monitoring the state and civil liberties in Europe

https://www.statewatch.org

  • How the EU coordinates the outsourcing of migration control

    It is no secret that the EU is seeking greater cooperation from non-EU states in its migration control agenda. Less is known, however, about precisely how that cooperation is organised and encouraged. A document produced last year and released in response to an access to documents request from Statewatch provides some further details on the topic, pointing to avenues for advocacy, research and investigation.

    Coordinating the “external dimension of migration” at the “local level”

    An EU Council document (pdf) sheds light on the mechanisms behind the EU’s externalisation agenda.

    Produced by the Belgian Presidency in mid-2024 and shared with the MOCADEM working group, it outlines how EU institutions and member states align their efforts to influence migration policies beyond the EU’s borders.

    It also highlights the scale and entrenchment of the EU’s externalisation agenda, which is fuelling human rights violations with few obvious avenues for democratic control or accountability.

    A centralised coordination system built on emergency powers

    The document was produced for MOCADEM, the Operational Coordination Mechanism on the External Dimension of Migration.

    In 2022, MOCADEM was established using emergency powers related to “a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster.” It is designed to “enable the [European] Union to coordinate and react in a timely manner to issues related to the external dimension of migration.”

    MOCADEM produces “country-specific action plans,” “action files, and “matrixes” designed to guide coordinated action and messaging by EU member states and institutions in discussions on migration with other states.

    As of mid-2024, ten countries were covered by action plans, and twelve had action files and matrices. Additionally, there were “thematic action files on instrumentalisation and return.” Statewatch has published most of the public documentation that exists on MOCADEM’s work.

    For the EU and its member states, this coordination makes their work on the “external dimension of migration” more efficient.

    But in doing so, it enshrines a powerful and opaque structure for exporting EU migration enforcement that actively avoids any form of democratic scrutiny or oversight.

    Diplomats, delegations, and decentralised enforcement

    “Local coordination in the area of migration varies according to the location and may follow different approaches,” the document says.

    Much of this coordination is pushed through EU delegations and national embassies in partner countries. Through regular meetings, EU and member state officials align approaches, share intelligence, and prepare joint messaging. The document gives examples from Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Niger:

    - In Egypt, the EU delegation and member state diplomatic staff co-chair bi-monthly “migration roundtables.”
    - In Iraq, a meeting chaired by the EU delegation brings together member states “to exchange information on developments in cooperation with Iraq and recent visits.”
    – In Libya, the EU delegation “launched a series of debates with Tripoli-based EU MS [member states] to discuss different aspects of migration.” The document says these follow “the priorities set in the MOCADEM action file on Libya and the strategic discussion organised in the EMWP [External Aspects of Asylum and Migration Working Party].”
    - In Niger, until the 2023 coup, member state officials convened a “migration cluster” to identify priorities and shape political dialogue.

    The document also refers to actions by EU delegations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here, events entitled “Rule of Law Breakfasts” are said to cover topics such as “anti-smuggling.”

    To link the actions in targeted states with discussions in Brussels, the document highlights the role played by the “Commission and EEAS [European External Action Service] services in Brussels, as well as the link via member state delegates in Brussels, via capitals, to their own embassies.”

    Samoa Agreement

    The Samoa Agreement, signed in 2023, governs the EU’s political and economic relationships with 77 countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. According to the Council of the EU, this covers around 2 billion people.

    The document notes that the “Partnership Dialogues” established under the Samoa Agreement can be used to push the EU’s migration control agenda. Specifically, it says they “can be used to facilitate collaboration on various areas… including migration.”

    Liaison officers

    Liaison officers deployed by member states, the European Commission and Frontex also play a role.

    According to the document, liaison officers in Morocco and Nigeria organise regular meetings on migration at the EU delegations.

    The document highlights that “closer coordination between liaison officers as well as with other EU stakeholders could have a substantial positive impact.”

    A recently-declassified report from 2018 (pdf), on the work of the Immigration Liaison Officers’ Network in Morocco, gives an idea of these officials’ activities.

    Team Europe Initiatives

    Another layer of coordination happens through “Team Europe Initiatives” (TEIs) – a structure with no legal basis but significant impact.

    The concept of “Team Europe” was introduced in April 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

    According to the European External Action Service, it “brings together the EU, its Member States and their diplomatic network, finance institutions and implementing organizations,” along with the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

    It has no legal basis in the EU treaties and has been described by Dutch MEP Sophie in’t Veld as a “fantasy body.”

    It is nevertheless a “fantasy body” that has become firmly embedded in the EU’s policy framework – albeit without the inclusion of the European Parliament.

    In a 2024 resolution, MEPs expressed regret that the Parliament had not been “fully recognised by the Commission, the Council and the EEAS as an integral player within the ‘Team Europe’ approach.”

    The June 2024 Council document notes that “country level committees” for the Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) on the Atlantic/Western Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean migration routes have been set up in 16 African states.[1]

    “These committees meet regularly at the initiative of the EU delegations and local representation of all TEIs members are participating,” the document says.

    They provide a forum for “general coordination with EU member States on Migration,” it adds.

    According to the Belgian Presidency, these committees “have mapped the actions of EU and TEIs members related to Migration in each partner countries and agreed on a TEI implementation plan that identified gaps in programming and agreed on areas of focus for the future.”

    As a result of this work, there were implementation plans in place for seven states: Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

    A call for scrutiny

    The mechanisms outlined by the 2024 Council document, from embassy roundtables to informal networks, development agreements to diplomatic working groups, provide some of the institutional foundations of the EU’s externalisation agenda.

    They operate largely out of public view – and with little consideration for the human rights implications of outsourcing migration enforcement to authoritarian or unstable regimes.

    For those seeking more scrutiny and accountability — and migration policies that uphold human rights and social justice — the initiatives and groups outlined here would be a good starting point for further investigation.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2025/june/how-the-eu-coordinates-the-outsourcing-of-migration-control

    #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #EU #UE #Union_européenne
    #Egypte #Irak #Libye #Niger #Samoa_Agreement #Team_Europe_Initiatives

  • Royaume-Uni : le gouvernement travaille à un programme de prédiction des crimes

    https://www.rfi.fr/fr/europe/20250409-royaume-uni-le-gouvernement-travaille-%C3%A0-un-programme-de-pr%C3%A9di

    Prévoir les meurtres avant qu’ils ne soient commis, et donc les empêcher. C’est le synopsis du film Minority Report, et le principe de la « justice prédictive ». Au Royaume-Uni, le gouvernement travaille à un programme de prédiction des crimes, mis au jour par une ONG de défense des libertés.

  • Polish government proposes life-long EU entry bans for deportees

    In the coming months, EU institutions will start negotiating a new law to increase deportations. EU governments want their positions taken into account in the European Commission’s forthcoming proposal. The Polish government has proposed banning deportees from EU territory for “an indefinite period of time,” alongside other coercive measures.

    Indefinite entry bans

    The Polish government has proposed banning people from entering the EU “without time limit.”

    This could happen if a non-EU citizen “represents a serious threat to public order, public security or national security,” a topic that has been discussed by member states a number of times over the last year.

    The new proposal comes in a discussion paper (pdf) on a new deportation law. The paper makes no reference to basic principles of EU law, such as Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

    Article 49 says that any penalty has to be proportionate to the offence.

    The Charter refers to criminal law, whereas a new EU deportation law would be based on immigration law.

    Nevertheless, as a form of indefinite punishment, the proposal is likely to raise eyebrows amongst legal experts and human rights organisations.

    Discussion paper on new deportation law

    The discussion paper (pdf) was circulated to other member states by the Polish government in mid-January. The Polish government currently holds the presidency of the Council of the EU. It was published with the latest edition of the bulletin Outsourcing Borders.

    The paper was drafted to inform a January meeting of the Integration, Migration and Expulsion Working Party (IMEX).

    This followed multiple other discussions between member state governments over the past year. Many of those have also been documented in Statewatch’s bulletin on the externalisation of border controls.

    The January paper (pdf) sets out three areas for discussion:

    - uniform deportation procedures across EU member states;
    - new obligations for people facing deportation; and
    - new “incentives” for deportees to cooperate, alongside new “consequences” for non-cooperation.

    In effect, there are two issues up for discussion. Firstly, the degree to which national practices should be harmonised. Secondly, the different forms of coercion that can be used against deportees.

    Harmonising national law

    The first topic covered in the paper is the possibility of harmonising national deportation procedures.

    The Polish presidency suggests that “common time limits could be considered as one of ways of improving the effectiveness of return procedure.”

    For example, the new law could introduce uniform limits for filing an appeal against a deportation order. These limits currently differ from one member state to another.

    However, this could place an “additional burden on administrative and/or judicial authorities,” says the Polish presidency.

    “Mutual recognition” of deportation orders

    The presidency also raises “mutual recognition” of return decisions.

    This would mean a legal obligation for every EU member state to recognise the deportation orders issued by other member states.

    The idea of mutual recognition was first introduced into EU law in relation to economic affairs, to aid the creation of the single market. It means that “a product that can be lawfully sold in one member state can be lawfully sold in any other.”

    In the single market, it contributed to “processes of liberalization and socialization,” the academic Sandra Lavenex wrote in 2007.

    However, in the realm of police cooperation, criminal law and immigration, “mutual recognition does not expand the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state,” she argued:

    Instead of increasing individual freedoms in relation to the regulatory scope of government, in the AFSJ [Area of Freedom, Security and Justice], mutual recognition boosts the transnational enforcement capacity of governmental actors.

    Obligations for deportees

    The Polish presidency’s paper goes on to note that the current EU deportation law, dating back to 2008, “includes a wide range of rights of third country nationals and procedural safeguards in the return procedure.”

    This includes “the respect for fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement.”

    However, “respect for fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement” are fundamental obligations of the EU and its member states. They stem from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and international law.

    The paper goes on to say that the law as it stands does not include any obligations for deportees, and the new law “should include some obligations for illegally staying third country nationals.”

    The presidency suggests that Article 9 of the EU’s new Asylum Procedure Regulation could serve as an inspiration.

    Amongst other things, this obliges asylum applicants to:

    - provide the authorities with various items of personal data;
    - to remain available to the authorities throughout the asylum procedure; and
    - to provide documents in support of the application as soon as possible.

    Failure to cooperate may result in the withdrawal of the application or of international protection (asylum) status, if already granted.

    Incentives and consequences

    The presidency also suggests introducing various forms of “incentives and sanctions” for individuals facing deportation, to encourage cooperation.

    The paper notes that the EU is making increasing use of incentives and sanctions in deportation policy, but mainly “in relations with third countries.”

    This would include, for example, the use of “visa sanctions” against states that do not accept deportation flights from the EU.

    The presidency suggests harmonising the support made available to deportees through “reintegration” programmes.

    Currently, different levels of support – for example, the provision of money to deportees – “might be exploited by third country nationals who try to take the advantage of more ‘generous’ systems,” says the document.

    “Strategic use of an entry ban”

    “Additionally, the strategic use of an entry ban could also serve to incentivise cooperation or sanction non–cooperation,” argues the presidency.

    The paper goes on to say “an entry ban could be shortened when the third country national is cooperating, while it could be extended in case of non-cooperation.”

    Furthermore, “an entry ban for an indefinite period of time could also be considered,” in cases “where a third-country national represents a serious threat to public order, public security or national security”.

    Whatever finally ends up in the new law, the presidency is clear that new obligations and consequences should “send a clear signal to third country nationals that lack of cooperation will not be tolerated.”

    However, simply changing the law may not be enough to achieve the goal of massively increasing the number of deportations from the EU.

    The presidency’s paper points out, perhaps inadvertently, some of the problems with this goal: not only does it require the cooperation of people, but also non-EU states.

    “An effective return policy relies on the cooperation of the returnees and their countries of origin,” the presidency notes in passing.

    The EU is already using various means to try to increase non-EU states’ cooperation with deportations, such as visa sanctions.

    It remains to be seen how that may change in the future – though Donald Trump’s recent threat of trade sanctions against Colombia gives an insight into the more extreme levels of coercion that may be available in some cases.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2025/february/polish-government-proposes-life-long-eu-entry-bans-for-deportees
    #Pologne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières

    ping @karine4

  • Deportations: New role for #Frontex as EU pushes for more “voluntary” returns

    A special report by Hope Barker and Anas Ambri: The EU has been funding new accelerated asylum and deportation procedures in Bulgaria, including a new “assisted voluntary return” project. Increasing “voluntary” returns is a key part of the plan to increase deportations from the EU, with Frontex playing an increasing role. The project targets individuals in detention. Experts question whether such procedures can ever be truly voluntary.

    In August 2023, Bulgarian and European Commission (EC) officials met to discuss a “targeted assisted voluntary return project” as part of the Commission’s Pilot Project in the country.

    The “Pilot Project for fast asylum and returns procedures” had been launched in Bulgaria and Romania a few months prior to create “ad hoc solutions” to some of the issues preventing the two countries from finalising their accession to the Schengen area.

    Some of these “solutions” included the continuation of pushbacks against people on the move. Balkan Insight revealed the widespread – if not systematic – pushbacks at the EU’s eastern and south-eastern borders in February last year.

    Another “solution” was the implementation of “an updated AVR [Assisted Voluntary Return] programme in Bulgaria, with the deployment of additional Frontex return counsellors and technical assistance from the Commission,” according to a document obtained by Statewatch through an access to documents request.

    What are “assisted voluntary returns”?

    Voluntary returns are repatriations of non-EU citizens to their country of origin “based on a free and informed choice.” They differ from mandatory returns (when a deportation decision has been issued) and from forced returns (when individuals are deported by force).

    The “assisted” component in AVR usually comes in the form of financial and logistical support to individuals. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), an arm of the United Nations, has historically been in charge of implementing such programmes in Bulgaria.

    EU-funded AVR programme in Bulgaria

    Shortly after the March 2023 technical mission, the EC announced the launch of a new AVR programme in the country for early 2024, to be supported under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF).

    This new AVR programme increased the incentives and reintegration assistance to beneficiaries. The cash incentive, usually handed to individuals shortly before they depart, was increased from €150 to a maximum of €900.

    Reintegration assistance – in-kind contribution to support an individual’s reintegration after their return – was also increased from €1,000 to a maximum of EUR 3,000, and for families from €2,000 to a maximum of €7,000.

    Frontex’s involvement reflects an expansion of its mandate across the bloc. In 2019, a new Regulation gave the agency new powers, including in deportations.

    In April 2021, the European Commission released its first EU-wide strategy on voluntary return and reintegration which cemented the role of Frontex as “the operational arm of the common EU system of returns.”

    One lesser-examined aspect of Frontex’ role in the EU’s new deportation system has been its takeover of return counselling services for individuals subject to deportation orders or in detention.

    Frontex’s takeover of return counselling

    Return counselling is the provision of information to people on the move on the available options for them returning to their country of origin or residence.

    Depending on the circumstances of the individual, this can include information on the “obligation to leave the country and the consequences of not leaving,” and encouragement of “(assisted) voluntary return.” Advocates of the practice claim that it can be used as a way to “prioritise clarity, individual rights and agency, and honesty.”

    In January 2022, Frontex introduced return counselling as a job profile within its Standing Corps of border guards. Those taking up the role are trained using a curriculum developed with the Vienna-based International Centre for Migration Policy Development, as part of the latter’s CADRE project.

    In 2023, Frontex deployed four return counsellors to Bulgaria, where they conducted 1,547 counselling sessions, according to an agency spokesperson. The vast majority of these sessions (1,382, or 89%) were conducted between May and September as part of the Pilot Project.

    At least one of these return counsellors was deployed inside the Bulgaria’s Lyubimets detention centre, according to a November 2023 fact-finding mission report from the European Commission.

    Lyubimets is a closed pre-removal centre for individuals who have received a deportation order, or who are considered to be a security risk. Under Bulgarian law, individuals can be kept in detention for up to 18 months if a mandatory removal order is issued against them.

    According to a European Commission document from 2023, Lyubimets “is comprised of a building and container complex that can house families and single men amounting to a total capacity of 1892 places,” though an inspection by the Bulgarian ombudsman in July of that year put the capacity at 660.

    Based on an interview given by one of Frontex’ return counsellors deployed in Bulgaria in 2023, most of the counselling was offered to individuals who recently arrived in the country.

    Rights and missing safeguards in return counselling

    Valentin Feneberg, Research Associate at the Institute of Political Science at Leuphana University in Germany, told Statewatch: “If Frontex is tasked with providing this counselling immediately upon arrival, it is essential that individuals have guaranteed access to independent legal advisors, as well as a clear and comprehensive understanding of their rights, including the right to seek asylum.”

    However, access to legal aid is difficult in the Lyubimets centre, as the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee is the only NGO that is able to regularly visit.

    Feneberg, who studies the unintended consequences of AVR programmes, said that “independent monitoring by human rights organisations to guarantee fairness and transparency” would also be needed.

    “While I find it difficult to see how Frontex’s Return Counselling could become the sole form of counselling available to rejected asylum seekers, if this were to happen, these safeguards would need to be significantly strengthened to protect individuals’ rights,” he told Statewatch.

    Given the absence of such safeguards, many suspect that the true purpose of return counselling activities inside the detention camps has little to do with encouraging free and informed choices.

    Not-so-voluntary returns

    In May 2021, Statewatch revealed how the European Commission wanted to use detention to “increase the uptake of voluntary returns at early stages of the return process.”

    In the view of Reinhard Schweitzer, Research Professor on Migration at Universitat Abat Oliba CEU in Barcelona, there is nothing voluntary about returns conducted from within detention.

    “Assuming that there is something that we can call voluntariness, it would have at least three elements. The most obvious is the absence of coercion… The decision [to return] must also be based on information that is unbiased and can be relied on, that is trusted, which is a very subjective element, and that is objective, in the sense that it does not just portray the possibilities that are made available by the government. This is linked to the third element: availability of acceptable alternatives,” Schweitzer explained.

    In June 2022, Schweitzer published a study into how the exclusion of civil society from voluntary returns programmes negatively impacted the “voluntariness” of the returns conducted in two different countries, including his native Austria. In his view, it is clear that Frontex’ involvement would have a similar effect.

    “Voluntary” returns: Fortress Europe’s new frontier

    With the new Commission finally voted in, it’s clear that deportations remain a top priority.

    The new Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner, has committed to drafting a new deportation law in the first 100 days of his mandate, at the behest of several Members of the European Parliament as well as EU member states.

    Rumours suggest that the file, designed to replace the 2008 Returns Directive, will be a Regulation, making it directly legally binding on all member states. It will come alongside ongoing discussions on “return hubs”, better described as deportation camps, in non-EU states.

    Until these new rules are proposed and agreed, the EU’s approach will be governed by the 2008 Directive, its 2021 returns strategy and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

    Under the Pact, people arriving at the bloc’s external borders will be pre-screened and then sorted into so-called ordinary and accelerated border procedures.

    According to the new rules, most people will be funneled into fast-track procedures which last a maximum of 12 weeks and take place in de facto detention at the external border.

    The areas in which people will be held will not technically qualify as member state territory, due to the newly introduced “legal fiction of non-entry.” If people are rejected during the accelerated procedure, they will enter a return border procedure – also fast-tracked.

    Other EU countries have been using accelerated procedures for years. Since November 2020, rejected asylum applications in Cyprus come with a deportation order. Individuals accused of threatening “public order” are put into indefinite detention. Many are forced to sign up for voluntary returns to be released.

    As part of the Pilot Project, the European Commission recommended that Bulgaria amend its national law to allow for rejection and return decisions to be issued simultaneously. In February 2024, Bulgaria did just that.

    Under the Pact, people detained at external borders will be similarly advised – or pressured – to enrol in voluntary return schemes.

    Expanding role for Frontex

    Frontex’s involvement in voluntary returns will come with an expansion of its size and functions. Return counsellors will be deployed to centres at the EU’s external borders where pre-screening and accelerated border procedures are carried out. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the European Parliament in July that Frontex could triple its Standing Corps to 30,000 during her new mandate.

    Frontex’s Management Board, on the other hand, has asked the agency to train more states on return counselling. The goal is now to train 160 individuals in return counselling in five different member states in 2024, up from 75 staff in five states in 2023.

    This newfound interest in return counselling is anything but altruistic: as part of the Pact, states can count their financial and operational contribution to counselling activities as “solidarity” measures.

    Rather than relocating new arrivals across the bloc to increase the sharing of responsibility, states can instead choose to finance voluntary returns and return counselling.

    “Anti-solidarity”

    Reinhard Schweitzer, the research professor, noted the “insidious” way this solidarity mechanism could be abused.

    “I think it would be a very comfortable thing for the [current] Austrian government to say: ‘instead of taking in people, we send our counsellors there to help deport people’,” he told Statewatch.

    “I’m surprised that it’s really called a solidarity mechanism, because it’s a twist of what solidarity is supposed to mean. It’s anti-solidarity,” he concluded.

