas qui leur sont distribués, en signe de protestation contre la quarantaine imposée. Ils dénoncent aussi leur impossibilité de se procurer de quoi se nourrir dans les supérettes improvisées qui fonctionnent dans le camp ainsi que la très mauvaise qualité de la nourriture distribuée. Ils protestent également contre la baisse de leur allocation mensuelle qui est passé de 90 à 75 euros. Aux dernières nouvelles les réfugiés ont cessé cette forme de protestation en prenant part à la distribution du repas du soir

      Source en grec https://www.stonisi.gr/post/11170/diamartyries-sth-moria

      Mail de Vicky Skoumbi via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 06.09.2020

    • 243 Covid-19 cases detected at #Kara_Tepe facility

      A total of 243 coronavirus cases have been detected at the new temporary facility on the Greek island of Lesvos, government spokesman Stelios Petsas said Monday.

      He said authorities have conducted a total of 7,064 rapid tests at the tent camp – set up at Kara Tepe near the port of Mytilene after a blaze destroyed the Moria camp – which currently accommodates 9,200 people according to government estimates.

      The average age of the Covid-19 patients at Kara Tepe is 24 years old and most are asymptomatic, he said.

      A total 160 police and administrative staff all tested negative, he said.

      Petsas said the positive cases from Kara Tepe would be added to the country’s official Covid-19 figures released later in the day.

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/257196/article/ekathimerini/news/243-covid-19-cases-detected-at-kara-tepe-facility

    • Plus de 240 exilés positifs au Covid dans le camp provisoire de #Lesbos

      Sur les 7 000 demandeurs d’asile testés au coronavirus ces derniers jours à Lesbos en Grèce, plus de 240 sont contaminés, selon une agence sanitaire publique. Un nouveau camp de fortune érigé après que Moria a été réduit en cendres il y a dix jours compte déjà plus de 9 000 personnes pour une capacité totale de 10 000.

      Le nombre de demandeurs d’asile testés positifs au nouveau coronavirus est en forte augmentation ces derniers jours sur l’île grecque de Lesbos : plus de 240 exilés résidant dans un camp provisoire érigé à la hâte la semaine dernière après les incendies du centre d’hébergement pour migrants de Moria ont été contaminés, a annoncé lundi 21 septembre l’agence sanitaire publique Eody, citée par l’AFP.

      Sur les 7 000 personnes testées, « 243 nouvelles infections ont été découvertes », a révélé cet organisme dans un communiqué. Les tests effectués sur 120 policiers et 40 membres du personnel présents sur place ont en revanche été négatifs, selon la même source.

      Chassés de Moria par les flammes des incendies survenues les 8 et 9 septembre, des milliers de personnes ont d’abord trouvé refuge au bord des routes, dans des champs ou encore des bâtisses abandonnées. Sous la pression policière menaçant de ne pas traiter leur dossier de demande d’asile, les sans-abri ont accepté à partir de jeudi dernier de se réinstaller dans un nouveau camp de fortune situé sur un ancien champ de tir à trois kilomètres du port de Mytilène, le chef-lieu de Lesbos.
      D’une capacité maximale de 10 000, ce camp censé être provisoire compte déjà 9 000 personnes. On estime qu’au moins 12 700 exilés ont perdu leur logement de fortune depuis les incendies de Moria. Selon les autorités, le nouveau complexe souffre déjà d’un manque de couchages et est équipé d’installations sanitaires rudimentaires.

      Jusqu’à présent le nombre de contaminations dans le camp de Moria était resté relativement faible au regard des conditions de surpopulation et d’insalubrité des lieux. Pour autant, les camps de migrants et de réfugiés en Grèce sont strictement confinés depuis la mi-mars pour cause du Covid-19 alors que le reste de ce pays est retourné à la normalité début mai. Une situation dénoncée à maintes reprises par des ONG comme Amnesty International.

      Le ministre grec des Migrations Notis Mitarachi a promis lundi devant le parlement qu’un nouveau camp, « moderne » et « sûr », verrait le jour à Lesbos. Et que les responsables des incendies seraient expulsés. Six jeunes demandeurs d’asile afghans, accusés d’en être à l’origine, ont été placés en détention provisoire. Ils sont inculpés d’"incendie volontaire".

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/27451/plus-de-240-exiles-positifs-au-covid-dans-le-camp-provisoire-de-lesbos

    • Υγειονομικός αποκλεισμός στη ΒΙΑΛ της Χίου μόνο για πρόσφυγες

      Σε καραντίνα δεν τέθηκαν οι εργαζόμενοι που είχαν έρθει σε επαφή με τα δύο κρούσματα κορονοϊού στις έγκυες.

      « Καραντίνα μόνο για πρόσφυγες » εφαρμόζει το Υπουργείο Μετανάστευσης και Ασύλου στη ΒΙΑΛ της Χίου, εξαιρώντας από τα μέτρα τους εργαζόμενους που δουλεύουν σε ευαίσθητους τομείς, όπως τους υπαλλήλους της Υπηρεσίας Πρώτης Υποδοχής, της Υπηρεσίας Ασύλου αλλά και τις δύο μαίες που χθες συνέχιζαν να εργάζονται κανονικά προτού διακόψουν και μάλιστα αιφνιδιαστικά, υπό το πρόσχημα της απεντόμωσης.

      Τα δύο κρούσματα κορονοϊού στις έγκυες και τα πολλαπλά στις επαφές τους έθεσαν το ΚΥΤ σε υγειονομικό αποκλεισμό, αλλά και εξέθεσαν πλήρως την αδυναμία διαχείρισης της κατάστασης έκτακτης ανάγκης στη ΒΙΑΛ.

      Χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα οι δύο μαίες που έχει διαθέσει ο ΕΟΔΥ, οι οποίες συνέχισαν να δέχονται επισκέψεις εγκύων, παρά το γεγονός ότι είχαν έρθει σε επαφή με τις ήδη διεγνωσμένες γυναίκες, εκθέτοντας έτσι τον εαυτό τους αλλά και το σύνολο των εγκύων σε κίνδυνο.

      Ξαφνικά οι έγκυες που περίμεναν τη σειρά τους στο ιατρείο πήραν εντολή να βγουν από τον χώρο προκειμένου, όπως τους είπαν, να γίνει « απεντόμωση ». Σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες, τελικά επρόκειτο για απολύμανση, όπως ήταν φυσικό.

      Πλήρης ασυνεννοησία επικράτησε και στην Υπηρεσία Ασύλου, αφού η πλειονότητα αν όχι το σύνολο των εργαζομένων, έχοντας υπόψη τους από χθες την ΚΥΑ περί υγειονομικού αποκλεισμού, δεν πήγαν στην εργασία τους.

      Ωστόσο, μόλις στις 7.20 το πρωί ενημερώθηκαν ότι θα συνεχίσουν να εργάζονται κανονικά και έτσι σταδιακά από το μεσημέρι οι εργαζόμενοι άρχισαν να εμφανίζονται στις θέσεις τους, την ώρα που είχαν περάσει πια τα προγραμματισμένα ραντεβού για συνεντεύξεις με πρόσφυγες. Εννοείται ότι κανείς μέχρι χθες δεν ήταν σε θέση να πει με βεβαιότητα πότε και αν θα πραγματοποιηθούν οι συγκεκριμένες συνεντεύξεις.

      Στο μεταξύ, μόλις χθες το μεσημέρι το υπουργείο αποφάσισε να υπογράψει τελικά την παροχή των 300.000 ευρώ προς την Περιφέρεια Βορείου Αιγαίου, ώστε να ανοίξει η κάνουλα του Γενικού Λογιστηρίου και να εκταμιευθούν τα χρήματα που προορίζονται για προσλήψεις του απαραίτητου ιατρικού προσωπικού στα ΚΥΤ των νησιών της Περιφέρειας Βορείου Αιγαίου καθώς και για προμήθειες υλικού αντιμετώπισης της πανδημίας.

      Παρόλο που το σχετικό ΦΕΚ είχε υπογραφεί εδώ και καιρό και επιπλέον το ποσό αυτό είχε εγγραφεί στον προϋπολογισμό της Περιφέρειας, ο περιφερειάρχης Κώστας Μουτζούρης είχε αρνηθεί να προχωρήσει στις προσλήψεις και τις προμήθειες προτού να δει το ρευστό στους τραπεζικούς λογαριασμούς της οικονομικής του υπηρεσίας. Με αποτέλεσμα να στερούνται τα ΚΥΤ την παρουσία γιατρών όλο αυτό το κρίσιμο, όπως αποδείχθηκε, διάστημα.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/264424_ygeionomikos-apokleismos-sti-bial-tis-hioy-mono-gia-prosfyges

      –—

      Traduction reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop :

      Les employées entrées en contact avec les deux femmes enceintes porteuses de coronavirus n’ont pas été mis en quarantaine.

      La « Quarantaine uniquement pour les réfugiés » est appliquée par le Ministère de l’Immigration et de l’Asile au hot-spot de VIAL à Chios : les mesures de confinement ne concernent pas les employés du camp qui travaillent dans les secteurs sensibles, comme les employés du Premier Service d’Accueil, du Service d’Asile, mais aussi les deux sages-femmes qui avaient continué à travailler hier normalement avant qu’ils ne s’arrêtent, et même brusquement, sous prétexte de désinfestation.

      Les deux femmes enceintes dépistées positives au coronavirus et les multiples cas parmi leurs contacts placent le Centre de Réception et d’Identification en quarantaine sanitaire, mais le manque de mesures appropriées concernant les employés du camp ont mis en évidence l’incapacité des autorités de gérer la situation d’urgence à VIAL.

      Un exemple typique est cela est le fait que les deux sages-femmes qui avaient été en contact avec les femmes enceintes déjà diagnostiquées, ont continué à recevoir des visites de femmes enceintes, exposant ainsi toutes les femmes enceintes mais aussi s’exposant ainsi elles-mêmes au risque de contamination.

      Le dispensaire gynécologique a fini par fermer pour une opération de désinfestation, mais bien après avoir fonctionné plusieurs heures d’affilés.

      Une incompréhension totale a également prévalu au sein du Service d’Asile, puisque la majorité sinon la totalité des salariés, ayant en tête la décision gouvernementale de confinement sanitaire, ne sont pas allés travailler.

      Cependant, ce n’est qu’à 7 h 20 du matin qu’ils ont été informés qu’ils devraient continuer à travailler normalement et donc progressivement à partir de midi les employés ont commencé à apparaître à leur poste de travail, au moment où les rendez-vous prévus pour les entretiens avec les réfugiés étaient passés. Il va sans dire que jusqu’à hier, personne n’était en mesure de dire avec certitude quand et si les entretiens spécifiques auront lieu.

      En attendant, hier à midi, le ministère a finalement décidé de signer la provision de 300.000 euros à la Région Nord-Égée, afin d’ouvrir la voie à la Comptabilité Générale de débourser l’argent destiné au recrutement du personnel médical nécessaire aux hot-spots des îles de la Région nord de la mer Égée ainsi qu’à la fourniture de matériel de protection contre la pandémie.

    • Chios camp in quarantine after at least 30 test positive for COVID-19

      The Vial camp on the Greek island of Chios has been placed under strict quarantine measures again after it was reported that at least 30 migrants had tested positive for COVID-19.

      The Greek Migration Ministry announced on Wednesday, October 14 that it would be placing the migrant camp at Vial on the Greek island of Chios under quarantine again, after at least 30 migrants reportedly tested positive for COVID-19.

      According to the news agency dpa, the quarantine measures will be in place until at least October 21. The ministry said it was now carrying out “extensive health checks.”

      This is the second time the camp on Chios has been placed under quarantine. In August the camp was placed under quarantine after first a Yemeni man and a female employee were reported to have tested positive and then three more residents found they had the virus.

      Unable to leave camp

      In August this year, the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR confirmed that there were some 121,400 migrants and refugees in Greece. About 27,700 of those were on the Greek islands and about 3,000 people were thought to be in the Chios camp at the time. At that point the camp was holding about two thirds more than its capacity.

      According to Daily Sabah, a Turkish newspaper, all migrants in the camp will be prevented from leaving its confines and only a “small number of staff members may enter the camp.” Daily Sabah estimates that there are currently “over 3,800 asylum seekers living at the Vial camp.”

      Coronavirus in Greece

      Greece has so far had relatively few cases of coronavirus compared with many other countries in Europe. According to World Health Organization data, between January 3 and October 14 this year, there were 23,060 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 462 deaths.

      However, cases in Greece, like in many other countries, are rising. The country recorded the highest number of daily deaths so far this year on October 12, with 13 people dying from or with COVID-19.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27938/chios-camp-in-quarantine-after-at-least-30-test-positive-for-covid-19

  • Region in northwestern Bosnia sets up roadblocks to deter migrants

    Authorities in northeastern Bosnia have deployed police officers along a main transit highway to prevent migrants from entering their territory. The migrants are finding themselves trapped as neighboring regions are blocking them from walking back too.

    The local authorities in Krajino, in the northwestern part of Bosnia, have begun enforcing their decision to ban all new migrant arrivals and have set up roadblocks to prevent migrants who are headed to western Europe from entering their territory. The Krajino authorities allege that they are bearing the brunt of ongoing migration and that other parts of the country are failing to step in and help out.

    The deployment of police and the order to turn back all the migrants they encounter is an apparent violation of Bosnia’s human rights and immigration laws, AP reports.

    The roadblocks are set up on the main highway connecting Krajina to the rest of the country. Police in neighboring administrative regions of Bosnia in turn started blocking migrants from walking back, reports AP.
    Ali Razah, a Pakistani migrant, is one of hundreds trapped in the middle. He told AP that various police units had blocked him and other migrants from moving in any direction. “There is no food, no water, nothing and we are staying on the grass,” he said.

    Anti-migrant protests

    The Krajino region, on the border with Croatia, is a major transit point for migrants and refugees who aim to reach the European Union. The two towns Bihac and Velika Kladusa with their refugee and migrant camps are located in the region’s northwestern corner and have become a bottleneck for migrants — as Croatian authorities have sealed the border to the EU-member state and are reported to conduct pushbacks across the border using violence against the migrants.

    Recently, local residents of Velika Kladusa have repeatedly staged anti-migrant protests, accusing migrants of assaults and violence against the local population. On Monday August 17, hundreds of people reportedly blocked a road near a migrant reception center, complaining of harassment and increasing misbehavior by migrants in the city. The residents claim that cases of aggression and intimidation by migrants had multiplied, and that migrants from rival groups often fought or set fire to warehouses or dilapidated buildings where they they were staying.

    There are about 1,300 irregular migrants in Velika Kladusa, according to estimates by the authorities reported in the media, many of whom are sleeping rough in the surrounding area. In northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina along the Croatian border there are more than 7,000 migrants, according to ANSA.

    Political infighting

    Most migrants enter Bosnia across the Drina River on the eastern border with Serbia. From there, they cross the country to reach Krajina.

    Bosnia since 1995 has been split along ethnic lines into two highly autonomous parts - the Serb-run Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Local authorities in Krajina have long accused Bosnia’s central government of not doing enough to resolve the crisis in Bosnia and of using the migration issue to fuel political infighting.

    So far, the Bosnian Serb hard-line leader Milorad Dodik has blocked efforts to deploy the army along the border with Serbia to stem the arrival of migrants, AP writes, and he is said to have used the migration issue to promote his Serbian-first position. He has repeatedly pressed for Serbs to separate from multi-ethnic Bosnia and unite with Serbia. Dodik refused to accommodate any migrants in the country’s autonomous Serb-run half and instead pushed them into Krajina.

    ’Closing borders is not a solution’

    Migrant aid groups working on the ground, however, stress that local authorities lack the willingness for practical solutions too. “The big problem is that we do not see a willingness from the different governments – international, national or local – to make a solution, to sit together with different groups and try to find a way to make the situation less hard for everyone,” a member of the NGO ’No Name Kitchen’ which helps migrants and refugees in Bosnia and Serbia told the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIRN), reported the BalkanInsight, in light of growing tensions towards migrants.

    “Opening camps and closing borders is not a solution,” they told BIRN. “It is just a patch. So we have people in transit who have nowhere to go, no tents, no blankets… If they try to reach an EU country, it is common that they get pushed back and normally with violence. Camps paid for by EU money are full and renting a house is not allowed. At the same time, locals are exhausted,” ’No Name Kitchen’ told BIRN.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/26832/region-in-northwestern-bosnia-sets-up-roadblocks-to-deter-migrants

    #militarisation_des_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #frontières #Bosnie #barrages_routiers #fermeture_des_frontières #Krajino

  • Rights in route. The “#quarantine_ships” between risks and criticisms

    The use of quarantine ships is one of the measures put in place by the Italian government to deal with the arrivals of foreign nationals in times of pandemic. Almost two months after the start of this experiment, it is possible to make a first assessment of the adequacy and criticism entailed in this measure.

    The first experiment was carried out on board the ship Rubattino, run by the Tirrenia company, which hosted 183 people between the 17 April and the 5 May. On the 19 April, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportations launched a procedure for the chartering of vessels for the assistance and “health surveillance” of migrants autonomously arriving on the Italian coasts or rescued in SAR operations. The #Moby_Zazà was then identified as a “quarantine ship” capable of accommodating up to 250 people. 160 migrants, whose Covid-19 test was finally negative, left the ship on the 30 May.

    The issue of the controversial interministerial decree no. 150 of 7 April 2020 gave rise to the redefinition of post-disembarkation procedures. The decree establishes that, during the health emergency caused by the spread of Covid-19, Italian ports cannot be classified as safe places, place of safety, for the landing of migrants.

    On 12 April, Decree no. 1287/2020 of the Head of the Civil Protection Department was published, entrusting the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration of the Ministry of the Interior with the management of procedures related to the fiduciary isolation and quarantine of foreign citizens rescued or arrived independently by sea. On the basis of this decree, the Ministry of Interior, together with the Italian Red Cross, may use ships for the “health surveillance” period “with reference to persons rescued at sea and for whom it is not possible to indicate the “Place of Safety”. This indication, apparently sibylline, refers to the persons referred to in the decree of 7 April, i.e. persons rescued outside the Italian SAR by ships flying a foreign flag for which Italian ports cannot be considered “safe places”. Migrants arriving autonomously, i.e. not as a result of SAR operations, should in the first instance carry out the quarantine period in reception facilities on the territory and not on ships, unless it is for some reason impossible to identify such facilities, as in fact happened for many people disembarked in Italy in May and June.

    A number of problems arise from use of the so-called quarantine ships. First of all, it is a device for the deprivation of personal freedom which differs clearly from the measures to which foreign citizens who have come to Italy by other means have been subjected during the lockdown. The Interministerial Decree of 17 March provided that persons arriving from abroad, in the absence of symptoms, must report their return to the public sanitary office, prevention department, and undergo isolation and health surveillance for a period of 14 days. It is therefore a formula with markedly discriminatory characteristics.

