monitoring the state and civil liberties in Europe

How the EU coordinates the outsourcing of migration control

It is no secret that the EU is seeking greater cooperation from non-EU states in its migration control agenda. Less is known, however, about precisely how that cooperation is organised and encouraged. A document produced last year and released in response to an access to documents request from Statewatch provides some further details on the topic, pointing to avenues for advocacy, research and investigation.

Coordinating the “external dimension of migration” at the “local level”

An EU Council document (pdf) sheds light on the mechanisms behind the EU’s externalisation agenda.

Produced by the Belgian Presidency in mid-2024 and shared with the MOCADEM working group, it outlines how EU institutions and member states align their efforts to influence migration policies beyond the EU’s borders.

It also highlights the scale and entrenchment of the EU’s externalisation agenda, which is fuelling human rights violations with few obvious avenues for democratic control or accountability.

A centralised coordination system built on emergency powers

The document was produced for MOCADEM, the Operational Coordination Mechanism on the External Dimension of Migration.

In 2022, MOCADEM was established using emergency powers related to “a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster.” It is designed to “enable the [European] Union to coordinate and react in a timely manner to issues related to the external dimension of migration.”

MOCADEM produces “country-specific action plans,” “action files, and “matrixes” designed to guide coordinated action and messaging by EU member states and institutions in discussions on migration with other states.

As of mid-2024, ten countries were covered by action plans, and twelve had action files and matrices. Additionally, there were “thematic action files on instrumentalisation and return.” Statewatch has published most of the public documentation that exists on MOCADEM’s work.

For the EU and its member states, this coordination makes their work on the “external dimension of migration” more efficient.

But in doing so, it enshrines a powerful and opaque structure for exporting EU migration enforcement that actively avoids any form of democratic scrutiny or oversight.

Diplomats, delegations, and decentralised enforcement

“Local coordination in the area of migration varies according to the location and may follow different approaches,” the document says.

Much of this coordination is pushed through EU delegations and national embassies in partner countries. Through regular meetings, EU and member state officials align approaches, share intelligence, and prepare joint messaging. The document gives examples from Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Niger:

- In Egypt, the EU delegation and member state diplomatic staff co-chair bi-monthly “migration roundtables.”
- In Iraq, a meeting chaired by the EU delegation brings together member states “to exchange information on developments in cooperation with Iraq and recent visits.”
– In Libya, the EU delegation “launched a series of debates with Tripoli-based EU MS [member states] to discuss different aspects of migration.” The document says these follow “the priorities set in the MOCADEM action file on Libya and the strategic discussion organised in the EMWP [External Aspects of Asylum and Migration Working Party].”
- In Niger, until the 2023 coup, member state officials convened a “migration cluster” to identify priorities and shape political dialogue.

The document also refers to actions by EU delegations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here, events entitled “Rule of Law Breakfasts” are said to cover topics such as “anti-smuggling.”

To link the actions in targeted states with discussions in Brussels, the document highlights the role played by the “Commission and EEAS [European External Action Service] services in Brussels, as well as the link via member state delegates in Brussels, via capitals, to their own embassies.”

Samoa Agreement

The Samoa Agreement, signed in 2023, governs the EU’s political and economic relationships with 77 countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. According to the Council of the EU, this covers around 2 billion people.

The document notes that the “Partnership Dialogues” established under the Samoa Agreement can be used to push the EU’s migration control agenda. Specifically, it says they “can be used to facilitate collaboration on various areas… including migration.”

Liaison officers

Liaison officers deployed by member states, the European Commission and Frontex also play a role.

According to the document, liaison officers in Morocco and Nigeria organise regular meetings on migration at the EU delegations.

The document highlights that “closer coordination between liaison officers as well as with other EU stakeholders could have a substantial positive impact.”

A recently-declassified report from 2018 (pdf), on the work of the Immigration Liaison Officers’ Network in Morocco, gives an idea of these officials’ activities.

Team Europe Initiatives

Another layer of coordination happens through “Team Europe Initiatives” (TEIs) – a structure with no legal basis but significant impact.

The concept of “Team Europe” was introduced in April 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the European External Action Service, it “brings together the EU, its Member States and their diplomatic network, finance institutions and implementing organizations,” along with the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

It has no legal basis in the EU treaties and has been described by Dutch MEP Sophie in’t Veld as a “fantasy body.”

It is nevertheless a “fantasy body” that has become firmly embedded in the EU’s policy framework – albeit without the inclusion of the European Parliament.

In a 2024 resolution, MEPs expressed regret that the Parliament had not been “fully recognised by the Commission, the Council and the EEAS as an integral player within the ‘Team Europe’ approach.”

The June 2024 Council document notes that “country level committees” for the Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs) on the Atlantic/Western Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean migration routes have been set up in 16 African states.[1]

“These committees meet regularly at the initiative of the EU delegations and local representation of all TEIs members are participating,” the document says.

They provide a forum for “general coordination with EU member States on Migration,” it adds.

According to the Belgian Presidency, these committees “have mapped the actions of EU and TEIs members related to Migration in each partner countries and agreed on a TEI implementation plan that identified gaps in programming and agreed on areas of focus for the future.”

As a result of this work, there were implementation plans in place for seven states: Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

A call for scrutiny

The mechanisms outlined by the 2024 Council document, from embassy roundtables to informal networks, development agreements to diplomatic working groups, provide some of the institutional foundations of the EU’s externalisation agenda.

They operate largely out of public view – and with little consideration for the human rights implications of outsourcing migration enforcement to authoritarian or unstable regimes.

For those seeking more scrutiny and accountability — and migration policies that uphold human rights and social justice — the initiatives and groups outlined here would be a good starting point for further investigation.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2025/june/how-the-eu-coordinates-the-outsourcing-of-migration-control

#externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #EU #UE #Union_européenne
#Egypte #Irak #Libye #Niger #Samoa_Agreement #Team_Europe_Initiatives

Royaume-Uni : le gouvernement travaille à un programme de prédiction des crimes

▻https://www.rfi.fr/fr/europe/20250409-royaume-uni-le-gouvernement-travaille-%C3%A0-un-programme-de-pr%C3%A9di

Prévoir les meurtres avant qu’ils ne soient commis, et donc les empêcher. C’est le synopsis du film Minority Report, et le principe de la « justice prédictive ». Au Royaume-Uni, le gouvernement travaille à un programme de prédiction des crimes, mis au jour par une ONG de défense des libertés.

Polish government proposes life-long EU entry bans for deportees

In the coming months, EU institutions will start negotiating a new law to increase deportations. EU governments want their positions taken into account in the European Commission’s forthcoming proposal. The Polish government has proposed banning deportees from EU territory for “an indefinite period of time,” alongside other coercive measures.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/4750/eu-entry-bans.jpg

Indefinite entry bans

The Polish government has proposed banning people from entering the EU “without time limit.”

This could happen if a non-EU citizen “represents a serious threat to public order, public security or national security,” a topic that has been discussed by member states a number of times over the last year.

The new proposal comes in a discussion paper (pdf) on a new deportation law. The paper makes no reference to basic principles of EU law, such as Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Article 49 says that any penalty has to be proportionate to the offence.

The Charter refers to criminal law, whereas a new EU deportation law would be based on immigration law.

Nevertheless, as a form of indefinite punishment, the proposal is likely to raise eyebrows amongst legal experts and human rights organisations.

Discussion paper on new deportation law

The discussion paper (pdf) was circulated to other member states by the Polish government in mid-January. The Polish government currently holds the presidency of the Council of the EU. It was published with the latest edition of the bulletin Outsourcing Borders.

The paper was drafted to inform a January meeting of the Integration, Migration and Expulsion Working Party (IMEX).

This followed multiple other discussions between member state governments over the past year. Many of those have also been documented in Statewatch’s bulletin on the externalisation of border controls.

The January paper (pdf) sets out three areas for discussion:

- uniform deportation procedures across EU member states;
- new obligations for people facing deportation; and
- new “incentives” for deportees to cooperate, alongside new “consequences” for non-cooperation.

In effect, there are two issues up for discussion. Firstly, the degree to which national practices should be harmonised. Secondly, the different forms of coercion that can be used against deportees.

Harmonising national law

The first topic covered in the paper is the possibility of harmonising national deportation procedures.

The Polish presidency suggests that “common time limits could be considered as one of ways of improving the effectiveness of return procedure.”

For example, the new law could introduce uniform limits for filing an appeal against a deportation order. These limits currently differ from one member state to another.

However, this could place an “additional burden on administrative and/or judicial authorities,” says the Polish presidency.

“Mutual recognition” of deportation orders

The presidency also raises “mutual recognition” of return decisions.

This would mean a legal obligation for every EU member state to recognise the deportation orders issued by other member states.

The idea of mutual recognition was first introduced into EU law in relation to economic affairs, to aid the creation of the single market. It means that “a product that can be lawfully sold in one member state can be lawfully sold in any other.”

In the single market, it contributed to “processes of liberalization and socialization,” the academic Sandra Lavenex wrote in 2007.

However, in the realm of police cooperation, criminal law and immigration, “mutual recognition does not expand the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state,” she argued:

Instead of increasing individual freedoms in relation to the regulatory scope of government, in the AFSJ [Area of Freedom, Security and Justice], mutual recognition boosts the transnational enforcement capacity of governmental actors.

Obligations for deportees

The Polish presidency’s paper goes on to note that the current EU deportation law, dating back to 2008, “includes a wide range of rights of third country nationals and procedural safeguards in the return procedure.”

This includes “the respect for fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement.”

However, “respect for fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement” are fundamental obligations of the EU and its member states. They stem from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and international law.

The paper goes on to say that the law as it stands does not include any obligations for deportees, and the new law “should include some obligations for illegally staying third country nationals.”

The presidency suggests that Article 9 of the EU’s new Asylum Procedure Regulation could serve as an inspiration.

Amongst other things, this obliges asylum applicants to:

- provide the authorities with various items of personal data;
- to remain available to the authorities throughout the asylum procedure; and
- to provide documents in support of the application as soon as possible.

Failure to cooperate may result in the withdrawal of the application or of international protection (asylum) status, if already granted.

Incentives and consequences

The presidency also suggests introducing various forms of “incentives and sanctions” for individuals facing deportation, to encourage cooperation.

The paper notes that the EU is making increasing use of incentives and sanctions in deportation policy, but mainly “in relations with third countries.”

This would include, for example, the use of “visa sanctions” against states that do not accept deportation flights from the EU.

The presidency suggests harmonising the support made available to deportees through “reintegration” programmes.

Currently, different levels of support – for example, the provision of money to deportees – “might be exploited by third country nationals who try to take the advantage of more ‘generous’ systems,” says the document.