    Frontex did not respond to a request for comment from Statewatch.

    A spokesperson for the European Commission said: “Efficient border management must be firmly rooted in the respect of fundamental rights, including human dignity and the principle of non-refoulement.”

    “Bulgarian authorities, as all EU Member States, must fully respect obligations under the asylum and international law, including ensuring access to the asylum procedure. It is the responsibility of Member States to investigate any allegations of wrongdoing,” they added.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2025/january/deportations-new-role-for-frontex-as-eu-pushes-for-more-voluntary-return

    #retours_volontaires #migrations #renvois #expulsions #réfugiés #Bulgarie #frontières

  • Out of sight, out of mind : EU planning to offshore asylum applications ?

    In a letter sent to EU heads of state last month, European Commission president #Ursula_von_der_Leyen named 2024 “a landmark year for EU migration and asylum policy,” but noted that the agreement on new legislation “is not the end.” She went on to refer to the possibility of “tackling asylum applications further from the EU external border,” describing it as an idea “which will certainly deserve our attention.”

    “Safe havens”

    The idea of offshoring asylum applications has come in and out of vogue in Europe over the last two decades. In the early 2000s, a number of states wanted camps established in Albania and Ukraine, with the Blair government’s “safe haven” proposals providing an inspiration to other governments in the EU.

    The idea has come back with a bang in the last few years, with the UK attempting to deport asylum-seekers to Rwanda (a plan now shelved), and EU governments noting their approval for similar schemes.

    Austria plays a key role in the externalisation of border and migration controls to the Balkans, and the country’s interior minister has called on the EU to introduce “asylum procedures in safe third countries,” referring to “a model that Denmark and Great Britain are also following.” Denmark adopted their own Rwanda plan, but that was suspended last year.

    “Innovative strategies”

    Now the idea has made it to the top of the EU’s political pyramid.

    “Many Member States are looking at innovative strategies to prevent irregular migration by tackling asylum applications further from the EU external border,” says von der Leyen’s letter (pdf).

    “There are ongoing reflections on ideas which will certainly deserve our attention when our next institutional cycle is under way,” it continues, suggesting that the intention is to get working on plans quickly from September onwards.

    The news comes just as almost 100 organisations, including Statewatch, have published a statement calling on EU institutions and member states to uphold the right to asylum in Europe, underlining that attempts to outsource asylum processing have caused “immeasurable human suffering and rights violations.”

    Von der Leyen goes on to indicate that the offshoring of asylum applications may be tacked onto existing migration control initiatives: “Building on experience with the emergency transit mechanisms or the 1:1, we can work upstream on migratory routes and ways of developing these models further.”

    The phrase “the 1:1” refers to the intended human trading scheme introduced by the 2016 EU-Turkey deal: “For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU.” In a seven-year period, up to May 2023, fewer than 40,000 people were resettled under the scheme, while tens of thousands of people remained trapped in Greek camps awaiting their intended removal to Turkey.

    The current Commission president, who is soon likely to be elected for a second five-year term, goes on to say that the EU can “draw on the route-based approach being developed by UNHCR and IOM,” allowing the EU to “support the setting up of functioning national asylum systems in partner countries while strengthening our cooperation on returns to countries of origin.” In short: someone else should take care of the problem.

    These efforts will be bolstered by the new Asylum Procedure Regulation, says the letter, with the Commission considering “how to better work in synergy with future designated safe third countries.”

    “Hybrid attacks”

    The letter closes with a consideration of the use of so-called “hybrid attacks” by the EU’s geopolitical enemies.

    “When I was in Lappeenranta [in Finland] in April, it was clear that Russia’s actions at the border with Finland, or those of Belarus at the border with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, are hybrid attacks aimed at undermining the security of our external borders, as well as that of the border regions and our citizens,” von der Leyen writes.

    The Commission president goes on to suggest that more legislation may be forthcoming on the topic, further reinforcing the security approach to migration, despite the EU having only just approved rules on the issue, where the term used is “instrumentalisation of migrants.”

    “We will therefore need to continue reflecting on strengthening the EU’s legal framework to provide for an appropriate response not only from a migration but also from a security perspective in line with the Treaties,” says the letter.

    The need for new legislation is also hinted at in the “strategic agenda” adopted by the European Council at the end of June, the same meeting to which von der Leyen’s letter was addressed.

    That document states the European Council’s intention to “find joint solutions to the security threat of instrumentalised migration.”

    As for the people targeted by all these initiatives, they are barely mentioned in the letter – but von der Leyen notes that the Commission is “conscious of the need… to enable durable solutions to be found for the migrants themselves.”

    It might be remarked, however, that “solutions” will likely only be considered “durable” to the EU if they are outside its territory.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/july/out-of-sight-out-of-mind-eu-planning-to-offshore-asylum-applications
    #lettre #migrations #asile #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #safe_havens #ports_sûrs #Tony_Blair #Albanie #Rwanda #pays_tiers #pays_tiers_sûrs #Autriche #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #Danemark #innovations #accord_UE-Turquie #1:1 #IOM #OIM #HCR #hybrid_attacks #attaques_hybrides #géopolitique #Russie #Biélorussie #frontières_extérieures #instrumentalisation #menaces_sécuritaires

  • Border externalisation: billions of euros, visa sanctions, and a wealth of documentation

    The second edition of the bulletin, published with migration-control.info, includes analyses of multi-billion increases in the EU’s budgets for border externalisation (https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/a-bottomless-pit-billions-more-euros-for-externalised-border-controls) and the growing use of visa sanctions to coax third states into cooperating with EU deportations (https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/visa-sanctions-to-increase-deportations).

    It also includes an extensive update to the document archive, with almost two dozen documents from the secretive Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration, MOCADEM (mécanisme de coordination opérationnelle pour la dimension extérieure des migrations).

    Many of the documents added to the archive have been summarised in the bulletin’s section on thematic and regional developments, intended to provide a useful overview of key issues, themes and events.

    However, there is more in the documents than can be summarised there, and readers are advised to dig into the documents for themselves.

    The bulletin editorial (https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/editorial) looks at the Council of the EU’s stubborn refusal to grant the European Parliament any right of democratic scrutiny over the workings of MOCADEM.

    The next issue of the bulletin will be published at the end of September.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/july/border-externalisation-billions-of-euros-visa-sanctions-and-a-wealth-of-

    #externalisation #frontières #migrations #business #visa #sanctions #pays-tiers #réfugiés #visas

    • A bottomless pit: billions more euros for externalised border controls

      In view of the recently concluded mid-term review of the EU’s budget, funding for the externalisation of migration control has been at the top of the political agendas of EU member states and institutions. In the words of the European Commission and the European External Action Service, funding “ensure[s] that the actions undertaken… continue delivering results.” A substantial increase in the EU budget is on the cards, at the same time as a possible shift towards a supposedly new “preventive model” for external migration control.

      Funding externalisation under the 2021-2027 EU budget

      Under the current budget, EU border externalisation initiatives are funded through three Commission Directorate-Generals: Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). They oversee a variety of different funds that, either in whole or in part, provide what in EU jargon is called “external funding” – that is, funding for projects outside EU territory.

      DG NEAR is responsible for the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) as well as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (#NDICI) funds earmarked for the EU’s “neighbourhood.” DG INTPA administers NDICI funds which are destined for countries beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. This fund, also referred to as “Global Europe,” channels the biggest share of external funding.

      DG HOME is responsible for the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (#AMIF), the Border Management and Visa Instrument (#BMVI), and the Internal Security Fund (#ISF). With regard to externalisation, the AMIF focuses “on supporting actions that are not development-oriented and serve the interest of internal Union policies.” The ISF focuses on enhancing cooperation with third countries “in areas of relevance to the Union’s internal security,” including “combating cross-border criminal smuggling networks.” A report by Statewatch and the Transnational Institute explains in more detail how the home affairs funds finance border externalisation.

      Finally, certain agencies, such as Frontex, the European Asylum Agency (EUAA) and Europol, hold their own budgets which may be used for migration and border related projects beyond EU borders.

      NDICI: institutionalising “#containment_development

      NDICI is fundamental to the external dimension of EU migration control. With a budget of €79.5 billion, it replaces and merges ten different external funding instruments into one. It is the EU’s main development instrument and, as set out in the founding legislation, 93% of NDICI funds must comply with Official Development Assistance (#ODA) criteria, such as recipient country ownership. ODA is supposed to promote and specifically target the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

      At the same time, the NDICI Regulation sets a target for 10% of the total fund to be “dedicated particularly to actions supporting management and governance of migration and forced displacement.” As the Commission’s report on the use of external funding instruments for 2022 shows, 13.6% of the total committed in 2022 was dedicated to migration. This not only underscores the often-raised criticism of diverting development aid for migration control purposes, but also represents a risk to the integrity of ODA. Evaluations of funding under the NDICI by CeSPI and Oxfam have further cemented these concerns.

      Some of the projects funded under NDICI are a direct continuation of projects financed by the European #Trust_Fund for Africa (#EUTF), a €5 billion initiative launched in 2015 which fostered what has been termed the “containment” approach to development. Through this, development interventions for issues such as job creation or adaptation to climate change are based on the idea that addressing these “root causes” will diminish majority world citizens’ ambitions to move to Europe.

      A draft action file produced by the Council of the EU’s Operational Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration (MOCADEM) in January 2023 shows that NDICI is seen as a direct continuation of the EUTF. There is therefore an evident path dependency and normalisation of such migration-related interventions creeping into broader development aims.

      This instrumentalisation of development is further highlighted by the built-in “flexible incitative [sic] approach” of NDICI. This “positive” conditionality mechanism aims to reward countries for their willingness to engage in, for example, fighting against smuggling and trafficking or showing cooperation on deportation and readmission. However, making access to development aid conditional on migration control objectives has been criticised, not least because it goes against the EU’s own development principles and leads to ineffective assistance when funding does not go where it is most needed.

      For the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood”[1] there is a “Multi-Country Migration Programme for the Southern Neighbourhood” (MCMP) which is supposed to “provide a flexible source of funding”, allowing for special measures and “country-specific actions that… offer to selected countries an incentive to go beyond what their country MIP [multiannual indicative programme] offers, in line with a flexible incitative approach”. In Sub-Saharan Africa this approach is operationalised through the action “Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement”. However, there is a lack of transparency regarding what is funded under this mechanism, which has so far mobilised €200m, and how countries are selected to receive additional funding.

      Member states in the driving seat

      While civil society and the European Parliament lament a lack of oversight and transparency of NDICI projects, member states have increased their role through the “NDICI Coordination Group on Migration,” which was set up specifically for member states to oversee migration programming under the NDICI.

      Member states are also highly involved in the Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs). These are initiatives involving EU and national institutions and agencies “around which European funding instruments and modalities coalesce to bring a transformational impact“ in a selected priority area – one of which is irregular migration. NDICI projects are supposed to support these initiatives, but other funding methods and partners are also used.

      For example, the TEI on the Central Mediterranean brings together the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), along with 11 EU and Schengen member states,[2] which have together mobilised €1.13 billion in national and EU funding. The TEI on the Atlantic/Western Mediterranean Route is taken forward by the Commission and the EEAS, with nine EU and Schengen member states,[3] which have so far mobilised €908 million. Even if “Team Europe” is essentially a branding exercise, it is one which provides another way to create alliances for further externalising migration control.

      Mid-term review: more funding for migration control

      The mid-term review of the current EU budget, the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–27, was finalised this spring. It was launched by the Commission in June 2023, with the institution calling for an increase in the EU budget due to the economic situation and the war in Ukraine, which had “pushed the resources of the EU budget to the point of exhaustion.”

      Several important changes have been agreed. Earlier this year, the Council gave final approval to a total of €64.6 billion in additional funding, which was approved by the Parliament. Of this amount, €7.6 billion is for NDICI, aiming at, amongst other things, the “continuation of actions previously undertaken through the EU Trust Fund for Africa.”

      An additional €2 billion will go to the AMIF and BMVI funds, as well as the budget of the EU Asylum Agency (EUAA). This is to address “urgent challenges and needs related to migration and border management” and the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, including the heavily criticized border procedure.

      Finally, the maximum amount of the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) has been increased by €1.5 billion. This fund is dedicated to both natural disasters on European territories and natural disasters and humanitarian crises in non-EU states.

      A Spanish Council presidency paper discussed in the following section gives some indication of how the additional funding may be used.

      Spanish presidency paper: proposals to improve the “effectiveness” of externalisation funding

      A November 2023 document illustrates both the priorities of the Spanish Council presidency (in place from July-December 2023) and grants some insight into how the increased funding may be used. It builds on an earlier presidency paper that called for the necessity “to achieve more and better funding for the external dimension of migration.”

      The paper contains several suggestions to render internal EU coordination more efficient. It proposes strengthening existing Council working parties or establishing a new ad hoc Council mechanism to monitor the use of funds more closely. It also calls for more regular and systematic dissemination of information on externalisation funding, including the improvement of online databases such as the Financial Transparency System (FTS) and EU Aid Explorer.

      A “migration marker” used by EU officials to track the use of NDICI funds for migration purposes could be extended to other funds, the paper suggests. It also strongly emphasises the need for more “executive and short-term funding mechanisms” to prevent irregular migration, and highlights that the development objective of NDICI restrains the more operational needs required for a “preventive model”.

      The Spanish presidency’s proposed “preventive model” (a term coined in September 2023) deviates from the more common, but equally contested, understanding of a preventive approach that focuses on “root causes”. Instead, it is primarily concerned with operational border and migration management efforts in non-EU states: for example, the purchase of vehicles, vessels, and surveillance equipment; or meeting the needs of forcibly displaced persons hosted by partner countries. To back up this approach, the paper says EU member states “should consider the possibilities of strengthening other funding tools of our external dimension toolbox.”

      Whose crisis?

      According to the Spanish Presidency, a “preventive approach” is necessary because longer-term actions focusing on root causes both fail to “effectively address the migration crises that have already erupted” and “to prevent impending crises that are building up.” This framing overshadows the structural reasons that cause “crises” to emerge in the first place and demonstrates the productivity of crisis labelling.

      Firstly, labelling something as a “migration crisis” shifts the focus from the humanitarian crises produced by the absence of safe and legal pathways to a perceived crisis of state sovereignty. In doing so, it silences the fact that migrants encounter crises on their journeys, which are themselves the result of restrictive migration governance and the absence of legal pathways.

      Secondly, crisis and emergency framing has been used by EU agencies and member states to derogate from legal norms and safeguards. An emphasis on operational cooperation with third states is likely to enhance this trend.

      Thirdly, EU-funded border and migration control capacities in non-EU countries are likely to aggravate the very crises they aim to solve – rendering available pathways more dangerous without significantly reducing migration. This possibility is particularly concerning given the use of the “more for more principle,” heralded by the Spanish presidency as ensuring “genuine involvement of partner countries.” Ultimately, this means that more financial, material and other resources are given to the countries most willing to cooperate in the EU’s migration containment agenda.

      Putting “capacity building” into perspective

      The Spanish presidency’s emphasis on operational support and the “more for more principle” are not new. Two decades ago, the EU set up its first financial instrument dedicated to the provision of financial and material support to non-EU countries for migration and border management operations. Meanwhile, the “more for more principle” was first introduced in 2011 under the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

      Since then, scholars have considered how this so-called capacity building has helped frame migration control initiatives as technocratic, neutral and apolitical. Other research has shown that it reproduces Eurocentric categories of migration governance that do not neatly map onto, for example, less state-centric notions of mobility in countries such as Niger. Further, research has warned of the possibility of it negatively affecting freedom of movement within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Finally, scholars have pointed to the often self-serving nature of capacity building as such, often profiting and being driven by the European (and global) border-industrial complex.

      Migration control considerations that require strengthening the security apparatus of partner states are a central element in capacity building initiatives. Strong concerns have been raised by journalists and rights groups. These concerns pertain to human rights abuses and a lack of scrutiny.

      EU funding for so-called migration management has resulted in pushbacks of refugees and migrant workers to the deserts of Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania. Finally, rights groups have repeatedly warned over the negative human rights implications of some projects funded under the NDICI in Tunisia and Libya, especially those building the capacities of the Tunisian and Libyan coast guards. Furthermore, recurrent drownings have been reported at the hands of the Senegalese navy, which has received support from the EU and its member states, in particular Spain, for almost two decades.

      Concerns also relate to the question of who is being funded. For example, prior to the outbreak of the current civil war in Sudan, EU migration funds have reportedly indirectly supported the Rapid Support Forces. Another recurrent question raised by journalists pertains to the question of what (else) is happening with donated materials. In Senegal, vehicles donated by the EU through the EUTF were used to violently repress democratic protests in 2023.

      Finally, there is the collateral damage accepted by EU policy makers. These concerns have been raised strongly in regard to the EU’s anti-smuggling agenda in pre-coup Niger, but also more recently in the context of the EU- Mauritania deal and its linked support for capacity building. Here, observers have raised strong concerns over how these measures aggravate acute risks for the Afro-Mauritanian community, (further) inflaming racial tensions and social polarization in the country.

      Besides these concerns, shifting geopolitical alliances on the African continent also puts in question the future feasibility of the EU externalisation agenda. The ongoing political reconfigurations are likely to impact the EU’s ability to be an “agenda setter”. This is most starkly illustrated by the 2023 military coup in Niger which has resulted not only in the suspension of security cooperation and financial support to the country by the EU, but also the abrogation of the much-criticized 2015 law against migrant smuggling by the Nigerien government. In a statement announcing the repeal, the military government stated that the law “did not take into account the interests of Niger and its citizens.”

      Put differently, the shifting geopolitical context has enabled African states to challenge the EU and EU member states as hegemonic actors. Therefore, an additional question emerges: whether the EU is at risk of undermining its relations with non-EU countries when it pushes them to adopt migration policies which contribute to the global racialized exclusion of their citizens, negatively affect local economies and lead to human insecurity.

      Besides the wider concerns raised above, policies that perpetuate longstanding asymmetric and unequal relations in the field of migration and beyond, are untenable in the longer term. Working towards establishing truly mutually beneficial relations is not only advisable but necessary. The emphasis on enhancing operational cooperation in the EU’s external migration and border management, mirrored both in the proposed MFF budget increase and the Spanish presidency paper, instead falls within the longer-term, broader logics of the increasingly challenged toolbox of EU security and migration control.

      Ways forward

      Billions more euros are being made available for EU migration and border control externalisation initiatives through the mid-term revision of the EU budget. The Spanish presidency paper offers a glimpse behind the scenes of the negotiations and offers some idea of what moving towards a “preventive approach”, centred around operational capacity-building, means in practice.

      While the risks of such an approach are not unknown, the key to challenging it is to build a better understanding of what is happening on the ground. To do so, European civil society needs to develop and reinforce alliances with partners in countries affected by EU policies, to enable joint challenges and confrontations to the externalisation agenda. Civil society may also make use of the concern of some member states – or, at least, the Spanish delegation – over the opacity of EU spending on externalisation. This may make it possible to exert pressure for more transparency of EU external migration funding and its translation into projects on the ground.

      Leonie Jegen and Zina Weisner for migration-control.info

      Notes

      [1] Encompassing Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.

      [2] Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland

      [3] Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland

      https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/a-bottomless-pit-billions-more-euros-for-externalised-border-controls

      #root_causes #causes_profondes #développement #réfugiés_syriens

    • Visa sanctions to increase deportations

      Changes to the EU’s rules on visa issuance that came into force in 2020 have made it possible for sanctions to be introduced against states that fail to cooperate with deportations. For example, non-EU states that consistently fail to provide identity documents for their own nationals facing deportation from the EU can have visa fees increased, or the examination of applications slowed down. The tool appears to be popular with EU institutions and member states, and changes are on the way to “improve” its functioning. This analysis examines the mechanism itself, measures proposed or adopted under the mechanism, and recent proposals to develop and reform the system, and considers the way in which the idea of “solidarity” (between EU member states and EU bodies) is used as a weapon against third countries.

      Visas: privilege and apartheid

      In May 2024 the Commission published figures indicating that 10.3 million worldwide short-stay visa applications were received by EU and Schengen-associated countries, a 37% increase compared to 2022’s 5.9 million applications, but much lower than the figure for 2019 (17 million). A similar pattern applies to the number of visas issued (8.5 million in 2023; 5.9 million in 2022; and 15 million in 2019), as the visa refusal rate declined slightly (from 17.9% in 2022 to 16% in 2023). Over half the visas issued in 2023 (54.2%) allowed multiple entry, compared to 58.1% in 2022, marking a slight decrease. In addition, 85,200 uniform visas were issued at external border points in 2023.