    With regard to the conditions in which people are inside the ship, the words of the National Ombudsman for the rights of prisoners effectively paint the situation of the Moby Zaza: “the […] playful image painted on the hull, corresponds dramatically to the reality of those who, presumably escaped from wars or imprisonments, await the flow of the, though dutiful, quarantine with a lack of certain information and support against despair”.

    The use of ships for the quarantine also has important symbolic value both for migrants subjected to the measure and in the political debate linked to the issue of disembarkation and the sharing of responsibility among the European member states in the field of migration.

    Finally, no news has been spread about the procedures that are implemented on the ships, about the support that is or is not provided to foreign citizens, about the possible police investigations carried out on board and about institutional and non institutional actors operating on board.

    For this reason, a request for access to the files was sent to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Health to find out which procedures are implemented on board, how they are carried out and who is involved.

    From the first answers received from the Civil Liberty and Immigration Department, as implementing entity, it is clear only the role of the Italian Red Cross responsible for health care measures, cultural linguistic mediation, social assistance, psychological support and identification of vulnerabilities.

    Finally, particular attention deserves the future of this praxis: migration management policies in recent years teach us that the major innovations have been introduced to manage emergencies. The hotspots themselves were set up in 2015 as an extraordinary measure to deal with a situation where the number of people arriving in Italy and Greece was extremely high. However, this system, having ended “the emergency”, continued to operate and became fully integrated into the ordinary management system of migration, revolutionizing it and introducing serious violations of the rights of foreign citizens.

    It is therefore necessary to ensure that quarantine ships do not become the forerunner of “#hotspot_ships”, “hotspot platforms” or other systems aimed at preventing foreign citizens rescued at sea from disembarking in Italy. The conditions of the ships, their structural isolation, the difficult monitoring and the impossibility of the contacts with civil society, make this formula absolutely inadequate for carrying out the delicate operations of reception, information, definition of the legal status of foreign citizens.

    https://inlimine.asgi.it/rights-in-route-the-quarantine-ships-between-risks-and-criticisms

    #navi_quarantena #hotspot #bateaux_hotspots #frontières_mobiles #Italie #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #navi-quarantena #Méditerranée #mer #bateaux_quarantaine #bateau_quarantaine

    ping @isskein

    • Cosa sono e quanto costano le navi da quarantena per i migranti?

      Le navi da quarantena sono traghetti privati usati per isolare i migranti arrivati in Italia via mare e sono state istituite dal governo il 12 aprile con un decreto della Protezione civile, dopo che era stato dichiarato lo stato di emergenza per l’epidemia di coronavirus. Lo stato di emergenza terminerà il 31 luglio e non è ancora chiaro se le navi da quarantena rimarranno operative. Secondo il decreto, sui traghetti dovrebbero essere trasferite tutte le persone che sono state soccorse dalle imbarcazioni delle ong, tuttavia negli ultimi mesi sono stati confinati su queste strutture anche alcuni migranti che erano arrivati a terra direttamente con delle imbarcazioni di fortuna partite dalla Tunisia o dalla Libia.

      Le navi da quarantena sono sotto accusa da quando, il 20 maggio scorso, un ragazzo tunisino di 28 anni si è buttato in mare per raggiungere a nuoto la costa ed è morto. L’ultimo caso di un trasbordo su una nave da quarantena che ha fatto discutere è quello che ha coinvolto la nave Ocean Viking dell’ong Sos Meditérranée: bloccata per dieci giorni in mare, la notte del 6 luglio ha ricevuto dalle autorità italiane l’autorizzazione ad attraccare a Porto Empedocle, da dove i migranti sono stati trasferiti sulla Moby Zazà, anche se sono risultati tutti negativi al test per il covid-19.

      Come funzionano
      I traghetti Rubattino e Moby Zazà della Compagnia italiana di navigazione (Cin, già Tirrenia) sono le due navi passeggeri usate per la quarantena dei migranti. La Rubattino è stata attiva fino al 7 maggio ed è stata usata per la quarantena di 180 persone soccorse dalla nave della ong Sea Eye, Alan Kurdi, il 17 aprile 2020 e dall’imbarcazione Aita Mari il 19 aprile 2020. La Moby Zazà è diventata operativa il 12 maggio e attualmente il contratto è valido fino al 13 luglio.

      Per il nolo di questa nave la Compagnia italiana di navigazione ha ricevuto una somma che oscilla tra 900mila euro e 1,2 milioni di euro. La sorveglianza sanitaria a bordo è svolta dagli operatori della Croce rossa italiana (Cri). “Le navi non sono ospedali, sono traghetti passeggeri, attrezzati per ospitare circa 250 persone”, spiega la responsabile immigrazione della Croce rossa (Cri) Francesca Basile. “Dal 15 maggio la Moby Zazà ha ospitato 680 persone”, continua Basile, che assicura che sulla nave medici, infermieri e operatori culturali sono protetti da dispositivi di sicurezza e seguono tutti i protocolli sanitari per garantire la salute delle persone.

      Chi risulta negativo al test per il coronavirus rimane a bordo per quindici giorni, chi risulta positivo rimane sulla nave fino al momento in cui il tampone diventa negativo. “Abbiamo riscontrato una trentina di persone positive al test dall’inizio dell’operazione a maggio. Erano tutti asintomatici. Sono stati isolati a bordo della nave in una zona rossa, su uno dei ponti. Finché il tampone non è diventato negativo”, spiega la responsabile della Croce rossa.

      I costi e le criticità
      Alcuni esperti hanno però evidenziato diverse criticità di queste navi, soprattutto dopo che il 20 maggio un ragazzo tunisino si è gettato in mare ed è morto, mentre tentava di raggiungere la costa a nuoto. Valentina Brinis, operatrice legale dell’ong Open Arms, spiega che tenere le persone per lunghi periodi a bordo di una nave provoca un disagio psicologico, che anche in passato ha spinto le persone a gettarsi in mare. “Come Open Arms abbiamo avuto esperienza di quanto sia rischioso tenere a bordo le persone per un periodo di tempo prolungato, come c’è già successo nell’agosto del 2019 nella missione 66”.

      In quel caso le condizioni psicologiche critiche delle persone erano state documentate anche dal procuratore di Agrigento, Luigi Patronaggio che aveva parlato di “grande disagio fisico e psichico, di profonda prostrazione psicologica e di altissima tensione emozionale che avrebbero potuto provocare reazioni difficilmente controllabili delle quali, peraltro, i diversi tentativi di raggiungere a nuoto l’isola costituivano solo un preludio”.

      Per l’operatrice la quarantena andrebbe svolta a terra, nei centri di accoglienza e negli hotspot, perché “sulla nave è difficile mantenere una situazione di calma quando le persone hanno un vissuto molto traumatico”. Spesso tra le altre cose le persone sono fatte scendere a terra per poi risalire a bordo della nave da quarantena, “creando incomprensioni e frustrazioni che possono essere state all’origine del gesto del ragazzo che si è gettato in mare”. Un altro elemento di criticità è la violazione delle leggi internazionali sul soccorso in mare: le Convenzioni internazionali sul soccorso in mare stabiliscono infatti che le persone soccorse debbano essere rapidamente portate a terra e solo una volta arrivate in un place of safety (Pos) i soccorsi sono da ritenersi conclusi.

      Infine non sono chiari i protocolli seguiti a bordo delle navi da quarantena, mentre nei centri a terra ci sono delle normative (i capitolati hotspot) che regolamentano ogni aspetto di questi luoghi in cui le persone sono private temporaneamente della libertà personale. Anche dal punto di vista medico, uno studio coordinato da Joacim Rocklöv, docente di epidemiologia all’Università Umeå, in Svezia, pubblicato sul Journal of travel medicine, ha mostrato che il confinamento delle persone a bordo delle navi (in quel caso si trattava della nave da crociera Diamond Princess) non è efficace per limitare il contagio. Secondo lo studio, l’evacuazione della nave avrebbe portato a un ottavo circa i casi riscontrati al termine della quarantena a bordo.

      Per l’esperto di diritto marittimo Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo anche la conformità alle leggi di questo tipo di navi è dubbia, anche se consentita dalle direttive europee: “Un documento non vincolante della Commissione Europea sembra prevedere, con limiti assai discrezionali, questa vistosa violazione delle regole dettate in materia di prima accoglienza dalle direttive dell’Unione europea, dal diritto internazionale del mare e dall’articolo 10 ter del testo unico sull’immigrazione n.286 del 1998”, afferma Vassallo Paleologo.

      Dopo l’Italia, anche Malta ha adottato questo tipo di navi turistiche adibite a navi da quarantena per gli stranieri

      Secondo la Commissione europea infatti,“per quanto riguarda le condizioni di accoglienza, gli stati membri possono avvalersi della possibilità prevista dalla direttiva 2013/33/UE di stabilire, in casi debitamente giustificati e per un periodo ragionevole di durata più breve possibile, modalità relative alle condizioni materiali di accoglienza diverse da quelle normalmente richieste. Tali modalità devono in ogni caso garantire che si provveda alle esigenze essenziali, compresa l’assistenza sanitaria. Le misure di quarantena o di isolamento per la prevenzione della diffusione della covid-19 non sono disciplinate dall’acquis dell’Unione europea in materia di asilo. Tali misure possono essere imposte anche ai richiedenti asilo conformemente alla normativa nazionale, a condizione che siano necessarie, proporzionate e non discriminatorie”.

      “Rimane dunque da accertare se il trattenimento in quarantena a bordo di navi traghetto ancorate in mare, come la Moby Zazà sia ‘necessario, proporzionato e non discriminatorio’. La prassi del trattenimento su navi traghetto destinate alla quarantena dei naufraghi ha comunque disatteso il chiaro indirizzo fornito dalla Corte di cassazione con la sentenza del 20 febbraio 2020, sul caso Rackete, che ribadisce come le operazioni di soccorso in mare si concludano soltanto con lo sbarco a terra, in conformità del diritto internazionale e della normativa interna”, conclude l’esperto.

      Dopo l’Italia, anche Malta ha adottato questo tipo di navi turistiche adibite a navi da quarantena per gli stranieri. Nelle ultime settimane sono state tenute al largo 425 persone su navi private, per un costo complessivo di 1,7 milioni di euro. “La maggior parte di questi soldi sono stati usati per le 33mila ore di sorveglianza ai migranti”, spiega il quotidiano The Times of Malta, soprattutto per evitare che facessero gesti di autolesionismo o che si gettassero in acqua. Ora La Valletta vorrebbe chiedere i soldi di questa operazione all’Unione europea, che ha già fatto sapere che non li rimborserà.

      https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2020/07/07/navi-quarantena-moby-zaza

      #coût #Italie #Malte #coronavirus #quarantaine #confinement #covid-19 #décret #protection_civile #ferries #privatisation #sauvetage #Rubattino #Compagnia_italiana_di_navigazione #Cin #Tirrenia #Croce_rossa_italiana (#Cri)

    • Migrant tourist boats operation cost €1.7 million

      The government provides a breakdown of costs as it pushes for EU funding.

      Hosting 425 migrants on four boats out at sea cost taxpayers €1.7 million and discussions to secure EU funds are ongoing, the government said on Monday.

      The vast majority of that cost - €1 million - went to pay for the 33,000 hours of security services needed to keep watch of the migrants.

      They were detained aboard the boats after Malta closed its ports when declaring a public health emergency over the COVID-19 pandemic.

      They were only brought ashore over fears of a takeover on one of them.

      On Monday the government said in a statement that renting the four vessels racked up a bill of €363,440: €3,000 a day for each Captain Morgan boat and €6,500 for one owned by Supreme Travel.

      The sum of €212,646.12 was paid out to 33 companies for the provision of food, drinks, sanitation products and clothes.

      Vessels needed to be rented out to deliver these items, and this cost €87,741. The disembarkation procedure meanwhile cost €10,908.12.

      In the statement the government said that talks with the EU about funding for the costs were ongoing.

      While the government has said that it expects the EU to foot the bill for the operation, the EU has said that Malta’s application for funding is “not eligible for support”.

      https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/migrant-tourist-boats-operation-cost-17-million.803181

    • Italie : dans les #navires_de_quarantaine, des centaines de migrants enfermés loin des regards

      En raison du Covid-19, des centaines de migrants sont actuellement confinés dans des navires amarrés au large de ports italiens, afin d’observer une quarantaine de plusieurs semaines. La situation à bord est floue, presque aucune information ne circulant sur leurs conditions de vie.

      À leur arrivée à Lampedusa, après avoir traversé la Méditerranée, les migrants ne mettent pas tous le pied à terre. Ils sont le plus souvent transférés dans des ferries afin de limiter la surpopulation du seul centre d’accueil de l’île italienne qui dispose d’un peu moins de 100 places. Enfermés à bord de ces navires amarrés au large de plusieurs ports italiens, les exilés doivent observer une période de quarantaine de 14 jours, dans le but d’éviter la propagation de la pandémie de Covid-19.

      « En théorie, ils restent deux semaines, mais il semblerait que parfois cela dure plus longtemps », signale à InfoMigrants Flavio Di Giacomo, porte-parole de l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM).
      Très peu d’informations sur la situation à bord

      Les informations sur les conditions de vie à bord de ces centres flottants sont rares et difficiles à obtenir. Plusieurs centaines de migrants, pour la plupart originaires de Tunisie, vivent actuellement loin des regards dans ces bateaux.

      L’OIM admet avoir peu de détails sur la situation dans ces navires. « Nous n’avons pas d’équipe à l’intérieur de ces structures, donc peu d’informations à ce sujet. Nous ne savons pas combien de personnes y sont retenues, ni quel est leur quotidien », indique Flavio Di Giacomo.

      Selon Majdi Karbai, député tunisien du parti du courant démocratique joint par InfoMigrants, on dénombre environ 700 migrants pour le seul navire Azzura, positionné au large du port sicilien d’Augusta. « Je suis en contact avec des personnes à bord de ce ferry, mais je ne sais pas combien sont enfermées dans les autres navires. Il y en a aussi à Palerme ou en Calabre », précise-t-il.

      https://twitter.com/karbai/status/1311680948073832455

      Le 18 septembre, le député publie sur Twitter une vidéo filmée à bord de l’Azzurra, avec ce commentaire : « Tentative de suicide d’un migrant tunisien ». Les images laissent deviner un homme au sol au loin, entouré de plusieurs personnes. Il sera finalement pris en charge à l’hôpital, explique Majdi Karbai.
      Un migrant disparu après avoir tenté de s’échapper

      Le 1er octobre, il signale sur le même réseau social que cinq Tunisiens ont tenté de s’échapper d’un navire de quarantaine amarré à Palerme, en Sicile. « Deux sont tombés sur le quai et se sont cassés la jambe, trois se sont enfuis avant d’être arrêtés par la police », raconte le député.

      https://twitter.com/karbai/status/1311679465609719813

      Quelques jours plus tard, les médias italiens rapportent une histoire similaire. Dans la nuit du samedi 3 au dimanche 4 octobre, trois autres migrants ont sauté à l’eau depuis le navire Azzura. Deux d’entre eux ont été récupérés par des pompiers mais le troisième a disparu. Les recherches n’ont pas permis de le retrouver, laissant craindre une noyade.

      « Les migrants tentent de s’échapper de ces bateaux car ils redoutent d’être renvoyés en Tunisie », signale Majdi Karbai. Des dizaines de personnes ont en effet été transférées directement depuis ces navires vers des centres de renvoi, en vue d’une expulsion. D’autres ont reçu une obligation de quitter le territoire italien sous sept jours.

      « On ne sait pas pourquoi untel est renvoyé, et un autre écope de ce document. Tout est flou. Certains pourraient bénéficier d’une protection internationale mais ils n’ont eu accès à aucun avocat et n’ont pas pu demander l’asile », souligne le député. « Les droits de ces personnes sont bafoués », déplore encore Majdi Karbai.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/27749/italie-dans-les-navires-de-quarantaine-des-centaines-de-migrants-enfer

      Déjà signalé sur seenthis par @veronique_petit :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/879809

    • Abbandonati nei #CAS quarantena in attesa del rimpatrio

      In questi giorni la campagna LasciateCIEntrare sta raccogliendo diverse testimonianze di cittadini tunisini stritolati all’interno del sistema di controllo e trattenimento a cui sono sottoposti una volta intercettati allo sbarco. Che siano posti su navi quarantena, di fatto diventate luoghi di detenzione illegittima, o immediatamente all’interno di Cas quarantena detentivi, le procedure a cui sono sottoposti sono perlopiù funzionali ad un rimpatrio immediato. In questo dispositivo di trattenimento-rimpatrio non c’è alcuno spazio per la salvaguardia dei diritti fondamentali e per la tutela delle persone.

      «Quali sono gli accordi criminali stipulati tra Tunisia ed Italia? Cos’è questa orribile macchina aspira e sputa uomini?», afferma Yasmine Accardo, referente della campagna che sta inviando segnalazioni al Garante delle persone private della libertà e insieme a LasciateCIEntrare invoca il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali.

      «Si tratta ancora una volta di situazioni di gravità assoluta che ricordano che in futuro sarà anche peggio e che dovrebbero portare ad una denuncia e mobilitazione univoca delle persone e delle organizzazioni che ancora credono che esista un mondo di diritto», continua l’attivista.

      «I nuovi tanto acclamati decreti si inseriscono così perfettamente in questo contesto: lasciate ogni speranza voi che entrate. Noi non ci stiamo! Chiediamo un’immediata mobilitazione perché vengano liberate queste persone trattenute illegittimamente ed in condizioni di trattamenti inumani e degradanti».

      Le ultime testimonianze raccolte provengono da gruppi di persone trattenute in Sicilia a Trapani e Caltanissetta.
      Testimonianze da Trapani

      Arrivati il 19 settembre a Lampedusa, i cittadini tunisini dopo circa 3 giorni sono stati trasferiti in quarantena in un Cas a Valderice a Trapani, chiamato “Villa Sant’Andrea”. Fin dallo sbarco non hanno ricevuto alcuna adeguata informativa. Sono stati letteralmente sbattuti in questo centro e obbligati, per l’emergenza sanitaria Covid-19, a restare in quarantena. Nessuna figura di mediazione, nessuna attenzione per far sì che questo periodo di isolamento, reso necessario di questi tempi, potesse esser compreso come qualcosa a tutela della propria e altrui salute.

      Alcuni fuggono dal centro ed immediatamente si scatena la protesta dei vicini che chiedono maggiori protezioni, con in prima linea il sindaco di Valderice che pretende maggiori controlli. Verranno quindi costruite sbarre e potenziata la sorveglianza.