“Strategic use of an entry ban”

“Additionally, the strategic use of an entry ban could also serve to incentivise cooperation or sanction non–cooperation,” argues the presidency.

The paper goes on to say “an entry ban could be shortened when the third country national is cooperating, while it could be extended in case of non-cooperation.”

Furthermore, “an entry ban for an indefinite period of time could also be considered,” in cases “where a third-country national represents a serious threat to public order, public security or national security”.

Whatever finally ends up in the new law, the presidency is clear that new obligations and consequences should “send a clear signal to third country nationals that lack of cooperation will not be tolerated.”

However, simply changing the law may not be enough to achieve the goal of massively increasing the number of deportations from the EU.

The presidency’s paper points out, perhaps inadvertently, some of the problems with this goal: not only does it require the cooperation of people, but also non-EU states.

“An effective return policy relies on the cooperation of the returnees and their countries of origin,” the presidency notes in passing.

The EU is already using various means to try to increase non-EU states’ cooperation with deportations, such as visa sanctions.

It remains to be seen how that may change in the future – though Donald Trump’s recent threat of trade sanctions against Colombia gives an insight into the more extreme levels of coercion that may be available in some cases.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2025/february/polish-government-proposes-life-long-eu-entry-bans-for-deportees
#Pologne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières

ping @karine4

Deportations: New role for #Frontex as EU pushes for more “voluntary” returns

A special report by Hope Barker and Anas Ambri: The EU has been funding new accelerated asylum and deportation procedures in Bulgaria, including a new “assisted voluntary return” project. Increasing “voluntary” returns is a key part of the plan to increase deportations from the EU, with Frontex playing an increasing role. The project targets individuals in detention. Experts question whether such procedures can ever be truly voluntary.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/4690/eu-avr-02-lyubimets.jpg

In August 2023, Bulgarian and European Commission (EC) officials met to discuss a “targeted assisted voluntary return project” as part of the Commission’s Pilot Project in the country.

The “Pilot Project for fast asylum and returns procedures” had been launched in Bulgaria and Romania a few months prior to create “ad hoc solutions” to some of the issues preventing the two countries from finalising their accession to the Schengen area.

Some of these “solutions” included the continuation of pushbacks against people on the move. Balkan Insight revealed the widespread – if not systematic – pushbacks at the EU’s eastern and south-eastern borders in February last year.

Another “solution” was the implementation of “an updated AVR [Assisted Voluntary Return] programme in Bulgaria, with the deployment of additional Frontex return counsellors and technical assistance from the Commission,” according to a document obtained by Statewatch through an access to documents request.

What are “assisted voluntary returns”?

Voluntary returns are repatriations of non-EU citizens to their country of origin “based on a free and informed choice.” They differ from mandatory returns (when a deportation decision has been issued) and from forced returns (when individuals are deported by force).

The “assisted” component in AVR usually comes in the form of financial and logistical support to individuals. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), an arm of the United Nations, has historically been in charge of implementing such programmes in Bulgaria.

EU-funded AVR programme in Bulgaria

Shortly after the March 2023 technical mission, the EC announced the launch of a new AVR programme in the country for early 2024, to be supported under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF).

This new AVR programme increased the incentives and reintegration assistance to beneficiaries. The cash incentive, usually handed to individuals shortly before they depart, was increased from €150 to a maximum of €900.

Reintegration assistance – in-kind contribution to support an individual’s reintegration after their return – was also increased from €1,000 to a maximum of EUR 3,000, and for families from €2,000 to a maximum of €7,000.

Frontex’s involvement reflects an expansion of its mandate across the bloc. In 2019, a new Regulation gave the agency new powers, including in deportations.

In April 2021, the European Commission released its first EU-wide strategy on voluntary return and reintegration which cemented the role of Frontex as “the operational arm of the common EU system of returns.”

One lesser-examined aspect of Frontex’ role in the EU’s new deportation system has been its takeover of return counselling services for individuals subject to deportation orders or in detention.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/4689/eu-avr-01-border-fence.jpg

Frontex’s takeover of return counselling

Return counselling is the provision of information to people on the move on the available options for them returning to their country of origin or residence.

Depending on the circumstances of the individual, this can include information on the “obligation to leave the country and the consequences of not leaving,” and encouragement of “(assisted) voluntary return.” Advocates of the practice claim that it can be used as a way to “prioritise clarity, individual rights and agency, and honesty.”

In January 2022, Frontex introduced return counselling as a job profile within its Standing Corps of border guards. Those taking up the role are trained using a curriculum developed with the Vienna-based International Centre for Migration Policy Development, as part of the latter’s CADRE project.

In 2023, Frontex deployed four return counsellors to Bulgaria, where they conducted 1,547 counselling sessions, according to an agency spokesperson. The vast majority of these sessions (1,382, or 89%) were conducted between May and September as part of the Pilot Project.

At least one of these return counsellors was deployed inside the Bulgaria’s Lyubimets detention centre, according to a November 2023 fact-finding mission report from the European Commission.

Lyubimets is a closed pre-removal centre for individuals who have received a deportation order, or who are considered to be a security risk. Under Bulgarian law, individuals can be kept in detention for up to 18 months if a mandatory removal order is issued against them.

According to a European Commission document from 2023, Lyubimets “is comprised of a building and container complex that can house families and single men amounting to a total capacity of 1892 places,” though an inspection by the Bulgarian ombudsman in July of that year put the capacity at 660.

Based on an interview given by one of Frontex’ return counsellors deployed in Bulgaria in 2023, most of the counselling was offered to individuals who recently arrived in the country.

Rights and missing safeguards in return counselling

Valentin Feneberg, Research Associate at the Institute of Political Science at Leuphana University in Germany, told Statewatch: “If Frontex is tasked with providing this counselling immediately upon arrival, it is essential that individuals have guaranteed access to independent legal advisors, as well as a clear and comprehensive understanding of their rights, including the right to seek asylum.”

However, access to legal aid is difficult in the Lyubimets centre, as the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee is the only NGO that is able to regularly visit.

Feneberg, who studies the unintended consequences of AVR programmes, said that “independent monitoring by human rights organisations to guarantee fairness and transparency” would also be needed.

“While I find it difficult to see how Frontex’s Return Counselling could become the sole form of counselling available to rejected asylum seekers, if this were to happen, these safeguards would need to be significantly strengthened to protect individuals’ rights,” he told Statewatch.

Given the absence of such safeguards, many suspect that the true purpose of return counselling activities inside the detention camps has little to do with encouraging free and informed choices.

Not-so-voluntary returns

In May 2021, Statewatch revealed how the European Commission wanted to use detention to “increase the uptake of voluntary returns at early stages of the return process.”

In the view of Reinhard Schweitzer, Research Professor on Migration at Universitat Abat Oliba CEU in Barcelona, there is nothing voluntary about returns conducted from within detention.

“Assuming that there is something that we can call voluntariness, it would have at least three elements. The most obvious is the absence of coercion… The decision [to return] must also be based on information that is unbiased and can be relied on, that is trusted, which is a very subjective element, and that is objective, in the sense that it does not just portray the possibilities that are made available by the government. This is linked to the third element: availability of acceptable alternatives,” Schweitzer explained.

In June 2022, Schweitzer published a study into how the exclusion of civil society from voluntary returns programmes negatively impacted the “voluntariness” of the returns conducted in two different countries, including his native Austria. In his view, it is clear that Frontex’ involvement would have a similar effect.

“Voluntary” returns: Fortress Europe’s new frontier

With the new Commission finally voted in, it’s clear that deportations remain a top priority.

The new Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner, has committed to drafting a new deportation law in the first 100 days of his mandate, at the behest of several Members of the European Parliament as well as EU member states.

Rumours suggest that the file, designed to replace the 2008 Returns Directive, will be a Regulation, making it directly legally binding on all member states. It will come alongside ongoing discussions on “return hubs”, better described as deportation camps, in non-EU states.

Until these new rules are proposed and agreed, the EU’s approach will be governed by the 2008 Directive, its 2021 returns strategy and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

Under the Pact, people arriving at the bloc’s external borders will be pre-screened and then sorted into so-called ordinary and accelerated border procedures.

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According to the new rules, most people will be funneled into fast-track procedures which last a maximum of 12 weeks and take place in de facto detention at the external border.

The areas in which people will be held will not technically qualify as member state territory, due to the newly introduced “legal fiction of non-entry.” If people are rejected during the accelerated procedure, they will enter a return border procedure – also fast-tracked.

Other EU countries have been using accelerated procedures for years. Since November 2020, rejected asylum applications in Cyprus come with a deportation order. Individuals accused of threatening “public order” are put into indefinite detention. Many are forced to sign up for voluntary returns to be released.

As part of the Pilot Project, the European Commission recommended that Bulgaria amend its national law to allow for rejection and return decisions to be issued simultaneously. In February 2024, Bulgaria did just that.

Under the Pact, people detained at external borders will be similarly advised – or pressured – to enrol in voluntary return schemes.

Expanding role for Frontex

Frontex’s involvement in voluntary returns will come with an expansion of its size and functions. Return counsellors will be deployed to centres at the EU’s external borders where pre-screening and accelerated border procedures are carried out. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the European Parliament in July that Frontex could triple its Standing Corps to 30,000 during her new mandate.

Frontex’s Management Board, on the other hand, has asked the agency to train more states on return counselling. The goal is now to train 160 individuals in return counselling in five different member states in 2024, up from 75 staff in five states in 2023.

This newfound interest in return counselling is anything but altruistic: as part of the Pact, states can count their financial and operational contribution to counselling activities as “solidarity” measures.

Rather than relocating new arrivals across the bloc to increase the sharing of responsibility, states can instead choose to finance voluntary returns and return counselling.

“Anti-solidarity”

Reinhard Schweitzer, the research professor, noted the “insidious” way this solidarity mechanism could be abused.

“I think it would be a very comfortable thing for the [current] Austrian government to say: ‘instead of taking in people, we send our counsellors there to help deport people’,” he told Statewatch.

“I’m surprised that it’s really called a solidarity mechanism, because it’s a twist of what solidarity is supposed to mean. It’s anti-solidarity,” he concluded.

Frontex did not respond to a request for comment from Statewatch.

A spokesperson for the European Commission said: “Efficient border management must be firmly rooted in the respect of fundamental rights, including human dignity and the principle of non-refoulement.”

“Bulgarian authorities, as all EU Member States, must fully respect obligations under the asylum and international law, including ensuring access to the asylum procedure. It is the responsibility of Member States to investigate any allegations of wrongdoing,” they added.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2025/january/deportations-new-role-for-frontex-as-eu-pushes-for-more-voluntary-return

#retours_volontaires #migrations #renvois #expulsions #réfugiés #Bulgarie #frontières

Out of sight, out of mind : EU planning to offshore asylum applications ?