      The visa mechanism also operates within a context that has been criticised for establishing a situation of “passport privilege” and “visa apartheid”, particularly regarding Africans’ access to Europe and America. A 2020 study documented the experiences of Tunisians suffering from higher costs and more restrictive policies, and complaints about the costly, burdensome and discriminatory nature of EU visa procedures often arise from civil society groups in non-EU countries. For instance, in late 2022 high refusal rates for north Africans were criticised, and in November 2023 complaints emerged from Senegal about north-south discrimination, costs and profiteering practices linked to securing interviews and access to the procedure. The visa sanction mechanism outlined in this piece is likely to intensify such problems, yet this does not appear to have been considered amidst efforts to make cooperation between EU and non-EU states on deportation and readmission more “effective”.

      Article 25a: visa sanctions for deportations

      The EU’s longstanding push to increase deportations (“returns”, in official jargon) has seen efforts targeted at all parts of the deportation procedure. The possibility for visa sanctions introduced by article 25a of the Visa Code relates to readmission procedures: the political and bureaucratic guarantees required from non-EU states to enable the return and admission of their citizens removed from EU territory into their country, such as agreeing to accept deportations in the first place, the provision of identity documents for individuals, or landing permits for deportation flights.

      Article 25a(1) of the revised Visa Code establishes that insufficient cooperation by a non-EU state with readmission proceedings may entail a suspension of favourable measures for citizens of the country concerned that apply for Schengen visas. For example, the EU can choose to suspend:

      - fast-track procedures for applicants “known to the consulate or the central authorities for his integrity and reliability, in particular as regards the lawful use of previous visas” (article 14.6);
      - the waiving of visa fees for holders of diplomatic or service passports (article 16(5b));
      - the 15-day time limit for decisions on applications (article 23(1));
      - issuance of multi-entry visas (art. 24(2)) and five-year multi-entry visas (art. 24(2c))for all nationals.

      If the adoption of such measures fails to improve cooperation, higher visa fees (€120 or €160) for nationals of the third country in question (except for children under 12 years old) may be introduced.

      The procedure under article 25a lays out a framework for continuous monitoring of cooperation on readmission and returns, with the Commission obliged to produce an annual report for the Council’s consideration. The criteria to be considered include return decisions issued, forced returns, readmission requests accepted (by member state), assistance in identification, acceptance of an EU travel document or laissez-passer for returns, acceptance of people to be returned to their home country, of return flights and operations. Attention is also paid to how many third-country nationals residing illegally in EU territory have transited through a third country, and whether they accept returns of people who travelled through their territory.

      The intensive nature of this monitoring has led to member state complaints (see the “effectiveness of the visa leverage” section, below) about the administrative burden in relation to third states from which they have few visa applications and/or a low number of people subject to expulsion orders for illegal entry and stay. It must be noted that in the Visa Code itself, and in subsequent policy and discussion documents, third countries and their authorities feature merely as actors to be subjected to concerted pressure to secure cooperation.

      Proposals to date

      Since February 2020, when the Visa Code reform introduced the possibility to apply restrictive visa measures to third countries for inadequate cooperation on readmission, the Commission has tabled proposals concerning Iraq, Bangladesh, Senegal, The Gambia and Ethiopia. A document (17111/23) circulated by the Spanish Council presidency in January this year, for a meeting of the Council’s Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion (IMEX), summarised the history of each proposal.

      In the presidency paper, Iraq is repeatedly cited as an example of best practices. Adoption of a first proposal for restrictive visa measures in July 2021 was averted after constructive engagement by Iraq to help resolve the Belarus border crisis, although shortcomings in cooperation continued, as reported by member states. Measures were proposed again in 2022, and Iraq promised to cooperate in March 2023. In May 2023, Iraq announced that it had lifted a moratorium on accepting forced returns, flanked by outreach towards EU states and indication of a willingness to sign bilateral readmission agreements. The EU deadline thus slid to the October meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, when Iraqi willingness to conclude a non-binding EU-Iraq instrument on readmission and return resulted in the opening of a discussion, scheduled for January 2024.

      Restrictive visa measures were proposed for Bangladesh in July 2021. Improved cooperation levels resulted in the measures not being adopted, but member states insisted on keeping the proposal on the table until improvement with all member states was deemed sustainable, but the quality of cooperation was reported as having decreased “significantly” in 2022.

      In the case of Senegal, restrictive measures were proposed in November 2022 (and discussed in the Council’s Visa Working Party), alongside intense contacts and an improvement in cooperation with some member states, although the picture was mixed and the outcome of February 2024 elections was pending.

      Germany notified the Commission in February 2021 of “substantial and persisting practical problems” with The Gambia, and restrictive visa measures were proposed in July 2021 and adopted in October. A Commission report concluded that the measures had been ineffective despite limited improvements, leading to the proposal and adoption of an increased visa fee in November and December 2022. Cooperation in organising return flights and operations led to repeal of the visa fee measure in December 2023, but the original visa restriction measures were maintained due to insufficient overall cooperation on readmission (assistance in identification, timely issuing of travel documents, frequency of flights). Nevertheless, deportations to The Gambia have resumed, with Yahya Sonko, an advocate for the rights of Gambian migrants in Germany, recently said:

      “…deportations exacerbate the already challenging situation in The Gambia, where the government is struggling to manage high youth unemployment rates. The return of hundreds of citizens each year without adequate reintegration support only serves to worsen the socioeconomic conditions for deportees and their families.”

      In the case of Ethiopia, a Commission evaluation led to a proposal for visa sanctions in September 2023 (suspension of waiver of visa document requirement, of 15-day processing deadline, of multi-entry visa issuing and of visa fee waiver for diplomats and holders of service passports). The following month, a “note verbale” by the Ethiopian authorities announced resumption of the implementation of the 2018 readmission arrangement, alongside a request to renegotiate it. Discussion on the measures has taken place in the EU’s Visa Working Party, and The Commission proposed early 2024 meetings for the EU-Ethiopia working group. Significantly, acknowledgement of an armed conflict in northern Ethiopia from November 2021 to February 2022 did not interrupt these endeavours, nor bring into play considerations as to whether returns to Ethiopia may place people at risk, as reported return rates were low (10% in 2021 and 2022).

      Member states discuss a “new approach”

      In a document (5114/24) circulated for the January meeting of the Visa Working Party, the Spanish presidency proposed a “new approach” for the 25a procedure that would rejig the way in which internal EU discussions take place.

      The proposed approach suggests that introducing punitive visa measures be discussed in the Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion (IMEX) and MOCADEM (operational coordination mechanism for the external dimension of migration), with the Visa Working Party (VWP) only to be involved “at a later stage.” Thus, after an IMEX decision that lack of progress on readmission cooperation warrants adopting visa measures, the VWP would approve such measures and analyse other visa-related aspects.

      Alleged shortcomings in past Visa Working Party scrutiny are mentioned in the presidency document:

      “…the Visa WP has so far missed the opportunity to examine further the implications of the considered visa measures, especially when adopting visa sanctions towards The Gambia. Those ‘visa-related aspects’ to be discussed could include: the number of visas delivered by the Member States in the third country, the additional administrative burden to be expected and to be considered when deciding on the entry into force of the measures, the potential problems that could arise from the adoption of the measures, etc.”

      This appears to be an effort by member states and the Council to seize control of the mechanism and speed it up, as part of efforts to hold the Commission to deadlines to systematically issue visa restriction proposals and to speed up the cycle in pursuit of increased effectiveness (see below).

      A further discussion paper (17110/23) on the “Visa Code Article 25a exercise” was circulated by the presidency on 9 January, to prepare the IMEX working party meeting on 16 January (it was also reported on by Statewatch here). The paper reaffirms the purpose of the “visa leverage” provided by article 25a, as the “only legal tool at our disposal for all third countries to improve readmission cooperation.” The “external dimension” (that is, relations with non-EU states) is deemed crucial to increase the number of returns and ensure satisfactory cooperation by third states to readmit “illegally staying third country nationals vis-à-vis all Member States,” regardless of their caseload. Prioritisation of this objective in this semester requires a “strategic discussion” on the visa leverage’s effectiveness, says the document.

      The moving of preliminary discussions on the “state of play of outreach towards the relevant third countries and the developments in terms of cooperation on readmission” away from the VWP to the IMEX is also noted in the document, adding that this should “increase the coherence and the effectiveness of the mechanism.” Ensuring that the Commission has concrete deadlines to issue proposals on restrictive visa measures is viewed as potentially fruitful, and follow-up to proposals that are on the table are to be discussed within IMEX.

      Weaponising “solidarity” against third countries and a systematic adoption of visa measures

      The presidency document on “effectiveness of the visa leverage” (17110/23) contains a troubling assessment of the mechanism’s “credibility, strategy and solidarity.” Credibility requires “a search for the right and delicate balance between incentivizing cooperation by giving enough time and space for dialogue and taking restrictive visa measures when no real progress is observed.” Member states are required to act jointly, “in a true spirit of solidarity, which sometimes might mean prioritizing a wider European interest over the national interests.” Thus, even if progress with some member states is observed, this should not impede visa restriction measures unless it applies to all member states, regardless of caseloads.

      Member state requests to lessen administrative burdens by linking the information requested to the size of caseloads have led the Commission to adapt its data collection methods. A timeline adopted in December 2023 aims to reduce gaps between data collection, the Commission’s annual evaluation and subsequent visa measure proposals. The adoption of visa measures is deemed secondary to fostering progress in cooperation by third countries. As the presidency puts it, “[t]he power of the mechanism lies in the political message conveyed by the proposals, rather than the measures themselves,” strengthening the Commission’s credibility in outreach activities.

      Nonetheless, “the Presidency believes that the Commission should issue more proposals with regard to other relevant third countries not yet concerned by the proposals currently on the table”. The adoption of positive measures like reducing the visa fee from 80 to 60 euros, the deadline for a decision from 15 to 10 days, or increasing the duration of multiple entry visas also features in the article 25a mechanism, but none have been proposed to date, because the third countries identified already had more favourable visa regimes.

      Regarding the Commission’s selection of third countries to be targeted, the paper notes that having to consider the EU’s overall relations with the third country in question (rather than just cooperation on readmission) should not be treated as a “blocking element,” to prevent the mechanism becoming “inoperative towards some priority countries.” Following the Commission report, member states identify priority countries among those whose cooperation is deemed unsatisfactory, which fall into three categories: those facing visa restriction measures proposals; those not facing such proposals but identified by the Council as priorities; and those which do not face visa sanctions proposals and are not deemed priorities. Close scrutiny of all states that do not cooperate adequately is necessary, but its intensity should be tailored to their category, the presidency paper argues.

      The strategy section argues that the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) contribution to assessing the “third country national context” is crucial for taking decisions in an “enlightened manner,” and that member state involvement when the Commission prepares outreach and visits to third states enables “strategic decision-making.” The communication of clear deadlines to third country authorities is deemed a best practice, drawing on the example of Iraq. Failure to make progress would result in restrictive visa measures, allowing “the EU to put pressure on the third country in a transparent and precise way.” Dilatory tactics (“delays in the appointment of interlocutors or hindrances to meetings”) should not excuse delays in improving operational cooperation. Formal steps like the negotiation or extension of readmission agreements or arrangements should be deemed separate from “concrete progress on readmission cooperation on the ground,” without affecting cooperation evaluation deadlines.

      Regarding the stock of proposals for visa restriction measures under the article 25a mechanism, the management of existing proposals that have not been adopted for years could lead to the Commission withdrawing a proposal but, the presidency paper stresses, this should not be automatic. Moreover, the time that passes without substantial improvement should be a “decisive element” when considering adoption of a decision. Returns of third country nationals posing a security threat must be prioritised, requiring “smooth cooperation on identification, issuance of travel documents and readmission”, for which the article 25a mechanism could contribute to improvement.

      The final section on “solidarity” is striking, because it spells out the power play theme mentioned above. In fact, working as “Team Europe” in a coordinated way, “the message brought collectively is more influential and bears concrete results,” says the paper. Iraq is again cited as an example of success in this regard. The possibility provided by article 25a for a simple majority of member states to compel the Commission to submit proposals within 12 months (while continuing efforts to improve cooperation) has not been used to date. Yet, it is viewed as a “solution” to demonstrate “solidarity” among member states and to “send a strong signal to third countries.”

      Moreover, improving cooperation with some member states should not be deemed adequate to prevent adoption of restrictive visa measures towards a third country unless it applies to all member states regardless of caseloads. A united Council position to prioritise EU interests when outreach does not produce “substantial and sustainable progress” should adopt restrictive measures:

      “The importance of solidarity between Member States at this stage of the mechanism is a key element to further put the third country under pressure and also to ensure the credibility of the Article 25a mechanism.”

      Visa Code evaluation: speeding up cooperation on readmission

      Whilst member states were considering ways to enhance the implementation of article 25a, the Commission was undertaking a broader assessment of the EU’s Visa Code. The evaluation includes an examination of cooperation on return, readmission and migration management, which suggests that procedures should be accelerated to increase effectiveness.

      The main problem identified in the evaluation was the length of the cycles, which was deemed to have hindered accomplishment of the Visa Code reform’s three main goals (below). These are supposed to run annually but have previously exceeded a year in length, resulting in overlaps and faulty evaluation. Nevertheless, the Commission supports a need for flexibility to factor in different aspects to the discussion. The delay between approval of the Commission report and the submission of Commission proposals is identified as the main impediment. Seven member states, and the French and Czech Council presidencies, called for a shorter cycle to address these shortcomings.

      Discussions mentioned in the annual evaluation of the Visa Code include the involvement of different stakeholders and Eurostat and Frontex data used in the annual assessment report, which the EU Court of Auditors identified as containing “weaknesses” in 2021. Frontex has bemoaned the lack of a “robust, integrated electronic data collection system” in several member states, but it supports them in developing integrated return case management systems connected to a central hub operated by the agency, intended to improve data on removals and readmission. Despite member states putting mechanisms in place to temper such shortcomings and duly fill in the relevant questionnaire, they complain about the administrative burden involved.

      The overall evaluation on the three goals that motivated the Visa Code reform complains that:

      - visa fees did not fully cover administrative expenses incurred by member states for visa issuing;
      - an unclear legal basis has resulted in discrepancies and in most member states developing “restrictive practices when issuing multiple-entry visas” (MEVs); and
      - a lack of cooperation and “low levels of readmission and return of irregular migrants to countries of origin” persist.

      Strikingly, while the EEAS called for further involvement in providing expertise about the situation in third countries for the annual article 25a evaluation report (and three member states calling for more information on the political context), this was opposed by the Commission because “including this type of political analysis would detract from the current technical focus and factual nature of the reports.” Eurostat data is used regarding expulsion decisions and effective return rates, whereas Frontex data is used for readmission requests (by member states) and travel documents issued (by third countries). This apparently restricts the scope of the article 25a requirement for the Commission to take into account overall relations with a third state when deciding upon proposals for visa restriction measures. It also appears to exemplify efforts to subordinate the formal level (such as ensuring that deportations do not violate the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) in cooperation with third countries to the operative level, squarely focused on achieving strategic migration policy goals (like higher rates of removal, regardless of other considerations).

      Single-minded approach

      The documents examined display a wilful lack of critical scrutiny of the mechanism (other than on the basis of achieving operational goals) and of assessment on proportionality based on the size of caseloads and on conditions in third countries that may mean that some deportations may be unsafe from a formal viewpoint. There appears to be a strong drive to improve “effectiveness” and to speed up the process to pressure third country authorities, even if this may worsen the quality of decision-making and limit the information and stakeholders involved. Only four years after the mechanism was first introduced, amidst admissions that it is burdensome, the Council and some member states already appear eager to pile on pressure to cooperate on targeted third countries and to limit the Commission’s margins of appreciation and initiative before imposing or threatening to impose restrictions to visa access for their citizens, for the sake of “effectiveness”.

      The idea of “solidarity” being used as a weapon to break a third country’s resistance to measures that may penalise their citizens – for example, by increasing the likelihood of them being targeted by police operations in the EU to enable deportations, to lessen remittances from abroad, or give rise to opposition by civil society – is not palatable. Moreover, successes and best practices that are highlighted may amount to the EU and its member states (as “Team Europe”) succeeding in achieving unlawful outcomes (in the case of returns that may place people at risk, for instance in Iraq and Ethiopia).

      Furthermore, the risk that good cooperation on readmission and returns may lead to unsafe third countries being declared “safe” to enable swift refusals of asylum and/or protection, linked to speedy returns at the operative level, may restrict access to protection for bona fide refugees and protection seekers. There is no guarantee that people may not be targeted by authorities and/or armed groups in target countries like Senegal and The Gambia, whereas the Bangladeshi example also brings the issue of potential climate refugees into the picture.

      https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/visa-sanctions-to-increase-deportations

  • Policing migration: when “harm reduction” means “multipurpose aerial surveillance”

    The EU’s latest “#operational_action_plan” on migrant smuggling gives a central role to #Europol, which will receive data resulting from more than two dozen joint police operations launched by EU member states, EU agencies and a range of non-EU states. The UK is heavily involved in the plan, and is leading one activity. One objective is for harm reduction and assistance to victims, but the only activity foreseen is for Frontex to increase use of its “#EUROSUR_Fusion_Services, including the #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance aircraft service.”


    Police against people smuggling

    The action plan (pdf) covers the 2024-25 period and contains an outline of 25 activities listed under eight strategic goals, but offers no insight into the causes of human smuggling, and none of the activities are framed at addressing causes.

    The overall aim is to control migration flows both into the EU and within the EU, and to enhance police cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, EU agencies (Europol, #Frontex and the #EU_police_database_agency, #eu-LISA) and with countries outside the EU, through joint operations and the exchange of information and intelligence.

    Many of the activities include targets for arrests: one led by Poland, for example, foresees the arrest of 200 facilitators of irregular migration per year; another, led by Cyprus, expects at least 1,000 “apprehensions/arrests”.

    In 2015, Statewatch exposed a planned EU-wide police operation against irregular migrants called ‘Mos Maiorum’, which led to significant media coverage and political controversy, as well as numerous actions to inform people of their rights and to try to map police activities. Since then, the number of such operations has skyrocketed, but attention has dwindled.

    European plan

    The 2024-25 plan is part of the #European_Multidisciplinary_Platform_Against_Criminal Threats, a now-permanent initiative (https://www.statewatch.org/statewatch-database/eu-joint-police-operations-target-irregular-migrants-by-chris-jones) through which joint police operations are coordinated. It is managed by Europol, with political control exercised by the member states in the Council of the EU.

    A “leader” is assigned to each activity in the action plan, responsible for initiating and reporting on the relevant activity, with “key performance indicators” often indicated in respect of each one.

    The leaders include nine EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain), the UK, as well Frontex, Europol, eu-LISA and the European Police College (CEPOL).

    Europol will provide overall support across all the different activities and is specifically responsible for leading four activities.

    In many activities led by national police forces, it is specified that a goal is also to participate in other Europol initiatives, such as the “Europol Cyberpatrol to target and identify targets” and Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre. The Operational Action Plan stipulates that other, unspecified, “Europol tools” may be used “where appropriate”.

    The action plan specifies that the operational data emanating from the activities is to be shared with Europol to be processed through its Analysis Projects, further swelling the databases at its headquarters in The Hague.

    The first version of the action plan was circulated amongst member states two weeks before the European Commission published a proposal to reinforce Europol’s powers in relation to migrant smuggling, arguing that they were urgently needed – though this assessment was not shared by the member states.

