Just a moment...
https://www.refworld.org
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#ONU, le #scandale des #abus_sexuels
De la Centrafrique à New York, une investigation sur les abus sexuels commis par les collaborateurs de l’ONU et l’impuissance de l’organisation à les combattre.
« Tout ceci est hautement immoral et en totale contradiction avec notre mission. » En 2004, l’ONU et son secrétaire général, Kofi Annan, affrontaient un vaste scandale d’abus sexuels commis par des militaires et des employés de l’organisation en République démocratique du Congo. Dans la foulée, le conseiller Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein présentait ses préconisations pour éradiquer le fléau et l’impunité qui l’accompagne : mise en place de cours martiales dans les pays où des casques bleus sont déployés et adoption d’une convention internationale permettant à l’ONU d’engager des poursuites pénales contre son personnel civil. Près de quinze ans plus tard, alors que les États membres s’opposent toujours au morcellement de leur compétence juridictionnelle, l’exploitation et les violences sexuelles perdurent sur les terrains d’opération, comme en Centrafrique. Malgré les mesures déployées (création d’un poste de défenseur des droits des victimes, couvre-feux pour éviter les contacts entre la population locale et les employés des Nations unies en dehors des heures de service, travail de sensibilisation et d’éducation…) et la tolérance zéro prônée par l’actuel secrétaire général, António Guterres, près de cinquante nouvelles plaintes ont été enregistrées l’année dernière.
Victimes oubliées
Cette enquête recueille la parole de victimes oubliées – non signalées ou abandonnées par l’organisation –, les tentatives d’explication de responsables onusiens et le témoignage effarant du Français Didier Bourguet, seul civil condamné à ce jour, pour deux viols sur mineures, alors qu’il reconnaît avoir eu des rapports sexuels avec au moins une vingtaine d’enfants. Elle pointe ainsi l’intolérable impunité qui prédomine dans la grande majorité des cas.►https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/074593-000-A/onu-le-scandale-des-abus-sexuels
#viols #impunité #pédophilie #pédocriminalité #documentaire #film_documentaire #casques_bleus #RDC #MINUSCA #Didier_Bourguet #plaintes #justice #faille_juridique #République_Centrafricaine #Centrafrique #abus_sexuels #code_blue #viols_sur_mineurs #Régiment_des_Diables_Rouges #casques_bleus_français #Innocence_en_danger (ONG) #tolérance_zéro #Fondation_Femme_Plus #grossesse #MONUSCO-
Code Blue
The Code Blue Campaign works to end impunity for sexual abuse by un personnel.
The UN has a longstanding crisis caused, first, by UN personnel who commit sexual offenses against members of the populations they’re intended to serve and against other UN personnel and, second, by the institution’s response—the policies, procedures, and practices that create and sustain an institutional culture of impunity.We have identified three root causes of the UN’s culture of impunity:
The institution has taken the liberty to manage its crisis internally.
UN senior managers responsible for responding to and deliberating on individual cases are all rendered non-neutral by the conflicts of interest inherent in their positions: each is simultaneously called upon to represent and defend the best interests of the UN, the rights of the Organization’s accused employees and witnesses, and the rights of claimants.
UN immunity makes the Organization’s “words and deeds” uniquely impervious to oversight or audit, shielding its functions and functionaries from external scrutiny and effectively negating the freedom of information that is a cornerstone of due process and a necessary precondition to equal justice for all.
The Code Blue Campaign is concerned with overhauling several UN practices now in place that allow the UN Organization to dismiss and violate claimants’ fundamental rights to due process and neutral justice before the law:
In addressing claims of “sexual exploitation and abuse” and “sexual harassment and assault” made against UN personnel, UN officials consistently misinterpret, misrepresent, and misapply UN immunity (an important legal protection intended to protect the multilateral work of the world body) to shield individual personnel from accountability and the Organization’s officials from reputational damage.
The license to manage its sexual abuse crisis internally has evolved in tandem with the linear, largely unplanned growth of the UN system into a sprawling bureaucracy with many dozens of semi-autonomous “entities” that operate in relative isolation with barely monitored and rarely questioned authority accorded the heads.
This combination of rapid de-centralization and unmonitored, quasi-independence and authority has in turn given rise within the various “entities” to dozens of inharmonious, non-coherent, and often conflicting policies, procedures, and practices for addressing sexual offense claims made against the personnel of those entities.
The result is a non-system in which claimants and accused UN personnel associated with one entity of the UN Organization are subject to policies and procedures that may bear no resemblance to those followed by other entities of the same UN Organization. The only unifying factors across the system are the root causes of the UN’s culture of impunity for sexual offenses: the internal handling of all cases including those in which crimes beyond the UN’s “jurisdiction” are alleged; the misinterpretation and misapplication of UN immunity; and the inherent conflicts of interest underlying every case.
The Code Blue Campaign has arrived at these conclusions through years of intense research. We have exposed several cases that illustrate the injustice, the incoherence, the innate and insurmountable conflicts of interest, and the long history of rights violations and abusive treatment by the UN Organization, primarily of victims but also of the accused. We argue that unjust UN policies and practices have, over decades, resulted in a culture of impunity for sexual “misconduct” ranging from breaches of UN rules to grave crimes. This represents a contravention of the UN Charter. Member States must intervene immediately. The General Assembly could end this crisis by divesting the UN Organization of any role in cases of “sexual misconduct,” and delegating the authority instead to an appropriate entity created, staffed by and reporting directly to the Member States, and entirely independent of the Organization.
