• Border security with drones and databases

    The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

    Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

    The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

    Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

    The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

    The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

    This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

    Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

    This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

    Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

    In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

    The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

    While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

    While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

    This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

    Notes

    [1] https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

    [2] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

    [3] https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

    [4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

    [5] https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

    [6] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [7] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [8] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [9] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

    [10] https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

    [11] https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

    [12] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    [13] https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

    [14] https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

    [15] https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
    #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

  • Frontex and deportations, 2006-2022

    Data covering 17 years of Frontex’s deportation operations shows the expanding role of the agency. We have produced a series of visualisations to show the number of people deported in Frontex-coordinated operations, the member states involved, the destination states, and the costs.

    In August 2020 Statewatch published the report Deportation Union, to provide a critical examination of EU measures designed to increase the number of deportations carried out by national authorities and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. The report focuses on three key areas: attempts to reduce or eliminate rights and protections in the law governing deportations; the expansion and interconnection of EU databases and information systems; and the increased budget, powers and personnel awarded to Frontex. The infographics and data here build upon data compiled for that report, covering the period from 2006 to 2022.

    Data collection, compilation and visualisations by Ida Flik.

    A note on this update

    This article has been updated to include data for 2022 (the previous edition covered the years 2006 to 2021), but we filed an access to documents request with Frontex seeking data from 2006 up until the end of 2022. The information they provided for years prior to 2022 in some cases differs significantly from that used for the previous version of this article. There is, for example, some variation in the number of people deported to different destinations. There are also some substantial differences in the number of people deported, and some minor differences in the total number of operations conducted.

    Some of this may be due to errors on our part in compiling the data provided in the first place, which was released by Frontex in the form of non-machine readable PDFs that required substantal amounts of manual transcription. Shortcomings in the data released by Frontex also required that we make estimates for some figures, as we noted in the disclaimer in the dataset released with Deportation Union (available here).

    The biggest variations between the old figures and the new are visible in the data on the amount of money spent by Frontex on deportations. The data releaed in response to access to documents requests filed for this article shows amounts of expenditure that dwarf that shown in the data released following access to documents requests filed for the research for Deportation Union. To take just one example, the old data indicated that in 2015 the agency spent €11.2 million on deportations. The new data pushes that figure up to more than €67 million.

    These are not the only discrepancies in the Frontex data. The information released in response to requests filed for this article says the agency assisted in the removal of 9,919 people in EU territory in 2022, while Frontex’s own report on deportations in the second half of 2022 says that 13,684 people were returned in the months from July to December alone.

    We asked Frontex’s press office to explain the discrepancies and variations described here, but received no response.
    Deporting states and destination states

    This graphic provides a visual representation of the 15 EU member states most invested in Frontex’s deportation operations, and the 15 most popular destinations for those operations. Germany is by far and away the biggest user of Frontex’s services, and Albania the primary destination for Frontex-coordinated deportations.

    Deportations by year, EU member states and destination states

    This graphic makes it possible to examine in more detail the member states involved in Frontex-coordinated deportations to particular destinations. For example: Germany is the only state to have deported anyone to Azerbaijan via a Frontex-coordinated operation since 2019; it is also the only EU member state to have deported anyone to Bosnia via a Frontex coordinated operation since 2018.

    Frontex’s financial contributions to member states

    Member states can claim back from Frontex the costs they incur for participating in deportation operations coordinated by the agency. This graphic shows how much each participating member state has received each year. As the biggest user of Frontex-coordinated deportation operations, Germany remains by far the biggest recipient of these funds. The total it received in 2022 (more than €20.4 million) is lower than the 2021 total, but still a vast amount of money.

    Costs per deportee by destination state

    The financial cost of deporting somebody differs depending on the destination state, as shown in this chart. Burundi is now by far the most expensive destination state, though according to the figures provided by Frontex for this update there have been no Frontex-coordinated operations to that country since 2010. The change from last year (when Ethiopia was by far the most expensive destination, with the cost to remove one person to the east African state coming in at over €42,000) is presumably due to the changes in the data described above.

    Number of operations and people deported, by year and operation type

    This chart shows the number of people deported and the number of deportation operations, by year and operation type. For joint return operations (JROs), Frontex coordinates the actions of multiple member states who wish to deport people to one or more destinations. National return operations involve just one EU member state, but Frontex nevertheless plays a coordinating and financing role. Collecting return operations involve a plane and staff from the destination state travelling to the EU to pick up deportees.

    The updated data provided in 2022 contains the abbreviations VRD, VDO and “Humanitarian VR”. Frontex did not respond to questions on what exactly these stand for. “Humanitarian VR” is presumably “humanitarian voluntary return,” while the VR in VRD may also stand for voluntary return. However, the precise meaning cannot be confirmed without a statement from the agency.

    https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/frontex-and-deportations-2006-22
    #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #sans-papiers #données #statistiques #chiffres #coût #budget #évolution #graphiques #visualisation

  • Is Frontex involved in illegal ’pushbacks’ in the Balkans ?

    Refugees and migrants in Greece trying to reach western Europe have accused EU border protection agency Frontex of taking part in illegal deportations known as “pushbacks.” DW reports.

    Ali al-Ebrahim fled in 2018 from Manbij, a Syrian city that was under Kurdish control, to escape being forced to fight in the conflict.

    Al-Ebrahim, now 22, first tried his luck in Turkey. When he arrived in Antakya, not far from the Syrian border, Turkish authorities took his details and sent him back home without citing any reasons, the young Syrian man says in very good English. He explains that this meant he was banned from legally entering Turkey again for five years.

    Nevertheless, al-Ebrahim decided to try again, this time with the aim of reaching Greece. He managed to make his way to Turkey’s Aegean coastline and eventually reached the Greek island of Leros in a rubber dinghy. When he applied for asylum, however, his application was rejected on the grounds that Turkey was a safe third country.

    But al-Ebrahim was not able to return to Turkey, and certainly not Syria — though this was of no interest to Greek authorities. “The new Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is very strict when it comes to migrants,” he says. “So I decided to go to Albania.”
    Uniforms with the EU flag

    Al-Ebrahim says that in September 2020, he traveled by bus with five others to the northern Greek city of Ioannina, and then walked to the Albanian border without encountering any Greek police.

    But, he says, staff from the EU border protection agency Frontex stopped them in Albania and handed them over to Albanian authorities in the border town of Kakavia. When asked how he knew they were Frontex officials, al-Ebrahim replies, “I could tell from their armbands.”

    Frontex staff wear light-blue armbands with the EU flag on them.
    €5,000 to reach Austria

    Al-Ebrahim says that he and the other migrants asked the Albanian authorities for asylum but were told that the coronavirus pandemic made it impossible to file any new asylum applications. They were then just sent back to Greece without the Greek authorities being notified, he says.

    Al-Ebrahim had more luck on the second attempt. He managed to travel to the Albanian capital, Tirana, and then on to Serbia via Kosovo.

    His interview with DW takes place at a refugee camp in the Serbian city of Sombor, near the Hungarian border. Al-Ebrahim says he wants to travel on through Hungary into Austria, but the traffickers charge €5,000 to get as far as the Austrian border.

    Detention instead of asylum

    Hope Barker has heard many similar stories before. She coordinates the project “Wave - Thessaloniki,” which provides migrants traveling the Balkan route with food, medical care and legal advice. Barker tells DW that the northern Greek city was a safe haven until the new conservative government took office in summer 2019.

    In January 2020, a draconian new law came into effect in Greece. According to Barker, it allows authorities to detain asylum seekers for up to 18 months without reviewing their cases — and detention can then be extended for another 18 months.

    “So you can be held in detention for three years without any action on your case if you ask for asylum,” says Baker.

    Pushbacks by Frontex?

    Baker tells DW that the illegal deportation of migrants, known as “pushbacks,” happen both at the borders and further inland. Migrants trying to reach western Europe avoid any contact with Greek authorities.

    Refugee aid organizations say there have been “lots of pushbacks” at the border with North Macedonia and Albania. Baker says that witnesses have reported hearing those involved speaking German, for example, and seeing the EU insignia on their blue armbands.

    Frontex rejects allegations

    Baker says that it is, nonetheless, difficult to prove pushbacks at the Greek border because of the confusing situation, but she adds that they know that Frontex is active in Albania and that there are pushbacks on a daily basis across the River Evros that flows through Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey and forms a large part of the border. “We know that pushbacks are happening daily. So, to think that they don’t know or are not at all involved in those practices seems beyond belief,” says Baker.

    A Frontex spokesman told DW that the agency had investigated some of the allegations and “found no credible evidence to support any of them.”

    Frontex added that its staff was bound by a code of conduct, which explicitly calls for the “prevention of refoulement and the upholding of human rights, all in line with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.”

    “We are fully committed to protecting fundamental rights,” it added.

    Border protection from beyond the EU

    So why does the European border protection agency protect an external border of the European Union from the Albanian side? “The main aim of the operation is to support border control, help tackle irregular migration, as well as cross-border crime, including migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and terrorism, and identify possible risks and threats related to security,” said Frontex to DW.

    Frontex also said that cooperation with countries in the western Balkans was one of its priorities. “The agency supports them in complying with EU standards and best practices in border management and security,” the spokesman said.

    Yet it is worthwhile taking a look at another part of Greece’s border. While military and police officers are omnipresent at the Greek-Turkish border and are supported by Frontex staff, you seldom encounter any uniforms in the mountains between Greece and Albania. As a result, this route is regarded as safe by refugees and migrants who want to travel onward to western Europe via Greece.

    The route west

    Many migrants travel from Thessaloniki to the picturesque town of Kastoria, about 30 kilometers outside Albania. “There, the police pick us up from the bus and take us to the Albanian border,” Zakarias tells DW at the Wave Center in Thessaloniki. He is Moroccan and arrived in Greece via Turkey.

    But at this point, these are just rumors.

    That afternoon the men get on the bus. Another Moroccan man, 46-year-old Saleh Rosa, is among them. He has been in Greece for a year and was homeless for a long time in Thessaloniki. “Greece is a good country, but I cannot live here,” Rosa tells DW. He aims to reach western Europe via Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and then Hungary.

    Ominous police checks

    Police stop the bus shortly before its arrival in Kastoria. There is a parked police car with uniformed officers. Two men in plain clothes board the bus, claiming to be police. Without showing any ID, they target the foreigners, detaining Saleh, Zakarias and their companions.

    At around 11pm that same evening, the migrants send a WhatsApp message and their Google coordinates. They say that the men in plainclothes have taken them to a place some 15 kilometers from the Albanian border, but within Greece. Later in the Albanian capital, Tirana, DW met with Rosa again, who stresses that his papers were not checked in Greece.

    Conflicting accounts

    When asked by DW, Greek police authorities confirmed the existence of the plain-clothed officers and the roadside check. But then their account diverges from that of the two men. Police said they wanted to check if the migrants were legally permitted to be in Greece and they were released once this was confirmed.

    But the migrants say that Saleh Rosa was the only one with the papers to stay in Greece legally and that the other men were unregistered. Moreover, there is a curfew in Greece because of COVID-19. You are only allowed to travel from one district to another in exceptional cases. Even if they had been carrying papers, the men should have been fined.

    The police refused to comment on that.

    https://www.dw.com/en/is-frontex-involved-in-illegal-pushbacks-in-the-balkans/a-56141370

    #Frontex #Balkans #route_des_balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #Albanie #Serbie #Kosovo #Sombor #Hongrie #Macédoine_du_Nord #Evros #Grèce

    –---

    voir aussi les accusations envers Frontex de refoulement en #Mer_Egée :
    Migrations : l’agence européenne #Frontex mise en cause pour des #refoulements en mer
    https://seenthis.net/messages/882952

    • Frontex confronted with allegations of violence in North Macedonia

      Allegations that officials deployed on Frontex operations have participated in or condoned violence against people on the move in North Macedonia must be investigated, says a letter (https://www.statewatch.org/media/2494/letter-to-frontex-sw-and-bvmn.pdf) sent to Frontex today by #Statewatch and #Border_Violence_Monitoring_Network (#BVMN).

      Allegations that officials deployed on Frontex operations have participated in or condoned violence against people on the move in North Macedonia must be investigated, says a letter sent to Frontex today by Statewatch and Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN).

      Since September 2019, volunteers for BVMN have gathered five separate testimonies from people pushed back from North Macedonia to Greece alleging the presence of Frontex officers on North Macedonian territory, where the agency has no legal authority to act. The reports involve a total of 130 people.

      The testimonies include allegations that officers deployed by Frontex engaged in or condoned brutal violence – including the use of tasers and electroshock batons, throwing people into rivers, and tying people up and beating them.

      Frontex says it has no records of any such incidents. The agency’s press office said to Statewatch last month that “Frontex does not have any operational activities at the land border from the North Macedonian side,” and “is only present on the Greek side of the border.”

      The letter, addressed to Frontex’s executive director, the new Fundamental Rights Officer, and the agency’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, calls for a thorough investigation into the allegations to clarify the facts and ensure appropriate action against any individuals found to have engaged in, condoned or consented to violence and/or to have acted on North Macedonian territory.

      The violence allegedly meted out or condoned by Frontex officials is part of a broader wave of violence against people on the move through North Macedonia. Since February 2019, BVMN volunteers have gathered 37 reports of pushbacks from North Macedonia to Greece, which are likely only a fraction of the total number of pushback cases.

      The five reports alleging the presence of Frontex officials are a subset of 15 testimonies that cite the involvement of foreign officials working alongside North Macedonian officers.

      An analysis published today by Statewatch (https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/foreign-agents-and-violence-against-migrants-at-the-greek-macedonian-bor) looks at the deployment of foreign border guards to North Macedonia, which since 2015 has played a key role in the EU’s efforts to prevent migrants and refugees departing from Greece to reach ‘core’ EU territory further north.

      A number of states (members of the EU and other states in the region) have signed bilateral deals with the North Macedonian government that allow the deployment of border guards in the country.

      Frontex, meanwhile, is not yet legally able to operate there. An agreement between the EU and North Macedonia is in the works, but is being held up in a dispute over language (https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu).

      The agency must provide answers and an investigation into the numerous allegations of its officials being involved in abuse.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/june/frontex-confronted-with-allegations-of-violence-in-north-macedonia
      #Macédoine_du_Nord

    • Briefing: External action: Frontex operations outside the EU

      The EU has negotiated five agreements with states in the Balkans that allow Frontex operations on their territories, and most of the agreements have now been approved by both sides. This briefing looks at the main provisions of those agreements, highlights key differences and similarities, and argues that they will likely serve as a template for future deals with states that do not border the EU, as made possible by the 2019 Regulation governing Frontex.

      For an overview of the key points of the agreements, see the table at the end of this article, or here as a PDF (https://www.statewatch.org/media/2011/eu-frontex-external-action-briefing-table.pdf).

      Frontex launched its first official joint operation on non-EU territory at Albania’s border with Greece in May 2019. Still ongoing today, this was the first operation resulting from a series of Status Agreements between the EU and a number of Western Balkan states – Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.

      These agreements make it possible for Frontex to undertake operations on those other states’ territories. Signed in accordance with the agency’s 2016 Regulation, all five agreements allow the agency to carry out joint operations and rapid border interventions on the states’ borders, where those borders are coterminous with those of an EU member state or states. Frontex can also assist those states with deportation operations from EU member states to those countries. Since the entry into force of Frontex’s 2019 mandate, the EU can now also make such agreements with states that do not border EU territory.

      The contents of the status agreements, all based on a template document produced by the Commission, are very similar, with small but important differences emerging from the negotiation procedures with each state, explored below.

      The first agreements in context

      The five Balkan states targeted for the first agreements make up what is seen by officials as a “buffer zone” between Greece and other Schengen states, and they have long been embroiled in the bloc’s border policies. Through long negotiations over accession to the Union (https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/albania-dealing-with-a-new-migration-framework-on-the-edge-of-the-empire), Western Balkan states are at various stages of approximating domestic law with the EU’s legal ‘acquis’, involving substantial amendments to migration and asylum systems.

      In theory, these systems must match up to EU legal and fundamental rights standards in order to allow accession, though violence against migrants is well documented on both sides of these “coterminous borders”. The so-called Balkan Route is the site of well-documented abuses (https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/january/eu-the-black-book-of-pushbacks-testimonies-of-pushbacks-affecting-over-1) suffered by people on the move, recently compiled and published in a ‘Black Book of pushbacks’ which detail violence perpetrated by border agents, member state police and soldiers. Pushbacks from Croatia (https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/november/european-commission-plans-to-visit-croatia-in-light-of-human-rights-viol) and Hungary are particularly notorious, with Frontex finally withdrawing its support for operations in Hungary (https://www.statewatch.org/statewatch-database/frontex-suspends-operations-in-hungary) in January this year due to the state’s violation of a European Court of Justice ruling against pushbacks into Serbia.

      The agency had long-insisted that its presence discouraged fundamental rights violations (https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/february/frontex-management-board-pushes-back-against-secrecy-proposals-in-prelim) - a far less credible claim in the wake of allegations (https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/february/frontex-management-board-pushes-back-against-secrecy-proposals-in-prelim) of Frontex complicity in serious incidents in the Aegean, including possible pushbacks.

      Frontex expands external operations while future agreements remain on hold

      Following deployment of officers to Montenegro’s border with Croatia in July, Frontex launched a second operation in Montenegro in October. The third executive operation outside the EU (and the second in Montenegro), the aim of this activity is “to tackle cross-border crime at the country’s sea borders, including the smuggling of drugs and weapons, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and terrorism”.

      The agency says it will provide aerial surveillance, deploy officers from EU member states, and provide technical and operational assistance with coast guard functions in international waters, “including search and rescue support, fisheries control and environmental protection”.

      The agreement with Serbia was approved by the European Parliament in February this year, along with the agreement with Montenegro. Three presidential entities need to sign the agreement in order for it to be ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s government; the Serb entity has so far refused to do so.

      Meanwhile, the agreement with North Macedonia was due to be tabled in the European Parliament this autumn, but negotiations have been held up, in part by Bulgaria’s objection to the language in which it is written. According to the site European Western Balkans, “Bulgaria does not recognise the language of North Macedonia as ‘Macedonian’”, but “as a dialect of Bulgarian”. It will apparently take “a change in terminology regarding Macedonian language in order to allow progress in drafting a final negotiating framework”. While negotiations are stalled, the agreement cannot be considered by the European Parliament.

      Once the status agreements are in force, Frontex operations are launched in accordance with an operational plan agreed with each state. These plans include the circumstances under which Frontex staff can use executive powers and other details of the operations not available elsewhere. These plans are not systematically made public and although it is possible for the public to request their release, Frontex can refuse access to them. These non-public documents contain important provisions on fundamental rights and data protection, as well as details on the aims and objectives of the agency’s operations.

      Fundamental rights

      Under article 8 of the agreements with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina (article 9 of the other agreements) all parties are obliged to:

      “[H]ave a complaint mechanism to deal with allegations of a breach of fundamental rights committed by its staff in the exercise of their official functions in the course of a joint operation, rapid border intervention or return operation performed under this agreement”.

      Both Frontex and the host state must operate such a complaints mechanism, to handle allegations against their own team members. Frontex’s complaint mechanism is currently the subject of an Ombudsman inquiry, following years of research showing it up as inaccessible and ineffective. Details of updates bringing the mechanism into line with Frontex’s 2019 Regulation have not yet been made public, although the rules set out in that Regulation have problems of their own. It is noteworthy that the agreements do not explicitly require an independent complaints mechanism.

      On the question of parallel complaints mechanisms for Frontex officers and host country officers, a Frontex spokesperson explained:

      “The complaints team within Frontex Fundamental Rights Office has been working since 2019 on the concept of how to deal with complaints concerning Frontex activities in [Albania]. For that purpose, the FRO team met with competent national authorities in Albania in October 2019. Both parties agreed on the draft of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the purpose of which is a coordination between both complaints mechanisms. The MoU draft proposal was shared with Albanian authorities for their consideration on September 2020 and finalization of the modalities.

      The draft of this MoU will serve as basis for other third countries arrangements on the coexistence of complaints mechanisms, such as the case for Montenegro.”

      An extra article 3

      The agreements with Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia contain an article not included in the agreements with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. From article 3, on launching an action:

      “The Agency may propose launching an action to the competent authorities of [the host state].

      The competent authorities of [the host state] may also request the Agency to consider launching an action.”

      The launching of any action requires the consent of competent authorities of the host-state and of Frontex (Article 3(2) of the status agreements), while any disputes over the content of the status agreements shall be resolved between the non-EU state in question and the European Commission (Article 11).

      Privileges and immunities of the members of the team

      Members of teams deployed in each of the host states shall enjoy immunity from the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of the host state, for all acts carried out in the exercise of official functions, where these are committed in the course of actions contained in the operational plan (articles 6 or 7). It is at the discretion of the executive director of Frontex (currently Fabrice Leggeri) to determine whether acts were committed in the course of actions following the operational plan. This immunity may be waived by the team members’ home state – that is to say, the state of nationality of a Frontex team member, such as Spain or Germany.

      While the agreements with Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia include the provision that the executive director’s decision will be binding upon the authorities of the host state, no such article is found in the agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.