    Strategic goals

    The 26 activities outlined in the plan are designed to contribute to eight strategic goals:

    - Criminal intelligence picture. The activities under this heading are for Europol to provide a “situational picture of migrant smuggling” including threat assessments, updates on migratory routes, “modi operandi” and future trends, which will be made available to member states and third countries. It will involve sharing information with Frontex. Europol also aims to “strengthen the strategic and tactical intelligence picture on the use/abuse of legal business structures by criminal networks” not only in respect of migrant smuggling, but throughout “all main crime areas affecting the EU”.
    - Investigations and judicial response. There are 11 activities planned in relation to this goal. The objective is to prepare and conduct investigations and prosecutions. Police forces of different member states lead the activities and set out specific targets by reference to the numbers of arrests, initiated investigations and identified networks. Each planned activity appears to reflect specific national or local police force priorities. Germany for instance aims to “detect 5,000 irregular migrants” per year, and arrest 500 “facilitators”, whilst France focuses on seizing 100 small boats crossing the Channel to the UK. Spain focuses on air routes, including links between human smuggling and drug trafficking; and Portugal’s aim is to disrupt “marriages of convenience abuse and associated threats” (400 cases specifically). Europol also leads an activity aimed at the development of “intelligence products in support of MS investigations” (50 per year) and Frontex aims to focus on border checks and surveillance measures on the EU external borders (with 1,000 “apprehensions/arrests”).
    - Coordinated controls and operations targeting the online and offline trade in illicit goods and services. The only activity planned in relation to this goal is by the French police forces, to improve law enforcement response against “those utilising the Dark Web and other internet messenger applications to enable illegal immigration and document fraud”. The dark web is identified as an “intelligence gap” in this context.
    - Criminal finances, money laundering and asset recovery. Led by the UK, the activity planned under this goal heading is to disrupt money flows specifically within hawaladar networks.
    - Document fraud. Frontex, as well as French and German police forces each lead activities under this goal aimed at “targeting networks or individuals” involved in document fraud. In this respect, Frontex’s “Centre of Excellence for Combating Document Fraud” has a key role.
    – Capacity building through training, networking and innovation. This involves activities aimed at improving the skills, knowledge and expertise of law enforcement and judicial authorities, led by CEPOL, eu-LISA (on the use of SIS and Eurodac databases) and German police forces.
    - Prevention, awareness raising and harm reduction, as well as early identification and assistance to victims. The only goal that is expressed as being aimed at improving the safety of people is led by Frontex, and is focused on the detection of migrant smuggling through the “use of EUROSUR Fusion Services, including the Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance aircraft service, for [member states] and stakeholders to support more effective detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and migrant smuggling.” No mention is made of identification, assistance or victims.
    - Cooperation with non EU partners: under this last goal, one activity is led by Austrian police forces, aimed at expanding the geographical focus of the Task Force Western Balkans to Turkey and “other relevant countries of origin and transit”. The work is already based on intelligence information provided by Europol and Frontex and aims to “enhance mobile phone extractions” (the link here is not clear). The second activity listed under this last goal is led by Europol, and aims to provide a “common platform for EU agencies, military, law enforcement and other stakeholders to exchange intelligence on criminal networks operating along the migration corridors”, creating a broad and focal role for itself in information exchange with a wide range of stakeholders, including private companies.

    For the purposes of the Operational Action Plan, “migrant smuggling” is broadly defined as:

    “…the process of facilitating the unlawful entry, transit or residence of an individual in a country with or without obtaining financial or other benefits. Migrant smuggling entails the facilitation of illegal entry to the EU and of secondary movements within the EU. It can also involve facilitating the fraudulent acquisition of a residence status in the EU.”

    It therefore does not require the involvement of any benefit and includes movements within the EU.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/april/policing-migration-when-harm-reduction-means-multipurpose-aerial-surveil
    #surveillance #surveillance_aérienne #migrations #réfugiés #données #coopération_policière #European_Police_College (#CEPOL) #European_Migrant_Smuggling_Centre #Europol_Cyberpatrol

  • “Action file” on Tunisia outlines EU’s externalisation plans

    An “action file” obtained by Statewatch lays out the objectives and activities of the EU’s cooperation on migration with Tunisia – whose government was heavily criticized by the European Parliament this week for “an authoritarian reversal and an alarming backslide on democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”

    Externalisation of migration control

    The document (pdf), produced as part of the #Operational_Coordination_Mechanism_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM) and circulated within the Council in December 2023, summarizes ongoing EU efforts to externalise migration and border control to Tunisia. It covers the main developments since the signature of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding of July 2023.

    The MoU is cited in the document as a cooperation “framework” whose implementation shall “continue”. Criticism also continues, with the organization Refugees International arguing:

    “The short-term securitisation approach to Tunisia advanced by Team Europe is… likely to fail on at least two fronts: both on its own terms by failing to stem irregular migration, and on legal and ethical terms by tying EU support to the inevitability of grave human rights abuses by Tunisian authorities.”

    From the document it is clear that the EU has intensified political and technical outreach to Tunisia through high-level visits from both EU and member state representatives and that the Tunisian authorities are involved in different initiatives, including through EU agencies, such as Europol and Frontex. The European Police College (CEPOL), the EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and Eurojust are also mentioned as potential actors for cooperation.

    The measures listed in the document target all potential migration from Tunisia to the EU. However, distinctions are drawn – including in the language used – between measures addressed to non-Tunisian nationals and measures addressed to Tunisian nationals.

    Measures addressed to non-Tunisian nationals

    For non-Tunisian nationals, “preventing irregular departures from, as well as irregular arrivals to Tunisia” is the key objective of ongoing cooperation in the areas of border management, anti-smuggling and search and rescue. The EU provides Tunisia different amounts of funding through existing projects.

    Border management, including search and rescue

    the EU finances the projects Strengthening the Tunisian Coast Guard Training Pillar, run by #ICMPD (2023-2026) and the #EUTF funded Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region (#BMP-Maghreb) (2018-2024). Both projects aim at developing the Tunisian authorities’ border control capacity, for both land and sea borders, thus including search and rescue activities. This is done through the donation of equipment and the training of the Garde National of Tunisia and the Navy.

    As for equipment, details about the delivery of boats, engines and spare parts for putting search and rescue vessels to Tunisia are included in the document, including the provision of fuel. A new contract will “build and equip a command-and-control centre for the Tunisian national guard at the border with Libya,” to enhance cross-border cooperation with Libya.

    With regard to training, the document mentions a session for two officials in Rome as well as the participation of the Tunisian border control authorities in a Frontex workshop organised in the context of Joint Operation Themis. The MOCADEM reports that Tunisia considers talks on a working arrangement with Frontex “pre-mature.”

    Anti-smuggling

    The EU pursues the Anti-smuggling Operational Partnership (ASOP) to try to develop the Tunisian police capacity to investigate, prosecute and convict smugglers. Training is also key in this area.

    The document mentions a mentorship programme between Tunisia and the EU Member States on migrant smuggling. Cross-border cooperation in investigations is encouraged, also through Europol, information campaigns (in North Africa and along the Central Mediterranean), and regional action. There is an ongoing discussion on a Europol agreement to exchange personal data between Europol and Tunisian authorities.

    Return and reintegration of non-Tunisian nationals

    the EU finances IOM’s project on Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration in North Africa, concretely supporting assisted voluntary return from Tunisia to countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The MOCADEM document states that the EU engages “with Tunisian authorities to develop a national mechanism for returns facilitation.”

    Direct capacity-building of national authorities to return non-Tunisian nationals to their country of origin is a novelty in the EU migration policies. This is a follow-up of the objective spelled out in the EU-Tunisia MoU of “developing a system for the identification and return of irregular migrants already present in Tunisia”. It is reported that a “new technical assistance programme to further support the return system in Tunisia is under preparation.”

    International protection for non-Tunisian nationals

    As usual, protection programmes receive much lower funding than other cooperation objectives for the securitisation of migration. In Tunisia, the EU will fund a project run by the UNCHR to enhance reception and access to international protection for asylum seekers and refugees.

    Measures addressed to Tunisian nationals

    For Tunisian nationals, the EU aims to increase return and readmission of Tunisian nationals deemed to be irregularly staying in the EU to Tunisia, privileging so-called “assisted voluntary return” and reintegration projects for Tunisian nationals over forced returns. At the same time, the EU stresses the importance of increasing opportunities for legal migration through the launch of a “Talent Partnership” and better visa conditions for Tunisian nationals.

    Deportations

    the EU finances a national reintegration support mechanism called “Tounesna,” as well as the Frontex Joint Reintegration Services, for which Frontex launched a new call for proposals. Key actors in this area are the High Level Network for Return, chaired by the EU Return Coordinator and composed of representatives of all Member States and Frontex.

    In October 2023, Tunisia was identified as one of the seven countries targeted for joint deportation actions. The document reports that the negotiations for an EU-Tunisia readmission agreement and visa facilitation agreements, which started in 2016, have been on hold since 2019 and that “Tunisia has shown no interest to date to relaunch the negotiations.”

    Legal migration

    The EU finances pilot projects under the Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF) and the regional project THAMM (2018-2023), which received extra funding. Again, the launch of an EU-Tunisia Talent Partnership is announced through a Joint Roadmap for a Talent Partnership, which is yet to be finalized.

    In the EU-Tunisia MoU, the EU promised to “take appropriate measures to facilitate legal mobility between the two Parties, including facilitating the granting of visas by reducing delays, costs and administrative procedure.” However, in this document there are no prospects for cooperation on visa policy. The document merely contains a reminder that visa policy is conditional on readmission cooperation.

    Ongoing cooperation

    While the European Parliament this week condemned a decision by the Commission to release €150 million to Tunisia through an urgent written procedure, bypassing the normal-decision making process, with a resolution that said the North African country is undergoing “an authoritarian reversal and an alarming backslide on democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”

    The resolution goes on to say that “over the last year, President Kais Saied has had opposition politicians, judges, media workers and civil society activists arbitrarily arrested and detained.”

    However, the cooperation being coordinated through MOCADEM remains largely beyond the reach of parliamentary scrutiny. As highlighted by a separate article published today by Statewatch and Migration-Control.info, the parliament’s lawyers agree with MEPs that this needs to change.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/march/action-file-on-tunisia-outlines-eu-s-externalisation-plans
    #Tunisie #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #financement #Kais_Saied #accord #frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #contrôles_frontaliers

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) avec la #Tunisie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

  • Border security with drones and databases

    The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

    Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

    The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

    Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

    The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

    The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

    This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

    Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

    This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

    Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

    In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

    The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

    While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

    While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

    This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

    Notes

    [1] https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

    [2] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

    [3] https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

    [4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

    [5] https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

    [6] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [7] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [8] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [9] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

    [10] https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

    [11] https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

    [12] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    [13] https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

    [14] https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

    [15] https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
    #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

  • #Espace_Schengen : l’Union européenne trouve un #accord pour clarifier le cadre des contrôles aux frontières

    Depuis 2015, de nombreux pays ont réintroduit dans l’espace de libre circulation européen des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières, invoquant la #pression_migratoire ou la #menace_terroriste.

    Les négociateurs du Parlement européen et du Conseil (Etats membres) ont trouvé un accord, mardi 6 février, sur une réforme du #code_Schengen destinée à clarifier et renforcer le cadre prévu pour la réintroduction et la prolongation des contrôles aux frontières intérieures de cet espace de libre circulation.

    Au sein de l’espace Schengen, qui regroupe 27 pays − dont 23 Etats membres de l’Union européenne (UE) plus l’Islande, le Liechtenstein, la Norvège et la Suisse −, plus de 400 millions de personnes peuvent en principe circuler sans être soumises à des contrôles. Mais depuis 2015, invoquant la pression migratoire ou la menace terroriste − voire les deux −, de nombreux pays ont réintroduit des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières. Ils sont actuellement plus de la moitié à le faire. L’espace Schengen a aussi été fragmenté par des restrictions de circulation décidées par les Etats membres pendant la pandémie de Covid-19.

    Or, ces contrôles sont autorisés par le code Schengen à titre exceptionnel, en cas de #menace_grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure d’un Etat, mais de manière 3provisoire. Et la Cour de justice de l’UE a rappelé en avril 2022 qu’ils ne devaient pas excéder six mois. En décembre 2021, la Commission européenne a proposé une révision du code Schengen pour tenter de mettre de l’ordre et tirer les leçons de la crise du Covid-19.

    Libre circulation et sécurité

    Selon l’accord trouvé mardi soir, qui devra encore être approuvé formellement par le Parlement européen et le Conseil, en cas de menace grave à sa sécurité, un Etat peut autoriser des contrôles à ses frontières, pour une durée maximale de deux ans, avec une prolongation possible d’un an. Ces Etats devront évaluer la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ces contrôles et déterminer si les objectifs poursuivis ne peuvent être atteints par des mesures alternatives.

    Aux frontières extérieures, la réforme prévoit en cas d’urgence sanitaire de grande ampleur d’harmoniser les règles d’entrée dans l’UE en provenance de pays tiers − les éventuelles mises en quarantaine ou tests notamment. Les citoyens et résidents de l’UE seraient exemptés de telles restrictions d’entrée. Elle prévoit aussi des réponses aux tentatives d’Etat tiers d’« instrumentaliser » les migrants dans le but de déstabiliser un pays de l’UE − comme la Biélorussie et la Russie ont été accusées de le faire −, notamment en limitant les points de passage.

    « La #libre_circulation dans nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord conclu aujourd’hui (…) clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers », a commenté la ministre de l’intérieur belge, Annelies Verlinden, dont le pays assure la présidence semestrielle du Conseil de l’UE.

    L’eurodéputée française Sylvie Guillaume (membre du groupe Alliance progressiste des socialistes & démocrates) s’est déclarée « satisfaite ». « Avec cet accord, nous avons protégé la libre circulation des personnes tout en répondant aux défis auxquels l’espace Schengen a été confronté au cours des dix dernières années », a-t-elle insisté.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/02/07/espace-schengen-l-union-europeenne-parvient-a-un-accord-pour-clarifier-le-ca

    #frontières_intérieures #frontières_internes #frontières #Schengen #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #migrations #asile #réfugiés #exception

    • Border controls: EU updates Schengen rules despite racial profiling concerns

      The Schengen Border Code will be updated as the Belgian Presidency of the Council of the EU and negotiators from the European Parliament have reached a provisional agreement on the adjustment of the border rules, announced Interior Minister Annelies Verlinden (CD&V).

      The update clarifies the rules on (re)introducing border controls between the 27 European countries who are part of the Schengen area, and ensures that they remain “a last resort,” Verlinden’s office said in a press release.

      “Smooth movement across our internal borders and the security of our external borders are the two cornerstones of the Schengen area,” she said. “This agreement on the revision of the Schengen Borders Code will clarify and strengthen these two pillars.”

      The Schengen Borders Code provides for the absence of internal border controls in the Schengen area, which in principle allows over 420 million people to travel freely between the Member States. From 31 March 2024, Bulgaria and Romania will also become part of the area.

      Introducing border controls

      In recent years, discussions about updating the border rules of the area flared up several times, as a result of the debate around migration but also due to travel restrictions during the Covid-19 pandemic.

      The amended Schengen Borders Code will provide Member States with new opportunities to effectively manage the EU’s external borders in a situation where migrants are used for political gain. “This includes limiting the number of border crossing points or shortening their opening hours.”

      In practice, this means that the deal would allow internal checks and increased policing in situations of so-called “instrumentalisation of migration,” which is when a Member State claims that a non-EU country or ’hostile non-state actor’ is pushing migrants towards external EU borders for political reasons.

      “This is an extremely problematic concept, whose codification into EU law would introduce broad derogations to fundamental rights, including the right to asylum and freedom of movement,” said PICUM, a Brussels-based network of over 160 NGOs working to advance the rights of undocumented people. They added that the new deal would de facto legitimise racial profiling in border checks.

      While the reform of the Schengen Borders Code aims to reduce the amount of temporary generalised internal EU border checks, PICUM stressed that it would escalate checks on specific groups of people. The deal would allow police authorities in joint patrols to carry out “random” document checks near internal EU borders, under the guise of apprehending people without valid travel or residence documents.

      Research has already shown that police tend to stop people for checks based on racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics. It is clear that these checks will depend on the police’s decisions about who “looks like” a person without valid papers, the network said.

      “This agreement embraces a very harmful narrative which assumes that people crossing borders without valid documents are a threat to the EU and proposes to address it by increasing policing, while de facto encouraging racial profiling,” said Silvia Carta, Advocacy Officer at PICUM.

      Internal pushbacks, no safeguards

      The new code also introduces “alternative measures” to counter unauthorised movements of third-country nationals staying in the Schengen area. If they are apprehended in the border area, a new procedure will allow Member States to return them to the Member State from which they arrived directly. The arrest must take place in the context of a bilateral partnership, the deal states.

      However, PICUM stressed that this would legalise the violent practice of “internal pushbacks,” which consists of apprehending and detaining people caught without a valid document near an internal border, and transferring them to the Member State the police think the person came from without conducting an individual assessment.

      It is still unclear which “safeguards” have been introduced to protect children, who are not explicitly excluded from such transfer procedures.

      The deal would most likely also escalate the use of monitoring and surveillance technologies that do not apply relevant safeguards and would be at odds with existing EU data protection legislation and fundamental rights.

      If there is a serious threat to public order or internal security, the deal will also allow Member States to exceptionally (re)introduce border controls. However, this will only be possible after assessing “the necessity and proportionality” of this reintroduction, and ensuring that other measures are not sufficient.

      Controls will be able to be introduced immediately if threats to public order or security are unpredictable. In that case, the Commission, Member States and the European Parliament are required to be informed at the same time. “These controls may then be reintroduced for a period of up to one month and extended for up to three months.”

      Internal border controls for foreseeable threats – which have been communicated to the Commission, other Member States and the European Parliament before being reintroduced – can remain in force for a maximum of six months. They can be extended for a renewable period of up to six months, with a maximum duration of two years.

      In serious exceptional situations relating to a persistent threat, internal border controls may be extended after two years for a maximum of six more months, which may then be extended once more (total duration of one year).

      Another health crisis

      In the event of another large-scale public health emergency, the Council can decide to authorise temporary travel restrictions at the EU’s external border. The decision may also include health-related travel restrictions, such as testing, quarantine and self-isolation. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU could only make non-binding recommendations to Member States.

      Certain categories of people – those enjoying the right of free movement, long-term residents and people enjoying international protection – will be exempted from the entry restrictions.

      Now, this provisional agreement will be submitted to the representatives of the Member States in the Council for confirmation. After that, it must still be formally adopted by both institutions.

      https://www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/914176/reintroducing-border-controls-eu-agrees-on-schengen-code-update

      #profilage_racial #instrumentalisation_de_la_migration #contrôles_au_faciès #refoulements #refoulements_internes #push-backs

    • Schengen : le Conseil et le Parlement européen conviennent d’une révision du code frontières de l’UE

      La présidence belge du Conseil de l’UE et les négociateurs du Parlement européen sont parvenus aujourd’hui à un accord provisoire sur la modification du droit de l’UE qui fixe les règles de fonctionnement de l’espace Schengen aux frontières extérieures et intérieures. Les modifications convenues, qui devront être approuvées et adoptées formellement par les deux institutions, renforceront la coordination de l’UE et amélioreront les outils dont disposent les États membres pour faire face aux difficultés rencontrées aux frontières de l’UE.

      « Le franchissement sans entrave de nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord intervenu aujourd’hui en vue de la révision du code frontières Schengen clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers. » (Annelies Verlinden, ministre de l’intérieur, des réformes institutionnelles et du renouveau démocratique de la Belgique)

      La mise à jour clarifie en particulier les règles relatives au rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières en veillant à ce qu’ils restent une mesure de dernier recours, propose des solutions pour les situations dans lesquelles les migrants sont instrumentalisés et permet d’introduire des mesures communes pour harmoniser les restrictions de déplacement en cas d’urgence de santé publique.
      Lutte contre l’instrumentalisation des flux migratoires

      Le code frontières Schengen modifié mettra à disposition des États membres de nouvelles mesures pour une gestion efficace des frontières extérieures de l’UE dans les cas d’instrumentalisation des migrants à des fins politiques. Cela passe notamment par une limitation du nombre de points de passage aux frontières ou par la réduction de leurs heures d’ouverture.

      On parle d’instrumentalisation lorsqu’un pays tiers ou un acteur non étatique encourage ou facilite le déplacement de ressortissants de pays tiers vers les frontières extérieures de l’UE afin de déstabiliser l’UE ou un État membre.
      Rétablissement des contrôles aux frontières intérieures

      Le texte approuvé clarifie et renforce le cadre du rétablissement et de la prolongation des contrôles aux frontières intérieures. Les États membres peuvent rétablir des contrôles à titre exceptionnel en cas de menace grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure. Ils devront évaluer la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ce rétablissement et estimer si les objectifs poursuivis ne peuvent pas être atteints par d’autres moyens, notamment par des mesures alternatives.

      Selon les nouvelles règles, si des menaces pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité ont un caractère imprévisible, des contrôles peuvent être mis en place immédiatement en en informant simultanément la Commission, les autres États membres et le Parlement européen. Ces contrôles sont limités à une période d’un mois maximum et ne peuvent être prolongés que pour une durée maximale de trois mois.

      Dans le cas de menaces prévisibles, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures, notifiés à la Commission, aux États membres et au Parlement européen avant d’être rétablis, peuvent rester en place pendant une période de six mois maximum. Ils peuvent être prolongés par périodes renouvelables de six mois maximum, pour une durée n’excédant pas deux ans. Dans des situations exceptionnelles majeures liées à une menace persistante, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures peuvent être prolongés au-delà de deux ans, pour une période maximale de 6 mois supplémentaires, renouvelable une fois, la durée totale n’excédant pas un an.
      Promotion de mesures alternatives

      Une autre mise à jour du code frontières Schengen sur laquelle la présidence et le Parlement européen ont marqué leur accord concerne le recours à des mesures alternatives aux contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

      Le recours à ces mesures alternatives permettra aux États membres de limiter considérablement le rétablissement éventuel des contrôles aux frontières intérieures, en garantissant la sécurité tout en préservant l’espace de libre circulation sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

      Le nouveau code introduit également des mesures alternatives pour lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier dans l’espace Schengen. Une nouvelle procédure permettra à un État membre de transférer des ressortissants de pays tiers arrêtés dans la zone frontalière et séjournant illégalement sur son territoire vers l’État membre d’où ils sont arrivés directement. L’arrestation devrait s’effectuer dans le cadre d’une coopération bilatérale.
      Mesures aux frontières extérieures en cas de crise sanitaire

      En vertu du nouveau code frontières Schengen, le Conseil peut adopter une décision autorisant des restrictions temporaires de déplacement aux frontières extérieures en cas d’urgence de santé publique de grande ampleur. Pendant la pandémie de COVID-19, l’UE n’a pu émettre que des recommandations non contraignantes à l’intention des États membres.