Member States have not yet come to the realization that the day of reckoning is approaching. If they do not take the initiative to fully recognize, understand, and solve a problem that has become an attention-getting Achilles heel, the UN’s sexual abuse crisis is likely to reach a pinnacle soon that could hobble the United Nations’ ability and authority to perform any of its functions. The UN could follow in the unenviable footsteps of another enormously powerful, largely secretive global institution whose former heights of moral authority are now universally queried: the Catholic Church.
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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly
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Taking action on sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers: Report of an independent review on sexual exploitation and abuse by international peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic
Executive Summary
I. Introduction
When peacekeepers exploit the vulnerability of the people they have been sent to protect, it is a fundamental betrayal of trust. When the international community fails to care for the victims or to hold the perpetrators to account, that betrayal is compounded.
In the spring of 2014, allegations came to light that international troops serving in a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (“CAR”) had sexually abused a number of young children in exchange for food or money (the “Allegations”). The alleged perpetrators were largely from a French military force known as the Sangaris Forces, which were operating as peacekeepers under authorization of the Security Council but not under UN command.
The manner in which UN agencies responded to the Allegations was seriously flawed. The head of the UN mission in CAR failed to take any action to follow up on the Allegations; he neither asked the Sangaris Forces to institute measures to end the abuses, nor directed that the children be removed to safe housing. He also failed to direct his staff to report the Allegations higher up within the UN. Meanwhile, both UNICEF and UN human rights staff in CAR failed to ensure that the children received adequate medical attention and humanitarian aid, or to take steps to protect other potential victims identified by the children who first raised the Allegations.
Instead, information about the Allegations was passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN offices, with no one willing to take responsibility to address the serious human rights violations. Indeed, even when the French government became aware of the Allegations and requested the cooperation of UN staff in its investigation, these requests were met with resistance and became bogged down in formalities. Staff became overly concerned with whether the Allegations had been improperly “leaked” to French authorities, and focused on protocols rather than action. The welfare of the victims and the accountability of the perpetrators appeared to be an afterthought, if considered at all. Overall, the response of the UN was fragmented and bureaucratic, and failed to satisfy the UN’s core mandate to address human rights violations.
By examining these failures and recommending reforms to deter future incidents of sexual violence by peacekeepers, this Report provides an opportunity for the UN to chart a new course of action and to undertake meaningful organizational change. If the Secretary-General’s zero tolerance policy is to become a reality, the UN as a whole—including troop contributing countries (“TCCs”)—must recognize that sexual abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers is not a mere disciplinary matter, but a violation of the victims’ fundamental human rights, and in many cases a violation of international humanitarian and criminal law. Regardless of whether the peacekeepers were acting under direct UN command or not, victims must be made the priority.
In particular, the UN must recognize that sexual violence by peacekeepers triggers its human rights mandate to protect victims, investigate, report and follow up on human rights violations, and to take measures to hold perpetrators accountable. In the absence of concrete action to address wrongdoing by the very persons sent to protect vulnerable populations, the credibility of the UN and the future of peacekeeping operations are in jeopardy.
▻https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Independent-Review-Report.pdf
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#Fondation
#Femme_Plus (Rdc)Spécialisée en accompagnement psychosocial des personnes vivant avec le #VIH (PVVIH), des personnes affectées par le #Sida (PA) et des #survivantes_des_violences_sexuelles (SVS) et des patients tuberculeux.
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Innocence en danger. Mouvement mondial de protection des enfants contre toutes formes de #violences notamment sexuelles.
Innocence en Danger (IED) est un mouvement mondial de protection des enfants contre toutes formes de violences notamment sexuelles, présent dans une dizaine de pays et partenaire d’associations internationales actives dans la lutte contre la pédocriminalité.
Le Directeur Général de l’Unesco, Fédérico Mayor, nomme en 1999, Homayra Sellier Présidente du mouvement de protection mondial de l’enfance. Depuis avril 2000, Innocence en Danger (IED) est une association Loi 1901 en France à vocation internationale. Elle est indépendante de tout organisme, déclarée à la préfecture de Paris, à but non lucratif et reconnue d’intérêt général.
Innocence en Danger regroupe tous les acteurs militants de notre société : spécialistes d’internet, juristes, experts de l’enfance, décideurs des mondes politiques, économiques et médiatiques. Son but est de sensibiliser l’opinion internationale aux fléaux croissants rencontrés par l’enfance, afin de peser sur les décisions des gouvernements.
Innocence en Danger constitue une force d’action, de sensibilisation, de proposition, d’éducation et d’information auprès des organisations gouvernementales ou non gouvernementales, des instances européennes et internationales, des entreprises, des écoles, des collectivités locales, des groupes de jeunes…
Innocence en Danger tient le rôle de relais d’informations entre le public et les institutions publiques. Elle accompagne au quotidien les enfants victimes et le(s) parent(s) protecteur(s). Elle est la première et la seule association à avoir mis en place des séjours de résilience.
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Evaluation of #Emergency_Transit_Centres in Romania and the Slovak Republic
Executive summary
The Emergency Transit Centres were established to provide emergency protection and the possibility to evacuate refugees who could not be protected in their countries of asylum. Temporary relocation of refugees who required resettlement on an urgent or emergency basis to an Evacuation Transit Facility (ETF) was expected to serve five objectives, namely:
Provide timely and effective protection to an individual or group of individuals of concern to UNHCR;
Demonstrate a tangible form of burden‐ and responsibility‐sharing, enabling States not otherwise involved in emergency resettlement to accept cases from an ETF;
Enable officials from UNHCR and resettlement countries to undertake interviews in a stable, safe and secure environment;
Promote the subsequent realization of the durable solution of permanent resettlement; and - Encourage States hosting ETFs to become involved in resettlement.