      A further difficulty with this article was highlighted earlier this year in an internal Frontex report: Protocol No 7 annexed to the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU, under which the privileges and immunities Agency and its statutory staff are covered, is not applicable outside of the EU. The Commission has not yet responded to a request for comment on an investigation said to be underway into this issue.

      Acting on behalf of the host non-EU state

      Across the status agreements, members of the teams are limited to performing tasks and exercising powers in the host territory in the presence and under instructions of the host state’s border guards or other relevant authorities. The host state may authorise members of teams to act on its behalf, taking into consideration the views of the agency via its coordinating officer. The agreement with Serbia contains extra emphasis (article 5):

      “the competent authority of the Republic of Serbia may authorise members of the teams to act on its behalf as long as the overall responsibility and command and control functions remain with the border guards or other police officers of the Republic of Serbia present at all times.”

      This agreement also emphasises that “the members of the team referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 to 6 do not include agency staff”.

      Members of teams shall be authorised to use force, including service weapons as permitted by the host state, home state, and Frontex. Each host state may authorise members of the team to use force in the absence of border guards or other relevant staff under article 4 (6) – Albania and Bosnia and Herzegoviina – or 5 (6) – Montenegro,

      Access to databases

      The agreements with Albania and Montenegro allow the host state to authorise members of the team to consult national databases if necessary for the operational aims or for return operations. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s status agreements are more cautious, allowing certain data from national databases to be shared at the request of a member of the team, provided it is needed to fulfil operational aims as outlined in the operational plan. The agreement with Serbia contains, once more, additional provisions: “members of the team may be communicated only information concerning relevant facts which is necessary for performing their tasks and exercising their powers”, though it also includes in the subsequent paragraph:

      “For the purposes of fulfilling operational aims specified in the operation plan and the implementing actions, the competent authority of the Republic of Serbia and members of the team may exchange other information and findings”.

      Language on discrimination

      The agreement with Serbia once again follows slightly different wording to the others in terms of the prohibition of discrimination. The agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia recite:

      “While performing their tasks and exercising their powers, they shall not arbitrarily discriminate against persons on any grounds including sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, sexual orientation or gender identity.”

      However, the agreement with Serbia does not include (https://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/july/eu-frontex-in-the-balkans-serbian-government-rejects-eu-s-criminal-immun) any reference to gender identity.

      Obligation to give evidence as witnesses in criminal proceedings

      Under each of the agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Serbia, members of the team shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses. Not only does the agreement with Montenegro omit this provision, it also outlines:

      “Members of the team who are witnesses may be obliged by the competent authorities of Montenegro, while respecting paragraphs 3 and 4, to provide evidence through a statement and in accordance with the procedural law of Montenegro.”

      Frontex and home state obligation not to jeopardise criminal proceedings

      The agreement with Serbia is the only agreement not to include an obligation on the agency and home state of a team member to “refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardise possible subsequent criminal prosecution of the member of the team by the competent authorities” of the host non-EU state.

      Lingering uncertainty

      On top of uncertainty over when the agreements with North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina might be completed, questions remain regarding the accessibility of complaints mechanisms and the application of rules governing privileges and immunity of team members, even in Albania and Montenegro, where operations have been launched already.

      Additionally, since the entry into force of its new regulation in 2019 and the removal of provisions limiting Frontex’s extra-EU operations only to neighbouring states, the EU can now conclude status agreements with countries not bordering the EU. The implementation of these agreements, as well as their contents, will likely set a precedent for negotiations and operations further afield.

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu
      #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #buffer-zone #zone-tampon

    • Albania: dealing with a new migration framework on the edge of the empire

      In 2014, Albania was formally accepted as a candidate for membership to the EU. The country is aiming to approximate its domestic law with the EU legal ’acquis’ within the next two years, prompting big changes in the country’s immigration and asylum system - at least on paper. Currently, those systems cannot be said to meet fundamental rights or EU legal standards, but given conditions within the EU itself - notably in Greece - it remains to be seen whether this will be a barrier to Albania joining the bloc.

      Background

      In the 1990s Albania, a small country in the middle of the Balkans, was just emerging from a harsh communist dictatorship. In 1991, a new era in Europe began for the country, as it opened diplomatic relationships with the then-European Community. But it was not until 2014 that Albania was formally accepted as a candidate for membership of the EU, following the endorsement of the European Council.[1]

      In that time, the European Community had evolved into the fortress of the European Union, its borders and expansion reminiscent of the spread of the Roman Empire. Speaking of the EU’s borders, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte has even commented, “big empires go down if the external borders are not well-protected”.[2] Since 2014, Albania has been racing to fulfil all the requirements needed to be accepted among the fabulous 27, making major changes in the five main areas identified by the EU: public administration, rule of law, tackling corruption, organised crime and fundamental rights.

      In February 2018, the European Commission declared that further enlargement to encompass the states of the ‘Western Balkans’ (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo) would be “an investment in the EU’s security, economic growth and influence and in its ability to protect its citizens”.[3] In short, the EU was presenting a so-called win-win agreement, where all sides stand to gain.

      In March 2020 – following a limping reform of the justice system, some destabilizing stop-and-go of talks between the EU and Albania, a gloomy summer election crisis in 2019, German concerns, a temporary French veto and a devastating earthquake in November 2019 – the EU finally said ‘I do’ and committed to opening accession negotiations with Albania, in a statement that underscored the need to ‘keep an eye’ on the country:

      “The Council further invites the Commission to continue to monitor the progress and compliance in all areas related to the opening of negotiations and to carry out and complete the process of analytical examination of the EU acquis with the country, starting with the fundamentals’ cluster”.[4]

      Aligning Albania with the EU’s “area of freedom, security and justice”

      The current ‘Project Plan for European integration 2020-2022’[5] lists all the legislative reforms and changes required to align Albanian and EU law. The full approximation of Albanian law with that of the European Union, and its full and effective implementation, is one of the criteria for membership. Indeed, the process of membership negotiations is in itself that process of approximation.

      The process involves the following steps: analysis of EU legislation; identification of deficiencies or contradictory acts of Albanian law; drafting or reviewing of the approximated Albanian acts; and monitoring the implementation of approximated legislation. The 24th chapter of the plan, on “justice, freedom and security”, focuses on: border control; visas; external migration; asylum; police cooperation; the fight against organised crime and terrorism; cooperation on drugs issues; customs; and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters.

      Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the area of Freedom, Security and Justice is regulated in Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, running from Article 67 to Article 89.[6] This covers secondary legislation on: border checks, asylum and immigration; police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; judicial cooperation in civil matters; and police cooperation. Primary and secondary legislation is complemented by a large body of jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU, whose primacy is a cornerstone principle of EU law. The acquis inherited by Albania for this specific chapter consists of a volume of 392 acts, divided into a “hard acquis” (which derives from binding acts such as treaties, directives, regulations, etc.) and a “soft acquis” (which derives from standards, principles and recommendations of EU or other relevant international organizations).

      Updating the laws on immigration and borders

      The government affirms to have completed and adopted a comprehensive national cross-sectoral migration strategy, included a new strategy on the diaspora for the period 2018-2024.[7] The government also says it has updated a contingency plan for a possible massive influx of migrants and asylum seekers, expected to be approved soon. But the other side of the coin is that Albania, as the project plan admits, is largely unprepared to host and protect migrants on its territory. Albania currently has one reception centre for irregular migrants in Karreç, with a capacity of only 150 beds. The centre was visited in September 2019 by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which found it to be inadequate in many respects.[8] Even more concerning is the lack of facilities for unaccompanied minors.

      According to a footnote in a 2016 law,[9] Albania’s border control legislation has been aligned with the Schengen Borders Code.[10] However, it appears that the wider legal framework for managing Albania’s external borders is not yet fully in line with EU standards. The government reports that the implementation of the integrated border management strategy and action plan is proceeding: the reconstruction of the two border crossing points Hani i Hotit and Morina has been completed; the country has signed a protocol with Montenegro on the establishment of joint checkpoints; the trilateral centre in Plav (in Northern Macedonia) has become operational; an agreement with Kosovo on the joint border crossing point in Morina has been concluded; anti-corruption preventive measures have been implemented at border crossing points through the installation of cameras; and cooperation between agencies and neighbouring countries has improved.

      Frontex: already on the scene

      The section of the government’s report on regular and irregular immigration states that the agreement with the EU permitting the deployment of Frontex officials on Albanian territory was finalised in February 2019.[11] The deployment began on 22 May 2019, for an indefinite period.[12]

      The joint operation – Frontex’s first outside the EU – deploys 50 EU officers in Albania to “help Albanian authorities with border surveillance and border checks… They will also assist their Albanian counterparts in screening of migrants”.[13] This is not the first time that an EU presence has been active on Albanian territory – an Italian operation in 1997 sought to prevent migration, and there have also been monitoring missions. However, the Frontex presence is an executive mission, marking a more active departure from the monitoring exercises of the past.[14]

      The Albanian Minister of Internal Affairs, Sander Lleshaj, has described the operation as “really effective, very collaborative… crucial in the way to EU integration”.[15] The Prime Minister, Edi Rama, has said the operation makes Albania a contributor to the EU in countering illegal migration and organised crime.[16] The Albanian press has so far expressed an uncritical view of the Frontex mission. In a state where many are supportive of EU accession, appetite for critical investigation is possibly low.

      And asylum?

      Albania reports that its Asylum Law is partially in line with the EU acquis. The country has the necessary institutions and procedures to handle asylum applications. Complaints can be filed with the National Commission for Refugees and Asylum, which was established in 2017 and reopened in 2019. All relevant national legislation should be publicly available on the government website,[17] but the information available does not clarify if complaints related to the application process are admissible, or if the word “complaints” refers to appeals related to unsuccessful applications. Regarding the asylum procedure, applications are registered by the Border and Migration Police by filling out the pre-screening forms, then reported to the Directorate of Asylum and Citizenship to proceed with the status determination procedures.

      Although the number of asylum seekers increased significantly in 2018, with 5,730 arrivals, the authorities say they have responded to the large number of asylum applications. According to UNHCR asylum applications that year increased to 4,378, a 14-fold increase compared to 2017.[18] Albania’s official Gazette outlined in March 2020 that the number of people applying for asylum was at its highest in 2018, and 40 times higher than it had been in 2015.[19] According to the Project Plan for European integration, an asylum database has been functioning since April 2019; it serves as an integral data centre between the Directorate of Asylum and Citizenship, the Directorate of Border and Migration and the National Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers, exchanging information in real time between these institutions and enabling the completion of procedures as well as the issuance of statistics.

      The government also says it tripled its reception capacity for asylum seekers in October 2017. Total reception capacity, including the national reception centre in Tirana and the temporary accommodation centres in Gjirokastra and Korça, reaches almost 380 places. In October 2019, a new centre with a reception capacity of 60 beds was inaugurated to cope with the expected increase of people needing temporary housing in Kapshticë/Korça,[20] which has the same parameters as the transit centre in Gërhot of Gjirokastra.

      Summary

      Both Albania and the EU have undergone a transformative thirty years, with talks of accession beginning six years ago. The EU sees Albania’s incorporation into the bloc as a way of contributing to the economic growth and strengthened security; a different understanding of “expanding the fortress”. Accession negotiations were reinvigorated in March 2020, and the current goal is for Albania to approximate its law to the EU acquis, and implement those measures, within two years. This includes legislation on immigration and borders, which have been updated on paper. Though conditions for asylum seekers and migrants in Albania are not in line with fundamental rights law or the EU acquis, nor are those in EU member states – most notably the Greek island hotspots. The deployment of the EU’s border agency in Albania, unlikely to be criticised locally, represents further step in the EU’s mission to control migration across a wider terrain.

      Sara Ianovitz, Ph.D. in International Law

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/albania-dealing-with-a-new-migration-framework-on-the-edge-of-the-empire

      #Albanie

    • Foreign agents and violence against migrants at the Greek-Macedonian border

      An increasing number of reports of violent pushbacks at the Greek-Macedonian border have been collected by volunteers in recent years. Some reports allege the presence of Frontex, but bilateral policing deals in place may also explain the presence of foreign officers in Macedonia. The violence underpins a long-standing plan to close the ‘Balkan Route’ and keep people out of ‘core’ EU territory. Whoever is behind the violence, there is no shortage of border guards to mete it out – but justice is in short supply.

      Midnight in Macedonia

      Around midnight on 14 August last year, a group of some 20 people were intercepted by border police just north of the Greek-Macedonian border, near the small town of Gevgelija. What happened next, according to the testimony of one member of the group, makes for grim reading.

      “[T]he police officers approached the group and became physically violent. The officers struck various group-members with their batons. Others were pepper-sprayed, including the women and children. After this, the officers loaded the group into a van and left them there without any air conditioning, jammed, soaking in sweat for around two hours, while going about to catch more transit groups. In the end, they squashed around 40 people in a van for fit for ten persons.”[1]

      Macedonian officials were not the only ones involved in the operation. The testimony also recounts “foreign officers wearing uniforms with the European Union flags on their shoulders,” the distinctive mark of EU border agency Frontex.

      Foreign agents

      The testimony is one of five reports gathered by Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), altogether involving some 130 people, that describe violence being meted out in the presence of, or even by, border guards allegedly deployed by Frontex on North Macedonian territory. A further 10 reports gathered by the network, encompassing some 123 people, recount the use of violence by foreign border guards and police officers operating in North Macedonia, but do not mention uniforms bearing the EU flag.[2]

      Statewatch and Border Violence Monitoring Network have written to Frontex to demand an investigation into the allegations recounted in this article. Read more here.

      The violence recounted in those testimonies is shocking. According to the report on the 14 August incident, after cramming people into the van, the police drove them to the banks of the Vardar river. There, they threw peoples’ possessions into the water, took their phones and money, and “the group was beaten brutally with metal electroshock batons and some people were thrown into the river by the police. One person was thrown in despite crying and begging not to be thrown in.” They were subsequently taken back to the border and pushed through a gate leading to the Greek side, while police beat them with electroshock batons.

      In that incident, the witness said that officials with uniforms bearing EU flags were present, but did not directly participate in the violence. But a report from the same area, concerning an incident less than a week later, refers to officials in uniforms bearing Croatian, Slovenian, Czech and EU flags, who bound a group of four men with zip ties and beat three of them with batons (one of the group, who was a minor, was spared the beating).[3] Reports of other incidents allege the presence of Italian, German and Austrian officials.

      No reports at Frontex

      While BVMN volunteers have gathered multiple testimonies that allege Frontex’s presence or involvement in violence in North Macedonia, the agency itself says it has received no reports of any such incidents. The agency also denies any presence in the country – in May, a press officer told Statewatch that “Frontex does not have any operational activities at the land border from the North Macedonian side,” and “is only present on the Greek side of the border.”

      In December 2020, Frontex responded to an access to documents request filed by Statewatch some months earlier. The request sought copies of all serious incident reports (SIRs) concerning the agency’s activities at the Greek-Macedonian land border from 1 January 2020 onwards. SIRs are supposed to be filed by officials deployed on Frontex operations for a variety of reasons, including in case of “suspected violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations.”[4]

      In its response, the agency said that it did not hold any SIRs concerning the geographic area and time period covered by the request. This does not mean, however, that the incidents recorded by BVMN did not take place – it may simply be that nobody is reporting them.

      A working group set up by Frontex’s own Management Board, in response to allegations of involvement in pushbacks in Greece, found numerous problems with the agency’s reporting system. It noted that there was no way of monitoring the quality of reports submitted, and there were no confidential avenues for team members to report rights violations by their colleagues.

      The report also called for “a newly introduced culture,” suggesting that the existing ambience at the agency is not one in which the rights of migrants and refugees are at the forefront of officials’ minds. The working group said that the agency needed “awareness of and sensitiveness towards possible misconduct,”[5] a call it repeated in its final report.[6]

      Not even numbers

      Serious incident reports may not exist, but the request from Statewatch to Frontex also sought to establish the scale of the agency’s activities at the Greek-Macedonian border through another means – by requesting data on the number of migrants and migrant smugglers apprehended at the Greek-Macedonian border over the same period (1 January 2020 onwards).

      This data, argued Frontex, could not be released – doing so “would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the activities of such networks,” despite the request seeking nothing more than figures that Frontex itself has published in previous reports.

      A public evaluation of the tongue-twistingly titled ‘Joint Operation Flexible Operational Activities 2018 Land on Border Surveillance’ (JO FOA Land) says that in 2018, 16,337 migrants and 313 smugglers were apprehended in the area covered by the operation – “the ‘green borders’ of Greece with Turkey, the North Macedonia [sic] and Albania, Bulgaria with Turkey, North Macedonia and Serbia.”[7] Yet for reasons known only to Frontex, providing a breakdown of these figures for the Greek-Macedonian border would apparently undermine public security.

      A significant presence

      According to Frontex’s evaluation report, 25 member states took part in operations at land borders in south-eastern Europe in 2018, along with 47 officers acting as observers from six different “third countries”, namely Georgia, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. Over 1,800 officials were deployed by Frontex over the course of the year. The operations recorded 2,011 “incidents”.

      A substantial Frontex presence at the border between Greece and North Macedonia has been in place since then. In a response to a parliamentary question from German MEP Özlem Demirel, the European Commission said last June that at Greece’s land borders with Bulgaria, North Macedonia and Turkey, 71 officials, 24 patrols and three “thermo-vision vans” were deployed as part of the 2020 edition of JO FOA Land. Thirteen different member states were providing contributions to the operation: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain.[8]

      While Frontex denies any physical presence on North Macedonia territory, the testimonies gathered by BVMN that allege the presence or participation of Frontex officials in violent acts raise serious questions for the agency. All the testimonies concern incidents that took place in North Macedonia, where the agency has no legal basis to operate. An agreement between the EU and North Macedonia that would permit Frontex deployments, similar to those currently in place with Montenegro and Albania, is facing hold-ups due to objections from the Bulgarian authorities.[9]

      Bilateral agreements

      Frontex operations are not the only deployments of foreign officials in North Macedonia. As noted above, nine of the 15 reports gathered by BVMN describing the involvement of non-Macedonian officers in pushbacks to Greece make no mention of Frontex at all. There are, however, multiple references to violence being meted out by officials in uniforms bearing the flags of Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany and Serbia.

      The presence of some of these officials in the country is made possible by bilateral border control agreements. North Macedonia has cooperation agreements with eight other states in the region (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Serbia), who provide the Macedonian authorities “with assistance from foreign police officers in patrolling the south border with Greece and in performing their daily duties.”[10] The agreement with Austria, Hungary and Serbia has come in for particular criticism, as it is a memorandum of understanding rather than a formal agreement, and therefore has faced no parliamentary scrutiny in Macedonia.[11] Germany, meanwhile, does not appear to have such a formal agreement with North Macedonia at the federal level – which makes the allegations of the presence of German officers puzzling – but the EU’s largest state has provided a ready supply of equipment, including vehicles, mobile thermal imaging cameras, boots and torches.[12]

      The Croatian and Czech governments have made extensive deployments under these agreements. Between December 2015 (when Croatia and North Macedonia signed a police cooperation deal) and February 2019 “over 560 Croatian police… intercepted almost 6,000 illegal migrants in North Macedonia.”[13] The Czech deployments have been even larger – by December 2019, “1,147 police officers [had] been sent to North Macedonia” to police the border with Greece, according to the Czech government.[14]

      High-level police coordination preceded the signing of many of these agreements. In July 2016, the police chiefs of 12 states said that “the deployment of foreign police officers along borders which are strongly affected by irregular migration conveys a strong message that the countries concerned are resolute in jointly coping with the migration crisis.”[15] Under the agreements with Macedonia, foreign officials can “use technical equipment and vehicles with symbols, wear uniforms, carry weapons and other means of coercion”.[16] In some instances, it seems coercion tips over into outright violence.

      An incident dating from 16 August 2020, recorded by BVMN volunteers, refers to officers “with black ski masks over their faces” and “Croatian and Czech flags emblazoned on their uniforms.” The interviewees said that “these officers were violent with them – kicking the group, destroying their mobile phones, taking their money, insulting them, pushing their faces on the ground with tied hands behind the back. One of the respondents was also attacked by a dog, while the officers [were] laughing at him.”[17] As far back as March 2016, an activist supporting refugees at the increasingly well-guarded Greek-Macedonian border told the newspaper Lidovky that, in Macedonia, “the Czech police are known for violence and unprofessionalism.”[18]

      Buffer states in the Balkans

      Bilateral cooperation between EU states and North Macedonia extends far beyond these police cooperation agreements. In September 2020, the German Presidency of the Council of the EU described the region stretching from Turkey to Hungary (known in official jargon as the “Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans”) as being “of great strategic importance for the EU in terms of migration management.”[19] Significant attention is therefore being given to reinforcing the ability of states in the region to control peoples’ movements (an issue highlighted in another recent Statewatch report).