      La décision peut également prévoir des restrictions de déplacement liées à la santé, telles que des tests, une quarantaine et l’isolement à domicile.

      Certaines catégories de personnes seront exemptées des restrictions à l’entrée : les personnes jouissant du droit à la libre circulation, les résidents de longue durée et les bénéficiaires d’une protection internationale.
      Prochaines étapes

      L’accord provisoire intervenu aujourd’hui sera soumis aux représentants des États membres au sein du Conseil (Coreper) pour confirmation. Il devra également être formellement adopté par les deux institutions.
      Contexte

      L’espace Schengen s’étend sur plus de 4 millions de kilomètres carrés, se compose de 27 pays européens et permet à plus de 400 millions de personnes de voyager librement entre les pays membres sans passer par des contrôles aux frontières.

      La coopération entre les forces de police, les autorités douanières et les autorités chargées du contrôle des frontières extérieures des pays de l’espace Schengen contribue à la sécurité de la zone.

      Le code frontières Schengen, qui va être mis à jour par cet accord entre le Conseil et le Parlement européen, constitue le cadre réglementaire qui prévoit l’absence de contrôles aux frontières intérieures et fixe des règles pour le contrôle des personnes aux frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen.

      Le code permet aux États membres de rétablir des contrôles aux frontières intérieures dans des circonstances exceptionnelles mettant en péril le fonctionnement global de l’espace Schengen.

      https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2024/02/06/schengen-council-and-european-parliament-agree-to-update-eu-s-borde

    • Réforme Schengen : le nouveau code rend possible les refoulements aux frontières intérieures

      Un accord a été trouvé, mardi, par les négociateurs du Parlement et du Conseil européens quant à la révision du code Schengen des frontières. Cet accord introduit de nouvelles mesures qui, rendent notamment légal le transfert de migrants depuis une zone frontalière vers le pays dont il arrive. Infomigrants fait le point.

      L’accord a été annoncé mardi soir. Les négociateurs du Parlement européen et du Conseil européen viennent d’aboutir à une version finale de révision du code Schengen des frontières. Ce code régit les pratiques aux frontières intérieures et extérieures de l’espace Schengen, territoire composé par 27 États au sein duquel, en théorie, chacun peut circuler sans contrôle.

      L’accord doit encore être approuvé formellement par le Parlement et le Conseil. Si un communiqué de presse en donne les grandes lignes, le texte détaillé n’a pas encore été rendu public. « La libre circulation dans nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord conclu aujourd’hui (...) clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers », soutient la ministre belge de l’Intérieur, Annelies Verlinden, dont le pays assure la présidence du Conseil de l’UE.

      Depuis 2015, de nombreux États, dont la France, ont réintroduit des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières intérieures. En raison de la menace terroriste, mais aussi des restrictions sanitaires dues au Covid-19. Ils sont actuellement plus de la moitié des États membres de l’espace Schengen à le faire, rappelle l’AFP. Et ce, alors que ces contrôles internes sont contraires au principe de libre circulation dans l’espace Schengen.
      Un an de prolongation supplémentaire pour les contrôles aux frontières intérieures

      Ce type de contrôle est autorisé par le code Schengen « en cas de menace grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure d’un État ». La réintroduction d’un contrôle aux frontières intérieures est d’une période de six mois maximum. Ces périodes sont ensuite renouvelables, sur une durée maximale de deux ans.

      La nouvelle réforme du code Schengen réaffirme le caractère exceptionnel de ces contrôles. La « nécessité et la proportionnalité » de ces derniers devra être argumentée.

      Mais elle ajoute la possibilité de les prolonger encore d’une année supplémentaire. Le nouveau code encadre donc mieux la pratique… Tout en allongeant sa possibilité à trois années maximum.
      Une nouvelle mesure qui légitime les refoulements aux frontières intérieures

      À partir de cette base, les négociateurs ont introduit une nouvelle mesure pour contrôler les mouvements migratoires au sein de l’espace Schengen qui inquiète fortement les ONG et avocats en droit des étrangers. Le nouveau code permettra en effet à un État membre de « transférer les ressortissants de pays tiers appréhendés dans la zone frontalière et séjournant illégalement sur son territoire vers l’État membre d’où ils sont directement arrivés. L’arrestation devra avoir lieu dans le cadre d’un cadre de coopération bilatérale », détaille le communiqué.

      Par exemple : à la frontière franco-italienne, avec cette nouvelle mesure, « toute personne qui se trouve dans la zone frontalière pourra être arrêtée si les autorités françaises soupçonnent que cette personne est en situation irrégulière et venue d’Italie », décrit Ulrich Stege, avocat en droit des étrangers membre du réseau juridique italien ASGI, et enseignant à l’International University de Turin. Il sera possible de la refouler via « une procédure simplifiée, par exemple un unique document indiquant l’identité de la personne. On le lui fait signer, puis on la repousse ». Des pushbacks qui deviendraient légaux, en somme.

      Cette pratique a pourtant été épinglée, pas plus tard qu’en septembre 2023, par la Cour de Justice de l’UE. « La volonté est clairement de codifier et généraliser, dans la législation européenne, une pratique qui est en ce moment même en place notamment entre la France et l’Italie », confirme Ulrich Stege.
      Risques accrus de contrôles au faciès

      Edwige*, une exilée ivoirienne rencontrée à Vintimille en octobre, avait raconté à Infomigrants le déroulement des contrôles de police menant à des refoulements, dans les trains entre l’Italie et la France. « Les policiers nous ont dit de sortir. Directement, sans regarder nos documents. Moi, j’étais aux toilettes à ce moment-là : ils sont rentrés, ils m’ont tirée dehors. Je ne comprenais pas ce qu’il se passait », témoignait-elle. « C’est là que je me suis rendue compte qu’ils avaient fait sortir tous les Noirs du train. »

      « Rappelons que, dès que l’on parle de contrôles aux frontières intérieures, on ne peut pas imaginer autre chose que ce que l’on voit depuis 2015 : c’est-à-dire des contrôles avec un profilage racial des personnes. Cela ne peut pas se faire autrement », met en garde Ulrich Stege.

      Avec cette nouvelle mesure, « on s’oriente vers une systématisation de ces contrôles basées sur du profilage racial », soutient l’avocat et professeur d’université italien. Pour rappel, ces contrôles au faciès sont bien entendus illégaux... Car discriminatoires. "Il est clair que les contrôles « aléatoires » de documents dépendront des décisions de la police quant à savoir qui « ressemble » à une personne sans-papiers", abonde l’ASGI dans son analyse de la réforme, parue mi 2022.

      « Jusqu’ici, on avait des pratiques basées sur des accords bilatéraux. Cette fois, il y aurait une loi européenne qui régularise et légitime ces pratiques. Or, ce sont des pratiques violentes, de refoulements et de discriminations raciales », tranche Silvia Carta, chargée de plaidoyer politique migratoire pour le réseau PICUM (Plateforme pour la coopération internationale sur les migrants sans papiers), également interrogée par Infomigrants.
      Pas d’exception pour les mineurs, les demandeurs d’asile ou les familles ?

      Plusieurs questions restent en suspens. Existera-t-il un droit au recours, pour les personnes soumises à cette nouvelle mesure ? Mais aussi : combien de temps les personnes pourront-elles être placées dans des locaux de rétention, en attendant leur refoulement ? Par-dessus tout : y aura-t-il des exceptions pour les catégories protégées, à savoir les mineurs non-accompagnés, les familles avec enfants, ou encore les demandeurs d’asile - qui ont le droit imprescriptible de déposer une demande d’asile partout dans l’UE ?

      « Notre crainte, c’est que cette mesure favorise, entre autres, la rétention illégale des personnes », pointe Silvia Carta. « Le Parlement avait envisagé des garde-fous. Mais nous ne savons pas exactement ce qui a été retenu dans le texte, d’autant que le Conseil était, à l’inverse, réticent à les intégrer dans l’accord... »

      Or, « sans précision, sans règle claire, chacun fait un peu comme il le veut. On le voit bien à la frontière franco-italienne, où des demandeurs d’asile sont refoulés », insiste Ulrich Stege.

      De manière globale, le nouveau code Schengen vise à promouvoir et créer d’autres « mesures alternatives pour lutter contre les mouvements non autorisés de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier dans l’espace Schengen », assume le communiqué européen.

      Sans publication du texte, difficile de savoir pour le moment ce que recouvre ce champ des « mesures alternatives ». Les ONG craignent une intensification du recours aux technologies de surveillance. Avec l’idée de « faciliter les détections et les interceptions des gens de façon de plus en plus systématique. Via des drones, des caméras, l’intelligence artificielle... », souligne Silvia Carta.
      Des mesures face aux tentatives « d’instrumentalisation » de migrants

      La révision du code Schengen concerne aussi les frontières extérieures. Il est prévu une harmonisation des règles d’entrée dans l’UE « en cas d’urgence sanitaire », avec des « éventuelles mises en quarantaine ou tests », laisse entrevoir le communiqué.

      Surtout, l’accord prévoit des mesures face aux tentatives d’Etats tiers d’"instrumentaliser" les migrants « dans un but politique » de déstabilisation - comme le Bélarus ou encore la Russie ont été accusés par l’UE de le faire, en 2023. Il s’agira de « limiter le nombre de points de passage, ou de réduire leurs horaires d’ouverture », annonce le communiqué.

      "Ce concept d’"instrumentalisation" est problématique et inquiétant", réagit Silvia Carta. "Il associe la migration à une menace sécuritaire. Et puis, qui rentrera dans cette définition de l’"instrumentalisation" ? Est-ce qu’à terme, cela pourrait viser aussi les missions de sauvetage des personnes exilées menées par des ONG ?"

      Le rôle de l’agence de garde-frontières Frontex s’en verra renforcé, souligne dans son analyse détaillée le réseau Border Violence Monitoring. Dans les moments de tension aux frontières extérieures, comme entre la Finlande et la Russie fin 2023, des agents sont envoyés sur place, en mission.

      « C’est un constat que l’on fait pour tous les textes sur les migrations, y compris le nouveau Pacte migratoire européen : l’UE produit des nouvelles règles qui se basent sur une approche sécuritaire, avec la criminalisation de la figure du migrant », conclut Ulrich Stege. « Et cela nuit aux droits fondamentaux qui devraient s’appliquer ».

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/55028/reforme-schengen--le-nouveau-code-rend-possible-les-refoulements-aux-f

    • Racial profiling and « internal pushbacks » in new Schengen borders legislation

      Statewatch is publishing the final compromise text of the revised Schengen Borders Code, which is due for adoption soon by the Council and the Parliament. The text has been heavily criticised for encouraging racial profiling through the increased use of police patrols and checks at internal borders in the Schengen area, as well as legitimating “internal pushbacks”, with the aim of avoiding the full-blown reintroduction of internal border controls.

      The proposed Regulation, which comes hot on the heels of other new legislation as part of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, has a number of goals, as explained in the compromise text document (pdf):

      a) establish a new mechanism which should allow for a timely adoption by the Council of a binding instrument setting out temporary travel restrictions at the external borders in case of a pandemic,

      b) address the instrumentalisation of migrants, where a third country actor is using human beings to destabilise the Union or its Member States,

      c) create a new mechanism allowing for a European response to problems affecting a majority of Member States at the same time and thus putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk,

      d) clarify and expand the list of elements that must be assessed by a Member State when taking the decision on temporary reintroduction of border controls,

      e) provide that safeguards should always be applied, to limit the negative impact of the temporary reintroduction of border checks at internal borders, should this reintroduction be inevitable.

      The Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migration has said that the text will increase the use of police checks at internal borders that will be based on “racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics,” whilst warning that it also legalises “the violent practice of ‘internal pushbacks’, which consists in apprehending and detaining people caught without a valid document near an internal border, and transferring them to the member state the police think the person came from without conducting an individual assessment.”

      The document includes an explanation from the Presidency of “the key elements of the compromise text”:

      – Travel restrictions – The definition and concept of “large-scale public health emergency” were agreed and the Parliament accepted that Member States can apply stricter measures than those agreed at EU level. A supplementary list of categories of travellers that could be exempted from travel restrictions was included from which categories of essential travellers could be added to Annex XI by means of an implementing act.

      – Alternative police measures – These measures are intended to enable Member States to avoid having to resort to the reintroduction of internal border controls. These provisions were largely maintained in the final agreement. This is an important element since it will expand the toolbox available to Member States to deal with threats before reintroducing internal border controls.

      – Transfer procedure – The procedure will take place in the context of a bilateral cooperation framework. Minors will not be exempted from the procedure, but procedural safeguards will be included.

      – Instrumentalisation – A cross-reference was made to the definition of instrumentalisation as contained in the Crisis Regulation

      – Attempt to cross the external border en masse and using force – The wording of a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights was maintained.

      – Reintroduction/prolongation of internal border controls – On the issue of a maximum duration for which Member States can reintroduce internal border controls, an agreement was reached for a total period of two years, with possibility of two additional prolongations of 6 months each. In the case of a situation putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border controls that affects several Member States, the application of the provision will be restricted to large scale public health emergencies.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/february/racial-profiling-and-internal-pushbacks-in-new-schengen-borders-legislat

    • Asylum and migration reform: EU member states’ representatives green light deal with European Parliament

      Today, EU member states’ representatives (Coreper) approved the provisional deal that was reached between the Council presidency and the European Parliament on 20 December 2023, constituting a pact of five key laws which will reform the EU’s asylum and migration system.

      “The member states today confirmed their commitment to improve the European asylum and migration system. These new rules will make the European asylum system more effective and increase solidarity between member states. This agreement will fundamentally change the way in which we deal with migration and asylum on the ground, at the borders and within our territories. The agreement will not change the situation on the ground from day one after its adoption, but now we have to be fully committed to implement what we have decided.” (Nicole de Moor, Belgian State Secretary for Asylum and Migration)

      Pact on asylum and migration

      The five EU laws of the pact touch upon all stages of asylum and migration management.

      The update of the Eurodac regulation (the EU fingerprint database) will make it possible to better tackle irregular movements and monitor the paths of asylum seekers and persons in an irregular situation throughout the EU.

      The screening regulation’s aim is to strengthen controls of persons at external borders. It also ensures fast identification of the correct procedure – such as return to their country of origin or start of an asylum procedure – when a person enters the EU without fulfilling the right entry conditions.

      The asylum procedure regulation (APR) establishes a common procedure that member states need to follow when people seek international protection. It streamlines the procedural arrangements and sets standards for the rights of the asylum seeker. It introduces a mandatory border procedure, with the aim of quickly assessing at the EU’s external borders whether applications for asylum are unfounded or inadmissible.

      The asylum and migration management regulation (AMMR) will replace the current Dublin regulation. It sets out rules determining which member state is responsible for the examination of an asylum application. To balance the current system whereby a few member states are responsible for the vast majority of asylum applications, a new solidarity mechanism will be established. The new rules combine mandatory solidarity to support member states who cannot cope with the number of irregular arrivals into their territory with flexibility for member states as regards the choice of their contributions

      The fifth leg of the Pact is a new law that establishes a framework allowing member states to address situations of crisis in the field of asylum and migration. They would be authorised to adjust certain rules, for instance concerning the registration of asylum applications or the asylum border procedure. On the other hand these countries would be able to request solidarity and support measures from the EU and its member states.
      Reception conditions, qualification and resettlement

      The permanent representatives committee also gave the thumbs up to three asylum and migration laws on which Council and Parliament had already reached agreement in 2022. These three laws comprise a revision of the reception conditions directive, an update of the qualification regulation and a regulation establishing an EU resettlement framework.

      A return border regulation was also approved which allows the pact to apply to those European countries with differing Schengen rules.
      Next steps

      The laws approved today will have to be formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council.

      Background

      The asylum procedure regulation, asylum and migration management regulation, Eurodac regulation, screening regulation and crisis regulation are components of the new pact on migration and asylum, which the Commission proposed on 23 September 2020.

      The reception conditions directive, qualification regulation and EU resettlement framework were proposed in 2016.

      https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/02/08/asylum-and-migration-reform-eu-member-states-representatives-green-

  • Frontex and deportations, 2006-2022

    Data covering 17 years of Frontex’s deportation operations shows the expanding role of the agency. We have produced a series of visualisations to show the number of people deported in Frontex-coordinated operations, the member states involved, the destination states, and the costs.

    In August 2020 Statewatch published the report Deportation Union, to provide a critical examination of EU measures designed to increase the number of deportations carried out by national authorities and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. The report focuses on three key areas: attempts to reduce or eliminate rights and protections in the law governing deportations; the expansion and interconnection of EU databases and information systems; and the increased budget, powers and personnel awarded to Frontex. The infographics and data here build upon data compiled for that report, covering the period from 2006 to 2022.

    Data collection, compilation and visualisations by Ida Flik.

    A note on this update

    This article has been updated to include data for 2022 (the previous edition covered the years 2006 to 2021), but we filed an access to documents request with Frontex seeking data from 2006 up until the end of 2022. The information they provided for years prior to 2022 in some cases differs significantly from that used for the previous version of this article. There is, for example, some variation in the number of people deported to different destinations. There are also some substantial differences in the number of people deported, and some minor differences in the total number of operations conducted.

    Some of this may be due to errors on our part in compiling the data provided in the first place, which was released by Frontex in the form of non-machine readable PDFs that required substantal amounts of manual transcription. Shortcomings in the data released by Frontex also required that we make estimates for some figures, as we noted in the disclaimer in the dataset released with Deportation Union (available here).

    The biggest variations between the old figures and the new are visible in the data on the amount of money spent by Frontex on deportations. The data releaed in response to access to documents requests filed for this article shows amounts of expenditure that dwarf that shown in the data released following access to documents requests filed for the research for Deportation Union. To take just one example, the old data indicated that in 2015 the agency spent €11.2 million on deportations. The new data pushes that figure up to more than €67 million.

    These are not the only discrepancies in the Frontex data. The information released in response to requests filed for this article says the agency assisted in the removal of 9,919 people in EU territory in 2022, while Frontex’s own report on deportations in the second half of 2022 says that 13,684 people were returned in the months from July to December alone.

    We asked Frontex’s press office to explain the discrepancies and variations described here, but received no response.
    Deporting states and destination states

    This graphic provides a visual representation of the 15 EU member states most invested in Frontex’s deportation operations, and the 15 most popular destinations for those operations. Germany is by far and away the biggest user of Frontex’s services, and Albania the primary destination for Frontex-coordinated deportations.

    Deportations by year, EU member states and destination states

    This graphic makes it possible to examine in more detail the member states involved in Frontex-coordinated deportations to particular destinations. For example: Germany is the only state to have deported anyone to Azerbaijan via a Frontex-coordinated operation since 2019; it is also the only EU member state to have deported anyone to Bosnia via a Frontex coordinated operation since 2018.

    Frontex’s financial contributions to member states

    Member states can claim back from Frontex the costs they incur for participating in deportation operations coordinated by the agency. This graphic shows how much each participating member state has received each year. As the biggest user of Frontex-coordinated deportation operations, Germany remains by far the biggest recipient of these funds. The total it received in 2022 (more than €20.4 million) is lower than the 2021 total, but still a vast amount of money.

    Costs per deportee by destination state

    The financial cost of deporting somebody differs depending on the destination state, as shown in this chart. Burundi is now by far the most expensive destination state, though according to the figures provided by Frontex for this update there have been no Frontex-coordinated operations to that country since 2010. The change from last year (when Ethiopia was by far the most expensive destination, with the cost to remove one person to the east African state coming in at over €42,000) is presumably due to the changes in the data described above.

    Number of operations and people deported, by year and operation type

    This chart shows the number of people deported and the number of deportation operations, by year and operation type. For joint return operations (JROs), Frontex coordinates the actions of multiple member states who wish to deport people to one or more destinations. National return operations involve just one EU member state, but Frontex nevertheless plays a coordinating and financing role. Collecting return operations involve a plane and staff from the destination state travelling to the EU to pick up deportees.