To date, three ETFs have become operational, namely the Emergency Transit Centres (ETCs) in Romania in 2008 and the Slovak Republic in 2011(although the Tri-Partite Agreement was signed in 2010), and the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) in the Philippines in 2009. The ETCs are managed on the basis of Tri-Partite Agreements signed by their hosting governments, UNHCR and IOM. The ETC in Timisoara, Romania, can accommodate a maximum of 200 refugees, whereas the one in Humenné, Slovak Republic, a total of 150 refugees (from mid-2012 onwards). As of 30 September 2015, 1,717 refugees had departed from the ETC in Timisoara, and 797 refugees from Humenné to resettlement countries. Since 2012, the main resettlement countries using the two centres are the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and Finland, with the USA the sole resettlement country using Humenné since 2013.
At the request of UNHCRs Resettlement Service in the Division of International Protection UNHCR’s Policy Development and Evaluation Service commissioned an evaluation of the ETCs in Romania and the Slovak Republic. As the ETCs have been in place for seven (Timisoara) and four years (Humenné) respectively, the evaluation presented UNHCR with an opportunity to assess whether the objectives set out at their establishment have been met. A comparative approach was used to assess the functioning of the two ETCs. The evaluation’s main findings should inform the development of strategies to meet emergency resettlement needs. Additionally, the results of the evaluation contribute to reflections on minimum standards and on whether the ETCs should continue with the same or similar objectives, or if there are other objectives that could lead to enhanced protection dividends for refugees.
The evaluation team was composed of one PDES staff member and one external evaluation consultant.
The ETCs in Timisoara, Romania, and in Humenné, Slovak Republic, have been relevant and appropriate for UNHCR, IOM, the ETC-hosting governments, resettlement countries and refugees. The ETCs offer a mechanism to UNHCR to provide a safe environment for refugees pending resettlement processing, including those classified under emergency or urgent priority, and to realize the durable solution of resettlement. While the number of refugees with emergency prioritization is small relative to the total number of refugees transferred to the centres, interlocutors described the ETCs as “life-saving” and “indispensable” for those few high-profile or high-risk refugees. This function for the most compelling protection cases is seen as core to UNHCR’s protection mandate.
The centres also have an advocacy function. This is of pivotal importance to UNHCR and the hosting countries, as the agency must be seen to be able to respond immediately to lifethreatening situations to provide immediate protection. Although the overall contribution to global resettlement figures is small, the positive change brought about by the immediate safety and security (and access to basic services) and the overall realization of resettlement for hundreds of refugees has considerable value. In the evaluation period from the beginning of 2012 until 30 September, 2015 a total of 1,568 refugees were resettled through the two ETCs. The life-saving dimension in compelling protection cases is seen as vital even if there are very few emergency cases.
Moreover, ETCs provided resettlement countries (and the IOM as part of its Resettlement Service Centre function for the US-government) access to refugees to undertake activities necessary to complete the resettlement process, including the selection of municipalities in resettlement countries. Some countries, in particular the US, are unable to process emergency cases due to long and complicated state procedures. The existence of the ETCs allows the US to process resettlement cases of persons who have been evacuated, and thereby increase accessibility of resettlement to some refugees, even if not on an emergency basis. The centre in Humenné has gradually expanded into one which solely caters to US-government processing, while only Timisoara has received emergency cases due to the shorter Romanian government clearance, and the absence of visa requirements. For the ETC-hosting governments, Romania and the Slovak Republic, the centres provided an opportunity to show their solidarity with countries hosting large refugee case-loads, while neither providing a permanent home to larger groups of refugees nor carrying all the operational costs of these centres.
While the coverage of the ETCs is in principle global, only refugees of some nationalities and countries of first asylum have been accommodated in the centres. Ad hoc planning and the obstacles experienced by some resettlement countries in the process of adjudication or completion of resettlement procedures, including selecting municipalities, has generally driven the use of ETCs. Most of the refugees transferred to the ETCs were resettled to the USA or the UK.
Male and female refugees of all age groups have been transferred to the ETCs, although some restrictions have been imposed with respect to refugees with high medical needs, including serious mental health needs due to limitations of the ETCs with respect to providing services to persons with high medical needs. There have also been challenges in providing accommodation to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) refugees. Since 2014, Iraqi refugees from Syria for resettlement to the USA are no longer transferred due to the refusal of already pre-vetted cases during the period 2012 - 2014. This has resulted in traumatic experiences for the concerned refugees, as three of them have remained in Timisoara since 2012 without a durable solution. Although alternative resettlement countries have been found for most of the rejected cases, this created an extra burden for UNHCR as well as delays for the concerned refugees.
The efficiency of the ETC operations in Timisoara and Humenné was assessed from different angles, namely UNHCR and IP staffing, budgets, and utilization of capacity including the “pipeline”.
The efficiency of the ETC operations in Timisoara and Humenné was assessed from different angles, namely UNHCR and IP staffing, budgets, and utilization of capacity including the “pipeline”.
The centres are respectively under the supervision of the UNHCR Country Representative in Bucharest, and the UNHCR Deputy Regional Representative of the Regional Representative Office for Central Europe (RRCE) in Budapest. The resulting reporting lines and management of the budgets has led to limited coordination to ensure commonalities in approach in terms of staffing and assistance provided. Thus, in Timisoara, three UNHCR staff (with UNHCR or UNOPS contracts) work in the centre. In the Slovak Republic, the only UNHCR staff member manages the centre on a UNOPS contract. The difference in ETC-level staffing cannot be fully justified on the basis of their capacity. The above has also led to different budgets and variations in IP capacity, responsibilities and assistance, with the division of responsibilities between the different actors in Timisoara resulting in an overstretched IP with reduced capacity for counseling and other refugee-oriented activities.