      As of May 2020, 15 EU member states were providing bilateral “support” on migration issues to states in the Western Balkans through a total of 228 activities, according to a survey carried out by the Croatian Presidency of the Council of the EU. The majority of that support was focused on control measures, “namely border management and combating the smuggling of migrants (over 50% of all MS activities),” said a summary produced by the Presidency. More than 50% of the 228 activities were taking place in Serbia and North Macedonia, both of which border EU territory.[20]

      The Croatian Presidency highlighted the “geopolitical importance” of those two countries, given that “Member States’ focus is on the prevention of irregular migratory movements to the EU.” This was “both expected and understandable, but may contribute to strengthening the Western Balkan partners’ self-perception as a transit region, which poses a challenge for the further improvement of all aspects of their migration capacities.” Rather than a transit region, the plan is to provide ‘capacity-building’ and technical assistance to develop buffer states that can keep people out of the ‘core’ of the EU after they depart from Greece.

      This is, of course, not a new plan. In February and March 2016, as the EU-Turkey deal was heading for agreement and in the wake of the arrival of hundreds of thousands of people travelling by foot, road and rail to the ‘core’ of the EU, the ‘Balkan Route’ was declared closed by EU leaders. Initially done on the crude, discriminatory basis of nationality,[21] exclusion measures were extended to apply to all those crossing borders in the region. That process of closure continues today, and violence is a longstanding component of the strategy.[22] Indeed, it is a prerequisite for it to work effectively, and has been denounced repeatedly over the years by NGOs and international organisations. In March 2016, the Macedonian authorities sought supplies of pepper spray, tasers, rubber bullets, “special bomb (shock, with rubber balls)” and “acoustic device to break the mob.”[23] The concern now may be with smaller groups of people attempting to pass through the country, rather than with “the mob”, but the violence is no less brutal.

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/foreign-agents-and-violence-against-migrants-at-the-greek-macedonian-bor

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • Militarisation des frontières en #Mer_Egée

    En Mer Egée c’est exactement la même stratégie qui se met en place, et notamment à #Samos, où une #zeppelin (#zeppelin_de_surveillance) de #Frontex surveillera le détroit entre l’île et la côte turque, afin de signaler tout départ de bateaux. L’objectif est d’arrêter « à temps » les embarcations des réfugiés en les signalant aux garde-corps turques. Comme l’a dit le vice-ministre de l’immigration Koumoutsakos « on saura l’heure de départ de l’embarcation, on va en informer les turques, on s’approcher du bateau... »
    S’approcher pourquoi faire, sinon, pour le repousser vers la côte turque ?
    Le fonctionnement de la montgolfière sera confié aux garde-cotes et à la police grecque, l’opération restant sous le contrôle de Frontex.

    –-> reçu via la mailing-list de Migreurop, le 30.07.2017

    #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Turquie #Grèce #migrations #réfugiés #asile #police #gardes-côtes #surveillance

    –-----------

    Commentaire de Martin Clavey sur twitter :

    Cynisme absolu : Frontex utilise des drones pour surveiller les migrants en méditerranée ce qui permet à l’Union européenne de ne pas utiliser de bateau de surveillance et donc ne pas être soumis au #droit_maritime et à avoir à les sauver

    https://twitter.com/mart1oeil/status/1158396604648493058

    • Σε δοκιμαστική λειτουργία το αερόσταστο της FRONTEX

      Σε δοκιμαστική λειτουργία τίθεται από σήμερα για 28 ημέρες το αερόστατο της FRONTEX στη Σάμο, μήκους 35 μέτρων, προσδεμένο στο έδαφος, εξοπλισμένο με ραντάρ, θερμική κάμερα και σύστημα αυτόματης αναγνώρισης, το οποίο θα επιτηρεί αδιάλειπτα και σε πραγματικό χρόνο το θαλάσσιο πεδίο.

      Σύμφωνα με ανακοίνωση του Λιμενικού, στόχος είναι η αστυνόμευση του θαλάσσιου πεδίου και η καταπολέμηση του διασυνοριακού εγκλήματος. Δημιουργείται ωστόσο το ερώτημα αν οι πληροφορίες που θα συλλέγει το αερόστατο θα χρησιμοποιούνται για την αναχαίτιση ή την αποτροπή των πλεούμενων των προσφύγων που ξεκινούν από τα τουρκικά παράλια για να ζητήσουν διεθνή προστασία στην Ευρώπη.

      « Πρώτα απ’ όλα ξέρεις τι ώρα φεύγει από τους διακινητές το σκάφος, ενημερώνεις την τουρκική πλευρά, πηγαίνεις εσύ κοντά, δηλαδή είναι ένα σύνολο ενεργειών » σημείωνε την περασμένη εβδομάδα σε συνέντευξή του στον ΑΝΤ1 ο αναπληρωτής υπουργός Μεταναστευτικής Πολιτικής Γιώργος Κουμουτσάκος, μιλώντας για τα αποτελέσματα που αναμένεται να έχει το αερόστατο στην ενίσχυση της επιτήρησης των συνόρων.

      Το Λιμενικό είναι η πρώτη ακτοφυλακή κράτους-μέλους της Ε.Ε. που χρησιμοποιεί αερόστατο για την επιτήρηση της θάλασσας, δέκα μήνες μετά την πρώτη παρόμοια πανευρωπαϊκή χρήση μη επανδρωμένου αεροσκάφους μεσαίου ύψους μακράς εμβέλειας.

      « Αυτό καταδεικνύει την ισχυρή και ξεκάθαρη βούληση του Λ.Σ.-ΕΛ.ΑΚΤ. να καταβάλει κάθε δυνατή προσπάθεια, χρησιμοποιώντας τη διαθέσιμη τεχνολογία αιχμής, για την αποτελεσματική φύλαξη των εξωτερικών θαλάσσιων συνόρων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης, την πάταξη κάθε μορφής εγκληματικότητας καθώς και την προστασία της ανθρώπινης ζωής στη θάλασσα », σημειώνει το Λιμενικό.

      Η λειτουργία του αερόστατου εντάσσεται στην επιχείρηση « Ποσειδών » που συντονίζουν το Λιμενικό και η ΕΛ.ΑΣ. υπό την επιτήρηση της FRONTEX.

      Παράλληλα, στο νησί θα τεθεί σε λειτουργία φορτηγό εξοπλισμένο με παρόμοια συστήματα, προκειμένου να μπορούν να συγκριθούν τα αποτελέσματα και η λειτουργία του επίγειου και του εναέριου συστήματος.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/205553_se-dokimastiki-leitoyrgia-aerostasto-tis-frontex

    • Zeppelin over the island of Samos to monitor migrants trafficking

      Greek authorities and the Frontex will release a huge surveillance Zeppelin above the island of Samos to monitor migrants who illegally try to reach Greece and Europe. The installation of the ominous balloon will be certainly a grotesque attraction for the tourists who visit the island in the East Aegean Sea.

      Deputy Minister of Migration Policy Giorgos Koumoutsakos told private ANT1 TV that the Zeppelin will go in operation next week.

      “In Samos, at some point, I think it’s a matter of days or a week, a Zeppelin balloon will be installed in cooperation with FRONTEX, which will take a picture of a huge area. What does that mean? First of all, you know what time the ship moves away from the traffickers, inform the Turkish side, you go near, that is a set of actions,” Koumoutsakos said.

      The Zeppelin will be monitored by the GNR radar unit of the Frontext located at the port of Karlovasi, samiakienimerosi notes adding “It will give a picture of movements between the Turkish coast to Samos for the more effective guarding of our maritime borders.”

      The Deputy Minister did not elaborate on what exactly can the Greek Port Authority do when it comes “near” to the refugee and migrants boats.

      According to daily efimerida ton syntakton, the Norwegian NGO, Aegean Boat Report, revealed a video shot on July 17. The video shows how a Greek Coast Guard vessel approaches a boat with 34 people on board and leaves them at the open sea to be “collected” by Turkish authorities, while the passengers, among them 14 children, desperately are shouting “Not to Turkey!”

      It is not clear, whether the Greek Coast Guard vessel is in international waters as such vessels do not enter Turkish territorial waters. According to international law, the passengers ought to be rescued. The Greek Coast Guard has so far not taken position on the issue, saying it will need to evaluate the video first, efsyn notes.

      “There is no push backs. Everything will be done in accordance with the international law. Greece will do nothing beyond the international law,” Koumoutsakos stressed.

      PS I suppose, tourists will be cheered to have their vacation activities monitored by a plastic Big Brother. Not?

      https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2019/07/26/zeppelin-samos-migrants-refugees

    • Once migrants on Mediterranean were saved by naval patrols. Now they have to watch as #drones fly over
      https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/8a92adecf247b04c801a67a612766ee753738437/0_109_4332_2599/master/4332.jpg?width=605&quality=85&auto=format&fit=max&s=c0051d5e4fff6aff063c70

      Amid the panicked shouting from the water and the smell of petrol from the sinking dinghy, the noise of an approaching engine briefly raises hope. Dozens of people fighting for their lives in the Mediterranean use their remaining energy to wave frantically for help. Nearly 2,000 miles away in the Polish capital, Warsaw, a drone operator watches their final moments via a live transmission. There is no ship to answer the SOS, just an unmanned aerial vehicle operated by the European border and coast guard agency, Frontex.

      This is not a scene from some nightmarish future on Europe’s maritime borders but a present-day probability. Frontex, which is based in Warsaw, is part of a £95m investment by the EU in unmanned aerial vehicles, the Observer has learned.

      This spending has come as the EU pulls back its naval missions in the Mediterranean and harasses almost all search-and-rescue charity boats out of the water. Frontex’s surveillance drones are flying over waters off Libya where not a single rescue has been carried out by the main EU naval mission since last August, in what is the deadliest stretch of water in the world.

      The replacement of naval vessels, which can conduct rescues, with drones, which cannot, is being condemned as a cynical abrogation of any European role in saving lives.

      “There is no obligation for drones to be equipped with life-saving appliances and to conduct rescue operations,” said a German Green party MEP, Erik Marquardt. “You need ships for that, and ships are exactly what there is a lack of at the moment.” This year the death rate for people attempting the Mediterranean crossing has risen from a historical average of 2% to as high as 14% last month. In total, 567 of the estimated 8,362 people who have attempted it so far this year have died.

      Gabriele Iacovino, director of one of Italy’s leading thinktanks, the Centre for International Studies, said the move into drones was “a way to spend money without having the responsibility to save lives”. Aerial surveillance without ships in the water amounted to a “naval mission without a naval force”, and was about avoiding embarrassing political rows in Europe over what to do with rescued migrants.

      Since March the EU’s main naval mission in the area, Operation Sophia, has withdrawn its ships from waters where the majority of migrant boats have sunk. While Sophia was not primarily a search-and-rescue mission, it was obliged under international and EU law to assist vessels in distress. The switch to drones is part of an apparent effort to monitor the Mediterranean without being pulled into rescue missions that deliver migrants to European shores.

      Marta Foresti, director of the Human Mobility Initiative at the Overseas Development Institute, an influential UK thinktank, said Europe had replaced migration policy with panic, with potentially lethal consequences. “We panicked in 2015 and that panic has turned into security budgets,” she said. “Frontex’s budget has doubled with very little oversight or design. It’s a knee-jerk reaction.”

      The strategy has seen Frontex, based in Warsaw, and its sister agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, based in Lisbon, invest in pilotless aerial vehicles. The Observer has found three contracts – two under EMSA and one under Frontex – totalling £95m for drones that can supply intelligence to Frontex.

      The models include the Hermes, made by Elbit Systems, Israel’s biggest privately owned arms manufacturer, and the Heron, produced by Israel Aerospace Industries, a state-owned company. Both models were developed for use in combat missions in the occupied Palestinian territory of Gaza. Frontex said its drone suppliers met all “EU procurement rules and guidelines”.

      There is mounting concern both over how Frontex is spending EU taxpayers’ money and how it can be held accountable. The migration panic roiling Europe’s politics has been a boon for a once unfashionable EU outpost that coordinated national coastal and border guards. Ten years ago Frontex’s budget was £79m. In the latest budget cycle it has been awarded £10.4bn.

      Demand from member states for its services have largely been driven by its role in coordinating and carrying out deportations. The expansion of the deportation machine has caused concern among institutions tasked with monitoring the forced returns missions: a group of national ombudsmen, independent watchdogs appointed in all EU member states to safeguard human rights, has announced plans to begin its own independent monitoring group. The move follows frustration with the way their reports on past missions have been handled by Frontex.

      Andreas Pottakis, Greece’s ombudsman, is among those calling for an end to the agency policing itself: “Internal monitoring of Frontex by Frontex cannot substitute for the need for external monitoring by independent bodies. This is the only way the demand for transparency can be met and that the EU administration can effectively be held into account.”
      Acting to extradite helpless civilians to the hands of Libyan militias may amount to criminal liability

      The Frontex Consultative Forum, a body offering strategic advice to Frontex’s management board on how the agency can improve respect for fundamental rights, has also severely criticised it for a sloppy approach to accountability. An online archive of all Frontex operations, which was used by independent researchers, was recently removed.

      The switch to drones in the Mediterranean has also led to Frontex being accused of feeding intelligence on the position of migrant boats to Libya’s coast guards so they can intercept and return them to Libya. Although it receives EU funds, the Libyan coast guard remains a loosely defined outfit that often overlaps with smuggling gangs and detention centre owners.

      “The Libyan coast guard never patrols the sea,” said Tamino Böhm of the German rescue charity Sea-Watch. “They never leave port unless there is a boat to head to for a pullback. This means the information they have comes from the surveillance flights of Italy, Frontex and the EU.”

      A Frontex spokesperson said that incidents related to boats in distress were passed to the “responsible rescue coordination centre and to the neighbouring ones for situational awareness and potential coordination”. Thus the maritime rescue coordination centre in Rome has begun to share information with its Libyan counterpart in Tripoli, under the instructions of Italy’s far-right interior minister, Matteo Salvini.

      The EU is already accused of crimes against humanity in a submission before the International Criminal Court for “orchestrating a policy of forced transfer to concentration camp-like detention facilities [in Libya] where atrocious crimes are committed”.

      The case, brought by lawyers based in Paris, seeks to demonstrate that many of the people intercepted have faced human rights abuses ranging from slavery to torture and murder after being returned to Libya.

      Omer Shatz, an Israeli who teaches at Sciences Po university in Paris, and one of the two lawyers who brought the ICC case, said Frontex drone operators could be criminally liable for aiding pullbacks. “A drone operator that is aware of a migrant boat in distress is obliged to secure fundamental rights to life, body integrity, liberty and dignity. This means she has to take actions intended to search, rescue and disembark those rescued at safe port. Acting to extradite helpless vulnerable civilians to the hands of Libyan militias may amount to criminal liability.”

      Under international law, migrants rescued at sea by European vessels cannot be returned to Libya, where conflict and human rights abuses mean the UN has stated there is no safe port. Under the UN convention on the law of the sea (Unclos) all ships are obliged to report an encounter with a vessel in distress and offer assistance. This is partly why EU naval missions that were not mandated to conduct rescue missions found themselves pitched into them regardless.

      Drones, however, operate in a legal grey zone not covered by Unclos. The situation for private contractors to EU agencies, as in some of the current drone operations, is even less clear.

      Frontex told the Observer that all drone operators, staff or private contractors are subject to EU laws that mandate the protection of human life. The agency said it was unable to share a copy of the mission instructions given to drone operators that would tell them what to do in the event of encountering a boat in distress, asking the Observer to submit a freedom of information request. The agency said drones had encountered boats in distress on only four occasions – all in June this year – in the central Mediterranean, and that none had led to a “serious incident report” – Frontex jargon for a red flag. When EU naval vessels were deployed in similar areas in previous years, multiple serious incidents were reported every month, according to documents seen by the Observer.

      https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/04/drones-replace-patrol-ships-mediterranean-fears-more-migrant-deaths

      #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Libye

    • L’uso dei droni per guardare i migranti che affogano mette a nudo tutta la disumanità delle pratiche di controllo sui confini

      In troppi crediamo al mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la realtà macchiata di sangue.

      “Se avessi ignorato quelle grida di aiuto, non avrei mai più trovato il coraggio di affrontare il mare”.

      Con queste parole il pescatore siciliano Carlo Giarratano ha commentato la sua decisione di sfidare il “decreto sicurezza” del Governo italiano, che prevede sanzioni o l’arresto nei confronti di chiunque trasporti in Italia migranti soccorsi in mare.

      La sua storia è un esempio della preoccupante tensione che si è creata ai confini della “Fortezza Europa” in materia di leggi e regolamenti. Secondo il diritto internazionale, il capitano di un’imbarcazione in mare è tenuto a fornire assistenza alle persone in difficoltà, “a prescindere dalla nazionalità o dalla cittadinanza delle persone stesse”. Al contempo, molti paesi europei, e la stessa UE, stanno cercando di limitare questo principio e queste attività, malgrado il tragico bilancio di morti nel Mediterraneo, in continua crescita.

      L’Agenzia di Confine e Guardia Costiera Europea, Frontex, sembra aver escogitato una soluzione ingegnosa: i droni. L’obbligo legale di aiutare un’imbarcazione in difficoltà non si applica a un veicolo aereo senza pilota (UAV, unmanned aerial vehicle). Si può aggirare la questione, politicamente calda, su chi sia responsabile di accogliere i migranti soccorsi, se questi semplicemente non vengono proprio soccorsi. Questo principio fa parte di una consolidata tendenza a mettere in atto politiche finalizzate a impedire che i migranti attraversino il Mediterraneo. Visto l’obbligo di soccorrere le persone che ci chiedono aiuto, la soluzione sembra essere questa: fare in modo di non sentire le loro richieste.

      Jean-Claude Juncker sostiene che le politiche europee di presidio ai confini sono concepite per “stroncare il business dei trafficanti”, perché nella moralità egocentrica che ispira la politica di frontiera europea, se non ci fossero trafficanti non ci sarebbero migranti.

      Ma non ci sono trafficanti che si fabbricano migranti in officina. Se le rotte ufficiali sono bloccate, le persone vanno a cercare quelle non ufficiali. Rendere la migrazione più difficile, ha fatto aumentare la richiesta di trafficanti e scafisti, certamente non l’ha fermata. Invece che stroncare il loro business, queste politiche lo hanno creato.

      Secondo la logica della foglia di fico, l’UE sostiene di non limitarsi a lasciare affogare i migranti, ma di fornire supporto alla guardia costiera libica perché intercetti le imbarcazioni che tentano la traversata e riporti le persone nei campi di detenzione in Libia.

      Ma il rapporto del Global Detention Project, a proposito delle condizioni in questi campi, riferisce: “I detenuti sono spesso sottoposti a gravi abusi e violenze, compresi stupri e torture, estorsioni, lavori forzati, schiavitù, condizioni di vita insopportabili, esecuzioni sommarie.” Human Rights Watch, in un rapporto intitolato Senza via di fuga dall’Inferno, descrive situazioni di sovraffollamento e malnutrizione e riporta testimonianze di bambini picchiati dalle guardie.

      L’Irish Times ha riportato accuse secondo cui le milizie associate con il GNA (Governo Libico di Alleanza Nazionale, riconosciuto dall’ONU), starebbero immagazzinando munizioni in questi campi e userebbero i rifugiati come “scudi umani”. Sembra quasi inevitabile, quindi, la notizia che il 3 luglio almeno 53 rifugiati sono stati uccisi durante un attacco dei ribelli appartenenti all’Esercito Nazionale Libico, nel campo di detenzione di Tajura, vicino a Tripoli.

      Secondo una testimonianza riportata dall’Associated Press, a Tajura i migranti erano costretti a pulire le armi delle milizie fedeli al GNA, armi che erano immagazzinate nel campo. Secondo i racconti di testimoni oculari dell’attacco, riportati dalle forze ONU, le guardie del campo avrebbero aperto il fuoco su chi tentava di scappare.

      Nel mondo occidentale, quando parliamo di immigrazione, tendiamo a focalizzarci sul cosiddetto “impatto sulle comunità” causato dai flussi di nuovi arrivati che si muovono da un posto all’altro.

      Nelle nostre discussioni, ci chiediamo se i migranti portino un guadagno per l’economia oppure intacchino risorse già scarse. Raramente ci fermiamo a guardare nella sua cruda e tecnica realtà la concreta applicazione del controllo alle frontiere, quando si traduce davvero in fucili e filo spinato.

      Ci ripetiamo che i costi vanno tutti in un’unica direzione: secondo la nostra narrazione preferita, i controlli di confine sono tutti gratis, è lasciare entrare i migranti la cosa che costa. Ma i costi da pagare ci sono sempre: non solo il tributo di morti che continua a crescere o i budget multimilionari e sempre in aumento delle nostre agenzie di frontiera, ma anche i costi morali e sociali che finiamo con l’estorcere a noi stessi.

      L’ossessione per la sicurezza dei confini deve fare i conti con alcune delle più antiche e radicate convinzioni etiche proprie delle società occidentali. Prendersi cura del più debole, fare agli altri quello che vogliamo sia fatto a noi, aiutare chi possiamo. Molti uomini e donne che lavorano in mare, quando soccorrono dei naufraghi non sono spinti solo da una legge che li obbliga a prestare aiuto, ma anche da un imperativo morale più essenziale. “Lo facciamo perché siamo gente di mare”, ha detto Giarratano al Guardian, “in mare, se ci sono persone in pericolo, le salviamo”.