      La popolazione ha paura ed un «CAS quarantena» non è gradito. Nessun tentativo di portare anche solo un messaggio di vicinanza positiva, di benvenuto. Insulti e rabbia accolgono le persone che arrivano. Ben inteso di questi tempi ognuno di noi (lo sa bene chi è stato o sta in quarantena) viene evitato e guardato come un untore, con pochissimi che si preoccupano della solitudine di chi si trova “internato” o di portare un minimo di conforto anche da lontano.

      La paura è fuori verso chi è imprigionato, e dentro chi è isolato non trova niente di buono, solo polizia, rabbia, insulti in stanze approntate alla bell’e meglio con materassi di gommapiuma per terra e le solite porzioni di cibo freddo ed immangiabile.

      La parola «accoglienza» è qualcosa di profondamente lontano e questo gruppo di tunisini è più “fortunato di altri” perché se non altro non sono costretti a rimanere nelle navi quarantena anche per oltre un mese.

      Il centro che li ospita in questa detenzione strutturata per la quarantena, e che in realtà diventa pre-rimpatrio, è gestito da Badia Grande, perché i re del business dell’accoglienza ovviamente ne hanno approfittato subito anche in questa situazione: tanto i servizi sono ridotti all’osso. Non ci sono nemmeno le coperte. Stanze e materassi buttati a terra. “Minimal reception” mentre c’è sempre un grande guadagno e intanto i diritti sono al ribasso, se non proprio in estinzione. Un lavoro facile facile: quarantena e via. Quarantena e via. Perché qui non ci sono persone. Sole ombre di cui non resteranno nemmeno i resti.

      Ci rimangono le storie come quella di G. che deve essere raccontata perché si sappia ciò che accade.

      Il 24 settembre la polizia entra nelle stanze per prendere un gruppo di uomini per portarli in un altro centro, scopriremmo poi che si tratta del Cpr di via Corelli a Milano. G. è disperato, non vuole essere rimpatriato e si butta dal secondo piano.

      Cade e si rompe entrambe le gambe. Viene condotto al pronto soccorso di Trapani dove farà l’intervento il 7 ottobre. Due giorni dopo è già di nuovo sul materasso di gommapiuma buttato a terra nel centro di Badia Grande. Ha dolore alle gambe e non sa a chi chiedere aiuto.

      Nei giorni di ospedalizzazione aveva detto “non voglio tornare in quel posto orribile! Fatemi restare in ospedale finchè non mi sento bene. Per camminare mi servono le stampelle, ma ora ho troppo dolore”.

      Eppure il medico del reparto in cui G. è rimasto per due settimane ha ritenuto di dimetterlo solo due giorni dopo l’intervento.

      G. è ancora in attesa di poter essere riconosciuto come persona. Persona. Non come richiedente protezione che è un salto troppo lungo, quando nemmeno le basi del diritto esistono più.

      Vorrebbe capire se ci sono diritti dove è arrivato, vorrebbe sapere quali sono le procedure e perché fin dall’inizio è stato trattato come un vestito vuoto. Vuole capire perché qui ha trovato solo restrizioni e dolore.

      Il 9 ottobre hanno rimpatriato 80 tunisini in un giorno.
      Testimonianze da Caltanissetta

      Erano sulla nave quarantena GNV di fronte a Trapani. L’8 ottobre, circa 200 persone sono state trasferite dentro il CARA di Caltanissetta, in un’area posta proprio a fianco del CPR, al momento inagibile.

      Giunti nel centro intorno all’una di notte hanno trovato ad accoglierli materassi per terra in uno spazio circondato da polizia e militari. In condizioni disumane per tutta la notte hanno provato a protestare senza ottenere che parole monche e rimandi.

      Il giorno successivo un unico operatore urlante insieme ad un mediatore ha spiegato a 200 persone, stanche e preoccupate di trovarsi in condizioni così degradanti, quali sono le procedure: se vogliono chiedere la protezione possono farlo e la domanda verrà valutata dalla Commissione in tempi rapidi: 5 gg. Chi non farà domanda verrà rimpatriato.

      Tra di loro vi sono persone vulnerabili con patologie croniche, come il diabete, e da quando sono stati posti in quarantena non hanno ricevuto i farmaci a loro indispensabili. Sulla nave hanno fatto il test per il Covid-19 risultando negativi, si aspettavano dunque di raggiungere un centro di accoglienza degno di questo nome: invece il duro asfalto e materassi in gommapiuma a terra. Le condizioni dei bagni sono ovviamente impressionanti. «Se entriamo ci prendiamo una malattia certamente», ci dicono.

      C’è grande preoccupazione inoltre per il virus. Alla fine del trasferimento gestito dalla Croce Rossa, si sono ritrovati tutti insieme i gruppi provenienti dai piani diversi della nave quarantena. Alcuni di loro ci dicono che al settimo piano avevano messo i positivi: «Qui invece siamo tutti insieme. Tra noi ci sono alcuni positivi. Se eravamo negativi ora ci infetteremo tutti». Altri ripetono: “Ci hanno detto che proprio perché ci sono i positivi meglio che ci rimpatriano presto così non ci infettiamo”.

      E’ il caos totale tra persone in lacrime e chi vorrebbe tentare il suicidio. In una situazione di continui trattenimenti e scarsa informativa dove "ci trattano come schiavi e peggio delle bestie. Può succedere qualsiasi cosa. Siamo tutti spaventati. Quanto manterremo l’equilibrio in questa situazione?”.

      Anche le informazioni relativamente a chi è infetto e chi non lo è derivano da una gestione vergognosamente approssimata, autorità e sottoposti che hanno mescolato persone senza spiegare nulla, come fossero chicchi di mais. Così aumenta la paura e il sospetto e si rischia la caccia all’untore in un gruppo di persone già fortemente provato. Nessuna di loro ha incontrato organizzazioni di tutela delle persone, tenute evidentemente alla larga o conniventi e silenti con quanto sta accadendo.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/Abbandonati-nei-CAS-quarantena-in-attesa-del-rimpatrio.html

      #Trapani #Caltanissetta

    • Italy Has Turned Cruise Liners Into Jails for Migrants

      With Italy’s tourist sector sunk by the pandemic, authorities are now hiring cruise ships as floating jails for refugees. The migrant prisons show capitalism’s ability to restructure in times of crisis — but also the potential resistance to it.

      How do you make a prison?

      We like to imagine things being built from scratch. Perhaps stone and mortar heaped up by little computer game figurines, or Lego building blocks piled high. Most of the time, we have a simple idea of how our world is constructed, falling back on the games we played as children. Maybe this was occasionally the case when colonizers built their outposts. Perhaps they, too, were children once. But today’s world is already too built up for such endeavors — too full of things. Capitalists prefer to use what they find lying around, rather than invest in start-ups.

      On the Mediterranean island of Sicily, the material at hand was the cruise ship — and the prison it has been converted into is the so-called quarantine ship, on which newly arriving immigrants are forcibly kept. These new prisons are the single piece of technology that most succinctly sums up the transformations underway in Italy’s COVID-19 capitalism. Doubtless, other islands and continents have their own landmarks strewn across the landscape of contagion, from the New York hotel rooms packed with the homeless, to the food warehouses of central Nigeria. (And to each monument, its resistance: the lawsuits being filed in US courts, or the looting of stockpiles by Nigerian protesters).

      The Sicilian case can, even so, be used to open up some wider questions about what’s going on in this surreal border moment in history, how capitalism is reacting, and what forms of resistance we are witnessing. For years, working-class Africans and Asians have hammered on the gates of Europe to readdress the balance in global inequalities. The articulate call for freedom that reverberates from the borders is not hard to hear: one need only block out the deafening silence of our current barbarism.

      So, what I will attempt to show, here, is that the resistance to the authoritarianism unleashed by the pandemic does have a side that can be supported by progressive forces — that is, without being dragged into the pitfalls of repudiating scientific evidence, casting aside our masks and our principles. It provides a way to hold onto the thought that perhaps, at the end of all this, our governments might build something other than prisons.
      From Cruise Ships To Floating Prisons

      One of the first media stories that lifted the pandemic beyond China’s borders (a long ten months ago) was the quarantining of the Diamond Princess. This British-owned cruise ship was quarantined at the port of Okinawa, Japan in early February, with almost four thousand passengers and crew on board. Over the following month, one-fifth of the passengers were infected and gradually flown off to their respective countries or disembarked at port (the crew were less fortunate and less mobile). There were fourteen deaths. This was followed by other mass outbreaks on cruise ships: the Rotterdam, the Zaandam, the Ruby Princess, and the Greg Mortimer — all luxury holiday vessels that helped spread the virus around the world. The last of these was probably responsible for half the cases in Australia.

      Alongside the many criticisms made of how the Japanese authorities blocked everyone on board, leading to unnecessary deaths, it quickly became clear that cruise holidays would be one of the first markets to be axed in the name of human survival. Or rather, that the perils were so clear that tourists would soon disappear — and the invisible hand of the market would do its work. The sector sank. The cruise companies had, recently, began to hoist hopes of a new start to their ventures — but the second wave dashed such vanities.

      Leaving aside the glee one may draw from the shipowners’ misfortune, cruise holidays also provide an extraordinary symbol of our contemporary crisis. They bring the generational divide — a far wealthier older generation with expendable capital — into collision with the hypermobile internationalism of contemporary capitalism. The same hypermobility, that is, which brought us just-in-time logistics operations, international art fairs, and (as the Marxist geographer David Harvey has rightly pointed out) the pandemic itself.

      The cruise holiday’s disappearance was marked by a “traumatic” event: holidaymakers being held in quarantine on the ships. Indeed, journalists focused on passengers’ complaints and the sight of the upper classes roughing it onboard, while paying much less attention to the thousands of crew members trapped in cramped conditions. And as the cruise companies went bust and photographs of the new ship graveyards circulated on the internet, replete with the watery tears of the World Economic Forum and Saudi princes, far fewer words have been given over to one of the more peculiar yet indicative ways in which the sector has been rerouted: the “quarantine ship.”

      The Italian government first landed on the idea of using ships to quarantine newly arrived migrants from Africa back in May, when the ferry liner Moby Zazà was sequestered for this purpose and docked near the island of Lampedusa with several hundred people trapped on board. Since then, two cruise companies — GNV and SNAV — have won public tenders to provide a small fleet of cruise ships employed to quarantine hundreds of people at a time. The companies are being paid around €100 per person, per day for this service: over €1 million a month per ship.

      Those on board — mostly from Tunisia, but also Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Libya, Syria, and across West Africa — have experienced widely varying living conditions in isolation. Some of the ships have doctors and lawyers on board. Less fortunate passengers have seen only guards, crew, and police dogs. Newly arriving migrants, having already passed through the hell and high water of the Libyan war and the Mediterranean Sea, are trapped on board for a month or more, in conditions that potentially favor rather than prevent contagion. Even more extraordinarily, several cases have been brought to light of asylum seekers being sent from centers on mainland Italy to the quarantine ships, whether as a prevention against contagion or simply to punish those who rebel.

      Perhaps we might more aptly baptize such vessels “temporary prison ships” or even “floating hot spots.” This last phrase is especially appropriate given that a few years ago the Italian government proposed that the so-called EU border “hot spot” centers (for the mass identification and detention of newly arriving immigrants, experimented on Italian and Greek islands) be set up on ships — naming them “floating hot spots,” no less. The idea was dumped by the EU for infringing on just one too many human rights. But in love, war, and pandemic, anything goes. Here’s a short transcription of a video made by a young Ghanaian man removed by the Red Cross from his refugee hostel in the middle of the night:

      Last Sunday they bring people, say that they want to test us for COVID-19 . . . they tell me, they said I have positive. They take me from Roma to Palermo . . . I was asking my camp people — who tell me I am positive — so tell me, where is my positive document? They couldn’t show me . . . So now everyone in Roma with coronavirus, they are going to collect them on the ship? They quarantine me in Palermo, now we are in the Bari seaport, right now. Since they brought me here, no medicine, I couldn’t see doctor with my face . . . Try your best, and post [this video] to everywhere, so that the Italian leaders can also play it, to hear it, to fight for we the immigrants.

      Luxury Containers

      The use of luxury structures as centers of confinement is familiar to recent immigrants in Italy — and indeed to anyone (of whatever politics) who has followed the development of the Italian asylum system. It is extremely common for asylum seekers to be housed in government-funded (but privately run) hostels in former hotels, whether in the mountains or on the beach. Again, we very often find that these buildings have a lackluster history of Mafia-ish building speculation, rickety funding programs, market failure, and, finally, reconversion into hostels for asylum seekers. Or, to be a little less diplomatic, temporary housing for poor blacks.

      Failed beach resorts and ski chalets were not the only businesses to be propped up: you also find a range of failed old people’s homes, failed foster homes, failed student halls, etc. Furthermore, over the years the hotel-turned-camp has become the unwitting symbol of the far-right’s smear campaign against the African working class. Labeled as feckless, lazy, and presumptuous, for years asylum seekers’ protests for basic amenities (Wi-Fi, decent food, medical attention) were reported under headlines such as “Migrants Refuse 5* Hotel” or “We Want WiFi! Hotel Not Good Enough For Migrants” and similar.

      This kind of conversion of large housing structures from holiday homes/vessels into prisons/sites of confinement — floating or otherwise — represents a moment in what we might call “capitalist restructuring,” in which fixed capital has to be put to new uses. Following the Italian recession of 2012, these hostels and other containers were filled with the proletariat castoff (in one way or another) by the concurrent Arab Spring. The “quarantine ships” provide another moment of such restructuring. This is representative of the kind of response we are seeing, and probably will continue to see, to the global recession of 2020: not cuts and austerity, but active investment and reconversion of industries, in spurts of booming and busting that follow the contractions and spasms of waves of contagion. So much for the ways of capital.

      The question hanging over all of this, however, is to what extent this new world of things can be reshaped toward greater freedom, and not less. Mothballed factories can often be reopened, so long as the appropriate use is found. Moments of restructuring are not maneuvered by divine forces, but by ideas and the capacity of human beings to act upon those ideas. In the quarantine ships, we find the enactment of a particular idea of containment and the reconversion of luxury capital to those ends. It privileges containment as prison, over containment as community.

      But what if the capital of luxury could be converted into a common luxury? What if the rusty wreckage of today could become the raw material of tomorrow’s visionary futures? The very idea around which these prisons are being formed is the kernel of revolutionary thought: isolation, exodus, the commune. For every Robinson Crusoe (isolated by accident), there is a Maroon community (isolated by choice!). There was and still is a choice about the direction that the current moment of restructuring takes.

      The fixed capital of old sectors now laid into the waste bin of history — luxury cruise ships, packed shopping malls, packed anything really — can be put to new uses of many kinds. What we have seen with the “quarantine ships” is the expression of an authoritarian tendency that has prevailed over a utopian one. The idea of isolation has been interpreted as a prison rather than a holiday, as Lord of the Flies rather than Never Never Land.

      Michel Foucault noted these two opposing tendencies some four decades ago when he wrote: “The exile of the leper and the arrest of the plague do not bring with them the same political dream. The first is that of a pure community, the second that of a disciplined society.” And what if — as the Zapatistas have suggested in their reaction to the pandemic — the disciplined society was not that of an authoritarian disciplining, but rather one in which we ourselves have taken responsibility? What if instead of trying to force people to stay in a place of violence, we could instead make a site of quarantine so full of care, of luxury, of fulfilled desires, that no one wanted to leave it?

      The type of society I am alluding to is one that we have mentioned already: the holiday resort. OK, perhaps not the holiday resort as such — not Princess Cruises or the Four Seasons. Maybe capitalism still hasn’t managed to provide us with a true holiday. But perhaps even this minute form of utopia, the utopia of not working, of minibars and sun loungers, of exotic locations and intimate company, contains a small, tarnished vision of freedom.
      Diving for Freedom

      Perhaps it seems fanciful, even in bad taste, to discuss the utopian potential of containment amid a pandemic. Even more so to ponder such possibilities for Europe’s most exploited and least free population, the recently arrived working-class Africans and Asians aboard these ships. But the drive for freedom is there — rearing its head despite all the odds.

      Migrants have broken out and evaded every prison designed to contain them. People have run away from quarantine centers on land, leading to manhunts for Arabs in the forests of Sicily’s mountain ranges. There have been mass breakouts at the militarized “hub” in Villa Sikania, where an Ethiopian man was killed by a speeding car as he ran from the gates. They have fought with the police on board the quarantine ships, they — “the Tunisian heroes” as a Moroccan comrade has dubbed them — have burnt their beds in the detention centers. They have swallowed razor blades to protest their watery imprisonment and impending deportation. Like the young Ghanaian man quoted above, they have reached out to leaders and formed alliances with activists.

      Some have even dived overboard to reach dry ground. At least one man on board the Moby Zazà, the very first quarantine ship, died in the effort — if we needed reminding that the flight from containment can be a fight to the death.

      This is not the first time that people rescued from the Mediterranean route have later drowned at sea, desperately trying to reach the shore or another ship. There can be few examples so horrendous of the fatality of freedom, of the sheer necessity of breaking away. But the tragedy and desperation of these deaths remove nothing from the impulse for freedom that they express. It is a recognition of what is at stake in this moment of capitalist restructuring.

      Calls for freedom during the pandemic — and movements against the restrictive measures imposed by governments — have been dominated by a very different tone. Every country (or at least the ones I am familiar with) has its own version of the movement against lockdowns, enforced mask-wearing, and so on. Is this the same impulse for freedom? Do such movements represent the same acknowledgment of capital’s new turn? Is resistance to the quarantine ships the same as resistance to bans on alcohol sales or mass consumption in shopping malls?

      I think not. Not so much for any of the “political” connotations of the no-mask movement in the United States (associated with Trumpism), nor because one urges a return to a bland consumerism while the other sheds light on the darker, carceral corners of European civilization. But rather, because they deal with very different levels of freedom, with different consequences for people’s lives.

      In a society characterized by an authoritarian turn, everyone moves down a step on the scale of human rights. Those who had all their rights recognized and guaranteed find themselves with a few small tears at the edges of their personal constitutional charter. Those who were further down the ladder perhaps find themselves less free, crammed into makeshift lodgings, forced to renege on aspects of their autonomy. Those who were already clasping to the bottom rung of the ladder, however, now find themselves cast into gray zones of legality, their every freedom arbitrarily removed without reason or rhyme. And it is in these gray zones that capital makes its earliest advances when it restructures. It begins here, and works its way up.