In a letter sent to EU heads of state last month, European Commission president #Ursula_von_der_Leyen named 2024 “a landmark year for EU migration and asylum policy,” but noted that the agreement on new legislation “is not the end.” She went on to refer to the possibility of “tackling asylum applications further from the EU external border,” describing it as an idea “which will certainly deserve our attention.”

“Safe havens”

The idea of offshoring asylum applications has come in and out of vogue in Europe over the last two decades. In the early 2000s, a number of states wanted camps established in Albania and Ukraine, with the Blair government’s “safe haven” proposals providing an inspiration to other governments in the EU.

The idea has come back with a bang in the last few years, with the UK attempting to deport asylum-seekers to Rwanda (a plan now shelved), and EU governments noting their approval for similar schemes.

Austria plays a key role in the externalisation of border and migration controls to the Balkans, and the country’s interior minister has called on the EU to introduce “asylum procedures in safe third countries,” referring to “a model that Denmark and Great Britain are also following.” Denmark adopted their own Rwanda plan, but that was suspended last year.

“Innovative strategies”

Now the idea has made it to the top of the EU’s political pyramid.

“Many Member States are looking at innovative strategies to prevent irregular migration by tackling asylum applications further from the EU external border,” says von der Leyen’s letter (pdf).

“There are ongoing reflections on ideas which will certainly deserve our attention when our next institutional cycle is under way,” it continues, suggesting that the intention is to get working on plans quickly from September onwards.

The news comes just as almost 100 organisations, including Statewatch, have published a statement calling on EU institutions and member states to uphold the right to asylum in Europe, underlining that attempts to outsource asylum processing have caused “immeasurable human suffering and rights violations.”

Von der Leyen goes on to indicate that the offshoring of asylum applications may be tacked onto existing migration control initiatives: “Building on experience with the emergency transit mechanisms or the 1:1, we can work upstream on migratory routes and ways of developing these models further.”

The phrase “the 1:1” refers to the intended human trading scheme introduced by the 2016 EU-Turkey deal: “For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU.” In a seven-year period, up to May 2023, fewer than 40,000 people were resettled under the scheme, while tens of thousands of people remained trapped in Greek camps awaiting their intended removal to Turkey.

The current Commission president, who is soon likely to be elected for a second five-year term, goes on to say that the EU can “draw on the route-based approach being developed by UNHCR and IOM,” allowing the EU to “support the setting up of functioning national asylum systems in partner countries while strengthening our cooperation on returns to countries of origin.” In short: someone else should take care of the problem.

These efforts will be bolstered by the new Asylum Procedure Regulation, says the letter, with the Commission considering “how to better work in synergy with future designated safe third countries.”

“Hybrid attacks”

The letter closes with a consideration of the use of so-called “hybrid attacks” by the EU’s geopolitical enemies.

“When I was in Lappeenranta [in Finland] in April, it was clear that Russia’s actions at the border with Finland, or those of Belarus at the border with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, are hybrid attacks aimed at undermining the security of our external borders, as well as that of the border regions and our citizens,” von der Leyen writes.

The Commission president goes on to suggest that more legislation may be forthcoming on the topic, further reinforcing the security approach to migration, despite the EU having only just approved rules on the issue, where the term used is “instrumentalisation of migrants.”

“We will therefore need to continue reflecting on strengthening the EU’s legal framework to provide for an appropriate response not only from a migration but also from a security perspective in line with the Treaties,” says the letter.

The need for new legislation is also hinted at in the “strategic agenda” adopted by the European Council at the end of June, the same meeting to which von der Leyen’s letter was addressed.

That document states the European Council’s intention to “find joint solutions to the security threat of instrumentalised migration.”

As for the people targeted by all these initiatives, they are barely mentioned in the letter – but von der Leyen notes that the Commission is “conscious of the need… to enable durable solutions to be found for the migrants themselves.”

It might be remarked, however, that “solutions” will likely only be considered “durable” to the EU if they are outside its territory.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/july/out-of-sight-out-of-mind-eu-planning-to-offshore-asylum-applications
#lettre #migrations #asile #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #safe_havens #ports_sûrs #Tony_Blair #Albanie #Rwanda #pays_tiers #pays_tiers_sûrs #Autriche #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #Danemark #innovations #accord_UE-Turquie #1:1 #IOM #OIM #HCR #hybrid_attacks #attaques_hybrides #géopolitique #Russie #Biélorussie #frontières_extérieures #instrumentalisation #menaces_sécuritaires

Border externalisation: billions of euros, visa sanctions, and a wealth of documentation

The second edition of the bulletin, published with migration-control.info, includes analyses of multi-billion increases in the EU’s budgets for border externalisation (►https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/a-bottomless-pit-billions-more-euros-for-externalised-border-controls) and the growing use of visa sanctions to coax third states into cooperating with EU deportations (►https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/visa-sanctions-to-increase-deportations).

It also includes an extensive update to the document archive, with almost two dozen documents from the secretive Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration, MOCADEM (mécanisme de coordination opérationnelle pour la dimension extérieure des migrations).

Many of the documents added to the archive have been summarised in the bulletin’s section on thematic and regional developments, intended to provide a useful overview of key issues, themes and events.

However, there is more in the documents than can be summarised there, and readers are advised to dig into the documents for themselves.

The bulletin editorial (▻https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/editorial) looks at the Council of the EU’s stubborn refusal to grant the European Parliament any right of democratic scrutiny over the workings of MOCADEM.

The next issue of the bulletin will be published at the end of September.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/july/border-externalisation-billions-of-euros-visa-sanctions-and-a-wealth-of-

#externalisation #frontières #migrations #business #visa #sanctions #pays-tiers #réfugiés #visas

Policing migration: when “harm reduction” means “multipurpose aerial surveillance”

The EU’s latest “#operational_action_plan” on migrant smuggling gives a central role to #Europol, which will receive data resulting from more than two dozen joint police operations launched by EU member states, EU agencies and a range of non-EU states. The UK is heavily involved in the plan, and is leading one activity. One objective is for harm reduction and assistance to victims, but the only activity foreseen is for Frontex to increase use of its “#EUROSUR_Fusion_Services, including the #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance aircraft service.”

https://www.statewatch.org/media/4219/eu-smuggling-surveillance.jpg

Police against people smuggling

The action plan (pdf) covers the 2024-25 period and contains an outline of 25 activities listed under eight strategic goals, but offers no insight into the causes of human smuggling, and none of the activities are framed at addressing causes.

The overall aim is to control migration flows both into the EU and within the EU, and to enhance police cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, EU agencies (Europol, #Frontex and the #EU_police_database_agency, #eu-LISA) and with countries outside the EU, through joint operations and the exchange of information and intelligence.

Many of the activities include targets for arrests: one led by Poland, for example, foresees the arrest of 200 facilitators of irregular migration per year; another, led by Cyprus, expects at least 1,000 “apprehensions/arrests”.

In 2015, Statewatch exposed a planned EU-wide police operation against irregular migrants called ‘Mos Maiorum’, which led to significant media coverage and political controversy, as well as numerous actions to inform people of their rights and to try to map police activities. Since then, the number of such operations has skyrocketed, but attention has dwindled.

European plan

The 2024-25 plan is part of the #European_Multidisciplinary_Platform_Against_Criminal Threats, a now-permanent initiative (▻https://www.statewatch.org/statewatch-database/eu-joint-police-operations-target-irregular-migrants-by-chris-jones) through which joint police operations are coordinated. It is managed by Europol, with political control exercised by the member states in the Council of the EU.

A “leader” is assigned to each activity in the action plan, responsible for initiating and reporting on the relevant activity, with “key performance indicators” often indicated in respect of each one.

The leaders include nine EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain), the UK, as well Frontex, Europol, eu-LISA and the European Police College (CEPOL).

Europol will provide overall support across all the different activities and is specifically responsible for leading four activities.

In many activities led by national police forces, it is specified that a goal is also to participate in other Europol initiatives, such as the “Europol Cyberpatrol to target and identify targets” and Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre. The Operational Action Plan stipulates that other, unspecified, “Europol tools” may be used “where appropriate”.

The action plan specifies that the operational data emanating from the activities is to be shared with Europol to be processed through its Analysis Projects, further swelling the databases at its headquarters in The Hague.

The first version of the action plan was circulated amongst member states two weeks before the European Commission published a proposal to reinforce Europol’s powers in relation to migrant smuggling, arguing that they were urgently needed – though this assessment was not shared by the member states.

Strategic goals

The 26 activities outlined in the plan are designed to contribute to eight strategic goals:

- Criminal intelligence picture. The activities under this heading are for Europol to provide a “situational picture of migrant smuggling” including threat assessments, updates on migratory routes, “modi operandi” and future trends, which will be made available to member states and third countries. It will involve sharing information with Frontex. Europol also aims to “strengthen the strategic and tactical intelligence picture on the use/abuse of legal business structures by criminal networks” not only in respect of migrant smuggling, but throughout “all main crime areas affecting the EU”.
- Investigations and judicial response. There are 11 activities planned in relation to this goal. The objective is to prepare and conduct investigations and prosecutions. Police forces of different member states lead the activities and set out specific targets by reference to the numbers of arrests, initiated investigations and identified networks. Each planned activity appears to reflect specific national or local police force priorities. Germany for instance aims to “detect 5,000 irregular migrants” per year, and arrest 500 “facilitators”, whilst France focuses on seizing 100 small boats crossing the Channel to the UK. Spain focuses on air routes, including links between human smuggling and drug trafficking; and Portugal’s aim is to disrupt “marriages of convenience abuse and associated threats” (400 cases specifically). Europol also leads an activity aimed at the development of “intelligence products in support of MS investigations” (50 per year) and Frontex aims to focus on border checks and surveillance measures on the EU external borders (with 1,000 “apprehensions/arrests”).
- Coordinated controls and operations targeting the online and offline trade in illicit goods and services. The only activity planned in relation to this goal is by the French police forces, to improve law enforcement response against “those utilising the Dark Web and other internet messenger applications to enable illegal immigration and document fraud”. The dark web is identified as an “intelligence gap” in this context.
- Criminal finances, money laundering and asset recovery. Led by the UK, the activity planned under this goal heading is to disrupt money flows specifically within hawaladar networks.
- Document fraud. Frontex, as well as French and German police forces each lead activities under this goal aimed at “targeting networks or individuals” involved in document fraud. In this respect, Frontex’s “Centre of Excellence for Combating Document Fraud” has a key role.
– Capacity building through training, networking and innovation. This involves activities aimed at improving the skills, knowledge and expertise of law enforcement and judicial authorities, led by CEPOL, eu-LISA (on the use of SIS and Eurodac databases) and German police forces.
- Prevention, awareness raising and harm reduction, as well as early identification and assistance to victims. The only goal that is expressed as being aimed at improving the safety of people is led by Frontex, and is focused on the detection of migrant smuggling through the “use of EUROSUR Fusion Services, including the Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance aircraft service, for [member states] and stakeholders to support more effective detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and migrant smuggling.” No mention is made of identification, assistance or victims.
- Cooperation with non EU partners: under this last goal, one activity is led by Austrian police forces, aimed at expanding the geographical focus of the Task Force Western Balkans to Turkey and “other relevant countries of origin and transit”. The work is already based on intelligence information provided by Europol and Frontex and aims to “enhance mobile phone extractions” (the link here is not clear). The second activity listed under this last goal is led by Europol, and aims to provide a “common platform for EU agencies, military, law enforcement and other stakeholders to exchange intelligence on criminal networks operating along the migration corridors”, creating a broad and focal role for itself in information exchange with a wide range of stakeholders, including private companies.