      Ma i nostri governi hanno deciso che questo non vale per gli europei. Come se fosse una perversa sfida lanciata a istinti morali vecchi di migliaia di anni, nell’Europa moderna un marinaio che salva un migrante mentre sta per affogare, deve essere punito.

      Infrangere queste reti di reciproche responsabilità fra gli esseri umani, ha dei costi: divisioni e tensioni sociali. Ed è un amaro paradosso, perché proprio argomenti di questo genere sono in testa alle nostre preoccupazioni percepite quando si parla di migrazioni. E mentre l’UE fa di tutto per respingere un fronte del confine verso i deserti del Nord Africa, cercando di tenere i corpi dei rifugiati abbastanza lontani da non farceli vedere da vicino, intanto l’altro fronte continua a spingere verso di noi. L’Europa diventa un “ambiente ostile” e quindi noi diventiamo un popolo ostile.

      Ci auto-ingaggiamo come guardie di confine al nostro interno. Padroni di casa, infermiere, insegnanti, manager – ogni relazione sociale deve essere controllata. Il nostro regime di “frontiera quotidiana” crea “comunità sospette” all’interno della nostra società: sono persone sospette per il solo fatto di esistere e, nei loro confronti, si possono chiamare le forze dell’ordine in ogni momento, “giusto per dare un’occhiata”.

      Il confine non è solo un sistema per tenere gli estranei fuori dalla nostra società, ma per marchiare per sempre le persone come estranee, anche all’interno e per legittimare ufficialmente il pregiudizio, per garantire che “l’integrazione” – il Sacro Graal della narrazione progressista sull’immigrazione – resti illusoria e irrealizzabile, uno scherzo crudele giocato sulla pelle di persone destinate a rimanere etichettate come straniere e sospette. La nostra società nel suo insieme si mette al servizio di questo insaziabile confine, fino a definire la sua vera e propria identità nella capacità di respingere le persone.

      Malgrado arrivino continuamente immagini e notizie di tragedie e di morti, i media evitano di collegarle con le campagne di opinione che amplificano le cosiddette “legittime preoccupazioni” della gente e le trasformano in un inattaccabile “comune buon senso”.

      I compromessi che reggono le politiche di controllo dei confini non vengono messi in luce. Questo ci permette di guardare da un’altra parte, non perché siamo crudeli ma perché non possiamo sopportare di vedere quello che stiamo facendo. Ci sono persone e gruppi che, come denuncia Adam Serwer in un articolo su The Atlantic, sono proprio “Focalizzati sulla Crudeltà”. E anche se noi non siamo così, viviamo comunque nel loro stesso mondo, un mondo in cui degli esseri umani annegano e noi li guardiamo dall’alto dei nostri droni senza pilota, mentre lo stato punisce chi cerca di salvarli.

      In troppi crediamo nel mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la tragica e insanguinata realtà del concreto controllo quotidiano sui confini. E comunque, se fosse possibile, non avremmo ormai risolto questa contraddizione? Il fatto che non lo abbiamo fatto dovrebbe portarci a pensare che non ne siamo capaci e che ci si prospetta una cruda e desolante scelta morale per il futuro.

      D’ora in poi, il numero dei migranti non può che aumentare. I cambiamenti climatici saranno determinanti. La scelta di non respingerli non sarà certamente gratis: non c’è modo di condividere le nostre risorse con altri senza sostenere dei costi. Ma se non lo facciamo, scegliamo consapevolmente i naufragi, gli annegamenti, i campi di detenzione, scegliamo di destinare queste persone ad una vita da schiavi in zone di guerra. Scegliamo l’ambiente ostile. Scegliamo di “difendere il nostro stile di vita” semplicemente accettando di vivere a fianco di una popolazione sempre in aumento fatta di rifugiati senza patria, ammassati in baracche di lamiera e depositi soffocanti, sfiniti fino alla disperazione.

      Ma c’è un costo che, alla fine, giudicheremo troppo alto da pagare? Per il momento, sembra di no: ma, … cosa siamo diventati?

      https://dossierlibia.lasciatecientrare.it/luso-dei-droni-per-guardare-i-migranti-che-affogano-m

    • Et aussi... l’utilisation de moins en moins de #bateaux et de plus en plus de #avions a le même effet...

      Sophia : The EU naval mission without any ships

      Launched in 2015 to combat human smuggling in the Mediterranean, the operation has been all but dismantled, symbolizing European division on immigration policy.


      The Italian air base of Sigonella extends its wire fencing across the green and yellow fields of Sicily, 25 kilometers inland from the island’s coastline. Only the enormous cone of Mount Etna, visible in the distance, stands out over this flat land. Posters depicting a sniper taking aim indicate that this is a restricted-access military zone with armed surveillance.

      Inside, there is an enormous city with deserted avenues, runways and hangars. This is the departure point for aircraft patrolling the Central Mediterranean as part of EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Sophia, Europe’s military response to the human smuggling rings, launched in 2015. But since March of this year, the planes have been a reflection of a mutilated mission: Sophia is now a naval operation without any ships.

      The Spanish detachment in #Sigonella has just rotated some of its personnel. A group of newly arrived soldiers are being trained in a small room inside one of the makeshift containers where the group of 39 military members work. The aircraft that they use is standing just a few meters away, on a sun-drenched esplanade that smells of fuel. The plane has been designed for round-the-clock maritime surveillance, and it has a spherical infrared camera fitted on its nose that allows it to locate and identify seagoing vessels, as well as to detect illegal trafficking of people, arms and oil.

      If the EU had systematically shown more solidarity with Italy [...] Italian voters would not have made a dramatic swing to the far right

      Juan Fernando López Aguilar, EU Civil Liberties Committee

      This aircraft was also made to assist in sea rescues. But this activity is no longer taking place, now that there are no ships in the mission. Six aircraft are all that remain of Operation Sophia, which has been all but dismantled. Nobody would venture to say whether its mandate will be extended beyond the current deadline of September 30.

      The planes at Sigonella continue to patrol the Central Mediterranean and collect information to meet the ambitious if vague goal that triggered the mission back at the height of the refugee crisis: “To disrupt the business of human and weapons smuggling.” The operation’s most controversial task is still being carried out as well: training Libya’s Coast Guard so they will do the job of intercepting vessels filled with people fleeing Libyan war and chaos, and return them to the point of departure. Even official sources of Europe’s diplomatic service admitted, in a written reply, that the temporary suspension of naval assets “is not optimal,” and that the mission’s ability to fulfill its mandate “is more limited.”

      In these four years, the mission has had some tangible achievements: the arrest of 151 individuals suspected of human trafficking and smuggling, and the destruction of 551 boats used by criminal networks. Operation Sophia has also inspected three ships and seized banned goods; it has made radio contact with 2,462 vessels to check their identity, and made 161 friendly approaches. For European diplomats, the mission has been mainly useful in “significantly reducing smugglers’ ability to operate in high seas” and has generally contributed to “improving maritime safety and stability in the Central Mediterranean.”

      Sophia’s main mission was never to rescue people at sea, yet in these last years it has saved 45,000 lives, following the maritime obligation to aid people in distress. The reason why it has been stripped of its ships – a move that has been strongly criticized by non-profit groups – can be found 800 kilometers north of Sicily, in Rome, and also in the offices of European politicians. Last summer, Italy’s far-right Interior Minister Matteo Salvini began to apply a closed-port policy for ships carrying rescued migrants unless a previous relocation agreement existed with other countries. Salvini first targeted the non-profit groups performing sea rescues, and then he warned his European colleagues that Italy, which is leading the EU mission, would refuse to take in all the rescued migrants without first seeing a change in EU policy. A year later, no European deal has emerged, and every time a rescue is made, the issue of who takes in the migrants is negotiated on an ad hoc basis.

      Operation Sophia has saved 45,000 lives

      Although arrivals through this route have plummeted, Salvini insists that “Italy is not willing to accept all the migrants who arrive in Europe.” Political division among member states has had an effect on the European military mission. “Sophia has not been conducting rescues since August 2018,” says Matteo Villa, a migration expert at Italy’s Institute for International Policy Studies (ISPI). “Nobody in the EU wanted to see a mission ship with migrants on board being refused port entry, so the ‘solution’ was to suspend Sophia’s naval tasks.”

      The decision to maintain the operation without any ships was made at the last minute in March, in a move that prevented the dismantling of the mission just ahead of the European elections. “Operation Sophia has helped save lives, although that was not its main objective. It was a mistake for [the EU] to leave it with nothing but airplanes, without the ships that were able to save lives,” says Matteo de Bellis, a migration and refugee expert at Amnesty International. “What they are doing now, training the Libyans, only serves to empower the forces that intercept refugees and migrants and return them to Libya, where they face arbitrary detention in centers where there is torture, exploitation and rape.”

      Ever since the great maritime rescue operation developed by Italy in 2013, the Mare Nostrum, which saved 150,000 people, its European successors have been less ambitious in scope and their goals more focused on security and border patrolling. This is the case with Sophia, which by training the Libyan Coast Guard is contributing to the increasingly clear strategy of outsourcing EU migratory control, even to a country mired in chaos and war. “If Europe reduces search-and-rescue operations and encourages Libya to conduct them in its place, then it is being an accomplice to the violations taking place in Libya,” says Catherine Wollard, secretary general of the non-profit network integrated in the European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE).

      Training the Libyans only serves to empower the forces that intercept refugees and migrants and return them to Libya, where they face torture, exploitation and rape

      Matteo de Bellis, Amnesty International

      The vision offered by official European sources regarding the training of the Libyan Coast Guard, and about Operation Sophia in general, is very different when it comes to reducing mortality on the Mediterranean’s most deadly migration route. “Operation Sophia was launched to fight criminal human smuggling networks that put lives at risk in the Central Mediterranean,” they say in a written response. European officials are aware of what is going on in Libya, but their response to the accusations of abuse perpetrated by the Libyan Coast Guard and the situation of migrants confined in detention centers in terrible conditions, is the following: “Everything that happens in Libyan territorial waters is Libya’s responsibility, not Europe’s, yet we are not looking the other way. […] Through Operation Sophia we have saved lives, fought traffickers and trained the Libyan Coast Guard […]. We are performing this last task because substantial loss of life at sea is taking place within Libyan territorial waters. That is why it is very important for Libya’s Coast Guard and Navy to know how to assist distressed migrants in line with international law and humanitarian standards. Also, because the contribution of Libya’s Coast Guard in the fight against traffickers operating in their waters is indispensable.”

      Criticism of Operation Sophia is also coming from the European Parliament, which funded the trip that made this feature story possible. Juan Fernando López Aguilar, president of the parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, attacks the decision to strip Sophia of its naval resources. The Socialist Party (PSOE) politician says that this decision was made “in the absolute absence of a global approach to the migration phenomenon that would include cooperative coordination of all the resources at member states’ disposal, such as development aid in Africa, cooperation with origin and transit countries, hirings in countries of origin and the creation of legal ways to access the EU. Now that would dismantle [the mafias’] business model,” he says.

      López Aguilar says that the EU is aware of Italy’s weariness of the situation, considering that “for years it dealt with a migratory pressure that exceeded its response capacity.” Between 2014 and 2017, around 624,000 people landed on Italy’s coasts. “If they EU had systematically shown more solidarity with Italy, if relocation programs for people in hotspots had been observed, very likely Italian voters would not have made a dramatic swing giving victory to the far right, nor would we have reached a point where a xenophobic closed-port narrative is claimed to represent the salvation of Italian interests.”

      Miguel Urbán, a European Member of Parliament for the Spanish leftist party Unidas Podemos, is highly critical of the way the EU has been managing immigration. He talks about a “militarization of the Mediterranean” and describes European policy as bowing to “the far right’s strategy.” He blames Italy’s attitude for turning Sophia into “an operation in the Mediterranean without a naval fleet. What the Italian government gets out of this is to rid itself of its humanitarian responsibility to disembark migrants on its coasts.”

      For now, no progress has been made on the underlying political problem of disembarkation and, by extension, on the long-delayed reform of the Dublin Regulation to balance out frontline states’ responsibility in taking in refugees with solidarity from other countries. Sophia will continue to hobble along until September after being all but given up for dead in March. After that, everything is still up in the air.

      https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/08/29/inenglish/1567088519_215547.html
      #Sophie #Opération_Sophia #Sicile

    • L’uso dei droni per guardare i migranti che affogano mette a nudo tutta la disumanità delle pratiche di controllo sui confini

      In troppi crediamo al mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la realtà macchiata di sangue.

      “Se avessi ignorato quelle grida di aiuto, non avrei mai più trovato il coraggio di affrontare il mare”.

      Con queste parole il pescatore siciliano Carlo Giarratano ha commentato la sua decisione di sfidare il “decreto sicurezza” del Governo italiano, che prevede sanzioni o l’arresto nei confronti di chiunque trasporti in Italia migranti soccorsi in mare.

      La sua storia è un esempio della preoccupante tensione che si è creata ai confini della “Fortezza Europa” in materia di leggi e regolamenti. Secondo il diritto internazionale, il capitano di un’imbarcazione in mare è tenuto a fornire assistenza alle persone in difficoltà, “a prescindere dalla nazionalità o dalla cittadinanza delle persone stesse”. Al contempo, molti paesi europei, e la stessa UE, stanno cercando di limitare questo principio e queste attività, malgrado il tragico bilancio di morti nel Mediterraneo, in continua crescita.

      L’Agenzia di Confine e Guardia Costiera Europea, Frontex, sembra aver escogitato una soluzione ingegnosa: i droni. L’obbligo legale di aiutare un’imbarcazione in difficoltà non si applica a un veicolo aereo senza pilota (UAV, unmanned aerial vehicle). Si può aggirare la questione, politicamente calda, su chi sia responsabile di accogliere i migranti soccorsi, se questi semplicemente non vengono proprio soccorsi. Questo principio fa parte di una consolidata tendenza a mettere in atto politiche finalizzate a impedire che i migranti attraversino il Mediterraneo. Visto l’obbligo di soccorrere le persone che ci chiedono aiuto, la soluzione sembra essere questa: fare in modo di non sentire le loro richieste.

      Jean-Claude Juncker sostiene che le politiche europee di presidio ai confini sono concepite per “stroncare il business dei trafficanti”, perché nella moralità egocentrica che ispira la politica di frontiera europea, se non ci fossero trafficanti non ci sarebbero migranti.

      Ma non ci sono trafficanti che si fabbricano migranti in officina. Se le rotte ufficiali sono bloccate, le persone vanno a cercare quelle non ufficiali. Rendere la migrazione più difficile, ha fatto aumentare la richiesta di trafficanti e scafisti, certamente non l’ha fermata. Invece che stroncare il loro business, queste politiche lo hanno creato.

      Secondo la logica della foglia di fico, l’UE sostiene di non limitarsi a lasciare affogare i migranti, ma di fornire supporto alla guardia costiera libica perché intercetti le imbarcazioni che tentano la traversata e riporti le persone nei campi di detenzione in Libia.

      Ma il rapporto del Global Detention Project, a proposito delle condizioni in questi campi, riferisce: “I detenuti sono spesso sottoposti a gravi abusi e violenze, compresi stupri e torture, estorsioni, lavori forzati, schiavitù, condizioni di vita insopportabili, esecuzioni sommarie.” Human Rights Watch, in un rapporto intitolato Senza via di fuga dall’Inferno, descrive situazioni di sovraffollamento e malnutrizione e riporta testimonianze di bambini picchiati dalle guardie.

      L’Irish Times ha riportato accuse secondo cui le milizie associate con il GNA (Governo Libico di Alleanza Nazionale, riconosciuto dall’ONU), starebbero immagazzinando munizioni in questi campi e userebbero i rifugiati come “scudi umani”. Sembra quasi inevitabile, quindi, la notizia che il 3 luglio almeno 53 rifugiati sono stati uccisi durante un attacco dei ribelli appartenenti all’Esercito Nazionale Libico, nel campo di detenzione di Tajura, vicino a Tripoli.

      Secondo una testimonianza riportata dall’Associated Press, a Tajura i migranti erano costretti a pulire le armi delle milizie fedeli al GNA, armi che erano immagazzinate nel campo. Secondo i racconti di testimoni oculari dell’attacco, riportati dalle forze ONU, le guardie del campo avrebbero aperto il fuoco su chi tentava di scappare.

      Nel mondo occidentale, quando parliamo di immigrazione, tendiamo a focalizzarci sul cosiddetto “impatto sulle comunità” causato dai flussi di nuovi arrivati che si muovono da un posto all’altro.

      Nelle nostre discussioni, ci chiediamo se i migranti portino un guadagno per l’economia oppure intacchino risorse già scarse. Raramente ci fermiamo a guardare nella sua cruda e tecnica realtà la concreta applicazione del controllo alle frontiere, quando si traduce davvero in fucili e filo spinato.

      Ci ripetiamo che i costi vanno tutti in un’unica direzione: secondo la nostra narrazione preferita, i controlli di confine sono tutti gratis, è lasciare entrare i migranti la cosa che costa. Ma i costi da pagare ci sono sempre: non solo il tributo di morti che continua a crescere o i budget multimilionari e sempre in aumento delle nostre agenzie di frontiera, ma anche i costi morali e sociali che finiamo con l’estorcere a noi stessi.

      L’ossessione per la sicurezza dei confini deve fare i conti con alcune delle più antiche e radicate convinzioni etiche proprie delle società occidentali. Prendersi cura del più debole, fare agli altri quello che vogliamo sia fatto a noi, aiutare chi possiamo. Molti uomini e donne che lavorano in mare, quando soccorrono dei naufraghi non sono spinti solo da una legge che li obbliga a prestare aiuto, ma anche da un imperativo morale più essenziale. “Lo facciamo perché siamo gente di mare”, ha detto Giarratano al Guardian, “in mare, se ci sono persone in pericolo, le salviamo”.

      Ma i nostri governi hanno deciso che questo non vale per gli europei. Come se fosse una perversa sfida lanciata a istinti morali vecchi di migliaia di anni, nell’Europa moderna un marinaio che salva un migrante mentre sta per affogare, deve essere punito.

      Infrangere queste reti di reciproche responsabilità fra gli esseri umani, ha dei costi: divisioni e tensioni sociali. Ed è un amaro paradosso, perché proprio argomenti di questo genere sono in testa alle nostre preoccupazioni percepite quando si parla di migrazioni. E mentre l’UE fa di tutto per respingere un fronte del confine verso i deserti del Nord Africa, cercando di tenere i corpi dei rifugiati abbastanza lontani da non farceli vedere da vicino, intanto l’altro fronte continua a spingere verso di noi. L’Europa diventa un “ambiente ostile” e quindi noi diventiamo un popolo ostile.

      Ci auto-ingaggiamo come guardie di confine al nostro interno. Padroni di casa, infermiere, insegnanti, manager – ogni relazione sociale deve essere controllata. Il nostro regime di “frontiera quotidiana” crea “comunità sospette” all’interno della nostra società: sono persone sospette per il solo fatto di esistere e, nei loro confronti, si possono chiamare le forze dell’ordine in ogni momento, “giusto per dare un’occhiata”.

      Il confine non è solo un sistema per tenere gli estranei fuori dalla nostra società, ma per marchiare per sempre le persone come estranee, anche all’interno e per legittimare ufficialmente il pregiudizio, per garantire che “l’integrazione” – il Sacro Graal della narrazione progressista sull’immigrazione – resti illusoria e irrealizzabile, uno scherzo crudele giocato sulla pelle di persone destinate a rimanere etichettate come straniere e sospette. La nostra società nel suo insieme si mette al servizio di questo insaziabile confine, fino a definire la sua vera e propria identità nella capacità di respingere le persone.

      Malgrado arrivino continuamente immagini e notizie di tragedie e di morti, i media evitano di collegarle con le campagne di opinione che amplificano le cosiddette “legittime preoccupazioni” della gente e le trasformano in un inattaccabile “comune buon senso”.

      I compromessi che reggono le politiche di controllo dei confini non vengono messi in luce. Questo ci permette di guardare da un’altra parte, non perché siamo crudeli ma perché non possiamo sopportare di vedere quello che stiamo facendo. Ci sono persone e gruppi che, come denuncia Adam Serwer in un articolo su The Atlantic, sono proprio “Focalizzati sulla Crudeltà”. E anche se noi non siamo così, viviamo comunque nel loro stesso mondo, un mondo in cui degli esseri umani annegano e noi li guardiamo dall’alto dei nostri droni senza pilota, mentre lo stato punisce chi cerca di salvarli.

      In troppi crediamo nel mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la tragica e insanguinata realtà del concreto controllo quotidiano sui confini. E comunque, se fosse possibile, non avremmo ormai risolto questa contraddizione? Il fatto che non lo abbiamo fatto dovrebbe portarci a pensare che non ne siamo capaci e che ci si prospetta una cruda e desolante scelta morale per il futuro.

      D’ora in poi, il numero dei migranti non può che aumentare. I cambiamenti climatici saranno determinanti. La scelta di non respingerli non sarà certamente gratis: non c’è modo di condividere le nostre risorse con altri senza sostenere dei costi. Ma se non lo facciamo, scegliamo consapevolmente i naufragi, gli annegamenti, i campi di detenzione, scegliamo di destinare queste persone ad una vita da schiavi in zone di guerra. Scegliamo l’ambiente ostile. Scegliamo di “difendere il nostro stile di vita” semplicemente accettando di vivere a fianco di una popolazione sempre in aumento fatta di rifugiati senza patria, ammassati in baracche di lamiera e depositi soffocanti, sfiniti fino alla disperazione.