      Forget the mask-dodgers and their irrationality: the resistance we should be looking at is that of the fugitives from our new prisons.

      https://jacobinmag.com/2020/11/italy-migrants-cruise-lines-ships-prisons-coronavirus

    • Navi quarantena, due operatori umanitari raccontano “quel sistema sbagliato che sospende il diritto”

      Il racconto dall’interno dei ragazzi che erano a bordo insieme ad Abou, il ragazzo di 15 anni morto una volta sceso a terra. Senso di frustrazione, burn out e rabbia. “L’isolamento è impossibile. Una scelta solo mediatica, è ora di cambiare”

      Il primo forte senso di frustrazione è arrivato quando Abou,15 anni, non ce l’ha fatta. Il ragazzo è peggiorato in fretta, in pochi giorni, l’evacuazione medica non l’ha salvato. Sul caso è stata aperta un’inchiesta ma il dubbio che a incidere pesantemente su quella morte sia stato anche il “sistema delle navi quarantena” resta. E sapere di non aver fatto abbastanza, di non essersi opposti a una gestione sbagliata, tormenta le notti. E’ per questo che per la prima volta alcuni operatori che erano a bordo della nave Allegra hanno deciso di parlare con Redattore Sociale e raccontare cosa succede su questi spazi galleggianti, che il Governo italiano ha pensato come luoghi di isolamento temporaneo per i migranti. Abbiamo raccolto le loro testimonianze, i nomi che riportiamo sono di fantasia ( i ragazzi hanno chiesto di mantenere l’anonimato) ma ne abbiamo verificato le identità e il ruolo.
      Effetto burn out: “Dopo l’esperienza sulle navi quarantena ho avuto un crollo”

      “Dopo la morte di Abou non ho rinnovato la mia missione, dovevo stare un altro mese ma ho preferito scendere. Non volevo più lavorare, mi sono presa del tempo. Ora faccio altro” racconta Martina, che ha iniziato a fare l’operatrice umanitaria a 25 anni. “Ora ne ho 37 e per me è ancora una scelta di vita. E allora cosa ci facevo là sopra? Quale era il mio ruolo in un luogo come quello?”. Chi si occupa di cooperazione internazionale lo chiama il “dilemma umanitario”: curare è sempre un imperativo categorico, ma in certi contesti la presenza degli operatori umanitari rischia di avallare scelte improprie. Di contro, non esserci vuol dire lasciare le persone senza un supporto necessario. Eppure l’idea di essere complice di un sistema che sospende il diritto e calpesta, in nome di una emergenza sanitaria, la dignità di persone in fuga, a Martina ha fatto venire il primo attacco di panico della sua vita. Così ha lasciato la collaborazione con Croce Rossa, ha smesso di lavorare per qualche mese e ora presta servizio in un ospedale, nelle sale di rianimazione dove sono curati i pazienti con il Covid-19.

      “Quando sono salita sull’Allegra avevo già una titubanza iniziale, era l’ultimo posto in cui volevo stare - spiega -. Sarei voluta scendere il giorno stesso, ma mi sono detta: proviamo a vedere. Se scendiamo tutti lasciamo sole queste persone, se restiamo cerchiamo almeno di fare qualcosa dall’interno: proviamo a umanizzare questa situazione”. Ma col passare dei giorni Martina capisce che il sistema non funziona. “Era tutto agghiacciante: le energie venivano a mancare, l’impegno era h24, eppure per quelle persone, fatte salire lì senza sapere neanche perché, la condizione non cambiava. Quando poi è successo di Abou ho avuto un tracollo emotivo. Dopo uno scontro coi nostri responsabili è arrivato il momento del burn out e il primo attacco di panico”.

      La condizione stessa della nave non ha aiutato. “Non potevi isolarti, non potevi scendere, eri sempre lì a vivere in una condizione assurda con pochi medici e infermieri per tutte quelle persone - aggiunge. Da lì capisci che le navi non risolvono nulla, non garantiscono neanche una vera quarantena. Le persone rimangono insieme anche se in settori separati. Spesso chi si negativizza si trova a stare con chi è positivo e l’isolamento diventa infinito”. Le persone salvate insieme ad Abou dalla Open Arms il 10 settembre scorso erano state fatte salire direttamente sulla nave Allegra. Il 29 settembre le condizioni del ragazzo sono talmente gravi da richiedere un’evacuazione medica, morirà in ospedale qualche giorno dopo.

      “Dopo la morte di Abou mi aspettavo che cambiasse qualcosa, che ci fosse una sollevazione, bisognava parlare, denunciare, e invece nulla - conclude-. La sua morte è stata strumentalizzata da tutti: il povero ragazzo migrante che non ce l’ha fatta. No, era un ragazzo che stava dove non doveva stare, non è stato trattato come una persona. Meritava un’assistenza diversa”.
      Dov’è l’indipendenza dell’aiuto umanitario?

      Anche Marco è stato per 45 giorni sulla nave quarantena Allegra. Anche Marco era a bordo insieme ad Abou. Anche Marco oggi vive la stessa frustrazione. “L’impotenza che si sente di fronte a questa situazione è altissima. Soffrivamo noi a stare in mare, potendo muoverci e sapendo di avere una data di fine operazione, figuriamoci i migranti, portati lì senza che sapessero il motivo - spiega -. Le necessità di base venivano assicurate, il cibo, l’acqua, le mascherine. Ma l’assistenza non è solo questo. Ho sempre pensato che fosse tutto un grande teatro, una messa in scena: si potevano isolare meglio le persone a terra, assicurandogli anche assistenza. E invece no, dovevano stare in mezzo al mare. E’ un isolamento mediatico, teatrale”.

      Marco ricorda il via vai di persone di ogni età, dalle famiglie con bambini (anche di pochi mesi) ai minori che viaggiano soli, non accompagnati. “Ci sono state diverse proteste delle associazioni di tutela ma i minori continuano a restare a bordo, è un problema non risolto - aggiunge -. Di prassi i non accompagnati dovrebbero entrare in un circuito di accoglienza e tutela diverso. Invece salgono sulle navi senza aver mai parlato con un tutore o un garante. Alla fine, anche se dormono in stanze separate, si ritrovano in una situazione di promiscuità con gli adulti”. Ma è il sistema nave quarantena a creare questa situazione: “E’ difficile anche accompagnare le persone con bisogni particolari, come le vittime di tratta e chi ha subito abusi e torture. Il personale a bordo spesso non è preparato. L’ambito volontaristico è virtuoso, le persone danno il massimo a bordo ma in certi casi non basta - afferma -. Non è una nave ospedale, e così anche l’assistenza sanitaria non è quella che si può avere a terra. Quando è arrivato il gruppo della Open Arms abbiamo fatto i tamponi a bordo e separato le persone nel migliore dei modi. Ma non bastava ovviamente: capitava che le persone si muovessero negli spazi comuni, il contagio era sempre possibile”.

      L’operatore ha assistito anche all’arrivo in piena notte dei pullman con gli ospiti dei centri di accoglienza, mandati a fare l’isolamento sulle navi. “Scene davvero pietose: vedevamo queste famiglie che aspettavano sulla banchina alle due di notte, mamme con bambini, persone stremate - ricorda -. Non gli avevano spiegato nulla, abbiamo fatto noi l’informativa. Tutti temevano di salire sulla nave per essere rimpatriati, una cosa assurda”.

      Dopo le proteste delle organizzazioni, le denunce di Arci e Asgi e l’interrogazione parlamentare di Erasmo Palazzotto, il trasferimento dai centri è stato interrotto. Ma le anomalie non si sono fermate. Marco racconta, per esempio, della lista dei tamponi da fare con priorità alle persone che dovevano essere rimpatriate. E si chiede: “Dov’è l’indipendenza di un operatore umanitario in questo caso? Noi dovremmo essere autonomi, indipendenti, non siamo questurini, dobbiamo curare tutti: dal peggiore dei migranti al più virtuoso. Il nostro obiettivo è la cura delle persone, trattiamo tutti allo stesso modo. E allora, noi nemmeno lo dovremmo sapere chi abbiamo davanti. Dobbiamo assicurare a tutti il trattamento migliore”.

      Così non è stato e ora anche lui ha questo grande rimorso di essere stato parte di un sistema dove il diritto è sospeso e le ragioni politiche contano più di quelle sanitarie. “Oggi la mia denuncia la faccio non solo come operatore umanitario ma come cittadino italiano, vorrei che chi opera nel settore aprisse un dibattito serio sul sistema delle navi quarantena, un modello che non funziona e che va cambiato”.

      https://www.redattoresociale.it/article/notiziario/navi_quarantena_due_operatori_umanitari_raccontano_quel_sistema_sba

    • Navi e #bus, la «quarantena» dei migranti

      La navi da quarantena per i migranti sono state istituite dal governo lo scorso aprile, per far fronte all’emergenza sanitaria legata al coronavirus. Sono navi private, per passeggeri, adibite all’assistenza e alla sorveglianza sanitaria. Da subito la misura ha suscitato perplessità.

      La navi da quarantena per i migranti sono state istituite dal governo lo scorso aprile, per far fronte all’emergenza sanitaria legata al coronavirus. Sono navi private, per passeggeri, adibite all’assistenza e alla sorveglianza sanitaria dei migranti soccorsi in mare o giunti in Italia con barche autonome, prima dello sbarco in un porto sicuro. La decisione è legata all’impossibilità di indicare un “place of safety” in Italia per tutta la durata dell’emergenza sanitaria, per i casi di soccorso effettuati da parte di navi battenti bandiera straniera al di fuori dell’area Sar italiana.

      Da subito la misura ha suscitato perplessità. A partire dal Garante delle persone privati della libertà, Maura Palma, che, nei giorni immediatamente successevi alla decisione del governo, ha chiesto che non si creino zone di “limbo giuridico”, ribadendo la necessità che ogni persona sia messa nelle condizioni di esercitare i diritti fondamentali ed essere tutelata se vulnerabile, come le vittime di tratta. Duro anche il giudizio delle associazioni.

      La morte di Abou Dakite, quindicenne originario della Costa d’Avorio, dopo lo sbarco d’urgenza dalla nave quarantena “Allegra”, a Palermo, ha tragicamente riportato alla ribalta del dibattito mediatico la questione della presenza di minori sulle navi. Lo sbarco immediato e il collocamento in strutture idonee, in applicazione della legge Zampa, è stato chiesto dal Garante infanzia di Palermo e dai 200 tutori del distretto di Palermo, Agrigento e Trapani, mentre alcune associazioni hanno depositato esposti alle Procure presso i Tribunali per i Minorenni di Palermo e Catania.

      A centro di una interrogazione parlamentare il caso di alcuni trasferimenti dai centri di accoglienza alle navi quarantena di richiedenti asilo positivi al coronavirus. La ministra dell’Interno Luciana Lamorgese ha risposto in un question time alla Camera, facendo sapere che ci sono ora altre 25 strutture a terra, con una ricettività totale di 2700 posti per migranti

      Più in generale la condizione dell’accoglienza dei migranti ai tempi del Covid è analizzata in un rapporto della Coalizione Italiana per le Libertà e i Diritti civili (Cild), in cui si fa il punto su quanto avvenuto nei luoghi di transito o di privazione della libertà e si analizzata la situazione verificatasi da febbraio a fine giugno nei Centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio, negli hotspot e nelle navi quarantena.

      Inoltre, nei mesi di lockdown il Tavolo Asilo e il Tavolo immigrazione e salute hanno realizzato un monitoraggio in 200 strutture di accoglienza che evidenza come, in mancanza di linee guida nazionali, solo il buonsenso abbia evitato l’esplosione di focolai. Ora le organizzazioni chiedono indicazioni precise per non trovarsi di nuovo impreparate. In particolare si chiede l’istituzione di strutture ponte, per l’isolamento fiduciario dei migranti.

      Il caso #Udine

      Tra le soluzioni improvvisate c’è quella dei #bus_quarantena a Udine: le persone in arrivo dalla rotta balcanica sono state portate su alcuni pullman posteggiati davanti al #parco_Sant’Osvaldo. Il prefetto di Udine parla di una scelta obbligata per la difficoltà di reperire sul territorio posti per l’accoglienza e per l’isolamento fiduciario dei migranti. Dopo la protesta delle associazioni e dell’Unhcr i migranti sono stati fatti scendere e portati in apposite strutture di accoglienza.

      https://www.redattoresociale.it/article/focus/navi-bus-la-quarantena-migranti

    • Migranti. Bus quarantena a Udine, “condizioni deprecabili, a bordo anche minori”

      Dopo giorni di polemiche e proteste continua la pratica dell’utilizzo dei pullman per l’isolamento fiduciario dei migranti, in attesa dello screening. Un consigliere comunale in visita: “Un pullman non può diventare un centro di prima accoglienza, è inaccettabile”

      Qualcuno ha sistemato a terra dei cartoni e delle lenzuola per passarci la notte. Il caldo è insopportabile e dentro al bus non si riesce a stare. Così c’è chi preferisce accamparsi sotto gli alberi del giardino di Sant’Osvaldo. Dopo giorni di polemiche e proteste a Udine continua la pratica dei “bus quarantena”: qui, da due settimane, vengono portate le persone che arrivano in città per i controlli anti Covid19, come se si trattasse di un centro di prima accoglienza. In realtà, è un normale autobus, davanti al quale sono stati montati tre bagni chimici. Per lavarsi i migranti possono utilizzare una pompa dell’acqua. “Le condizioni sono deprecabili sia dal punto di vista umano che sanitario, da quello che ci raccontano alcuni dormono sul pullman altri a terra. E’ una situazione vergognosa”, spiega Federico Pirone, consigliere di opposizione a Udine. Pirone per due volte ha fatto visita al bus quarantena: la prima due settimane fa, l’ultima ieri. “Su trenta persone circa, una sola era a lì da dieci giorni, gli altri ruotano, alcuni restano quattro o cinque giorni. Arrivano qui, fanno lo screening e poi vengono trasferiti - spiega -. Mentre eravamo sul posto è arrivata una nuova corriera con a bordo persone, che si sarebbero trasferite sul bus quarantena. Tra loro c’erano anche tre ragazzi, minori non accompagnati”. Secondo il consigliere è necessario “essere in grado di dare una risposta europea a questo fenomeno: per ragioni umanitarie questa situazione deve cessare, bisogna rimettere al centro il rispetto delle persone - aggiunge -. Un bus non può diventare un centro di prima accoglienza, non è accettabile, ci sono strumenti di legge che consentono di operare in maniera diversa. E vanno applicati”.

      I bus per l’isolamento fiduciario sono stati posteggiati davanti al parco Sant’Osvaldo il 5 settembre scorso. Il prefetto di Udine parla di una scelta obbligata per la difficoltà di reperire sul territorio posti per l’accoglienza e per l’isolamento fiduciario dei migranti. In una lettera inviata il 14 settembre 2020 al Prefetto di Udine e al Capo del Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, le associazioni ActionAid, Asgi, Intersos e numerose sigle del territorio hanno ricordato che con il Decreto Cura Italia, in vigore dal 17 marzo 2020, i Prefetti hanno acquisito poteri straordinari al fine di assicurare la possibilità di ospitare persone in isolamento fiduciario nel caso in cui queste non potessero farlo presso il proprio domicilio. Nel testo è specificato che il Prefetto può requisire “strutture alberghiere, ovvero di altri immobili aventi analoghe caratteristiche di idoneità, per ospitarvi le persone in sorveglianza sanitaria e isolamento fiduciario o in permanenza domiciliare, laddove tali misure non possano essere attuate presso il domicilio della persona”. Per ora però le organizzazioni non hanno ricevuto risposta. La prossima settimana dovrebbe esserci un incontro anche con i responsabili del ministero dell’Interno.

      Intanto anche l’Unhcr sta seguendo con attenzione la situazione. “Ci auguriamo che venga al più presto trovata una soluzione adeguata per la quarantena. Siamo al corrente delle difficoltà, tuttavia quella attuale non consente di ospitare le persone in quarantena secondo standard accettabili- sottolinea Carlotta Sami portavoce di Unhcr -. Sappiamo che il territorio in questo momento è sotto pressione per l’aumento degli arrivi dai Balcani e che ci sono problemi a trovare posti in accoglienza, ma è necessario individuare strutture adeguate per far fare l’isolamento fiduciario ai migranti in ambienti idonei”. Cesare Fermi, responsabile Unità Migrazione di Intersos ricorda che “non esistono motivazioni di sicurezza o di ordine pubblico o di problematica logistica che possano giustificare in nessun modo una misura come quella di far pernottare degli esseri umani all’interno di un pullman in uno spazio aperto. Siamo assolutamente sconcertati dalle soluzioni che ultimamente in Italia si stanno cercando, dalle navi ai pullman".

      https://www.redattoresociale.it/article/notiziario/bus_quarantena_a_udine_condizioni_deprecabili_a_bordo_anche_minori_

    • Les bateaux quarantaine, ou comment l’Italie enferme en haute mer

      On publie ici une réflexion sur une nouvelle forme de retention administrative qui est apparue et s’est développée depuis un an aux frontières méridionales de l’Europe, et en Italie notamment. Avec l’excuse de la pandémie, les Etats européens n’arretent pas de tester des nouvelles formes de controle des frontières, d’enfermement et d’expulsion. Mais ceux et celles qui les subissent y résistent tous les jours, meme lorsqu’iels sont enfermé.e.s dans des « CRA flottants ». A nous de soutenir leurs luttes.
      Depuis bientôt un an, un nouvel dispositif d’enfermement pour personnes étrangères existe au large des côtes d’Italie – et pas que. Les bateaux quarantaine, ferries de croisière désaffectés en raison de la pandémie et réaffectés à la quarantaine des migrant.e.s, rendent la guerre menée par l’Etat italien contre ceux et celles qui passent les frontières encore plus efficace et chirurgicale. Si en théorie ces bateaux servent à « assurer la santé » de ceux et celles qui y sont enfermé.es, ils se sont transformés en véritables centres de tri et d’expulsion.
      État d’ugence et bateaux quarantaine
      Tout commence en avril 2020, lorsque la pandémie du coronavirus explose partout et que les frontières des états européens ferment. Le 7 avril 2020, on déclare que les ports italiens ne sont pas ‘place of safety’, c’est-à-dire des endroits sûrs où faire débarquer les personnes qui viennent de la Méditerranée (1). Par conséquent, le 12 avril, l’Etat décide de louer des bateaux de croisière à des compagnies privées. L’appel d’offre est signé par la Protection civile italienne, et souscrit par le Ministère de l’Intérieur et celui des transports. À bord des ferries travaille le personnel de la Croix Rouge. Au début, ces bateaux sont conçus pour la contention des personnes sauvées en mer par les ONG – mais par pour celles et ceux qui débarquent de façon autonome sur les côtes italiennes. Le fonctionnement est apparemment simple : tout le monde est soumis à un test, celles et ceux qui sont négatif.ives sont mis.es en quarantaine pendant 15 jours, au bout desquels ils.elles sont libéré.es. Les autres restent à bord jusqu’à ce que leur test soit négatif. Évidemment dans les espaces fermés d’un bateau il est très difficile de contrôler la diffusion de la maladie, ce qui mène à enchainer des quarantaines qui ne se terminent jamais. Au départ on compte deux ferries, mais très rapidement, à la fin de l’été cinq bateaux mouillent au large des côtes italiennes. Ironie du sort : un des premiers bateaux loué à cette fin, le ‘Raffaele Rubattino’ de la Compagnie de Navigation Italienne, porte le nom de l’amiral qui acheta la baie d’Assab en 1870 au nom du royaume d’Italie, débutant l’aventure coloniale italienne en Afrique orientale qui sera ensuite poursuivie par le régime fasciste.