For the purposes of the Operational Action Plan, “migrant smuggling” is broadly defined as:

“…the process of facilitating the unlawful entry, transit or residence of an individual in a country with or without obtaining financial or other benefits. Migrant smuggling entails the facilitation of illegal entry to the EU and of secondary movements within the EU. It can also involve facilitating the fraudulent acquisition of a residence status in the EU.”

It therefore does not require the involvement of any benefit and includes movements within the EU.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/april/policing-migration-when-harm-reduction-means-multipurpose-aerial-surveil
#surveillance #surveillance_aérienne #migrations #réfugiés #données #coopération_policière #European_Police_College (#CEPOL) #European_Migrant_Smuggling_Centre #Europol_Cyberpatrol

“Action file” on Tunisia outlines EU’s externalisation plans

An “action file” obtained by Statewatch lays out the objectives and activities of the EU’s cooperation on migration with Tunisia – whose government was heavily criticized by the European Parliament this week for “an authoritarian reversal and an alarming backslide on democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”

https://www.statewatch.org/media/4204/eu-tunisia-mocadem.jpg

Externalisation of migration control

The document (pdf), produced as part of the #Operational_Coordination_Mechanism_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM) and circulated within the Council in December 2023, summarizes ongoing EU efforts to externalise migration and border control to Tunisia. It covers the main developments since the signature of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding of July 2023.

The MoU is cited in the document as a cooperation “framework” whose implementation shall “continue”. Criticism also continues, with the organization Refugees International arguing:

“The short-term securitisation approach to Tunisia advanced by Team Europe is… likely to fail on at least two fronts: both on its own terms by failing to stem irregular migration, and on legal and ethical terms by tying EU support to the inevitability of grave human rights abuses by Tunisian authorities.”

From the document it is clear that the EU has intensified political and technical outreach to Tunisia through high-level visits from both EU and member state representatives and that the Tunisian authorities are involved in different initiatives, including through EU agencies, such as Europol and Frontex. The European Police College (CEPOL), the EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and Eurojust are also mentioned as potential actors for cooperation.

The measures listed in the document target all potential migration from Tunisia to the EU. However, distinctions are drawn – including in the language used – between measures addressed to non-Tunisian nationals and measures addressed to Tunisian nationals.

Measures addressed to non-Tunisian nationals

For non-Tunisian nationals, “preventing irregular departures from, as well as irregular arrivals to Tunisia” is the key objective of ongoing cooperation in the areas of border management, anti-smuggling and search and rescue. The EU provides Tunisia different amounts of funding through existing projects.

Border management, including search and rescue

the EU finances the projects Strengthening the Tunisian Coast Guard Training Pillar, run by #ICMPD (2023-2026) and the #EUTF funded Border Management Programme for the Maghreb region (#BMP-Maghreb) (2018-2024). Both projects aim at developing the Tunisian authorities’ border control capacity, for both land and sea borders, thus including search and rescue activities. This is done through the donation of equipment and the training of the Garde National of Tunisia and the Navy.

As for equipment, details about the delivery of boats, engines and spare parts for putting search and rescue vessels to Tunisia are included in the document, including the provision of fuel. A new contract will “build and equip a command-and-control centre for the Tunisian national guard at the border with Libya,” to enhance cross-border cooperation with Libya.

With regard to training, the document mentions a session for two officials in Rome as well as the participation of the Tunisian border control authorities in a Frontex workshop organised in the context of Joint Operation Themis. The MOCADEM reports that Tunisia considers talks on a working arrangement with Frontex “pre-mature.”

Anti-smuggling

The EU pursues the Anti-smuggling Operational Partnership (ASOP) to try to develop the Tunisian police capacity to investigate, prosecute and convict smugglers. Training is also key in this area.

The document mentions a mentorship programme between Tunisia and the EU Member States on migrant smuggling. Cross-border cooperation in investigations is encouraged, also through Europol, information campaigns (in North Africa and along the Central Mediterranean), and regional action. There is an ongoing discussion on a Europol agreement to exchange personal data between Europol and Tunisian authorities.

Return and reintegration of non-Tunisian nationals

the EU finances IOM’s project on Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration in North Africa, concretely supporting assisted voluntary return from Tunisia to countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The MOCADEM document states that the EU engages “with Tunisian authorities to develop a national mechanism for returns facilitation.”

Direct capacity-building of national authorities to return non-Tunisian nationals to their country of origin is a novelty in the EU migration policies. This is a follow-up of the objective spelled out in the EU-Tunisia MoU of “developing a system for the identification and return of irregular migrants already present in Tunisia”. It is reported that a “new technical assistance programme to further support the return system in Tunisia is under preparation.”

International protection for non-Tunisian nationals

As usual, protection programmes receive much lower funding than other cooperation objectives for the securitisation of migration. In Tunisia, the EU will fund a project run by the UNCHR to enhance reception and access to international protection for asylum seekers and refugees.

Measures addressed to Tunisian nationals

For Tunisian nationals, the EU aims to increase return and readmission of Tunisian nationals deemed to be irregularly staying in the EU to Tunisia, privileging so-called “assisted voluntary return” and reintegration projects for Tunisian nationals over forced returns. At the same time, the EU stresses the importance of increasing opportunities for legal migration through the launch of a “Talent Partnership” and better visa conditions for Tunisian nationals.

Deportations

the EU finances a national reintegration support mechanism called “Tounesna,” as well as the Frontex Joint Reintegration Services, for which Frontex launched a new call for proposals. Key actors in this area are the High Level Network for Return, chaired by the EU Return Coordinator and composed of representatives of all Member States and Frontex.

In October 2023, Tunisia was identified as one of the seven countries targeted for joint deportation actions. The document reports that the negotiations for an EU-Tunisia readmission agreement and visa facilitation agreements, which started in 2016, have been on hold since 2019 and that “Tunisia has shown no interest to date to relaunch the negotiations.”

Legal migration

The EU finances pilot projects under the Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF) and the regional project THAMM (2018-2023), which received extra funding. Again, the launch of an EU-Tunisia Talent Partnership is announced through a Joint Roadmap for a Talent Partnership, which is yet to be finalized.

In the EU-Tunisia MoU, the EU promised to “take appropriate measures to facilitate legal mobility between the two Parties, including facilitating the granting of visas by reducing delays, costs and administrative procedure.” However, in this document there are no prospects for cooperation on visa policy. The document merely contains a reminder that visa policy is conditional on readmission cooperation.

Ongoing cooperation

While the European Parliament this week condemned a decision by the Commission to release €150 million to Tunisia through an urgent written procedure, bypassing the normal-decision making process, with a resolution that said the North African country is undergoing “an authoritarian reversal and an alarming backslide on democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”

The resolution goes on to say that “over the last year, President Kais Saied has had opposition politicians, judges, media workers and civil society activists arbitrarily arrested and detained.”

However, the cooperation being coordinated through MOCADEM remains largely beyond the reach of parliamentary scrutiny. As highlighted by a separate article published today by Statewatch and Migration-Control.info, the parliament’s lawyers agree with MEPs that this needs to change.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/march/action-file-on-tunisia-outlines-eu-s-externalisation-plans
#Tunisie #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #financement #Kais_Saied #accord #frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #contrôles_frontaliers

–—

ajouté à la métaliste sur le #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) avec la #Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

Border security with drones and databases

The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

Notes

[1] ►https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

[2] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

[3] ▻https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

[4] ►https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

[5] ▻https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

[6] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[7] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[8] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[9] ►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

[10] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

[11] ►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

[12] ►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, ▻https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

[13] ▻https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

[14] ►https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

[15] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
#frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

#Espace_Schengen : l’Union européenne trouve un #accord pour clarifier le cadre des contrôles aux frontières

Depuis 2015, de nombreux pays ont réintroduit dans l’espace de libre circulation européen des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières, invoquant la #pression_migratoire ou la #menace_terroriste.

Les négociateurs du Parlement européen et du Conseil (Etats membres) ont trouvé un accord, mardi 6 février, sur une réforme du #code_Schengen destinée à clarifier et renforcer le cadre prévu pour la réintroduction et la prolongation des contrôles aux frontières intérieures de cet espace de libre circulation.

Au sein de l’espace Schengen, qui regroupe 27 pays − dont 23 Etats membres de l’Union européenne (UE) plus l’Islande, le Liechtenstein, la Norvège et la Suisse −, plus de 400 millions de personnes peuvent en principe circuler sans être soumises à des contrôles. Mais depuis 2015, invoquant la pression migratoire ou la menace terroriste − voire les deux −, de nombreux pays ont réintroduit des contrôles d’identité à leurs frontières. Ils sont actuellement plus de la moitié à le faire. L’espace Schengen a aussi été fragmenté par des restrictions de circulation décidées par les Etats membres pendant la pandémie de Covid-19.

Or, ces contrôles sont autorisés par le code Schengen à titre exceptionnel, en cas de #menace_grave pour l’ordre public ou la sécurité intérieure d’un Etat, mais de manière 3provisoire. Et la Cour de justice de l’UE a rappelé en avril 2022 qu’ils ne devaient pas excéder six mois. En décembre 2021, la Commission européenne a proposé une révision du code Schengen pour tenter de mettre de l’ordre et tirer les leçons de la crise du Covid-19.

Libre circulation et sécurité

Selon l’accord trouvé mardi soir, qui devra encore être approuvé formellement par le Parlement européen et le Conseil, en cas de menace grave à sa sécurité, un Etat peut autoriser des contrôles à ses frontières, pour une durée maximale de deux ans, avec une prolongation possible d’un an. Ces Etats devront évaluer la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ces contrôles et déterminer si les objectifs poursuivis ne peuvent être atteints par des mesures alternatives.

