Plusieurs observateurs ou observatrices, dans les rangs des spécialistes du Hezbollah, notent qu’à la suite du discours de Nasrallah vendredi et du retrait (semble t il spectaculaire) d’un grand nombre de manifestants, les mobilisations auraient été moins transversales ce week-end et auraient perdu (un peu de) leur capacité à agréger des segments différents en termes de classe sociale (moins de participation des classes populaires) et évidemment en termes communautaires (moins de chiites).
Cette affirmation peut sembler au premier abord discutable au vu du succès de la chaine humaine qui a justement réuni des participants de toutes les régions libanaises sur la côté, avec même des incursions dans l’intérieur puisqu’apparemment, un brin de la chaine allait jusqu’à Nabatiyé. Voilà ce qu’on lit dans l’Orient Le Jour :
La chaîne était cependant interrompue en plusieurs points du littoral, notamment au sud de Beyrouth et entre Saïda et Tyr, zones sous influence du Hezbollah. Une percée notable a toutefois été marquée à Nabatiyé, fief du parti chiite, et Kfar Remmane, où les manifestants ont pris part au mouvement, malgré les pressions exercées par le parti chiite.
▻https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1192872/jour-xi-les-libanais-forment-une-chaine-humaine-de-tripoli-a-tyr-en-p
Voici quelques-uns de ces commentaires auxquels je fais allusion. Les deux threads sont plutôt des commentaires sur les intentions du Hezbollah vis-à-vis des autres forces politiques et de ce point de vue peuvent apparaître un peu old-style par rapport aux nouvelles formes du débat qui émergent dans ces mobilisation. Mais ces commentaires sont parsemés de remarques sur les divisions qui commenceraient à apparaître dans le mouvement. Je surligne les passages qui vont dans ce sens.
D’abord un thread de Amal Saad, à ma connaissance auteure de livres reconnus sur le Hezbollah :
▻https://twitter.com/amalsaad_lb/status/1188102914620964869
1. Thread: Nasrallah’s speech reveals that Hizbullah’s statism isn’t just dictated by its need to preserve its alliances, but by a more general fear of chaos. By securitizing the state and its institutions, as well as roads, Hizbullah has cast itself as a bulwark of the system
2. By securitizing the state, Hizbullah is preserving the delicate web of alliances & balances that have protected its Resistance. As unjust as it is, the current system is seen as crucial part of the political and strategic framework required for its own operational functioning
3. As a state-like actor, it’s choices are governed by raison d’etat. Faced between a kleptocracy that it’s familiar with, and a nebulous, leaderless movement which right wing Christian forces and other kleptocrats have joined forces with, it unhesitantly chose the former
4. Nasrallah’s call on Hizbullah supporters to leave the protests resonated with a community for whom the specter of a repeat of March 14 and the Syrian experience looms large. Hizbullah supporters were already feeling alienated by the anti-Nasrallah chants at some protests
5. Having “saved” the state, Hizbullah is in a stronger position vis-a-vis its partners in govt to enact these half hearted reforms and to push for more radical ones. It’s strategy will be one of controlled change from within, with the threat of mobilizing its own protests
Un autre thread de Ali Kourani (@Ali_Kourani) recoupe celui-ci sur plusieurs points (il est bcp plus long, je fais des sélections) :
▻https://twitter.com/Ali_Kourani/status/1188494671863005184
Day 11 of the protests: In light of recent developments and a sea of fiery takes, a not-so-loud analysis of Hezbollah’s evolving position to the protests: Thread.
[...] If there was one clear thing in Nasrallah’s speech, it was that the protests have taken two dramatically different courses: a national and rightful movement carrying honest grievances and demands, -
–and a coalition of marginalized establishment parties co-opting the protests and trying to orchestrate a coup against Hezbollah and its allies (mainly LF, Kataeb, partially PSP, Rifi etc.)