    The updated data provided in 2022 contains the abbreviations VRD, VDO and “Humanitarian VR”. Frontex did not respond to questions on what exactly these stand for. “Humanitarian VR” is presumably “humanitarian voluntary return,” while the VR in VRD may also stand for voluntary return. However, the precise meaning cannot be confirmed without a statement from the agency.

    https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/frontex-and-deportations-2006-22
    #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #sans-papiers #données #statistiques #chiffres #coût #budget #évolution #graphiques #visualisation

  • Europe’s (digital) borders must fall: End the expansion of the EU’s #EURODAC database

    110 civil society organisations, including Statewatch, are calling for an end to the expansion of EURODAC, the EU database for the registration of asylum-seekers. EURODAC, designed to collect and store migrants’ data, is being transformed into an expansive, violent surveillance tool that will treat people seeking protection as crime suspects This will include children as young as 6 whose fingerprints and facial images will be integrated into the database.

    Europe’s (digital) borders must fall: End the expansion of the EU’s EURODAC database

    EURODAC is being expanded to enforce the EU’s discriminatory and hostile asylum and migration policies: increasing deportations, detention and a broader climate of racialised criminalisation.

    The endless expansion of EURODAC must be stopped: https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/EURODAC-open-letter.pdf.

    What is EURODAC?

    Since its inception in 2003, the EU has repeatedly expanded the scope, size and function of EURODAC.

    Created to implement the Dublin system and record the country responsible for processing asylum claims, it originally stored only limited information, mostly fingerprints, on few categories of people: asylum-seekers and people apprehended irregularly crossing the EU’s borders. From the start, this system has been a means to enforce a discriminatory and harmful deportation regime, premised on a false framework of ‘illegality’ in migration.

    After a first reform in 2013 allowing police to access the database, the EU continues to detach EURODAC from its asylum framework to re-package it as a system pursuing ‘wider immigration purposes’. The changes were announced in 2020 in the EU Migration Pact, the EU’s so-called ‘fresh start on migration’. Rather than a fresh start, the proposals contain the harshest proposals in the history of the EU’s migration policy: more detention, more violence, and a wider, evolved tool of surveillance in the EURODAC database to track, push back and deport ‘irregular’ migrants.
    How is the EURODAC expansion endangering people’s human rights?

    More people included into the database: Concretely EURODAC would collect a vast swathe of personal data (photographs, copies of travel and identity documents, etc.) on a wider range of people: those resettled, relocated, disembarked following search and rescue operations and arrested at borders or within national territories.

    Data collection on children: The reform would also lower the threshold for storing data in the system to the age of six, extend the data retention periods and weaken the conditions for law enforcement consultation of the database.

    Including facial images into the database: The reform also proposes the expansion to include facial images. Comparisons and searches run in the database can be based on facial recognition – a technology notoriously error-prone and unreliable that threatens the essence of dignity, non- discrimination and privacy rights. The database functions as a genuine tool of violence as it authorises the use of coercion against asylum-seekers who refuse to give up their data, such as detention and forced collection. Not only do these changes contradict European data protection standards, they demonstrate how the EU’s institutional racism creates differential standards between migrants and non-migrants.

    Access by law enforcement: EURODAC’s revamp also facilitates its connection to other existing EU migration and police databases as part of the so-called ‘interoperability’ initiative - the creation of an overarching EU information system designed to increase police identity checks of non-EU nationals, leading to increased racial profiling. These measures also unjustly equate asylum seekers with criminals. Lastly, the production of statistics from EURODAC data and other databases is supposed to inform future policymaking on migration movement trends. In reality, it is expected that they will facilitate illegal pushbacks and overpolicing of humanitarian assistance.
    End the expansion of EURODAC

    The EURODAC reform is a gross violation of the right to seek international protection, a chilling conflation of migration and criminality and an out-of-control surveillance instrument. The far- right is already anticipating the next step, calling for the collection of DNA.

    The EURODAC reform is one of many examples of the digitalisation of Fortress Europe. It is inconsistent with fundamental rights and will undermine frameworks of protection and rights of people on the move.

    We demand:

    – That the EU institutions immediately reject the expansion of EURODAC.
    - For legislators to prevent further violence and ensure protection at and within borders when rethinking the EURODAC system.
    - For legislators and EU Member States to establish safe and regular pathways for migrants and protective reception conditions.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/europe-s-digital-borders-must-fall-end-the-expansion-of-the-eu-s-eurodac
    #base_de_données #surveillance #frontières #frontières_digitales #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Dublin #règlement_Dublin #données_personnelles #reconnaissance_faciale #technologie

  • EU to step up support for human rights abuses in North Africa

    In a letter (https://www.statewatch.org/media/4088/eu-com-migration-letter-eur-council-10-23.pdf) to the European Council trumpeting the EU’s efforts to control migration, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to coast guards in Libya and Tunisia, where refugee and migrant rights are routinely violated.

    The letter (pdf) states:

    “…we need to build up the capacity of our partners to conduct effective border surveillance and search and rescue operations. We are providing support to many key partners with equipment and training to help prevent unauthorised border crossings. All five vessels promised to Libya have been delivered and we see the impact of increased patrols. Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operational, and others will be repaired by the end of the year. More is expected to be delivered to countries in North Africa in the coming months.”

    What it does not mention is that vessels delivered to the so-called Libyan coast guard are used to conduct “pullbacks” of refugees to brutal detention conditions and human rights violations.

    Meanwhile in Tunisia, the coast guard has been conducting pullbacks of people who have subsequently been dumped in remote regions near the Tunisian-Algerian border.

    According to testimony provided to Human Rights Watch (HRW)¸ a group of people who were intercepted at sea and brought back to shore were then detained by the National Guard, who:

    “…loaded the group onto buses and drove them for 6 hours to somewhere near the city of Le Kef, about 40 kilometers from the Algerian border. There, officers divided them into groups of about 10, loaded them onto pickup trucks, and drove toward a mountainous area. The four interviewees, who were on the same truck, said that another truck with armed agents escorted their truck.

    The officers dropped their group in the mountains near the Tunisia-Algeria border, they said. The Guinean boy [interviewed by HRW) said that one officer had threatened, “If you return again [to Tunisia], we will kill you.” One of the Senegalese children [interviewed by HRW] said an officer had pointed his gun at the group.”

    Von der Leyen does not mention the fact that the Tunisian authorities refused an initial disbursement of €67 million offered by the Commission as part of its more than €1 billion package for Tunisia, which the country’s president has called “small” and said it “lacks respect.” (https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-europe-migration-851cf35271d2c52aea067287066ef247) The EU’s ambassador to Tunisia has said that the refusal “speaks to Tunisia’s impatience and desire to speed up implementation” of the deal.

    [voir: https://seenthis.net/messages/1020596]

    The letter also emphasises the need to “establish a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership with Egypt,” as well as providing more support to Türkiye, Jordan and Lebanon. The letter hints at the reason why – Israel’s bombing of the Gaza strip and a potential exodus of refugees – but does not mention the issue directly, merely saying that “the pressures on partners in our immediate vicinity risk being exacerbated”.

    It appears that the consequences rather than the causes of any movements of Palestinian refugees are the main concern. Conclusions on the Middle East agreed by the European Council last night demand “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and aid to reach those in need” in Gaza, but do not call for a ceasefire. The European Council instead “strongly emphasises Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law and international humanitarian law.”

    More surveillance, new law

    Other plans mentioned in the letter include “increased aerial surveillance” for “combatting human smuggling and trafficking” by Operation IRINI, the EU’s military mission in the Mediterranean, and increased support for strengthening controls at points of departure in North African states as well as “points of entry by migrants at land borders.”

    The Commission also wants increased action against migrant smuggling, with a proposal to revise the 2002 Facilitation Directive “to ensure that criminal offences are harmonised, assets are frozen, and coordination strengthened,” so that “those who engage in illegal acts exploiting migrants pay a heavy price.”

    It appears the proposal will come at the same time as a migrant smuggling conference organised by the Commission on 28 November “to create a Global Alliance with a Call to Action, launching a process of regular international exchange on this constantly evolving crime.”

    Deportation cooperation

    Plans are in the works for more coordinated action on deportations, with the Commission proposing to:

    “…work in teams with Member States on targeted return actions, with a lead Member State or Agency for each action. We will develop a roadmap that could focus on (1) ensuring that return decisions are issued at the same time as a negative asylum decisions (2) systematically ensuring the mutual recognition of return decisions and follow-up enforcement action; (3) carrying out joint identification actions including through a liaison officers’ network in countries of origin; (4) supporting policy dialogue on readmission with third countries and facilitating the issuance of travel documents, as well as acceptance of the EU laissez passer; and (5) organising assisted voluntary return and joint return operations with the support of Frontex.”

    Cooperation on legal migration, meanwhile, will be done by member states “on a voluntary basis,” with the letter noting that any offers made should be conditional on increased cooperation with EU deportation efforts: “local investment and opportunities for legal migration must go hand in hand with strengthened cooperation on readmission.”

    More funds

    For all this to happen, the letter calls on the European Council to make sure that “migration priorities - both on the internal and external dimension - are reflected in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework,” the EU’s 2021-27 budget.

    Mid-term revision of the budget was discussed at the European Council meeting yesterday, though the conclusions on that point merely state that there was an “in-depth exchange of views,” with the European Council calling on the Council of the EU “to take work forward, with a view to reaching an overall agreement by the end of the year.”

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/eu-to-step-up-support-for-human-rights-abuses-in-north-africa

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Afrique_du_Nord #externalisation #Ursula_von_der_Leyen #lettre #contrôles_frontaliers #Tunisie #Libye #bateaux #aide #gardes-côtes_libyens #surveillance_frontalière #surveillance_frontalière_effective #frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Memorandum_of_Understanding #MoU #pull-backs #Egypte #Turquie #Jourdanie #Liban #réfugiés_palestiniens #Palestine #7_octobre_2023 #Operation_IRINI #IRINI #surveillance_aérienne #passeurs #directive_facilitation #renvois #déportation #officiers_de_liaison #réadmissions #laissez-passer #Frontex

    ping @isskein @_kg_ @karine4

    • *Crise migratoire : le bilan mitigé des accords passés par l’Union européenne pour limiter les entrées sur son sol*

      Réunis en conseil jeudi et vendredi, les Vingt-Sept devaient faire le point sur la sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’UE. Mardi, la présidente de la Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, a proposé de conclure de nouveaux partenariats « sur mesure » avec le #Sénégal, la #Mauritanie et l’Egypte.

      Malgré la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas, qui s’est imposée à leur ordre du jour, le sujet de la migration demeure au menu des Vingt-Sept, qui se réunissent en Conseil européen jeudi 26 et vendredi 27 octobre à Bruxelles. Les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement doivent faire un point sur la dimension externe de cette migration et la sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne (UE). Depuis janvier, le nombre d’arrivées irrégulières, selon l’agence Frontex, a atteint 270 000, en progression de 17 % par rapport à 2022. Sur certaines routes, la croissance est bien plus importante, notamment entre la Tunisie et l’Italie, avec une augmentation de 83 % des arrivées sur les neuf premiers mois de 2023.

      Si le #pacte_asile_et_migration, un ensemble de réglementations censé améliorer la gestion intra européenne de la migration, est en passe d’être adopté, le contrôle des frontières externes de l’Europe est au cœur des discussions politiques. A moins de huit mois des élections européennes, « les questions de migration seront décisives », prévient Manfred Weber, le patron du groupe conservateur PPE au Parlement européen.

      Nouveaux « #partenariats sur mesure »

      Mardi, dans une lettre aux dirigeants européens, Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission, a rappelé sa volonté de « combattre la migration irrégulière à la racine et travailler mieux avec des #pays_partenaires », c’est-à-dire ceux où les migrants s’embarquent ou prennent la route pour l’UE, en établissant avec ces pays des « #partenariats_stratégiques_mutuellement_bénéficiaires ». Elle propose de conclure avec le Sénégal, la Mauritanie et l’Egypte de nouveaux « #partenariats_sur_mesure » sur le modèle de celui qui a été passé avec la Tunisie. Sans oublier la Jordanie et le Liban, fortement déstabilisés par le conflit en cours entre Israël et Gaza.

      L’UE souhaite que ces pays bloquent l’arrivée de migrants vers ses côtes et réadmettent leurs citoyens en situation irrégulière sur le Vieux Continent contre des investissements pour renforcer leurs infrastructures et développer leur économie. « L’idée n’est pas nécessairement mauvaise, glisse un diplomate européen, mais il faut voir comment c’est mené et négocié. Le partenariat avec la Tunisie a été bâclé et cela a été fiasco. »

      Depuis vingt ans, l’Europe n’a eu de cesse d’intégrer cette dimension migratoire dans ses accords avec les pays tiers et cette préoccupation s’est accentuée en 2015 avec l’arrivée massive de réfugiés syriens. Les moyens consacrés à cet aspect migratoire ont augmenté de façon exponentielle. Au moins 8 milliards d’euros sont programmés pour la période 2021-2027, soit environ 10 % des fonds de la coopération, pour des politiques de sécurisation et d’équipements des gardes-côtes. Ces moyens manquent au développement des pays aidés, critique l’ONG Oxfam. Et la Commission a demandé une rallonge de 15 milliards d’euros aux Vingt-Sept.

      Mettre l’accent sur les retours

      Tant de moyens, pour quels résultats ? Il est impossible de chiffrer le nombre d’entrées évitées par les accords passés, exception faite de l’arrangement avec la Turquie. Après la signature le 18 mars 2016, par les Vingt-Sept et la Commission, de la déclaration UE-Turquie, les arrivées de Syriens ont chuté de 98 % dès 2017, mais cela n’a pas fonctionné pour les retours, la Turquie ayant refusé de réadmettre la majorité des Syriens refoulés d’Europe. Cet engagement a coûté 6 milliards d’euros, financés à la fois par les Etats et l’UE.

      « Pour les autres accords, le bilan est modeste, indique Florian Trauner, spécialiste des migrations à la Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgique). Nous avons étudié l’ensemble des accords passés par l’UE avec les pays tiers sur la période 2008-2018 pour mesurer leurs effets sur les retours et réadmissions. Si les pays des Balkans, plus proches de l’Europe, ont joué le jeu, avec les pays africains, cela ne fonctionne pas. »

      Depuis le début de l’année, la Commission assure malgré tout mettre l’accent sur les retours. Selon Ylva Johansson, la commissaire chargée de la politique migratoire, sur près de 300 000 obligations de quitter le territoire européen, environ 65 000 ont été exécutées, en progression de 22 % en 2023. Ces chiffres modestes « sont liés à des questions de procédures internes en Europe, mais également à nos relations avec les Etats tiers. Nous avons fait beaucoup de pédagogie avec ces Etats en mettant en balance l’accès aux visas européens et cela commence à porter ses fruits. »

      « Généralement, explique Florian Trauner, les Etats tiers acceptent les premiers temps les retours, puis la pression de l’opinion publique locale se retourne contre eux et les taux de réadmissions baissent. Les accords qui conditionnent l’aide au développement à des réadmissions créent davantage de problèmes qu’ils n’en résolvent. La diplomatie des petits pas, plus discrète, est bien plus efficace. »

      L’alternative, juge le chercheur, serait une meilleure gestion par les Européens des migrations, en ménageant des voies légales identifiées pour le travail, par exemple. Dans ce cas, affirme-t-il, les pays concernés accepteraient de reprendre plus simplement leurs citoyens. « Mais en Europe, on ne veut pas entendre cela », observe M. Trauner.
      Statut juridique obscur

      Le développement de ces accords donnant-donnant pose un autre problème à l’UE : leur statut juridique. « Quel que soit leur nom – partenariat, déclaration…–, ce ne sont pas des accords internationaux en bonne et due forme, négociés de manière transparente avec consultation de la société civile, sous le contrôle du Parlement européen puis des tribunaux, rappelle Eleonora Frasca, juriste à l’Université catholique de Louvain (Belgique). Ce sont des objets juridiques plus obscurs. »

      En outre, les arrangements avec la Turquie ou la Libye ont conduit des migrants à des situations dramatiques. Qu’il s’agisse des camps aux conditions déplorables des îles grecques où étaient parqués des milliers de Syriens refoulés d’Europe mais non repris en Turquie, ou des refoulements en mer, souvent avec des moyens européens, au large de la Grèce et de la Libye, ou enfin du sort des migrants renvoyés en Libye où de multiples abus et de crimes ont été documentés.

      Concernant la Tunisie, « l’Union européenne a signé l’accord sans inclure de clause de respect de l’Etat de droit ou des droits de l’homme au moment même où cette dernière chassait des migrants subsahariens vers les frontières libyenne et algérienne, relève Sara Prestianni, de l’ONG EuroMed Droit. Du coup, aucune condamnation n’a été formulée par l’UE contre ces abus. » L’Europe a été réduite au silence.

      Sous la pression d’Ursula von der Leyen, de Giorgia Melloni, la présidente du conseil italien, et de Mark Rutte, le premier ministre néerlandais, ce partenariat global doté d’un milliard d’euros « a été négocié au forceps et sans consultation », juge une source européenne. La conséquence a été une condamnation en Europe et une incompréhension de la part des Tunisiens, qui ont décidé de renvoyer 60 millions d’euros versés en septembre, estimant que c’était loin du milliard annoncé. « Aujourd’hui, le dialogue avec la Tunisie est exécrable, déplore un diplomate. La méthode n’a pas été la bonne », déplore la même source.
      Exposition à un chantage aux migrants

      « L’Union européenne a déjà été confrontée à ce risque réputationnel et semble disposée à l’accepter dans une certaine mesure, nuance Helena Hahn, de l’European Policy Center. Il est important qu’elle s’engage avec les pays tiers sur cette question des migrations. Toutefois, elle doit veiller à ce que ses objectifs ne l’emportent pas sur ses intérêts dans d’autres domaines, tels que la politique commerciale ou le développement. »

      Dernier risque pour l’UE : en multipliant ces accords avec des régimes autoritaires, elle s’expose à un chantage aux migrants. Depuis 2020, elle en a déjà été l’objet de la part de la Turquie et du Maroc, de loin le premier bénéficiaire d’aides financières au titre du contrôle des migrations. « Ce n’est pas juste le beau temps qui a exposé Lampedusa à l’arrivée de 12 000 migrants en quelques jours en juin, juge Mme Prestianni. Les autorités tunisiennes étaient derrière. La solution est de rester fermes sur nos valeurs. Et dans notre négociation avec la Tunisie, nous ne l’avons pas été. »

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/10/26/crise-migratoire-le-bilan-mitige-des-accords-passes-par-l-union-europeenne-p

    • EU planning new anti-migration deals with Egypt and Tunisia, unrepentant in support for Libya

      The European Commission wants to agree “new anti-smuggling operational partnerships” with Tunisia and Egypt before the end of the year, despite longstanding reports of abuse against migrants and refugees in Egypt and recent racist violence endorsed by the Tunisian state. Material and financial support is already being stepped up to the two North African countries, along with support for Libya.

      The plan for new “partnerships” is referred to in a newly-revealed annex (pdf) of a letter from European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, that was sent to the European Council prior to its meeting in October and published by Statewatch.

      In April, the Commission announced “willingness” from the EU and Tunisia “to establish a stronger operational partnership on anti-smuggling,” which would cover stronger border controls, more police and judicial cooperation, increased cooperation with EU agencies, and anti-migration advertising campaigns.

      The annex includes little further detail on the issue, but says that the agreements with Tunisia and Egypt should build on the anti-smuggling partnerships “in place with Morocco, Niger and the Western Balkans, with the support of Europol and Eurojust,” and that they should include “joint operational teams with prosecutors and law enforcement authorities of Member States and partners.”

      Abuse and impunity

      Last year, Human Rights Watch investigations found that “Egyptian authorities have failed to protect vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers from pervasive sexual violence, including by failing to investigate rape and sexual assault,” and that the police had subjected Sudanese refugee activists to “forced physical labor [sic] and beatings.” Eritrean asylum-seekers have also been detained and deported by the Egyptian authorities.

      The EU’s own report on human rights in Egypt in 2022 (pdf) says the authorities continue to impose “constraints” on “freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and media freedom,” while “concerns remained about broad application of the Terrorism Law against peaceful critics and individuals, and extensive and indiscriminate use of pre-trial detention.”

      Amr Magdi, Human Rights Watch’s Senior Researcher on the Middle East and North Africa, has said more bluntly that “there can be no light at the end of the tunnel without addressing rampant security force abuses and lawlessness.” The Cairo Institute for Human Rights said in August that the country’s “security apparatus continues to surveil and repress Egyptians with impunity. There is little to no access to participatory democracy.”

      The situation in Tunisia for migrants and refugees has worsened substantially since the beginning of the year, when president Kais Said declared a crackdown against sub-Saharan Africans in speeches that appeared to draw heavily from the far-right great replacement theory.