As the host countries’ contributions are different in each of the ETCs, the contribution of UNHCR also differs, the biggest difference being that UNHCR pays the food costs in Timisoara, which amounted to between 40-49% of total expenditures in the period 2012-2014. The overall expenditures for Timisoara, excluding food costs ranged from USD 621,700 in 2012, USD 654,900 in 2013 to USD 657,000 in 2014. If food costs are included, the annual costs are USD 1,031,000 in 2012, USD 1,278,100 in 2013, USD 1,195,800 in 2014 and USD 1,157,000 in 2015. The ETC requires 51% (2015) to 60% (2012, 2013) of the total budget for the Romania operation. The overall expenditure for Humenné was USD 406,700 in 2012, USD 747,800 in 2013, USD 979,900 in 2014, and USD 666,700 in 2015 (first 11 months).
The underutilization of the ETCs was regularly raised as a concern by interlocutors. Their occupancy rate has historically been relatively low. The average daily occupancy rate for Timisoara is between one third to one half, and for Humenné approximately half of its capacity. Considering the nature of emergency case handling, and the flexibility this requires, the ETCs must always have space available to receive cases with serious protection needs. However, the planning documents for the ETCs do not allocate a specific number of spaces for emergency evacuations. In addition, the turnover of refugees has been slower than envisaged, with some refugees submitted to the US overstaying the maximum period of six months. The overwhelming majority of refugees stay an average of four to five months. Capacity has generally been viewed in terms of the available number of beds instead of in relation to site and shelter space available.
Minimum standards for ETCs have not been developed. The application of minimum humanitarian standards in the areas of shelter confirms that the centres would not fully comply with these criteria if used to capacity. As the ETCs have become a semi-permanent response mechanism in the resettlement process, it is necessary to consider developing minimum standards for ETCs to guarantee the well-being of refugees. These standards should be based for example on the Sphere minimum humanitarian standards for shelter and non-food items.1 The standards should also take into account the objectives of preparing refugees for life in a resettlement country.
The Romanian government has received funds from the EU to upgrade an existing facility to house the ETC. Work is expected to begin in 2016 so that refugees could be accommodated in 2017. It is imperative that UNHCR seize the opportunity to be involved at the planning stage of this process in order to ensure that the physical set-up is conducive to providing adequate assistance and protection, and to preparing refugees for resettlement. Some input into planning would also allow cost-savings if, for example, kitchens were included so that refugees could cook for themselves.
The utilization of the ETCs has also been viewed in connection with the selection of refugees, and the process of obtaining clearances and organizing the transfer to one of the centres. The ETCs are directly linked to UNHCR’s global resettlement operation through the ETC focal point in the Resettlement Service, UNHCR headquarters. UNHCR Field Offices and Regional Resettlement Hubs are vital in identifying refugees for whom transfer to the ETC is an appropriate solution. Yet not all resettlement staff are aware of the existence of these facilities or know how to use these centres. This can be partially attributed to outdated guidance notes and a gap between vision and practice, which has led to different views on the usage of these centres.
The underutilization of the ETCs is also a consequence of the use of emergency priority quota and/or a direct transfer to the resettlement country, which is the preferred option for all parties. Other obstacles include lengthy exit procedures of some countries of asylum, and a bureaucratic and lengthy process to organize the transfer of cases. Additionally, the part-time nature of the ETC focal point at headquarters does not encourage a more pro-active advocacy role.
There are some differences in the provision of protection and assistance in the two ETCs. The major protection deficit noted by the evaluation team was the application of “limited freedom of movement” in Romania. Article 2 (2) of the Tri-Partite Agreement states that refugees “shall be required to reside in the ETC facility designated by the Romanian government.” This provision has been implemented in a manner that restricts freedom of movement of refugees as they are not permitted to leave the centre unless escorted by the implementing partner. This limitation is extremely frustrating for refugees and leads to a degree of institutionalization.
While most of the refugees interviewed during the mission were satisfied with the standards of assistance offered, they felt that their lives in the ETC were on hold and many expressed a desire to have a “normal” life and to move on quickly from the ETC. Especially in Timisoara, concerns were expressed regarding the difficulties arising from living with many other refugees in a relatively small area, including sharing rooms with other families and/or individuals, the limited to no freedom of movement, few opportunities for leisure and language training for adults, and a general sense of boredom. This has produced a living environment in which stress and tensions between individuals can more easily build up. Overall, the services provided in Humenné were more comprehensive than in Timisoara. This was reflected in the level of satisfaction expressed by refugees during the focus group discussions.
Resettlement is by definition a partnership activity. Cooperation with external stakeholders was generally viewed as efficient and effective by all respondents. Cooperation between UNHCR and the Government of Romania was regarded in a positive light, especially with respect to the limited time needed to process clearance requests, and the provision of identification documentation and security in the premises. However, the “limited freedom of movement” for refugees in the town, the lack of maintenance of the premises, and the regular provision of basic household items has led to some concern.
Cooperation between UNHCR and the Government of the Slovak Republic was generally considered efficient and effective by all interlocutors, despite some challenges in obtaining visas from embassies in countries of asylum or neighboring countries. The third partner to the agreements, IOM, has taken effective care of travel logistics, medical assessments and cultural orientation training. Possible challenges were ironed out in the beginning of these local partnerships. Some communication challenges were however noted at the field level in countries of asylum between UNHCR and IOM (and some ICRC delegations) due to staff turnover.
A similar positive note can be recorded with regard to the cooperation between UNHCR and the nine resettlement countries that used the ETCs in the 2012-2015 period. However, concern was expressed about referring an adequate number of refugees for the US “pipeline” on the one hand, and the US speed of processing, both during the pre-vetting stage and the stay of refugees in the ETCs, on the other hand. The first issue was resolved in 2015 with stronger coordination taking place between the three partners: UNHCR, the US and IOM.