      Ma c’è un costo che, alla fine, giudicheremo troppo alto da pagare? Per il momento, sembra di no: ma, … cosa siamo diventati?

      https://dossierlibia.lasciatecientrare.it/luso-dei-droni-per-guardare-i-migranti-che-affogano-m

    • Grèce : le gouvernement durcit nettement sa position et implique l’armée à la gestion de flux migratoire en Mer Egée

      Après deux conférences intergouvernementales ce we., le gouvernement Mitsotakis a décidé la participation active de l’Armée et des Forces Navales dans des opérations de dissuasion en Mer Egée. En même temps il a décidé de poursuivre les opérations de ’désengorgement’ des îlses, de renfoncer les forces de garde-côte en effectifs et en navires, et de pousser plus loin la coopération avec Frontex et les forces de l’Otan qui opèrent déjà dans la région.

      Le durcissement net de la politique gouvernementale se traduit aussi par le retour en force d’un discours ouvertement xénophobe. Le vice-président du gouvernement grec, Adonis Géorgiadis, connu pour ses positions à l’’extrême-droite de l’échiquier politique, a déclaré que parmi les nouveaux arrivants, il y aurait très peu de réfugiés, la plupart seraient des ‘clandestins’ et il n’a pas manqué de qualifier les flux d’ ‘invasion’.

      source – en grec - Efimerida tôn Syntaktôn : https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/kybernisi/211786_kybernisi-sklirainei-ti-stasi-tis-sto-prosfygiko

      Il va de soi que cette militarisation de la gestion migratoire laisse craindre le pire dans la mesure où le but évident de l’implication de l’armée ne saurait être que la systématisation des opérations de push-back en pleine mer, ce qui est non seulement illégal mais ouvertement criminel.

      Reçu de Vicky Skoumbi via la mailing-list Migreurop, 23.09.2019

  • JE VAIS COMMENCER ICI UN NOUVEAU FIL DE DISCUSSION, SUR LES SAUVETAGES ET LES NAUFRAGES EN MEDITERRANEE.

    CE FIL DE DISCUSSION COMPLÈTE CELUI COMMENCÉ ICI :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/768421

    Ici la métaliste complète:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/706177

    ping @isskein

    –------------

    Ecco il decreto sicurezza-bis: multe per ogni migrante trasportato e per chi non rispetta le norme Sar

    Salvini si attribuisce la competenza a vietare il transito delle navi ritenute pericolose e prevede che a indagare possano essere solo le Dda. Pene più pesanti per chi aggredisce le forze dell’ordine. Il M5S: «Il ministro dell’Interno copre così il fallimento sui rimpatri».

    È un vero e proprio blitz quello con il quale il ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini vara un #decreto_sicurezza_bis che prevede sanzioni pecuniarie pesantissime contro chi soccorrse i migranti in violazione delle norme #Sar ma soprattutto con cui attribuisce al Viminale e alle Direzione distrettuali antimafia competenze che erano del ministero dei Trasporti e delle Procure ordinarie.

    Il provvedimento consta di dodici articoli, la maggior parte dei quali dedicato ancora al contrasto dell’immigrazione clandestina. Con norme clamorose destinate a spaccare il consiglio dei ministri.
    La prima prevede sanzioni a chi «nello svolgimento di operazioni di soccorso in acque internazionali, non rispetta gli obblighi previste dalle Convenzioni internazionali», dunque i comportamenti che Salvini attribuisce alle navi umanitarie. Le sanzioni previste sono di due tipi: da 3.500 a 5.500 euro per ogni straniero trasportato e, nei casi reiterati, se la nave è battente bandiera italiana la sospensione o la revoca della licenza da 1 a 12 mesi.

    L’articolo numero 2 va a modificare il #Codice_della_navigazione. Salvini attribuisce al Viminale quelle che sono al momento competenze del ministero dei Trasporti, in particolare la limitazione o il divieto di transito nelle acque territoriali di navi qualora sussistano ragioni di sicurezza e di ordine pubblico. E, come già scritto nelle direttive fin qui emanate, Salvini ritiene che tutte le navi che trasportino migranti siano una minaccia per la sicurezza nazionale.

    Il decreto modifica anche il codice di procedura penale estendendo anche alle ipotesi non aggravate di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina la competenza delle Direzioni distrettuali antimafia e la disciplina delle intercettazioni preventive. Di fatto togliendo alle Procure ordinarie la possibilità ad indagare.

    Tre milioni di euro vengono stanziati per l’impiego di poliziotti stranieri in operazioni sotto copertura contro le organizzazioni di trafficanti di uomini.

    Un altro pacchetto di norme inasprisce le sanzioni per chi devasta o danneggia nel corso di riunioni in luoghi pubblici e al contempo trasforma da sanzioni in delitti, con il conseguente inasprimento delle pene, le azioni di chi si oppone a pubblici ufficiali con qualsiasi mezzo di resistenza attiva o passiva, dagli scudi alle mazze e ai bastoni. Modifiche al codice penale aggravano il reato e dunque le sanzioni per violenza, minaccia e resistenza a pubblico ufficiale soprattutto se commessi durante manifestazioni in luogo pubblico. Soppressa la causa di esclusione della punibilità per particolare tenuità del fatto.

    L’articolo 7 è la norma già annunciata come «#spazzaclan» e prevede l’istituzione di un commissario straordinario con il compito di realizzare un programma di interventi finalizzati ad eliminare l’arretrato delle sentenze di condanna da eseguire nei confronti di imputati liberi. Previste le assunzioni a tempo determinato di durata annuale di 800 unità .

    L’ultimo articolo infine prevede l’impiego di altri 500 militari a Napoli in occasione delle #Universiadi.

    Fonti del M5s hanno commentato: «Salvini copre così il fallimento sui rimpatri». Secondo altre fonti «c’è fortissima preoccupazione che il ministro dell’Interno si spinga sempre più su temi estremisti».

    https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2019/05/10/news/ecco_il_decreto_sicurezza-bis_pene_piu_pesanti_per_i_trafficanti_di_uomin
    #decreto_sicurezza #décret #Italie #Salvini #migrations #réfugiés #Méditerranée #amende #sauvetage #mourir_en_mer #ONG #eaux_territoriales #eaux_internationales #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières

    • Message d’@isskein via la mailing-list Migreurop.
      Chronique 9-10 mai 2019 en Méditerranée :

      9 mai Le Mare Jonio (Mediterranea Saving Humains, RescueMed) sauve 29 passagers (1 enfant de 1 an, 3 femmes dont une enceinte) d’un bateau pneumatique endommagé dans les eaux internationales, à 40 miles des côtes libyennes. Ils demandent un port sûr au centre de coordination italien, le ministère de l’Intérieur leur enjoint de contacter les gardes-côtes libyens...

      10 mai Le Mare Ionio accoste à Lampedusa, les 29 rescapés débarquent. 20h45, la « saisie préventive » du MareJonio, réclamée depuis le matin par l’Intérieur, a été notifiée. Le capitaine Pietro Marrone et Luca Casarini, chef de mission du #Mare_Jonio, font l’objet d’une enquête pour facilitation de l’immigration clandestine

      10 mai le navire militaire italien #Cigala_Fulgosi débarque dans le port d’Augusta (Sicile) 36 migrants secourus sur une embarcation à la dérive

      10 mai Au moins 70 personnes disparues dans un naufrage au large des côtes tunisiennes

      Il n’y a aujourd’hui plus aucun navire d’ONG en Méditerranée centrale.

      Sur le #naufrage au large de la #Tunisie, v. plus ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/780298

    • Dl sicurezza bis, cosa prevede il decreto che introduce multe da 5.500 euro a chi salva i migranti

      Il Ministero dell’Interno nella serata del 10 maggio 2019 ha messo a punto il “decreto sicurezza bis”, che prevede multe per chi soccorre i migranti, ma non solo.

      Il decreto si compone di 12 articoli.

      Il nucleo centrale prevede l’inasprimento delle misure contro i trafficanti di esseri umani e il potenziamento delle operazioni sotto copertura per contrastare l’immigrazione clandestina.

      Qui abbiamo spiegato cosa prevede il decreto sicurezza bis, punto per punto:
      Multe per chi soccorre i migranti

      L’articolo 1 del decreto sicurezza bis prevede che chi, nello svolgimento di operazioni di soccorso in acque internazionali, non rispetta gli obblighi previsti dalle Convenzioni internazionali – con particolare riferimento alle istruzioni operative delle autorità SAR competenti o di quelle dello Stato di bandiera può incorrere in una “sanzione amministrativa del pagamento di una somma da 3.500 a 5.500 euro per ciascuno degli stranieri trasportati”.

      Nei casi “più gravi o reiterati è disposta la sospensione da 1 a 12 mesi, ovvero la revoca della licenza, autorizzazione o concessione rilasciata dall’autorità amministrativa italiana inerente all’attività svolta e al mezzo di trasporto utilizzato”.
      Modifiche al codice della navigazione

      L’articolo 2 del decreto sicurezza bis prevede alcune modifiche al codice della navigazione, e nello specifico viene attribuito al ministro dell’Interno il potere di “limitare o vietare il transito e la sosta di navi mercantili o unità da diporto o di pesca nel mare territoriale per motivi di ordine e sicurezza pubblica e comunque in caso di violazione” di alcune delle disposizioni della Convenzione di Montego Bay.
      Favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina

      All’articolo 3 il decreto sicurezza bis vuole contrastare a monte l’organizzazione dei trasporti di migranti irregolari. I reati associstende ai
      Finanziamento da 3 milioni per le forze dell’ordine

      Il decreto sicurezza bis all’articolo 4 prevede lo stanziamento di 3 milioni di euro nel triennio 2019-2021 per il finanziamento degli “oneri conseguenti al concorso di operatori di polizia di Stati con i quali siano stati stipulati appositi accordi” per lo svolgimento di operazioni sotto copertura “anche con riferimento alle attività di contrasto del delitto di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina”.
      Universiadi

      Tra le novità del decreto sicurezza bis c’è l’arrivo di 500 militari in più a Napoli in vista delle Universiadi 2019.
      Inasprimento delle sanzioni per i reati di devastazione

      L’articolo 5 del decreto sicurezza bis interviene sul Tulps, il Testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza, inasprendo le sanzioni conseguenti ai reati di devastazione, saccheggio e danneggiamento, commessi nel corso di riunioni effettuate in luogo pubblico o aperto al pubblico.

      Inoltre, prevede espressamente l’obbligo di comunicazione immediata, non oltre le 24 ore, all’autorità di pubblica sicurezza delle generalità delle persone ospitate in alberghi o in altre strutture ricettive.

      Tutela degli operatori delle forze dell’0rdine

      L’articolo 6 del decreto sicurezza bis prevede maggiori tutele per gli operatori delle forze dell’ordine impiegati in servizio di ordine pubblico, attraverso l’introduzione di nuove fattispecie delittuose. Il decreto inoltre trasforma quelle che attualmente sono contravvenzioni in delitti e prevede inoltre l’inasprimento delle sanzioni.

      Ad esempio, “chiunque nel corso di manifestazioni.. per opporsi a pubblico ufficiale o all’incaricato di pubblico servizio.. utilizza scudi o altri oggetti di protezione passiva ovvero materiali imbrattanti o inquinanti è punito con la reclusione da 1 a 3 anni”.

      Ovvero, “chiunque lancia o utilizza illegittimamente, in modo da creare un concreto pericolo per l’incolumità delle persone o l’integrità delle cose, razzi, bengala, fuochi artificiali, petardi, strumenti per l’emissione di fumo o di gas visibile… ovvero bastoni, mazze, oggetti contundenti è punito con la reclusione da 1 a 4 anni”.
      Commissario straordinario e assunzione di 800 persone

      L’articolo 8 del decreto sicurezza bis prevede l’istituzione di un commissario straordinario e l’assunzione di 800 persone con impegno di spesa per oltre 25 milioni di euro: permetterà di notificare sentenze ai condannati attualmente in libertà e garantire così l’effettività della pena. Inasprite anche le misure per chi aggredisce operatori delle forze dell’ordine.

      Il commissario straordinario, nominato dal Consiglio dei ministri su proposta del ministro dell’Interno, ha il compito di realizzare un programma di interventi finalizzati ad eliminare l’arretrato relativo ai procedimenti di esecuzione delle sentenze di condanna divenute definitive da eseguire nei confronti di imputati liberi.

      https://www.tpi.it/2019/05/10/decreto-sicurezza-bis-cosa-prevede

    • Decreto sicurezza bis, ennesima proposta in contrasto con i principi fondamentali

      Nelle stesse ore in cui apprendevamo dell’ennesima strage avvenuta nel Mare Mediterraneo a causa delle politiche di chiusura ed esternalizzazione dell’Italia e dell’Unione europea, i mass media hanno anticipato i contenuti di un possibile nuovo decreto d’urgenza proposto dal Ministero dell’Interno che dovrebbe andare nuovamente a modificare alcune delle norme sulla disciplina dell’immigrazione in Italia.

      Il testo appare essere l’ennesimo stravolgimento dei fondamentali principi di diritto internazionale e un ulteriore contributo alla politica posta in essere da questo Governo, così come da quello precedente, finalizzata a colpire coloro, specialmente organizzazioni non governative di chiara fama, che non vollero ubbidire alla regolamentazione della salvaguardia del diritto alla vita.

      Tra esse la previsione di nuove sanzioni (ed addirittura la sospensione o la revoca della licenza alla navigazione) a carico di chi a certe condizioni ponga in essere “azioni di soccorso di mezzi adibiti alla navigazione ed utilizzati per il trasporto irregolare di migranti, anche mediante il recupero delle persone”. Ovvero sanzioni per chi, nell’adempimento di un dovere etico, giuridico e sociale, salva vite umane altrimenti destinate alla morte.

      Nonostante i gravi dissidi istituzionali determinati dall’ultimo Governo Conte e dalle politiche dell’attuale Ministro dell’Interno, con l’attuale ipotesi di decreto legge (a cui sono evidenti a tutti la mancanza dei requisiti di necessità ed urgenza), si persegue pervicacemente nella strada intrapresa e, addirittura, si decide di portare la guerra agli esseri umani anche in acque internazionali sbeffeggiando le convenzioni internazionali in materia di ricerca e soccorso in mare.

      Riservandoci una compiuta analisi normativa se e quando (malauguratamente) quel testo dovesse prendere formalmente vita, riteniamo doveroso evidenziare che :

      sino ad oggi la magistratura italiana ha ritenuto che le operazioni di salvataggio in mare da parte di navi private sono state svolte per adempiere a precisi obblighi internazionali e per rispondere ad evidenti condizioni di necessità

      La situazione generatasi in Libia nel corso degli ultimi anni è degenerata ulteriormente nelle ultime settimane impone di intervenire per salvare la vita dei civili e dei migranti presenti nel Paese e di interrompere le politiche di sostegno alla Libia relative alle operazioni della Guardia costiera libica

      Salvare vite in mare è un dovere che risponde a precisi obblighi umanitari e non può e non dovrà mai essere considerato un crimine.

      Prendere posizione contro questo ennesimo attacco al rispetto della vita umana, ai diritti e alle libertà fondamentali è un dovere a cui non è più possibile sottrarsi.

      https://www.asgi.it/primo-piano/decreto-sicurezza-bis-ennesima-proposta-in-contrasto-con-i-principi-fondamental

    • Il teorema #Zuccaro sulle ong è fallito

      Il giudice per le indagini preliminari (gip) di Catania, #Nunzio_Sarpietro, ha accolto la richiesta di archiviazione della procura di Catania per l’inchiesta a carico del comandante della nave umanitaria Open Arms Marc Reig e della capomissione Anabel Montes Mier, accusati di associazione a delinquere finalizzata al favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina in seguito al salvataggio di più di duecento persone, il 15 marzo 2018, al largo della Libia. Durante l’operazione la nave umanitaria si era trovata a dover affrontare momenti di tensione con una motovedetta libica, che rivendicava il coordinamento delle operazioni.

      In quell’occasione gli spagnoli si erano rifiutati di consegnare ai guardacoste libici i migranti appena soccorsi e per questo, dopo essere approdati nel porto di Pozzallo, erano stati accusati di diversi reati e la loro nave era stata sequestrata. Con l’archiviazione di questa inchiesta, cade uno degli ultimi pilastri del cosiddetto “teorema Zuccaro”, la tesi sostenuta dal procuratore di Catania Carmelo Zuccaro secondo cui ci sarebbero stati dei contatti tra le navi delle ong e i trafficanti di esseri umani. Resta aperta, invece, l’inchiesta della procura di Ragusa contro Reig e Montes Mier accusati di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina e violenza privata per lo stesso caso. Rimane aperta anche l’inchiesta della procura di Trapani contro la nave Iuventa dell’ong Jugend Rettet, sequestrata nell’agosto del 2017. Il gip dovrebbe decidere l’eventuale rinvio a giudizio nelle prossime settimane.

      “Siamo felici di apprendere che un ulteriore passo verso la verità è stato fatto”, ha commentato l’organizzazione spagnola Proactiva Open Arms in un comunicato. “Ribadiamo di aver sempre operato nel rispetto delle convenzioni internazionali e del diritto del mare e che continueremo a farlo mossi da un unico obiettivo: difendere la vita e i diritti delle persone più vulnerabili”. L’avvocata Rosa Emanuela Lo Faro chiarisce di non aver ancora preso visione delle motivazioni che hanno spinto la stessa procura di Catania a chiedere l’archiviazione. “Dal 3 maggio 2019 sapevamo però che il gip aveva archiviato questa indagine”, conferma Lo Faro.

      Già nel marzo del 2018 lo stesso gip Sarpietro aveva confermato il sequestro della nave, ma aveva escluso il reato di associazione a delinquere contro il capitano Marc Reig e la coordinatrice dei soccorsi Anabel Montes Mier, lasciando in piedi invece l’accusa di favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina. Questo elemento aveva fatto decadere la competenza territoriale del tribunale di Catania che ha una specifica autorità per i reati associativi e aveva fatto intervenire il tribunale di Ragusa, che deve ancora esprimersi in merito all’inchiesta per favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina e violenza privata.

      In questo caso giudiziario è stata particolarmente importate la decisione del gip di Ragusa nell’aprile del 2018 di dissequestrare la nave, ferma nel porto di Pozzallo per un mese dopo il salvataggio. Nel decreto di dissequestro infatti il gip di Ragusa Giovanni Giampiccolo aveva riconosciuto lo stato di necessità nel quale era avvenuto il salvataggio e aveva inoltre stabilito che la Libia non è un posto sicuro in cui portare le persone soccorse in mare. Il giudice Giampiccolo ha riconosciuto che la Libia è “un luogo in cui avvengono gravi violazioni dei diritti umani (con persone trattenute in strutture di detenzione in condizioni di sovraffollamento, senza accesso a cure mediche e a un’adeguata alimentazione, e sottoposte a maltrattamenti e stupri e lavori forzati)”.

      “Quella decisione ha fatto scuola”, sottolinea l’avvocata Lo Faro. Da quel momento infatti non sono stati più disposti sequestri preventivi, ma solo sequestri probatori.

      Le indagini della procura di Catania
      Una figura centrale in questa vicenda è stato il procuratore generale di Catania Carmelo Zuccaro, alla guida della procura della città siciliana dal 2016. Dopo aver annunciato l’apertura di un fascicolo d’indagine conoscitivo sull’attività di queste organizzazioni, nella primavera del 2017 aveva rilasciato numerose interviste ai mezzi d’informazione italiani e stranieri. Il 22 marzo 2017 il pm era anche intervenuto in un’audizione al comitato parlamentare di controllo sull’attuazione dell’accordo di Schengen dichiarando di aver aperto delle indagini sui profitti delle ong e affermando di ritenere sospetto il “proliferare così intenso di queste unità navali”.

      “Noi riteniamo ci si debba porre il problema di capire da dove provenga il denaro che alimenta, che finanzia questi costi elevati. Da questo punto di vista, la successiva fase della nostra indagine conoscitiva sarà quella di capire quali siano i canali di finanziamento”. In quell’occasione aggiungeva di trovare “anomalo” che le navi non approdassero nel porto più vicino, bensì nei porti italiani, e sosteneva che ci fosse un rapporto tra la presenza delle navi umanitarie e l’aumento del numero dei morti. L’altra questione che il procuratore sollevava era quella della necessità della presenza a bordo delle navi di poliziotti e autorità giudiziarie impegnate nel contrasto al traffico di esseri umani. Questo è stato un tema caro ai magistrati, perché il materiale raccolto dalla polizia giudiziaria nel periodo della missione umanitaria Mare nostrum aveva aiutato le procure a condurre diverse indagini contro i trafficanti.