Aux frontières extérieures, la réforme prévoit en cas d’urgence sanitaire de grande ampleur d’harmoniser les règles d’entrée dans l’UE en provenance de pays tiers − les éventuelles mises en quarantaine ou tests notamment. Les citoyens et résidents de l’UE seraient exemptés de telles restrictions d’entrée. Elle prévoit aussi des réponses aux tentatives d’Etat tiers d’« instrumentaliser » les migrants dans le but de déstabiliser un pays de l’UE − comme la Biélorussie et la Russie ont été accusées de le faire −, notamment en limitant les points de passage.

« La #libre_circulation dans nos frontières intérieures et la sécurité de nos frontières extérieures sont les deux pierres angulaires de l’espace Schengen. L’accord conclu aujourd’hui (…) clarifiera et renforcera ces deux piliers », a commenté la ministre de l’intérieur belge, Annelies Verlinden, dont le pays assure la présidence semestrielle du Conseil de l’UE.

L’eurodéputée française Sylvie Guillaume (membre du groupe Alliance progressiste des socialistes & démocrates) s’est déclarée « satisfaite ». « Avec cet accord, nous avons protégé la libre circulation des personnes tout en répondant aux défis auxquels l’espace Schengen a été confronté au cours des dix dernières années », a-t-elle insisté.

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/02/07/espace-schengen-l-union-europeenne-parvient-a-un-accord-pour-clarifier-le-ca

#frontières_intérieures #frontières_internes #frontières #Schengen #contrôles_systématiques_aux_frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #migrations #asile #réfugiés #exception

Frontex and deportations, 2006-2022

Data covering 17 years of Frontex’s deportation operations shows the expanding role of the agency. We have produced a series of visualisations to show the number of people deported in Frontex-coordinated operations, the member states involved, the destination states, and the costs.

In August 2020 Statewatch published the report Deportation Union, to provide a critical examination of EU measures designed to increase the number of deportations carried out by national authorities and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. The report focuses on three key areas: attempts to reduce or eliminate rights and protections in the law governing deportations; the expansion and interconnection of EU databases and information systems; and the increased budget, powers and personnel awarded to Frontex. The infographics and data here build upon data compiled for that report, covering the period from 2006 to 2022.

Data collection, compilation and visualisations by Ida Flik.

A note on this update

This article has been updated to include data for 2022 (the previous edition covered the years 2006 to 2021), but we filed an access to documents request with Frontex seeking data from 2006 up until the end of 2022. The information they provided for years prior to 2022 in some cases differs significantly from that used for the previous version of this article. There is, for example, some variation in the number of people deported to different destinations. There are also some substantial differences in the number of people deported, and some minor differences in the total number of operations conducted.

Some of this may be due to errors on our part in compiling the data provided in the first place, which was released by Frontex in the form of non-machine readable PDFs that required substantal amounts of manual transcription. Shortcomings in the data released by Frontex also required that we make estimates for some figures, as we noted in the disclaimer in the dataset released with Deportation Union (available here).

The biggest variations between the old figures and the new are visible in the data on the amount of money spent by Frontex on deportations. The data releaed in response to access to documents requests filed for this article shows amounts of expenditure that dwarf that shown in the data released following access to documents requests filed for the research for Deportation Union. To take just one example, the old data indicated that in 2015 the agency spent €11.2 million on deportations. The new data pushes that figure up to more than €67 million.

These are not the only discrepancies in the Frontex data. The information released in response to requests filed for this article says the agency assisted in the removal of 9,919 people in EU territory in 2022, while Frontex’s own report on deportations in the second half of 2022 says that 13,684 people were returned in the months from July to December alone.

We asked Frontex’s press office to explain the discrepancies and variations described here, but received no response.
Deporting states and destination states

This graphic provides a visual representation of the 15 EU member states most invested in Frontex’s deportation operations, and the 15 most popular destinations for those operations. Germany is by far and away the biggest user of Frontex’s services, and Albania the primary destination for Frontex-coordinated deportations.

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Deportations by year, EU member states and destination states

This graphic makes it possible to examine in more detail the member states involved in Frontex-coordinated deportations to particular destinations. For example: Germany is the only state to have deported anyone to Azerbaijan via a Frontex-coordinated operation since 2019; it is also the only EU member state to have deported anyone to Bosnia via a Frontex coordinated operation since 2018.

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Frontex’s financial contributions to member states

Member states can claim back from Frontex the costs they incur for participating in deportation operations coordinated by the agency. This graphic shows how much each participating member state has received each year. As the biggest user of Frontex-coordinated deportation operations, Germany remains by far the biggest recipient of these funds. The total it received in 2022 (more than €20.4 million) is lower than the 2021 total, but still a vast amount of money.

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Costs per deportee by destination state

The financial cost of deporting somebody differs depending on the destination state, as shown in this chart. Burundi is now by far the most expensive destination state, though according to the figures provided by Frontex for this update there have been no Frontex-coordinated operations to that country since 2010. The change from last year (when Ethiopia was by far the most expensive destination, with the cost to remove one person to the east African state coming in at over €42,000) is presumably due to the changes in the data described above.

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Number of operations and people deported, by year and operation type

This chart shows the number of people deported and the number of deportation operations, by year and operation type. For joint return operations (JROs), Frontex coordinates the actions of multiple member states who wish to deport people to one or more destinations. National return operations involve just one EU member state, but Frontex nevertheless plays a coordinating and financing role. Collecting return operations involve a plane and staff from the destination state travelling to the EU to pick up deportees.

The updated data provided in 2022 contains the abbreviations VRD, VDO and “Humanitarian VR”. Frontex did not respond to questions on what exactly these stand for. “Humanitarian VR” is presumably “humanitarian voluntary return,” while the VR in VRD may also stand for voluntary return. However, the precise meaning cannot be confirmed without a statement from the agency.

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/7c649620b-69b6c5/TPDilPlHg6iL/cWuMnhHdvnN5aixKFVsJqNE3k0L4Dn5JwUfZYuT9.png

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/frontex-and-deportations-2006-22
#renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #sans-papiers #données #statistiques #chiffres #coût #budget #évolution #graphiques #visualisation

Europe’s (digital) borders must fall: End the expansion of the EU’s #EURODAC database

110 civil society organisations, including Statewatch, are calling for an end to the expansion of EURODAC, the EU database for the registration of asylum-seekers. EURODAC, designed to collect and store migrants’ data, is being transformed into an expansive, violent surveillance tool that will treat people seeking protection as crime suspects This will include children as young as 6 whose fingerprints and facial images will be integrated into the database.

https://www.statewatch.org/media/4122/eu-eurodac-reform.jpg

Europe’s (digital) borders must fall: End the expansion of the EU’s EURODAC database

EURODAC is being expanded to enforce the EU’s discriminatory and hostile asylum and migration policies: increasing deportations, detention and a broader climate of racialised criminalisation.

The endless expansion of EURODAC must be stopped: ▻https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/EURODAC-open-letter.pdf.

What is EURODAC?

Since its inception in 2003, the EU has repeatedly expanded the scope, size and function of EURODAC.

Created to implement the Dublin system and record the country responsible for processing asylum claims, it originally stored only limited information, mostly fingerprints, on few categories of people: asylum-seekers and people apprehended irregularly crossing the EU’s borders. From the start, this system has been a means to enforce a discriminatory and harmful deportation regime, premised on a false framework of ‘illegality’ in migration.

After a first reform in 2013 allowing police to access the database, the EU continues to detach EURODAC from its asylum framework to re-package it as a system pursuing ‘wider immigration purposes’. The changes were announced in 2020 in the EU Migration Pact, the EU’s so-called ‘fresh start on migration’. Rather than a fresh start, the proposals contain the harshest proposals in the history of the EU’s migration policy: more detention, more violence, and a wider, evolved tool of surveillance in the EURODAC database to track, push back and deport ‘irregular’ migrants.
How is the EURODAC expansion endangering people’s human rights?

More people included into the database: Concretely EURODAC would collect a vast swathe of personal data (photographs, copies of travel and identity documents, etc.) on a wider range of people: those resettled, relocated, disembarked following search and rescue operations and arrested at borders or within national territories.

Data collection on children: The reform would also lower the threshold for storing data in the system to the age of six, extend the data retention periods and weaken the conditions for law enforcement consultation of the database.

Including facial images into the database: The reform also proposes the expansion to include facial images. Comparisons and searches run in the database can be based on facial recognition – a technology notoriously error-prone and unreliable that threatens the essence of dignity, non- discrimination and privacy rights. The database functions as a genuine tool of violence as it authorises the use of coercion against asylum-seekers who refuse to give up their data, such as detention and forced collection. Not only do these changes contradict European data protection standards, they demonstrate how the EU’s institutional racism creates differential standards between migrants and non-migrants.

Access by law enforcement: EURODAC’s revamp also facilitates its connection to other existing EU migration and police databases as part of the so-called ‘interoperability’ initiative - the creation of an overarching EU information system designed to increase police identity checks of non-EU nationals, leading to increased racial profiling. These measures also unjustly equate asylum seekers with criminals. Lastly, the production of statistics from EURODAC data and other databases is supposed to inform future policymaking on migration movement trends. In reality, it is expected that they will facilitate illegal pushbacks and overpolicing of humanitarian assistance.
End the expansion of EURODAC

The EURODAC reform is a gross violation of the right to seek international protection, a chilling conflation of migration and criminality and an out-of-control surveillance instrument. The far- right is already anticipating the next step, calling for the collection of DNA.

The EURODAC reform is one of many examples of the digitalisation of Fortress Europe. It is inconsistent with fundamental rights and will undermine frameworks of protection and rights of people on the move.

We demand:

– That the EU institutions immediately reject the expansion of EURODAC.
- For legislators to prevent further violence and ensure protection at and within borders when rethinking the EURODAC system.
- For legislators and EU Member States to establish safe and regular pathways for migrants and protective reception conditions.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/europe-s-digital-borders-must-fall-end-the-expansion-of-the-eu-s-eurodac
#base_de_données #surveillance #frontières #frontières_digitales #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Dublin #règlement_Dublin #données_personnelles #reconnaissance_faciale #technologie

EU to step up support for human rights abuses in North Africa

In a letter (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4088/eu-com-migration-letter-eur-council-10-23.pdf) to the European Council trumpeting the EU’s efforts to control migration, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to coast guards in Libya and Tunisia, where refugee and migrant rights are routinely violated.

The letter (pdf) states:

“…we need to build up the capacity of our partners to conduct effective border surveillance and search and rescue operations. We are providing support to many key partners with equipment and training to help prevent unauthorised border crossings. All five vessels promised to Libya have been delivered and we see the impact of increased patrols. Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operational, and others will be repaired by the end of the year. More is expected to be delivered to countries in North Africa in the coming months.”