      It is unclear whether the EU will attempt to address this violence, abuse and discrimination as it seeks to strengthen the powers of the countries’ security authorities. The annex to von der Leyen’s letter indicates that cooperation with Tunisia is already underway, even if an anti-smuggling deal has not been finalised:

      “Three mentorship pairs on migrant smuggling TU [Tunisia] with Member States (AT, ES, IT [Austria, Spain and Italy]) to start cooperation in the framework of Euromed Police, in the last quarter of 2023 (implemented by CEPOL [the European Police College] with Europol)”

      Anti-smuggling conference

      The annex to von der Leyen’s letter indicates that the Egyptian foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry, “confirmed interest in a comprehensive partnership on migration, including anti-smuggling and promoting legal pathways,” at a meeting with European Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, at the UN General Assembly.

      This month the fourth EU-Egypt High Level Dialogue on Migration and the second Senior Officials Meeting on Security and Law Enforcement would be used to discuss the partnership, the annex notes – “including on the involvement of CEPOL, Europol and Frontex” – but it is unclear when exactly the Commission plans to sign the new agreements. An “International Conference on strengthening international cooperation on countering migrant smuggling” that will take place in Brussels on 28 November would provide an opportune moment to do so.

      The conference will be used to announce a proposal “to reinforce the EU legal framework on migrant smuggling, including elements related to: sanctions, governance, information flows and the role of JHA agencies,” said a Council document published by Statewatch in October.

      Other sources indicate that the proposal will include amendments to the EU’s Facilitation Directive and the Europol Regulation, with measures to boost the role of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre hosted at Europol; step up the exchange of information between member states, EU agencies and third countries; and step up Europol’s support to operations.

      Additional support

      The proposed “partnerships” with Egypt and Tunisia come on top of ongoing support provided by the EU to control migration.

      In July the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia covering “macro-economic stability, economy and trade, green energy, people-to-people contacts and migration and mobility.”

      Despite the Tunisian government returning €67 million provided by the EU, the number of refugee boat departures from Tunisia has decreased significantly, following an increase in patrols at sea and the increased destruction of intercepted vessels.

      Violent coercion is also playing a role, as noted by Matthias Monroy:

      “State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.”

      The annex to von der Leyen’s letter notes that the EU has provided “fuel to support anti-smuggling operations,” and that Tunisian officials were shown around Frontex’s headquarters in mid-September for a “familiarisation visit”.

      Egypt, meanwhile, is expected to receive the first of three new patrol boats from the EU in December, €87 million as part of the second phase of a border management project will be disbursed “in the coming months,” and Frontex will pursue a working arrangement with the Egyptian authorities, who visited the agency’s HQ in Warsaw in October.

      Ongoing support to Libya

      Meanwhile, the EU’s support for migration control by actors in Libya continues, despite a UN investigation earlier this year accusing that support of contributing to crimes against humanity in the country.

      The annex to von der Leyen’s letter notes with approval that five search and rescue vessels have been provided to the Libyan Coast Guard this year, and that by 21 September, “more than 10,900 individuals reported as rescued or intercepted by the Libyan authorities in more than 100 operations… Of those disembarked, the largest groups were from Bangladesh, Egypt and Syria”.

      The letter does not clarify what distinguishes “rescue” and “interception” in this context. The organisation Forensic Oceanography has previously described them as “conflicting imperatives” in an analysis of a disaster at sea in which some survivors were taken to Libya, and some to EU territory.

      In a letter (pdf) sent last week to the chairs of three European Parliament committees, three Commissioners – Margaritas Schinas, Ylva Johansson and Oliver Várhelyi – said the Commission remained “convinced that halting EU assistance in the country or disengagement would not improve the situation of those most in need.”

      While evidence that EU support provided to Libya has facilitated the commission of crimes against humanity is not enough to put that policy to a halt, it remains to be seen whether the Egyptian authorities’ violent repression, or state racism in Tunisia, will be deemed worthy of mention in public by Commission officials.

      The annex to von der Leyen’s letter also details EU action in a host of other areas, including the “pilot projects” launched in Bulgaria and Romania to step up border surveillance and speed up asylum proceedings and returns, support for the Moroccan authorities, and cooperation with Western Balkans states, amongst other things.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

      en italien:
      Statewatch. Mentre continua il sostegno alla Libia, l’UE sta pianificando nuovi accordi anti-migrazione con Egitto e Tunisia
      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/11/statewatch-mentre-continua-il-sostegno-alla-libia-lue-sta-pianificando-n

    • Accord migratoire avec l’Égypte. Des #navires français en eaux troubles

      Les entreprises françaises #Civipol, #Défense_Conseil_International et #Couach vont fournir à la marine du Caire trois navires de recherche et sauvetage dont elles formeront également les équipages, révèle Orient XXI dans une enquête exclusive. Cette livraison, dans le cadre d’un accord migratoire avec l’Égypte, risque de rendre l’Union européenne complice d’exactions perpétrées par les gardes-côtes égyptiens et libyens.

      La France est chaque année un peu plus en première ligne de l’externalisation des frontières de l’Europe. Selon nos informations, Civipol, l’opérateur de coopération internationale du ministère de l’intérieur, ainsi que son sous-traitant Défense Conseil International (DCI), prestataire attitré du ministère des armées pour la formation des militaires étrangers, ont sélectionné le chantier naval girondin Couach pour fournir trois navires de recherche et sauvetage (SAR) aux gardes-côtes égyptiens, dont la formation sera assurée par DCI sur des financements européens de 23 millions d’euros comprenant des outils civils de surveillance des frontières.

      Toujours selon nos sources, d’autres appels d’offres de Civipol et DCI destinés à la surveillance migratoire en Égypte devraient suivre, notamment pour la fourniture de caméras thermiques et de systèmes de positionnement satellite.

      Ces contrats sont directement liés à l’accord migratoire passé en octobre 2022 entre l’Union européenne (UE) et l’Égypte : en échange d’une assistance matérielle de 110 millions d’euros au total, Le Caire est chargé de bloquer, sur son territoire ainsi que dans ses eaux territoriales, le passage des migrants et réfugiés en partance pour l’Europe. Ce projet a pour architecte le commissaire européen à l’élargissement et à la politique de voisinage, Olivér Várhelyi. Diplomate affilié au parti Fidesz de l’illibéral premier ministre hongrois Viktor Orbán, il s’est récemment fait remarquer en annonçant unilatéralement la suspension de l’aide européenne à la Palestine au lendemain du 7 octobre — avant d’être recadré.

      La mise en œuvre de ce pacte a été conjointement confiée à Civipol et à l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) de l’ONU, comme déjà indiqué par le média Africa Intelligence. Depuis, la présidente de la Commission européenne Ursula von der Leyen a déjà plaidé pour un nouvel accord migratoire avec le régime du maréchal Sissi. Selon l’UE, il s’agirait d’aider les gardes-côtes égyptiens à venir en aide aux migrants naufragés, via une approche « basée sur les droits, orientée vers la protection et sensible au genre ».
      Circulez, il n’y a rien à voir

      Des éléments de langage qui ne convainquent guère l’ONG Refugees Platform in Egypt (REP), qui a alerté sur cet accord il y a un an. « Depuis 2016, le gouvernement égyptien a durci la répression des migrants et des personnes qui leur viennent en aide, dénonce-t-elle auprès d’Orient XXI. De plus en plus d’Égyptiens émigrent en Europe parce que la jeunesse n’a aucun avenir ici. Ce phénomène va justement être accentué par le soutien de l’UE au gouvernement égyptien. L’immigration est instrumentalisée par les dictatures de la région comme un levier pour obtenir un appui politique et financier de l’Europe. »

      En Égypte, des migrants sont arrêtés et brutalisés après avoir manifesté. Des femmes réfugiées sont agressées sexuellement dans l’impunité. Des demandeurs d’asile sont expulsés vers des pays dangereux comme l’Érythrée ou empêchés d’entrer sur le territoire égyptien. Par ailleurs, les gardes-côtes égyptiens collaborent avec leurs homologues libyens qui, également soutenus par l’UE, rejettent des migrants en mer ou les arrêtent pour les placer en détention dans des conditions inhumaines, et entretiennent des liens avec des milices qui jouent aussi le rôle de passeurs.

      Autant d’informations peu compatibles avec la promesse européenne d’un contrôle des frontières « basé sur les droits, orienté vers la protection et sensible au genre ». Sachant que l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes Frontex s’est elle-même rendue coupable de refoulements illégaux de migrants (pushbacks) et a été accusée de tolérer de mauvais traitements sur ces derniers.

      Contactés à ce sujet, les ministères français de l’intérieur, des affaires étrangères et des armées, l’OIM, Civipol, DCI et Couach n’ont pas répondu à nos questions. Dans le cadre de cette enquête, Orient XXI a aussi effectué le 1er juin une demande de droit à l’information auprès de la Direction générale du voisinage et des négociations d’élargissement (DG NEAR) de la Commission européenne, afin d’accéder aux différents documents liés à l’accord migratoire passé entre l’UE et l’Égypte. Celle-ci a identifié douze documents susceptibles de nous intéresser, mais a décidé de nous refuser l’accès à onze d’entre eux, le douzième ne comprenant aucune information intéressante. La DG NEAR a invoqué une série de motifs allant du cohérent (caractère confidentiel des informations touchant à la politique de sécurité et la politique étrangère de l’UE) au plus surprenant (protection des données personnelles — alors qu’il aurait suffi de masquer lesdites données —, et même secret des affaires). Un premier recours interne a été déposé le 18 juillet, mais en l’absence de réponse de la DG NEAR dans les délais impartis, Orient XXI a saisi fin septembre la Médiatrice européenne, qui a demandé à la Commission de nous répondre avant le 13 octobre. Sans succès.

      Dans un courrier parvenu le 15 novembre, un porte-parole de la DG NEAR indique :

      "L’Égypte reste un partenaire fiable et prévisible pour l’Europe, et la migration constitue un domaine clé de coopération. Le projet ne cible pas seulement le matériel, mais également la formation pour améliorer les connaissances et les compétences [des gardes-côtes et gardes-frontières égyptiens] en matière de gestion humanitaire des frontières (…) Le plein respect des droits de l’homme sera un élément essentiel et intégré de cette action [grâce] à un contrôle rigoureux et régulier de l’utilisation des équipements."

      Paris-Le Caire, une relation particulière

      Cette livraison de navires s’inscrit dans une longue histoire de coopération sécuritaire entre la France et la dictature militaire égyptienne, arrivée au pouvoir après le coup d’État du 3 juillet 2013 et au lendemain du massacre de centaines de partisans du président renversé Mohamed Morsi. Paris a depuis multiplié les ventes d’armes et de logiciels d’espionnage à destination du régime du maréchal Sissi, caractérisé par la mainmise des militaires sur la vie politique et économique du pays et d’effroyables atteintes aux droits humains.

      La mise sous surveillance, la perquisition par la Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI) et le placement en garde à vue de la journaliste indépendante Ariane Lavrilleux fin septembre étaient notamment liés à ses révélations dans le média Disclose sur Sirli, une opération secrète associant les renseignements militaires français et égyptien, dont la finalité antiterroriste a été détournée par Le Caire vers la répression intérieure. Une enquête pour « compromission du secret de la défense nationale » avait ensuite été ouverte en raison de la publication de documents (faiblement) classifiés par Disclose.

      La mise en œuvre de l’accord migratoire UE-Égypte a donc été indirectement confiée à la France via Civipol. Société dirigée par le préfet Yann Jounot, codétenue par l’État français et des acteurs privés de la sécurité — l’électronicien de défense Thales, le spécialiste de l’identité numérique Idemia, Airbus Defence & Space —, Civipol met en œuvre des projets de coopération internationale visant à renforcer les capacités d’États étrangers en matière de sécurité, notamment en Afrique. Ceux-ci peuvent être portés par la France, notamment via la Direction de la coopération internationale de sécurité (DCIS) du ministère de l’intérieur. Mais l’entreprise travaille aussi pour l’UE.

      Civipol a appelé en renfort DCI, société pilotée par un ancien chef adjoint de cabinet de Nicolas Sarkozy passé dans le privé, le gendarme Samuel Fringant. DCI était jusqu’à récemment contrôlée par l’État, aux côtés de l’ancien office d’armement Eurotradia soupçonné de corruption et du vendeur de matériel militaire français reconditionné Sofema. Mais l’entreprise devrait prochainement passer aux mains du groupe français d’intelligence économique ADIT de Philippe Caduc, dont l’actionnaire principal est le fonds Sagard de la famille canadienne Desmarais, au capital duquel figure désormais le fonds souverain émirati.

      DCI assure principalement la formation des armées étrangères à l’utilisation des équipements militaires vendus par la France, surtout au Proche-Orient et notamment en Égypte. Mais à l’image de Civipol, l’entreprise collabore de plus en plus avec l’UE, notamment via la mal nommée « Facilité européenne pour la paix » (FEP).
      Pacte (migratoire) avec le diable

      Plus largement, ce partenariat avec l’Égypte s’inscrit dans une tendance généralisée d’externalisation du contrôle des frontières de l’Europe, qui voit l’UE passer des accords avec les pays situés le long des routes migratoires afin que ceux-ci bloquent les départs de migrants et réfugiés, et que ces derniers déposent leurs demandes d’asile depuis l’Afrique, avant d’arriver sur le territoire européen. Après la Libye, pionnière en la matière, l’UE a notamment signé des partenariats avec l’Égypte, la Tunisie — dont le président Kaïs Saïed a récemment encouragé des émeutes racistes —, le Maroc, et en tout 26 pays africains, selon une enquête du journaliste Andrei Popoviciu pour le magazine américain In These Times.

      Via ces accords, l’UE n’hésite pas à apporter une assistance financière, humaine et matérielle à des acteurs peu soucieux du respect des droits fondamentaux, de la bonne gestion financière et parfois eux-mêmes impliqués dans le trafic d’êtres humains. L’UE peine par ailleurs à tracer l’utilisation de ces centaines de millions d’euros et à évaluer l’efficacité de ces politiques, qui se sont déjà retournées contre elles sous la forme de chantage migratoire, par exemple en Turquie.

      D’autres approches existent pourtant. Mais face à des opinions publiques de plus en plus hostiles à l’immigration, sur fond de banalisation des idées d’extrême droite en politique et dans les médias, les 27 pays membres et les institutions européennes apparaissent enfermés dans une spirale répressive.

      https://orientxxi.info/magazine/accord-migratoire-avec-l-egypte-des-navires-francais-en-eaux-troubles,68

  • Database delays: new timetable for interoperable EU policing and migration systems by 2027

    EU interior ministers have agreed another revised timeline for the plan to make all justice and home affairs databases “interoperable”, with the aim now to have the systems up and running by 2027. Mandatory biometric border checks may now be introduced progressively, in the hope of limiting delays at border crossing points.

    The new timetable, agreed at the Justice and Home Affairs Council last week, follows on from previous delays. A revision to the timeline adopted in November 2021 included a plan for the Entry/Exit System (EES), a biometric border-crossing registration database, to be functional by September 2022. Further changes saw the deadline extended to May this year. A Belgian proposal to “decouple” the EES and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) does not appear to have been taken on board.

    Under the new plan, the EES is supposed to come into use at some point in the second half of 2024 - though a note from the Spanish Presidency (pdf) suggests that even then, the “capturing and storing of biometrics... could be activated progressively.” This is because of the extra waiting times that the introduction of mandatory biometric capture, storage and verification at all EU border crossing points is likely to introduce.

    As previously reported by Statewatch, the Austrian government expects “process times to double compared to the current situation,” the Croatian government is clear that “the waiting time for border checks will certainly be significantly longer,” and the German government has said “control times for passengers will increase significantly by the introduction of EES.”

    To mitigate this, the Spanish Presidency’s note says that “derogation measures will be available for activation at individual border crossing points to prevent long waiting times. The date that will be retained for the entry into operation will be outside periods of major events and high travel times.”

    The introduction of the EES in the second half of 2024 is supposed to be followed by the ETIAS in the first half of 2025, the European Criminal Records Information System for Third Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN) in mid-2026, finalisation of “the technical implementation of the IO [interoperability] architecture” in late 2026, followed by work to “upgrade and evolve the IO architecture” from 2027 onward.

    The timetable published by eu-Lisa also foresees the eventual integration of the expanded #Eurodac database, depending on the adoption of the law, which is currently under discussion in the Council and the Parliament.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/database-delays-new-timetable-for-interoperable-eu-policing-and-migratio
    #EU #UE #Union_européenne #biométrie #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #migrations #réfugiés #interopérabilité #frontières #Entry/Exit_System (#EES) #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation_System (#ETIAS) #European_Criminal_Records_Information_System_for_Third_Country_Nationals (#ECRIS-TCN) #agenda

  • #Frontex : deportations at record high in first half of 2023

    The European Union’s border agency, Frontex, facilitated the deportation of nearly 18,000 individuals from EU territory during the first half of 2023, marking an unprecedented peak. This surge in removals, executed through both scheduled flights and “voluntary” return procedures, demonstrates a 60% upswing in deportations compared to the corresponding period in 2022.

    113% increase in “voluntary” returns

    The numbers come from a Frontex report obtained by Statewatch (https://www.statewatch.org/media/4059/eu-council-frontex-operational-activities-report-first-half-2023-12561-2) that summarises the agency’s operational activities in the first six months of 2023, with the agency attributing the notable spike in return operations to the increased number of “voluntary” returns.

    This category constituted more than half of all removals for the reporting period, a marked increase from the 39% recorded across 2022, leading to a 113% rise in the number of third-country nationals deported “voluntarily”. The majority of these returns were conducted via ordinary, scheduled flights, as opposed to charter flights.

    This record number of deportations aligns with the establishment of the #standing_corps (SC), the uniformed, armed wing of Frontex that is supposed to be include 10,000 officers by 2027. SC personnel are deployed in #joint_operations (#JO) “to support the host authorities in border control, including prevention, detection of and combatting cross-border crime“.

    According to the report, the introduction of the SC constitutes a fundamental shift in how Frontex manages and executes operational response activities, especially within joint operations, rapid border interventions, and return operations.

    Analysis by Statewatch illustrates Frontex’s expanding role in deportation operations over the last 15 years, and the upswing in deportations mirrors the augmented budget allocated in 2023. As per the 2023 Procurement Plan, Frontex earmarked €40 million exclusively for the acquisition of chartered aircraft to facilitate forced returns from 2023 to 2027. In 2022, the Agency’s annual expenditure on deportations of €79 million was nearly four times higher than in 2020.

    Fundamental rights issues and concerns

    With the European Commission urging EU member states to increase deportations and endorse migrant return agreements, these figures seem like to increase in the coming years.

    Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) has previously raised concerns regarding fundamental rights during return operations, including a lack of interpreters, privacy infringements, insufficient medical assessments and provision of food and drinks, as well as dangerous conditions, among other issues. Furthermore, the application of force and coercive measures has been reported as disproportionate and without clear justification.

    The escalating volume of deportations from the EU has garnered criticism from rights groups such as the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), which has welcomed alternative approaches offered by some cities and municipalities.

    “Some local authorities are actually trying to implement programs which offer accommodation for undocumented people, which support them and help them to explore whether and how they can regularize their position. This is happening in the Netherlands and Belgium. Municipalities are realizing that we need to go in a different direction,” Marta Gionco told InfoMigrants in May this year.

    Frontex’s operational activities

    In its report on operational activities, Frontex mentions the implementation of 21 joint operations in 296 locations, with over 2,800 staff deployed by the agency. These operations “are based on the risk analysis and along the main migratory routes”.

    The operations include: JO Coordination Points Air, Land, Sea; JO Focal Point Air; the maritime operations JO Themis 2023, JO Poseidon 2023, JO Indalo 2023, JO Seaports 2023, JO Opal Coast, JO Albania Sea and JO Montenegro Sea; as well as the land border operations JO North Macedonia 2023, JO Montenegro Land 2023, JO Albania Land 2023, JO Serbia Land 2023, JO Moldova 2023 and the largest operation JO Terra 2023.

    The agency does not list the names or locations of most of these operations publicly on its website, instead mainly offering generic information on the countries in which it has officials and equipment deployed.

    The prioritization of these operational activities is determined by various criteria, including risk analysis, vulnerability assessments, attributed impact levels on external border sections, and strategic and political significance, as well as Frontex’s existing capabilities. Additionally, these priorities are contingent on requests, availability, and hosting capacities of member states.

    The report states that the planned prioritization was presented to the Management Board in the preceding month, although it does not appear that any decision has yet been taken on the topic.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/frontex-deportations-at-record-high-in-first-half-of-2023

    #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #sans-papiers #chiffres #statistiques #2023 #retours_volontaires #déportations

    ping @_kg_

  • Tracking the Pact : Derogations all round in Council’s latest crisis Regulation edit

    Of the five legislative proposals in the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, there is only one for which the Council has not so far adopted a negotiating position: the crisis and force majeure Regulation. The main purpose of the law is to set out derogations from other measures in the Pact, which are all due to be approved by next spring. The latest version of the text (published here) was up for discussion yesterday at the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which failed to reach agreement on it. Another attempt will reportedly be made on Monday.