The two ETCs have been effective to some degree considering the initial objectives established especially considering that a transfer can only be approved if a resettlement country is already identified. Only the centre in Timisoara was used for emergency priority cases in 2013 and 2014. An overall reduction of this function is visible during the period 2012-2015. However, for refugees classified under normal priority, the transfer to an ETC was still viewed as life-saving if evacuated from an unsafe situation.
The majority of refugees were transferred to the ETCs to support either the processing of resettlement cases by means of interviews, biometrics or to find municipalities in the resettlement country. Providing opportunities for recovery and preparing for the integration process has only been achieved to some degree, depending on the situation in countries of asylum and the protection and assistance provided in the two centres. The centres have however supported the objective “potential for resettlement realized”. The overwhelming majority of refugees arriving in the ETCs actually departed for resettlement. The ETCs have therefore contributed to facilitating the resettlement process of some refugees that otherwise could not have been resettled.
The main impact of the ETCs has been the provision of immediate and effective protection to refugees. Moreover, as a tangible form of responsibility-sharing, the centres have given Romania and the Slovak Republic the opportunity to present their contribution to the international protection regime in international fora. Romania established a resettlement programme with a quota of 40 refugees per year, with the first group of 38 refugees arriving in 2010, and the second group in 2014. The Slovak Republic also pledged, on a voluntary basis, 100 resettlement places in the period 2015-2017 towards the Council of the European Conclusions on Resettlement of 20 July 2015. However, arrivals under this programme are still pending.
Given the current situation in Europe it could be argued that more responsibility-sharing could be expected, and the existence of the ETCs should not absolve these governments of the obligation to provide durable solutions to a greater number of refugees. The host governments might also be persuaded to contribute more resources to the running of the ETCs.
The ETCs have contributed modestly to global resettlement figures and to reducing protracted refugee case-loads in countries of first asylum. But they have provided a safe alternative for cases that could not be transferred directly to resettlement countries, thereby offering the only available durable solution to these refugees. For some refugees, without the ETCs, there would simply be no possibility of resettlement.
In conclusion, the evolution in the operation of the ETCs shows a move away from their original vision. In the words of one interlocutor “there is nothing emergency about this process.” This has resulted in a situation whereby the policies and practices of resettlement countries to a large extent actually determine the use of the ETCs. Internal factors further impact upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the centres. Thus, replacing the first word of the acronym “ETC” with resettlement (“Resettlement Transit Centres”) would actually give a clearer indication of the main purpose of these centres, namely to support the realization of this durable solution. This could then also cover possible shifts or changes in their functions as RTCs continue to respond to the needs of different stakeholders. The sustainability of these centres must also be viewed in relation to UNHCR’s responsibility to manage the “pipeline” in cooperation with resettlement states.
The key recommendations of this evaluation are directed to DIP’s Resettlement Service, the RRCE and CO Romania.
▻https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/575935d17_0.pdf
#Roumanie #République_Tchèque #ETC #asile #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #réinstallation #évacuation #protection_d'urgence #Evacuation_Transit_Facility (#ETF) #hub
–-> document de 2016, mis ici pour archivagevia @pascaline
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Guidance Note on Emergency Transit Facilities: #Timisoara, Romania / #Manila, #Philippines / #Humenné, the Slovak Republic
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Refworld | Nigeria: The Black Axe confraternity, also known as the Neo-Black Movement of Africa, including their rituals, oaths of secrecy, and use of symbols or particular signs; whether they use force to recruit individuals (2009-November 2012)
►http://www.refworld.org/docid/50ebf7a82.htmlPublisher Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
Publication Date 3 December 2012
Citation / Document Symbol NGA104208.E
Related Document(s) Nigéria : information sur la Confrérie de la hache noire (Black Axe confraternity), aussi connue sous le nom de Nouveau mouvement noir d’Afrique (Neo-Black Movement of Africa), y compris ses rituels, ses serments du secret et son utilisation de symboles ou de signes distinctifs; information indiquant si elle a recours au recrutement forcé; information sur le traitement réservé par ses membres aux personnes qui s’opposent aux sectes (2009-novembre 2012)
Cite as Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Nigeria: The Black Axe confraternity, also known as the Neo-Black Movement of Africa, including their rituals, oaths of secrecy, and use of symbols or particular signs; whether they use force to recruit individuals (2009-November 2012), 3 December 2012, NGA104208.E, available at: ►http://www.refworld.org/docid/50ebf7a82.html [accessed 30 August 2018]Disclaimer This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.
1. Background
Sources indicate that the Black Axe confraternity is a cult (Leadership 27 July 2012; Vanguard 27 July 2012; Coventry Cathedral Feb. 2009, 10). According to Coventry Cathedral, a Church of England’s place of worship that has existed for over 1,000 years (ibid. n.d.) and that has been “extensively involved” in Nigeria since 2002, the Black Axe confraternity and some other cult groups “were formed in the 1980s as tools of the Nigerian military and they in turn formed street cult groups” (ibid. Feb. 2009, 6, 10). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.2. The Neo-Black Movement of Africa (NBM)
Sources state that the Black Axe confraternity is also known as the Neo-Black Movement of Africa (NBM) (Daily Trust 3 May 2012; This Day 6 Jan. 2012). However, sources indicate that, according to the NBM, they are not the Black Axe confraternity nor are they a secret cult (Vanguard 11 Jan. 2012; The Guardian 30 Dec. 2009). The Coventry Cathedral states that the Black Axe confraternity is a “splinter group” of the NBM, and indicates that, since 1985, the NBM “sought to dissociate itself from the Black Axe Confraternity’s activities” (Feb. 2009, 97-98).According to the NBM’s website, the group was created during the 1977-1978 academic year by nine University of Benin undergraduates who were concerned about the “plight of the Black Man” (NBM n.d.). The NBM website further states that within “a decade of its existence the Movement was operational in most major tertiary institutions in Nigeria,” but later withdrew its operations from university campuses in 1994 due to the “wave of violence” at Nigerian universities that started in the late 1980s (ibid.). Coventry Cathedral indicates that NBM is not a confraternity and excludes students and fraternity members from its organization (Feb. 2009, 97). According to the NBM, they have “Zones” in most large cities across the world, and their headquarters is located in Benin City, Edo State (NBM n.d.).