What it does not mention is that vessels delivered to the so-called Libyan coast guard are used to conduct “pullbacks” of refugees to brutal detention conditions and human rights violations.

Meanwhile in Tunisia, the coast guard has been conducting pullbacks of people who have subsequently been dumped in remote regions near the Tunisian-Algerian border.

According to testimony provided to Human Rights Watch (HRW)¸ a group of people who were intercepted at sea and brought back to shore were then detained by the National Guard, who:

“…loaded the group onto buses and drove them for 6 hours to somewhere near the city of Le Kef, about 40 kilometers from the Algerian border. There, officers divided them into groups of about 10, loaded them onto pickup trucks, and drove toward a mountainous area. The four interviewees, who were on the same truck, said that another truck with armed agents escorted their truck.

The officers dropped their group in the mountains near the Tunisia-Algeria border, they said. The Guinean boy [interviewed by HRW) said that one officer had threatened, “If you return again [to Tunisia], we will kill you.” One of the Senegalese children [interviewed by HRW] said an officer had pointed his gun at the group.”

Von der Leyen does not mention the fact that the Tunisian authorities refused an initial disbursement of €67 million offered by the Commission as part of its more than €1 billion package for Tunisia, which the country’s president has called “small” and said it “lacks respect.” (▻https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-europe-migration-851cf35271d2c52aea067287066ef247) The EU’s ambassador to Tunisia has said that the refusal “speaks to Tunisia’s impatience and desire to speed up implementation” of the deal.

[voir: ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1020596]

The letter also emphasises the need to “establish a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership with Egypt,” as well as providing more support to Türkiye, Jordan and Lebanon. The letter hints at the reason why – Israel’s bombing of the Gaza strip and a potential exodus of refugees – but does not mention the issue directly, merely saying that “the pressures on partners in our immediate vicinity risk being exacerbated”.

It appears that the consequences rather than the causes of any movements of Palestinian refugees are the main concern. Conclusions on the Middle East agreed by the European Council last night demand “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and aid to reach those in need” in Gaza, but do not call for a ceasefire. The European Council instead “strongly emphasises Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law and international humanitarian law.”

More surveillance, new law

Other plans mentioned in the letter include “increased aerial surveillance” for “combatting human smuggling and trafficking” by Operation IRINI, the EU’s military mission in the Mediterranean, and increased support for strengthening controls at points of departure in North African states as well as “points of entry by migrants at land borders.”

The Commission also wants increased action against migrant smuggling, with a proposal to revise the 2002 Facilitation Directive “to ensure that criminal offences are harmonised, assets are frozen, and coordination strengthened,” so that “those who engage in illegal acts exploiting migrants pay a heavy price.”

It appears the proposal will come at the same time as a migrant smuggling conference organised by the Commission on 28 November “to create a Global Alliance with a Call to Action, launching a process of regular international exchange on this constantly evolving crime.”

Deportation cooperation

Plans are in the works for more coordinated action on deportations, with the Commission proposing to:

“…work in teams with Member States on targeted return actions, with a lead Member State or Agency for each action. We will develop a roadmap that could focus on (1) ensuring that return decisions are issued at the same time as a negative asylum decisions (2) systematically ensuring the mutual recognition of return decisions and follow-up enforcement action; (3) carrying out joint identification actions including through a liaison officers’ network in countries of origin; (4) supporting policy dialogue on readmission with third countries and facilitating the issuance of travel documents, as well as acceptance of the EU laissez passer; and (5) organising assisted voluntary return and joint return operations with the support of Frontex.”

Cooperation on legal migration, meanwhile, will be done by member states “on a voluntary basis,” with the letter noting that any offers made should be conditional on increased cooperation with EU deportation efforts: “local investment and opportunities for legal migration must go hand in hand with strengthened cooperation on readmission.”

More funds

For all this to happen, the letter calls on the European Council to make sure that “migration priorities - both on the internal and external dimension - are reflected in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework,” the EU’s 2021-27 budget.

Mid-term revision of the budget was discussed at the European Council meeting yesterday, though the conclusions on that point merely state that there was an “in-depth exchange of views,” with the European Council calling on the Council of the EU “to take work forward, with a view to reaching an overall agreement by the end of the year.”

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/eu-to-step-up-support-for-human-rights-abuses-in-north-africa

#migrations #asile #réfugiés #Afrique_du_Nord #externalisation #Ursula_von_der_Leyen #lettre #contrôles_frontaliers #Tunisie #Libye #bateaux #aide #gardes-côtes_libyens #surveillance_frontalière #surveillance_frontalière_effective #frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Memorandum_of_Understanding #MoU #pull-backs #Egypte #Turquie #Jourdanie #Liban #réfugiés_palestiniens #Palestine #7_octobre_2023 #Operation_IRINI #IRINI #surveillance_aérienne #passeurs #directive_facilitation #renvois #déportation #officiers_de_liaison #réadmissions #laissez-passer #Frontex

ping @isskein @_kg_ @karine4

Database delays: new timetable for interoperable EU policing and migration systems by 2027

EU interior ministers have agreed another revised timeline for the plan to make all justice and home affairs databases “interoperable”, with the aim now to have the systems up and running by 2027. Mandatory biometric border checks may now be introduced progressively, in the hope of limiting delays at border crossing points.

The new timetable, agreed at the Justice and Home Affairs Council last week, follows on from previous delays. A revision to the timeline adopted in November 2021 included a plan for the Entry/Exit System (EES), a biometric border-crossing registration database, to be functional by September 2022. Further changes saw the deadline extended to May this year. A Belgian proposal to “decouple” the EES and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) does not appear to have been taken on board.

Under the new plan, the EES is supposed to come into use at some point in the second half of 2024 - though a note from the Spanish Presidency (pdf) suggests that even then, the “capturing and storing of biometrics... could be activated progressively.” This is because of the extra waiting times that the introduction of mandatory biometric capture, storage and verification at all EU border crossing points is likely to introduce.

As previously reported by Statewatch, the Austrian government expects “process times to double compared to the current situation,” the Croatian government is clear that “the waiting time for border checks will certainly be significantly longer,” and the German government has said “control times for passengers will increase significantly by the introduction of EES.”

To mitigate this, the Spanish Presidency’s note says that “derogation measures will be available for activation at individual border crossing points to prevent long waiting times. The date that will be retained for the entry into operation will be outside periods of major events and high travel times.”

The introduction of the EES in the second half of 2024 is supposed to be followed by the ETIAS in the first half of 2025, the European Criminal Records Information System for Third Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN) in mid-2026, finalisation of “the technical implementation of the IO [interoperability] architecture” in late 2026, followed by work to “upgrade and evolve the IO architecture” from 2027 onward.

The timetable published by eu-Lisa also foresees the eventual integration of the expanded #Eurodac database, depending on the adoption of the law, which is currently under discussion in the Council and the Parliament.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/database-delays-new-timetable-for-interoperable-eu-policing-and-migratio
#EU #UE #Union_européenne #biométrie #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #migrations #réfugiés #interopérabilité #frontières #Entry/Exit_System (#EES) #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation_System (#ETIAS) #European_Criminal_Records_Information_System_for_Third_Country_Nationals (#ECRIS-TCN) #agenda

#Frontex : deportations at record high in first half of 2023

The European Union’s border agency, Frontex, facilitated the deportation of nearly 18,000 individuals from EU territory during the first half of 2023, marking an unprecedented peak. This surge in removals, executed through both scheduled flights and “voluntary” return procedures, demonstrates a 60% upswing in deportations compared to the corresponding period in 2022.

113% increase in “voluntary” returns

The numbers come from a Frontex report obtained by Statewatch (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4059/eu-council-frontex-operational-activities-report-first-half-2023-12561-2) that summarises the agency’s operational activities in the first six months of 2023, with the agency attributing the notable spike in return operations to the increased number of “voluntary” returns.

This category constituted more than half of all removals for the reporting period, a marked increase from the 39% recorded across 2022, leading to a 113% rise in the number of third-country nationals deported “voluntarily”. The majority of these returns were conducted via ordinary, scheduled flights, as opposed to charter flights.

This record number of deportations aligns with the establishment of the #standing_corps (SC), the uniformed, armed wing of Frontex that is supposed to be include 10,000 officers by 2027. SC personnel are deployed in #joint_operations (#JO) “to support the host authorities in border control, including prevention, detection of and combatting cross-border crime“.

According to the report, the introduction of the SC constitutes a fundamental shift in how Frontex manages and executes operational response activities, especially within joint operations, rapid border interventions, and return operations.

Analysis by Statewatch illustrates Frontex’s expanding role in deportation operations over the last 15 years, and the upswing in deportations mirrors the augmented budget allocated in 2023. As per the 2023 Procurement Plan, Frontex earmarked €40 million exclusively for the acquisition of chartered aircraft to facilitate forced returns from 2023 to 2027. In 2022, the Agency’s annual expenditure on deportations of €79 million was nearly four times higher than in 2020.

Fundamental rights issues and concerns

With the European Commission urging EU member states to increase deportations and endorse migrant return agreements, these figures seem like to increase in the coming years.

Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) has previously raised concerns regarding fundamental rights during return operations, including a lack of interpreters, privacy infringements, insufficient medical assessments and provision of food and drinks, as well as dangerous conditions, among other issues. Furthermore, the application of force and coercive measures has been reported as disproportionate and without clear justification.

The escalating volume of deportations from the EU has garnered criticism from rights groups such as the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), which has welcomed alternative approaches offered by some cities and municipalities.

“Some local authorities are actually trying to implement programs which offer accommodation for undocumented people, which support them and help them to explore whether and how they can regularize their position. This is happening in the Netherlands and Belgium. Municipalities are realizing that we need to go in a different direction,” Marta Gionco told InfoMigrants in May this year.

Frontex’s operational activities

In its report on operational activities, Frontex mentions the implementation of 21 joint operations in 296 locations, with over 2,800 staff deployed by the agency. These operations “are based on the risk analysis and along the main migratory routes”.

The operations include: JO Coordination Points Air, Land, Sea; JO Focal Point Air; the maritime operations JO Themis 2023, JO Poseidon 2023, JO Indalo 2023, JO Seaports 2023, JO Opal Coast, JO Albania Sea and JO Montenegro Sea; as well as the land border operations JO North Macedonia 2023, JO Montenegro Land 2023, JO Albania Land 2023, JO Serbia Land 2023, JO Moldova 2023 and the largest operation JO Terra 2023.

The agency does not list the names or locations of most of these operations publicly on its website, instead mainly offering generic information on the countries in which it has officials and equipment deployed.

The prioritization of these operational activities is determined by various criteria, including risk analysis, vulnerability assessments, attributed impact levels on external border sections, and strategic and political significance, as well as Frontex’s existing capabilities. Additionally, these priorities are contingent on requests, availability, and hosting capacities of member states.