    While there were major diplomatic efforts to reach agreement on the text (https://www.statewatch.org/media/4055/eu-council-force-majeure-mandate-13499-23.pdf), reports indicate that Italy joined Hungary and Poland in vetoing it during Thursday’s meeting.

    However, “the Coreper, the grouping of 27 national ambassadors to the EU, will meet Monday to approve the deal, and now with Germany’s support, a majority will be clinched on rules that define what a ’migration emergency’ is,” says a report in Malta Today.

    If that is the case, the path will be open to negotiations with the European Parliament.

    Earlier this week the rapporteur for the file in the civil liberties committee, Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar, said there would be a halt to talks on the other files in the Pact “unless the Council makes up its mind on the Crisis Regulation because the element of solidarity, binding solidarity when needed.”

    The solidarity foreseen by the crisis Regulation will involve other EU member states and EU agencies stepping up to support the country deemed to be facing a “crisis” or a situation of “instrumentalisation of migrants.”

    This particular form of solidarity is for states, rather than people, and measures can include “return actions” and “strengthened actions and cross-sectoral activities in the external dimension of migration.”

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/september/tracking-the-pact-derogations-all-round-in-council-s-latest-crisis-regul

    #crise #force_majeure #dérogations #solidarité #migrations #asile #réfugiés

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1019088

  • Telling the story of EU border militarization

    Addressing and preventing European border violence is a huge but necessary strategic challenge. This guide offers framing messages, guiding principles, and suggested language for people and organisations working on this challenge. It emerges from a process of discussion online and in-person between over a dozen organisations working in the European migrant justice space.

    The European Union’s external borders are rapidly becoming more expansive and more dangerous. Europe’s border regime is costing lives, destabilising countries beyond European borders, and driving widespread abuse - and its budget and power is increasing. Meanwhile, the migration justice movement is under-resourced and often necessarily composed of organisations working on a single significant element of the vast EU border regime.

    A key part of successfully challenging Europe’s border regime is being able to describe and expose it, by telling the same story about the dangers it poses across the continent. For the last few months, a number of organisations involved in human rights and migration have worked together to produce this guide; which provides that story, as part of a narrative guide to communicating about border militarisation and its consequences.

    https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/telling-the-story-of-eu-border-militarization
    #ressources_pédagogiques #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #brochure #manuel #guide #justice_migratoire #narration #externalisation #Frontex #business #complexe_militaro-industriel #lobby #industrie_militaire #technologie #morts_aux_frontières #mourir_aux_frontières #menace #violence #justification #catégorisation #récit #contre-récit

  • EU and USA plough ahead with secret discussions on biometric data exchange scheme

    The EU and USA are discussing a proposed “#Enhanced_Border_Security_Partnership” which would involve “continuous and systematic” transfers of biometric data in both directions, but the Commission has refused to release documents that would provide further information to the public.

    Statewatch revealed last year that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was touting Enhanced Border Security Partnerships to EU institutions and member states, requiring direct connections between the biometric databases of participating states and the USA’s #IDENT/#HART system.

    IDENT/HART is “the largest U.S. Government biometric database and the second largest biometric database in the world, containing over 270 million identities from over 40 U.S. agencies,” according to a DHS document.

    Further documents obtained by Statewatch indicated that the Commission and the USA had set up a “dedicated working group” to discuss the scheme and a “proof of concept,” which would involve the transmission of data.

    The Commission’s response to an access to documents request filed by Statewatch suggests that the working group has been busy – but the Commission refused to release any of the documents it identified, citing the need to protect “public security” and “international relations”.

    The request filed with the Commission sought the following documents:

    “1. All agendas and minutes of the working group between the European Commission and the US authorities regarding the proposed Enhanced Border Security Partnership (#EBSP).

    2. Presentations, notes, reports or other documents presented, discussed, or used as background information for the meetings of that working group.

    3. Documents regarding the “proof of concept” on the potential sharing of data under an EBSP, in particular setting out the authorities involved, the data to be transferred, the source of that data, and the legal basis for sharing data as part of a “proof of concept”.”

    The response from the Commission (pdf) said that five documents had been identified:

    “1- Flash report: Meeting with DHS on new EBSP Working, Commission document for internal use, dated 13/07/2022, ref. ARES (2023)4144843,

    2- Flash report: Kick-Off meeting COM/DHS Working Group on new US EBSP requirements (06/09/22), Commission document for internal use, dated 06/09/2022, ref. ARES (2023)4119093,

    3- EU-US Working Group on EBSP, Commission document for internal use, dated 22/09/2022, ref. ARES (2023)4144961,

    4- WORKING DOCUMENT & ANSWERS: COM-US Working Group on the U.S. Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP) requirements as part of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), Commission document for internal use, dated 04/10/2022, ref. ARES (2023)4118328,

    5- DHS Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP) Requirement, Powerpoint presentation by US Department of Homeland Security, dated September 2022, ref. ARES (2023)4118099.”

    The letter, signed by Monique Pariat, the Director-General for Migration and Home Affairs, said that the documents could not be released as they contain “sensitive information of ongoing discussions between the Commission and the US on the Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP).”

    Some of that information concerns “law enforcement investigative procedures that, in the hands of criminals and terrorists, could be misused against public security, for example by facilitating the bypassing of effective cross-border checks and obstructing the attempts of US authorities to prevent illegal activities.”

    Furthermore, wrote Pariat, “given the public security concerns outlined above, the public disclosure of the documents, which were intended to be used for official internal purposes only, would be tantamount to a breach of trust of the US authorities and could therefore undermine international relations with the US.”

    Releasing parts of the documents whilst censoring others would be impossible, the letter argued, but they are either “entirely covered by the exceptions or the remaining parts after expunging the confidential information might be meaningless or illegible.”

    The Council has also discussed the EBSP plan recently, with the Council’s Working Party on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Information Exchange (IXIM) holding an “exchange of views” in mid-July (pdf).

    A comment made in April this year by Chris Jones, Statewatch Director, remains relevant:

    “The EU’s own top court has ruled on multiple occasions that the USA does not offer adequate privacy protections for non-citizens, yet the Commission and the member states are planning to open up their biometric databases to the Department of Homeland Security and, by extension, who knows how many other US agencies? The fact that discussions on the plan are taking place in secret makes it all the more galling, albeit entirely unsurprising.”

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/august/eu-and-usa-plough-ahead-with-secret-discussions-on-biometric-data-exchan

    #échange_de_données #données #USA #Etats-Unis #Europe #UE #données_biométriques #frontières #Union_européenne #EU #coopération #partenariat #sécurité_frontalière

  • Bulgaria and Romania speed up asylum and deportation procedures with EU support

    #Pilot_projects” intended to beef up border controls, accelerate asylum and deportation proceedings, and reinforce the role of EU agencies in Bulgaria and Romania have just begun - yet EU legislation intended to do the same is yet to be approved.

    Pilot projects

    In February the European Council confirmed its support for Commission-funded “border management pilot projects,” and two such projects have been launched in recent months, in Bulgaria (€45 million) and Romania (€10.8 million).

    As revealed by Statewatch in March, “the key border between Bulgaria and Turkiye,” was to be the first target of €600 million being made available to reinforce border controls and speed up removals.

    Of that funding, the Commission recently announced that it will make €140 million available “for the development of electronic surveillance systems at land external borders” and €120 million to “support reception and asylum systems,” in particular for the reception of unaccompanied minors and “reception capacity at the border”.

    Both Bulgaria and Romania have recently circulated notes within the Council to update other member states on the projects, and the Commission also trumpeted the “progress made” in a press release.

    Bulgaria

    According to the Bulgarian note, (pdf) the project “foresees the implementation by Bulgaria of targeted tools for border management and screening of third country nationals, conduct of an accelerated asylum and return procedure and cooperation in the fight against migrant smuggling.”

    The project is being implemented “with the operational and technical support of the relevant JHA agencies (EUAA, Europol and Frontex). It builds on Bulgaria’s good practices and experience, including its excellent cooperation with its neighboring countries and the EU agencies present in Bulgaria. The duration of the pilot is 6 months.”

    The country is “improving the digitalization of the asylum and return systems,” while:

    “Work is ongoing on legislative amendments for issuing of a return decision at the same time with a negative decision for international protection. Bulgaria is also working on drawing up a list with designated safe countries of origin in line with the Asylum Procedure Directive. Negotiations are ongoing with EUAA on an updated Operational plan in the field of asylum.”

    A “Roadmap for strengthened cooperation” with Frontex is “pending finalization”, which will allow for “provision of technical equipment and increased deployment of personnel.”

    However, Frontex presence in the country has already been stepped up, according to the Commission’s press release, with the agency providing “additional support to Bulgaria through return counsellors and interpreters.”

    The note also states an intention to a sign a Joint Action Plan on Return “in the margins of JHA Council,” presumably the meeting on 8 and 9 June, but the Council’s press release makes no mention of this.

    Romania

    While the Bulgarian note is not particularly detailed, it offers more information than the one circulated by Romania (pdf).

    The Romanian note states that agreement with the European Commission on launching the pilot project was reached on 17 March, and that it aims to implement “key operational actions in the area of border protection, asylum and return. One of the targeted operational actions foresees setting up pilot projects in interested Member States for fast asylum and return procedures.”

    While the Bulgarian note mentions the need for legal reforms to accelerate asylum and removal proceedings, the Romanian note says that this “showcase” of “Romania’s best practices in the areas of asylum, return, border management and international cooperation.. is based on EU and applicable Romanian legislation, as well as on Romania’s very good cooperation with neighbouring countries and EU agencies.”

    According to the Commission, however, Romania has changed national law in two respects: “to allow for the participation of EUAA [EU Asylum Agency] experts in the registration and assessment of asylum applications,” and - as in Bulgaria - “to allow for the issuing of a negative decision on international protection together with a return decision.”

    The country has also been cooperating with Frontex on align its national IT systems for deportations with the agency’s own, and “Romanian authorities will host and use the first Frontex Mobile Surveillance Vehicles at Romanian - Serbian border section of the Terra 2023 operational area.”

    Terra 2023 is presumably a continuation of the Frontex operation Terra 2022.

    Documentation

    - European Commission press release: Migration management: Update on progress made on the Pilot Projects for asylum and return procedures and new financial support for Bulgaria and Romania: https://www.statewatch.org/media/3932/eu-com-pilot-projects-bulgaria-romania-pr-7-6-23.pdf
    - Bulgarian delegation: Pilot project at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Council doc. 9992/23, LIMITE, 5 June 2023, pdf: https://www.statewatch.org/media/3930/eu-council-bulgaria-pilot-project-migration-asylum-9992-23.pdf
    - Romanian delegation: Pilot project in the area of asylum, returns, border management and international cooperation, Council doc. 9991/23, LIMITE, 5 June 2023: https://www.statewatch.org/media/3931/eu-council-romania-pilot-project-migration-asylum-09991-23.pdf

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/june/bulgaria-and-romania-speed-up-asylum-and-deportation-procedures-with-eu-
    #Bulgarie #Roumanie #renvois #expulsions #contrôles_frontaliers #financement #EU #UE #aide_financière #JHA #Europol #Frontex #EUAA #externalisation #externalisation_des_contrôles_frontaliers #digitalisation #directive_procédure #pays_sûrs #militarisation_des_frontières #Joint_Action_Plan_on_Return #Frontex_Mobile_Surveillance_Vehicles #Mobile_Surveillance_Vehicles #Terra_2023 #frontières

  • Il muro della Bulgaria. Un altro ostacolo europeo ai diritti dei migranti

    La Commissione europea ha messo a disposizione 600 milioni di euro per sostenere gli Stati membri nelle attività di contrasto ai flussi delle persone. Sofia, tra i primi destinatari dei finanziamenti, punta a rafforzare la barriera di 130 chilometri con la Turchia. Mentre Ong e volontari internazionali denunciano gravi violazioni e abusi

    Il 3 aprile di quest’anno i cittadini bulgari sono stati chiamati alle urne. Ad avere la maggioranza (risicata) è stato il partito Gerb guidato da Bojko Borisov. Il gruppo conservatore non ha stravinto e si preannuncia dunque un difficile periodo di transizione alla ricerca di alleanze per poter formare un nuovo governo. Borisov è già stato per tre volte a capo dell’esecutivo e durante i suoi mandati si è distinto per una linea molto dura in tema di immigrazione.

    Una linea mantenuta anche dall’attuale presidente, Rumen Radev, eletto per la prima volta nel 2017 grazie al sostegno del Partito socialista. A febbraio di quest’anno Radev ha chiesto all’Unione europea fondi per finanziare il rafforzamento della barriera lunga 130 chilometri che divide il Paese dalla Turchia. La richiesta per il “muro” è pervenuta nonostante la presidente della Commissione europea, Ursula von der Leyen, già a ottobre avesse affermato, non senza ipocrisie, che l’Ue non avrebbe mai finanziato la costruzione di muri e di filo spinato per impedire l’attraversamento dei migranti.

    Pochi mesi dopo però, in apertura dell’ultimo Consiglio europeo, è stata diramata una lettera (diffusa da Statewatch: https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/march/von-der-leyen-letter-key-border-between-bulgaria-and-turkiye-is-first-ta) nella quale è stato annunciato lo stanziamento di 600 milioni di euro per supportare “in modo sostanziale gli Stati membri nel controllo delle frontiere”, con particolare riferimento a quelle “esterne” della Turchia e quelle “interne” della Bulgaria, che riceveranno per prime tali fondi. Il budget sarà speso per finanziare sistemi di sorveglianza quali telecamere termiche, droni e radar grazie ai quali la polizia di frontiera potrà sorvegliare ogni movimento sospetto ai confini.

    Questa decisione, presa per rafforzare il controllo delle frontiere, interviene nonostante le criticità espresse da Ong e operatori locali nei confronti della gestione dell’immigrazione da parte delle autorità bulgare. A ottobre dello scorso anno un ragazzo siriano è stato raggiunto da colpi di arma da fuoco sparati dalla polizia di frontiera bulgara mentre tentava di attraversare il confine dalla Turchia. L’uomo è sopravvissuto nonostante i proiettili lo abbiano raggiunto al petto e alla mano, lasciandogli quest’ultima semi-paralizzata. E non era la prima volta che accadeva: sulla stessa frontiera nel 2015 un cittadino afghano è morto dopo gli spari esplosi da una guardia bulgara.

    Episodi del genere vengono confermati ripetutamente dalle testimonianze che i migranti rilasciano alle organizzazioni internazionali come Medici senza frontiere che in suo recente report ha raccolto le voci di chi è transitato in Bulgaria. C’è chi è stato picchiato ripetutamente con tubi di gomma da parte delle autorità, donne che hanno subito dalle stesse violenze sessuali, persone private di ogni bene e costrette a tornare in Turchia senza vestiti, sulla neve. Un uso della violenza spropositato, in barba a qualsiasi norma sui diritti umani, che viene denunciato anche da No name kitchen (Nnk), Ong spagnola e internazionale che opera sulle rotte balcaniche.

    Una delle testimonianze raccolte da Nnk recita: “La polizia bulgara ci ha attaccati con un cane che ha morso un mio amico alle gambe, alle mani e alla testa. Dopo ci hanno tolto tutti i vestiti, anche alle donne che erano con noi, e ci hanno spediti indietro in Turchia. I colpi che ci hanno inferto hanno rotto gambe e braccia ad alcune persone che poi non sono riuscite a proseguire il cammino per mesi e mesi”.

    Barbara Bécares, responsabile stampa della stessa Ong, spiega come tra 2018 e 2019 moltissimi migranti abbiano preferito passare per la Grecia a causa della nota violenza e dei trattamenti disumani perpetrati dalla polizia bulgara. Una polizia europea. Ma questa rotta è tornata in auge proprio dal 2020, quando anche in Grecia le autorità si sono macchiate di simili comportamenti rendendo il passaggio per il Paese altrettanto difficile e pericoloso. Le testimonianze che giungono sono da considerarsi come una piccola parte rispetto al totale di coloro che subiscono gli stessi trattamenti e che magari preferiscono non parlare per paura di ritorsioni. In Bulgaria la criminalizzazione delle organizzazioni non governative impedisce ai migranti di poter chiedere aiuto e denunciare gli abusi che subiscono. Chi riesce a varcare il confine dalla Turchia senza essere stanato, tenta di mantenere un profilo basso in attesa di oltrepassare la frontiera per la Serbia. Molti sanno che se vengono intercettati dalle autorità rischiano di essere respinti in Turchia o di finire all’interno di campi di detenzione. Un’inchiesta realizzata dal collettivo Lighthouse Reports denuncia l’esistenza di centri di detenzione illegali: vere e proprie gabbie nei pressi della stazione di polizia di Sredets (città a 40 chilometri dal confine turco) dove i migranti vengono rinchiusi anche per giorni. “La struttura assomiglia a una cuccia per cani in disuso, con sbarre su un lato -si legge nell’inchiesta-. I richiedenti asilo l’hanno descritta come una ‘gabbia’”.

    Gli abusi che vengono perpetrati quotidianamente a richiedenti asilo e migranti nel Paese sono ormai più che noti. A ciò si somma una sistematica negligenza nell’esame delle richieste d’asilo: molti richiedenti hanno denunciato di attendere una risposta alla propria domanda da anni.

    Tra questi c’è anche Khalid, un uomo eritreo che raggiunto telefonicamente ci ha raccontato la sua storia. È scappato dall’Eritrea nel lontano 2012. Arrivato in Turchia ha tentato di raggiungere la Grecia attraversando il confine dal fiume Evros ma per tre volte è stato respinto dalla polizia ellenica. Ha deciso dunque di cambiare frontiera e a marzo 2013 è riuscito ad arrivare in Bulgaria e da qui è cominciato quello che lui stesso definisce “un incubo”, non ancora finito. Dapprima è stato rinchiuso per tre mesi in un centro di detenzione a Lyubimets, una piccola cittadina non lontana dal confine turco. Le condizioni all’interno del centro sono descritte come degradanti: “Era un edificio di tre piani nelle quali venivano stipate migliaia di persone. Al piano inferiore c’erano le donne e le famiglie con bambini e a quello superiori gli uomini. Era sovraffollato e non veniva rispettata nessuna regola da parte delle autorità”.

    Poi è stato trasferito in un campo profughi vicino la capitale bulgara dove gli sono state prese le impronte digitali e dove ha richiesto la protezione internazionale. Non avendo ricevuto alcuna risposta, dopo sette mesi ha dunque deciso di scappare e di andare in Grecia, dove è stato rinchiuso all’interno di un altro centro. Qui ha trascorso altri sette mesi e dopo il suo rilascio ha iniziato un lungo viaggio che lo avrebbe poi portato fino in Svezia. Siamo nel 2016. Nel Paese scandinavo ha tentato di chiedere nuovamente asilo ma la sua domanda è stata respinta in base al Regolamento di Dublino ed è stato quindi trasferito in maniera coatta proprio in Bulgaria, dove è rimasto per altri tre anni. Dopo un anno e mezzo gli è stata notificata la prima risposta alla richiesta d’asilo: negativa. Ad aprile 2018 Khalid ha fatto appello alla Corte suprema bulgara. Ma tutto si è rivelato un buco nell’acqua. Senza alcun riscontro ed esasperato per l’attesa, ha deciso di ripercorrere l’intera rotta balcanica fino alla Slovenia, dove è giunto nel 2019 e dove ha ripresentato la domanda d’asilo. Dopo un anno gli è stato notificato l’ennesimo esito negativo e a quel punto, pur di non essere deportato nuovamente, ha deciso di andare in Francia, passando per l’Italia.

    Ed è proprio da un centro per richiedenti asilo di Parigi che ora racconta la sua storia. A metà aprile avrà il suo primo colloquio negli uffici per l’immigrazione ma è già stato avvisato che, tra le opzioni possibili, c’è anche quella di essere riportato in Slovenia e da lì in Bulgaria. Quando gli si chiede che cosa pensa di fare, dice che probabilmente non andrà all’appuntamento. “Preferisco rimettermi in viaggio per il Belgio o tenterò di attraversare il canale della Manica per raggiungere l’Inghilterra”. Nel 2012, quando fuggì dalla sua Asmara, aveva 33 anni.

    https://altreconomia.it/il-muro-della-bulgaria-un-altro-ostacolo-europeo-ai-diritti-dei-migrant
    #murs #barrières_frontalières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Bulgarie #Turquie #drones #radar #caméras_thermiques #budget #complexe_militaro-industriel #militarisation_des_frontières #violence #route_des_Balkans #Lyubimets