Sources indicate that the NBM is legally registered as an organization (Vanguard 11 Jan. 2012) with the Corporate Affairs Commission (Daily Trust 3 May 2012; Nigeria Daily News 30 Dec. 2009). However, sources point out that Rivers State enacted the Secret Cult and Similar Activities (Prohibition) Law in 2004 (Vanguard 19 Aug. 2007; NDPEHRD Aug. 2004, 3). The Black Axe confraternity and the NBM have been banned under this law (ibid.; CODESRIA 2011, 22).
According to the NBM website, their objectives include: “the redirection of all minds towards Black Realism and Determinism” and teaching people discipline of the body and mind, preventing negative images of Black people, conducting research on traditional African religions, and publishing a regular magazine called Uhuru (NBM n.d.). The NBM ’s magazine Uhuru used to be called the Black Axe Magazine (ibid.). According to the website: “the Axeman (a member of the Neo Black Movement) is always expected to talk with Reason, act with Courage and behave with Grace; this has served as our code of conduct” (ibid.).
Media sources report that the NBM:
donated medication to health centres in Uhunmwode local government area of Edo state in March 2010 (Plus News Pakistan 31 Mar. 2010);
organized free medical treatment, including for malaria and blood checks, to 200 people at Kwale West local government area of Delta State in January 2010 (Vanguard 4 Jan. 2010); and
provided money for a sick abandoned baby in Ughelli, Delta state in 2009 (ibid. 24 Sept. 2009).
3. Black Axe Confraternity Recruitment
A 2007 Human Rights Watch report indicated that the Black Axe confraternity forcibly recruits new members (Oct. 2007, 24). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.According to Vanguard, a Lagos-based newspaper, the Edo state Police Public Relations Officer indicated that generally, cult activities are secretive (24 Jan. 2011). Information on rituals, oaths of secrecy, and use of symbols or particular signs of the Black Axe confraternity could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
4. Black Axe Confraternity Cult Violence by State
On 22 September 2008, the Nigerian Ministry of Education indicated that there has been an upsurge of cult-related violence in tertiary institutions across Nigeria (Nigeria 22 Sept. 2008).4.1 Abuja
The Daily Trust, an Abuja-based newspaper, reports that a clash between the Black Axe confraternity and the Vikings confraternity left a student cult member of the University of Abuja injured in 2009 (7 May 2009). Vanguard also indicates that in 2009 a University of Abuja Black Axe member was arrested for attempted kidnapping of two ministers for ransom (18 Sept. 2009).4.2 Delta
Leadership, an Abuja-based newspaper, states that cult activities, including Black Axe confraternity’s activities, have reached an “alarming” level in Delta state, and are “surprisingly uninterrupted in the various higher institutions in the state” (27 Oct. 2011). Leadership also indicates that rival cults clashed almost daily in January and February 2011, and reports on the death of six people (21 Feb. 2011).On 11 August 2011, Vanguard reported that a clash between the Black Axe confraternity and the Mafite cult resulted in the death of two Delta State University students, with unconfirmed sources indicating that five people were killed.
4.3 Edo State
In Benin City, Edo State, media sources reported on cult wars between the Black Axe confraternity and the Eiye [also called Eye and Aiye] confraternity which include the following accounts of violence:in July 2012, Leadership reported that 4 people were killed in 2 days (27 July 2012), while the Lagos-based newspaper the Guardian reported that 6 suspected cult members were killed (27 July 2012);
in January 2012, media sources reported on the death of 8 people (This Day 6 Jan 2012; Vanguard 11 Jan. 2012);
in May 2011, Vanguard reported that 18 people were killed (26 May 2011);
in January 2011, Vanguard indicated that 10 people were killed (24 Jan. 2011);
in February 2009, 7 suspected cultists were killed according to Vanguard (23 Feb. 2009);
Plus News Pakistan indicated that in February 2009, more than 16 people were reportedly killed, including 2 university students and a prominent businessman (11 Mar. 2010).
Media sources have also reported on cult wars involving the Black Axe confraternity and other cults, including:in August 2012, during a clash with the Vikings confraternity at Ambrose Alli University, two students were killed, reportedly after an altercation between a Black Axe member and an anti-cultist student (PM News 7 Aug. 2012; PTI 8 Aug. 2012);
on 22 October 2010, Vanguard stated that during a clash with Maphite confraternity in Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, 7 people were killed, while police confirmed 3 deaths;
in March 2010, according to Plus News Pakistan, there was a “renewed bloody clash” with Manfile confraternity (11 Mar. 2010);
in March 2010, This Day reported that, in a war with the Markvites, 9 cult members were killed (15 Mar. 2010).