      Au fil du temps, la situation sur la terre ferme s’empire et il n’y a littéralement plus de place pour enfermer dans les centres d’accueil, les centres de rétention et dans les hotspot (2), à cause également de la fermeture des frontières. On commence alors à transférer sur les bateaux les personnes qui se trouvent déjà sur le sol italien. Les bateaux quarantaine deviennent des véritables hotspot flottants : les personnes y sont amenées sans recevoir aucun type d’information juridique sur leur situation – à bord il n’y a que le personnel de la Croix Rouge qui ne fournit pas de suivi juridique -, souvent on leur fait signer des papiers sans traduction et une fois qu’elles descendent elles sont amenées directement dans les CPR (3). Au cours de l’été, il arrive même que des migrant.es en voie de régularisation mais testé.es positif.ves au coronavirus soient amené.es sur un bateau, et qu’à cause de l’isolement et du manque d’information, ils et elles soient exclu.es du parcours d’accueil (4). Cette situation provoque l’indignation des associations humanitaires qui se décident enfin à prendre la parole et à dénoncer ce qui se passe dans ces lieux d’enfermement.

      Entre temps, le tri et les expulsions continuent : en particulier, les personnes tunisiennes passent souvent du bateau à l’avion, ou sont même expulsées par bateau (5). Ceci est permis par les accords entre la Tunisie et l’Italie – signés entre autres par la même ministre de l’intérieur italienne qui est une des signataires de l’appel d’offre pour la location des ferries de quarantaine. Ces traités autorisent le rapatriement forcé des citoyen.es tunisien.nes arrivé.es en Italie, ainsi que l’enterrement des déchets italiens en sol tunisien, en échange d’importantes sommes d’argent (6). Ordures et êtres humains : ce que l’Etat italien pense des personnes tunisiennes qui arrivent par mer est assez évident. En septembre, à la fin d’un été qui a vu reprendre la circulation touristique et les expulsions depuis l’Europe vers de nombreux pays d’Afrique et du Moyen Orient, un deuxième appel d’offre est lancé par la Protection civile (7). Cette fois une seule compagnie remporte l’appel d’offre, l’entreprise GNV (Grandi Navi Veloci), tandis que la Croix Rouge reste prestataire de service à bord des bateaux. Depuis, on compte 9 bateaux quarantaine à bord des côtes de la Sicile, de la Calabre et des Pouilles, où l’on continue d’enfermer, trier et expulser les migrant.es.
      Lutte et résistance sur les bateaux
      Ce qui est intéressant à remarquer, c’est le lien qui existe entre ce qui se passe sur les bateaux et ce qui se passe dans le hotspot de Lampedusa, d’où viennent la plupart des personnes enfermées en mer pendant l’été. Le 11 août une manifestation coordonnée a lieu dans le centre de l’île et sur le bateau Azzurra de GNV, pour dénoncer les conditions inhumaines de détention. Quelques semaines après, ce sera à cause des menaces du maire de Lampedusa, qui annonce une grève générale sur l’île, que le gouvernement décide de louer un nouveau ferry destiné à la quarantaine des personnes migrantes (8).

      Par ailleurs, la manifestation du 11 août n’est pas un acte isolé : des résistances collectives et individuelles existent depuis la création des bateaux quarantaine. Les moyens de révolte sont divers, comme c’est le cas dans les centres de rétention : automutilation, grève de la faim, incendie, et aussi quelques belles tentatives d’évasion. Le 21 novembre dernier, alors que le bateau accoste au port pour se réapprovisionner, un groupe des personnes arrive à s’évader du ferry Rhapsody de la GNV, profitant d’une échelle en bois et de l’absence de la police (9). La dernière manifestation remonte au 15 mars dernier, lorsqu’un groupe de personnes tunisiennes enfermées sur un bateau de la GNV bloque un des ponts du ferry et fait circuler une vidéo qui montre les conditions d’enfermement (10).

      La répression est aussi violente dans ces lieux, même si la police n’est pas présente à bord. Souvent par contre elle est présente au moment où le bateau accoste pour ‘gérer’ le débarquement des personnes enfermées. Il n’y a plus seulement les centres d’accueil et les hotspot qui sont militarisés, surveillés H24 par des militaires, face à la rage montante de celles et ceux qui y sont enfermé.es sans soin et sans information. En septembre, lorsque plusieurs centaines de migrant.es sont censé.es débarquer au port de Bari à la fin de leur quarantaine, suite au test positif d’une personne, on empêche à tout le monde de descendre. Les gens, à bout après plusieurs semaines sans aucun soin réel, s’enragent et essaient de débarquer. Ils et elles sont chargé.es par la police qui rentre jusque sur les ponts pour matraquer ceux et celles qui veulent descendre (11). Depuis leur mise en place, les bateaux quarantaine ont déjà tué trois personnes : au mois de mai, une personne tunisienne se suicide en se jetant depuis le pont du bateau Moby Zaza ; en septembre Abdallah, un mineur migrant, meurt à l’hôpital de Palerme de tuberculose, suite au manque de soins à bord du bateau où il était enfermé, tandis que quelques semaines plus tard, en octobre, Abou, âgé de 15 ans, meurt au bout de 15 jours de quarantaine à bord du bateau Allegra, à cause du manque de soins (12). Encore une fois, les frontières et les Etats tuent, quel que soit le dispositif qu’ils décident d’employer.
      La détention administrative “off-shore”
      Il faut dire que cette idée ne vient pas de nulle part, mais qu’elle a des précédents dans l’histoire d’Italie et plus en général de l’Europe et du monde. La détention administrative offshore est de fait pratiquée en Australie, où existent des véritables île-prison pour les immigré.es (13). En Italie, en 2016, le ministre de droite Alfano propose de construire des centres de détention offshore, mais l’Union Européenne déclare que cette proposition viole les droits humains (14). Il aura fallu une autre ministre seulement quatre ans après pour convaincre l’Europe de cette bonne idée et pour le faire réellement… D’ailleurs, on ne peut pas dire que des formes de détention administrative offshore ‘informelle’ n’étaient pas déjà pratiquées avant dans la Méditerranée. Il suffit de penser au blocus des ports pour les ONG en 2019, qui a mené des centaines de personnes à passer des semaines enfermées sur des bateaux au large des côtes italiennes. Ou encore à la répression de la piraterie somalienne par les empires européens, qui a permis d’expérimenter et ensuite de transformer en lois un arsenal répressif permettant la détention offshore. Entre 2009 et 2011, plusieurs pirates arrêtés par les armées italienne, française et anglaise coordonnées au sein de l’opération européenne Atalanta ont été détenus pour de longues périodes sur des bateaux militaires, dans l’attente de décider dans quel tribunal ils allaient être jugés. Suite à cette guerre à la piraterie, la France passe une loi en 2011 qui crée un « un régime sui generis pour la rétention à bord » des pirates sur le modèle de la détention administrative, et qui autorise la privation de liberté sur les avions, bateaux etc., qui deviennent ainsi des zones de non-droit (15).

      De lieux d’isolement sanitaire à prisons flottantes, les bateaux quarantaine permettent à l’Etat italien, et par conséquence à l’Europe, d’externaliser encore plus ses frontières, et d’affiner la machine à expulser. Ce n’est pas un hasard s’ils ont été mis en place en Italie, et plus précisément dans le sud de l’Italie, à Lampedusa, et que quelques mois plus tard deux bateaux quarantaine ont fait leur apparition à Malte et à Lesbos (16) : des lieux périphériques, aux frontières de l’Europe, des endroits clés pour le contrôle des mobilités. Comme les camps en Libye, ces ferries relèvent d’une gestion néocoloniale des migrations et des frontières. Parallèlement à la mise en place de ce dispositif, l’agence européenne Frontex a annoncé qu’à partir de janvier 2021 la mer Méditerranée sera surveillée par des drones… achetés à Israël, un état envahisseur et colonisateur.

      Encore une fois, ceux qui font de l’argent sur les corps de prisonnier.es sont les entreprises privées, et la Croix Rouge, professionnels de l’enfermement des migrant.es. C’est vers eux que va toute notre haine. En Italie comme partout, le seul intérêt de l’Etat est de mieux contrôler et enfermer. Les résistances des prisonnier.es, sur les bateaux quarantaine comme dans les CRA, nous montrent la seule voie face à la machine des expulsions : la détruire.

      (1) https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/italia-porto-non-sicuro-approdo-migranti
      (2) Les hotspot sont des lieux d’enfermement servant à identifier, enregistrer et prendre les empreintes digitales des migrants arrivant.
      (3) CPR, centres de permanence pour le rapatriement, équivalent italien des CRA.
      (4) https://www.imgpress.it/attualita/illegali-e-discriminatori-i-trasferimenti-coercitivi-sulle-navi-quarantena-
      https://www.tvsvizzera.it/tvs/migrazione-e-covid_navi-quarantena-anche-per-gli-immigrati-residenti-in-italia/46137554
      (5) https://ilmanifesto.it/navi-quarantena-per-i-tunisini-sono-lanticamera-dei-rimpatri
      (6) https://www.nigrizia.it/notizia/italia-tunisia-e-quellaccordo-fantasma
      (7)https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/topnews/2020/09/10/migranti-nuovo-bando-navi-quarantenaanche-per-arrivi-terra_65a0eb84-10cc-43e5-8
      (8)https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_agosto_30/migranti-lampedusa-viminale-annuncia-trasferimenti-imminenti-altre-3-navi-q
      (9) https://www.secoloditalia.it/2020/11/porto-empedocle-migranti-fuggono-dalla-scaletta-della-nave-quarantena-
      (10) https://www.facebook.com/107635584259867/videos/1413214879039905
      (11)https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/home/1253758/bari-rivolta-sulla-nave-di-migranti-oltre-50-positivi-a-bor
      (12)https://ilmanifesto.it/navi-quarantena-i-minori-che-hanno-perso-la-vita-sono-due
      (13)https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25711/eu-trying-to-replicate-australia-s-offshore-detention-centers-refugee-
      (14)https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/05/18/news/sicurezza_alfano_nel_2015_il_minor_numero_di_reati_rispetto_all_ultimo_de
      (15)https://www.senat.fr/rap/r11-499/r11-499_mono.html
      (16) http://www.vita.it/it/article/2020/05/22/malta-e-italia-quei-migranti-nelle-navi-quarantena-tenuti-lontani-da-n/155580

      https://abaslescra.noblogs.org/les-bateaux-quarantaine-ou-comment-litalie-enferme-en-haute-mer

  • Pro-migrant protests in Athens as Greece extends lockdown

    Following protests in Athens slamming the government for its treatment of migrants, the Greek government over the weekend said it would extend the COVID-19 lockdown on the migrant camps on Greek Aegean islands and on the mainland.

    Greece has extended a coronavirus lockdown on its migrant camps for a further two weeks. On Saturday, Greece announced extension of the coronavirus lockdown on its overcrowded and unsanitary migrant camps on its islands in the Aegean Sea for another fortnight.

    The move came hours after some 2,000 people protested in central Athens on Saturday to mark World Refugee Day and denounced the government’s treatment of migrants.

    The migration ministry said migrants living in island camps as well as those in mainland Greece will remain under lockdown until July 5. It was due to have ended on Monday, June 22, along with the easing of general community restrictions as the country has been preparing to welcome tourists for the summer.

    The Greek government first introduced strict confinement measures in migrant camps on March 21. A more general lockdown was imposed on March 23; it has since been extended a number of times. No known coronavirus deaths have been recorded in Greek migrant camps so far and only a few dozen infections have surfaced. Rights groups have expressed concern that migrants’ rights have been eroded by the restrictions.

    On May 18, the Greek asylum service resumed receiving asylum applications after an 11-week pause. Residence permits held by refugees will be extended six months from their date of expiration to prevent the service from becoming overwhelmed by renewal applications.

    ’No refugee homeless, persecuted, jailed’

    During the Saturday protests, members of anti-racist groups, joined by residents from migrant camps, marched in central Athens. They were holding banners proclaiming “No refugee homeless, persecuted, jailed” and chanting slogans against evictions of refugees from temporary accommodation in apartments.
    Migrants living in Greece take part in a protest marking the World Refugee Day in Athens Greece June 20 2020 Photo Picture-alliance
    Migrants living in Greece take part in a protest marking the World Refugee Day in Athens, Greece, June 20, 2020 | Photo: Picture-alliance
    More than 11,000 refugees who have been living in reception facilities for asylum seekers could soon be evicted. Refugees used to be able to keep their accommodation for up to six months after receiving protected status.

    But the transitional grace period was recently reduced significantly: Since March of this year, people can no longer stay in the reception system for six months after they were officially recognized as refugees — they only have 30 days.

    Refugee advocacy groups and UNHCR have expressed concern that the people evicted could end up homeless. “Forcing people to leave their accommodation without a safety net and measures to ensure their self-reliance may push many into poverty and homelessness,” UNHCR spokesperson Andrej Mahecic said last week.

    The government insists that it is doing everything necessary “to assure a smooth transition for those who leave their lodgings.”

    Moreover, UNHCR and several NGOs and human rights groups have spoken out to criticize the Greek government’s decision to cut spending on a housing program for asylum seekers by up to 30%. They said that it means less safe places to live for vulnerable groups.

    Asylum office laments burden, defends action

    In a message for World Refugee Day, the Ministry for Migration and Asylum said Greece has found itself “at the centre of the migration crisis bearing a disproportionate burden”, news agency AFP cites.

    “The country is safeguarding the rights of those who are really persecuted and operates as a shield of solidarity in the eastern Mediterranean,” it added.

    Government officials have repeatedly said Greece must become a less attractive destination for asylum seekers.

    The continued presence of more than 36,000 refugees and asylum seekers on the islands — over five times the intended capacity of shelters there — has caused major friction with local communities who are demanding their immediate removal.

    An operation in February to build detention centers for migrants on the islands of Lesbos and Chios had to be abandoned due to violent protests.

    Accusations of push-backs

    Greece has also been repeatedly accused of illegal pushbacks by its forces at its land and sea borders, which according to reports have spiked since March.

    On land, a Balkans-based network of human rights organizations said migrants reported beatings and violent collective expulsions from inland detention spaces to Turkey on boats across the Evros River. In the Aegean, a recent investigation by three media outlets claims that Greek coast guard officers intercept migrant boats coming from Turkey and send them back to Turkey in unseaworthy life rafts.

    Athens has repeatedly denied using illegal tactics to guard its borders, and has in turn accused Turkey of sending patrol boats to escort migrant boats into its waters.

    According to UNHCR, around 3,000 asylum seekers arrived in Greece by land and sea since the start of March, far fewer people than over previous months. Some 36,450 refugees and asylum seekers are currently staying on the Aegean islands.

    With material from AFP

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25521/pro-migrant-protests-in-athens-as-greece-extends-lockdown

    #covid-19 #migration #migrant #grece #extension #confinement #manifestation #athenes

  • Migrants : les échecs d’un #programme_de_retour_volontaire financé par l’#UE

    Alors qu’il embarque sur un vol de la Libye vers le Nigeria à la fin 2018, James a déjà survécu à un naufrage en Méditerranée, traversé une demi-douzaine d’États africains, été la cible de coups de feu et passé deux ans à être maltraité et torturé dans les centres de détention libyens connus pour la brutalité qui y règne.

    En 2020, de retour dans sa ville de Benin City (Etat d’Edo au Nigéria), James se retrouve expulsé de sa maison après n’avoir pas pu payer son loyer. Il dort désormais à même le sol de son salon de coiffure.

    Sa famille et ses amis l’ont tous rejeté parce qu’il n’a pas réussi à rejoindre l’Europe.

    « Le fait que tu sois de retour n’est source de bonheur pour personne ici. Personne ne semble se soucier de toi [...]. Tu es revenu les #mains_vides », raconte-t-il à Euronews.

    James est l’un des quelque 81 000 migrants africains qui sont rentrés dans leur pays d’origine avec l’aide de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) des Nations unies et le #soutien_financier de l’Union européenne, dans le cadre d’une initiative conjointe de 357 millions d’euros (https://migrationjointinitiative.org). Outre une place sur un vol au départ de la Libye ou de plusieurs autres pays de transit, les migrants se voient promettre de l’argent, un #soutien et des #conseils pour leur permettre de se réintégrer dans leur pays d’origine une fois rentrés chez eux.

    Mais une enquête d’Euronews menée dans sept pays africains a révélé des lacunes importantes dans ce programme, considéré comme la réponse phare de l’UE pour empêcher les migrants d’essayer de se rendre en Europe.

    Des dizaines de migrants ayant participé au programme ont déclaré à Euronews qu’une fois rentrés chez eux, ils ne recevaient aucune aide. Et ceux qui ont reçu une aide financière, comme James, ont déclaré qu’elle était insuffisante.

    Nombreux sont ceux qui envisagent de tenter à nouveau de se rendre en Europe dès que l’occasion se présente.

    « Je ne me sens pas à ma place ici », confie James. « Si l’occasion se présente, je quitte le pays ».

    Sur les 81 000 migrants qui ont été rapatriés depuis 2017, près de 33 000 ont été renvoyés de Libye par avion. Parmi eux, beaucoup ont été victimes de détention, d’abus et de violences de la part de passeurs, de milices et de bandes criminelles. Les conditions sont si mauvaises dans le pays d’Afrique du Nord que le programme est appelé « retour humanitaire volontaire » (VHR), plutôt que programme de « retour volontaire assisté » (AVR) comme ailleurs en Afrique.

    Après trois ans passés en Libye, Mohi, 24 ans, a accepté l’offre d’un vol de retour en 2019. Mais, une fois de retour dans son pays, son programme de réintégration ne s’est jamais concrétisé. « Rien ne nous a été fourni ; ils continuent à nous dire ’demain’ », raconte-t-il à Euronews depuis le nord du Darfour, au Soudan.

    Mohi n’est pas seul. Les propres statistiques de l’OIM sur les rapatriés au Soudan révèlent que seuls 766 personnes sur plus de 2 600 ont reçu un soutien économique. L’OIM attribue cette situation à des taux d’inflation élevés et à une pénurie de biens et d’argent sur place.