The report states that the planned prioritization was presented to the Management Board in the preceding month, although it does not appear that any decision has yet been taken on the topic.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/frontex-deportations-at-record-high-in-first-half-of-2023

#renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #sans-papiers #chiffres #statistiques #2023 #retours_volontaires #déportations

ping @_kg_

Tracking the Pact : Derogations all round in Council’s latest crisis Regulation edit

Of the five legislative proposals in the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, there is only one for which the Council has not so far adopted a negotiating position: the crisis and force majeure Regulation. The main purpose of the law is to set out derogations from other measures in the Pact, which are all due to be approved by next spring. The latest version of the text (published here) was up for discussion yesterday at the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which failed to reach agreement on it. Another attempt will reportedly be made on Monday.

While there were major diplomatic efforts to reach agreement on the text (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4055/eu-council-force-majeure-mandate-13499-23.pdf), reports indicate that Italy joined Hungary and Poland in vetoing it during Thursday’s meeting.

However, “the Coreper, the grouping of 27 national ambassadors to the EU, will meet Monday to approve the deal, and now with Germany’s support, a majority will be clinched on rules that define what a ’migration emergency’ is,” says a report in Malta Today.

If that is the case, the path will be open to negotiations with the European Parliament.

Earlier this week the rapporteur for the file in the civil liberties committee, Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar, said there would be a halt to talks on the other files in the Pact “unless the Council makes up its mind on the Crisis Regulation because the element of solidarity, binding solidarity when needed.”

The solidarity foreseen by the crisis Regulation will involve other EU member states and EU agencies stepping up to support the country deemed to be facing a “crisis” or a situation of “instrumentalisation of migrants.”

This particular form of solidarity is for states, rather than people, and measures can include “return actions” and “strengthened actions and cross-sectoral activities in the external dimension of migration.”

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/september/tracking-the-pact-derogations-all-round-in-council-s-latest-crisis-regul

#crise #force_majeure #dérogations #solidarité #migrations #asile #réfugiés

–—

ajouté à la métaliste sur le #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1019088

Telling the story of EU border militarization

https://www.statewatch.org/media/3998/eu-border-militarisation-narrative-guide.jpg

Addressing and preventing European border violence is a huge but necessary strategic challenge. This guide offers framing messages, guiding principles, and suggested language for people and organisations working on this challenge. It emerges from a process of discussion online and in-person between over a dozen organisations working in the European migrant justice space.

The European Union’s external borders are rapidly becoming more expansive and more dangerous. Europe’s border regime is costing lives, destabilising countries beyond European borders, and driving widespread abuse - and its budget and power is increasing. Meanwhile, the migration justice movement is under-resourced and often necessarily composed of organisations working on a single significant element of the vast EU border regime.

A key part of successfully challenging Europe’s border regime is being able to describe and expose it, by telling the same story about the dangers it poses across the continent. For the last few months, a number of organisations involved in human rights and migration have worked together to produce this guide; which provides that story, as part of a narrative guide to communicating about border militarisation and its consequences.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/telling-the-story-of-eu-border-militarization
#ressources_pédagogiques #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #brochure #manuel #guide #justice_migratoire #narration #externalisation #Frontex #business #complexe_militaro-industriel #lobby #industrie_militaire #technologie #morts_aux_frontières #mourir_aux_frontières #menace #violence #justification #catégorisation #récit #contre-récit

EU and USA plough ahead with secret discussions on biometric data exchange scheme

The EU and USA are discussing a proposed “#Enhanced_Border_Security_Partnership” which would involve “continuous and systematic” transfers of biometric data in both directions, but the Commission has refused to release documents that would provide further information to the public.

Statewatch revealed last year that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was touting Enhanced Border Security Partnerships to EU institutions and member states, requiring direct connections between the biometric databases of participating states and the USA’s #IDENT/#HART system.

IDENT/HART is “the largest U.S. Government biometric database and the second largest biometric database in the world, containing over 270 million identities from over 40 U.S. agencies,” according to a DHS document.

Further documents obtained by Statewatch indicated that the Commission and the USA had set up a “dedicated working group” to discuss the scheme and a “proof of concept,” which would involve the transmission of data.

The Commission’s response to an access to documents request filed by Statewatch suggests that the working group has been busy – but the Commission refused to release any of the documents it identified, citing the need to protect “public security” and “international relations”.

The request filed with the Commission sought the following documents:

“1. All agendas and minutes of the working group between the European Commission and the US authorities regarding the proposed Enhanced Border Security Partnership (#EBSP).

2. Presentations, notes, reports or other documents presented, discussed, or used as background information for the meetings of that working group.

3. Documents regarding the “proof of concept” on the potential sharing of data under an EBSP, in particular setting out the authorities involved, the data to be transferred, the source of that data, and the legal basis for sharing data as part of a “proof of concept”.”

The response from the Commission (pdf) said that five documents had been identified:

“1- Flash report: Meeting with DHS on new EBSP Working, Commission document for internal use, dated 13/07/2022, ref. ARES (2023)4144843,

2- Flash report: Kick-Off meeting COM/DHS Working Group on new US EBSP requirements (06/09/22), Commission document for internal use, dated 06/09/2022, ref. ARES (2023)4119093,

3- EU-US Working Group on EBSP, Commission document for internal use, dated 22/09/2022, ref. ARES (2023)4144961,

4- WORKING DOCUMENT & ANSWERS: COM-US Working Group on the U.S. Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP) requirements as part of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), Commission document for internal use, dated 04/10/2022, ref. ARES (2023)4118328,

5- DHS Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP) Requirement, Powerpoint presentation by US Department of Homeland Security, dated September 2022, ref. ARES (2023)4118099.”

The letter, signed by Monique Pariat, the Director-General for Migration and Home Affairs, said that the documents could not be released as they contain “sensitive information of ongoing discussions between the Commission and the US on the Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP).”

Some of that information concerns “law enforcement investigative procedures that, in the hands of criminals and terrorists, could be misused against public security, for example by facilitating the bypassing of effective cross-border checks and obstructing the attempts of US authorities to prevent illegal activities.”

Furthermore, wrote Pariat, “given the public security concerns outlined above, the public disclosure of the documents, which were intended to be used for official internal purposes only, would be tantamount to a breach of trust of the US authorities and could therefore undermine international relations with the US.”

Releasing parts of the documents whilst censoring others would be impossible, the letter argued, but they are either “entirely covered by the exceptions or the remaining parts after expunging the confidential information might be meaningless or illegible.”

The Council has also discussed the EBSP plan recently, with the Council’s Working Party on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Information Exchange (IXIM) holding an “exchange of views” in mid-July (pdf).

A comment made in April this year by Chris Jones, Statewatch Director, remains relevant:

“The EU’s own top court has ruled on multiple occasions that the USA does not offer adequate privacy protections for non-citizens, yet the Commission and the member states are planning to open up their biometric databases to the Department of Homeland Security and, by extension, who knows how many other US agencies? The fact that discussions on the plan are taking place in secret makes it all the more galling, albeit entirely unsurprising.”

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/august/eu-and-usa-plough-ahead-with-secret-discussions-on-biometric-data-exchan

#échange_de_données #données #USA #Etats-Unis #Europe #UE #données_biométriques #frontières #Union_européenne #EU #coopération #partenariat #sécurité_frontalière

Bulgaria and Romania speed up asylum and deportation procedures with EU support

“#Pilot_projects” intended to beef up border controls, accelerate asylum and deportation proceedings, and reinforce the role of EU agencies in Bulgaria and Romania have just begun - yet EU legislation intended to do the same is yet to be approved.

Pilot projects

In February the European Council confirmed its support for Commission-funded “border management pilot projects,” and two such projects have been launched in recent months, in Bulgaria (€45 million) and Romania (€10.8 million).

As revealed by Statewatch in March, “the key border between Bulgaria and Turkiye,” was to be the first target of €600 million being made available to reinforce border controls and speed up removals.

Of that funding, the Commission recently announced that it will make €140 million available “for the development of electronic surveillance systems at land external borders” and €120 million to “support reception and asylum systems,” in particular for the reception of unaccompanied minors and “reception capacity at the border”.

Both Bulgaria and Romania have recently circulated notes within the Council to update other member states on the projects, and the Commission also trumpeted the “progress made” in a press release.

Bulgaria

According to the Bulgarian note, (pdf) the project “foresees the implementation by Bulgaria of targeted tools for border management and screening of third country nationals, conduct of an accelerated asylum and return procedure and cooperation in the fight against migrant smuggling.”

The project is being implemented “with the operational and technical support of the relevant JHA agencies (EUAA, Europol and Frontex). It builds on Bulgaria’s good practices and experience, including its excellent cooperation with its neighboring countries and the EU agencies present in Bulgaria. The duration of the pilot is 6 months.”

The country is “improving the digitalization of the asylum and return systems,” while:

“Work is ongoing on legislative amendments for issuing of a return decision at the same time with a negative decision for international protection. Bulgaria is also working on drawing up a list with designated safe countries of origin in line with the Asylum Procedure Directive. Negotiations are ongoing with EUAA on an updated Operational plan in the field of asylum.”

A “Roadmap for strengthened cooperation” with Frontex is “pending finalization”, which will allow for “provision of technical equipment and increased deployment of personnel.”

However, Frontex presence in the country has already been stepped up, according to the Commission’s press release, with the agency providing “additional support to Bulgaria through return counsellors and interpreters.”

The note also states an intention to a sign a Joint Action Plan on Return “in the margins of JHA Council,” presumably the meeting on 8 and 9 June, but the Council’s press release makes no mention of this.

Romania

While the Bulgarian note is not particularly detailed, it offers more information than the one circulated by Romania (pdf).

The Romanian note states that agreement with the European Commission on launching the pilot project was reached on 17 March, and that it aims to implement “key operational actions in the area of border protection, asylum and return. One of the targeted operational actions foresees setting up pilot projects in interested Member States for fast asylum and return procedures.”

While the Bulgarian note mentions the need for legal reforms to accelerate asylum and removal proceedings, the Romanian note says that this “showcase” of “Romania’s best practices in the areas of asylum, return, border management and international cooperation.. is based on EU and applicable Romanian legislation, as well as on Romania’s very good cooperation with neighbouring countries and EU agencies.”

According to the Commission, however, Romania has changed national law in two respects: “to allow for the participation of EUAA [EU Asylum Agency] experts in the registration and assessment of asylum applications,” and - as in Bulgaria - “to allow for the issuing of a negative decision on international protection together with a return decision.”

The country has also been cooperating with Frontex on align its national IT systems for deportations with the agency’s own, and “Romanian authorities will host and use the first Frontex Mobile Surveillance Vehicles at Romanian - Serbian border section of the Terra 2023 operational area.”