In March 2009, the son of the Chairman of Ovia South West local government council was abducted by people suspected of being cult members (The Nation 16 Mar. 2009; Vanguard 12 Mar. 2009), including members of Black Axe (ibid.). The child was released in exchange for ransom (The Nation 16 Mar. 2009).4.4 Ekiti
Media sources indicate that in July 2011, 13 students at the Ekiti State University were wounded during a clash between the Black Axe confraternity and the Aiye confraternity (Leadership 7 July 2011; Daily Trust 7 July 2011).4.5 Imo
Media sources report that the principal of Holy Ghost College, Owerri survived an attempted assassination in August 2012 by suspected Black Axe members (Vanguard 27 Aug. 2012; Daily Independent 27 Aug. 2012).4.6 Lagos
Vanguard reports on cult wars between the Black Axe and the Eiye confraternities in which “many people” have been killed and “several” have been wounded in March 2012 in Ijanikin, including the death of a 26 year-old who was not a member of any cult group (Vanguard 19 Mar. 2012). The newspaper adds that there are “daily killings and maiming of rival members” of Black Axe and Eiye confraternities in this area (ibid.). On 27 July 2011, 3 people were killed during a clash between the Black Axe confraternity and the Eiye confraternity in Ikorodu (Daily Independent 1 Aug. 2011; The Nation 29 July 2011).4.7 Nasarawa
The Daily Trust reports that a Black Axe confraternity member killed a member of the Vikings cult in September 2011 in Lafia (20 Sept. 2011).4.8 Ogun
The Daily Independent, a Lagos-based newspaper, reports that, in March 2010, in Sagamu, Ogun State, six people were killed in clashes between the Black Axe and Eiye confraternities in a less than a week, including the son of a former council chairman who was reportedly also a cult member (18 Mar. 2010).5. Treatment of Anti-cultists
In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Nigeria, a commission established by the Nigerian government (Nigeria n.d.a) that, among other activities, investigates complaints and provides conflict resolution services (ibid. n.d.b), indicated that the NHRC, which has not conducted “detailed” research on the Black Axe confraternity, has “limited” knowledge of this organization (5 Dec. 2012). However, according to the NHRC, the “observation of facts” indicates that[a]s a general rule, Black Axe and other cults do not engage in violent activities against those not involved in cult activities. They are however known to attack anti-cult campaigners through clandestine intimidation and physical attacks. (5 Dec. 2012)
Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
6. Black Axe Confraternity’s Connection to Officials
Sources indicate that clashes between the Black Axe and Aiye confraternities in Benin City are related to the sharing of money that has been given to these cults by politicians (Leadership 27 July 2012; Vanguard 27 July 2012).According to a January 2011 article by Vanguard, cultists have been recruited “as thugs” by politicians during primaries (24 Jan. 2011). Leadership newspaper indicates that cults are reportedly supported by people in “high places” such as security agencies (27 Oct. 2011).
7. State Protection
According to the National Universities Commission, the federal government has asked the heads of tertiary institutions to take measures to curb cult violence on campuses, including: sanctioning apprehended student cultists, conducting media sensitization campaigns, creating aggressive public campaigns and increasing advocacy efforts (Nigeria 22 Sept. 2008). Further information on whether this was implemented could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.Media sources indicate that police arrested suspects in about ten of the incidents of violence listed in Section 4 (Daily Trust 7 May 2009; Vanguard 18 Sept. 2009; Leadership 21 Feb. 2011; This Day 6 Jan. 2012; Vanguard 26 May 2011; ibid. 24 Jan. 2011; ibid. 12 Mar. 2009; Leadership 7 July 2011; Daily Trust 7 July 2011; Vanguard 19 Mar. 2012; Daily Trust 20 Sept. 2011). Information on whether some Black Axe members were charged or sentenced for acts of violence could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.
Leadership indicates that, according to Nigerians living in Delta state, the federal government, the police, and traditional and religious institutions show a “lack of commitment in addressing the underlying causes of cult-related violence” (21 Feb. 2011).
According to the Vanguard, the Edo state Police Commissioner said that the federal government is “’doing its best’” to tackle the problem of cult violence in Edo state, “’but there are areas that still need improvement’” (Vanguard 24 Jan. 2011). The Edo state Police Commissioner reportedly also said that police are facing a shortage of patrol vehicles, adding that no divisional operational department has more than one police vehicle (ibid.).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
References
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). 2011. Eghosa E. Osaghae, Augustine Ikelegbe, Omobolaji O. Olarinmoye, and Stephen I. Okhomina. Youth Militias, Self Determination and Resource Control Struggles in the Niger-delta Region of Nigeria. CODESRIA Research Report No. 5. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2012]Coventry Cathedral. February 2009. Stephen Davis. The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta. [Accessed 26 Sept. 2012]
___. N.d. “Our Heartbeat.” [Accessed 15 Nov. 2012]
Daily Independent [Lagos]. 27 August 2012. Anolu Vincent and Bassey Inyang. “Gunmen Kill Ex-CBN Director, Nwosu, in Owerri.” [Accessed 26 Nov. 2012]
___. 1 August 2011. Emmanuel Nzomiwu and Femi Ogbonnikan. “Ten Die, Houses Razed in Enugu Tanker Explosion.” (Factiva)
___. 18 March 2010. Wisdom Patrick, Onoja Audu and Segun Adeleye. “Thirteen Killed in Fresh Jos Violence - Cult Clash Claims Six in Sagamu.” (Factiva)
Daily Trust [Abuja]. 3 May 2012. Nurudeen Oyewole. “’21 Cult Groups Infiltrate Secondary Schools’.” (Factiva)
___. 20 September 2011. Hir Joseph. “State Security Services Raid Cultists Hideouts, Arrests 28 Suspects.” (Factiva)
___. 7 July 2011. Doyin Adebusuyi. “Pandemonium at Ekiti Varsity as Cultits Exchange Gunfire.” (Factiva)
___. 7 May 2009. Abubakar Sadiq Isah. “Uniabuja Expels Five Over Cult Activities.” (Factiva)
The Guardian [Lagos]. 27 July 2012. Alemma-Ozioruva Aliu and Michael Egbejule. “Six Die in Cult Violence.” [Accessed 23 Nov. 2012]
___. 30 December 2009. “Nigerian Police Arrest Thirty Suspects Over Recent Violent Clashes.” (Factiva)
Human Rights Watch. October 2007. Criminal Politics. Violence, “Godfathers” and Corruption in Nigeria. [Accessed 25 Sept. 2012]
Leadership [Abuja]. 27 July 2012. Patrick Ochoga. “Six Feared Killed in Renewed Cult War in Edo.” (Factiva)
___. 27 October 2011. Kola Niyi-Eke. “Battling Cultism in Delta.” (Factiva)
___. 7 July 2011. Abiola Alo. “Suspected Cultists Terrorise Ekiti Varsity.” (Factiva)
___. 21 February 2011. Kola Niyi-Eke. “Cultists Kill Pregnant Women, 6 Others.” (Factiva)
The Nation [Lagos]. 29 July 2011. Titilayo Banjoko. “Three Killed in Cult’s Clash.” [Accessed 26 Nov. 2012]
___. 16 March 2009. Osagie Otabor. “Abducted Council Boss’s Son Released.” [Accessed 26 Nov. 2012]
Neo-Black Movement of Africa (NBM). N.d. Chima Oji. “A Brief History of Neo Black Movement of Africa.” [Accessed 15 Nov. 2012]
Niger Delta Project for Environment, Human Rights and Development (NDPEHRD). August 2004. Small Arms Project. A Harvest of Guns. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2012]
Nigeria. 5 December 2012. National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.