    Mais M. Kwaku Arhin-Sam, spécialiste des projets de développement et directeur de l’Institut d’évaluation Friedensau, estime de manière plus générale que la moitié des programmes de réintégration de l’OIM échouent.

    « La plupart des gens sont perdus au bout de quelques jours », explique-t-il.
    Deux tiers des migrants ne terminent pas les programmes de réintégration

    L’OIM elle-même revoit cette estimation à la baisse : l’agence des Nations unies a déclaré à Euronews que jusqu’à présent, seul un tiers des migrants qui ont commencé à bénéficier d’une aide à la réintégration sont allés au bout du processus. Un porte-parole a déclaré que l’initiative conjointe OIM/EU étant un processus volontaire, « les migrants peuvent décider de se désister à tout moment, ou de ne pas s’engager du tout ».

    Un porte-parole de l’OIM ajoute que la réintégration des migrants une fois qu’ils sont rentrés chez eux va bien au-delà du mandat de l’organisation, et « nécessite un leadership fort de la part des autorités nationales », ainsi que « des contributions actives à tous les niveaux de la société ».

    Entre mai 2017 et février 2019, l’OIM a aidé plus de 12 000 personnes à rentrer au Nigeria. Parmi elles, 9 000 étaient « joignables » lorsqu’elles sont rentrées chez elles, 5 000 ont reçu une formation professionnelle et 4 300 ont bénéficié d’une « aide à la réintégration ». Si l’on inclut l’accès aux services de conseil ou de santé, selon l’OIM Nigéria, un total de 7 000 sur 12 000 rapatriés – soit 58 % – ont reçu une aide à la réintégration.

    Mais le nombre de personnes classées comme ayant terminé le programme d’aide à la réintégration n’était que de 1 289. De plus, les recherches de Jill Alpes, experte en migration et chercheuse associée au Centre de recherche sur les frontières de Nimègue, ont révélé que des enquêtes visant à vérifier l’efficacité de ces programmes n’ont été menées qu’auprès de 136 rapatriés.

    Parallèlement, une étude de Harvard sur les Nigérians de retour de Libye (https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2464/2019/11/Harvard-FXB-Center-Returning-Home-FINAL.pdf) estime que 61,3 % des personnes interrogées ne travaillaient pas après leur retour, et que quelque 16,8 % supplémentaires ne travaillaient que pendant une courte période, pas assez longue pour générer une source de revenus stable. À leur retour, la grande majorité des rapatriés, 98,3 %, ne suivaient aucune forme d’enseignement régulier.

    La commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, a admis à Euronews que « c’est un domaine dans lequel nous avons besoin d’améliorations ». Mme Johansson a déclaré qu’il était trop tôt pour dire quelles pourraient être ces améliorations, mais a maintenu que l’UE avait de bonnes relations avec l’OIM.

    Sandrine, Rachel et Berline, originaires du Cameroun, ont elles accepté de prendre un vol de l’OIM de Misrata, en Libye, à Yaoundé, la capitale camerounaise, en septembre 2018.

    En Libye, elles disent avoir subi des violences, des abus sexuels et avoir déjà risqué leur vie en tentant de traverser la Méditerranée. À cette occasion, elles ont été interceptées par les garde-côtes libyens et renvoyées en Libye.

    Une fois rentrées au Cameroun, Berline et Rachel disent n’avoir reçu ni argent ni soutien de l’OIM. Sandrine a reçu environ 900 000 fcfa (1 373,20 euros) pour payer l’éducation de ses enfants et lancer une petite entreprise – mais cela n’a pas duré longtemps.

    « Je vendais du poulet au bord de la route à Yaoundé, mais le projet ne s’est pas bien déroulé et je l’ai abandonné », confie-t-elle.

    Elle se souvient aussi d’avoir accouché dans un centre de détention de Tripoli avec des fusillades comme fond sonore.

    Toutes les trois ont affirmé qu’au moment de leur départ pour le Cameroun, elles n’avaient aucune idée de l’endroit où elles allaient dormir une fois arrivées et qu’elles n’avaient même pas d’argent pour appeler leur famille afin de les informer de leur retour.

    « Nous avons quitté le pays, et quand nous y sommes revenues, nous avons trouvé la même situation, parfois même pire. C’est pourquoi les gens décident de repartir », explique Berline.

    En novembre 2019, moins de la moitié des 3 514 migrants camerounais qui ont reçu une forme ou une autre de soutien de la part de l’OIM étaient considérés comme « véritablement intégrés » (https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ENG_Press%20release%20COPIL_EUTF%20UE_IOM_Cameroon.pdf).

    Seydou, un rapatrié malien, a reçu de l’argent de l’OIM pour payer son loyer pendant trois mois et les factures médicales de sa femme malade. Il a également reçu une formation commerciale et un moto-taxi.

    Mais au Mali, il gagne environ 15 euros par jour, alors qu’en Algérie, où il travaillait illégalement, il avait été capable de renvoyer chez lui plus de 1 300 euros au total, ce qui a permis de financer la construction d’une maison pour son frère dans leur village.

    Il tente actuellement d’obtenir un visa qui lui permettrait de rejoindre un autre de ses frères en France.

    Seydou est cependant l’un des rares Maliens chanceux. Les recherches de Jill Alpes, publiées par Brot für die Welt et Medico (l’agence humanitaire des Églises protestantes en Allemagne), ont révélé que seuls 10 % des migrants retournés au Mali jusqu’en janvier 2019 avaient reçu un soutien quelconque de l’OIM.

    L’OIM, quant à elle, affirme que 14 879 Maliens ont entamé le processus de réintégration – mais ce chiffre ne révèle pas combien de personnes l’ont achevé.
    Les stigmates du retour

    Dans certains cas, l’argent que les migrants reçoivent est utilisé pour financer une nouvelle tentative pour rejoindre l’Europe.

    Dans un des cas, une douzaine de personnes qui avaient atteint l’Europe et avaient été renvoyées chez elles ont été découvertes parmi les survivants du naufrage d’un bateau en 2019 (https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/21407/mauritanian-coast-guard-intercepts-boat-carrying-around-190-migrants-i se dirigeait vers les îles Canaries. « Ils étaient revenus et ils avaient décidé de reprendre la route », a déclaré Laura Lungarotti, chef de la mission de l’OIM en Mauritanie.

    Safa Msehli, porte-parole de l’OIM, a déclaré à Euronews que l’organisation ne pouvait pas empêcher des personnes de tenter de repartir vers l’Europe une fois revenues.

    « C’est aux gens de décider s’ils veulent ou non émigrer et dans aucun de ses différents programmes, l’OIM ne prévoit pas d’empêcher les gens de repartir », a-t-elle expliqué.

    Qu’est-ce que l’OIM ?

    A partir de 2016, l’OIM s’est redéfinie comme agence des Nations unies pour les migrations, et en parallèle son budget a augmenté rapidement (https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/110/C-110-10%20-%20Director%20General%27s%20report%20to%20the%20110). Il est passé de 242,2 millions de dollars US (213 millions d’euros) en 1998 à plus de 2 milliards de dollars US (1,7 milliard d’euros) à l’automne 2019, soit une multiplication par huit. Bien qu’elle ne fasse pas partie des Nations unies, l’OIM est désormais une « organisation apparentée », avec un statut similaire à celui d’un prestataire privé.

    L’UE et ses États membres sont collectivement les principaux contributeurs au budget de l’OIM (https://governingbodies.iom.int/system/files/en/council/110/Statements/EU%20coordinated%20statement%20-%20Point%2013%20-%20final%20IOM), leurs dons représentant près de la moitié de son financement opérationnel.

    De son côté, l’OIM tient à mettre en évidence sur son site web les cas où son programme de retour volontaire a été couronné de succès, notamment celui de Khadeejah Shaeban, une rapatriée soudanaise revenue de Libye qui a pu monter un atelier de couture.

    –-
    Comment fonctionne le processus d’aide à la réintégration ?
    Les migrants embarquent dans un avion de l’OIM sur la base du volontariat et retournent dans leur pays ;
    Ils ont droit à des conseils avant et après le voyage ;
    Chaque « rapatrié » peut bénéficier de l’aide de bureaux locaux, en partenariat avec des ONG locales ;
    L’assistance à l’accueil après l’arrivée peut comprendre l’accueil à l’aéroport, l’hébergement pour la nuit, une allocation en espèces pour les besoins immédiats, une première assistance médicale, une aide pour le voyage suivant, une assistance matérielle ;
    Une fois arrivés, les migrants sont enregistrés et vont dans un centre d’hébergement temporaire où ils restent jusqu’à ce qu’ils puissent participer à des séances de conseil avec le personnel de l’OIM. Des entretiens individuels doivent aider les migrants à identifier leurs besoins. Les migrants en situation vulnérable reçoivent des conseils supplémentaires, adaptés à leur situation spécifique ;
    Cette assistance est généralement non monétaire et consiste en des cours de création d’entreprise, des formations professionnelles (de quelques jours à six mois/un an), des salons de l’emploi, des groupes de discussion ou des séances de conseil ; l’aide à la création de micro-entreprises. Toutefois, pour certains cas vulnérables, une assistance en espèces est fournie pour faire face aux dépenses quotidiennes et aux besoins médicaux ;
    Chaque module comprend des activités de suivi et d’évaluation afin de déterminer l’efficacité des programmes de réintégration.

    –-

    Des migrants d’#Afghanistan et du #Yémen ont été renvoyés dans ces pays dans le cadre de ce programme, ainsi que vers la Somalie, l’Érythrée et le Sud-Soudan, malgré le fait que les pays de l’UE découragent tout voyage dans ces régions.

    En vertu du droit international relatif aux Droits de l’homme, le principe de « #non-refoulement » garantit que nul ne doit être renvoyé dans un pays où il risque d’être torturé, d’être soumis à des traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants ou de subir d’autres préjudices irréparables. Ce principe s’applique à tous les migrants, à tout moment et quel que soit leur statut migratoire.

    L’OIM fait valoir que des procédures sont en place pour informer les migrants pendant toutes les phases précédant leur départ, y compris pour ceux qui sont vulnérables, en leur expliquant le soutien que l’organisation peut leur apporter une fois arrivés au pays.

    Mais même lorsque les migrants atterrissent dans des pays qui ne sont pas en proie à des conflits de longue durée, comme le Nigeria, certains risquent d’être confrontés à des dangers et des menaces bien réelles.

    Les principes directeurs du Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) sur la protection internationale considèrent que les femmes ou les mineurs victimes de trafic ont le droit de demander le statut de réfugié. Ces populations vulnérables risquent d’être persécutées à leur retour, y compris au Nigeria, voire même d’être à nouveau victime de traite.
    Forcer la main ?

    Le caractère volontaire contestable des opérations de retour s’étend également au Niger voisin, pays qui compte le plus grand nombre de migrants assistés par l’OIM et qui est présenté comme la nouvelle frontière méridionale de l’Europe.

    En 2015, le Niger s’est montré disposé à lutter contre la migration en échange d’un dédommagement de l’UE, mais des centaines de milliers de migrants continuent de suivre les routes à travers le désert en direction du nord pendant que le business du trafic d’êtres humains est florissant.

    Selon le Conseil européen sur les réfugiés et les exilés, une moyenne de 500 personnes sont expulsées d’Algérie vers le Niger chaque semaine, au mépris du droit international.

    La police algérienne détient, identifie et achemine les migrants vers ce qu’ils appellent le « #point zéro », situé à 15 km de la frontière avec le Niger. De là, les hommes, femmes et enfants sont contraints de marcher dans le désert pendant environ 25 km pour atteindre le campement le plus proche.

    « Ils arrivent à un campement frontalier géré par l’OIM (Assamaka) dans des conditions épouvantables, notamment des femmes enceintes souffrant d’hémorragies et en état de choc complet », a constaté Felipe González Morales, le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies, après sa visite en octobre 2018 (https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23698%26LangID).

    Jill Alpes, au Centre de recherche sur les frontières de Nimègue, estime que ces expulsions sont la raison principale pour laquelle les migrants acceptent d’être renvoyés du Niger. Souvent repérés lors d’opérations de recherche et de sauvetage de l’OIM dans le désert, ces migrants n’ont guère d’autre choix que d’accepter l’aide de l’organisation et l’offre de rapatriement qui s’ensuit.

    Dans ses travaux de recherche, Mme Alpes écrit que « seuls les migrants qui acceptent de rentrer au pays peuvent devenir bénéficiaire du travail humanitaire de l’OIM. Bien que des exceptions existent, l’OIM offre en principe le transport d’Assamakka à Arlit uniquement aux personnes expulsées qui acceptent de retourner dans leur pays d’origine ».

    Les opérations de l’IOM au Niger

    M. Morales, le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies, semble être d’accord (https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23698%26LangID). Il a constaté que « de nombreux migrants qui ont souscrit à l’aide au retour volontaire sont victimes de multiples violations des droits de l’Homme et ont besoin d’une protection fondée sur le droit international », et qu’ils ne devraient donc pas être renvoyés dans leur pays. « Cependant, très peu d’entre eux sont orientés vers une procédure de détermination du statut de réfugié ou d’asile, et les autres cas sont traités en vue de leur retour ».

    « Le fait que le Fonds fiduciaire de l’Union européenne apporte un soutien financier à l’OIM en grande partie pour sensibiliser les migrants et les renvoyer dans leur pays d’origine, même lorsque le caractère volontaire est souvent douteux, compromet son approche de la coopération au développement fondée sur les droits », indique le rapporteur spécial des Nations unies.
    Des contrôles insuffisants

    Loren Landau, professeur spécialiste des migrations et du développement au Département du développement international d’Oxford, affirme que le travail de l’OIM souffre en plus d’un manque de supervision indépendante.

    « Il y a très peu de recherches indépendantes et beaucoup de rapports. Mais ce sont tous des rapports écrits par l’OIM. Ils commandent eux-même leur propre évaluation , et ce, depuis des années », détaille le professeur.

    Dans le même temps, le Dr. Arhin-Sam, spécialiste lui de l’évaluation des programmes de développement, remet en question la responsabilité et la redevabilité de l’ensemble de la structure, arguant que les institutions et agences locales dépendent financièrement de l’OIM.

    « Cela a créé un haut niveau de dépendance pour les agences nationales qui doivent évaluer le travail des agences internationales comme l’OIM : elles ne peuvent pas être critiques envers l’OIM. Alors que font-elles ? Elles continuent à dire dans leurs rapports que l’OIM fonctionne bien. De cette façon, l’OIM peut ensuite se tourner vers l’UE et dire que tout va bien ».

    Selon M. Arhin-Sam, les ONG locales et les agences qui aident les rapatriés « sont dans une compétition très dangereuse entre elles » pour obtenir le plus de travail possible des agences des Nations unies et entrer dans leurs bonnes grâces.

    « Si l’OIM travaille avec une ONG locale, celle-ci ne peut plus travailler avec le HCR. Elle se considère alors chanceuse d’être financée par l’OIM et ne peuvent donc pas la critiquer », affirme-t-il.

    Par ailleurs, l’UE participe en tant qu’observateur aux organes de décision du HCR et de l’OIM, sans droit de vote, et tous les États membres de l’UE sont également membres de l’OIM.

    « Le principal bailleur de fonds de l’OIM est l’UE, et ils doivent se soumettre aux exigences de leur client. Cela rend le partenariat très suspect », souligne M. Arhin-Sam. « [Lorsque les fonctionnaires européens] viennent évaluer les projets, ils vérifient si tout ce qui est écrit dans le contrat a été fourni. Mais que cela corresponde à la volonté des gens et aux complexités de la réalité sur le terrain, c’est une autre histoire ».
    Une relation abusive

    « Les États africains ne sont pas nécessairement eux-mêmes favorables aux migrants », estime le professeur Landau. « L’UE a convaincu ces États avec des accords bilatéraux. S’ils s’opposent à l’UE, ils perdront l’aide internationale dont ils bénéficient aujourd’hui. Malgré le langage du partenariat, il est évident que la relation entre l’UE et les États africains ressemble à une relation abusive, dans laquelle un partenaire est dépendant de l’autre ».

    Les chercheurs soulignent que si les retours de Libye offrent une voie de sortie essentielle pour les migrants en situation d’extrême danger, la question de savoir pourquoi les gens sont allés en Libye en premier lieu n’est jamais abordée.

    Une étude réalisée par l’activiste humanitaire libyenne Amera Markous (https://www.cerahgeneve.ch/files/6115/7235/2489/Amera_Markous_-_MAS_Dissertation_2019.pdf) affirme que les migrants et les réfugiés sont dans l’impossibilité d’évaluer en connaissance de cause s’ils doivent retourner dans leur pays quand ils se trouvent dans une situation de détresse, comme par exemple dans un centre de détention libyen.

    « Comment faites-vous en sorte qu’ils partent parce qu’ils le veulent, ou simplement parce qu’ils sont désespérés et que l’OIM leur offre cette seule alternative ? » souligne la chercheuse.

    En plus des abus, le stress et le manque de soins médicaux peuvent influencer la décision des migrants de rentrer chez eux. Jean-Pierre Gauci, chercheur principal à l’Institut britannique de droit international et comparé, estime, lui, que ceux qui gèrent les centres de détention peuvent faire pression sur un migrant emprisonné pour qu’il s’inscrive au programme.

    « Il existe une situation de pouvoir, perçu ou réel, qui peut entraver le consentement effectif et véritablement libre », explique-t-il.

    En réponse, l’OIM affirme que le programme Retour Humanitaire Volontaire est bien volontaire, que les migrants peuvent changer d’avis avant d’embarquer et décider de rester sur place.

    « Il n’est pas rare que des migrants qui soient prêts à voyager, avec des billets d’avion et des documents de voyage, changent d’avis et restent en Libye », déclare un porte-parole de l’OIM.

    Mais M. Landau affirme que l’initiative UE-OIM n’a pas été conçue dans le but d’améliorer la vie des migrants.

    « L’objectif n’est pas de rendre les migrants heureux ou de les réintégrer réellement, mais de s’en débarrasser d’une manière qui soit acceptable pour les Européens », affirme le chercheur.