Terra 2023 is presumably a continuation of the Frontex operation Terra 2022.

Documentation

- European Commission press release: Migration management: Update on progress made on the Pilot Projects for asylum and return procedures and new financial support for Bulgaria and Romania: ▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/3932/eu-com-pilot-projects-bulgaria-romania-pr-7-6-23.pdf
- Bulgarian delegation: Pilot project at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Council doc. 9992/23, LIMITE, 5 June 2023, pdf: ▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/3930/eu-council-bulgaria-pilot-project-migration-asylum-9992-23.pdf
- Romanian delegation: Pilot project in the area of asylum, returns, border management and international cooperation, Council doc. 9991/23, LIMITE, 5 June 2023: ▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/3931/eu-council-romania-pilot-project-migration-asylum-09991-23.pdf

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/june/bulgaria-and-romania-speed-up-asylum-and-deportation-procedures-with-eu-
#Bulgarie #Roumanie #renvois #expulsions #contrôles_frontaliers #financement #EU #UE #aide_financière #JHA #Europol #Frontex #EUAA #externalisation #externalisation_des_contrôles_frontaliers #digitalisation #directive_procédure #pays_sûrs #militarisation_des_frontières #Joint_Action_Plan_on_Return #Frontex_Mobile_Surveillance_Vehicles #Mobile_Surveillance_Vehicles #Terra_2023 #frontières

Il muro della Bulgaria. Un altro ostacolo europeo ai diritti dei migranti

La Commissione europea ha messo a disposizione 600 milioni di euro per sostenere gli Stati membri nelle attività di contrasto ai flussi delle persone. Sofia, tra i primi destinatari dei finanziamenti, punta a rafforzare la barriera di 130 chilometri con la Turchia. Mentre Ong e volontari internazionali denunciano gravi violazioni e abusi

https://i0.wp.com/altreconomia.it/app/uploads/2023/04/MSB153143High-scaled.jpg

Il 3 aprile di quest’anno i cittadini bulgari sono stati chiamati alle urne. Ad avere la maggioranza (risicata) è stato il partito Gerb guidato da Bojko Borisov. Il gruppo conservatore non ha stravinto e si preannuncia dunque un difficile periodo di transizione alla ricerca di alleanze per poter formare un nuovo governo. Borisov è già stato per tre volte a capo dell’esecutivo e durante i suoi mandati si è distinto per una linea molto dura in tema di immigrazione.

Una linea mantenuta anche dall’attuale presidente, Rumen Radev, eletto per la prima volta nel 2017 grazie al sostegno del Partito socialista. A febbraio di quest’anno Radev ha chiesto all’Unione europea fondi per finanziare il rafforzamento della barriera lunga 130 chilometri che divide il Paese dalla Turchia. La richiesta per il “muro” è pervenuta nonostante la presidente della Commissione europea, Ursula von der Leyen, già a ottobre avesse affermato, non senza ipocrisie, che l’Ue non avrebbe mai finanziato la costruzione di muri e di filo spinato per impedire l’attraversamento dei migranti.

Pochi mesi dopo però, in apertura dell’ultimo Consiglio europeo, è stata diramata una lettera (diffusa da Statewatch: ▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/march/von-der-leyen-letter-key-border-between-bulgaria-and-turkiye-is-first-ta) nella quale è stato annunciato lo stanziamento di 600 milioni di euro per supportare “in modo sostanziale gli Stati membri nel controllo delle frontiere”, con particolare riferimento a quelle “esterne” della Turchia e quelle “interne” della Bulgaria, che riceveranno per prime tali fondi. Il budget sarà speso per finanziare sistemi di sorveglianza quali telecamere termiche, droni e radar grazie ai quali la polizia di frontiera potrà sorvegliare ogni movimento sospetto ai confini.

Questa decisione, presa per rafforzare il controllo delle frontiere, interviene nonostante le criticità espresse da Ong e operatori locali nei confronti della gestione dell’immigrazione da parte delle autorità bulgare. A ottobre dello scorso anno un ragazzo siriano è stato raggiunto da colpi di arma da fuoco sparati dalla polizia di frontiera bulgara mentre tentava di attraversare il confine dalla Turchia. L’uomo è sopravvissuto nonostante i proiettili lo abbiano raggiunto al petto e alla mano, lasciandogli quest’ultima semi-paralizzata. E non era la prima volta che accadeva: sulla stessa frontiera nel 2015 un cittadino afghano è morto dopo gli spari esplosi da una guardia bulgara.

Episodi del genere vengono confermati ripetutamente dalle testimonianze che i migranti rilasciano alle organizzazioni internazionali come Medici senza frontiere che in suo recente report ha raccolto le voci di chi è transitato in Bulgaria. C’è chi è stato picchiato ripetutamente con tubi di gomma da parte delle autorità, donne che hanno subito dalle stesse violenze sessuali, persone private di ogni bene e costrette a tornare in Turchia senza vestiti, sulla neve. Un uso della violenza spropositato, in barba a qualsiasi norma sui diritti umani, che viene denunciato anche da No name kitchen (Nnk), Ong spagnola e internazionale che opera sulle rotte balcaniche.

Una delle testimonianze raccolte da Nnk recita: “La polizia bulgara ci ha attaccati con un cane che ha morso un mio amico alle gambe, alle mani e alla testa. Dopo ci hanno tolto tutti i vestiti, anche alle donne che erano con noi, e ci hanno spediti indietro in Turchia. I colpi che ci hanno inferto hanno rotto gambe e braccia ad alcune persone che poi non sono riuscite a proseguire il cammino per mesi e mesi”.

Barbara Bécares, responsabile stampa della stessa Ong, spiega come tra 2018 e 2019 moltissimi migranti abbiano preferito passare per la Grecia a causa della nota violenza e dei trattamenti disumani perpetrati dalla polizia bulgara. Una polizia europea. Ma questa rotta è tornata in auge proprio dal 2020, quando anche in Grecia le autorità si sono macchiate di simili comportamenti rendendo il passaggio per il Paese altrettanto difficile e pericoloso. Le testimonianze che giungono sono da considerarsi come una piccola parte rispetto al totale di coloro che subiscono gli stessi trattamenti e che magari preferiscono non parlare per paura di ritorsioni. In Bulgaria la criminalizzazione delle organizzazioni non governative impedisce ai migranti di poter chiedere aiuto e denunciare gli abusi che subiscono. Chi riesce a varcare il confine dalla Turchia senza essere stanato, tenta di mantenere un profilo basso in attesa di oltrepassare la frontiera per la Serbia. Molti sanno che se vengono intercettati dalle autorità rischiano di essere respinti in Turchia o di finire all’interno di campi di detenzione. Un’inchiesta realizzata dal collettivo Lighthouse Reports denuncia l’esistenza di centri di detenzione illegali: vere e proprie gabbie nei pressi della stazione di polizia di Sredets (città a 40 chilometri dal confine turco) dove i migranti vengono rinchiusi anche per giorni. “La struttura assomiglia a una cuccia per cani in disuso, con sbarre su un lato -si legge nell’inchiesta-. I richiedenti asilo l’hanno descritta come una ‘gabbia’”.

Gli abusi che vengono perpetrati quotidianamente a richiedenti asilo e migranti nel Paese sono ormai più che noti. A ciò si somma una sistematica negligenza nell’esame delle richieste d’asilo: molti richiedenti hanno denunciato di attendere una risposta alla propria domanda da anni.

Tra questi c’è anche Khalid, un uomo eritreo che raggiunto telefonicamente ci ha raccontato la sua storia. È scappato dall’Eritrea nel lontano 2012. Arrivato in Turchia ha tentato di raggiungere la Grecia attraversando il confine dal fiume Evros ma per tre volte è stato respinto dalla polizia ellenica. Ha deciso dunque di cambiare frontiera e a marzo 2013 è riuscito ad arrivare in Bulgaria e da qui è cominciato quello che lui stesso definisce “un incubo”, non ancora finito. Dapprima è stato rinchiuso per tre mesi in un centro di detenzione a Lyubimets, una piccola cittadina non lontana dal confine turco. Le condizioni all’interno del centro sono descritte come degradanti: “Era un edificio di tre piani nelle quali venivano stipate migliaia di persone. Al piano inferiore c’erano le donne e le famiglie con bambini e a quello superiori gli uomini. Era sovraffollato e non veniva rispettata nessuna regola da parte delle autorità”.

Poi è stato trasferito in un campo profughi vicino la capitale bulgara dove gli sono state prese le impronte digitali e dove ha richiesto la protezione internazionale. Non avendo ricevuto alcuna risposta, dopo sette mesi ha dunque deciso di scappare e di andare in Grecia, dove è stato rinchiuso all’interno di un altro centro. Qui ha trascorso altri sette mesi e dopo il suo rilascio ha iniziato un lungo viaggio che lo avrebbe poi portato fino in Svezia. Siamo nel 2016. Nel Paese scandinavo ha tentato di chiedere nuovamente asilo ma la sua domanda è stata respinta in base al Regolamento di Dublino ed è stato quindi trasferito in maniera coatta proprio in Bulgaria, dove è rimasto per altri tre anni. Dopo un anno e mezzo gli è stata notificata la prima risposta alla richiesta d’asilo: negativa. Ad aprile 2018 Khalid ha fatto appello alla Corte suprema bulgara. Ma tutto si è rivelato un buco nell’acqua. Senza alcun riscontro ed esasperato per l’attesa, ha deciso di ripercorrere l’intera rotta balcanica fino alla Slovenia, dove è giunto nel 2019 e dove ha ripresentato la domanda d’asilo. Dopo un anno gli è stato notificato l’ennesimo esito negativo e a quel punto, pur di non essere deportato nuovamente, ha deciso di andare in Francia, passando per l’Italia.

Ed è proprio da un centro per richiedenti asilo di Parigi che ora racconta la sua storia. A metà aprile avrà il suo primo colloquio negli uffici per l’immigrazione ma è già stato avvisato che, tra le opzioni possibili, c’è anche quella di essere riportato in Slovenia e da lì in Bulgaria. Quando gli si chiede che cosa pensa di fare, dice che probabilmente non andrà all’appuntamento. “Preferisco rimettermi in viaggio per il Belgio o tenterò di attraversare il canale della Manica per raggiungere l’Inghilterra”. Nel 2012, quando fuggì dalla sua Asmara, aveva 33 anni.

▻https://altreconomia.it/il-muro-della-bulgaria-un-altro-ostacolo-europeo-ai-diritti-dei-migrant
#murs #barrières_frontalières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Bulgarie #Turquie #drones #radar #caméras_thermiques #budget #complexe_militaro-industriel #militarisation_des_frontières #violence #route_des_Balkans #Lyubimets