      La stessa preoccupazione ha ispirato anche uno dei punti del codice di condotta voluto dal ministro dell’interno Marco Minniti. Dal 2013 la procura di Catania si era trasformata nell’epicentro delle indagini sul traffico di esseri umani nel Mediterraneo, grazie proprio alla missione Mare nostrum. Prima i barconi con i migranti si spingevano sotto costa e arrivavano a Lampedusa, l’isola italiana più vicina alla Tunisia, oppure sulla parte occidentale della Sicilia, nella provincia di Trapani, che in linea d’aria è più raggiungibile dalle spiagge nordafricane. Ma in quello stesso periodo la marina militare e la guardia costiera italiana avevano cominciato a effettuare soccorsi in alto mare, nel canale di Sicilia, e poi nelle acque internazionali davanti alle coste libiche, quindi diversi porti siciliani, soprattutto quelli orientali come Catania, erano stati coinvolti negli sbarchi.

      Anche per questo Zuccaro si diceva preoccupato del grado di collaborazione tra le ong e la polizia giudiziaria: “Vogliamo cercare di capire se da parte di queste ong vi è comunque quella doverosa collaborazione che si deve prestare alle autorità di polizia e alle autorità giudiziarie al momento in cui si pongono in contatto con l’autorità giudiziaria italiana”. In questa prima audizione per il procuratore di Catania risultano sospetti soprattutto i finanziamenti che le ong ricevono, mentre in diverse interviste successive si concentra sui presunti contatti tra i trafficanti e le navi.

      Circa un mese dopo, durante la trasmissione Agorà su Rai 3, il pm si spinge oltre, affermando che l’obiettivo delle navi umanitarie potrebbe essere quello di destabilizzare l’economia: “A mio avviso alcune ong potrebbero essere finanziate dai trafficanti, sono a conoscenza di contatti. Forse la cosa potrebbe essere ancora più inquietante. Si perseguono da parte di alcune ong finalità diverse: destabilizzare l’economia italiana per trarne dei vantaggi”.

      Accuse a cui il governo, tramite i ministri dell’interno Marco Minniti e quello della giustizia Andrea Orlando, reagiva con fermezza, chiedendo le prove. Zuccaro rispondeva di “avere denunciato un fenomeno e non singole persone”, perché se “si aspetta troppo tempo si rischia di produrre elementi deleteri non più controllabili”. Parlava di “deroga” al riserbo, ma anche di “un dovere per chi deve fare rispettare la legalità”. In un’intervista con la Repubblica del 28 aprile 2017, il procuratore afferma però una cosa nuova: finalmente ha “la certezza” dei contatti tra le ong e i trafficanti, ma si tratta di materiale non utilizzabile in sede giudiziaria. Si parla di tabulati telefonici e conversazioni nelle mani dell’intelligence. Zuccaro si dice certo di un rapporto di complicità tra le ong e gli scafisti.

      Per due mesi nella primavera del 2017 il procuratore è molto presente sui mezzi d’informazione nazionali e internazionali con dichiarazioni di questo tenore, in tanti lo accusano di violare il segreto istruttorio e di produrre affermazioni che hanno un valore più politico che giudiziario. Mentre Zuccaro concede le sue interviste è aperta un’indagine conoscitiva sulle ong della Commissione difesa del senato, guidata dal senatore Nicola La Torre. Interpellato dalla commissione parlamentare, il generale Stefano Screpanti, capo del III Reparto operazioni del comando generale della guardia di finanza, smentisce le affermazioni del procuratore capo di Catania: “Allo stato attuale delle nostre conoscenze, non ci sono evidenze investigative tali da far emergere collegamenti tra ong e organizzazioni che gestiscono il traffico di migranti”.

      Dopo due anni d’indagini, il 13 agosto 2018 l’inchiesta “madre” di Zuccaro (che intanto aveva ipotizzato anche il reato di associazione a delinquere) è avviata all’archiviazione, nel caso Open Arms viene archiviata l’accusa di “associazione a delinquere”, ma ormai la campagna di discredito ai danni delle ong ha fatto il suo corso e le dichiarazioni del pm hanno influenzato in maniera irreversibile l’opinione pubblica italiana, che considera “accertati” i contatti tra ong e scafisti, in barba a qualsiasi garantismo.

      https://www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2019/05/15/amp/open-arms-zuccaro-ong?__twitter_impression=true

    • Des migrants débarqués à Lampedusa, Salvini furieux

      Quarante-sept migrants ont été débarqués dimanche soir à Lampedusa, une île au sud de la Sicile, après la saisie sur ordre de justice de leur bateau de sauvetage, provoquant la colère du ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini.

      Le navire affrété par l’ONG allemande Sea-Watch battant pavillon néerlandais, qui stationnait dans les eaux italiennes tout près de l’île de #Lampedusa, a été saisi dans la journée par la police financière italienne sur ordre d’un procureur de Sicile.

      Puis, les migrants à bord ont été transférés par moto-vedettes vers la terre ferme en fin de soirée. Une décision que M. Salvini —également vice-Premier ministre et chef de la Ligue (extrême-droite)— a semblé découvrir en temps réel à la télévision, l’amenant à demander qui au gouvernement avait pu prendre une telle décision contre son avis formel.

      Déjà à couteaux tirés avec lui, son partenaire gouvernemental du Mouvement 5 étoiles, Luigi Di Maio, a rétorqué qu’il n’acceptait pas ses insinuations, rappelant qu’il était obligatoire de faire débarquer les passagers d’un bateau saisi par la justice.

      Parallèlement à ce nouveau couac gouvernemental en pleine campagne pour les élections européennes, des échauffourées ont eu lieu dimanche soir à Florence (centre) entre forces de l’ordre et 2.000 personnes venues protester contre la présence de M. Salvini qui tenait un meeting politique dans la ville.

      Dimanche, le chef de Ligue avait jugé risibles les critiques du Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’Homme (HCDH) de l’ONU contre un projet visant à durcir la législation anti-migratoire en Italie.

      L’ONU, « un organisme international qui coûte des milliards d’euros aux contribuables, qui a comme membres la Corée du Nord et la Turquie, et qui vient faire la morale sur les droits de l’Homme à l’Italie ? (...) Cela prête à rire », a commenté M. Salvini.

      Un projet de décret-loi, qui pourrait être soumis lundi au conseil des ministres, propose de donner au ministre de l’Intérieur le pouvoir d’interdire les eaux territoriales italiennes à un navire pour des raisons d’ordre public.

      Le texte prévoit aussi une amende de 3.500 à 5.500 euros par migrant arrivé en Italie pour tout navire de secours n’ayant pas respecté les consignes des garde-côtes compétents dans la zone où il serait intervenu.

      Dans sa lettre envoyée au ministère italien des Affaires étrangères, le HCDH demande à l’Italie de ne pas approuver ce nouveau décret-loi.

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/des-migrants-debarques-lampedusa-salvini-furieux.afp.com.2019

    • Sea Watch, sbarcati i migranti. Salvini accusa i M5s: «Chi ha dato l’ordine?». Di Maio: «Non dia la colpa a noi»

      Sequestrata la nave Ong. Il ministero dell’Interno: i migranti non scenderanno. Ma il pm ordina che vengano portati sull’isola. E scoppia lo scontro tra i partner di governo. I primi a scendere una donna incinta e suo marito.
      La prima è una donna incinta, sorretta dal marito. A piedi nudi. Poi via via, tutti gli altri. Sorrisi, abbracci e saluti. Sono scesi tutti. Nonostante Salvini. “Fino a quando sono ministro io quella nave in un porto italiano non entra e non sbarca nessuno”, aveva garantito il ministro dell’Interno quando la Sea Watch 3 aveva ignorato la sua diffida e si era presentata davanti al porto di Lampedusa ottenendo l’autorizzazione all’ancoraggio alla fonda.

      Ventiquattro ore dopo, i 47 migranti rimasti a bordo della nave della Ong tedesca sono scesi a terra. Sequestro della nave d’iniziativa della Guardia di finanza, perquisizione e contestuale sbarco di tutti i migranti. Lo stesso “modello” già seguito per due volte per sbloccare i precedenti soccorsi della Mare Jonio, rimasta sequestrata per alcuni giorni e poi sempre liberata dai pm di Agrigento. Che questa volta si sono mossi di concerto con la Guardia di finanza forzando la mano ad un inferocito Salvini, incredulo di essere smentito proprio alla vigilia di quel consiglio dei ministri in cui intende portare all’approvazione il suo contestatissimo decreto sicurezza-bis.

      Un braccio di ferro senza precedenti quello tra la Procura di Agrigento e la Guardia di finanza da una parte e il Viminale dall’altro, conclusosi alle otto di sera quando due motovedette, dopo aver notificato al comandante della Sea Watch i decreti di sequestro e perquisizione firmati dal procuratore aggiunto Salvatore Vella che per tutto il weekend ha seguito personalmente sull’isola l’evolversi della vicenda, hanno scortato in porto la nave umanitaria.

      L’accelerazione nel primo pomeriggio quando il comandante Arturo Centore fa sapere alla Guardia costiera che la situazione a bordo è di assoluta emergenza. Alcuni migranti hanno indossato il giubbotto di salvataggio e minacciano di buttarsi a mare. “Se entro le nove di sera la situazione non si sblocca, levo l’ancora ed entro direttamente in porto”, annuncia il comandante della Sea Watch.

      A quel punto Guardia di finanza, guardia costiera e Procura decidono di notificare i sequestri e far sbarcare tutti. Anche contro il volere del Viminale.

      Salvini, che già poche ore prima, in un comizio a Sassuolo aveva attaccato a testa bassa “una procura e un giudice che invece di indagare gli scafisti indaga me”, incassa malissimo il colpo e ancor prima che la Sea Watch attracchi al molo di Lampedusa mette le mani avanti e sottolinea che lo sbarco avviene contro la sua volontà. “La magistratura faccia come crede ma il Viminale continua e continuerà a negare lo sbarco da quella nave fuorilegge. Il ministro dell’Interno si aspetta provvedimenti nei confronti del comandante della nave dal quale è lecito attendersi indicazioni precise sui presunti scafisti presenti a bordo”.

      Alle otto di sera, quando i 47 migranti toccano terra e vengono portati nell’hotspot di contrada Imbriacola, una nota firmata dal procuratore di Agrigento Luigi Patronaggio (il pm del caso Diciotti che per primo ha contestato a Salvini il sequestro di persona) spiega la “ratio” della scelta degli inquirenti: “Il sequestro probatorio è stato eseguito per violazione dell’articolo 12 del Testo unico sull’immigrazione ponendo la nave a disposizione di questa procura che ne ha disposto, previo sbarco dei migranti, il trasferimento sotto scorta nel porto di Licata. Le indagini proseguiranno sia per l’individuazione degli eventuali trafficanti di esseri umani coinvolti sia per la valutazione della condotta della Ong”. Come sempre. A sbarco avvenuto, quando anche l’ultimo migrante era già sceso a terra, Salvini ricara: «Per me possono stare lì fino a ferragosto. Gli porto da mangiare e da bere ma stanno lì». E al procuratore di Agrigento: «E’ quello che mi ha indagato per sequestro di persona. Se li farà sbarcare, ne prenderò atto e valuteremo nei suoi confronti il favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina».
      Salvini attacca i 5s: «Chi ha dato l’ordine?»
      Matteo Salvini ha assistito in diretta tv allo sbarco dei migranti dalla nave Sea Watch 3, ospite in studio su La7. «Qualcuno l’ordine lo avrà dato. Questo qualcuno ne dovrà rispondere», si irrita il ministro. Il M5s fa sapere a stretto giro che non sono stati i suoi ministri. Ma Salvini insiste: «Chi è che li ha autorizzati a
      sbarcare? Io no, non ho autorizzato niente, deve essere qualcun altro. Io sorrido ma è grave. Perché siamo un Paese sovrano con leggi, regole, una storia e nessuna associazione privata se ne può disinteressare. Qualcuno quell’ordine lo avrà dato. Questo qualcuno ne deve rispondere».

      Il vicepremier Luigi Di Maio prende le distanze parlando A che tempo che fa: «Il sequestro lo esegue la magistratura quindi non credo sia un espediente» per far sbarcare i migranti a bordo «perché la magistratura è indipendente dal governo. Quando arrivano qui contattiamo i Paesi Ue e chiediamo la redistribuzione. Io credo che la politica delle redistribuzioni è l’unica strada che abbiamo per fronteggiare il fenomeno. Poi c’è il tema dei rimpatri che si devono fare. La Chiesa Valdese stamattina ha lanciato una disponibilità, lavoriamo nel senso della redistribuzione» e «non scontriamoci con la magistratura, tutte queste tensioni non fanno bene al Paese».

      E dopo le accusa di Salvini replica: «Non accetto che il ministro dell’Interno dice che se stanno sbarcando dalla Sea Watch è perché i ministri 5 Stelle hanno aperto i porti. La nave è stata sequestrata dalla magistratura e, quando c’è un sequestro, si fanno sbarcare obbligatoriamente le persone a bordo».

      Duro anche il ministro Danilo Toninelli: «Salvini, se ha qualcosa da dirmi, me la dica in faccia. Non parli a sproposito del sottoscritto in tv. È evidente che l’epilogo della vicenda è legato al sequestro della nave da parte della magistratura, non serve un esperto per capirlo. Magari il ministro dell’Interno si informi prima di parlare. E trovi soluzioni vere sui rimpatri, non ancora avviati da quando è il responsabile della sicurezza nazionale».
      Lo sbarco per Salvini è una sconfitta politica
      Comunque la si guardi, la conclusione del braccio di ferro per Salvini è una sonora sconfitta che il ministro dell’Interno cerca di capitalizzare puntando tutte le sue carte su quel decreto sicurezza-bis che l’Onu chiede di ritirare ritenendolo una “violazione dei diritti umani e delle convenzioni internazionali”.

      Dopo aver irriso la lettera dell’alto Commissariato dell’Onu invitandolo ad occuparsi “dell’emergenza umanitaria in Venezuela anziché fare campagna elettorale in Italia”, Salvini ribadisce: "Resta un tema fondamentale: la difesa dei confini nazionali e l’ingresso in Italia di un gruppo di sconosciuti dev’essere una decisione della politica (espressione della volontà popolare) o di magistrati e Ong straniere? La vicenda Sea Watch 3 conferma una volta di più l’urgenza di approvare il decreto sicurezza bis già nel Consiglio dei ministri di domani per rafforzare gli strumenti del governo per combattere i trafficanti di uomini e chi fa affari con loro”.

      I 47 migranti sbarcati aspettano adesso di conoscere il loro destino. Le chiese evangeliche hanno dato la loro piena disponibilità ad accoglierli tutti nelle loro comunità in Italia ma anche all’estero.

      https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2019/05/19/news/via_libera_per_la_sea_watch_puo_attraccare_a_lampedusa-226674239

    • Italy: UN experts condemn bill to fine migrant rescuers

      UN human rights experts* have condemned a proposed draft decree by Italy’s interior minister, Matteo Salvini, to fine those who rescue migrants and refugees at sea, and urged the Government to halt its approval.

      “The right to life and the principle of non-refoulement should always prevail over national legislation or other measures purportedly adopted in the name of national security,” said the independent experts, who conveyed their concerns about the decree in a formal letter to the Italian Government.

      “We urge authorities to stop endangering the lives of migrants, including asylum seekers and victims of trafficking in persons, by invoking the fight against traffickers. This approach is misleading and is not in line with both general international law and international human rights law. Instead, restrictive migration policies contribute to exacerbating migrants’ vulnerabilities and only serve to increase trafficking in persons.”

      Earlier this month, Mr. Salvini announced a proposal to issue a decree that would fine vessels for every person rescued at sea and taken to Italian territory. NGO and other boats that rescued migrants could also have their licences revoked or suspended.

      The UN experts said that, should the decree – yet to be approved by the government – enter into force, it would seriously undermine the human rights of migrants, including asylum seekers, as well as victims of torture, of trafficking in persons and of other serious human rights abuses.

      They also asked for the withdrawal of two previous Directives banning NGO vessels rescuing migrants off Libya’s coasts from accessing Italian ports. In particular, the second Directive singled out the Italian ship Mare Jonio for helping those at sea.

      Declaring that Libyan ports were “able to provide migrants with adequate logistical and medical assistance” was particularly alarming, the experts said, especially given reports that Libyan coastguards had committed multiple human rights violations, including collusion with traffickers’ networks and deliberately sinking boats.

      The experts said any measure against humanitarian actors should be halted. “We are deeply concerned about the accusations brought against the Mare Jonio vessel, which have not been confirmed by any competent judicial authority. We believe that this represents yet another political attempt to criminalise humanitarian actors delivering life-saving services that are indispensable to protect humans’ lives and dignity.”

      The UN experts said Italian authorities had failed to properly consider several international norms, such as article 98 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, on the duty to help any person in danger at sea. “Article 98 is considered customary law. It applies to all maritime zones and to all persons in distress, without discrimination, as well as to all ships, including private and NGO vessels under a State flag,” they said.

      The Directives stigmatize migrants as “possible terrorists, traffickers and smugglers”, without providing evidence, the experts said. “We are concerned that this type of rhetoric will further increase the climate of hatred and xenophobia, as previously highlighted in another letter to which the Italian Government is also yet to reply.”

      The experts have contacted the Government about their concerns and await a reply. A copy of the letter has also been shared with Libya and the European Union.

      https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24628&LangID=E

    • Des ONG accusent la marine italienne de ne pas avoir porté assistance à des migrants en détresse

      L’ONG allemande Sea-Watch et le collectif Mediterranea accusent un navire de la marine italienne d’être resté à distance d’une embarcation de migrants en détresse au large des côtes libyennes, alors qu’il ne se trouvait qu’à plusieurs dizaines de kilomètres. Les 80 personnes en difficulté ont finalement été interceptées par les garde-côtes libyens et renvoyées en Libye.

      « Le navire P492 Bettica de la marine italienne est à proximité d’un canot pneumatique en détresse avec environ 80 personnes à son bord mais il n’intervient pas ». Ce message a été posté sur Twitter jeudi 23 mai en début d’après-midi par l’ONG Sea-Watch qui alerte sur la présence d’une embarcation dans les eaux internationales, au large de la Libye. C’est son avion de secours, le Moonbird, qui a repéré le canot en difficulté. « Notre avion a envoyé un message de détresse et a confirmé que des personnes sont accrochées à l’embarcation qui est en train de se dégonfler », continue l’ONG allemande.
      https://twitter.com/SeaWatchItaly/status/1131652854006067200?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

      Un peu plus tôt, Alarm Phone, la plateforme téléphonique qui vient en aide aux migrants en mer, avait donné l’alerte sur les réseaux sociaux. « Depuis 12h40, nous sommes en contact avec un bateau en détresse en Méditerranée centrale […]. L’eau entre dans le bateau. Nous avons transmis leur position au MRCC de Rome. Nous demandons une opération de sauvetage rapide ».

      Selon les ONG, la marine italienne n’est pas loin de l’embarcation. Elle ne serait pas intervenue.

      Un tweet de la marine italienne confirme, en effet, sa présence dans la zone, à 80 km du canot en difficulté. « Nous envoyons notre propre hélicoptère pour soutenir le Colibri [également sur zone, ndlr] », écrit la marine italienne sur le réseau social. « Avec un hélicoptère de la région, nous avons vérifié que les migrants ont été récupérés par un bateau de la patrouille libyenne ».

      « Le gouvernement sera responsable de ses actes »

      Seulement voilà, les ONG accusent ainsi les Italiens d’être « restés à distance » sciemment, pour laisser « le champ libre » aux garde-côtes libyens. « Encore un refoulement par procuration en Méditerranée centrale » a réagi Alarm Phone. « L’UE continue de violer le droit international, d’ignorer les bateaux en détresse et de repousser les gens en zone de guerre ».

      https://twitter.com/alarm_phone/status/1131612656341852161?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E11

      Des accusations qui inquiètent plusieurs personnalités politiques en Italie. « Si c’est vrai, ce serait très grave car il est absolument impensable que des hommes, des femmes et des enfants soient renvoyés dans cet enfer qu’est la Libye », a déclaré le sénateur du mouvement 5 étoiles (M5S) Gregorio De Falco, également officier de la marine.

      Même son de cloche chez Massimiliano Smeriglio, candidat du Parti démocrate aux élections européennes. « Nous ne pouvons pas croire qu’’un navire de notre marine, qui a accompli tant de missions de secours international, peut apporter son aide sans intervenir dans une tragédie. Intervenez sans délai sans quoi le gouvernement sera responsable de ses actes », a-t-il insisté.
      Début mai, un navire militaire italien avait subi les foudres du ministre de l’Intérieur après avoir secouru des migrants en mer sans avoir attendu les garde-côtes. Matteo Salvini refuse systématiquement le débarquement des migrants sur le sol italien.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17114/des-ong-accusent-la-marine-italienne-de-ne-pas-avoir-porte-assistance-

    • Dl sicurezza bis, I pescatori continueranno a salvare i migranti

      Michele e Salvatore Casciaro, padre e figlio, sono pescatori di Novaglie, Salento. Salvatore assiste alla tragedia dei migranti nel canale d’Otranto sin dal grande esodo degli albanesi negli anni Novanta. E da allora partecipa con la propria imbarcazione alle operazioni di soccorso e salvataggio dei naufraghi. Oggi i flussi principali provengono dal nord africa. Nell’ultimo salvataggio ha salvato con il figlio Michele una somala che altrimenti sarebbe annegata. Ma con il decreto sicurezza bis, continueranno a salvare i naufraghi o si volteranno dall’altra parte? (M. Tota)

      http://www.la7.it/tagada/video/dl-sicurezza-bis-i-pescatori-continueranno-a-salvare-i-migranti-21-05-2019-27242
      #pêcheurs

    • Il cambio di rotta di un Paese che perde l’onore
      Finora la Marina militare aveva sempre risposto alle chiamate di

      naufraghi in difficoltà.