Why did Nasrallah ask his supporters to pull out from the streets? The threat of militia takeovers of certain areas across the country isn’t taken lightly by Hezbollah. There is enough recorded proof to believe LF already has multiple checkpoints on several highways ID’ing people Several scuffles between thin-skinned Hezbollah supporters and protestors insulting Nasrallah are also a concern for the party. Not only do they embarrass it, they add to the impending threat of chaos Hezbollah does not wish to see.
A complete withdrawal is not a preference for the party anymore, but a tactical necessity. While Hezbollah is “saving” the state, it surely isn’t ensconcing the previous order governing the state. One thing is certain: what was before the 17th of October won’t be the same after. Establishment parties are already seeing internal cracks (FPM, Future) and alliances will be restructured to acclimatize to new pressures from their constituencies. For Hezbollah in particular, the very nature of its alliances with both the FPM and AMAL will see a crucial makeover. While FPM is known to do well in elections, it proved time and again its capacity to mobilize a solid support base is very limited. Without Hezbollah’s backing, FPM loses chances of any other presidential tenure to Marada (another Hezb ally) and subsequently much of the grip on its street. AMAL has never been less popular in the South. Without Hezbollah’s backing, AMAL loses an overwhelming majority of its voters and enters an identity crisis that threatens the very existence of the movement: what exactly is AMAL without Hezbollah? A resistance movement? (No.) A popular movement for the disenfranchised? (No.) In turn, Hezbollah expects that by saving its main allies it will be able to extract more concessions from them that allow it to push for more radical reforms and pass a set of much-needed laws in Parliament. Everyone is a loser today: Establishment parties have never been on shakier ground. Hezbollah lost a golden opportunity to ostracize AMAL completely.
The protestors have lost a major impetus to their movement after Hezbollah pulled out, essentially leaving them with the lesser-of-two-evils option instead of meaningful structural change. The protestors did little to assure Hezbollah’s support base this uprising does not target their first line of security. Even the staunchly pro-resistance colors in the protests (LCP, CIAS, PM, PNO, SSNP etc.) stood idly as Nasrallah was berated and Hezbollah called terrorist.
When we talk about Hezbollah’s support base, we are not merely referring to individuals. Hezbollah’s ‘resistance community’ is arguably the largest, most organized, unified and structured social movement in the country’s history that produces its own intelligentsia, social service networks, ideology, music, myths, propaganda and regional army. As Amal Saad argues, Hezbollah managed to sustain an image of itself as “a rationality, a way of thinking and existence (episteme)” to its supporters. This community has suffered 18 years of occupation, a 33-day bombardment campaign, 11 VBIED and suicide bomber attacks in the last 6 years alone, and corroborated conspiring with the US by actors in government today. To put any grassroots movement at odds with the above, in any context, and if I am to put this nicely, is political suicide. Hezbollah’s head of executive council had to reiterate this morning that the party does not believe all protestors are receiving foreign funding, so it’s unclear why so many of them took the accusation personally and jumped on the defensive. When Nasrallah talks about a resulting ‘vacuum’ that could accelerate a financial collapse in case the government resigns, he is not talking about the caretaker government that will still be operative, but about the cul-de-sac all sides will reach if protestors will not negotiate.
It’s clear the second half of the protests was commandeered by the middle class, and the state isn’t exactly fearful of those. Whatever the outcome (cabinet reshuffle or new government), what’s certain is that this was but one throe in a protracted childbirth that won’t stop here. The next challenge is the state’s ability to avert the fiscal crisis and keep the leviathan of workers&farmers (less than ~$10k/year class) at bay. Sectarianism cannot be unlearned in two weeks either. Now is the time for reasonable incremental change, not rosy idealistic dreams.
J’ai rassemblé ces commentaires qui me paraissent intéressants mais qui peuvent être tout à fait contestés. Je viens d’arriver à Beyrouth qui pour quelques affaires fortement perturbées par les événements et du coup j’espère avoir du temps pour observer les choses par moi même.