___. 22 September 2008. National Universities Commission. “FGN Steps Up Fight Against Cult-Related Violence in Tertiary Institutions.” Monday Bulletin. Vol. 3, No. 37. [Accessed 27 Sept. 2012]
___. N.d.a. “The Commission.” [Accessed 18 Dec. 2012]
___. N.d.b. “Activities of the Commission.” [Accessed 18 Dec. 2012]
Nigeria Daily News. 30 December 2009. Tunji Omofoye (Osogbo) and Alemma-Ozioruva Aliu. “Police Arrest, Arraign 30 over Violence.” [Accessed 15 Nov. 2012]
Plus News Pakistan. 31 March 2010. “Nigeria: NBM Donates Drugs Worth N1m to Uhunmwode LG.” (Factiva)
___. 11 March 2010. “Nigeria: 2 Benin-based Actors Shot Dead.” (Factiva)
PM News [Lagos]. 7 August 2012. Jethro Ibileke. “Cult War Leaves 2 Nigerian Students Dead.” [Accessed 4 Oct. 2010]
Press Trust of India (PTI). 8 August 2012. “Two Nigerian Students Killed in Gang Violence.” (Factiva)
This Day [Lagos]. 6 January 2012. Adibe Emenyonu. “Eight Killed in Renewed Cult War.” (Factiva)
___. 15 March 2010. Adibe Emenyonu. “Another Bomb Scare in Edo.” (Factiva)
Vanguard [Lagos]. 27 August 2012. Chidi Nkwopara. “Cleric Escapes Suspected Assassins Bullets in Owerri.” (Factiva)
___. 27 July 2012. Simon Ebegbulem and Gabriel Enogholase. “Three Killed in Renewed Cult War in Benin.” (Factiva)
___. 19 March 2012. Ifeanyi Okolie. “Police Raid Hideout of Cultists in Lagos.” (Factiva)
___. 11 January 2012. Simon Ebegbulem. “Group Denies Involvement in Cult War.” (Factiva)
___. 11 August 2011. Emma Amaize and Bulou Kosin. “Two Shot Dead as Cultists Clash in Abraka University.” (Factiva)
___. 26 May 2011. Simon Ebegbulem. “Police Parade 31 Suspected Cultists.” (Factiva)
___. 24 January 2011. Simon Ebegbulem. “How Cultists Prepared to Set Benin on Fire.” (Factiva)
___. 22 October 2010. Simon Ebegbulem. “Seven Die in Renewed Cult War in Ambrose Alli Varsity.” (Factiva)
___. 4 January 2010. Festus Ahon. “Group Gives Free Medical Treatment to 200 at Kwale.” (Factiva)
___. 24 September 2009. “Nigeria: Group Aids Abandoned Baby.” [Accessed 15 Nov. 2012]
___. 18 September 2009. Ise-Oluwa Ige. “Education, Labour Ministers Escape Kidnap Plot.” (Factiva)
___. 12 March 2009. Simon Ebegbulem. “Gunmen Abduct Ovia S-West LG Boss’ Son.” (Factiva)
___. 23 February 2009. Patience Ogbodo and Simon Ebegbulem. “Death Toll Rises to 11 in Bauchi Crisis.” (Factiva)
___. 19 August 2007. George Onah. “Rivers Battles 103 Cult Groups - The Genesis of Problem; Solution, by Ex-Militants.” [Accessed 15 Nov. 2012]
Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Attempts to contact the following representatives and organizations were unsuccessful within the time constraints of this Response: author of Secret Cults in Nigeria’s Tertiary Institutions; Human Rights and Justice Group International; lecturer, School of Law, University of Leicester; National Association of Nigerian Students; National Universities Commission; Nigeria — Federal Ministry of Education; professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; ecoi.net; The Jamestown Foundation; Minority Rights Group International; Nigeria — Federal Ministry of Education; United Nations — Integrated Regional Information Network, Refworld; United States Department of State.
Copyright notice: This document is published with the permission of the copyright holder and producer Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB). The original version of this document may be found on the offical website of the IRB at ▻http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en. Documents earlier than 2003 may be found only on Refworld.