      OGGI le cose in Italia non sono facili e quindi è proprio oggi che dobbiamo amare il nostro Paese, rispettarlo, dobbiamo dialogare, confrontarci, litigare sapendo che il suolo che calpestiamo ci restituirà solo ciò che avremo seminato e curato. Ogni parola è un seme, ogni ragionamento è un seme e noi italiani restiamo quello che siamo sempre stati: persone fatte di terra e mare. Conosciamo il mare, gabbia e occasione, limite e infinito, siamo uomini e donne di mare. Ecco perché, quando già l’Europa trattava l’immigrazione come un problema, l’Italia continuava a salvare vite in mare. E le salvava perché un uomo, una donna, un bambino che dall’Africa prendono il mare per venire in Italia, se in pericolo, non sono migranti, ma naufraghi. È la legge eterna del mare: ogni naufrago va tratto in salvo. Sempre.

      Qualcuno mi dira’, non possiamo salvarli tutti noi. Se nessun altro li salva, vi rispondo, allora li salveremo noi! Esistono le Zone Sar (Search and Rescue, ovvero “ricerca e salvataggio”) di competenza dei diversi paesi, perché dovremmo farci carico di recuperare i naufraghi anche laddove non sarebbe di nostra competenza? Perché per prima cosa dobbiamo rispettare la vita umana, è una regola universale alla quale se ci sottraiamo iniziamo a modificarci. Lasciare che una persona anneghi significa perdere qualsiasi cosa abbiamo raggiunto. Empatia, leggi, diritti, morale, convivenza. Perdiamo tutto. Non è sentimentalismo, è misura di ciò che sta accadendo. Non possiamo sottrarci dal salvare le persone in mare perché ogni vita perduta, quando poteva essere salvata, è sofferenza che si moltiplica, è odio. E l’odio diventa rancore, e il rancore vendetta.

      Ma non possiamo accoglierli tutti, mi direte. Manca il lavoro per noi, come possiamo farci carico di centinaia di migliaia di persone in cerca di un futuro migliore? Ma noi non dobbiamo accoglierli tutti: noi dobbiamo salvarli tutti, è nostro dovere farlo. Non facciamoci fregare dalla propaganda: salvare e accogliere sono due cose diverse, due momenti diversi che possono e devono essere gestiti in maniera diversa. Il salvataggio risponde a una necessità immediata, non c’è tempo per la strategia. L’accoglienza viene dopo e su quella si può discutere e cambiare passo, ma senza mettere in dubbio la necessità di salvare. Anzi, direi, senza mettere in discussione il diritto che noi italiani abbiamo, il privilegio che viviamo nel salvare vite umane. Salvare vite è come donare vita, come è accaduto che lo abbiamo dimenticato? Qualcuno oggi pensa di poter girare la faccia davanti a queste storie, pensa che tutto sommato la quotidianità sia già così difficile che non serve complicarsi la vita con questo strazio; non invidio queste persone perché per loro il risveglio sarà ancora più duro. E non le invidio perché non sanno quanto l’Italia abbia fatto la differenza, perché non sanno che l’Italia non ha mai girato le spalle a chi, in pericolo, chiedeva aiuto.

      Mi sono sentito orgoglioso di essere italiano quando ho visto il lavoro titanico che la Marina militare italiana ha sempre fatto, prima da sola, poi con l’Europa ma da capofila, poi insieme alle Ong, poi di nuovo da sola. Sono orgoglioso dei pescatori italiani che, nonostante andassero incontro a sanzioni gravose e al sequestro delle loro imbarcazioni che sono per loro sopravvivenza stessa, hanno sempre obbedito alla legge del mare, quella legge che impone di prestare soccorso a chiunque si trovi in pericolo tra le onde, a qualunque costo e senza pensare alle conseguenze. “Noi gente in mare non l’abbiamo lassata mai!”: questo era il principio dei pescatori lampedusani e a questo principio non si sono sottratti; se l’avessero fatto, avrebbero negato ogni singola parte della loro vita.

      Ma le cose sono cambiate ora, dirà qualcuno tra voi. Oggi la Marina sta agendo diversamente, direte. Sappiamo che il 23 maggio scorso, e lo sappiamo dagli unici testimoni rimasti nel Mediterraneo a darci queste informazioni, ovvero le Ong, un uomo è morto durante un’operazione di salvataggio, anzi, prima ancora che l’operazione iniziasse. Nel video girato da un velivolo della Sea-Watch si vede un gommone in avaria che sta imbarcando velocemente acqua. La Sea-Watch contatta prima la Guardia costiera libica che non risponde e poi la nave della Marina militare italiana Bettica, che si trova a meno di trenta miglia dal gommone.

      Improvvisamente e per quasi un’ora le comunicazioni tra la Marina militare italiana e la Sea-Watch si interrompono, quando riprendono la Bettica avverte che la Guardia costiera libica si sta recando sul posto. È prassi che la Guardia costiera libica non risponda alle richieste di soccorso. È prassi che i salvataggi siano fatti all’unico scopo di riportare i migranti nei campi di prigionia libici dove ricomincia il loro calvario, dove vengono torturati e dove viene estorto loro denaro: ogni migrante preso dalla Guardia costiera libica è guadagno doppio per i trafficanti (che, detto per inciso, non sono le Ong ma la guardia costiera libica finanziata dall’Italia e dall’Europa) che li lasceranno tornare nel loro paese solo in cambio di denaro.

      È ormai appurato che la Libia non è un porto sicuro. E allora perché la nave della Marina militare italiana Bettica non è intervenuta? Perché si infanga l’onore (che bella parola quando porta con sé il rispetto per la vita umana) dei militari della Marina che hanno sempre, secondo coscienza, risposto prima ancora che alle convenzioni internazionali, che pure stabiliscono il dovere di salvare vite, alla superiore e universale legge del mare? Oggi possiamo dividerci su tutto, ma non sulla necessità e sul dovere di salvare vite. Quando un uomo, una donna o un bambino sono in pericolo in mare, noi abbiamo il dovere di salvarli e se l’alternativa è la Libia, dobbiamo essere consapevoli che li stiamo condannando all’inferno. Per sfuggire a questo ragionamento, la propaganda inventa scorciatoie ridicole ma funzionanti: parole da buonista, parli bene dall’attico a Manhattan; si bersaglia chi racconta, non il racconto, perché quello è oggettivo e non può essere messo in discussione. Ma quell’uomo che annega è vita reale, non la finzione spacciata per realtà sui social.

      Facile dire la solita balla buonista parli tu dall’attico a Manhattan… no, parlo da meridionale, nato e cresciuto nelle terre più martoriate d’Italia, più saccheggiate, terre dimenticate da Dio e dagli uomini, ma non dai politici avvoltoi e sciacalli. Quelli, di noi meridionali, non si dimenticano mai. Promettono acqua agli assetati e intanto condannano le nostre anime per l’eternità. Parlo da uomo che non può accettare che il confine tra la vita e la morte sia una linea convenzionale e invisibile tracciata nel mare. Ciò che resta, alla fine di tutto, è l’onore. L’onore riscattato dal significato abusivo che ne danno le mafie per indicare nell’uomo d’onore l’affiliato. Onore inteso come rispetto dei nostri principi umani più profondi al di là delle conseguenze, nonostante le conseguenze.

      Onore è ciò che permette ancora di guardarci l’un l’altro e di sapere che io mi posso fidare di te perché tu ti puoi fidare di me, qualunque sia la tua condizione sociale, qualunque sia il luogo da cui provieni, il tuo quartiere, la tua religione e il colore della tua pelle, la tua condizione sociale, il tuo lavoro, il tuo conto in banca, la scuola che frequenta tuo figlio, il lavoro che fai. È facile: se mentre tu soffri e muori io giro lo sguardo dall’altra parte, se io soffrirò e rischierò di morire mi ripagherai con la stessa moneta. Salvare per essere salvati. Salvare per salvarsi: nel nostro mare, se smettiamo di salvare, finiremo annegati noi.

      https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2019/06/01/news/il_cambio_di_rotta_di_un_paese_che_perde_l_onore-227596448

    • Appel au secours d’un capitaine, coincé en mer avec 75 migrants malades

      Le capitaine d’un bateau égyptien ayant recueilli vendredi 75 migrants dans les eaux internationales, a lancé un appel aux autorités tunisiennes pour qu’elles le laissent accoster, alors que les vivres commencent à manquer et que des migrants sont malades.

      Le remorqueur égyptien #Maridive_601, qui dessert des plateformes pétrolières entre la Tunisie et l’Italie, est arrivé vendredi soir au port de Zarzis, dans le sud de la Tunisie, après avoir récupéré dans la matinée les migrants à la dérive.

      « Je demande aux autorités tunisiennes de nous permettre d’urgence d’entrer dans le port de Zarzis », a déclaré à l’AFP le capitaine #Faouz_Samir, ajoutant que « l’état de santé des migrants est mauvais, beaucoup sont atteints de la gale ».

      Un médecin a pu monter à bord, a indiqué la branche locale du Croissant-Rouge. « Quatre personnes sont dans un état qui nécessite une intervention médicale », et la plupart d’entre eux sont atteints de la gale infectieuse", a déclaré à l’AFP Mongi Slim, responsable du Croissant-Rouge dans le sud de la Tunisie.

      Selon l’organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), les migrants, 64 Bangladais, 9 Egyptiens, un Marocain et un Soudanais, dont au moins 32 enfants et mineurs non accompagnés, « ont besoin d’urgence d’eau, de nourriture, de vêtements, de couvertures et surtout d’assistance médicale ».

      L’agence de l’ONU a indiqué être prête à aider la Tunisie pour accueillir ces candidats à l’exil, partis de Libye dans l’espoir d’atteindre l’Europe.

      « Nous comprenons les difficultés et l’ampleur des défis que les flux migratoires peuvent poser et nous travaillons à appuyer les capacités de secours et d’assistance », a souligné Lorena Lando, chef de mission de l’OIM en Tunisie.

      « Nous restons toutefois préoccupés par les politiques de plus en plus restrictives adoptées par plusieurs pays du nord de la Méditerranée », ajoute Mme Lando.

      Le gouvernement et les autorités locales tunisiennes, sollicitées par l’AFP, n’ont pas souhaité s’exprimer.

      En août dernier, un autre bateau commercial, le Sarost 5, était resté bloqué plus de deux semaines en mer avec les 40 immigrés clandestins qu’il avait secourus. Soucieuses de ne pas créer un précédent, les autorités tunisiennes avaient souligné qu’elles acceptaient ces migrants exceptionnellement et pour raisons « humanitaires ».

      Le 10 mai, 16 migrants originaires en majorité du Bangladesh avaient été sauvés par des pêcheurs tunisiens, après le naufrage de leur embarcation qui avait fait une soixantaine de morts.

      La majorité des bâtiments de la marine qui ont patrouillé au large de la Libye ces dernières années se sont retirés tandis que les navires humanitaires font face à des blocages judiciaires et administratifs.

      https://www.voaafrique.com/a/appel-au-secours-d-un-capitaine-coinc%C3%A9-en-mer-avec-75-migrants-malades/4943716.html

    • Tugboat carrying 75 migrants stranded off Tunisia for 10 days

      The #Maridive_601, an Egyptian tugboat that rescued 75 migrants in international waters over one week ago, is still stranded off the Tunisian coast as Tunisian authorities refuse to let it dock.

      The Egyptian tugboat Maridive 601 rescued the migrants off the southern Tunisian coast on May 31 after they embarked from Libya.

      Sixty-four of the 75 migrants are Bangladeshi and at least 32 of those on board are minors and unaccompanied children, according to the International Organization for Migration.

      The Maridive 601, which services oil platforms between Tunisia and Italy, picked up the migrants who were drifting in international waters near the Tunisian coast, and headed to the closest port of Zarzis in southern Tunisia.

      “I request that the Tunisian authorities allow us to make an emergency entry to Zarzis port,” appealed Faouz Samir, captain of the Maridive 601 shortly after the rescue.

      Since then, the crew has not received entry permission. An official from the Tunisian interior ministry was quoted as saying Monday that „the migrants want to be taken in by a European country." The official did not want to be quoted by name.

      Cases of infectious scabies

      Earlier last week, a Red Crescent team based in the southern Tunisian city of Zarzis delivered aid and medical care to the migrants, some of whom were ill, according to the Red Crescent.

      They “urgently need water, food, clothes, blankets and above all medical assistance,” the IOM added. According to AFP reports, the IOM added it was ready to help Tunisia provide for the migrants.

      Mongi Slim, a Red Crescent official in southern Tunisia, told InfoMigrant last Thursday that cases of scabies were on the rise and that there were around thirty people affected. The second captain of the Maridive 601 added that the Red Crescent was not allowed to board the ship to provide scabies medication. Instead, the crew had to contact its chartering company, Shell Tunisia, which in turn delivered medication in addition to food, water, mattresses and blankets. “We’re in telephone contact with the Red Crescent and they give us instructions on how to treat the migrants,” the captain informed InfoMigrants.

      Video footage

      Photos published online by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights, an NGO, showed migrants lying on the deck of the boat, while sailors attempted to feed them. A video by the same NGO shows migrants shouting: “We don’t need food, we don’t want to stay here, we want to go to Europe.”

      https://www.facebook.com/ftdes/videos/189765251957864

      Tunisia’s central government and local authorities did not wish to comment to media requests.

      “We understand the difficulties and the scale of the challenges that migration flows pose and we are working to support relief and assistance capacities,” said Lorena Lando, the IOM’s head of mission in Tunisia. “But we are worried by the increasingly restrictive policies adopted by several countries,” Lando told AFP.

      Last month, around 60 migrants, most from Bangladesh, drowned off the coast of Tunisia after leaving Libya on a boat bound for Europe.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/17413/tugboat-carrying-75-migrants-stranded-off-tunisia-for-10-days?ref=tw
      #Tunisie
      ping @_kg_

    • Méditerranée : le navire #Sea_Watch_3 de retour dans la zone de détresse

      Après avoir été bloqué par la justice italienne pendant près d’un mois, le navire humanitaire Sea Watch 3 est de retour dans la zone de détresse (SAR zone) au large de la Libye. Il est actuellement le seul bateau de sauvetage en mer.

      Le navire humanitaire de l’ONG allemande Sea Watch, le Sea Watch 3, est de retour dans la zone de sauvetage au large de la Libye, la SAR zone.

      Le Sea Watch 3 était bloqué depuis le 20 mai par la justice italienne dans le cadre de poursuites pour aide à l’immigration illégale. Il a reçu samedi 8 juin l’autorisation de repartir en mer, a annoncé l’association.

      "Le Sea Watch 3 est libre ! Nous avons reçu une notification formelle sur la libération du navire saisi et son retour aux opérations" en mer, s’est félicitée l’organisation humanitaire sur Twitter.

      Malgré la politique de "fermeture des ports" du ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini (extrême droite), le Sea Watch 3 avait pu débarquer les 65 migrants qu’il avait secourus à la mi-mai ; ils ont été autorisés à débarquer sur l’île de Lampedusa.

      Cette opération de secours avait provoqué la fureur de Matteo Salvini, qui a semblé la découvrir en temps réel à la télévision. “Je suis le ministère des règles et des ports fermés. Si un ministre du mouvement 5 étoiles a autorisé le débarquement, il devra répondre de ses actes devant les Italiens”, avait-il notamment lâché.

      Matteo Salvini estime que les migrants qui partent en mer à partir de la Libye doivent être remis aux garde-côtes libyens, conformément à un accord conclu entre l’Union européenne et Tripoli, mais les organisations humanitaires qui portent au secours des migrants refusent de s’y conformer.

      Hormis le Sea Watch 3, à la date du 10 juin, aucun autre navire humanitaire n’est présent au large des côtes libyennes.

      Les navires humanitaires qui sont bloqués dans des ports européens :

      – Depuis un débarquement en juin 2018 à Malte, le Lifeline de l’ONG allemande eponyme est bloqué au port de La Valette, à Malte, où les autorités contestent sa situation administrative.

      – Depuis le mois de janvier 2019, l’Open Arms de l’ONG espagnole Proactiva Open Arms est bloqué à Barcelone par les autorités espagnoles. Au printemps 2018, ce navire avait été placé un mois sous séquestre en Italie avant d’être autorisé à repartir.

      – Début août 2017, la justice italienne a saisi le Juventa de l’ONG allemande Jugend Rettet, accusée de complicité avec les passeurs libyens mais qui clame depuis son innocence.

      –Le Mare Jonio, un navire battant pavillon italien qui entend avant tout témoigner de la situation en mer, est actuellement bloqué en Sicile par les autorités.

      Les ONG qui résistent :

      –Dans les airs, les petits avions Colibri de l’ONG française Pilotes volontaires et Moonbird de Sea-Watch mènent régulièrement des patrouilles pour tenter de repérer les embarcations en difficulté.

      –L’Astral, le voilier de l’ONG Open Arms, est actuellement à Barcelone.

      Les navires humanitaires qui ont renoncé :

      Des ONG engagées au large des côtes libyennes ont suspendu leurs activités, face à la chute des départs de Libye et face à une intensification des menaces des garde-côtes libyens, qui considèrent les ONG comme complices des passeurs.

      – Suite aux pressions politiques, privé de pavillon, l’Aquarius de l’ONG SOS Méditerranée – qui a secouru près de 20 000 personnes en deux ans et demi - a mis fin à ses missions en décembre 2018. L’ONG espère toutefois trouver un nouveau bateau pour repartir rapidement en mer au printemps 2019.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17410/mediterranee-le-navire-sea-watch-3-de-retour-dans-la-zone-de-detresse

    • Italy to fine NGOs who rescue migrants at sea

      The Italian government has decided to impose stiff fines on rescuers who bring migrants into port without authorization. It also gave the interior ministry, led by Matteo Salvini, power to demand the payment.

      A decree adopted by the Italian government on Tuesday would force non-governmental organizations to pay between €10,000 and €50,000 ($11,327 – $56,638) for transporting rescued migrants to Italian ports.

      Rescuers who repeatedly dock without authorization risk having their vessel permanently impounded. The fines would be payable by the captain, the operator and the owner of the rescue ship.

      The Italian government is composed of the anti-establishment 5-Star Movement and right-wing populist League Party. The League leader Matteo Salvini, who also serves as the interior minister, has been spearheading an effort to clamp down on illegal immigration.

      Delayed decree

      The adoption of the decree has been delayed due to criticism from the United Nations and the office of the Italian president. Following the cabinet session on Tuesday, however, Salvini praised it as a “step forward the security of this country.” The populist leader also said he was “absolutely sure about the fact that it is compliant” with all national and international laws.

      The decree allows police to investigate possible migrant trafficking operations by going undercover. It also makes it easier to eavesdrop electronically on suspected people smugglers. Other sections of the decree impose stricter punishments on rioters and violent football fans.

      Read more: Italian court rules Salvini can be charged with kidnapping

      Additionally, the decree gives Salvini’s ministry the power to order the NGOs to pay the fines, this was previously the area of the transport and infrastructure ministries.

      Salvini has pushed through several anti-migrant decrees since becoming interior minister a year ago, including one in December which ended humanitarian protection for migrants who do not qualify for refugee status. Earlier this week, Salvini blasted three judges who opposed his hardline policies.

      Risking life at sea

      Since 2014, more than 600,000 people have made the dangerous journey across the central Mediterranean to reach Italy, fleeing war and poverty in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. More than 14,000 have been recorded killed or missing when attempting the trip.

      Without a legal way to reach Europe, they pay people smugglers for passage in unseaworthy boats. The UNHCR and IOM recently said that 1,940 people have reached Italy from north Africa since the beginning of 2019, and almost 350 have died en route — putting the death rate for those crossing at more than 15%. The number of new arrivals has dropped off in recent years, but Rome is still faced with hundreds of thousands of people who migrated illegally. Pending asylum claims as of May 31 this year were 135,337.

      With official search-and-rescue missions canceled, the burden of assisting the shipwrecked migrants falls on rescue NGOs. The Italian coastguard estimates NGOs have brought in some 30,000 people per year since 2014.

      https://www.dw.com/en/italy-to-fine-ngos-who-rescue-migrants-at-sea/a-49143481

    • L’UNHCR chiede all’Italia di riconsiderare un decreto che penalizzerebbe i salvataggi in mare nel Mediterraneo centrale

      L’UNHCR, l’Agenzia delle Nazioni Unite per i Rifugiati, esprime preoccupazione per l’approvazione da parte del governo italiano di un nuovo decreto contenente anche diverse disposizioni che potrebbero penalizzare i salvataggi in mare di rifugiati e migranti nel Mediterraneo centrale, compresa l’introduzione di sanzioni finanziarie per le navi delle Ong ed altre navi private impegnate nel soccorso in mare.