    « Si par ’fonctionner’, nous entendons se débarrasser de ces personnes, alors le projet fonctionne pour l’UE. C’est une bonne affaire. Il ne vise pas à résoudre les causes profondes des migrations, mais crée une excuse pour ce genre d’expulsions ».

    https://fr.euronews.com/2020/06/22/migrants-les-echecs-d-un-programme-de-retour-volontaire-finance-par-l-u
    #retour_volontaire #échec #campagne #dissuasion #migrations #asile #réfugiés #IOM #renvois #expulsions #efficacité #réintégration #EU #Union_européenne #Niger #Libye #retour_humanitaire_volontaire (#VHR) #retour_volontaire_assisté (#AVR) #statistiques #chiffres #aide_à_la_réintégration #Nigeria #réfugiés_nigérians #travail #Cameroun #migrerrance #stigmates #stigmatisation #Assamaka #choix #rapatriement #Fonds_fiduciaire_de_l'Union européenne #fonds_fiduciaire #coopération_au_développement #aide_au_développement #HCR #partenariat #pouvoir

    –---
    Ajouté à la métaliste migrations & développement (et plus précisément en lien avec la #conditionnalité_de_l'aide) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768702

    ping @rhoumour @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

  • Sea-Watch 3, Mare Jonio land in Sicily with 278 migrants - InfoMigrants
    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#mediterranee#sauvetage

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25513/sea-watch-3-mare-jonio-land-in-sicily-with-278-migrants

    Private migrant rescue vessels Sea-Watch 3 and Mare Jonio over the weekend disembarked close to 300 migrants on the Italian island of Sicily. The arrivals in Italy were the first of their kind since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.

  • Germany to restart ’Dublin transfers’ - InfoMigrants
    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#allemagne#expulsion

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25392/germany-to-restart-dublin-transfers

    Germany has announced it is ready to begin sending asylum seekers who have already applied for asylum in another EU country back to those countries to complete the process. The so-called ’Dublin transfers’ were paused towards the end of March due to the coronavirus pandemic.

  • 36 migrants rescued off Lesbos on Sunday

    36 migrants from Iran and Afghanistan, traveling from Turkey, were rescued off the coast of Lesbos on Sunday. The migrants were taken to Petra port on the island where they were tested for the novel coronavirus, and then taken into quarantine.

    The small boat carrying 36 migrants was spotted off the coast of Lesbos on Sunday, June 14, according to the French news agency Agence France Presse (AFP). The Greek press agency ANA-MPA said that the boat was carrying 16 men, 10 women, two of whom are pregnant, and 10 minors.

    The boat, continued ANA-MPA, had “become stranded” between the Turkish coast and the north-west coast of the island of Lesbos.

    Quarantine

    After being taken in by the Greek coastguard, the migrants were first taken to Lesbos’s Petra port where they were tested for the novel coronavirus by a medical team. The group were then moved to Megala Therma, a temporary camp on the north of the island for a “seven-day” quarantine, according to AFP.

    According to ANA-MPA, this is the “third such boat” arriving on Lesbos since the beginning of June. So far, reported the agency, a total of 108 migrants have arrived on the island this month, in stark contrast to the greatly reduced numbers since mid-March, when Greece like most other countries around the world shut down due to restrictions to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Pro-migrant organizations like Aegean Boat Report regularly post on social media when boats arrive on the Greek islands. Their latest post refers to an arrival of “40 migrants” on Sunday, June 9.

    AFP reported that the migrant boat this weekend was in fact spotted on Saturday morning, but the rescue operation by the Greek coastguard “did not take place until midnight.” Distress hotline Alarm Phone, which monitors migrant boats across the Mediterranean, repeatedly tweeted about the situation of those on board.

    Throughout Saturday, they sent out a series of urgent tweets, some with videos and pictures calling on the Greek and Turkish coastguards to help the people on board, since it appeared one of the pregnant women had gone into labor.

    ’Hurry, we are so scared’

    Those on board the boat told Alarm Phone to tell the authorities to “hurry” because they were “so scared.” In a subsequent tweet, Alarm Phone said “we could hear the people in the boat scream.” They said that someone on the boat had told them “the [pregnant] woman is dying.” Alarm Phone asked “Europe: What are you doing?”

    Later still on Saturday, they published a photo of the woman who they said was giving birth, under a blanket or tarpaulin, her face pixeled out. “The woman is giving birth in the dark on a dinghy in distress,” Alarm Phone wrote. “All competent authorities have knowledge of the situation. The Greek and Turkish Coast Guards, Frontex and NATO bear the full responsibility of these lives and any fatalities.”

    ’Brutal pushbacks’

    On May 29, Aegean Boat Report, which also monitors migrant boats in the Mediterranean and advocates for migrant rights in the region, accused the Greek coastguard of “brutally pushing back” another boat carrying “around 40” people. They said the Greek coastguards “destroyed their engine, [and] sprayed them with an unknown white powder.” This was just one instance of several, said migrant organizations.

    Throughout the lockdown, Greece has continued to transfer some migrants and asylum seekers off the Aegean islands to the mainland, in an attempt to ease overcrowding. AFP reports however that because of a shortage of accommodation on the mainland too, many migrants and asylum seekers have taken to sleeping in Victoria Square in the center of Athens. A phenomenon that was last seen in 2015 when more than a million migrants arrived in Greece in the hope of making it on to other countries in the EU.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25368/36-migrants-rescued-off-lesbos-on-sunday

    #covid-19 #migration #migrant #grece #lesbos #meregee #quarantaine #traversee #alarmphone #test

  • Greece to replace printed asylum cards with digital ones

    Greece’s Migration Ministry has announced that the printed cards issued to asylum seekers in the country will be replaced by electronic cards as of October 1, 2020.

    The move announced by the ministry comes in response to dangerous overcrowding taking place in recent weeks outside the offices of the Asylum Service in the Katehaki, Alimos and Piraeus areas of Athens, since the offices opened up again on May 18 after the lifting of COVID-19 safety measures.

    Hundreds of refugees and migrants crowd the entrances every day and the government has come under heavy criticism from media observers for the unnecessary suffering, especially of vulnerable groups who reportedly wait for hours without even gaining entrance.

    Under the government’s proposed scheme, the new digital cards will be issued by the newly-appointed governors of the accommodation facilities and identification centers hosting the migrants. The cards will also be used as entry cards for the camps, as well as for other services offered by the ministry.

    In parallel, the ministry also announced that it has extended the validity of all asylum cards until October 1 that expired or will expire between June 1 and September 30 this year. At the same time, the temporary social security and healthcare number for refugees will be issued solely via the website of the Social Security Electronic Governance SA (IDIKA).

    Digital difficulties

    Migration Minister Notis Mitarakis claimed it was the refugees and migrants themselves who were to blame for the dangerous overcrowding at the Asylum Services offices. “It’s a bit difficult to explain to all these people that the process is now going digital. Unfortunately, despite our best efforts, many people seem to have this personal insecurity issue and they want to come here themselves, just to get information that is already available on the internet,” Mitarakis told reporters.

    Mitarakis insisted that eight out of ten people did not even need to go to any asylum office because they had already been informed that the residence cards had been extended and that many changes were being made electronically.

    This viewpoint is being criticized by many in the local media who suggest that Mitarakis is overlooking the extremely complex and difficult reality that the refugees and migrants are facing, adding that most Greeks would struggle to understand the information provided.

    It remains to be seen whether the measures will have an immediate effect, as it will of course take time to inform and familiarize tens of thousands of refugees and migrants with the new digital systems.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25369/greece-to-replace-printed-asylum-cards-with-digital-ones

    #covid-19 #migration #migrant #grece #digitalisation #asile #camp

  • Quarantine extended at Greek island migrant camps

    The Greek government recently extended lockdown measures at crowded migrant camps on some of the country’s islands in the Aegean Sea. NGOs like Doctors Without Borders have heavily criticized that decision. Meanwhile, a new government regulation will require thousands of refugees to move out of state housing.

    The medical aid group Doctors Without Borders has criticized the decision by Greece’s government to extend the quarantine period at overcrowded migrant camps on the islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos to June 21. This means the lockdown there will last almost three months. Meanwhile, anti-coronavirus measures are being relaxed at several camps on the mainland.

    Lockdown extension ’unjustifiable’

    Lisa Papadimitriou, the head of staff at Doctors Without Borders on Lesbos, said: “The extension to restrict the movement of asylum seekers living in these island reception centers until June 21 is unjustifiable and will further reduce their already limited access to basic services and medical care and, at the current stage of the COVID-19 epidemic, is not justified in any way in terms of public health.”

    She added that “so far there is no confirmed incident at any of the reception centers on the islands, which means that these populations are not a danger.”

    The lockdown of the island camps began earlier and will now continue for longer than the quarantine for the general population in Greece.

    Many NGOs and human rights groups have expressed concern over the Greek government’s policies concerning migrants during the pandemic. Some have claimed that the government is taking advantage of the situation to continue its so-called policy of “containment” regarding refugees and migrants. They say the government’s actions go against scientific protocols and are contrary to the recommendations of the European Commission and the World Health Organization (WHO) on the protection of refugees and migrants.

    Thousands of refugees to be evicted

    Meanwhile, the government’s bid to move thousands of refugees out of state facilities and subsidized accommodation to make room for new asylum seekers is suffering delays as many migrants are refusing to move out.

    Under a new law, refugees who have secured asylum now have a grace period of just one month to leave state accommodation. Until March, the grace period had been six months.

    Under this regulation, up to 9,000 migrants must leave the state reception system by the end of June. Of that total, approximately 4,000 are living in EU-funded apartments, while the rest are staying in subsidized hotels or camps.

    A further 11,000 are supposed to leave in the coming months.

    Could many end up homeless?

    However, NGOs say refugees and migrants living in apartments funded by the EU-supported ESTIA scheme are refusing to leave because they have nowhere else to go. The UN refugee agency UNHCR, which runs ESTIA, has asked the Greek Migration Ministry to provide these migrants with a “safety net” to make the transition.

    A leading humanitarian and anti-racism organisation in Greece, KEERFA, has criticized the government’s plan, and recently there were protests against the evictions in the center of Athens.

    KEERFA, which stands for the Movement United Against Facism and the Racist Threat, said that many migrants could be left homeless.

    This came after Migration Minister Notis Mitarakis announced that 60 of the current 93 hospitality facilities that were created in hotels on the mainland for asylum seekers will be closed in 2020, starting on June 1.

    Residents will be transferred to other facilities or be included in ESTIA integration program.

    It remains to be seen if Mitarakis can help speed up transfers from the island camps. Despite a recent dip in the number of arrivals, there are still close to 120,000 asylum seekers in Greece, according to the latest UNHCR data. 39,700 of them live on the islands and 80,300 are on the mainland in various locations stretching from Athens to the northern land border at Evros.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25329/quarantine-extended-at-greek-island-migrant-camps

    #Covid19 #migrant #migration #grece #prolongation #quarantaine #deconfinement #camp

  • ’I am Italian too’: How #BlackLivesMatter protests reignited the Italian citizenship debate

    Global anti-racism protests following the death of African-American George Floyd could impact Italy’s citizenship laws. Here, politicians are under pressure to allow more children of migrants born and educated in the country to become Italians.

    June 2 is the day Italy celebrates becoming a republic. Partly, it is a day for reflecting on the values of the country and its citizens, and what it means to be Italian. “This year it will be remembered for a series of exceptional events,” writes Angelica Pesarini in an essay entitled “Questions of Privilege” on the newsletter for cultural space Il lavoro culturale (Cultural work).

    Pesarini is a faculty member in social and cultural analysis at New York University (NYU) in Florence. She is also a black Italian, born in Italy to a family with roots in Somalia and Eritrea, countries that have colonial links with Italy.

    Many Italians think “to be Italian is to be white,” Pesarini told the BBC in 2019. “I feel I have to justify my Italian-ness a lot,” she continued. “People assume I cannot be Italian. When people ask me: ’Where are you from?’ I say: ’I’m from Rome.’ They ask: ’No, but where are you really from?’” Pesarini says that this frequent exchange demonstrates how “race, colonialism and whiteness are all connected to Italian identity today.”

    Children of migrants

    Pesarini is Italian, but her identity is still questioned. For others, the children of migrant parents, it is not just strangers who ask questions about their roots, but the state itself. As Italy’s migrant population grows, and more and more children are being born in Italy and growing up and going to school in the Italian system, they ask why they too cannot be recognized as Italian citizens.

    The current law allows Italian citizenship to be granted automatically only to those born to Italian parents. The children of migrants, both those born on Italian soil and those who migrated with their parents as minors, are not automatically granted an Italian passport when they turn 18.

    ’One million’ Italians without citizenship

    According to the campaign group “Italiani senza cittadinanza” (Italians without citizenship), there are now one million people in this position. “I feel I am Italian, but it as though the state doesn’t see me,” says Alessia Korotkova in a video made by Oxfam in 2019. She had hoped to compete at the Olympic Games in Tokyo 2020 but she couldn’t because she was unable to get Italian citizenship. “We might seem invisible to the state,” Korotkova continues, “but we are not invisible, we ARE here,” she says smiling as the video flashes up a hashtag #noicisiamo (#We_are_here).

    “I’m a foreigner in my own home,” says Ghassan Ezzarraa in another video in the series. “I feel like I am in a video game; to become myself, I have to jump the hurdles to the next level,” he says. “I am the only person in my family still considered a foreigner,” he adds.

    One of the lucky ones?

    Ghassan might be considered one of the lucky ones. At the end of January 2020, he was granted citizenship in his home town of Reggio Emilia at the age of 23. He had been living in Italy since he was four years old.

    But his journey to citizenship, like that of many others, was long and complicated. Ghassan was born in Rabat, Morocco in 1996. Just after he turned four, he and his mother were able to join his father in Italy where he had been living and working. A year later, his sister was born on Italian soil, but even that didn’t qualify her for automatic citizenship.

    According to La Repubblica newspaper, as a long time resident, Ghassan’s father received Italian citizenship in 2015. His sister, who was still a child, received it soon after, as did his mother, as his father’s legal spouse. Only Ghassan, who had already turned 18 failed to “inherit” the citizenship granted to the rest of his family.

    Becoming Italian

    Having been through the Italian school system, Ghassan applied for citizenship, traveling to Morocco to obtain all the necessary documents. The procedure should have taken two years, but under the government’s migration and security decree, this process was lengthened to four years.

    The complications meant that Ghassan had to partially give up on the athletic career he had dreamed of because, as a ’foreigner’, he was not eligible to receive sponsorship and training. He took up a job and, with the help of various cultural organizations, campaigned to get his story heard. Finally, the mayor of Reggio Emilia in the north of Italy, did listen and announced the happy news on his Facebook page in January.

    Different proposals debated

    The debate on citizenship rights has continued for decades. A commission in the current parliament has been hearing evidence on the issue since late 2019. Its deliberations were largely buried during the restrictions placed on Italy by the COVID-19 pandemic, but now, with demonstrations across Italy taking place in protest over the death of African-American George Floyd, the issue is back in the media, and public, spotlight.

    The current government is split on the issue, writes the Italian news agency ANSA. Three different proposals have been put forward. The first is granting citizenship based on where you are born, ie, if you are born on Italian soil, you should be considered Italian. The second is an idea based around education and culture. According to this, if you have been educated in Italian, speak the language fluently and think ’like an Italian’, then why shouldn’t you be considered Italian? This second proposal would also allow those who migrated with their parents but grew up feeling themselves to be Italian citizens to access citizenship. The third is a combination of both these ideas.

    The UN children’s charity, UNICEF in Italy, points out that this law would not automatically grant citizenship to any child of a migrant born on Italian soil. In fact, even the new proposals are rich with caveats. Children of parents who are waiting to have their request for international protection decided, for instance, would not qualify. Nor would children born to parents without a legal permit to stay.

    A change to the citizenship law would help children of those who have lived in Italy for a long time, completed more than five years of education and/or a professional qualification and possibly obtained Italian citizenship themselves. UNICEF says it is needed to “stop discrimination against those children who are legitimately part of Italian society.”
    Black people die in Italy too

    In her essay, Angelica Pesarini lists some of the black people, many of whom are migrants, who have been murdered on Italian soil. She highlights the death of a Malian man Soumalia Sacko on Republic Day two years ago in 2018. Sacko, she writes, was working “exploited” in the Calabrian fields in the south of Italy. He was helping two workmates collect some material from an abandoned building in the fields, in order to try and construct a shack where they were living. As they were collecting the material, they were shot at by an Italian man with an “unlicensed shotgun.” The shots resulted in a head trauma, from which Sacko died.

    His death, writes Pesarini, was initially “reported in a distorted manner” based on information provided by the Prefecture in Reggio Calabria. They said, that he was “shot at by someone unknown whilst stealing.” Soon after his death, the deputy Prime Minister at the time, Matteo Salvini, tweeted about migrants “The fun’s over;” referring to the idea that migrants arrive in Italy just to obtain benefits and ’easy’ work.
    #BlackLivesMatter: Italy

    One of the leading members of the Sardines movement, which has been fighting for migrant rights in Italy, is also pushing for the citizenship law to be reformed. “This is such an important law that it shouldn’t fall victim to political disagreement or propaganda,” Jasmine Cristallo, spokesperson for the “6,000 Sardines” movement told ANSA.

    Campaigners are hopeful that they can use the momentum of the protests around the world and anger at institutional racism to change politicians’ minds and bring citizenship laws into the 21st century. On Facebook on June 9, Italians without citizenship posted pictures from the latest demonstration in Rome, where Italian-Haitian anti-racism campaigner Stella Jean called for a change to the current citizenship laws. Jean told ANSA: “I’m speaking today because it is no longer possible to remain silent. I don’t want my own children to be subject to the threats I received as a girl. Everyone merits citizenship.”

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25300/i-am-italian-too-how-blacklivesmatter-protests-reignited-the-italian-c
    #citoyenneté #Italie #migrations #naturalisation #nationalité

    ping @wizo @karine4 @isskein @albertocampiphoto @cede

  • Grèce : nouvelle extension du confinement dans les #camps de demandeurs d’asile

    En Grèce, les autorités ont à nouveau prolongé le confinement des principaux camps de demandeurs d’asile pour 15 jours supplémentaires, soit jusqu’au 21 juin. C’est la troisième fois que ce confinement est prolongé depuis le mois de mai, officiellement en raison de la lutte contre la pandémie de coronavirus. Un virus qui a pourtant relativement épargné le pays, où moins de 200 victimes ont été recensées depuis le début de la crise sanitaire.

    C’est début mai que le confinement de la population grecque a été levé. Depuis, celui-ci se poursuit pourtant dans les centres dits « d’accueil et d’identification » de demandeurs d’asile. Des camps où s’entassent au total près de 35 000 personnes et qui se situent sur cinq îles de la mer Égée - à l’image de #Moria sur l’île de #Lesbos - ou à la frontière terrestre avec la Turquie, comme le centre de l’#Evros.

    Officiellement, il s’agit pour les autorités grecques de lutter contre la propagation du coronavirus. Or, parmi l’ensemble des demandeurs d’asile, seuls quelques dizaines de cas ont été signalés à travers le pays et aucune victime n’a été recensée.

    Avant la crise sanitaire, la tension était vive en revanche sur plusieurs îles qui abritent des camps, en particulier à Lesbos fin février et début mars. Une partie de la population locale exprimait alors son ras-le-bol, parfois avec violence, face à cette cohabitation forcée.

    Athènes a d’ailleurs l’intention de mettre prochainement en place de premiers centres fermés ou semi-fermés. Notamment sur l’île de Samos et à Malakassa, au nord de la capitale. La prolongation répétée du confinement pour plusieurs dizaines de milliers de demandeurs d’asile semble ainsi s’inscrire dans une logique parallèle.

    http://www.rfi.fr/fr/europe/20200607-gr%C3%A8ce-nouvelle-extension-confinement-les-camps

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #extension #prolongation #confinement #coronavirus #covid-19 #Grèce #camps_de_réfugiés

    ping @luciebacon @karine4 @isskein

    • Νέα παράταση εγκλεισμού στα ΚΥΤ των νησιών με πρόσχημα τον κορονοϊό

      Αν δεν υπήρχε ο κορονοϊός, η κυβέρνηση θα έπρεπε να τον είχε εφεύρει για να μπορέσει να περάσει ευκολότερα την ακροδεξιά της ατζέντα στο προσφυγικό.

      Από την αρχή της εκδήλωσης της πανδημίας του κορονοϊού η κυβέρνηση αντιμετώπισε την πανδημία όχι σαν κάτι από το οποίο έπρεπε να προστατέψει τους πρόσφυγες και τους μετανάστες που ζουν στις δομές, αλλά αντιθέτως σαν άλλη μια ευκαιρία για να τους στοχοποιήσει σαν υποτιθέμενη υγειονομική απειλή. Εξού και δεν πήρε ουσιαστικά μέτρα πρόληψης και προστασίας των δομών, αγνοώντας επιδεικτικά τις επείγουσες συστάσεις ελληνικών, διεθνών και ευρωπαϊκών φορέων.

      Δεν προχώρησε ούτε στην άμεση εκκένωση των Κέντρων Υποδοχής και Ταυτοποίησης από τους περισσότερους από 2.000 πρόσφυγες και μετανάστες που είναι ιδιαίτερα ευπαθείς στον κορονοϊό - άνθρωποι ηλικιωμένοι ή με χρόνια σοβαρά προβλήματα υγείας. Αντιθέτως, ανέβαλε στην πράξη με προσχηματικές αοριστολογίες ή και σιωπηρά για τουλάχιστον δύο μήνες τη σχετική συμφωνία που είχε κάνει το υπουργείο Μετανάστευσης και Ασύλου με την κυρία Γιόχανσον στις αρχές Απριλίου.

      Με άλλα λόγια, αν δεν υπήρχε ο κορονοϊός, η κυβέρνηση θα έπρεπε να τον είχε εφεύρει για να μπορέσει να περάσει ευκολότερα την ακροδεξιά της ατζέντα στο προσφυγικό. Στην πραγματικότητα, αυτό ακριβώς κάνει ο υπουργός Μετανάστευσης και Ασύλου : χρησιμοποιεί την πανδημία του κορονοϊού για να παρατείνει ξανά και ξανά την καραντίνα σε δομές. Ιδίως στα Κέντρα Υποδοχής και Ταυτοποίησης στα νησιά, όπου εξελίχθηκαν σε φιάσκο οι άτσαλες και βιαστικές απόπειρες του υπουργού Νότη Μητασράκη και του υπουργού Προστασίας του Πολίτη Μιχάλη Χρυσοχοΐδη να επιβάλουν με επιτάξεις, απευθείας αναθέσεις και άγρια καταστολή έργα πολλών δεκάδων εκατομμυρίων ευρώ για τη δημιουργία νέων Κέντρων Υποδοχής και Ταυτοποίησης, πολλαπλάσιας χωρητικότητας από ατυτή των σημερινών.

      Η επιβολή καραντίνας στα ΚΥΤ στα νησιά ξεκίνησε στις 24 Μαρτίου, αρκετά πριν την επιβολή καραντίνας στο γενικό πληθυσμό, και από τότε ανανεώνεται συνεχώς. Το Σάββατο 20 Ιουνίου οι υπουργοί Μηταράκης και Χρυσοχοΐδης έδωσαν άλλη μια παράταση υγειονομικού αποκλεισμού των ΚΥΤ μέχρι τις 5 Ιουλίου, οπότε και θα συμπληρωθούν 3,5 μήνες συνεχούς καραντίνας. Τουλάχιστον για τα μάτια των ξενοφοβικών, καθώς στην πράξη οι αρχές αδυνατούν να επιβάλουν καραντίνα σε δομές που εξαπλώνονται σε μεγάλη έκταση έξω από τους οριοθετημένους χώρους των ΚΥΤ.

      Οι υπουργοί ανακοίνωσαν επίσης παράταση της καραντίνας στις δομές της Μαλακάσας, της Ριτσώνας και του Κουτσόχερου, όπου είχαν εμφανιστεί κρούσματα πριν από πολλές εβδομάδες, και έκτοτε δεν υπάρχει ενημέρωση για νέα κρούσματα μέσα στις δομές, παρόλο που έχει παρέλθει προ πολλού το προβλεπόμενο χρονικό όριο της καραντίνας.

      Πρόκειται για σκανδαλωδώς προκλητική διαχείριση, επικοινωνιακή και μόνο, τόσο του προσφυγικού και μεταναστευτικού όσο και του ζητήματος του κορονοϊού.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/node/248622

      #hotspot #hotpspots

      –—

      Avec ce commentaire de Vicky Skoumbi, reçu le 21.06.2020 via la mailing-list Migreurop :

      Sous des prétexte fallacieux, le gouvernement prolonge une énième fois les mesures de restriction de mouvement pour les résidents de hotspots dans les #îles et pour trois structures d’accueil au continent, #Malakasa, #Ritsona et #Koutsohero. Le 5 juillet, date jusqu’à laquelle court cette nouvelle #prolongation, les réfugiés dans les camps auront passés trois mois et demi sous #quarantaine. Je rappelle que depuis au moins un mois la population grecque a retrouvé une entière liberté de mouvement. Il est fort à parier que de prolongation en prolongation tout le reste de l’été se passera comme cela, jusqu’à la création de nouveaux centres fermés dans les îles. Cette éternisation de la quarantaine -soi-disant pour des raisons sanitaires qu’aucune donné réel ne justifie, transforme de fait les hotspots en #centres_fermés anticipant ainsi le projet du gouvernement.

      #stratégie_du_choc

    • Pro-migrant protests in Athens as Greece extends lockdown

      Following protests in Athens slamming the government for its treatment of migrants, the Greek government over the weekend said it would extend the COVID-19 lockdown on the migrant camps on Greek Aegean islands and on the mainland.

      Greece has extended a coronavirus lockdown on its migrant camps for a further two weeks. On Saturday, Greece announced extension of the coronavirus lockdown on its overcrowded and unsanitary migrant camps on its islands in the Aegean Sea for another fortnight.

      The move came hours after some 2,000 people protested in central Athens on Saturday to mark World Refugee Day and denounced the government’s treatment of migrants.

      The migration ministry said migrants living in island camps as well as those in mainland Greece will remain under lockdown until July 5. It was due to have ended on Monday, June 22, along with the easing of general community restrictions as the country has been preparing to welcome tourists for the summer.

      The Greek government first introduced strict confinement measures in migrant camps on March 21. A more general lockdown was imposed on March 23; it has since been extended a number of times. No known coronavirus deaths have been recorded in Greek migrant camps so far and only a few dozen infections have surfaced. Rights groups have expressed concern that migrants’ rights have been eroded by the restrictions.

      On May 18, the Greek asylum service resumed receiving asylum applications after an 11-week pause. Residence permits held by refugees will be extended six months from their date of expiration to prevent the service from becoming overwhelmed by renewal applications.

      ’No refugee homeless, persecuted, jailed’

      During the Saturday protests, members of anti-racist groups, joined by residents from migrant camps, marched in central Athens. They were holding banners proclaiming “No refugee homeless, persecuted, jailed” and chanting slogans against evictions of refugees from temporary accommodation in apartments.

      More than 11,000 refugees who have been living in reception facilities for asylum seekers could soon be evicted. Refugees used to be able to keep their accommodation for up to six months after receiving protected status.

      But the transitional grace period was recently reduced significantly: Since March of this year, people can no longer stay in the reception system for six months after they were officially recognized as refugees — they only have 30 days.

      Refugee advocacy groups and UNHCR have expressed concern that the people evicted could end up homeless. “Forcing people to leave their accommodation without a safety net and measures to ensure their self-reliance may push many into poverty and homelessness,” UNHCR spokesperson Andrej Mahecic said last week.

      The government insists that it is doing everything necessary “to assure a smooth transition for those who leave their lodgings.”

      Moreover, UNHCR and several NGOs and human rights groups have spoken out to criticize the Greek government’s decision to cut spending on a housing program for asylum seekers by up to 30%. They said that it means less safe places to live for vulnerable groups.

      Asylum office laments burden, defends action

      In a message for World Refugee Day, the Ministry for Migration and Asylum said Greece has found itself “at the centre of the migration crisis bearing a disproportionate burden”, news agency AFP cites.

      “The country is safeguarding the rights of those who are really persecuted and operates as a shield of solidarity in the eastern Mediterranean,” it added.

      Government officials have repeatedly said Greece must become a less attractive destination for asylum seekers.

      The continued presence of more than 36,000 refugees and asylum seekers on the islands — over five times the intended capacity of shelters there — has caused major friction with local communities who are demanding their immediate removal.

      An operation in February to build detention centers for migrants on the islands of Lesbos and Chios had to be abandoned due to violent protests.

      Accusations of push-backs

      Greece has also been repeatedly accused of illegal pushbacks by its forces at its land and sea borders, which according to reports have spiked since March.

      On land, a Balkans-based network of human rights organizations said migrants reported beatings and violent collective expulsions from inland detention spaces to Turkey on boats across the Evros River. In the Aegean, a recent investigation by three media outlets claims that Greek coast guard officers intercept migrant boats coming from Turkey and send them back to Turkey in unseaworthy life rafts.

      Athens has repeatedly denied using illegal tactics to guard its borders, and has in turn accused Turkey of sending patrol boats to escort migrant boats into its waters.

      According to UNHCR, around 3,000 asylum seekers arrived in Greece by land and sea since the start of March, far fewer people than over previous months. Some 36,450 refugees and asylum seekers are currently staying on the Aegean islands.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/25521/pro-migrant-protests-in-athens-as-greece-extends-lockdown

      #résistance

    • Greek government must end lockdown for locked up people on Greek islands

      COVID-19-related lockdown measures have had an impact on the lives of everyone around the world and generated increasing levels of stress and anxiety for many of us. However, the restriction of movement imposed in places like Moria and Vathy, on the Greek islands, have proven to be toxic for the thousands of people contained there.

      When COVID-19 reached Greece, more than 30,000 asylum seekers and migrants were contained in the reception centres on the Greek islands in appalling conditions, without access to regular healthcare or basic services. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) runs mental health clinics on the islands.

      In March 2020, a restriction of movement imposed by the central government in response to COVID-19 has meant that these people, 55 per cent of whom are women and children, have essentially been forced to remain in these overcrowded and unhygienic centres with no possibility to escape the dangerous conditions which are part of their daily life.

      Despite the fact that there have been zero cases of COVID-19 in any of the reception centres on the Greek islands, and that life has returned to normal for local people and tourists alike, these discriminatory measures for asylum seekers and migrants continue to be extended every two weeks.

      Today, these men, women and children continue to be hemmed in, in dire conditions, resulting in a deterioration of their medical and mental health.

      “The tensions have increased dramatically and there is much more violence since the lockdown, and the worst part is that even children cannot escape from it anymore,” says Mohtar, the father of a patient from MSF’s mental health clinic for children. “The only thing I could do before to help my son was to take him away from Moria; for a walk or to swim in the sea, in a calm place. Now we are trapped.”

      MSF cannot stay silent about this blatant discrimination, as the restriction of movement imposed on asylum seekers dramatically reduces their already-limited access to basic services and medical care.

      In the current phase of the COVID-19 epidemic in Greece, this measure is absolutely unjustified from a public health point of view – it is discriminatory towards people that don’t represent a risk and contributes to their stigmatisation, while putting them further at risk.

      “The restrictions of movement for migrants and refugees in the camp have affected the mental health of my patients dramatically,” says Greg Kavarnos, a psychologist in the MSF Survivors of Torture clinic on Lesbos. “If you and I felt stressed and were easily irritated during the period of the lockdown in our homes, imagine how people who have endured very traumatic experiences feel now that they have to stay locked up in a camp like Moria.”

      “Moria is a place where they cannot find peace, they cannot find a private space and they have to stand in lines for food, for the toilet, for water, for everything,” says Kavarnos.

      COVID-19 should not be used as a tool to detain migrants and refugees. We continue to call for the evacuation of people, especially those who belong to high-risk groups for COVID-19, from the reception centres to safe accommodation. The conditions in these centres are not acceptable in normal times however, they have become even more perilous pits of violence, sickness, and misery when people are unable to move due to arbitrary restrictions.

      https://www.msf.org/covid-19-excuse-keep-people-greek-islands-locked

    • La Grèce prolonge à nouveau le confinement dans les camps de migrants

      Athènes a annoncé vendredi une prolongation jusqu’à la fin du mois d’août du confinement dans les camps de migrants installés sur ses îles et le continent. Le pays connaît une hausse du nombre d’infections mais aucun décès n’a encore été enregistré dans les camps de migrants.

      Les camps de migrants de Grèce resteront confinés au moins jusqu’à la fin du mois d’août. Vendredi 31 juillet, le ministère des Migrations a déclaré que le confinement – entré en vigueur le 21 mars – sera prolongé jusqu’au 31 août "pour prévenir l’apparition et la diffusion des cas de coronavirus". Il s’agit de la 6e prolongation du confinement des camps de migrants, alors que la population grecque, elle, est sortie du confinement le 4 mai dernier.

      La Grèce, avec 203 décès dus au Covid-19, n’a pas été aussi sévèrement touchée que d’autres pays européens et aucun décès n’a été enregistré dans les camps de migrants.

      Mais ces derniers sont surpeuplés, en mer Egée particulièrement. Plus de 26 000 demandeurs d’asile y vivent, pour une d’une capacité d’accueil de moins de 6 100 places. Une situation qui génère de plus en plus de tensions avec la population locale.

      Néanmoins, la prolongation du confinement des seuls camps de migrants ne constitue pas moins une discrimination manifeste des droits des personnes migrantes, ont dénoncé de nombreuses ONG dans un communiqué publié le 17 juillet.

      “Nous sommes de plus en plus inquiets car les températures montent, nous sommes au milieu de l’été, et les migrants sont obligés de vivre dans des espaces saturés avec trop peu d’accès à l’hygiène, l’eau manque ainsi que les produits sanitaires dans la plupart des camps. Il y a un donc un risque que ces prolongement indéterminés provoquent d’importants problèmes sanitaires au sein des camps puisque les gens ne peuvent même plus sortir pour se faire soigner ou acheter des médicaments et des produits de première nécessité”, a indiqué à InfoMigrants Adriana Tidona, chercheuse spécialiste des questions migratoires en Europe pour Amnesty International.
      Augmentation du nombre de cas

      Si les autorités grecques veulent que les migrants restent dans des camps, elles invitent les touristes à venir dans le pays. Les aéroports grecs et les frontières ont ainsi été rouverts aux touristes étrangers. Or, ces mesures se sont accompagnées d’une augmentation du nombre de cas de Covid-19 dans le pays.

      Depuis le 1er juillet, plus de 340 cas confirmés ont été enregistrés parmi les près de 1,3 million de voyageurs entrant en Grèce, a indiqué mardi la protection civile

      Mardi, la Grèce a annoncé qu’elle rendait le masque obligatoire dans les magasins, les banques, les services publics et la quasi-totalité des lieux clos, en réponse à une résurgence des infections.


      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/26383/la-grece-prolonge-a-nouveau-le-confinement-dans-les-camps-de-migrants

    • Grèce : prolongation du confinement dans les camps de migrants

      Plus de 24.000 demandeurs d’asile sont logés dans des camps insalubres, d’une capacité d’accueil de moins de 6100 places.

      La Grèce a annoncé vendredi 28 août une prolongation jusqu’au 15 septembre du confinement imposé aux migrants dans les camps aux portes d’entrée de l’Europe, sur les îles et à la frontière terrestre du pays, qui connaît une résurgence des cas de coronavirus. Le confinement des camps, entré en vigueur le 21 mars, sera prolongé jusqu’au 15 septembre « pour empêcher l’apparition et la propagation des cas de coronavirus », a déclaré le ministère des Migrations.

      La présence de plus de 24.000 demandeurs d’asile dans des camps insalubres, d’une capacité d’accueil de moins de 6100 places, situés sur les cinq îles de la mer Égée, est une source d’inquiétude pour les autorités.

      Mais les ONG ont plusieurs fois dénoncé l’enfermement des demandeurs d’asile dans ces structures qui ne sont pas adaptées pour mettre en place les mesures barrières nécessaires. Les nouveaux arrivants sur les îles grecques sont par ailleurs placés en quarantaine dans des structures séparées pour ne pas prendre le risque de contaminer tout le camp. Alors que les arrivées s’étaient taries pendant le confinement, elles ont repris légèrement pendant l’été.

      Dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi, les gardes-côtes grecs ont entrepris une opération de sauvetage d’un voilier au large de l’île de Rhodes avec à bord 55 migrants. Mercredi, la police portuaire avait déjà effectué une opération similaire au large de l’île de Halki et avait secouru 96 personnes. Pour la troisième journée consécutive, des recherches se poursuivent pour retrouver un homme de 35 ans et son fils de 4 ans, portés disparus depuis le naufrage selon la mère de l’enfant. La Grèce, avec 254 décès dus au Covid-19, n’a pas été aussi sévèrement touchée que d’autres pays européens, et aucun décès n’a été enregistré dans les camps de migrants.

      https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/grece-prolongation-du-confinement-dans-les-camps-de-migrants-1-20200828

    • More camps locked down

      Migrant reception centers in #Thiva, central Greece, and Serres, in the country’s north, have been put on lockdown following outbreaks of the coronavirus.

      The lockdowns were announced on Saturday in a joint decision by the ministries of Migration, Citizens’ Protection and Health and are to remain in force until October 9 when they will be reviewed.

      Migrant facilities in Elaionas, Malakasa, Oinofyta, Ritsona, Schistos, Koutsohero and Fylakio, on the mainland, and on the islands of Samos and Leros are also under lockdown following outbreaks there.

      On Lesvos, following the destruction of the Moria camp in fires earlier this month, migrants have been transferred to a temporary facility where Covid-19 infected residents have been segregated.

      https://www.ekathimerini.com/257425/article/ekathimerini/news/more-camps-locked-down