      Salvare vite umane costituisce un imperativo umanitario consolidato ed è anche un obbligo derivante dal diritto internazionale. Nessuna nave o nessun comandante dovrebbe essere esposto a sanzioni per aver soccorso imbarcazioni in difficoltà e laddove esista il rischio imminente di perdita di vite umane.

      “In una fase in cui gli Stati europei si sono per lo più ritirati dalle operazioni di soccorso nel Mediterraneo centrale, le navi delle Ong sono più cruciali che mai,” ha dichiarato Roland Schilling, Rappresentante regionale a.i. per il Sud Europa. “Senza di loro, altre vite saranno inevitabilmente perse”.

      L’UNHCR è inoltre preoccupata per il fatto che il decreto possa avere l’effetto di penalizzare i comandanti che rifiutano di far sbarcare le persone soccorse in Libia.

      Alla luce della situazione di sicurezza estremamente volatile, delle numerose segnalazioni di violazioni di diritti umani e dell’uso generalizzato della detenzione nei confronti delle persone soccorse o intercettate in mare, nessuno dovrebbe essere riportato in Libia.

      L’UNHCR ha ribadito più volte che il rafforzamento delle capacità di ricerca e soccorso, in particolare nel Mediterraneo centrale, deve essere accompagnato da un meccanismo regionale volto ad assicurare procedure di sbarco rapide, coordinate, ordinate e sicure. La responsabilità per i rifugiati e i migranti soccorsi in mare deve essere condivisa tra tutti gli stati che li accolgono, invece di ricadere su uno o due.

      L’UNHCR chiede al governo italiano di rivedere il decreto e al parlamento di modificarlo, mettendo al centro la protezione dei rifugiati ed il salvataggio di vite umane.

      https://www.unhcr.it/news/lunhcr-chiede-allitalia-riconsiderare-un-decreto-penalizzerebbe-salvataggi-mar

    • Migrants bloqués au large de la Tunisie : les Bangladais refusent le rapatriement

      Quinze jours après avoir été secourus, 75 migrants - dont la moitié de mineurs - sont toujours coincés à bord d’un navire commercial égyptien près des côtes tunisiennes. La Tunisie refuse de les laisser débarquer et souhaite les faire « rentrer chez eux ». Seuls les migrants africains ont accepté d’être rapatriés. La majorité des rescapés, des Bangladais, s’opposent à toute expulsion.

      Les 75 naufragés secourus il y a quinze jours par le bateau commercial égyptien Maridive 601 sont toujours bloqués au large de Zarzis, sur la côte tunisienne. Quelque 32 mineurs se trouvent à bord du navire.

      Les autorités tunisiennes refusent de les laisser débarquer depuis le vendredi 31 mai, jour du sauvetage. « Le gouverneur de Médenine insiste pour qu’ils rentrent chez eux », explique Mongi Slim du Croissant rouge tunisien, joint par InfoMigrants vendredi 14 juin.

      Informés de cette décision par le Croissant rouge, seuls les Égyptiens, les Marocains et les Soudanais présents à bord ont accepté un rapatriement dans leurs pays.

      La Tunisie demande l’aide du Bangladesh

      Les 64 autres naufragés, des Bangladais dont de nombreux mineurs, ont refusé cette offre. « Ils demandent de rejoindre l’Italie ou de pouvoir rester en Tunisie avec une permission de travail », raconte Mongi Slim.

      « Les autorités ont sollicité l’aide de l’ambassade du Bangladesh. Elle va intervenir pour résoudre le problème », ajoute-t-il.

      « Rien pour se mettre à l’abri du soleil »

      En attendant, à bord, la situation psychologique des naufragés se dégrade. « Il fait très chaud en cette période de l’année dans le sud de la Tunisie, et sur le bateau les migrants n’ont rien pour se mettre à l’abri du soleil. Ils risquent la déshydratation. Ils sont emprisonnés en mer », déplore Ben Amor Romdhane, du Forum tunisien pour les droits économiques et sociaux (FTDES) également contacté par InfoMigrants. Le militant s’inquiète aussi des cas de gale signalés à bord.

      Pour la première fois depuis 15 jours, jeudi, une équipe médicale du Croissant rouge tunisien a pu monter sur le Maridive 601 avec des médicaments et des vivres. Jusqu’ici, le navire était ravitaillé en eau, en nourriture et en médicament anti-gale par la compagnie Shell Tunisie qui affrète le bateau. Le Croissant rouge était néanmoins parvenu à faire acheminer un stock de médicaments. Les premiers soins avaient été prodigués par l’équipage, guidé au téléphone par le Croissant rouge.

      Le médecin du Croissant rouge, qui a pu examiner les 75 migrants jeudi, a déclaré qu’il n’y avait pas de maladie grave ou d’urgences, seulement des cas de diabète, selon Mongi Slim.

      D’après le représentant du navire égyptien, joint par InfoMigrant, la situation reste pourtant « très tendue ». « La seule solution est de laisser ces migrants entrer en Tunisie », estime-t-il.

      Cet incident rappelle celui qu’avait connu le Sarost 5 l’an dernier. Le navire commercial, qui avait secouru 40 migrants en mer Méditerranée, avait dû attendre 17 jours l’autorisation de débarquer à Zarzis. Les autorités avaient finalement cédé titre exceptionnel « pour des raisons humanitaires ».

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17533/migrants-bloques-au-large-de-la-tunisie-les-bangladais-refusent-le-rap

    • Migrants stranded at sea for three weeks now risk deportation, aid groups warn

      Group of 75 people survive prolonged ordeal but could now be made to leave Tunisia.

      https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/235b366ca8ef3c06feec045df894e482906510c0/0_0_1280_768/master/1280.jpg?width=620&quality=85&auto=format&fit=max&s=35a960601e803a971255f0

      A group of migrants who spent nearly three weeks trapped onboard a merchant ship in torrid conditions face possible deportation to their home countries after they were finally allowed to disembark in Tunisia, aid groups have warned.

      The 75 migrants, about half of whom are minors or unaccompanied children, were rescued on 31 May by the Maridive 601 only to spend the next 20 days at sea as European authorities refused to let them land.

      “The migrant boat was ignored by Italian and Maltese authorities, though they were in distress in international waters”, said a spokesperson for Alarm Phone, a hotline service for migrants in distress at sea that was alerted to the ship’s plight by crew members. “This is a violation of international law and maritime conventions”.

      Heat and humidity onboard the Maridive 501, an Egyptian tugboat that services offshore oil platforms, were insufferable, said aid groups. Food and water were scarce, scabies broke out and spread, and several people suffered fractures and other injuries during the rescue operation.

      Witnesses said the psychological strain was immense for migrants and crew members alike.

      The brother of one Bangladeshi man said on 3 June: “Today is Eid [the festival marking the end of Ramadan]. But the day is not for me. My brother is on the ship. I can’t take it any more. How is he? How can I explain my feelings to you? When I get good news, this will be my Eid gift and that day will be my Eid day.”

      Six days later, he said: “How many days will they stay there? Who can take care of him? I am depressed, every day my mother is crying.”

      The ship’s captain, Faouz Samir, asked repeatedly to be allowed to land at the nearest port, in Zarzis, but was initially refused permission. Regional authorities said migrant centres in Medenine were too overcrowded.

      On 6 June, the migrants staged an onboard protest, asking to be sent to Europe. Video of the protest was published by the Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux.

      The closure of Italian and Maltese ports to rescue ships has seemingly had a ripple effect, with Tunisia closing its own harbours to rescued people in order to avoid an overwhelming influx of migrants.

      On Tuesday evening, however, the Tunisian authorities relented. The migrants, who are mainly from Bangladeshi but also include Egyptians, Moroccans and Sudanese, will now be transferred to a detention centre.

      Aid groups, however, who had been demanding an immediate disembarkation in view of the medical emergency onboard, are concerned people may be sent back to Libya or even deported to their home countries after landing in the port of Zarzis. The governor of Medenine had previously said the boat would be allowed to dock only if all the migrants were immediately deported.

      “We are happy for the survivors. They are exhausted, some are traumatised, but we will accompany them so that we can finally find respite and reflect on the different alternatives available to them,” said Wajdi Ben Mhamed, head of the International Organisation for Migration’s Zarzis office.

      The IOM said its protection team would assist the survivors with “their protection needs and provide, for those who have requested it, assistance for voluntary return to their country of origin’’.

      Relatives claim some of the Bangladeshi survivors were told that food, water and medical treatment would be withheld if they did not accept deportation.

      One man who spoke to his brother on 18 June said fears of imminent deportation had been exacerbated by the visit of a Bangladeshi envoy to the boat. The envoy’s visit followed a meeting five days earlier with the Tunisian minister of the interior.

      Another relative said of a Bangladeshi migrant aboard the tugboat: “In Bangladesh there are people who want to kill him. He paid all the money and went to Libya to get away from the problems in Bangladesh. Then he escaped from Libya because of the problems there. He wants to go to Europe.”

      Médecins Sans Frontières warned that Tunisia could not be defined a safe haven for migrants and refugees, given that it had no functioning asylum system in place. “The nearest places of safety for rescues in the central Mediterranean are Italy or Malta,” said a spokesperson.

      A dangerous precedent would be set if an agreement was found to deport those rescued to their countries of origin quickly after disembarkation in Tunisia. Aid groups warn that boats like the Maridive would turn into migrant holding facilities until deportations were arranged. Many more boats could thus turn from places of rescue to prison islands, floating along north African shores.
      More than 70 million people now fleeing conflict and oppression worldwide
      Read more

      Giorgia Linardi, of SeaWatch in Italy said: “After this episode we should reflect on whether Tunisia qualifies as a place of safety, as our sources suggested that the migrants could be immediately repatriated or expelled from the country. The situation aboard the Maridive is very much confronted with the situation faced right now by the SeaWatch vessel with 53 migrants on board which is still floating in front of Italian territorial waters. As of now, the attitude of the Italian authorities is no different from the attitude of the Tunisian authorities towards the Maridive despite the two states having a different framework in terms of protection of human rights and in terms of asylum system in place.”

      With sea conditions currently favourable, thousands are preparing to leave Libya, where war and political instability have been aggravated by floods caused by heavy rain.

      Without rescue boats, however, the number of shipwrecks is likely to rise further. Only two of the 10 NGO rescue boats that were active in the Mediterranean are still present.

      According to data from the UN and the IOM, about 3,200 people have reached Italy and Malta from North Africa since the beginning of 2019, and almost 350 have died en route – putting the death rate for those crossing at about 11% along the central Mediterranean route.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/jun/19/migrants-stranded-at-sea-for-three-weeks-now-face-deportation-aid-group

    • Italy’s redefinition of sea rescue as a crime draws on EU policy for inspiration

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-341-italy-salvini-boats-directive.pdf

      –-> analyse de #Yasha_Maccanico sur la première directive de Salvini contre la #Mare_Jonio et la façon dans laquelle il essaye (avec part de raison) justifier la criminalisation systématique des secours en mer en base aux instructions issues de la Commission dans le contexte de l’Agenda Européenne, plus des problèmes de base dans les représentations contenues dans la directive.

    • Maridive : les 75 migrants bloqués depuis 18 jours au large de Zarzis ont pu débarquer en Tunisie

      Après 18 jours d’hésitation, les autorités tunisiennes ont finalement laissé les 75 migrants du #Maridive débarquer au port de Zarzis, ce mercredi. Ils ont toutefois imposé leurs conditions : les migrants ont tous accepté préalablement de rentrer dans leur pays.

      « C’est enfin fini, c’est un soulagement ». Mongi Slim, membre du Croissant-rouge tunisien, s’est réjoui, mardi 18 juin, du débarquement des 75 migrants bloqués depuis le 31 mai au large de Zarzis. Les autorités tunisiennes refusaient en effet de laisser débarquer en Tunisie ces personnes secourues par un navire commercial égyptien, le Maridive 601, au large de la Libye.

      Après 18 jours de blocage, ils ont enfin pu toucher la terre ferme. « Nous sommes heureux pour les survivants. Ils sont épuisés, certains sont traumatisés mais nous les accompagnerons pour pouvoir enfin trouver du répit », a déclaré Wajdi Ben Mhamed, chef de bureau de l’agence de l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM), dans un communiqué.

      Un premier vol vers le Bangladesh jeudi

      Cependant, ce débarquement s’est fait sous conditions après de longues négociations entre les ONG, les organisations internationales et les autorités. Tunis a finalement autorisé leur débarquement à condition que les migrants acceptent tous d‘être renvoyés dans leur pays d’origine. Parmi les 75 migrants secourus, 64 sont de nationalité bangladaise, neuf égyptienne, un est originaire du Maroc et un autre du Soudan.


      https://www.facebook.com/iomtunis/posts/354908018559713

      Samedi 15 juin, des représentants de l’ambassade du Bangladesh sont montés à bord du Maridive et ont convaincu les Bangladais de retourner chez eux. Selon Mongi Slim, du Croissant rouge tunisien, un premier groupe de 20 Bangladais devrait être renvoyé dès jeudi 20 juin.

      Aucune demande d’asile déposée

      Une information que ne confirme par l’OIM, qui est chargée d’organiser les retours volontaires de ces naufragés. « Nous avons effectivement dit aux autorités qu’un vol commercial avec une vingtaine de places partaient de Tunisie demain vers le Bangladesh. Mais nous n’organisons pas de retours forcés », précise à InfoMigrants Lorena Lando, chef de mission de l’OIM en Tunisie. « Mais, nous attendons de faire un point avec les migrants et savoir qui veut profiter d’un retour volontaire », insiste-t-elle.

      Malgré l’accord, l’OIM rappelle que les migrants qui veulent demander l’asile seront redirigés vers le Haut-commissariat des Nations unies aux réfugiés (HCR). Mais pour l’heure, selon l’agence onusienne, aucun des migrants du Maridive ne souhaite déposer une demande d’asile en Tunisie.
      Le 10 mai dernier, 16 migrants, majoritairement du Bangladesh, avaient été sauvés par des pêcheurs tunisiens, après le naufrage de leur embarcation ayant fait une soixantaine de morts. Deux d’entre eux avaient décidé de rentrer dans leur pays.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17614/maridive-les-75-migrants-bloques-depuis-18-jours-au-large-de-zarzis-on

    • Working Paper: Guidelines on temporary arrangements for #disembarkation

      Given the voluntary nature of participation in the mechanism, determination of persons to be relocated will be based on the indications by the Member States of relocation of the profiles that these Member States are willing to accept (variable geometry)."

      “Member States that relocate voluntarily (a lump sum of 6000 EUR per applicant).”

      The Council of the European Union has produced a new “Working Paper” on: Guidelines on temporary arrangements for disembarkation (LIMITE doc no: WK 7219-19):

      “The Guidelines are based on best practices used in previous disembarkation cases, and rely on a coordinating role of the Commission and support by relevant agencies. The framework is of a temporary nature and the participation of the Member States is on a voluntary basis. This document has a non-binding nature.” [emphasis added]

      The circumstances for “triggering” Temporary Arrangements (TA) are:

      “type of arrivals covered

      – a search and rescue operation; and/or

      – other sea arrivals where there is a humanitarian ground at stake.”

      On the face of it the idea would appear to refer to just about every rescue. However the idea relies on the state of first disembarkation - for example, in the Med: Spain, France, Italy and Greece - allowing a safe port of arrival. These states then make a “relocation” request to other Member States. This is entirely based on voluntary participation.

      “Workflow in the Member State of disembarkation

      The following procedural steps should be undertaken in the Member State of disembarkation, where appropriate with the assistance from EU agencies, and where relevant with the involvement of the Member State of relocation, in agreement with the benefitting Member State:

      (...) Initial identification, registration, fingerprinting and swift security screening: Registration and fingerprinting of all arriving migrants as category 2 in Eurodac system; check against national and EU information systems (such as Eurodac, SIS, VIS, Europol and Interpol databases) to ensure that none of the persons arriving to the EU is a threat to public policy, internal security or public health.

      Assessment regarding possible use of alternatives to detention or detention, on a case by case basis, pending further processing (in the context of border procedure, where possible, or otherwise)”

      Member states will be allowed to set conditions on acceptable refugees to relocate:

      “Given the voluntary nature of participation in the mechanism, determination of persons to be relocated will be based on the indications by the Member States of relocation of the profiles that these Member States are willing to accept (variable geometry).”

      The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCGA) will:

      “provide assistance in screening, debriefing, identification and fingerprinting;

      – deploy Return Teams (composed of escort, forced return monitor and/or return specialists);”

      Financial support

      "Under the AMIF Regulation, funds are to be made available for:

      – Member States that relocate voluntarily (a lump sum of 6000 EUR per applicant, applying the amended Article 18 of the AMIF Regulation 516/2014);

      – support to return operations;

      – Member States under pressure, as appropriate, including the possibility of a lump sum per relocation to cover transfer costs.

      – When MS make full use of the lump sums available under the national programmes, additional financial support could be provided.

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/jun/eu-council-disembark.htm

    • La #marine_italienne sur le banc des accusés

      En octobre 2013, un bateau de pêche chargé de réfugiés syriens fait naufrage près de Lampedusa, île italienne proche de la Sicile. Si 212 personnes ont pu être sauvées, 26 corps ont été repêchés et environ 240 sont restées portés disparus dont une soixantaine d’enfants. Ce drame ne restera pas impuni.
      Un procès se tiendra en 2018 avec, sur le banc des accusés pour homicide involontaire et non-assistance à personnes en danger, des officiers de la marine italienne. C’est la première fois qu’un procès de ce type est lancé. Ce jour-là, un médecin syrien qui se trouvait à bord avec ses deux enfants -tous deux morts noyés- a appelé plusieurs fois au secours les garde-côtes italiens. Ceux-ci retransmettaient le relais à leurs confrères maltais et peu après lançaient un message signalant la situation aux navires se trouvant dans la zone. C’était le cas du navire Libra de la marine italienne, à moins d’une heure de navigation mais qui, au lieu de se précipiter, s’est éloigné en laissant intervenir les Maltais, ce qui prenait beaucoup plus de temps. Le bateau des migrants a fini par chavirer à 17h07. Les secours dont, le Libra, sont arrivés vers 18h00. Trop tard.

      https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/080337-000-A/la-marine-italienne-sur-le-banc-des-accuses

    • Bangladeshi migrants in Tunisia forced to return home, aid groups claim

      Relatives say more than 30 people stuck at sea told to go home or lose food and water.

      More than 30 migrants from Bangladesh who were trapped on a merchant ship off Tunisia for three weeks have been sent back to their home country against their will, according to relatives.

      They were among 75 migrants rescued on 31 May by the Maridive 601, an Egyptian tugboat that services offshore oil platforms, only to spend the next 20 days at sea near the Tunisian coast.

      The International Organization for Migration, an intergovernmental organisation linked to the United Nations, said the Bangladeshis “wished to return home”.

      But relatives and aid groups claimed that when a Bangladeshi envoy visited the boat the migrants were forced to accept their repatriation under the threat of having food, water and medical treatment being taken away.

      One relative told the Guardian: “When all the people were on the boat, they were told by the Bangladeshi embassy that if they didn’t agree to sign, they would not get any food or water any more. The people were afraid to die on the boat. The Bangladeshi embassy forced them to sign.”

      On 18 June, the 75 migrants, who included Egyptian, Moroccan and Sudanese people, were taken off the Maridive 601 and transferred to a Tunisian detention centre.

      The IOM confirmed that a few days later the first 17 individuals were returned to Bangladesh, and on 24 June, another 15 migrants were sent back.

      It said “more migrants will be travelling in the coming days, according to their decision”.

      The Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux (FTDES), an independent organisation that aims to defend economic and social rights, said: “We doubt that the decisions to return were made voluntarily by the migrants.

      “We have tried to visit the migrants in the reception centre in order to inquire about their wellbeing but despite making repeated inquiries and requests, the whereabouts of the detained migrants was not revealed.”

      Another relative said: “I spoke with my brother this morning in the centre. He is scared to be returned to Bangladesh, like all the people there. Nobody wants to return to Bangladesh; everyone who is returned is forced.”

      The IOM’s head of mission in Tunisia, Lorena Lando, rejected the accusations. “None of the migrants has been deported; [they] wished to return,” she said. “IOM does not do deportation, nor force anyone to return.”

      Lando said the IOM “did not have access” to the migrants until 19 June, after the Tunisian authorities allowed their disembarkation.

      She added: “Remaining at sea was not a solution either. It is up to the person to also apply for asylum if they fear persecution … or seek help to return home or take time to decide.”

      A spokesperson for Alarm Phone, a hotline service for migrants in distress at sea that was alerted to the ship’s plight by crew members, said: “The IOM refers to such deportations as voluntary returns but what is voluntary about telling survivors that they can leave their prison merely if they agree to be returned?

      “Do we really believe that these Bangladeshi people risked their lives to move to Libya and then to try to cross the Mediterranean, only to then be ‘voluntarily’ returned to Bangladesh?”

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/25/bangladeshi-migrants-in-tunisia-forced-to-return-home-aid-groups-claim